Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 85

16 February 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 85

1.  Another Youtube

I recently saw a youtube presentation about Platonic Theurgy.  The presenter was very enthusiastic about the topic and examined Theurgy as a type of magic and an  occult tradition.  What interested me, and I have posted about this before, is that he never mentions that Theurgy was designed to give a philosophical foundation for animal sacrifice, what is sometimes referred to as blood sacrifice.  I have found that this is common, though not universal.  There are a small number of books about theurgy that do refer to the way theurgy supports, and advocates for, blood sacrifice; but the large majority do not do so.

This is not just a theoretical issue.  Theurgy was used as the foundation for Julian’s very frequent and very numerous animal sacrifices.  This should be a painful heritage for contemporary theurgists but for the most part they simply dodge the issue.

From a Platonic perspective I tend to see theurgy as targeting, and undermining, Platonic ethics; in particular theurgy undermines the Platonic system of ethical restraints, or asceses.  I know I’ve talked about this before, but seeing yet another presentation on the topic led me to making another post about it.

2.  The Door to Dharma Traditions

One of the things that Indian Dharma traditions share is a process whereby someone becomes a member of that tradition by ceremonially affirming their commitment to the basic ethical commitments, or ethical restraints, of that tradition.  You find this in Buddhism, Jainism, Classical Yoga, Hinduism, and some forms of Shaivism.  The ceremony is simple; the individual(s) vocally affirm that they will live in accordance with these (often five) ethical principles.  Sometimes in large ceremonies those participating will collectively affirm their commitments; in small ceremonies it may be individuals who affirm their commitments one after another.

What I think this means is that taking a vow to maintain ethical restraints is the door to becoming a member of a particular Dharma tradition.  It is a visual and public affirmation of one’s commitments.

Platonism does not have such a ceremony.  But it does have ethical restraints that are referred to in various Dialogues of Plato.  I have adopted affirming my commitment to these Platonist ethical restraints as a part of my morning practice and ritual.  I simply affirm that I will follow these restraints as I live my life.  I’m the kind of person who needs a daily reminder of such commitments because my mind has a strong tendency to become distracted by other ‘interesting’ things (though that is diminishing with age).  I’ve known this about myself for a long time and that is the primary reason I do this ceremony on a daily basis.  In Indian Dharma traditions reaffirming commitment to basic ethical commitments is very rarely done on a daily basis after the initial ‘taking of the precepts’ ceremony.  However, the basic precepts are often included in other ceremonial contexts and celebrations; so there are regular reminders.

I think for Platonism the situation is that not very many people view Platonism as having basic ethical restraints that a practitioner of Platonism commits themselves to.  There is not a communal context where Platonists are regularly reminded of this and that is another reason why I find a daily reenactment of those commitments to be of assistance.

I think that these ethical restraints found in Platonist works are the door to an engagement with the Platonic tradition that goes beyond reading the primary texts of Platonism which are the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, as well as some secondary works.  These ethical commitments function in Platonism the same way that they function in Indian Dharma traditions by focusing the life of the Platonist on living in a way that aligns with the tradition as a whole (even before Platonism) and nourishes the Platonic tradition for the future. 

3.  Spacious

One of the aspects of Plato that has grown in my awareness is how ‘spacious’ his writing is.  I mean ‘spacious’ in the sense that Plato uses myth, allegory, metaphor, simile, and symbol in his works.  In addition, there are dialogues that do not come to a conclusion; instead they end ambiguously.  All of these contexts draw the reader into the dialogue(s); they invite the reader to participate and unpack the meaning of the dialogue.  Plato does not seem to be concerned with crafting a fully systematic presentation in the way that, for example, Spinoza does.  Plato is more concerned, I think, with the broad strokes of metaphysics and metaphysical cosmology because they assist people in aligning with the spiritual quest.

