On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

11 May 2026

On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

1.  Among contemporary academic scholars of the Platonic tradition there is disagreement about the continuity of the Platonic tradition, meaning whether or not there is a demonstrable unity to be found in Platonism across the thousands of years of the Platonic tradition’s history.  This is not surprising.  I think it arises, at least in part, from disputes about whether Plato’s thought developed over the course of the Dialogues or if Plato’s writings present a unified vision.  Some argue for a developmental view; for example, they interpret the dialogue Parmenides as, in part, a refutation, or a reconfiguration, of the theory of forms (noetic realities, eternal objects) of the way this view is presented in dialogues like Phaedo and The Republic.  Those who hold to the dialogues as presenting a unified vision interpret Parmenides as a further elaboration of the theory of forms rather than displacing an earlier understanding of this theory.

I also find this view of disjunctive developmentalism in the history of the Platonic tradition in the way that Plotinus is treated by many (perhaps most?) Platonic scholars today.  It is often stated that Plotinus is ‘the founder of Neoplatonism’, meaning that Plotinus presented a new interpretation of the tradition.  That view is nowhere to be found in the actual writings of Plotinus, nor is it to be found in any contemporary of Plotinus, but that’s the way Plotinus is often presented these days.

I think these disjunctive interpretations of Platonism (Plato himself and Platonism’s history as a whole) partly arise because of the influence of the theory of deconstruction that became widespread in the late 20^th century and continues today in the 21^st.  The procedures of deconstruction are designed to be disruptive and disjunctive so it’s not a surprise that analyses based on the theory of deconstruction will result in a disjunctive view of Platonism.

2.  Though this view that Platonism lacks a clear sense of unity over time (history), or even within the Dialogues of Plato, is widespread, this view does have its opponents within academia.  I have observed two different approaches for defending, or apologizing for, the unity of the Platonic tradition.  The first is presented by Lloyd P. Gerson in his book From Plato to Platonism.  The second is presented by David J. Yount in two published books (Plotinus the Platonist and Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics). 

2.1  Gerson’s approach is to present what Gerson refers to as a ‘via negativa’ to define what Gerson refers to as ‘Ur-Platonism’ meaning core perspectives that are essential to what Platonism means.  Gerson's approach is a ‘negative way’ because Gerson’s Ur-Platonism is a list of five types of philosophical understanding that Platonism rejects (hence a negative way).  Gerson writes, “The elements of UP [Ur-Platonism] according to my hypothesis are antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.” (Page 10)  Gerson’s view is that Platonism is opposed to the five teachings of materialism, mechanism, nominalism, relativism, and skepticism.  In this way Gerson distinguishes Platonism, and the Platonist tradition as a whole, from other philosophical traditions and frameworks.  I think it is noteworthy that this negative approach leads to a fairly broad and inclusive view as to what Platonism is: for example, Christian Platonism would be included in the Platonist tradition when using this negative definition and, in addition, contemporary Pagan Platonism would also be included.  I think this is a strength of Gerson’s approach.

2.2  In contrast to Gerson’s approach, David J. Yount’s approach to arguing for the continuity of the Platonist tradition over time is to take various topics, such as Mysticism and Ethics, and so forth, present how Plato understands these topics by quoting relevant passages from the Dialogues and then comparing these quotes from Plato with quotes from the Enneads of Plotinus to show that the two philosophers share an understanding regarding these topics.  Further, Yount then discusses various critiques by other philosophers as to the commonality of the Platonic and Plotinian interpretations of the topic.  Yount counters these criticisms by showing what Yount regards as the shortcomings of these criticisms.  In this way Yount presents the reader with a case for the continuity of the Platonic tradition at a point in its history where it is common to regard the Platonic tradition as morphing into something new and fundamentally different.  I have found Yount’s presentations to be valuable and helpful, as well as convincing.

2.3  Yount’s presentation is not a negative way to the unity of the Platonic tradition.  This is a contrast with Gerson, though it does not contradict Gerson’s approach; for example, Gerson’s five negations could be applied to Plotinus without effecting Yount’s analysis.  Together these two approaches provide useful tools for understanding the continuity of the Platonic tradition. 

