Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 53

30 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 53

1.  Platonism grows on you.  I mean that when people first encounter Platonism through reading the Dialogues, perhaps in a University class, it can feel confusing and sometimes opaque.  But there are passages, images, and allegories that are attractive, and some of the characters in the Dialogues are interesting.  It’s a bit like learning a new language; at first the comprehension is not great and there is likely to be much that is misunderstood.  But there are words and phrases that cohere and make sense.  Over time the language becomes internalized and can be used as a means of communication.  I think the process of becoming a Platonist is similar; at some point the pieces of the philosophy fit together and the beauty of its insights become inspiring.  Eventually this leads to daily interaction, through reading, through various practices, and through contemplation.  At this point the relationship to Platonism is no longer opaque or confusing; instead, it is nourishing and every morning when we wake up, we look forward to deepening our relationship to the tradition.

2.  Readers might be interested that David Litwa, a scholar dedicated to the Classical world of, roughly, 100 CE to 300 CE, with a special focus on Christian Gnosticism, has decided to translate Porphyry’s Against the Christians.  This book survives, as I understand it, only in quotes from Christian critics.  I don’t know if there have been any recent discoveries regarding this work, but if there have been Litwa would be aware of them.

Last year I read Litwa’s translation of Celsus’s critique of Christianity which Litwa translates as ‘The True Teaching.’  Both Celsus and Porphyry defend traditional Platonic perspectives on various issues.  I’m not sure when Litwa will publish Against the Christians, but I look forward to reading it.

3.  I sometimes toy with the idea of creating a Platonist Canon.  I do this as a thought experiment; if I was in some kind of position to recommend a canon of Platonic works, what would I choose?  I would, naturally, start with the Dialogues of Plato.  The next work would be the Enneads of Plotinus.  These two alone offer a complete and unsurpassed presentation of Platonism.  You really don’t need anything else.

But other works are helpful and worthwhile.  For this second tier I would add Alcinous’s Handbook of Platonism, Maximus of Tyre’s Orations, and Plutarch’s Platonic works.

For post-Plotinian works I would suggest Porphyry’s On Abstinence as well as additional works such as his Letter to Marcella, and so forth.  (I think it would be a good idea to publish an edition of the remaining complete works of Porphyry that would also include the fragments of works that have vanished.  It could be called ‘The Porphyry Project.’)

After Porphyry selection of works becomes more difficult because of the multiplication of influences impacting the Platonic tradition.  Christian Platonism emerges, and there is the earlier Jewish Platonism of Philo of Alexandria as well as the later development of Islamic Platonism.  At the moment, I’m inclined not include them in a Platonist Canon because the projects of these philosophers is to create what I call a hyphenated Platonism that subordinates Platonism to the concerns of their tradition.  This also applies to the theurgic tradition which is more concerned with ritual efficacy than it is with wisdom and Platonic insights and Platonic ethical practices.  I realize this last is a controversial claim, but that is how I see things at this time. 

The last Platonic philosopher of the Classical period I would include in a canon of Platonism would be Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. 

No doubt I have missed some important works which over time will move into my fantasy Platonic Canon.  In conclusion, this is just a fantasy or mental exercise.  I personally find it useful in negotiating the vast sea of Platonic literature, but I don’t actually think that anyone, or any institution, has the authority for making a definitive Platonic canon; that’s not how Platonism has worked in the past, which is a good thing.

4.  I sometimes think of the variations in how Platonists over the centuries have interpreted the noetic realm (what it is and how it works) as similar to variations on music themes or melodies.  The variation form in music is very widespread; you find it in classical music as well as popular music.  Variations can be simple and easily recognizable, or they can be complex and difficult to hear (that is a variation can be obscure to the listener as to the variation’s relationship to the original theme), and many degrees between. 

