Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 77

15 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 77

1.  Alcinous Defines Philosophy

In this post I’m returning to the definition of Platonic Philosophy as given by Alcinous in Alicnous’s Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon.  I posted this quote before; but here I want to focus solely on the definition.  In the previous post I quoted the whole section in which the definition appears.  Here I am using a narrower focus.

“Philosophy is a striving for wisdom, or the freeing and turning around of the soul from the body, when we turn towards the intelligible and what truly is, and wisdom is the science of things divine and human.”  (Page 3)

I think it is worth noting that Alcinous strongly links Philosophy to wisdom.  This is not surprising as the name of the tradition, Philosophy, means love of wisdom.  I think this definition of Alcinous would not have been controversial, or contested, by the tradition or by anyone affiliated with Platonism for the first 800+ years.  For all that time wisdom stood at the center of the tradition.

I think we need to recover that understanding.  I say this because I think the foundational nature of wisdom has become obscured by a number of sources who place other things at the center that they consider to be more significant.  This kind of replacement makes it difficult to access Platonism on its own terms.

Alcinous goes on to unpack wisdom.  First Alcinous states that wisdom is the ‘freeing and turning around of the soul from the body.’  This is done by distinguishing what is of the body and what is of the soul.  Wisdom is making those distinctions and then acting upon them in one’s life.

This turning has two aspects; the first is turning to the intelligible, what I would call the noetic, and the second is turning to what truly is, what Platonism calls the Good and the One.  What the intelligible and the Good have in common is that they are eternal.  The Good is eternal by its nature, eternal as such, or eternity qua eternity.  The intelligible, or noetic realities, what Whitehead called ‘eternal objects’, are eternal due to their metaphysical closeness to the Good and the One.  I would sum up this turning by saying that Wisdom means to be turning to, or towards, eternity.

The primary distinction of Wisdom, then, is to distinguish what is eternal from what is ephemeral.  What is eternal is the divine.  What is ephemeral is human, or of this world.

2.  Three Levels of Meaning in the Dialogues of Plato

In the Dialogues of Plato the reader is engaging with writing that functions at three primary levels.  These levels are rooted in the three levels, or hypostases, of Platonic metaphysics.  The first level in a Dialogue is the Good and the One.  Sometimes this is brought up explicitly but more often it is pointed to and suggested.  An example of bringing it up explicitly is when Plato refers to the Good in The Republic.  An example of pointing to the Good and the One is found in the opening of Plato’s Dialogue The Laws; I am thinking of the first word of the Dialogue is ‘God’ which is a word for the One in a Platonic context.  This can be more indirect as when Plato writes about recollection and points indirectly to higher realities through this discussion.

The second level is noetic; one might call it archetypal.  The noetic level is where eternal truths are found such as numbers.  When Plato talks about numbers Plato is referring to this second level.  Plato will sometimes personify this level using names of various deities as symbols for eternal noetic realities; this is a kind of indirect pointing.

The third level is the level of cyclic existence.  When Plato refers to human life and its many facets Plato is pointing to the realm of cyclic existence which is present in the human body.  These teachings mostly appear as what I call ‘instruction’, that is to say that Plato is referring to what human beings must do, as embodied beings, to walk a spiritual path in their lives.  In some ways instruction is easy to overlook.  This is because we are often focused on the characters and the plot of a Dialogue and the storyline is what attracts us.  But after some familiarity with the Dialogues we begin to notice that Plato offers us instruction on how to become a Philosopher which means adopting practices conducive to, and defining of, the Philosophical tradition.  You can spot these instructions because they are almost always askeses, meaning they are almost always in the form of ascetic practices that the Philosopher adopts.  This level of instruction is very fruitful and once a reader perceives this level he finds a wealth of such instruction in the Dialogues.

These three levels of meaning are not usually presented in a sequence, but I suspect that they are to be found in all of Plato’s dialogues.