2.3.1  I think it is worth pointing out that Yount’s method could be applied to any Platonist.  I mean that, for example, it would be possible to compare the Cambridge Platonists to Plato by using various topics, such as the topics used by Yount, and then quoting passages from Plato relevant to this topic and compare them to what the Cambridge Platonists have to say on the same topic.  As a method I think it could be quite fruitful; I am thinking of how such an approach might illuminate Whitehead’s relationship to the Platonic tradition.

2.4  I see these two different approaches to defending the unity of the Platonic tradition, the approach used by Gerson and the approach used by Yount, as tools that the dedicated Platonist can use when they are in a situation where the issue of the unity of Platonism arises.  Both Gerson and Yount have given the Platonic community these tools which, when understood, can increase the confidence in the reality of an actual Platonic tradition spanning many centuries.

3.  Using Gerson’s method for defining the Platonic tradition through negations you could define Christianity by saying Christianity is anti-pagan, anti-materialist, anti-fatalistic, anti-eternalist (in the sense of material cosmology), and so forth.  What this leaves out is the communal worship and ceremonies like Holy Communion as defining characteristics of the Christian tradition.  And I wonder if the same applies to Platonism?

3.1  From my perspective what is left out of Platonism in the Gerson analysis are things like ethics and virtues and their connection to metaphysical reality through the process of purification.  I am thinking specifically of the ethical restraints that are taught in the Dialogues and referred to consistently by subsequent Platonic Sages.  In other words, I am thinking that a philosophical tradition is not defined solely by its doctrines, or by the doctrines it rejects.  The ethical restraints indicate how a philosopher should act in the world, what they should do, what they should embody, in order to be a Platonist, which is to say to be a philosopher.  I see the ethical restraints of Platonism as defining Platonism in significant ways.  I don’t think the ethical restraints are an all-encompassing definition; it is more like a ‘pillar’ of Platonism, one of several pillars.  Additional pillars would include an understanding of the levels, or hypostases, of the metaphysical cosmos, an understanding of rebirth, an understanding of the virtues, the practice of contemplation, and a commitment to the regular reading of the Platonist classics such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus.  But to be fair to Gerson, I don’t think Gerson is engaged in offering a full-blown definition of Platonism; rather the five antis that Gerson offers are a method for distinguishing Platonism from other philosophies and that, Gerson argues, demonstrates the consistency of the Platonic tradition.

3.2  To put it another way, you could say that Gerson’s approach, the negative way, could be viewed as the skeleton of Platonism and the ethical restraints as the musculature.  Or you could say that they are two wings of Platonism that when the student matures in their understanding allows the student to fly to the higher hypostases.

3.3  This understanding of Philosophy as a way of life with ethical requirements and spiritual exercises isn’t new; it was put forth by Pierre Hadot, but I don’t see that it has caught on.  As far as I can tell the centrality of ethical restraints for Platonism is not, at this time, looked at as having the same kind of significance as comprehending metaphysical views.  I can understand that.  For a long time Western Philosophy has been primarily a way of analysis and the connection between Platonism and mathematics has, I think, helped to center that way of looking at Platonism. Most people do not think that the study of mathematics entails ethical commitments and if Platonism is looked at in this way the question of ethical restraints and their place in the philosophy of Platonism would probably not arise.

3.4  But perhaps the time has arrived to reconsider the ethical restraints of Platonism and their role in the Platonic tradition.  Here the Indian Dharma traditions can be of assistance.  The role of ethical restraints in most Dharma traditions (by Dharma Traditions I mean Indian traditions like Hinduism, Classical Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and so forth) is prominent and explicitly incorporated into the tradition through presentations and ceremonies.  The five minimal restraints offered in these traditions are considered foundational and necessary for walking the spiritual path.  I feel the same about Platonism.