Over the centuries there was a tendency in the Platonic tradition to become more systematic and to fill in what some might consider to be ‘gaps’ in Plato’s presentations.  This really took off in the Late Classical Period (roughly Iamblichus through Proclus).  There is a definite shift in tone in the sense that the Late Classical Platonists are not inviting us to participate in unpacking the meaning of what they have written.  Instead, they are talking down to the reader and insisting, sometimes very adamantly, that their interpretation is correct even when they know that lots of Platonists thought otherwise.  The writing is more tense.

There are exceptions, the most important ones I know of are Olympiodorus and Boethius.  Writers like these seem to want the reader to be a participant in what the author is offering.  But it is interesting to observe that both of these writers were not rooted in the Athenian tradition of Platonism and I suspect that there is a connection. 

I think this is helpful to understand because sometimes Late Classical Athenian Platonism (L-CAP for short?) is sometimes presented as the final and most profound unfolding of Classical Platonism.  I think that is doubtful.  Why do I say this? Well, I just don’t think it is necessary for someone to have absorbed the intricacies of their approach in order to understand and practice the Platonist tradition.  In a similar way, I don’t think it is necessary for a Mahayana Buddhist to comprehend the intricacies of Madhyamika, and its various tenets, in order to understand and practice that tradition.  (There are many similar comparisons like this one can make.)  We can look at it this way: if all the works of the L-CAP tradition had never been written, would that have any impact on how deeply we can comprehend Platonism?  Personally, I don’t think it would.  I realize that those who are dedicated to L-CAP will disagree; fair enough.  I’m simply presenting some conclusions I have come to that are based on my own reading and study.  Readers, of course, will come to their own conclusions.

I’m not opposed to someone studying the Late Classical Athenian Platonist tradition; there is a certain kind of person for whom that will be rewarding (just as there is a certain kind of person for whom studying the intricacies of Madhyamika will feel rewarding).  But I am skeptical that this L-CAP tradition has left us something essential that we must understand if we want to understand Platonism at all.  I think that is mistaken and leads at least some people astray.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 64

15 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 64

1.  Gaps in the History of Platonism

Two weeks ago, I posted about how I asked some AI sites for a list of what those sites considered are the most significant books in Metaphysics in Western Philosophy.  (This was Brief Notes on Various Topics – 62, dated 1 September 2025, Item 4.)  I have continued with investigating this focus this past week by downloading a few lists of essential reading in Western Philosophy that were compiled by Youtube Presenters who have channels focused on philosophy; I confined the downloads to people who have academic qualifications.

The reading lists mimicked what I found in AI; mainly, that there is a very long gap after Aristotle who is followed by early modern philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume.  What I would like to do here is to highlight two books from this timegap that I think are significant in the history of Platonism, and for philosophy in general, but do not appear in lists of significant philosophical literature when doing online searches of various types.

The first book to consider is The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius.  Boethius was born about 480 and died in 524.  Boethius lived after the fall of the Western Roman Empire and is often considered to be the last Classical Scholar of the Roman period due to his scholarly commitments and vast knowledge of the Classics. 

The Consolation was written when Boethius was imprisoned, charged with treason in a conspiracy that was hatched against Boethius by powerful forces at the court of the Ostrogothic King Theodoric. While in prison awaiting execution Boethius wrote the Consolation.

The book became a great success in the medieval period.  There are about 400 manuscript copies of the Consolation that have survived and that we can refer to, indicating the widespread circulation of this work.  It was hugely influential with images found in the book being widely used in art, and poems from the book being set to music.  For these reasons alone I consider the Consolation to be essential reading.  But there is more; the Consolation is a serious work of philosophy in the Platonic tradition.  It grapples with the nature of suffering, fate, and transcendence.  It is a book that has helped countless people down through the centuries right into the present.  The absence of the  Consolation is, to my mind, kind of embarrassing; it would seem to imply that contemporary academic philosophers are unaware of it, or haven’t read it, or both. 

For Platonists in particular who have an interest in how Platonism developed over the centuries, and how Platonism shaped Western culture, the Consolation is essential.  Even today it is widely read and talked about.   

