Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 11

28 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 11

Continuing with my series of notes and comments on Phaedo using the Harold North Fowler translation, published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’Now how about such things as this, Simmias?  Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?’

“’We certainly think there is.’

“’And absolute beauty and goodness.’

“’Of course.’

“’Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?’

“’Certainly not,’ said he.

“’Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses?  I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything.  Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body?  Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?’

“’Certainly.’

“’Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom?  Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?’

“’That is true as true can be, Socrates,’ said Simmias.

“’Then,’ said he, ‘all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this: “There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth.  For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth.  And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all.  The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body.  We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy.  But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone.  And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamoured of, but now while we live.  For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two things must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before.  And while we live, we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free.  And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure, -- and that is, perhaps, the truth.  For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.”  Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts.  Do you not agree?’

“’Most assuredly, Socrates.’

1.  This section begins with Socrates inquiring as to whether Simmias accepts that abstract objects, or entities, or forms, exist.  Socrates begins with Justice, then continues with Beauty and Goodness. 

The strategy of Socrates is to get Simmias to comprehend that Simmias uses abstract realities, what Platonists would call ‘forms,’ every day.  This is an approach that, I have observed, can be effective as long as the person, someone like Simmias, has some openness of mind.  If the person is a dogmatic materialist and/or a reductionist, it is unlikely that the discussion well bear fruit.

Socrates chooses to use difficult ideas like Justice, Beauty, and Goodness in his discussion with Simmias.  I suspect this is because Simmias has participated in discussions about these issues with Socrates in the past; either as an observer or participant.  In similar situations I have tended to use more readily accessible abstractions such as numbers because people use numbers every day in a casual way, without really giving numbers much thought.  It is, I think, easier to point out that we do not ever actually observe numbers as such, only their instantiations, and then continue, depending on how the discussion unfolds.

The point is to use the discussion to awaken the inquirer to the reality of non-sensory dimensions of existence.

2.  Socrates broadens the discussion by arguing for an underlying reality, or essence, of all things; I understand this as Socrates pointing to Being in the second hypostasis.  Our senses cannot access Being as such because Being as such is not a sound or a sight or a taste, etc.  If Being were a sound, it could not be found in visual objects.  If Being were a visual object, such as a quality like color or shape, it could not be found in sonic objects; and similarly for the other sense realms.  Being as such is, therefore, not something that is perceived, yet all objects perceived by the senses participate in Being.

This step by Socrates leads Simmias to a transcendental presence that is, at the same time, immanent in the sensory objects around them. 

3.  I think what Socrates is getting at, and carefully leading Simmias to understand, is that bodily sensations cloud our ability to access non-sensory realities.  We cannot see Being, we cannot hear Being, etc.  Yet Being manifests everywhere.

The solution, then, is to step back from the hold of the body; to ‘separate’ the soul from the body.  For the soul, which is immaterial, is able to access Being, Beauty, and Justice.

This may seem difficult to understand.  But consider situations when we are confronted with a difficult problem; this may involve money, a job, friendships, confrontations, etc.  Confronted with these kinds of difficulties, we often step back because we ‘need some time to think.’  It is evident to us that the solution will not appear by indulging the senses; even if such indulgence makes us feel good for a short time, the problem will still be there when the effects of the stimulation pass.

The problem that philosophy seeks to solve is the great problem of life and death.  And like these other problems it is only by stepping away from attachment to sensory stimulation that we find the path to its resolution.

4.  Socrates suggests that as long as we have a body we can be ‘near’ pure knowledge, but we cannot have full knowledge.  That makes sense to me.  On the other hand, partial knowledge of the transcendental, the Good and the One, is accessible and salvific. 

In a way, demanding full knowledge of ultimate otherness resembles a musician demanding a perfect, flawless, performance every time they have a concert.  Or a scientist making the demand that he never make a mistake in his calculations or interpretations.  Or that a cook never fall short of an ideal meal.  We live in the third hypostasis of becoming and begoning, a realm that is metaphysically distant from the Source of things; the things of this material world are copies, or paintings, of their source and, therefore, fall short of perfection.  In the realm of becoming and begoning perfection is not possible.