3.  When Friends Give Advice

A friend of mine recently said to me that I should give up philosophy.  He asked me if I knew that he felt that way.  I responded that I have known that for years and that it doesn’t bother me that my friend feels that way.

This is not the first time someone has made this suggestion.  I suspect that this kind of suggestion is made to anyone who has a commitment to a spiritual life of any kind.  I have observed this happening to other people.

Plato talks about this in several dialogues where Plato points out that people will think of Philosophers as inept and kind of buffoonish.  Some devout Catholics have written how casual Catholics often find their devotion to the tradition kind of embarrassing, indicating that what Plato wrote about is not exclusively a problem for practitioners of Philosophy.

It's not a big deal once you realize that people have different destinies. 

4.  A First Glance at the Chaldean Oracles

4.1 I have noticed that the Chaldean Oracles make an appearance in a lot of Platonist writings that were written after Plotinus.  I thought it might be a good idea to find out about the Oracles so I decided to read the translation by Ruth Majercik. 

The Chaldean Oracles were composed during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, 161 – 180 C.E.  The authors are Julian the Theurgist and his father Julian the Chaldean.  How, exactly, it was written is speculative but it may have been written, or received, in a trance state while Julian the Theurgist was practicing theurgy. 

The Chaldean Oracles are currently in a fragmentary state; the complete text has been lost but there are a significant number of quotes found in various sources.  Majercik catalogs these quotes, dividing them into two types; quotes that are regarded as securely part of the Chaldean Oracles, and dubious quotes.

The Chaldean Oracles remind me of Gnostic writing in general.  They are visionary and dogmatic; by dogmatic I mean that the Chaldean Oracles state their view as a revelation rather than as a discovery that others can share.  If you compare the Timaeus with the Chaldean Oracles I think you will understand what I am referring to.

Plato writes myths and allegories, but the tone of oracular writing is, I think, different.  In Plato’s devices the reader is being invited to unpack what is written; in contrast, in oracular writing the reader is being told to accept them as they are, even when they are very opaque and mysterious. 

To the extent that the Chaldean Oracles had an influence on Iamblichus and Proclus, I think it may have influenced them to lean toward a stance of talking down to the reader who, presumably, needs to follow their instruction.  Compare, for example, the tone of The Mysteries by Iamblichus to the tone Plato uses when he has Socrates offer instruction in philosophy; to be honest they feel like two different worlds.  Plato uses dialectic, oracular writing uses dogmatics.  I suspect the Chaldean Oracles also influenced the two of them to write in a very complex and opaque style which seems to be well-suited to oracular literature.

This is just a first impression; I have often changed my mind about spiritual works after rereading them. 

4.2  Both Iamblichus and Proclus wrote commentaries on the Chaldean Oracles; both of these are now lost.  The work is focused on theurgy and one can regard the Chaldean Oracles as the source, or a significant source, of what would become Platonic theurgy.  At times I have considered referring to Post-Porphyrian Platonism as “Chaldean Platonism” meaning Platonism that is shaped in significant ways by the Chaldean Oracles; I modeled the name after “Christian Platonism”.  The Chaldean Oracles view theurgy as the necessary practice and means for spiritual ascent, just as Iamblichus did and it may be that Iamblichus either got this idea from the Chaldean Oracles or the Oracles supported the view of Iamblichus in significant ways.  I think it is noteworthy that a primary source for theurgy in Platonism was a non-Platonist text.  Both the Chaldean Oracles and Iamblichus through Proclus view wisdom as insufficient for spiritual ascent which represents a major shift in understanding from the Platonic heritage.

4.3  I referred to the Chaldean Oracles as a non-Platonist text in 4.2 above.  But I think it is noteworthy that in contemporary discussions about Post-Porphyrian Platonism some authors will refer to the Chaldean Oracles as a ‘Neoplatonic’ work, or ‘Neoplatonic’ text.  The reason for this is that it was the Post-Porphyrian Platonists, such as Iamblichus and Proclus, who seem to have been most fascinated by this work, for this reason the association has become an historical one.  I don’t think that the Julians who wrote the Oracles had this specifically in mind, but that is what happened.  I use the term ‘non-Platonist’ for the Chaldean Oracles because the work displaces central understandings of the Platonic tradition such as the transformative nature of wisdom as well as wisdom’s soteriological function and after rejecting the sufficiency of wisdom creates a supersession based structure that places ritual above wisdom.

