Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 74

24 November 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 74

1.  Life and Meaning

Recently I listened to an online talk by a young philosopher who argued that it is not the job of Philosophy to teach people the meaning of life.  The young philosopher put the argument in analytic terms by arguing that asking ‘What is the meaning of life’ isn’t actually a question, that such a question, paradoxically, has no meaning.

It was frustrating to listen to such a talk at this point in the 21^st century.  I would have thought that the analytic tradition’s tropes about what falls into the category of meaningful would have, by now, exhausted themselves.  But, apparently, that is not the case.

If I were speaking directly to someone who has this person’s view my response would be to refer them to Plato’s Phaedo and to The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius.  Both of these are examples of Philosophy taking on the task of guiding the characters in these works, and the reader, to the meaning of life in the face of impermanence and death.  These works are salvific; and it used to be the case that philosophers thought of Philosophy as the means whereby it is possible to be guided to the meaning of life, to the point of existence, to how a human being can transcend the difficulties that life brings and how to transcend those difficulties by going beyond the mundane.

2.  Continuities

In the West those who are interested in Buddhism have access to the full range of Buddhist traditions.  In Buddhist history that is unusual, perhaps unprecedented.  Traditions that were separated for many centuries by geography, culture, and language (such as Theravada and Tibetan Vajrayana) are found rubbing shoulders on bookshelves and they are available at online retail outlets.

Years ago I was thinking about what holds these Buddhist traditions together?  Is there some kind of underlying unity that runs like a common thread among all these traditions?  If you contrast Theravada with Tibetan Buddhism you find that they have different collections of Buddhist texts, that they have different philosophical interpretations of what it means to be a Buddhist, that they have different rituals, and so forth.

What came to mind when thinking about this is that in all of these traditions there is one thing that unites all of them and that is the Monastic Sangha.  It is the institution of monasticism that provides a sense of unity among all of these variant Buddhist traditions. 

When I look at Platonism I see similar kinds of variations among contemporary Platonists.  Some Platonists are theurgists and others eschew a theurgic interpretation of Platonism.  Some consider Platonism to be grounded in mystical experience and others regard Plato as an analytic philosopher, or proto-analytic philosopher. 

Looking at this and thinking about it, I came up with a source of unity among these variations and that is the Dialogues that Plato wrote.  All the various interpretations of Platonism are rooted in that common canon; the Dialogues of Plato.

It’s interesting, I think, to consider that in Buddhism it is an institution that provides a common basis for the tradition as a whole; the Monastic Sangha.  In Platonism it is not an institution that provides a common basis, it is a book, the Dialogues. 

I think this happens because the Dialogues are attractive at many levels; as literature, as analysis, as dialectic, and as a guide to the transcendental.  The Dialogues are like an eternal spring of crystal clear water that flows forth nourishing everything that it contacts.

3.  Doing Platonism

Most people are introduced to Platonism through the reading of some of Plato’s Dialogues.  Usually this happens in college but it can also happen if someone is interested in becoming familiar with the foundations of Western thought in general, or Western Philosophy in particular.  If interest in Platonism takes root this often manifests as understanding Platonism as primarily a scholarly activity; I mean reading the Dialogues and related material, commenting on them, and exploring how others have understood them.  All of this is wonderful and inspiring and I, and many others, have benefitted greatly from this kind of activity.

At some point some people ask how to embody these teachings in one’s life; I think of this as asking how to do Platonism or what does Platonism indicate, or even demand, of its followers.  This is when an individual becomes interested in wanting to ground the teachings of Platonism in one’s behavior and in comprehending Platonism as not only a way of thought, but also a way of life.  By ‘way of life’ I mean that Platonism manifests in identifiable behaviors.

I have posted previously about what I think of as the Precepts of Platonism that offer a framework for doing Platonism, a doing that goes beyond ‘thinking about.’  I think the question that those interested in taking this step have is where to start.  The reason that is not easy to answer is that Platonism has not generated a guidebook for the basic steps, or practices, or precepts, in the way that, for example, Jainism, or other Dharma traditions, have.

But it is possible to glean from the Dialogues ethical practices and precepts that define a way of life that is consistent with being a Philosopher.  If I were asked by someone interested in what I call doing Platonism, I would make the suggestion that the first step is simply to become a vegetarian.  I say this because it is relatively easy to do; there is a lot of material to support a change to a vegetarian diet and there are a lot of vegetarians to offer support in such a change. 