Nevertheless, through our ascetic practices, and our cultivation of virtue and wisdom, we can prepare ourselves for an easy transition to the Good and the One, and step into the luminous darkness that is our true home.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 10

26 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 10

This post continues with quotations from the Classical commentaries on Phaedo.  This post will quote from the commentary of Olympiodorus; he lived from about 500 – 570 C.E.  Olympiodorus was the last person to hold the chair at the Alexandrian Academy of Platonic philosophy.  As with Damascius in Athens, Olympiodorus directly felt the impact of the final closing of centers of Classical learning and study.  Olympiodorus wrote commentaries on Plato’s Dialogues such as First Alcibiades, Gorgias, and Phaedo.  He also wrote a Life of Plato.  The difficulties of teaching in an increasingly hostile environment are perhaps reflected in this quote from his commentary on Gorgias:

“So too if they accuse me, asking why I am teaching the youth, will they ever be persuaded that I do this in their interests, in order that they may become men of true quality?  So under such a constitution, one must create a fortress for oneself, and live quietly within it all the time.”

(Olympiodorus, Life of Plato and On Plato First Alcibiades 1-9, translated by Michael Griffin, Bloomsbury, New York, 2015, page 1, ISBN: 9781472588302)

Here is a quote from Olympiodorus’s commentary on Phaedo that pertains to the topic of purification:

“’The philosopher, apart from the absolutely necessary, disdains the care of the body’; and he establishes this premise . . . in this way.  There are three kinds of activities, (1) those natural and necessary, such as feeding and sleeping, (2) those natural but not necessary, such as copulation, (3) those neither natural nor necessary, as the concern for elegance and colorful clothing etc. (that these are neither natural nor necessary is seen from the fact that other animals do not have them); those that are natural but not necessary and those that are neither natural nor necessary, he will even resist them forcibly (for secretion of semen the natural emission during sleep will suffice), while with the first kind he will deal briefly and perfunctorily, not to the point of repletion.  ‘If this is true, the philosopher, apart from the absolutely necessary, disdains the body; he who does this will be ready to die; therefore the philosopher prepares himself for death’.

(Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo, translated by L. G. Westerink, The Prometheus Trust, Wiltshire, UK, 1976, page 72, ISBN: 9781898910466)

1.  Olympiodorus uses the same structure to analyze different kinds of bodily activities as Damascius; but Damascius divides bodily activities into four kinds and Olympiodorus into three kinds.  I think this indicates that this way of commenting on this part of Phaedo preceded both of them, but I am not aware of when this kind of analysis first took hold.  I assume it arose in a teaching context and as a way of categorizing different ascetic practices.  My feeling is that it was a good way of framing class discussions on asceticism and its specific techniques.

2.  A phrase like ‘disdain for the body’ is a difficult one for those of us living in modernity to approach.  Yet there are many ordinary instances in life when people reject the demands of the body in order to achieve some purpose.  Anyone who has been on a diet knows how demanding the body can be; but people overcome this demand for the sensory pleasure of eating because they want to lose weight either for health reasons, or to look better, or a combination of both.  Similarly, in sport athletes often push themselves beyond what the body is comfortable with; sometimes suffering numerous aches and pains after an exercise session.  They do this because they want to achieve athletic goals and/or prominence.  In order to achieve these the athlete ‘disdains’ the body’s natural desire for relaxation and leisure.  Examples like this are very numerous; the alcoholic who overcomes the bodily desire for alcohol, the drug addict who does the same in his context, the student who pushes aside sleep in order to study, etc.

The difference with the philosopher is that the philosopher seeks to overcome bodily desires and demands, to ‘disdain’ the body, in order to separate the body from the soul.  This is a different kind of goal.  In modernity it is not even clear to many people that there is such a thing as a soul.  If you think the soul does not exist, then it makes no sense to overcome bodily desires to separate the body from the soul.

The ascetic ideal appears when we have a realization of the existence of the soul.  I refer to this as a realization of the presence of eternity.  The soul is the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  The body and its desires are ephemeral and cannot lead us to that which is eternal.  But the eternal is not absent from the body because eternity is omnipresent/everywhere.  Being present everywhere, it is present in all things, including the body of the individual.  But as long as we are distracted by that which is ephemeral, the body and its desires, that which is eternal remains hidden and difficult to access.  It is difficult to access because it is non-sensory; sensory objects are all ephemeral.  Ascetic practice is the steady whittling away of, and withdrawing from, the fascination with sensation so that access to that which is eternal is opened.