If we think of the noetic realm as the realm of eternal objects (Whitehead’s phrase) then it makes sense that those of us residing in the material world, meaning those of us who are ephemeral objects, need to use approximations to talk about the noetic realm.  This isn’t quite the same as trying to describe the ineffable, such as the One and the Good.  The ineffable is beyond description, beyond affirmation and negation.  Noetic objects are not beyond affirmation and negation; for example, numbers have specific characteristics which can be affirmed.  But the unchangingness and eternality of noetic realities means that noetic realities are very remote from our everyday experience which makes it difficult to talk about noetic realities without using comparisons that are approximations.  That’s why variations appear, why Aristotle places noetic realities in objects, why some early Platonists explain noetic realities by calling them thoughts in the mind of God, and why some take a mathematical approach and think of noetic realities as approximating an empty set that contains rules for membership inclusion, and so forth. 

5.  Egypt plays a significant role in the development of the Greek philosophical tradition and of Platonism in particular.  It appears to be the case that Plato had a high view of Egyptian spirituality.  I find that intriguing because on the surface Egyptian and Greek spirituality appear to be very different; I’m referring to, for example, the way images such as statues are divergent in the two traditions.  Greek statues of Gods and Goddesses are highly idealized human beings, often of striking attractiveness.  In contrast, Egyptian deities, for the most part, merge animal and human forms.  Such combinations do appear in Greek spirituality; a good example is the minotaur.  But such creatures are often threatening and I’m not sure that they would qualify as deities.

In Egyptian spirituality deities often have an animal head and a human body, or a human head and an animal body.  This is strikingly different from Greek presentations of the gods and, in addition, differs from the Abrahamic tradition and how God is represented in that tradition.  (I believe that Philo criticized Egyptian religion for using the kinds of images it used.) 

Nevertheless, Plato shows admiration for Egypt and what he thinks of as the country’s stability.  And Plato seems inclined to trust Egyptian sources for ancient history; this is seen, for example, in Plato’s comments on Atlantis. 

Porphyry picks up on this positive view of Egypt in Book 4 of his treatise On Abstinence.  Beginning with paragraph 6, there is a long presentation of how Egyptian philosophers lived in Egypt.  It is a portrait of a highly regulated and disciplined approach to spirituality.  Porphyry states that Egyptian philosophers lived in the Temples and only rarely, during some ceremonies, interacted with non-initiated, ordinary people.  They spent their time in study and contemplation.

It intrigues me that the picture painted here is explicitly that of the philosopher as a religious figure; I’m using the word ‘religious’ because, according to Porphyry’s description, their philosophers were part of a religious institution of great antiquity, as opposed to finding an individual path on their own, or setting up some kind of alternative organization like Plato’s Academy.  When I read Porphyry’s account, it’s not clear to me if philosophers in Egypt were a type of Priest, or whether these two categories of Philosopher and Priest were separate and distinct.  Perhaps a philosopher at that time resembles something like what we sometimes hear about in today’s religious traditions where someone is both a Priest and a learned Scholar, but not all Priests are Scholars and not all Scholars are Priests.

The Egyptian philosophers followed what I infer to be a strict rule that regulated their lives.  I don’t know if that rule survives in some form among ancient Egyptian documents today (I haven’t heard anything about such a document) and I know almost nothing about the specifics of Egyptian spirituality, so I can only speculate beyond this general observation.  But for us Platonists, I think it is worth noting that such a life was viewed by Porphyry, and perhaps Plato as well, as admirable and perhaps something of an ideal.

6.  According to scholars there are many passages in The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius that are paraphrases of various Platonic Dialogues.  These are not direct quotes, and the dialogues, with one exception, are not explicitly named.  This is likely due to the circumstances under which the Consolation was written, which was in a prison cell.

The one exception about naming a dialogue is found in Book III where Boethius explicitly mentions the Timaeus.  The mention of Timaeus is made by Lady Philosophy:

“’But since,’ said she, ‘as is my Plato’s opinion in the Timaeus, we ought to implore God’s help in even the least of matters, what do you think we should do now, that we may be worthy to discover the abode of that highest good?’”

(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by S. H. Tester, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, page 271, ISBN: 0674990838)

The passage in the Timaeus reads:

“Timaeus: Nay, as to that, Socrates, all men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great . . . “

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1929, page 49, 27C, ISBN: 9780674992573)

There are further references to Timaeus later in Book III but the dialogue itself is not explicitly named as it is here.  In addition, according to a footnote in the Loeb edition, some of the references are to a commentary on Timaeus written by Proclus.  I am not familiar with this commentary, but this shows that Boethius had a strong interest in that dialogue.