I also make this suggestion because vegetarianism, in a Platonist context, is directly tied to the teachings of non-harming and non-retaliation found in Dialogues such as Crito and The Republic.  Non-harming is the most important ethical teaching of Platonism and the source for all other ethical teachings and precepts.  But it is often the case that when first encountering non-harming it seems to be too big of a demand when considered in the abstract; and often the mind will raise objections.  Vegetarianism, however, is easy to access, provides an experiential basis for what non-harming means, and deepens one’s understanding of non-harming so that when a reader comes across these teachings in Platonic literature the reader has an experiential basis for understanding what non-harming means.  This is why I consider vegetarianism to be a significant teaching of Platonism rather than something peripheral.

There is a lot of material in the Platonic tradition that supports becoming a vegetarian.  This is helpful for those who want to practice Platonism in their lives.  Porphyry’s On Abstinence is the most significant example of a work on the topic of vegetarianism and it links vegetarianism to non-harming and living a philosophical life.  But there are others such as three essays on this topic by Plutarch.  The combined impact of these kinds of writings is to show the function of vegetarianism for those wanting to walk the Path of Platonism, for those wanting to become Philosophers.

I would also suggest that becoming vegetarian sheds a new light on reading and study of Platonic literature such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.  Once someone embodies Platonism through the practice of vegetarianism they begin to see reading and study of the Platonist tradition as a way of doing Platonism, as another practice that embodies Platonism in the life of a practitioner.  This is a subtle shift in the understanding of what someone is doing when they are reading Platonic literature.  The tendency is to understand such reading, at first, as a means of acquiring information in the same way that someone might read a history or even fiction.  When one begins to embody Platonism by doing Platonism then reading Platonic literature more closely resembles a musician playing music on their instrument, or the daily practice a musician has to maintain their musicianship.  Vegetarianism is similar to this kind of relationship; it is a practice that deepens one's understanding of what it means to be a Platonist and at the same time deepens one's understanding of what it means to read and study Platonic literature; the two practices mutually nourish each other.

So that is my suggestion to someone wanting to embody Platonism, wanting to do Platonism, in their life.  It is a first, or perhaps more accurately, an early step on the path that leads to the Good and the One.

4.  The Unseen Sun

At dusk the sun swiftly sets behind the distant November mountains.  On a moonless night the stars come out above the desert with its cacti and creosote bushes.  The sun has disappeared but its presence remains.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 47

19 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 47

1.  I’ve been spending time rereading Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals and I think it is a very fine example of a Platonic treatise.  Porphyry integrates many aspects of Platonic philosophy in his extended apology for vegetarianism.  He does this by placing the practice of vegetarianism in the context of both Platonic ethics and Platonic metaphysics.

What impresses me this time around is how Porphyry understands the necessity of ethical ascetic practice for purification to take place and for the divine ascent to the One to happen.  This differs from many spiritual groups I have observed over the decades.  There is a strong tendency in some groups to minimize ethical practice.  By ‘ethical practice’ I mean the commitment to ethical guidelines and regulations such as those found in traditional Dharmic traditions.  In Dharmic traditions these are usually encoded in precepts that outline these ethical commitments such as non-harming, non-stealing, refraining from alcohol, and so forth.  In Platonism the ethical regulations are scattered among different dialogues but the two dialogues that stand out in this regard are Phaedo and The Republic. 

The way I look at this is that the ethical precepts, which are all restraints on types of behavior, function as a kind of vessel, or bowl, or goblet, for holding the practice of contemplation, or creating the context for contemplation.  Many Westerners, it seems, have the view that contemplation by itself is sufficient for realization and that adherence to a set of ethical restraints are not causally related to the insights and realizations that the practice of contemplation offers.  But Porphyry makes a direct connection between the practice of ethical restraints, such as vegetarianism, and effecacious contemplation; a point Porphyry makes several times in his work On Abstinence.

What happens when contemplation is done outside of the context of ethical restraints?  What happens is that the insights, energy, and realizations that contemplation brings in such a context become value free experiences; and being value free they can be used for any purpose.  This resembles learning how to swing a baseball bat.  Someone who has learned how to swing a bat in the context of the rules of the baseball game will bring his fellow teammates much pleasure and fans will also be happy about such skill.  But someone who has no interest in the rules of baseball can use the bat to break a window, or even to break some bones.  The skill of swinging a baseball bat is a value free skill and how it is used depends on the context in which that skill is used.