The second book I want to highlight is the Periphyseon by Johannes Scotus Eriugena.  (I don’t think I’ve mentioned this book before on this blog.)  Eriugena lived from about 800 to 877 CE.  He was an Irishman who ended up at the Carolingian Court of Charles the Bald in about 845.  He wrote the Periphyseon in the 860’s. 

The Periphyseon is a work of Platonic Metaphysics and Theology.  But the specific heritage of Platonism that Eriugena connected with differs from that of the Classical Period of Platonist Philosophy.  His inspiration and grounding in Platonism was based on his reading of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite in which one finds such works as Mystical Theology and the Divine Names as well as works on celestial and terrestrial hierarchies.  Eriugena translated these works into Latin and in this way he became a conduit for philosophical mysticism in this period.  In contrast, Eriugena was not acquainted with Plotinus or Iamblichus or other late Classical Platonists (I suspect the availability of Plato and Aristotle was very limited; likely confined to translations by Boethius.)

I first encountered the Periphyseon (also known as The Divisions of Nature) many decades ago in the form of selected passages of the work; that was the only book available in English that I could find.  Later the University of Dublin translated the book, but their edition was very expensive and didn’t stay in print for very long.  Recently, though, a translation by I. P. Sheldon-Williams, edited by John O’Meara, has become available at a reasonable price.  Now those who are interested in the book in the English speaking world will be able to read it from cover to cover.

I have found the selections of this work that I have already read to be very inspiring.  The author frames his examination of nature, by which he means the cosmos as whole, including the transcendental, into four categories or divisions:

1.  That which creates and is not created

2.  That which creates and is created

3.  That which does not creates and is created

4.  That which neither creates nor is created

Spiritually, the idea unfolds of returning to the first category; so the purpose of the work is salvific. 

These are two examples of books that ‘fill in the gap’ that is present in most overviews of Western Philosophy at this time.  There are others, but for me these two are both significant and worthy of a Platonist’s time and attention.  Perhaps becoming aware of this gap in suggested reading material in the context of Western Metaphysics will inspire me to develop a reading list of my own.

2.  The Sentences of Porphyry: Sentence 10

We do not understand similarly in all things, but in a manner adapted to the essence of each.  For intellectual objects we understand intellectually; but those that pertain to soul rationally.  We understand plants spermatically; but bodies idolically (i.e. as images); and that which is above all these, super-intellectually and super-essentially.  (Thomas Taylor)

We do not think in the same manner in all things, but in a manner consonant with the essence of each.  In intellect, for example, we think intellectually; in soul, logically; in plants, seminally; in bodies, phantasmically; and in what transcends these, inconceivably and superessentially.  (Thomas Davidson)

Thought is not the same everywhere; it differs according to the nature of every being.  In intelligence, it is intellectual; in the soul it is rational; in the plant it is seminal; last, it is superior to intelligence and existence in the principle that surpasses all these [that is, the One – note by the translator].  (Kenneth Guthrie)

Everything exists in everything, but in a way that corresponds to the nature of each entity: in the mind - noetically, in the soul – rationally, in plants – through seeds, in bodies – in the form of images, and in the transcendent – unknown and beyond being. (Isaak Samarskyi)

2.1  Here Porphyry is presenting his view of how different types of things differ in their mode of understanding.  Deciphering this sentence feels complex because at times Porphyry seems to be referring to different types of biological things, such as plants as opposed to those biological things that have a mind. 

2.2  Porphyry seems to be saying that different things have different modes of thought, and I take thought as interacting with the material world.  But again, there is a source of confusion in that mind interacts noetically, which refers to the second level of existence, but the soul interacts rationally and the question that arises for me is if that aspect of reason is also noetic or does it refer to the material world. 