In contrast, there do not appear to be any clear, or explicit, references to Christian writings.  My take on this is that Boethius had absorbed a view of Philosophy that Platonism advocates for, but which is completely absent from modernity’s understanding of what the task of Philosophy is.  The view I am referring to is that the purpose of Philosophy is salvific; I mean that Platonic Philosophy viewed its purpose as that of freeing human beings from being trapped in materiality through an ascent that concludes in the experience of the Good and the One, the transcendental and the eternal.  That is what Lady Philosophy is referring to when she refers to the ‘abode of the highest Good.’  That is why Boethius turns to philosophy for consolation in his hour of desperate need.  And that is why we should turn to philosophy today.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 46

12 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 46

1.  In my recent reading of Timaeus my feeling was that Timaeus is an extended allegory with the Demiurge and the projects of the Demiurge being a personification of noetic realities.  I say this because it is noetic realities that bequeath the world system, or material realm, in which we live.  Looked at in this way nous is the Demiurge, or more accurately, the Demiurge is the personification of nous and the noetic realm.  Timaeus is about the nature of and order of the manifestations of becoming and begoning.  Becoming and begoning are not noetic realities, but nous is the foundation of becoming and begoning.

2.  “Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1241, 37d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

A distinguishing feature of this material realm is that it is ‘impossible to bestow eternity upon anything’ in the material world; that is because all things in the material realm are created and anything that is created will come to an end.  The closest we can come to eternity is a moving image of eternity.  The moving image of eternity with its sunrises and sunsets, with its waxing and waning moons, with its seasonal displays, is beautiful because eternity is beautiful (in a sense, the beautiful and eternity are the same).  But the beauty of the moving image of eternity means that the things of this image are temporary, whereas the beauty of eternity as such is beauty as such.

3.  Platonism has been around for over 2,000 years.  I sometimes wonder what Platonism might look like after another 2,000 years; that’s assuming that it will be around after another 2,000 years.  It’s impossible to be sure, of course, but I don’t think it is irrational or fanciful to imagine things along this line. 

Will there still be the original Greek texts of Plato and Plotinus?, or will people rely on some later translation in another language?  Platonism is one of the reasons that people are actively interested in ancient Greek and because of this the Greek texts might still be actively circulating.

Platonism has gone through many changes in its interpretation of itself; for example, there are changes on how noetic realities are understood.  In 2,000 years I think it is likely that Platonism will be interpreted through categories that we cannot imagine.

And what will the role of artificial intelligence be for Platonism?  Will we be able to download the Dialogues and the Enneads directly into our minds and ponder them through some kind of technological means?  Perhaps; but perhaps those innovations will have been cast aside.  It’s hard to say.

After 2,000 years it is likely that most of the nations here on earth will only be found in history.  But I suspect that the primary documents of Platonism will still be found and read and discussed at that time.

4.  Beauty is a central understanding of the Platonic tradition.  Some things are strikingly beautiful; for example, a sunset, or a forest path in autumn, or the desert under the full moon, and so forth.  Other things have a more hidden beauty.  When I was young, I lived for a few years on the north coast of Alaska.  The winter is severe, very cold, with snow as far as one can see in any direction.  The Brooks Range is to the south of the north coast and on clear days (which in winter only last a few hours) it can be seen, rising from the endless snow.  This is a different kind of beauty; it is glacial and stark, even threatening, but beautiful nevertheless.

5.  I understand emanation as a process of differentiation.  The One is pure unity and is, therefore, undifferentiated; that is why it lacks any sensory characteristics.  The task of the Platonist practitioner is to ‘return to the One’.  I understand this process of return as a process of de-differentiation, or the steady stepping beyond the differentiations of our material existence.  (This eventually also extends to going beyond the differentiations found in the noetic.)

De-differentiation is done through practices of equanimity, ataraxia, and most importantly, asceticism.  All the practices of de-differentiation are purifications that allow for the soul’s ascent. 

Returning to the One means becoming less and less differentiated which means less and less individuated, more and more like the One.