4.4  In some ways I find the interest in these kinds of works in Post-Porphyrian Platonism to be a bit embarrassing.  At another level, I think the Chaldean Oracles were what I might refer to as a ‘fad’ or a passing fancy.  I’m reminded of certain channeled works that were very popular for a few years and have now vanished; in particular, I am thinking of those channeled works that were produced in the 1960’s and 70’s.  The Chaldean Oracles have that kind of feeling for me.

5.  Wisdom

I’ve been thinking a lot about wisdom and wisdom traditions.  This has happened, I think, because of the growing realization of how wisdom was ejected from Platonism by the Post-Porphyrian Platonists.  Here are a few thoughts about wisdom:

5.1  Wisdom is a kind of knowing.  Wisdom can be divided into two broad types.  The first is practical wisdom and the second is transcendent wisdom which, in a Platonic context, refers to Philosophical Wisdom.  Platonist literature talks about this basic division in episodes where someone possesses skill in a practical field of learning.  An example would be someone who is a skilled physician, or a skilled in music, or in steering a ship, and so forth.  Someone who is skilled in steering a ship is wise in the ways of the sea.  Someone who is a skilled physician is wise in the ways of the human body.

Transcendent wisdom is also a kind of knowing, but it is knowing about that which applies to all existing things; that is to say it is metaphysical wisdom.  For example, insight into impermanence is a kind of wisdom because it applies to all material things.

5.2  Wisdom is knowing the truth, which is often hidden, about material things, but it is also knowing the truth about non-material realities.  Wisdom does not stop at the material metaphysics; that is just a first step on the path of wisdom.

5.3  Wisdom is a turning toward that which is non-material and therefore that which is eternal.  Wisdom does this by making distinctions and following up on those distinctions.  The basic distinction is to separate that which is ephemeral from that which is eternal. 

5.4  Wisdom is a function of mind; I don’t consider it to be a function of soul.  I say this because it is mind, due to its connection to the noetic, that makes distinctions.  The soul is the silent presence of eternity which the path of Wisdom leads us to.

5.5  Transcendent Wisdom refers to knowledge about the eternal; how to recognize it, how to approach it, how to dwell There.

 

Transcending Being in Plato's Dialogue Parmenides

23 December 2024

Transcending Being in Plato’s Dialogue Parmenides 

[Note: The dialogue begins with a number of participants, including Parmenides and Zeno, as well as a very young Socrates and other young philosophers including Glaucon, Adeimantus, Cephalus, Antiphon, and one whose name is Aristotle. This is not the Aristotle who was Plato's student at Plato's Academy, but another Aristotle. The dialogue shifts between Parmenides and various young men, including a passage where Socrates and Parmenides discuss the theory of forms. Soon after this the discussion shifts to focus on various 'hypotheses' about the One. Parmenides accepts the request to investigate these and requests that the youngest of those present respond to his questions; the youngest is Aristotle. The portion of the dialogue quoted below is between Parmenides and this young man Aristotle.]

Parmenides: “Now, don’t you think that ‘was’ and ‘has come to be’ and ‘was coming to be’ signify partaking of time past?”

Aristotle: “By all means.”

Parmenides: “And again that ‘will be’ and ‘will come to be’ and ‘will be coming to be’ signify partaking of time hereafter?”

Aristotle: “Yes.”

Parmenides: “And that ‘is’ and ‘comes to be’ signify partaking of time now present?”

Aristotle: “Of course.”

Parmenides: “Therefore, if the one partakes of no time at all, it is not the case that it has at one time come to be, was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, comes to be, or is; or will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be.”

Aristotle: “Very true.”

