On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

11 May 2026

On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

1.  Among contemporary academic scholars of the Platonic tradition there is disagreement about the continuity of the Platonic tradition, meaning whether or not there is a demonstrable unity to be found in Platonism across the thousands of years of the Platonic tradition’s history.  This is not surprising.  I think it arises, at least in part, from disputes about whether Plato’s thought developed over the course of the Dialogues or if Plato’s writings present a unified vision.  Some argue for a developmental view; for example, they interpret the dialogue Parmenides as, in part, a refutation, or a reconfiguration, of the theory of forms (noetic realities, eternal objects) of the way this view is presented in dialogues like Phaedo and The Republic.  Those who hold to the dialogues as presenting a unified vision interpret Parmenides as a further elaboration of the theory of forms rather than displacing an earlier understanding of this theory.

I also find this view of disjunctive developmentalism in the history of the Platonic tradition in the way that Plotinus is treated by many (perhaps most?) Platonic scholars today.  It is often stated that Plotinus is ‘the founder of Neoplatonism’, meaning that Plotinus presented a new interpretation of the tradition.  That view is nowhere to be found in the actual writings of Plotinus, nor is it to be found in any contemporary of Plotinus, but that’s the way Plotinus is often presented these days.

I think these disjunctive interpretations of Platonism (Plato himself and Platonism’s history as a whole) partly arise because of the influence of the theory of deconstruction that became widespread in the late 20^th century and continues today in the 21^st.  The procedures of deconstruction are designed to be disruptive and disjunctive so it’s not a surprise that analyses based on the theory of deconstruction will result in a disjunctive view of Platonism.

2.  Though this view that Platonism lacks a clear sense of unity over time (history), or even within the Dialogues of Plato, is widespread, this view does have its opponents within academia.  I have observed two different approaches for defending, or apologizing for, the unity of the Platonic tradition.  The first is presented by Lloyd P. Gerson in his book From Plato to Platonism.  The second is presented by David J. Yount in two published books (Plotinus the Platonist and Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics). 

2.1  Gerson’s approach is to present what Gerson refers to as a ‘via negativa’ to define what Gerson refers to as ‘Ur-Platonism’ meaning core perspectives that are essential to what Platonism means.  Gerson's approach is a ‘negative way’ because Gerson’s Ur-Platonism is a list of five types of philosophical understanding that Platonism rejects (hence a negative way).  Gerson writes, “The elements of UP [Ur-Platonism] according to my hypothesis are antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.” (Page 10)  Gerson’s view is that Platonism is opposed to the five teachings of materialism, mechanism, nominalism, relativism, and skepticism.  In this way Gerson distinguishes Platonism, and the Platonist tradition as a whole, from other philosophical traditions and frameworks.  I think it is noteworthy that this negative approach leads to a fairly broad and inclusive view as to what Platonism is: for example, Christian Platonism would be included in the Platonist tradition when using this negative definition and, in addition, contemporary Pagan Platonism would also be included.  I think this is a strength of Gerson’s approach.

2.2  In contrast to Gerson’s approach, David J. Yount’s approach to arguing for the continuity of the Platonist tradition over time is to take various topics, such as Mysticism and Ethics, and so forth, present how Plato understands these topics by quoting relevant passages from the Dialogues and then comparing these quotes from Plato with quotes from the Enneads of Plotinus to show that the two philosophers share an understanding regarding these topics.  Further, Yount then discusses various critiques by other philosophers as to the commonality of the Platonic and Plotinian interpretations of the topic.  Yount counters these criticisms by showing what Yount regards as the shortcomings of these criticisms.  In this way Yount presents the reader with a case for the continuity of the Platonic tradition at a point in its history where it is common to regard the Platonic tradition as morphing into something new and fundamentally different.  I have found Yount’s presentations to be valuable and helpful, as well as convincing.

2.3  Yount’s presentation is not a negative way to the unity of the Platonic tradition.  This is a contrast with Gerson, though it does not contradict Gerson’s approach; for example, Gerson’s five negations could be applied to Plotinus without effecting Yount’s analysis.  Together these two approaches provide useful tools for understanding the continuity of the Platonic tradition. 

2.3.1  I think it is worth pointing out that Yount’s method could be applied to any Platonist.  I mean that, for example, it would be possible to compare the Cambridge Platonists to Plato by using various topics, such as the topics used by Yount, and then quoting passages from Plato relevant to this topic and compare them to what the Cambridge Platonists have to say on the same topic.  As a method I think it could be quite fruitful; I am thinking of how such an approach might illuminate Whitehead’s relationship to the Platonic tradition.

2.4  I see these two different approaches to defending the unity of the Platonic tradition, the approach used by Gerson and the approach used by Yount, as tools that the dedicated Platonist can use when they are in a situation where the issue of the unity of Platonism arises.  Both Gerson and Young have given the Platonic community these tools which, when understood, can increase the confidence in the reality of an actual Platonic tradition spanning many centuries.