6.  “I [Porphyry] have shown in the previous two books [chapters], Firmus Castricius, that the eating of animal creatures contributes neither to temperance and simplicity nor to piety, which especially lead to the contemplative life, but rather opposes them.  Justice in its finest aspect is piety towards the gods, and piety is achieved especially by abstinence, so there is no need to fear that we may somehow infringe justice towards people by maintaining holiness towards the gods.  Socrates, in reply to those who argue that our end is pleasure, said that even if all hogs and he-goats agreed with this, he would not be convinced that our happiness lies in experiencing pleasure, so long as intellect rules over all. [See Philebus 67b] And we, even if all wolves and vultures approve of meat-eating, will not agree that what they say is just, so long as humans are naturally harmless and inclined to refrain from acquiring pleasures for themselves by harming others.”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 80, ISBN: 9781780938899)

6.1  This is part of the opening paragraph for Book 3 of Porphyry’s series of letters to Firmus Castricius on refraining from killing animals either for food or for ritual sacrifice.  This paragraph consolidates a number of points that Porphyry uses to support the practice of vegetarianism; for example, that eating animals undermines the virtues such as temperance, piety, and living a simple life (which I take as meaning a life with few possessions).  Porphyry particularly emphasizes how eating meat ‘opposes’ contemplation, which is a point Porphyry makes in the opening of the first Book, or letter, to Firmus.  Notice also how Porphyry states that eating meat undermines justice and holiness towards the gods. 

This is followed by Porphyry arguing against the idea that the pleasure of eating meat somehow justifies such a practice, reminding the reader that Socrates argued against such an approach to ethics. 

Porphyry also integrates the Platonic teachings on non-harming into his overall critique of killing animals.  This passage is dense with reasonings on why eating and killing animals should be avoided with the primary message being that such a practice is contrary to what it means to live a philosophical life.

6.2  Later in Book 3, at paragraphs 26 Porphyry expands on the theme of harmlessness:  “When the passions have been abased and appetite and anger have withered, and the rational part exercises the rule which is appropriate for it, assimilation to the Greater follows at once.  The Greater in the universe is altogether harmless, and itself by its power safeguards all, does good to all, and lacks nothing . . . “ (As above, page 98)

6.3 And in paragraph 27 Porphyry writes: “A man who is led by passions and is harmless only to his children and his wife, but contemptuous and aggressive towards others, is aroused and dazzled by mortal things because the irrational dominates in him.  In the same way, the man who is led by reason maintains harmlessness towards fellow-citizens too, and further still towards strangers and all human beings; he keeps irrationality subjected, and is more rational than those others and thereby also more godlike.  Thus someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other animals is more like the god . . . “ (Ibid, pages 98-99)

7.  On a Summer evening, the evening of the Summer Solstice, Plato walks through a northern Wisconsin forest on a broad path that most people do not see.  Beside Plato is a brown bear; they are walking together.  Now and then Plato scratches the bear behind the bear’s ears.  The slope of the path begins to descend to a small lake where there is a dock with Plato’s canoe tied to a post.  Sunset approaches.  Plato and the brown bear arrive at the shore of the placid lake.  They pause to look at the sunset.  The bear is glowing in the sunset light and with an inner glow as well.  The glow slowly becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes the sparks of starlight swirling in a disc like a galaxy.  The swirling light slowly fades.  Plato, standing on the shore, smiles.  The sun has disappeared but the night sky is clear.  Plato walks down the wooden dock to his canoe.  He unties it and steps into the canoe.  Plato takes a paddle and steers the canoe to the middle of the lake, turns the canoe to the right, and paddles down the middle of the lake.  The Milky Way is reflected in the water so that Plato is paddling on a path of stars.  The lake disappears.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 41

7 April 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 41

1.  I was reading some of the essays by John Dillon from his new book Perspectives on Plotinus and at the same time rereading from the Orations of Maximus of Tyre.  I was reading them now and then and going back and forth between them.  I came away with a pleasing feeling of continuity; that is to say I feel a sense of common purpose between Dillon and Maximus as well as a common approach in their essays.  They both have great respect for the Platonic tradition.  They both ground what they are saying in the Platonic heritage, including older texts.  They both write in a focused, essay, style; I mean that each of their writings is focused on a particular topic of Platonism which the authors then unpack, showing how the topic of the essay relates to other topics in Platonism and/or Platonism as a whole.