3.  The philosopher is ‘ready to die’ because the philosopher has had the experience of the eternal, is at rest in the eternal.  All things pass away in this third hypostasis of becoming and begoning.  But we have the possibility of transcending becoming and begoning as such by following the teachings of the ascetic ideal and stepping into the deathless and unborn, that which lies beyond becoming and begoning, the Good and the One.

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 9

23 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 9

I’m going to quote from sections of the commentary on Plato’s Phaedo by Damascius.  Damascius (462 – 538) was the last head of the Platonic Athenian Academy.  The school was closed in 529 C.E. by Emperor Justinian; it was part of a crackdown on the remaining Classical institutes of learning and worship.

I don’t know when Damascius wrote his commentary on Phaedo.  I will be quoting from two sections of the commentary.  The first is Damascius’s commentary on the section posted in the previous post.  The second quote is from a little later in the commentary, but it touches directly on the subject of ethics and the life of philosophy and for that reason I think it fits well at this point in my ‘Notes and Comments.’

“The first point: the philosopher despises physical pleasure.

“68.  [64d2-3}  In what way can ‘indifference towards pleasures’ be said to be peculiar to man in the stage of purification?  Surely he shares it with those who have achieved the civic or the moral virtues? – The answer is that the others, though they do not seek pleasure as an end in itself (for each of them pursues his own end), will sometimes seek it as a means to an end, and even this cannot be said to those on the way to purification.”

Comment:  Damascius is raising the question of the instrumentality of purification or, more broadly, the question of means and ends.  Damascius suggests that at times people may pursue pleasure, as described in Phaedo, in order to achieve some end.  For example, they might indulge in drinking after work with their boss in order to create a sense of camaraderie with the view in mind that this could help at getting a raise in wages in the future.

In contrast, Damascius suggests that philosophers practicing purification do not have this kind of transactional approach in mind.  I think what Damascius is getting at is that purification is a matter of aligning with the One, of becoming more like the One, and thereby stepping closer to the presence of the One. 

“69.  [64d2-65a8]  Because purification is its theme, the discourse starts with the lowest functions and proceeds to the highest: nutrition is common to all living beings, copulation goes with the irrational appetites, the wearing of ornaments is a form of irrationality found only in rational creatures.  One could also start with the most necessary pleasures and ascend to the least necessary.

The commentator’s own division, however, is based on the objects of the appetites: they may be necessary and natural (food) or neither [necessary nor natural] (ornaments) or natural but not necessary (sex) or necessary but not natural (indispensable clothing and shelter).”

Comment:  I suspect that ‘the commentator’ refers to Proclus, but I’m not sure if that is the case.  Platonism developed this four-fold division of ‘appetites,’ what we might call ‘desires,’ and Platonist lecturers and teachers seem to have used it as a structure for discussing them.  Appetites/desires may be:

necessary and natural (food)

neither necessary nor natural (ornaments)

natural but not necessary (sex)

necessary but not natural (indispensable clothing and shelter)

We might think of ‘natural’ as ‘biological.’  I haven’t seen this structure in modern commentaries (though I have read only a few of them), but it seems to have had a place in late Classical Platonism.  I can see how it would be helpful.

“70.  But supposing the philosopher is a ruler, will he not affect the apparel that befits a kind?  If he becomes a priest, will he not wear the sacerdotal garments? – This is answered by the addition ‘except in so far as absolutely inevitable.’

Or, rather, there is no question at all here of men in these functions, but only of the man in search of purification; if he should need sacred robes for this purpose, he will wear them as symbols, not as garments.”

Comment:  It’s interesting that this kind of question arises.  I suppose if you are the head of the Athenian Academy, which was famous, you might be called upon to serve in various capacities at civic functions; thus the concern.  There is also the example of Plutarch, who became a Priest at Delphi in 95 C.E.  This was a significant position and no doubt involved wearing priestly robes. 

“71.  Why does Socrates not declare the philosopher inaccessible to greed or ambition as yet? – Because his object was to prove the soul detachable from the body; that it exists independently of things extraneous to the body, is evident to anyone.  Or perhaps the denial of these is implied in the denial of care of the body and in what he called the ‘directing of the soul towards itself [64e6].

“It seems plausible that these arguments also prove the soul immune against the influences of sense-perception and imagination.”

Comment:  My own feeling about raising specifics like this, is that we need to keep in mind the circumstances of Phaedo.  Socrates has only a few hours, at most.  For this reason, at times in Phaedo Socrates speaks in broad strokes.  For example, he does not bring up the full structure of purifications, such as its various levels; nor does Socrates cover all the specific asceses that purification refers to.