Parmenides: “Could something partake of being except in one of those ways?”

Aristotle: “It couldn’t.”

Parmenides: “Therefore the one in no way partakes of being.”

Aristotle: “It seems not.”

Parmenides: “Therefore the one in no way is.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Therefore neither is it in such a way as to be one, because it would then, by being and partaking of being, be.  But, as it seems, the one neither is one nor is, if we are obliged to trust this argument.”

Aristotle: “It looks that way.”

Parmenides: “If something is not, could anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it?”

Aristotle: “How could it?”

Parmenides: Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account of any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it.”

Aristotle: “It seems not.”

Parmenides: “Is it possible that these things are so for the one?”

Aristotle: “I certainly don’t think so.”

(Plato, Parmenides, translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 375-376, 141d-142b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

Parmenides: “Well, and do not the words ‘was,’ ‘has become,’ and ‘was becoming’ appear to denote participation in past time?”

Aristotle: Certainly.”

Parmenides: “And ‘will be,’ ‘will become,’ and ‘will be made to become,’ in future time?”

Aristotle: “Yes.”

Parmenides: “And ‘is’ and ‘is becoming’ in the present?”

Aristotle: “Certainly.”

Parmenides: “Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.”

Aristotle: “Very true.”

Parmenides: “Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?”

Aristotle: “It cannot.”

Parmenides: “Then the one has no share in being at all.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Then the one is not at all.”

Aristotle: “Evidently not.”

Parmenides: “Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if that argument is to be trusted.”

Aristotle: “That seems to be true.”

Parmenides: “But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?”

Aristotle: “Of course not.”

Parmenides: “Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

Aristotle: “Evidently not.”

Parmenides: “And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Is it possible that all this is true about the one?”

Aristotle: “I do not think so.”

(Plato, Parmenides, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1939, page 251, 141D-142B, ISBN: 9780674991859)

The dialogue Parmenides is Plato’s most analytical dialogue.  Rigorous, meticulous, dense, and meaningful it unpacks the meaning of the transcendental, of the One, in Platonic philosophy and contemplation.  I have recently reread this dialogue and this reading was an uplifting experience; I was able to follow the ebb and flow of the analysis and to glimpse the overall point that was being made and the source from which it emerges.  

I have had this kind of experience before.  As I have previously written here, I am a slow learner, but I am willing to read something that interests me multiple times and for me this approach seems to bear fruit.  I first encountered this when I was engaged in reading some difficult Buddhist philosophy.  And I have kept with this method of reading and rereading until what the work is saying makes sense or becomes coherent.  It resembles listening to a piece of music in a style you are not familiar with.  When you first listen only brief moments will make sense, but it is difficult to get an overall feel for the piece.  But after listening multiple times the music’s overall shape and direction starts to register and the music may even become a great pleasure to listen to.  In a similar way, a difficult work like the dialogue Parmenides is the kind of work I need to spend time with in order to gain some clarity about it.  Here are a few comments stimulated by my last reading:

1.  The overall meaning of the passage quoted above is that the One transcends being.  I think that the source for this understanding is contemplation; in other words the quoted passage is an attempt to communicate the nature of the experience of the One to others.

2.  In this reading I connected what was being written in Parmenides to my studies of the Perfection of Wisdom discourses I spent a lot of time studying when I was a Buddhist.  For example, in both traditions all three aspects of time (past, present, and future) are given equal status when looked at from the point of view of the ultimate.  There is no privileging of the present, or the now, as more real than the past or the future.  For example, in the Diamond Sutra it says, “. . . the past mind is not found, the future mind is not found, and the present mind is not found.”  In the quote from Parmenides it states that the One does not partake of time at all and that therefore neither the present, nor the past, nor the future, is something that can be found in the One.