I am suggesting that contemplation outside of the context of ethical restraints and asceticism is similarly problematic.  If looked at in this way, it helps us to understand why some individuals who have meditated for many years, and can guide others in the practice of meditation or contemplation, are sometimes examples of ethically challenged lives; they break the window of their lives and leave behind them much suffering.  In extreme cases this can result in a practitioner of contemplation or meditation encouraging mayhem.  Unfortunately, this has been observed more than once.

There is a feeling that this kind of analysis has to be wrong because contemplation is innately transformative.  The conclusion would follow, then, that someone who behaves badly could not be an actual contemplative, that they must not really understand what contemplation means.  Beyond the fact that this is a classic ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy, I think this kind of analysis, or view, of contemplation underestimates the ability of insight and spiritual experiences to be used in a value-free way.  There are, for example, corporations who want their employees to meditate because their employees are more focused and therefore more productive when they meditate; this is a good example of value free spiritual practice. 

My overall point about Porphyry is that his understanding of Platonism is wholistic; I mean that Porphyry views the practices of purification and ethical restraint as foundational for Platonic practice and it is upon this foundation that contemplation takes place and blossoms.  Or to return to the previous metaphor, the practices of ethical restraint are the vessel which allows the practitioner to drink from the nectar of contemplation; without that vessel the realizations of contemplative practice will spill onto the ground and disappear from sight.

2.  Plato returns to his hermitage after a long morning walk.  The hermitage is located in the hills between two valleys.  There are a lot of oak trees and the foliage is mostly grass.  There is a creek running through the landscape that flows out of the valley at one end.

Plato sits at a table where the notebook he is writing in lies open.  After getting comfortable Plato continues his writing.  He is writing another dialogue which, he thinks, he might finish in another thousand years, perhaps two thousand.

3.  I have for a long time had difficulty with the idea of ‘matter’ in Platonic philosophy.  As I have said in a previous post, perhaps more than one, I’m not convinced that matter is a necessary concept in Platonism; by that I mean I think it might be possible to present Platonism without having to resort to the idea of matter.  I’m not confident about this, though.

These thoughts returned to my mind because I was reading John Dillon’s essay “Ennead III.5: Plotinus’ Exegesis of the Symposium Myth”.  In this essay (which I found complex and not always easy to follow) comments about matter on pages 76-77 (the book is Perspectives on Plotinus).  Dillon quotes Plotinus at III 5.9.49-53, and comments on the quote, “And so we have it – without qualification, it seems – Penia is Matter."  Looking up ‘penia’ I found it means lack or deficiency.  So matter is a kind of deficiency or a lack.  Later Dillon suggests that matter is in some way associated, or ‘stands for’, the ‘irrational element in Soul’. 

But I remain puzzled.  It’s not clear to me why we need the idea of matter to explain the irrational element in Soul, or why a lack or a deficiency requires the presence of matter.  For example, a fire generates heat.  The heat diminishes with distance.  If someone sits close to a fire they will feel comfortably warm, even in winter.  If someone sits across the room, the heat from the fire will have diminished; that is to say there is a lack of heat for those sitting across the room from the fire.  And if someone is outside, the lack of heat from the fire at the hearth is so great they will likely not notice the presence of the heat from the fire.  It does not seem to me that anything additional is needed to explain the heat diminishing with distance; this kind of observation indicates that such diminishment is part of what ‘distance’ means.

Metaphysically, the greater the metaphysical distance from the One, the less unity a thing has.  But it is distance that is determinative here.

It is likely that I am missing something but as a thought experiment, what would Platonism look like without matter?

4.  When does a sunrise begin?  When does a flower start to bloom?  It is not a simple thing to make these kinds of determinations.

Similarly, spiritual insights grow in us in ways that, for the most part, are undramatic and not recognized when they first appear in our minds and hearts. 

5.  There is a book on Porphyry by Aaron P. Johnson called Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre, Cambridge University Press.  I purchased it over a year ago, maybe two years ago.  Because my interest in Porphyry has been rekindled I took it down from the shelf and have started to read it.  The book is academic, but still accessible for those with some background in Late Classical Platonism.  There are some technical issues, such as variations in the taxonomy of the divine and how the different taxonomies are related to different views on Platonist practice, which it is not always clear as to why the topic is significant.  But I find the if I slow my reading pace and take in what the author has to offer, the topics and their relationships come into focus.