“72.  [64e8-65a2]  Plato, too makes separate activity the proof of separate existence, before Aristotle had used this argument.  This is the purport of his conclusion: ‘it is evident that the philosopher detaches his soul from the body.’”

“73.  [64e5; 65a2]  Why ‘as far as possible’ and ‘more than other people’? – Because the soul can be detached only in the measure in which human nature permits this; genii (a type of deity, perhaps what some others refer to as ‘daemon’) and Gods detach themselves from the body in a different way.”

Comment:  This is an intriguing comment.  First, separation of the soul from the body, it is noted, is accomplished to the degree human life permits, and within the context of an individual life.  This adds a nice note of practicality to the teaching.  Second, Damascius remarks that deities of various kinds can also separate their souls from their bodies, but that they do so in a ‘different way.’  I’m not familiar with the literature on how deities would separate their souls from their bodies.  Personally, I don’t see why deities would use a distinct process of separation.  My intuition is, in order for deities to separate soul and body (in other words, to practice philosophy) they would need to practice purification and the same asceses as human practitioners of philosophy.  Again, I haven’t read the counterargument to this; on the other hand, I have the backing of, for example, the Buddhist tradition in this matter.  I view deities as contingent, mortal, beings who are subject to becoming and begoning (birth and death).  They are part of the third hypostasis of genesis and samsara and live in the same world as humans, plants, and animals do.  My conclusion, therefore, is that the teachings of purification and asceticism are just as applicable to deities as they are to other living beings in the hypostasis of becoming and begoning.

Later in his commentary, Damascius makes some comments about purification that I think are applicable to this discussion.  Here they are:

“120.  One who is purifying himself and endeavoring to assimilate himself to the Pure must in the first place discard pleasure and pain as far as possible; secondly, the food of which he partakes should be simple, avoiding all luxury, and it should also be in accordance with the laws of justice and temperance (that is to say, free from the taint of bloodshed [this comment is in the commentary]) and with divine command and ancestral custom (for a diet that, in defiance of religious law, offends against animal life and coarsens the vital spirit, will make the body unruly towards the soul and unfit to enter into contact with God); thirdly, he must suppress the aimless motion of irrational appetite (what indeed could arouse desire or anger in one who has disengaged himself from all external things?), but if anything of the kind should ever stir in waking or sleeping, it must be quelled speedily by reason; fourthly, he must detach himself from sense-perception and imagination, except in so far as it is necessary to make use of them; in the fifth place, the man who wants to be set free from the plurality of genesis must dissociate himself from the multifarious variety of opinion; the sixth and last precept is to escape from the complexity of discursive reason and seek the simpler forms of demonstration and division as a preparation for the undivided activity of the intellect.”

(Damascius, Commentary On Plato’s Phaedo, translated by L. G. Westerink, The Prometheus Trust, Gloucestershire, UK, 2009, pages 74-76, ISBN: 9781898910473)

There is another translation of this passage by Eric Fallick, who publishes a blog on Platonist Asceticism and has posted his translation:

“. . . the contemplative philosopher is one wanting as his goal having been made one with the (hypostases) above himself and to be theirs rather than of himself: on which account (Plato) says ‘(it is not lawful) for the not pure to touch the pure.’

“It is necessary for one being purified and hastening to be made like the Pure first to reject pleasures and pains as far as he is able; second, he must nourish himself with plain, simple food without luxury, but also food that is righteous and temperate (but this is untainted with blood and spotless) and that is holy and in accord with ancestral practice (for food that is unholy and harming animals and coarsening the spirit makes the body intractable to the soul and unfit for contact with God); third, he must cut off the unharmonious wrong motion of the appetitive irrationality (for what would one standing aloof from all external things desire and with what would he be angry?), but if ever such a sort of thing would be moved either awake or asleep, it is most quickly put down by the reason; fourth, he must keep away from all sense-perceptions and imaginations, as far as it is not necessary to use them; fifth, the one wanting to be released from the multiplicity of becoming is to be separated from the opinions of all various sorts; the sixth precept out of all of them, is to escape the variegated complexity of thought and pursue the simpler expositions and distinctions with a view to becoming accustomed to the undivided intelligence.”