3.  It is fairly common to hear spiritual teachers say that the present, or the now, is privileged in some way.  This can be in the form of something like saying that only the now is real, or that we only have ‘this present moment.’  But in wisdom traditions such as Platonic philosophy, or Buddhist Perfection of Wisdom, the present is not given a higher status than the past or the future.  This kind of teaching points to a reality that is ‘prior’ (metaphorically prior and metaphysically prior) to time as such.  This can only be experienced in mystical union.

4.  It is remarkable to me that Plato as a writer is equally at home writing allegories and weaving stories of gatherings such as the Symposium as well as the mode of meticulous analysis found in Parmenides.  It is extremely rare to find a writer that can encompass so many different modes of writing and be so skilled in all of them.

5.  I don’t think it is possible to understand Parmenides unless the reader has practiced contemplation.  I’m not saying that reading Parmenides has no value unless one is a contemplative.  I read the Diamond Sutra long before I had an experience of transcendence in contemplation and it did help me.  Here is an analogy; it can be helpful to read a recipe if I am interested in cooking something I have heard about and that has attracted my attention.  The recipe will tell me the ingredients I need, the procedures for mixing and cooking, and so forth.  These are useful and meaningful.  But one more step is needed to really understand a specific recipe; that is to put the ingredients together and cook it.  Contemplation is the occasion that ‘puts the ingredients together.’

6.  I think the climax of this section of Parmenides is “Therefore the one in no way partakes of being.”  This is explaining very clearly that the one transcends being, is beyond (and ‘before’) being.  The final portion of this section of the dialogue unpacks some of the implications of the one transcending being, such as the one having no name.

7.  The place of being in Platonism is, for some, difficult to access.  I recently listened to a talk on youtube about Platonism in which the speaker stated that the One is pure being.  That’s not the first time I have heard this way of speaking about the One.  I believe that this view is at least influenced by Aristotle, but more importantly, I think many metaphysicians have difficulty understanding what transcending being would mean.  For example, what does it mean to say that the One has no name; that would imply that the One is not ‘the One,’ which is paradoxical and can be confusing.

The confusion is overcome through contemplative practice; and I don’t know of any other way that the difficulty presented by the idea of the One transcending being can be overcome.  This makes Platonism inherently a mystical philosophy.  If Platonism is looked at as an example of mysticism this creates difficulties for analytic and materialist philosophers, as well as for those who want Plato to be a proto-rationalist.

The confusion is also overcome through ascetic practice because ascetic practice is based on turning away from material manifestations.  To approach that which transcends being requires such a turning away.

8.  I don’t think that contemplation or asceticism can be incorporated into a modern university’s curriculum.  And this is why there will always be a gap between the mysticism of Platonic philosophy and contemporary academic approaches.

The model that is needed for accessing the fullness of Platonism is that of an ashram or a dojo; a place where the works of Platonism are studied, but the practices of contemplation and asceses are considered to be foundational and essential.

9.  The dialogue Parmenides is a jewel of wisdom.  

Wisdom 6

4 December 2023

Wisdom 6

“’. . . as to the natures of philosophers, let us agree that they are constantly devoted to that learning, which makes clear to them that part of existence which is eternal and does not wander round between growth and decay.’

“Yes, let’s agree on that.’

“’And their devotion is to the whole of it,’ I said, ‘and they do not willingly pass over anything that is insignificant, or larger, or of greater or less value, just like those we discussed earlier who are ambitious and lovers.’

“’You’re right,’ he said.

“’Now consider the next point, whether those who are to be the sort of people we were discussing must have something in their nature in addition to this.’

“’Such as?’

“’Not lying and under no circumstances be willing to accept falsehood, but rather detest it and be devoted to truth.’

"'That's fair enough,' he said.

“’Not only is it fair enough, my friend, but one who is by nature a lover of something is under total obligation to love everything that belongs to and is akin to the objects of his love.’

“’You’re right,’ he said.

“’Could you find anything closer to wisdom than truth?’

“’How could I?’ he said.

