Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 53

30 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 53

1.  Platonism grows on you.  I mean that when people first encounter Platonism through reading the Dialogues, perhaps in a University class, it can feel confusing and sometimes opaque.  But there are passages, images, and allegories that are attractive, and some of the characters in the Dialogues are interesting.  It’s a bit like learning a new language; at first the comprehension is not great and there is likely to be much that is misunderstood.  But there are words and phrases that cohere and make sense.  Over time the language becomes internalized and can be used as a means of communication.  I think the process of becoming a Platonist is similar; at some point the pieces of the philosophy fit together and the beauty of its insights become inspiring.  Eventually this leads to daily interaction, through reading, through various practices, and through contemplation.  At this point the relationship to Platonism is no longer opaque or confusing; instead, it is nourishing and every morning when we wake up, we look forward to deepening our relationship to the tradition.

2.  Readers might be interested that David Litwa, a scholar dedicated to the Classical world of, roughly, 100 CE to 300 CE, with a special focus on Christian Gnosticism, has decided to translate Porphyry’s Against the Christians.  This book survives, as I understand it, only in quotes from Christian critics.  I don’t know if there have been any recent discoveries regarding this work, but if there have been Litwa would be aware of them.

Last year I read Litwa’s translation of Celsus’s critique of Christianity which Litwa translates as ‘The True Teaching.’  Both Celsus and Porphyry defend traditional Platonic perspectives on various issues.  I’m not sure when Litwa will publish Against the Christians, but I look forward to reading it.

3.  I sometimes toy with the idea of creating a Platonist Canon.  I do this as a thought experiment; if I was in some kind of position to recommend a canon of Platonic works, what would I choose?  I would, naturally, start with the Dialogues of Plato.  The next work would be the Enneads of Plotinus.  These two alone offer a complete and unsurpassed presentation of Platonism.  You really don’t need anything else.

But other works are helpful and worthwhile.  For this second tier I would add Alcinous’s Handbook of Platonism, Maximus of Tyre’s Orations, and Plutarch’s Platonic works.

For post-Plotinian works I would suggest Porphyry’s On Abstinence as well as additional works such as his Letter to Marcella, and so forth.  (I think it would be a good idea to publish an edition of the remaining complete works of Porphyry that would also include the fragments of works that have vanished.  It could be called ‘The Porphyry Project.’)

After Porphyry selection of works becomes more difficult because of the multiplication of influences impacting the Platonic tradition.  Christian Platonism emerges, and there is the earlier Jewish Platonism of Philo of Alexandria as well as the later development of Islamic Platonism.  At the moment, I’m inclined not include them in a Platonist Canon because the projects of these philosophers is to create what I call a hyphenated Platonism that subordinates Platonism to the concerns of their tradition.  This also applies to the theurgic tradition which is more concerned with ritual efficacy than it is with wisdom and Platonic insights and Platonic ethical practices.  I realize this last is a controversial claim, but that is how I see things at this time. 

The last Platonic philosopher of the Classical period I would include in a canon of Platonism would be Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. 

No doubt I have missed some important works which over time will move into my fantasy Platonic Canon.  In conclusion, this is just a fantasy or mental exercise.  I personally find it useful in negotiating the vast sea of Platonic literature, but I don’t actually think that anyone, or any institution, has the authority for making a definitive Platonic canon; that’s not how Platonism has worked in the past, which is a good thing.

4.  I sometimes think of the variations in how Platonists over the centuries have interpreted the noetic realm (what it is and how it works) as similar to variations on music themes or melodies.  The variation form in music is very widespread; you find it in classical music as well as popular music.  Variations can be simple and easily recognizable, or they can be complex and difficult to hear (that is a variation can be obscure to the listener as to the variation’s relationship to the original theme), and many degrees between. 

If we think of the noetic realm as the realm of eternal objects (Whitehead’s phrase) then it makes sense that those of us residing in the material world, meaning those of us who are ephemeral objects, need to use approximations to talk about the noetic realm.  This isn’t quite the same as trying to describe the ineffable, such as the One and the Good.  The ineffable is beyond description, beyond affirmation and negation.  Noetic objects are not beyond affirmation and negation; for example, numbers have specific characteristics which can be affirmed.  But the unchangingness and eternality of noetic realities means that noetic realities are very remote from our everyday experience which makes it difficult to talk about noetic realities without using comparisons that are approximations.  That’s why variations appear, why Aristotle places noetic realities in objects, why some early Platonists explain noetic realities by calling them thoughts in the mind of God, and why some take a mathematical approach and think of noetic realities as approximating an empty set that contains rules for membership inclusion, and so forth. 