(Damascius, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo, translated by Eric S. Fallick, platonistasceticism.blogspot.com, August 15, 2021)

1.  In this section Damascius connects purification with vegetarianism when he mentions food that is ‘free from the taint of bloodshed’.  Damascius is, I believe, basing this on Porphyry’s On Abstinence.  I say this because Porphyry argues that killing animals, either for food or for sacrificing them in rituals, coarsens the soul, making the soul, or spirit, unfit for the ascending to higher hypostases.  In addition, Damascius makes reference to this kind of food as ‘ancestral’; that is an argument that Porphyry makes in On Abstinence, that anciently people did not indulge in meat and that it was only due to historical cataclysms or other misfortunes that people began to eat the flesh of animals.

2.  Plato does not explicitly mention vegetarianism in Phaedo.  I think that is for two reasons; first, by mentioning a number of ascetic practices the implication is that all of them are to be practiced (this is a common way of speaking and writing.)  Second, my feeling is that it was so well known that vegetarianism was foundational for the philosophical life that mentioning it would have been unnecessary.

3.  It is interesting, and somewhat unexpected, that Damascius remarks on escaping from discursive reason for a simpler type of cognition.  I think this simpler approach to cognition has to do with what Plotinus refers to as ‘comparisons’ as a method in Platonist consideration of philosophical issues and life.  ‘Comparison’ in this context means things like metaphor, simile, allegory, etc.  As the practitioner ascends to higher hypostases, access to them is found by using these kinds of comparisons rather than through the analytic approach of contemporary philosophy.  Why?  Because the analytic approach divides and dismembers both material things and objects of thought.  But the philosophical ascent is an ascent to greater and greater unity, not greater and greater division.  And it is the comparison found in devices like metaphor and allegory that demonstrate often hidden unities.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 8

21 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 8

I am continuing with my notes and comments on the dialogue Phaedo.  I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’But first let us ask Crito there what he wants.  He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.’

“’Only, Socrates,’ said Crito, ‘that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little was possible.  He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times.’

“And Socrates said: ‘Never mind him.  Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times.’

“’I was pretty sure that was what you would say,’ said Crito, ‘but he has been bothering me for a long time.’

“’Never mind him,’ said Socrates.  ‘I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land.  So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be.’

“’Other people are like not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead.  Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practicing.’

“And Simmias laughed and said, ‘By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they hear what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it.’

“’And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing well.  For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of death it is.  Let us the, ‘said he, ‘speak with one another, paying no further attention to them.  Do we think there is such a thing as death?’

“’Certainly,’ replied Simmias.

“’We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself?  Is death anything other than this?’

“’No, it is this,’ said he.

“’Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject.  Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?’

“’By no means, Socrates,’ said Simmias.

“’How about the pleasures of love.’

“’Certainly not.’

“’Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body – I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and other personal adornments?  Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?’

“’I think the true philosopher would despise them,’ he replied.

“’Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, as far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?’

“’Yes.’

“’To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?’

“’It is.’

“’Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn’t deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead.’

“’That is very true.’

“’Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge?  Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom?  What I mean is this:  Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately?  And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these.  Do you not think so?’

“’Certainly I do,’ he replied.

“’Then,’ said he, ‘when does the soul attain to truth?  For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it.’

“’True.’

In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?’

“’Yes.’

“’But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality.’

“’That is true.’

“’In this matter also, then, the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?’

“’Evidently.’”

(Ibid, pages 221 – 227, 63E-65D)

1.  This section of Phaedo is the heart of the dialogue’s teaching.  It places the ascetic ideal, which I see as animating Platonism, as well as foundational for Platonism, at the center.  It does this in two ways: first by providing a philosophical justification for the ascetic ideal which is the need to separate the soul from the body, and second by detailing specific asceses such as refraining from decorative clothing, as well as bodily pleasures.  Withdrawing from these bodily attachments brings about the separation of the soul from the body.  This means that the ascetic ideal is the Way of Platonism.

2.  There is a short interlude that is a kind of prelude to the discussion of the ascetic ideal.  This happens when Socrates notices that Crito has been trying to get his attention.  Crito explains that the one who is going to administer the poison to Socrates advises that Socrates refrain from so much talking because talking generates heat and such talking has been known to create a situation that requires multiple dosages.  Socrates dismisses the man’s concerns and from there heads directly into the discussion of the ascetic ideal.

The bearer of the poison symbolizes the bringer of death, perhaps we might consider him a metaphysical messenger.  But Socrates has already come to terms with this message and does not need any further reminders; hence the dismissal.