(Plato, Republic, translated by Christ Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Plato Republic Books 6-10, Loeb Classical Library, Harvad University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, pages 7-15, 485A-485C, ISBN: 9780674995619)

1.  I like to say that philosophy, understood as a spiritual path, is grounded on ‘distinguishing eternity’ from that which is not eternal.  Making the distinction between the eternal and that which is not eternal is the active application of wisdom; it is the primary meaning of wisdom.

This passage from the Republic, which was brought to my attention by a friend and reader of this blog, makes that point.  It is the ‘nature of philosophers’ that they pursue that which is eternal and withdraw from that which is not eternal, that which wanders between growth and decay, what I like to call becoming and begoning.

2.  It is helpful that the philosopher in his pursuit of understanding eternity is compared to a lover.  I think it is a good comparison.  A lover is constantly focused on their object of desire and cannot remain for very long uninterested in their love.  In a similar way, the philosopher is highly motivated to comprehend eternity, to understand eternity, to be consciously in the presence of eternity.

3.  The connection between eternity and truth is that from a Platonic perspective, views of that which is becoming and begoning are, by their very nature and the nature of the ephemera of material existence, are only opinions and can never be more than that.  In contrast, understanding the nature of eternity means understanding that which is true because truth is inherently stable, unlike opinion.

This is the connection between truth, wisdom, and eternity.  Wisdom is the understanding of, and awakening to, the presence of eternity, and truth is what emerges when that awakening occurs.

 

 

Wisdom 5

29 November 2023

Wisdom 5

“’Well now, for the dangers of a sea-voyage, do you consider any pilots to be more fortunate, as a general rule, than the wise ones?’

“’No, to be sure.’

“’Well, then, suppose you were on a campaign, with which kind of general would you prefer to share both the peril and the luck – a wise man, or an ignorant?’

“’With a wise one.’

“’Well, then supposing you were sick, with which kind of doctor would you like to venture yourself – a wise one, or an ignorant?’

“’With a wise one.’

“’And your reason,” I said, “is this, that you would fare with better fortune in the hands of a wise one than of an ignorant one?’

“’He assented.’

“’So that wisdom everywhere causes men to be fortunate: since I presume she could never err, but must needs be right in act and result; otherwise she could be no longer wisdom.’

“’We came to an agreement somehow or other in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements . . . ‘”

(Plato, Euthydemus, translated by W. R. M. Lamb, Plato: Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1924, pages 407-409, 279E-280B, ISBN: 9780674991835)

1.  In this part of the dialogue the meaning of wisdom is unpacked by using a technique that Socrates often uses: several examples of an idea are given and then the shared truth found in all of these instances is pointed to.  In this case the examples are a sea voyage, military service, and sickness.  It is drawn out that in each instance we would want to follow someone who is wise in the ways of a particular subject to one who is ignorant of those ways. 

Socrates then draws out the general truth regarding wisdom: “. . . he with whom it (wisdom) is present has no need of good fortune as well.”  And this is true because wisdom ‘never errs’. 

2.  Here wisdom is presented as having the function of a good guide.  And this is what connects practical wisdom (meaning wisdom of a particular topic) to wisdom in a philosophical context.  Practical wisdom has content, the content of a particular topic.  Philosophical wisdom transcends content.  But in both cases wisdom guides us in a beneficent manner.

3.  I think you could say that philosophical, or transcendent, wisdom is the systematic removal of material content from the mind.  Philosophical wisdom is, therefore, a kind of unlearning.

4.  Philosophical wisdom is becoming aware of the source of practical wisdom, what precedes practical wisdom.  Practical wisdom is the instantiation of philosophical wisdom confined to a specific topic.

5.  Notice the quality of beneficence, which I mentioned above.  That quality is shared by both practical wisdom and philosophical wisdom.  It is a kind of providence.

6.  We rely on wisdom to show us the way forward.  We are dependent on wisdom and its generosity.

7.  What wisdom does is make distinctions; this might be the distinctions that help us recognize a good doctor from a bad doctor, a good pilot from a bad pilots, and for philosophical wisdom, the distinctions that allow us to differentiate between the ephemeral and the eternal.