2.3  Maybe if we lay out the items referred to in a different way it might be helpful:

mind                          nous

soul                            reason

plants                         seeds

bodies                        images

transcendent             unknown and beyond being

Looked at in this way Porphyry is describing the path of ascent that goes through several means of understanding, ending in the transcendence of those modes in the One that is beyond being.  Looking at these categories and their interactions, I tend to see their relationships in this way:

plants                         seeds

bodies                        images

mind                          noetic differentiation

soul                             transcendence

2.3.1    I’m not exactly sure what Porphyry means by suggesting that the mode plants use to interact with the world are seeds.  But tentatively, the seeds of plants are responsive to things like temperature, rain, dry spells, and many other conditions.  It is through this interaction that the seed of a plant knows when to sprout.

2.3.2    Bodies interact with existence through images.  (I wonder if this includes dreams for Porphyry?)  In Platonism material images are often thought of as imitations; such as paintings being imitations of actual things.  Perhaps Porphyry is thinking of that kind of relationship.

2.3.3    The previous two types of things and their modes are materially bound.  In this third type of thing, mind, we move to the noetic.  Mind has the function of making differentiations and the source of these differentiations is nous.  (Incorrect differentiations are not found in nous; they are due to the diminished capacity of materially embodied minds to access noetic realities outside of contemplation.)  As an aside, discriminations by the mind that discriminate between that which is eternal from that which is ephemeral is the appearance of wisdom.

2.3.4    I understand the soul to be the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual; this seems to differ from Porphyry’s schema a bit.  Porphyry links the soul with reason, but I tend to see reason as a function of mind, specifically as a tool, or set of tools, for noetic discrimination.  In a sense you could say that reason is noetic discrimination which is why the principles of reason transcend material instantiations.

3.  I listened to a short Youtube where two philosophers were talking about how philosophy should not be taught to young people because young people tend to like arguing too much.  They suggested that philosophy should have a kind of age requirement of about 30 years old. 

Looking back on my own philosophical studies I can understand what they mean.  I think it is easy for younger people to misinterpret arguments or views, to simplify discussions that are inherently complex. 

On the other hand, it seems to be the case that a lot of older philosophers are not exactly free of these tendencies.  Personally, I think what is needed is a good teacher who can show that there is more to philosophy than crafting arguments or unpacking the meaning of a word or phrase.  There are also ethical restraints, purifications that shape one’s life in the world, how that life manifests; and that is just one example.  This embeds philosophy into the life of the practitioner so that insights, as opposed to arguments, are tested in the realm of experience.

4.  A Manner of Speaking

Words are slippery things.  I mean that words are subject to shifting usages, definitional drift, and becoming and begoning as older words vanish and newer words emerge.  This applies to the context of Philosophy as much as any other area of life.

And I have been thinking about how this applies to contemporary Platonism.  Such a focus has started me thinking that contemporary Platonism needs to develop and cultivate its own vocabulary and terms.  I say this because key terms of academic Platonism are recent inventions that have become very widespread and in important ways misrepresent the Platonic tradition.  The obvious example is the word ‘Neoplatonism’ which I have discussed several times on this blog.  But there are others as well.  And there are terms, such as ‘reason’, that have a range of meanings in Classical Platonism that is absent from contemporary usages of that word and I think this leads to misreadings of works from the Classical Platonist period.

As Platonism re-emerges from its eclipse under modernity, I think it will be natural for Platonists to reconnect with key words and phrases from the Platonic tradition with the idea of understanding what these words mean in the context of Classical Platonism without having a thick layer of modernist assumptions making it difficult to access what is being said.  I have already seen a few contemporary Platonists spontaneously move in that direction.

In short, I think Platonism needs to discover a distinctly Platonic manner of speaking, a manner of speaking that is more congenial to its transcendental insights than what we currently have.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 53

30 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 53

1.  Platonism grows on you.  I mean that when people first encounter Platonism through reading the Dialogues, perhaps in a University class, it can feel confusing and sometimes opaque.  But there are passages, images, and allegories that are attractive, and some of the characters in the Dialogues are interesting.  It’s a bit like learning a new language; at first the comprehension is not great and there is likely to be much that is misunderstood.  But there are words and phrases that cohere and make sense.  Over time the language becomes internalized and can be used as a means of communication.  I think the process of becoming a Platonist is similar; at some point the pieces of the philosophy fit together and the beauty of its insights become inspiring.  Eventually this leads to daily interaction, through reading, through various practices, and through contemplation.  At this point the relationship to Platonism is no longer opaque or confusing; instead, it is nourishing and every morning when we wake up, we look forward to deepening our relationship to the tradition.