3.  The ascetic ideal runs counter to the ideals of modernity.  The ascetic ideal only makes sense in the context of a transcendental reality.  I like to look at it this way:  I often say that the spiritual path is a shifting of attention from that which is ephemeral to that which is eternal.  The soul is the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  Because of this, in a way you can say that it is ‘natural’ (but not in the sense of materialism, more in the meaning of ‘it makes sense that’) for the soul to separate from the body.  This is because the primal nature of the body is to disintegrate; any unity it has is due to participation in higher realities, but it is not an inherent unity and cannot be sustained.  In contrast, the primal nature of the soul is its inherently eternal nature, another way of saying its unity.  This is why it is necessary to follow the path of the ascetic ideal.

4.  This is a difficult teaching.  From the discussion Socrates has with Simmias, it appears that this was a difficult teaching even at the time of this dialogue.  (Perhaps that is why some of these teachings were ‘esoteric.’)  The draw of material existence, both its pleasure and its pains, rooted in the body, is extremely powerful.  As the dialogue points out, most people would think of a life based on the ascetic ideal as foolish.  That is even more true today.

5.  It is interesting that structurally, Plato first addresses material attachments such as shoes and clothes, and then concludes with more subtle dimensions such as ‘pure knowledge’ and how access to ‘pure knowledge’ is hindered by material and bodily attachments.  I take ‘pure knowledge’ to mean transcendental knowledge; knowledge of the higher hypostases such as being, life, intellect, the forms, numbers, and the Good, the One, the Beautiful, that which is eternal. 

6.  The body as a hindrance to knowledge can, I think, be understood by simple, more worldly, examples.  If someone is attached to the pleasures of drugs, this sensory attachment will be a hindrance for them in being able to get out of that situation.  Even if someone tells them directly about a program that will assist them with this project, many will reject such assistance, preferring the sensory stimulation over not having it.

In an analogous way, attachment to material manifestations is a barrier to accessing transcendental reality, ‘pure knowledge’.

7.  One of the striking features of Phaedo is the confidence that Socrates has regarding the afterlife and its features; specifically that Socrates looks forward to his experiences in the afterlife which include communing with gods and other philosophers.  The questioners of Socrates are not so confident.  My feeling is that the confidence of Socrates arises out of his contemplative experience; examples of this are found in Phaedrus and The Symposium. 

8.  Because I think of this passage as the heart of the dialogue Phaedo, I am going to post some ancient commentaries on this passage.  I think they will assist in understanding how the followers of Plato in the Classical period viewed these teachings.  

Plotinus in My Life

18 June 2023

Plotinus in My Life

1.  I have been rereading Ennead VI.9, On the Good, or the One, in the McKenna translation this time around.  I don’t know how many times I have read it before.  But each time I read it, it feels fresh, uplifting, sublime.  This has led me to want to post a few brief thoughts about Plotinus; thoughts that don’t lend themselves to becoming an essay, or even a single blogpost, by themselves; but nevertheless observations about Plotinus that I think are worth sharing.

2.  A few years ago, maybe more, I wrote a haiku about Plotinus:

 

One thousand pages --

A year spent with Plotinus

And other sages.

I wrote this at the end of a year, probably late December.  For years I would read a few pages of Plotinus every day and in this way read through the Enneads in one year.  I would cycle through the available translations.  When I first started this practice there were three complete translations: Sylvan Guthrie, Stephen McKenna, and A. H. Armstrong so the cycle of readings would take three years.  There is now a fourth translation done by a committee headed by Lloyd Gerson leading to a four year cycle. 

I didn’t keep a notebook with me while reading the Enneads, though sometimes I would underline or write comments in the margin.  I would use the reading as a prelude to contemplation.  By ‘prelude’ I mean that after reading a section from the Enneads I would put it aside and enter into inner contemplation, often interior silence.  In this way the teachings of Plotinus would have a chance to sink into my consciousness and they gradually became a dominant part of my mental landscape.

Things got complicated in my life; I retired in 2022 and moved to a new location.  I had to put a lot of energy into moving and this cycle of devotional reading fell away, though I continued to pick up Plotinus and read a random Ennead, or part of an Ennead, now and then.  I hope to restart this cycle of reading again in 2024.