3.4.1  I’m not saying that Platonism is, or isn’t, influenced directly by these Dharma traditions; I’m neither for nor against this view.  I don’t know enough to have an opinion about it.  What I am noticing is that there is a shared interest in, and emphasis on, ethical restraints in both Platonism and Dharma traditions and furthermore that these restraints are, for the most part, the same across traditions.  Because of this I think that Dharma traditions can shed some light on how to bring forth the ethical restraints of Platonism that are taught in various dialogues, scattered here and there amongst the classics of Platonism.  What Dharma traditions offer Platonism on this topic is a time-tested method for presenting these restraints and using them explicitly. 

3.4.2  In a way, what I am suggesting for the ethical restraints found in Platonism is what has already happened for the Virtues.  The virtues, like the restraints, are commented on in scattered Platonic Dialogues.  But for purposes of presentation and teaching the Virtues have been gathered together and presented as a whole ethical teaching.  There has been a lot written about the Virtues beginning with the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, down to the present day.  But the restraints have not been treated in the same way.  What I am suggesting is treating the restraints in a manner that highlights them and centers them for the Platonic tradition and that the Dharma traditions are a resource for Platonists wishing to do so in the sense that Dharma traditions have forms and procedures that are focused on these kinds of teachings.  I don’t think borrowing these ways of presenting the ethical restraints of Platonism is illegitimate nor do I see it as cultural appropriation; just as Platonist mathematicians use Arabic numerals rather than Roman numerals, so also I think it would be legitimate to borrow the methods and procedures of Dharma traditions regarding the Platonic ethical restraints (asceses). 

4.  Gerson’s five antis is a very useful tool for discussing Platonism in certain contexts.  I am thinking specifically of the contemporary University context.  The doctrines that Gerson lists as doctrines that Platonism rejects are widespread in Academia today and it is therefore helpful to have them highlighted and pointed out as not the way Platonism views philosophy or the cosmos.  It’s an easy list to remember and can come in handy in intellectual discussions about philosophy.

But I think Platonism also needs to present itself as a kind of transformative praxis and it is here that the ethical restraints find their place.  This turns Platonism into a lived vocation.

Analysis and Its Function in the Platonic Tradition

16 September 2024

Analysis and Its Function in the Platonic Tradition

I have been reading Plotinus the Platonist by David J. Yount.  In the past I have used Yount’s books as reference books, meaning that I dove into them here and there, depending on the particular subject I was interested in.  This time I intend to read his books from cover to cover.  The second book is Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics.  They aren’t huge volumes, but they contain a huge amount of information.

I just finished Chapter 1 of Plotinus the Platonist which Yount refers to as containing his most ‘controversial claims.’  Yount’s approach is to state his understanding of a particular matter of interpretation and then briefly quote scholars who oppose his perspective.  Yount then attempts to counter the scholars who disagree with him.  This makes for a complex texture though I didn’t find it forbidding; partly, I think, this is because Yount doesn’t go off on tangents, which is sometimes a temptation in philosophical writing.

This approach also introduces the reader to the multitude of contemporary interpretations regarding Plato, Plotinus, and the relationship between them.  There is a wide range of such interpretations.  I was aware of this from reading a lot of commentaries on Phaedo when I was posting here about that Dialogue.  But Yount covers a lot more views and topics.

This got me thinking about the (inherent?) instability of these kinds of analyses.  I mean that there never seems to be a conclusion that is reached or a kind of settling down to a general agreement.  Primarily this is due to our living in the third level, or hypostasis, that is to say the material world, which is distinctively marked by differentiation and an inability to achieve unity.  Secondarily, this is due to the way modern philosophy views itself as part of the heritage of analytic philosophy which emerged in the early 20th century.  Analytic philosophy is all about splitting concepts, winning arguments by redefining concepts, creating sub-categories, simply for the sake of doing so.  In this way the analytic tradition sometimes resembles the Gnosticism that Plotinus critiqued because both traditions very much enjoy multiplying concepts beyond necessity.  