5.  Egypt plays a significant role in the development of the Greek philosophical tradition and of Platonism in particular.  It appears to be the case that Plato had a high view of Egyptian spirituality.  I find that intriguing because on the surface Egyptian and Greek spirituality appear to be very different; I’m referring to, for example, the way images such as statues are divergent in the two traditions.  Greek statues of Gods and Goddesses are highly idealized human beings, often of striking attractiveness.  In contrast, Egyptian deities, for the most part, merge animal and human forms.  Such combinations do appear in Greek spirituality; a good example is the minotaur.  But such creatures are often threatening and I’m not sure that they would qualify as deities.

In Egyptian spirituality deities often have an animal head and a human body, or a human head and an animal body.  This is strikingly different from Greek presentations of the gods and, in addition, differs from the Abrahamic tradition and how God is represented in that tradition.  (I believe that Philo criticized Egyptian religion for using the kinds of images it used.) 

Nevertheless, Plato shows admiration for Egypt and what he thinks of as the country’s stability.  And Plato seems inclined to trust Egyptian sources for ancient history; this is seen, for example, in Plato’s comments on Atlantis. 

Porphyry picks up on this positive view of Egypt in Book 4 of his treatise On Abstinence.  Beginning with paragraph 6, there is a long presentation of how Egyptian philosophers lived in Egypt.  It is a portrait of a highly regulated and disciplined approach to spirituality.  Porphyry states that Egyptian philosophers lived in the Temples and only rarely, during some ceremonies, interacted with non-initiated, ordinary people.  They spent their time in study and contemplation.

It intrigues me that the picture painted here is explicitly that of the philosopher as a religious figure; I’m using the word ‘religious’ because, according to Porphyry’s description, their philosophers were part of a religious institution of great antiquity, as opposed to finding an individual path on their own, or setting up some kind of alternative organization like Plato’s Academy.  When I read Porphyry’s account, it’s not clear to me if philosophers in Egypt were a type of Priest, or whether these two categories of Philosopher and Priest were separate and distinct.  Perhaps a philosopher at that time resembles something like what we sometimes hear about in today’s religious traditions where someone is both a Priest and a learned Scholar, but not all Priests are Scholars and not all Scholars are Priests.

The Egyptian philosophers followed what I infer to be a strict rule that regulated their lives.  I don’t know if that rule survives in some form among ancient Egyptian documents today (I haven’t heard anything about such a document) and I know almost nothing about the specifics of Egyptian spirituality, so I can only speculate beyond this general observation.  But for us Platonists, I think it is worth noting that such a life was viewed by Porphyry, and perhaps Plato as well, as admirable and perhaps something of an ideal.

6.  According to scholars there are many passages in The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius that are paraphrases of various Platonic Dialogues.  These are not direct quotes, and the dialogues, with one exception, are not explicitly named.  This is likely due to the circumstances under which the Consolation was written, which was in a prison cell.

The one exception about naming a dialogue is found in Book III where Boethius explicitly mentions the Timaeus.  The mention of Timaeus is made by Lady Philosophy:

“’But since,’ said she, ‘as is my Plato’s opinion in the Timaeus, we ought to implore God’s help in even the least of matters, what do you think we should do now, that we may be worthy to discover the abode of that highest good?’”

(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by S. H. Tester, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, page 271, ISBN: 0674990838)

The passage in the Timaeus reads:

“Timaeus: Nay, as to that, Socrates, all men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great . . . “

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1929, page 49, 27C, ISBN: 9780674992573)

There are further references to Timaeus later in Book III but the dialogue itself is not explicitly named as it is here.  In addition, according to a footnote in the Loeb edition, some of the references are to a commentary on Timaeus written by Proclus.  I am not familiar with this commentary, but this shows that Boethius had a strong interest in that dialogue.

In contrast, there do not appear to be any clear, or explicit, references to Christian writings.  My take on this is that Boethius had absorbed a view of Philosophy that Platonism advocates for, but which is completely absent from modernity’s understanding of what the task of Philosophy is.  The view I am referring to is that the purpose of Philosophy is salvific; I mean that Platonic Philosophy viewed its purpose as that of freeing human beings from being trapped in materiality through an ascent that concludes in the experience of the Good and the One, the transcendental and the eternal.  That is what Lady Philosophy is referring to when she refers to the ‘abode of the highest Good.’  That is why Boethius turns to philosophy for consolation in his hour of desperate need.  And that is why we should turn to philosophy today.