2.  A friend of mine disagreed with my assertion in “Brief Notes on Various Topics 40.3” that presenting Platonism to college students needs to be done in a manner that can connect with them by presenting Platonism in a way that does not clash with the assumptions of modernity; at least not too much.  This means that starting with the topics of transcendence, or asceticism, is unlikely to make sense to young people in our culture at this time because of its materialism, nihilism, and reductionism.  

My friend pointed out that Platonism is not a tradition that is for most people.  Rather, Platonism is for the few.  My friend was suggesting that crafting a presentation of Platonism to appeal to undergraduate college students (perhaps in an Introduction to Philosophy class) implicitly means that I want Platonism to be a popular ‘Dharma’ or a ‘universal’ Dharma.  I think this is a fair point.  We in the West are used to thinking of religions and spiritual traditions as having the goal of universal appeal and, potentially, universal adherence.  This is true of Christianity.  But it is also true of a religion like Buddhism which has always had a strong push to convert others to its tradition(s).  

But not all spiritual traditions, or religions, think of their mission in the world as including converting large numbers of people to their tradition.  A good example are what I might call ‘spiritual arts’.  I am thinking of things like tea ceremony, tarot, I Ching, body-centered practices like Chi Gong, various meditation traditions and contemplative traditions, traditions like Jainism, and so forth.

Platonism more closely resembles these kinds of practices. There are differences, for sure; for example, Platonism seems to be more heavily invested in reading, studying, and interacting at multiple levels with most of these traditions and practices.  But then again, there are differences between any two of these non-universalistic traditions. 

In a number of Dialogues Plato presents the requirements for being a philosopher.  In Phaedo those requirements are ascetic.  This is also true in other dialogues.  In addition, in The Republic Plato mentions things like having a good memory, being a quick learner, and living what we today might call a ‘minimalist’ life.  Such a description presents a calling that is for a limited number of people.

2.1  When thinking about this a bit more, it came to me that the idea that a particular engagement in human affairs is not normally considered to have universal appeal.  For example, if someone is a gardener that person does not normally think of gardening as something that everyone should do.  Or someone who practices calligraphy as a hobby does not normally think of calligraphy as something that everyone should practice.  But when it comes to spirituality it seems to be the case that people think of spiritual traditions as for everyone, or accessible to everyone, and that if the spiritual tradition or practice is not universal in this way that it is somehow a failure when compared to traditions that do have a universalist approach.  I think that happens in Buddhism, particularly Mahayana Buddhism, because of certain ideals of compassion which are interpreted as being fulfilled when all people align with the Buddhist understanding of compassion; I’m thinking, for example, of the Bodhisattva Vows.  I think this happens in Christianity and Islam because of their supersessionist tendencies.  But, again, Platonism is not like that and is content to appeal to a limited number.

3.  In the Timaeus Plato writes, “. . . the motions that have an affinity to the divine part within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe.  These, surely, are the ones which each of us should follow.  We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown off course at our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so bring into conformity with its objects our faculty of understanding, as it was in its original condition.  And when this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore.”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1289, 90c-d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

3.1  This helps the reader understand why astronomy is an important study in Platonism; because studying the revolutions of the universe connects us with the divine, linking the universe to the divine within us.  

3.2  One of the revolutions included would be the revolution of the sun, or the solar cycle.  This links astronomy to the contemplation what I call ‘waiting for the sun’.  I’ve posted about this before, but here in Timaeus is the explanation of the significance of this contemplation.  

4.  Most people use the word ‘theurgy’ as a synonym for magic.  I recently looked up the word ‘theurgy’ in an online dictionary and ‘magic’ was the first meaning listed.  I take a narrower, more specialized, view of theurgy.  In a Platonic context, based on Iamblichus’s influential On the Mysteries, theurgy is a sacrificial system that argues for the efficacy of blood sacrifice; that is to say the slaying of living animals as an essential part of theurgic ritual practice.  It’s not that all theurgic rituals require blood sacrifice; rather it is that theurgy is the foundation which permits animal sacrifice when it accords with the theurgic view.  I think that incorporating this perspective on ritual sacrifice into Platonism from Iamblichus onward, was a setback for Platonism that should be rejected.  The antidote is to be found in Porphyry’s Abstinence which argues against the slaying of animals either for ritual purposes or for slaying them for food.  A second antidote is to be found in the Platonic teachings on non-harming.