This situation, the multitude of interpretations on many issues of Platonic Philosophy that are all vying for acceptance, also got me thinking about what is the function of analysis in Platonic philosophy.  Platonism is a highly intellectual tradition and it has generated some of the greatest intellects of history from Aristotle to Whitehead.  But there is analysis, and then there is ‘analysis.’  Here are a few comments about this:

1.  I think one way of looking at this kind of analysis is to compare it to music theory.  Music theory looks at a piece of music and seeks to point out the underlying structures that are below the surface and hold the music together.  But different analyses will highlight different aspects of the same music.  In a similar way, different analyses of Platonic thought will highlight different aspects of the Platonic tradition.

2.  In some cases, it seems to me that some of these analyses are mere ‘mental fabrications’ or ‘speculations’ which are a kind of churning of the intellect.  Some of them do not seem to me to lead to clarity or insight; but that might be because I don’t understand what, in these cases, is being advocated.  As I have previously mentioned, I ran into these kinds of mental fabrications when I studied Buddhism.  In some ways they are attractive, but they don’t seem to have any real impact on practice.  That is to say whether or not I agree with one of these ‘tenet systems’ does not change or deepen my meditation or my ability to embody Buddhist ethics.  In that sense, they are disconnected from the life of a Buddhist practitioner.  I think the same can be said of some of the contemporary analyses of Platonism.

3.  This tendency to over-analyze and over-interpret Platonism appears to me to run counter to the purpose of experiencing Nous, or the second hypostasis, or the second level of reality. This level is usually referred to as ‘Intellect,’ sometimes ‘Intellectual Principle’ but I think that what the second level is about differs from the kinds of analyses I am expressing skepticism about.  Nous is a realm of unities and includes such unities as numbers, being, and the forms.  The experience of Nous brings us closer to the One which is pure unity and absence of differentiation.  When Nous is referred to as intellect, in a traditional Platonic context that means using the mind to uncover unity where unity was not previously accessible or known.  This is why devices like allegory, metaphor, simile, and other ‘comparisons’ of this kind are used in Platonism; because these devices are excellent for pointing to hidden unities.  But this way of approaching Platonic analysis is nearly the opposite of analysis that seeks to divide, separate, and is focused on the multiplication of mind-created entities.

4.  What Yount does in his two books is to point out what unites Plato and Plotinus rather than what separates them.  And by implication Yount is pointing to what unites the Platonic tradition as a whole.  This was how Plato and Plotinus were understood for over 1,000 years.  I think it is a good thing to return to that perspective.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 5

14 February 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics --5

1.  John Peter Kenney in his book Mystical Monotheism suggests that Plotinus advocated for an ineffable One as a way of countering the infinite regress implied in some versions of earlier Platonism; most of those versions were derived from the Plato’s Parmenides.  I don’t see it that way.  Plotinus’s apophatic approach to the One is derived from his contemplative experience rather than from an analysis of inferential systems. 

David J. Yount in his book Plotinus the Platonist understands this; for example, “I believe Plotinus had the same experience or vision of the Good that Plato did, and so their philosophies come out sounding, if not being, the same.  However, it is not because Plato wrote what he did that Plotinus agrees with it; Plotinus agrees with it because he achieved knowledge of the Good; thus Plato wrote what he did because he also had the experience of the Good.”  (Page xxiii)  And later Yount writes, “. . . it is my unprovable contention that Plotinus exited Plato’s Cave, saw the Good and described it in as much detail as he and his listeners had time to question and investigate – everything from the shadows on the wall to the Good Itself.” (page xxix) I would add, that I think that Yount’s view is provable if you walk the Way of Platonism long enough and enter into contemplation long enough; ‘long enough’ in this context means something like ‘many years.’

2.  I often compare Platonism to Dharmic traditions from India because I think Platonism has more in common with Dharmic traditions than it does with what philosophy has become in modernity.  Lately I have been comparing Platonism to Confucianism.  Points to consider include that rather undefined nature of ultimacy in both systems.  In Platonism the One is ineffable.  In Confucianism Heaven is mentioned, but it is not an idea that is unpacked in detail; it is rather an influential reality.  Heaven isn’t quite apophatic in a Plotinian sense; on the other hand, Heaven isn’t specified in any detail.