2.  Readers might be interested that David Litwa, a scholar dedicated to the Classical world of, roughly, 100 CE to 300 CE, with a special focus on Christian Gnosticism, has decided to translate Porphyry’s Against the Christians.  This book survives, as I understand it, only in quotes from Christian critics.  I don’t know if there have been any recent discoveries regarding this work, but if there have been Litwa would be aware of them.

Last year I read Litwa’s translation of Celsus’s critique of Christianity which Litwa translates as ‘The True Teaching.’  Both Celsus and Porphyry defend traditional Platonic perspectives on various issues.  I’m not sure when Litwa will publish Against the Christians, but I look forward to reading it.

3.  I sometimes toy with the idea of creating a Platonist Canon.  I do this as a thought experiment; if I was in some kind of position to recommend a canon of Platonic works, what would I choose?  I would, naturally, start with the Dialogues of Plato.  The next work would be the Enneads of Plotinus.  These two alone offer a complete and unsurpassed presentation of Platonism.  You really don’t need anything else.

But other works are helpful and worthwhile.  For this second tier I would add Alcinous’s Handbook of Platonism, Maximus of Tyre’s Orations, and Plutarch’s Platonic works.

For post-Plotinian works I would suggest Porphyry’s On Abstinence as well as additional works such as his Letter to Marcella, and so forth.  (I think it would be a good idea to publish an edition of the remaining complete works of Porphyry that would also include the fragments of works that have vanished.  It could be called ‘The Porphyry Project.’)

After Porphyry selection of works becomes more difficult because of the multiplication of influences impacting the Platonic tradition.  Christian Platonism emerges, and there is the earlier Jewish Platonism of Philo of Alexandria as well as the later development of Islamic Platonism.  At the moment, I’m inclined not include them in a Platonist Canon because the projects of these philosophers is to create what I call a hyphenated Platonism that subordinates Platonism to the concerns of their tradition.  This also applies to the theurgic tradition which is more concerned with ritual efficacy than it is with wisdom and Platonic insights and Platonic ethical practices.  I realize this last is a controversial claim, but that is how I see things at this time. 

The last Platonic philosopher of the Classical period I would include in a canon of Platonism would be Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. 

No doubt I have missed some important works which over time will move into my fantasy Platonic Canon.  In conclusion, this is just a fantasy or mental exercise.  I personally find it useful in negotiating the vast sea of Platonic literature, but I don’t actually think that anyone, or any institution, has the authority for making a definitive Platonic canon; that’s not how Platonism has worked in the past, which is a good thing.

4.  I sometimes think of the variations in how Platonists over the centuries have interpreted the noetic realm (what it is and how it works) as similar to variations on music themes or melodies.  The variation form in music is very widespread; you find it in classical music as well as popular music.  Variations can be simple and easily recognizable, or they can be complex and difficult to hear (that is a variation can be obscure to the listener as to the variation’s relationship to the original theme), and many degrees between. 

If we think of the noetic realm as the realm of eternal objects (Whitehead’s phrase) then it makes sense that those of us residing in the material world, meaning those of us who are ephemeral objects, need to use approximations to talk about the noetic realm.  This isn’t quite the same as trying to describe the ineffable, such as the One and the Good.  The ineffable is beyond description, beyond affirmation and negation.  Noetic objects are not beyond affirmation and negation; for example, numbers have specific characteristics which can be affirmed.  But the unchangingness and eternality of noetic realities means that noetic realities are very remote from our everyday experience which makes it difficult to talk about noetic realities without using comparisons that are approximations.  That’s why variations appear, why Aristotle places noetic realities in objects, why some early Platonists explain noetic realities by calling them thoughts in the mind of God, and why some take a mathematical approach and think of noetic realities as approximating an empty set that contains rules for membership inclusion, and so forth. 