But what I found very helpful is a translation of the fragments of Porphyry.  These fragments are collected in the closing section of the book.  Many of Porphyry’s books survive only in quotations from other classical authors who commented on Porphyry’s views.  These quotations are the sources for the fragments.  They are listed by topic and author.  For example, there are a lot of quotes from Porphyry that are found in various works by Saint Augustine, many more than I was aware of.  I find these quotes illuminating and even though I know they are fragments, there is enough of Porphyry in his surviving books to get a sense of where these quoted fragments might fit into Porphyry’s overall thought.

Recently I came across a paper at academia (dot) edu on what were the sources for Augustine’s understanding of Platonism.  The paper is titled “Augustine between Plotinus and Porphyry: A Possible Answer to the Problem of the Identity of the Platonicorum Libri” by Paolo Di Leo.  The paper discusses different views as to what Augustine read and studied when he was involved with Platonism; the author says that some scholars advocate for the primary source being Plotinus, others argue for Porphyry, and others for both.  It’s an interesting paper.

From the listing of fragments where Augustine is quoting Porphyry, I can see why some scholars would side with Porphyry as the primary source.  But I don’t know enough about Augustine to make an intelligent evaluation of this discussion.

It is somewhat surprising, pleasantly surprising, how influential Porphyry has been in the history of Platonism.  While I wouldn’t say that Porphyry is as influential as Plotinus, I’m gradually seeing that Porphyry’s writings have had a big impact on Platonism over the centuries.  For example, Porphyry’s On Abstinence had a significant impact on the Renaissance understanding of Platonism (see Renaissance Vegetarianism: The Philosophical Afterlives of Porphyry’s On Abstinence by Cecilia Muratori which I previously reviewed on this blog). 

It's paradoxical that Porphyry, the author of Against the Christians, seems to have had an impact on Augustine and how Augustine understood Platonism.  But perhaps the anti-Christian work of Porphyry was something Augustine may have felt a need to deal with, and from there Augustine became more familiar with what Porphyry had to say on other topics.  For example, both Porphyry and Augustine were ascetics and valued what I call the Ascetic Ideal; this would be a strong connection.

If you are interested in Porphyry, I recommend Religion and Identity.  I think you will find the thought of the author, as well as the translations of the fragments, to be helpful in studying this significant Platonist writer and practitioner.

6.  I think that one thing that links Dharmic traditions with Platonism is the way both Dharmic traditions and Platonism have a commitment to ethical teachings whose foundations are shared.  I am referring to the teachings on non-harming found in Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, and Platonism.  In Dharmic traditions non-harming, or Ahimsa, is often the first ethical Precept or Vow.  All other vows can be understood to be the application of Ahimsa to specific contexts of human life.

While in Dharmic traditions, as mentioned above, the principle of Ahimsa, or non-harming, is found in its placement at the head of lists of ethical precepts, commitments, or vows.  Platonism, as far as I know, did not generate that kind of document; that is to say, there is no listing of precepts in Platonism in the way one finds in Buddhism, Jainism, and Yoga.  This means that the teachings on non-harming are scattered in various works of Platonism from the Dialogues (see, for example, Crito) to Porphyry’s treatise On Abstinence.  There are also references to non-harming as being an ancient teaching that Platonism has inherited, though sources are not specifically mentioned (I think it is likely that they are Pythagorean and Orphic).

But the foundational nature of non-harming for Platonism and for Dharmic traditions is, I think, recognizably similar.  I say ‘similar’ rather than ‘the same’ because exactly how non-harming, or Ahimsa, works has its differences among Dharmic traditions (for example, the role that intention plays in an act of harming differs among Dharmic traditions).  It is, therefore, to be expected that there will be some differences in how Platonism applies non-harming/Ahimsa.  One thing I have noticed, which I offer as a tentative observation, is that Platonism seems to place a strong emphasis on non-retaliation as a necessary effect of non-harming; at least that is how I read Crito.  Another emphasis in Platonism is how non-harming is linked to the virtue of justice, and from there to the Platonic virtues overall.