Another similarity is that the Confucian Sage is dedicated to the Way of the Scholar Sage; in a Confucian context this means the study of the Confucian Classics such as the Analects and the Book of Rites and the Book of Poetry, and so forth.  I think it is possible to map onto Platonism some aspects of the Way of the Scholar Sage such as the dedicated reading and study of the Platonic Classics, specifically the Dialogues and the Enneads.

Though it is not generally understood in the West, Confucianism has a contemplative dimension.  This dimension is also present in Platonism.

Two big differences are, first, that the Confucian Sage regards serving the State as a noble calling.  In contrast, the Platonic Sage is not inherently drawn to such service.  And second, Confucianism is not an ascetic tradition, though it does have strong ethical commitments that might, in our hedonistic time, be thought of as unnecessarily restrictive.  But asceticism is central to Platonism, it is a primary form of practice.

3.  I’ve been thinking about why I spend time comparing Platonism to non-Western spiritual systems.  I think I am motivated to do so because Western Philosophy has evolved in a manner that makes it almost impossible to understand Platonism if you only view Platonism through the lens of contemporary, or modernist, Western Philosophy.  If I were to focus on a single absence in modernist Western Philosophy it would be that there is no understanding of Philosophy as salvific; the very idea of Philosophy as salvific sounds strange in a contemporary philosophical context.  In contrast, Dharmic traditions, and a tradition like Confucianism, view their philosophical studies as leading to salvation and the overcoming of negative metaphysically rooted conditions and situations.  For this reason I feel a need to link Platonism to, especially, Dharmic traditions, and other spiritual traditions in an attempt to explain what Platonism is about.

4.  I’ve posted several times about the topic of evil recently.  In a book by Eric Fallick, a contemporary Platonist practitioner, there is an essay, Some Thoughts on the Great Problems of Manyness and Evil.  Here is a quote;

“How and why can there be more than the One, especially when everything else is a descent from Its perfection?  How and why do many things come from the One?  Even more incomprehensible, how can evil, which is so evident and undeniable, arise from the Good Itself, and why should this be so?  Indeed, compared to the One Itself, just the existence of anything else, even of those things we ordinarily describe as good, is evil in itself just as those things being other than the Good!  Why are they then, and how can this be so?  Why did our souls descend in the first place and the beginningless cycles of birth and death, genesis, samsara begin?  These sorts of questions, and related variants according to different systems, have been considered and answered by many different people in many different systems of many varieties.  No answer has satisfied everyone and perhaps there is no answer but to realize union with the Absolute through diligent contemplative ascetic practice, at which point both the question and the questioner cease or, to put it another way, the answer is obvious.”

(Eric Fallick, Platonist Contemplative Asceticism: Practice and Principle, published by lulu-dot-com, 2019, pages 164 and 165, ISBN: 9780359773015)

Some things are answered only through practice.  I think this is true even in mundane activities.  For example, an instructor might tell an aspiring musician to hold his hands in a particular way around the instrument.  For the student this position may seem awkward or counterintuitive.  Later on, though, as he becomes more skilled, he finds out that this hand position allows for skillful performance of many pieces of music.  The analogy has some flaws, but I think you get what I’m saying. 

5.  Beautiful things in this world are like the sound of a bell.  They are attractive like the sound of a bell.  They arise due to causes and conditions like the sound of a bell.  The sound of a bell endures and then fades, just like beautiful things endure and then fade.

The beauty of the sound of a bell is the beauty of the noetic and the One manifesting in the dimension of time.  And this is true for all beautiful things.  But noetic beauty is Beauty as Such and does not fade because it transcends time.  Following the beauty of the sound of a bell back to its noetic source and we find ourselves in the presence of eternity.