5.  Egypt plays a significant role in the development of the Greek philosophical tradition and of Platonism in particular.  It appears to be the case that Plato had a high view of Egyptian spirituality.  I find that intriguing because on the surface Egyptian and Greek spirituality appear to be very different; I’m referring to, for example, the way images such as statues are divergent in the two traditions.  Greek statues of Gods and Goddesses are highly idealized human beings, often of striking attractiveness.  In contrast, Egyptian deities, for the most part, merge animal and human forms.  Such combinations do appear in Greek spirituality; a good example is the minotaur.  But such creatures are often threatening and I’m not sure that they would qualify as deities.

In Egyptian spirituality deities often have an animal head and a human body, or a human head and an animal body.  This is strikingly different from Greek presentations of the gods and, in addition, differs from the Abrahamic tradition and how God is represented in that tradition.  (I believe that Philo criticized Egyptian religion for using the kinds of images it used.) 

Nevertheless, Plato shows admiration for Egypt and what he thinks of as the country’s stability.  And Plato seems inclined to trust Egyptian sources for ancient history; this is seen, for example, in Plato’s comments on Atlantis. 

Porphyry picks up on this positive view of Egypt in Book 4 of his treatise On Abstinence.  Beginning with paragraph 6, there is a long presentation of how Egyptian philosophers lived in Egypt.  It is a portrait of a highly regulated and disciplined approach to spirituality.  Porphyry states that Egyptian philosophers lived in the Temples and only rarely, during some ceremonies, interacted with non-initiated, ordinary people.  They spent their time in study and contemplation.

It intrigues me that the picture painted here is explicitly that of the philosopher as a religious figure; I’m using the word ‘religious’ because, according to Porphyry’s description, their philosophers were part of a religious institution of great antiquity, as opposed to finding an individual path on their own, or setting up some kind of alternative organization like Plato’s Academy.  When I read Porphyry’s account, it’s not clear to me if philosophers in Egypt were a type of Priest, or whether these two categories of Philosopher and Priest were separate and distinct.  Perhaps a philosopher at that time resembles something like what we sometimes hear about in today’s religious traditions where someone is both a Priest and a learned Scholar, but not all Priests are Scholars and not all Scholars are Priests.

The Egyptian philosophers followed what I infer to be a strict rule that regulated their lives.  I don’t know if that rule survives in some form among ancient Egyptian documents today (I haven’t heard anything about such a document) and I know almost nothing about the specifics of Egyptian spirituality, so I can only speculate beyond this general observation.  But for us Platonists, I think it is worth noting that such a life was viewed by Porphyry, and perhaps Plato as well, as admirable and perhaps something of an ideal.

6.  According to scholars there are many passages in The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius that are paraphrases of various Platonic Dialogues.  These are not direct quotes, and the dialogues, with one exception, are not explicitly named.  This is likely due to the circumstances under which the Consolation was written, which was in a prison cell.

The one exception about naming a dialogue is found in Book III where Boethius explicitly mentions the Timaeus.  The mention of Timaeus is made by Lady Philosophy:

“’But since,’ said she, ‘as is my Plato’s opinion in the Timaeus, we ought to implore God’s help in even the least of matters, what do you think we should do now, that we may be worthy to discover the abode of that highest good?’”

(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by S. H. Tester, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, page 271, ISBN: 0674990838)

The passage in the Timaeus reads:

“Timaeus: Nay, as to that, Socrates, all men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great . . . “

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1929, page 49, 27C, ISBN: 9780674992573)

There are further references to Timaeus later in Book III but the dialogue itself is not explicitly named as it is here.  In addition, according to a footnote in the Loeb edition, some of the references are to a commentary on Timaeus written by Proclus.  I am not familiar with this commentary, but this shows that Boethius had a strong interest in that dialogue.