3.  My spiritual journey has been a complex one, with lots of twists and turns as I journeyed through many spiritual traditions.  One result of this is that I have read broadly from many of the world’s spiritual and religious traditions.  There is a lot out there that is inspiring and uplifting, but I slowly came to the conclusion that there is no work more lofty, more clear, more sublime, than the Enneads of Plotinus.  Now, there is a lot I have not read.  And I realize that claims like this are made for many spiritual works.  That is true, and yet I find myself willing to stand by this claim.  If you are skeptical, all I can say is to read the Enneads and then come to your own conclusion.  It might diverge from mine; fair enough.  But each time I read the Enneads, or an Ennead, I only become more secure in this perspective.

4.  There is a lot of writing done by Platonists over the centuries; the Dialogues (of course), and then there are people like Plutarch, and Maximus of Tyre, and Porphyry, et al.  I have learned a huge amount from the vast legacy of Platonism and I am immeasurably grateful for their insights.  But if I were forced to pick just one work from the Platonist tradition, it would be the Enneads of Plotinus.  I could read them, and contemplate them, until the end of time.

5.  One of the things I like about Plotinus is how he treats other philosophers with whom Plotinus disagrees.  A good example is Plotinus’s critique of Aristotle’s categories.  Plotinus spends a lot of time laying out Aristotle’s perspective; I think of this as ‘steel manning’ his opponent’s arguments.  It is only after this that Plotinus then puts forth his own view.  I think there is something spacious about this method.

6.  I also like the clarity with which Plotinus talks about the One which is fully transcendental and beyond conceptual understanding, yet at the same time it is the source for all our conceptual understanding.  Plotinus doesn’t just state that the One is beyond name and form, beyond affirmation or negation, he articulately explains why that is the case and then elaborates on the relationship between the transcendent and that which can be named and has form.  In some spiritual traditions I sometimes get the impression that the idea that there is something beyond name and form, beyond affirmation and negation, is used to dodge, or deflect, an inquiry.  I have, over time, become suspicious of those who too quickly resort to this kind of strategy.

When Plotinus speaks of the One, what I like to call the ultimate otherness, and its relationship to the world of name and form, and to the material world, my sense is that Plotinus is speaking as someone who is familiar with the One, has experienced the One; in fact, it feels to me like Plotinus more often dwelled in the One than he did in the material world in which we ordinary people dwell.  That is why Plotinus is able to unpack the relationship between the One and its emanations.

7.  Plotinus (204 C.E. to 270 C.E.) did not write anything until he was about 50.  In other words, his writings are all mature works.  His hesitancy to write was part of the Platonist tradition at that time.  Socrates did not write anything.  And the direct teacher of Plotinus, Ammonias Saccas, did not write anything either.  Plotinus and other students of Ammonias agreed not to put the teachings into writing, but subsequently, one by one, they changed their minds.  I suspect that there was a sense among the students of Ammonias that if the teachings weren’t written down, they would simply be lost and in a way, they saw putting them down in writing as a kind of duty to their teacher.

Whatever the reason, it is our good fortune that Plotinus did eventually decide to write his essays.

8.  The asceticism of Plotinus is well known.  He ate little and was likely a vegan.  He was devoted to contemplation.  Famously, Plotinus was ‘ashamed’ of having a body; a view that is consistent with the Platonic tradition going back to Plato, but profoundly at odds with modernity.  Plotinus lived the life of philosophy; that is to say a life devoted to purification and the cultivation of the virtues.  Plotinus’s life embodies what it means to be a philosopher in the material world.  And the Enneads are part of that embodiment.

9.  I don’t recall when I first encountered Plotinus.  I didn’t have a ‘lightning strike’ moment of realization while reading the Enneads.  Instead, a section, or even just a phrase, would speak to me and, based on that, I would return to the Enneads and each time I did so the process would repeat.  Looking back, this is a kind of cultivation, the cultivation of wisdom.  This type of cultivation requires patience; for example, if during a first reading you don’t understand something you simply accept that and go on.  Perhaps at the next reading, or the one after that, it will become clear.

Such an approach to reading the Enneads means having a sense of trust in Plotinus that, again, is built up slowly over time.  That is to say that Plotinus is viewed as the source of wisdom, insight, and spiritual, and transcendental, understanding. 

My own view is that spiritual understanding happens step by step, gradually; I like to say ‘glacially.’  That is why reading and rereading Plotinus makes sense; each time you read the Enneads a few more steps are taken on the path to the Good and the One.