 

 

Plato, Plotinus, and the Platonic Tradition: A Review of 'Plotinus the Platonist' by David J. Yount

Plato, Plotinus, and the Platonic Tradition

A Review and Appreciation of Plotinus the Platonist by David J. Yount

For over a thousand years Plotinus was thought of as a Platonist.  Plotinus himself, as well as all of the contemporaries of Plotinus, and the philosophers who came after in the Late Classical Period, thought of Plotinus as a Platonist; nothing more and nothing less.  The emerging Christian Platonism also thought of Plotinus as a Platonist; this was true both in Latin Christianity (for example, St. Augustine) as well as the Greek tradition of orthodoxy.  And this continued right through to the early modern period; for example, Ficino viewed Plotinus as a Platonist.

Then some academic scholars in the 1600’s decided that Plotinus was not actually a Platonist; instead Plotinus was a ‘Neoplatonist.’  This created a separation in the history of Platonism that did not exist before it was conjured in an academic setting.  And ever since the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ was conjured it has negatively affected the West’s understanding of Plotinus by creating a separation where none actually exists.

I have posted about this before, usually out of a sense of frustration.  When I hear a youtuber say that ‘Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism,’ a statement heard often, I realize that a deep misunderstanding is at the root of what they are about to present.  It’s not that someone who makes a statement like that has nothing to offer; but this opening thought about Plotinus will feed distortions and misunderstandings.  It’s like trying to write a song in major, but only using a minor key; some aspects of the song, like rhythm, will come through, but the overall presentation will not be accurate.

I recently came upon an antidote to this distortion.  David J. Yount, a philosophy Professor at Mesa College, has been equally frustrated by how the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’, and in particular the idea that Plotinus has something to do with it, as I have been (as well as many others).  But Yount has the scholarly ability to counter the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’, and how that idea has been used.  Yount’s findings are presented in two books; the first is Plotinus the Platonist and the second is Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics.

Yount’s method is to focus on particular features of Platonic philosophy, or particular topics in philosophy in general, and then meticulously compare how Plato and Plotinus treat these topics.  In doing so Yount demonstrates the unity of the two.

For example, in Plotinus the Platonist Yount has chapters dedicated to The One, Beauty, Intellect, World-Soul, The Three Hypostases and Emanation, and Matter and Evil.  In the second volume Yount takes the same approach with Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics (because the topics in the second volume are broader, the chapters are longer.)  In each chapter Yount takes quotes from Plato and Plotinus on the selected topic, compares them, showing how the two agree. 

In addition, Yount references modern scholars who disagree with the idea that Plato and Plotinus are in agreement on the specific topic being considered.  Because most academics have signed on to the idea that there is a meaningful difference between the two, Yount only takes a representative sample of those who argue against Yount’s view of a basic unity.  Yount then explains why he does not think that those holding to the idea that, for example, the understanding of the One is the same in Plato and Plotinus, are not reading the two philosophers accurately. 

This approach means the books are a rich treasury of material on various aspects of the Platonic tradition.  If you are interested in a specific topic, such as Beauty, you can go to that chapter and find relevant references in Plato and Plotinus, as well as what others have to say about Beauty in Platonism, along with a defense for the basic unity of the tradition.  This makes the two volumes an invaluable resource for those who regularly read and study the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, a resource that will prove helpful for their studies for many years.

The books are not easy reads and the prose at times is a bit plodding.  But I think that is a necessary consequence of Yount’s thoroughness and the inherent complexity of some of the issues; Yount needed to be thorough and meticulous because many, but not all, academics have accepted the idea of a division between the two, rather than comprehending their basic unity.  I am impressed, to the point of being in awe, of Yount’s command of the material and the ease with which he cross-references material from Plato with relevant material from Plotinus.  It must have taken Yount a long time to work on a project like this; it takes a lot of dedication to organize material in this way.  In addition, Yount is able to communicate to the reader how these passages are related with a sure voice which, at the same time, does not talk down to the reader. 

Yount says in the ‘Introduction’ that the reason for this foundational agreement is that Plato and Plotinus had the same experience of the Good and the One.  And it is from this experience that their philosophy flows.  In other words, Plato and Plotinus are talking about the same thing, guiding others to the same realization, showing readers the path to the transcendental source of all things that is beyond all affirmation and negation.