3.  Using Gerson’s method for defining the Platonic tradition through negations you could define Christianity by saying Christianity is anti-pagan, anti-materialist, anti-fatalistic, anti-eternalist (in the sense of material cosmology), and so forth.  What this leaves out is the communal worship and ceremonies like Holy Communion as defining characteristics of the Christian tradition.  And I wonder if the same applies to Platonism?

3.1  From my perspective what is left out of Platonism in the Gerson analysis are things like ethics and virtues and their connection to metaphysical reality through the process of purification.  I am thinking specifically of the ethical restraints that are taught in the Dialogues and referred to consistently by subsequent Platonic Sages.  In other words, I am thinking that a philosophical tradition is not defined solely by its doctrines, or by the doctrines it rejects.  The ethical restraints indicate how a philosopher should act in the world, what they should do, what they should embody, in order to be a Platonist, which is to say to be a philosopher.  I see the ethical restraints of Platonism as defining Platonism in significant ways.  I don’t think the ethical restraints are an all-encompassing definition; it is more like a ‘pillar’ of Platonism, one of several pillars.  Additional pillars would include an understanding of the levels, or hypostases, of the metaphysical cosmos, an understanding of rebirth, an understanding of the virtues, the practice of contemplation, and a commitment to the regular reading of the Platonist classics such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus.  But to be fair to Gerson, I don’t think Gerson is engaged in offering a full-blown definition of Platonism; rather the five antis that Gerson offers are a method for distinguishing Platonism from other philosophies and that, Gerson argues, demonstrates the consistency of the Platonic tradition.

3.2  To put it another way, you could say that Gerson’s approach, the negative way, could be viewed as the skeleton of Platonism and the ethical restraints as the musculature.  Or you could say that they are two wings of Platonism that when the student matures in their understanding allows the student to fly to the higher hypostases.

3.3  This understanding of Philosophy as a way of life with ethical requirements and spiritual exercises isn’t new; it was put forth by Pierre Hadot, but I don’t see that it has caught on.  As far as I can tell the centrality of ethical restraints for Platonism is not, at this time, looked at as having the same kind of significance as comprehending metaphysical views.  I can understand that.  For a long time Western Philosophy has been primarily a way of analysis and the connection between Platonism and mathematics has, I think, helped to center that way of looking at Platonism. Most people do not think that the study of mathematics entails ethical commitments and if Platonism is looked at in this way the question of ethical restraints and their place in the philosophy of Platonism would probably not arise.

3.4  But perhaps the time has arrived to reconsider the ethical restraints of Platonism and their role in the Platonic tradition.  Here the Indian Dharma traditions can be of assistance.  The role of ethical restraints in most Dharma traditions (by Dharma Traditions I mean Indian traditions like Hinduism, Classical Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and so forth) is prominent and explicitly incorporated into the tradition through presentations and ceremonies.  The five minimal restraints offered in these traditions are considered foundational and necessary for walking the spiritual path.  I feel the same about Platonism.

3.4.1  I’m not saying that Platonism is, or isn’t, influenced directly by these Dharma traditions; I’m neither for nor against this view.  I don’t know enough to have an opinion about it.  What I am noticing is that there is a shared interest in, and emphasis on, ethical restraints in both Platonism and Dharma traditions and furthermore that these restraints are, for the most part, the same across traditions.  Because of this I think that Dharma traditions can shed some light on how to bring forth the ethical restraints of Platonism that are taught in various dialogues, scattered here and there amongst the classics of Platonism.  What Dharma traditions offer Platonism on this topic is a time-tested method for presenting these restraints and using them explicitly. 

3.4.2  In a way, what I am suggesting for the ethical restraints found in Platonism is what has already happened for the Virtues.  The virtues, like the restraints, are commented on in scattered Platonic Dialogues.  But for purposes of presentation and teaching the Virtues have been gathered together and presented as a whole ethical teaching.  There has been a lot written about the Virtues beginning with the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, down to the present day.  But the restraints have not been treated in the same way.  What I am suggesting is treating the restraints in a manner that highlights them and centers them for the Platonic tradition and that the Dharma traditions are a resource for Platonists wishing to do so in the sense that Dharma traditions have forms and procedures that are focused on these kinds of teachings.  I don’t think borrowing these ways of presenting the ethical restraints of Platonism is illegitimate nor do I see it as cultural appropriation; just as Platonist mathematicians use Arabic numerals rather than Roman numerals, so also I think it would be legitimate to borrow the methods and procedures of Dharma traditions regarding the Platonic ethical restraints (asceses). 

4.  Gerson’s five antis is a very useful tool for discussing Platonism in certain contexts.  I am thinking specifically of the contemporary University context.  The doctrines that Gerson lists as doctrines that Platonism rejects are widespread in Academia today and it is therefore helpful to have them highlighted and pointed out as not the way Platonism views philosophy or the cosmos.  It’s an easy list to remember and can come in handy in intellectual discussions about philosophy.

But I think Platonism also needs to present itself as a kind of transformative praxis and it is here that the ethical restraints find their place.  This turns Platonism into a lived vocation.