5.  On an everyday level Platonism is a gift that slowly transforms one’s life for the better.  At one level, the Platonist practitioner becomes more aware of what it means to live a virtuous life and why someone should strive to live a life of virtue.  On another level, what happens is that the Platonist practitioner begins to perceive material objects as symbols, or instantiations, of divine, or higher, realities.  This ability adds additional dimensions of experience to our ordinary life.  And these additional dimensions are invitations to transcendence and to that which is eternal.

6.  There is a passage in The Laws where the Athenian Stranger refers to an Egyptian artistic tradition which has lasted for 10,000 years; unchanged for all that time.  This was a style of painting which had strict rules for the procedures of painting bodily forms.  Clinias responds that this is “Fantastic!”, which I think in this context means something like ‘unbelievable’.  (As an aside, there are contemporary traditions of painting that strictly control the manner in which bodily forms are presented; I am thinking at the moment of Tibetan Thangka painting with which the West has become somewhat familiar in the last 50 years or so.  This tradition has rules governing the placement of bodies and other elements and these rules go back many centuries.)   The passage continues with a discussion of an Egyptian tradition that does roughly the same thing with music.  The Athenian Stranger clearly approves of this and wants to see this kind of tradition planted in the Greek world.  

It is difficult to conceive of an artistic or musical tradition that has lasted 10,000 years.  Many traditions in the arts in our culture today (music, painting, sculpture, poetry, and so forth) don’t last 100 years; some don’t last 6 months.  Think of what it would mean to sing a song that was 10,000 years old.  Think of what it would mean to live in a culture where that would be celebrated.  It would be a very different world.  (This discussion is found in The Laws at 656d-657c)

Later in The Laws the Athenian Stranger says, “The music we ought to cultivate is the kind that bears a resemblance to its model, beauty.”  (668b)

 

Diogenes Laertius

25 November 2024

Diogenes Laertius

I recently reread the chapter on Plato from Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius.  Scholars say that Diogenes was a third century writer; his dates are never explicitly stated in his book, but the inference for a third century attribution seems fairly solid.  This would make Diogenes a contemporary of Plotinus, though Plotinus does not appear in his work.  Diogenes was mostly concerned with ancient philosophy, its beginning and the most influential philosophers who still, at the time Diogenes was writing, had significant influence.

Scholars suggest that Diogenes himself was an Epicurean; this is based primarily on the very lengthy treatment of Epicurus which appears in Book X and includes long quotations from primary sources.  

Diogenes over the centuries has had an up and down reputation.  His book is often the only source we have for some philosophers so Diogenes can’t be overlooked.  But critics sometimes suggest that Diogenes lacked discrimination as to what was important and what was not when he wrote about certain philosophers.  The chief objection seems to be that Diogenes will report unverified stories that may be nothing more than gossip.

In reading the chapter on Plato I had a kind of realization about Diogenes that I’d like to share.  It came to me that the chapters on various philosophers found in his work remind me of portraits of people that I used to read in ‘The New Yorker’ magazine.  I haven’t looked at The New Yorker in a long time, so I’m not sure that it still publishes this type of writing; but I’m referring to long, say as long as sixty pages, portraits of famous and/or influential people.  Usually these people were involved with the arts in some way; as musicians or composers, writers, poets, critics, and so forth.  The New Yorker would interview the person, but they would also contact people close to the person and sometimes report stories from such sources.  I wouldn’t call this gossip, though at times it could drift in that direction.

I don’t think Diogenes had what today we would call an academic audience in mind.  And it doesn’t seem that Diogenes was concerned with the kind of demands that historians today place on themselves in terms of including scholarly apparatus such as footnotes, endnotes, bibliography, and other types of references.  This is not entirely absent; often Diogenes will name his source and then quote from it.  And at other times Diogenes will list the works that a particular philosopher wrote which gives us a good idea of the scope of the philosopher’s work (see, for example, his portrait of Xenocrates.)  But at other times he doesn’t and perhaps the story he is telling us at that time was just a widely known, or believed, story about that particular philosopher with no secure source.