In contrast, there do not appear to be any clear, or explicit, references to Christian writings.  My take on this is that Boethius had absorbed a view of Philosophy that Platonism advocates for, but which is completely absent from modernity’s understanding of what the task of Philosophy is.  The view I am referring to is that the purpose of Philosophy is salvific; I mean that Platonic Philosophy viewed its purpose as that of freeing human beings from being trapped in materiality through an ascent that concludes in the experience of the Good and the One, the transcendental and the eternal.  That is what Lady Philosophy is referring to when she refers to the ‘abode of the highest Good.’  That is why Boethius turns to philosophy for consolation in his hour of desperate need.  And that is why we should turn to philosophy today.

 

3 October 2022

The Consolation of Boethius

Decades ago, I had to go to the hospital for surgery.  As I was gathering things, I looked at my shelves for a book or two to take with me.  At the time I didn’t self-identify as a Platonist; instead, I thought of myself as a Buddhist.  I had studied and practiced Buddhism for over 30 years, I had been a former Buddhist monastic, and I had taught classes in Buddhist thought at Junior Colleges and a few other locations.  I had a lot of Buddhist books, but for some reason none of them seemed to speak to me at this time, meaning none of them felt like they would assist me in my precarious situation.

Tucked away on a shelf, almost hidden, was a copy of The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius.  I had read it many years before in college and when I saw it, I took it off the shelf and put it in my small bag of things to take with me.  It turned out to be perfect; I found it uplifting, insightful, and beautifully crafted.  Since then, I have reread it every two or three years, and it has continued to have the same uplifting effect.

Over the years I have run into many people who have had a similar experience with Consolation.  The book is an antidote to the difficulties of life, putting them in perspective, and deepening our understanding of how these difficulties happen, and how wisdom opens a door that leads us beyond these difficulties.

In the English-speaking world Consolation has had a stellar career; it was translated into Anglo-Saxon by King Alfred, into Middle English by Chaucer, and into Early Modern English by Queen Elizabeth I.  In the medieval period the verse sections of Consolation were turned into songs; some of these songs have recently been reconstructed.  Today there are many translations of Consolation, indicating that it still has a wide appeal.

For those unfamiliar with Consolation, Boethius lived in the late 5^th, early 6^th, centuries.  He was classically educated and was intent on translating Greek philosophy into Latin.  Boethius entered into the political life of that time, rising to a very high position.  His two sons also attained high position.  Suddenly, Boethius was accused of treason by factions at court and he was arrested and thrown in prison.  A year later he was executed.  He wrote The Consolation of Philosophy while in prison.

In the opening of the Consolation Boethius laments his fate.  As Boethius falls into despair, the Goddess Philosophy appears to him in his prison room.  She takes it upon herself to remind Boethius of the teachings of philosophy, the nature of the world, and the wisdom that leads to the transcendence of the world and its sorrows.  The book is a dialogue between Boethius and Philosophy in both prose and verse.  It is thoroughly Platonic in its views, in its mode of discussion, and in its understanding that philosophy is salvific.  There are discussions about fate, wisdom, transcendence, the task of philosophy, and what it means to live a life of wisdom.  And there is a wonderful section on the nature of love:

What binds all things to order,

Governing earth and sea and sky,

Is love.

If love’s rein slackened

All things now held by mutual love

At once would fall to warring with each other

Striving to wreck that engine of the world

Which now they drive

In mutual trust with motion beautiful.

And love joins peoples too

By a sacred bond,

And ties the knot of holy matrimony

That binds chaste lovers,

Joins too with its law

All faithful comrades.

O happy race of men,

If the love that rules the stars

May also rule your hearts!

(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Library, 1973, page 227)

Looking back on my decision to take the Consolation with me to the hospital, I see it as a personal step, or decision, to move away from Buddhism and to enter into the house, or academy, that Platonism built.  I didn’t register it that way at the time as the decision to take Consolation with me was almost impulsive.  But what I learned from that experience is that philosophy is, as I said above, salvific, that philosophy offers deep consolation for the ups and downs of life, and leads those who will listen to its teachings to the realm that lies beyond all sorrow.