I think the audience Diogenes had in mind would be an educated literary person who wanted a quick, but knowledgeable, overview of their culture’s philosophical heritage without going into too great detail about difficult and complex topics.  Looked at in this way I think Lives is successful and remains a valuable source of information today.

I think that reading Diogenes’s portrait of Plato gives us a good idea of what Middle Platonists understood to be Platonic doctrine.  Sometimes Diogenes offers surprising insights.  For example, in his section on the creation of the material world, which is based on frequent quotes from Timaeus, Diogenes writes,

“In order that time might exist, the sun, moon, and planets were created.  . . . And in order that the universe, which had been created in the likeness of the intelligible being, might be complete, the nature of all other animals was created.  Since its pattern contains them, the universe must also contain them.  And thus it has gods, which are primarily fiery in nature, and three other kinds of creatures: the winged, the aquatic, and the terrestrial.”

(Diogenes Leartius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, translated by Pamela Mensch, edited by James Miller, Oxford University Press, 2018, pages 164-165, ISBN: 97801908621760)

What I find interesting in this passage is that Diogenes places the gods with ‘other kinds of creatures’ of the material world.  This implies that the gods are what I refer to as ‘third things.’  By ‘third things’ I mean things of the third level, or hypostasis, of the Platonic cosmology, the material world.  Here is a quote from Timaeus that Diogenes bases his own writing on:

“Prior to the coming to be of time, the universe had already been made to resemble in various respects the model in whose likeness the god was making it, but the resemblance still fell short in that it didn’t yet contain all the living things that were to have come to be within it.  This remaining task he went on to perform, casting the world into the nature of its model.  And so he determined that the living things as those which, according to the discernment of Intellect, are contained within the real Living Thing.  Now there are four of these kinds: first, the heavenly race of gods; next, the kind that has wings and travels through the air; third, the kind that lives in water; and fourth, the kind that has feet and lives on land.”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1243, 39e, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see this as Diogenes correctly teaching that the gods, as opposed to the god, are created (by the Demiurge) as one of the four types of living beings in the material world.  This is fascinating to me.  Again, I think this teaches that the gods are third things rather than the later interpretation that the gods are henads.  And there are other equally insightful passages in Diogenes’s presentation of Plato’s thought.

Another aspect of Diogenes writing on Plato I like is that Diogenes presents two arrangements of the Dialogues which seem to have been used at the time Diogenes wrote.  One consists of tetralogies which Diogenes lists along with their contents and, often, alternate names of the dialogues that were in use at the time, such as The Statesman which was also called On Monarchy and Phaedo which was also titled On the Soul.  The second consists of groupings into trilogies.  In this section Diogenes also discusses ‘spurious’ dialogues even suggesting in one case the actual author.

Diogenes collects certain brief quotes about Plato, such as, “He advised those who were drunk to look at themselves in the mirror; for they would then abstain from such unseemly conduct.”  And “He spent most of his time in seclusion, according to some writers.”  (These are from page 152 of the Mensch translation.)  This is the only reference I have found that suggests that Plato spent ‘most of his time’ in seclusion.  It is an unattributed comment.  Perhaps this refers to the need for writers to have a lot of alone time, or perhaps it refers to a contemplative life.

(As an aside, the section where Diogenes collects remarks about Plato reminds a little of Plutarch and his collections of sayings.  I wonder if Diogenes was influenced by Plutarch?)

Diogenes closes his chapter on Plato with a summary of Platonic doctrine.  This gives us a good window into how Platonism was understood at that time.  Diogenes does this by having paragraphs about types of friendship, forms of government, kinds of knowledge, kinds of medicine, kinds of law, and so forth.  

I think the chapter on Plato written by Diogenes belongs with the Handbook by Alcinous, the Orations of Maximus, and Plutarch’s writings that are pertinent to Platonism.  It tells us a lot about the life and thought of Plato as understood by Diogenes and, by extension, the people of the time in which Diogenes lived.  I think it is a very good introduction to both Plato and Platonism and it is well worth reading.