But though there are differences, the emphasis on non-harming as such is shared.  And I think that sharing is a good reason for considering Platonism to be more closely allied to Dharmic traditions than it is to what modern philosophy has become.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 46

12 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 46

1.  In my recent reading of Timaeus my feeling was that Timaeus is an extended allegory with the Demiurge and the projects of the Demiurge being a personification of noetic realities.  I say this because it is noetic realities that bequeath the world system, or material realm, in which we live.  Looked at in this way nous is the Demiurge, or more accurately, the Demiurge is the personification of nous and the noetic realm.  Timaeus is about the nature of and order of the manifestations of becoming and begoning.  Becoming and begoning are not noetic realities, but nous is the foundation of becoming and begoning.

2.  “Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1241, 37d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

A distinguishing feature of this material realm is that it is ‘impossible to bestow eternity upon anything’ in the material world; that is because all things in the material realm are created and anything that is created will come to an end.  The closest we can come to eternity is a moving image of eternity.  The moving image of eternity with its sunrises and sunsets, with its waxing and waning moons, with its seasonal displays, is beautiful because eternity is beautiful (in a sense, the beautiful and eternity are the same).  But the beauty of the moving image of eternity means that the things of this image are temporary, whereas the beauty of eternity as such is beauty as such.

3.  Platonism has been around for over 2,000 years.  I sometimes wonder what Platonism might look like after another 2,000 years; that’s assuming that it will be around after another 2,000 years.  It’s impossible to be sure, of course, but I don’t think it is irrational or fanciful to imagine things along this line. 

Will there still be the original Greek texts of Plato and Plotinus?, or will people rely on some later translation in another language?  Platonism is one of the reasons that people are actively interested in ancient Greek and because of this the Greek texts might still be actively circulating.

Platonism has gone through many changes in its interpretation of itself; for example, there are changes on how noetic realities are understood.  In 2,000 years I think it is likely that Platonism will be interpreted through categories that we cannot imagine.

And what will the role of artificial intelligence be for Platonism?  Will we be able to download the Dialogues and the Enneads directly into our minds and ponder them through some kind of technological means?  Perhaps; but perhaps those innovations will have been cast aside.  It’s hard to say.

After 2,000 years it is likely that most of the nations here on earth will only be found in history.  But I suspect that the primary documents of Platonism will still be found and read and discussed at that time.

4.  Beauty is a central understanding of the Platonic tradition.  Some things are strikingly beautiful; for example, a sunset, or a forest path in autumn, or the desert under the full moon, and so forth.  Other things have a more hidden beauty.  When I was young, I lived for a few years on the north coast of Alaska.  The winter is severe, very cold, with snow as far as one can see in any direction.  The Brooks Range is to the south of the north coast and on clear days (which in winter only last a few hours) it can be seen, rising from the endless snow.  This is a different kind of beauty; it is glacial and stark, even threatening, but beautiful nevertheless.

5.  I understand emanation as a process of differentiation.  The One is pure unity and is, therefore, undifferentiated; that is why it lacks any sensory characteristics.  The task of the Platonist practitioner is to ‘return to the One’.  I understand this process of return as a process of de-differentiation, or the steady stepping beyond the differentiations of our material existence.  (This eventually also extends to going beyond the differentiations found in the noetic.)

De-differentiation is done through practices of equanimity, ataraxia, and most importantly, asceticism.  All the practices of de-differentiation are purifications that allow for the soul’s ascent. 

Returning to the One means becoming less and less differentiated which means less and less individuated, more and more like the One.

6.  “I [Porphyry] have shown in the previous two books [chapters], Firmus Castricius, that the eating of animal creatures contributes neither to temperance and simplicity nor to piety, which especially lead to the contemplative life, but rather opposes them.  Justice in its finest aspect is piety towards the gods, and piety is achieved especially by abstinence, so there is no need to fear that we may somehow infringe justice towards people by maintaining holiness towards the gods.  Socrates, in reply to those who argue that our end is pleasure, said that even if all hogs and he-goats agreed with this, he would not be convinced that our happiness lies in experiencing pleasure, so long as intellect rules over all. [See Philebus 67b] And we, even if all wolves and vultures approve of meat-eating, will not agree that what they say is just, so long as humans are naturally harmless and inclined to refrain from acquiring pleasures for themselves by harming others.”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 80, ISBN: 9781780938899)

6.1  This is part of the opening paragraph for Book 3 of Porphyry’s series of letters to Firmus Castricius on refraining from killing animals either for food or for ritual sacrifice.  This paragraph consolidates a number of points that Porphyry uses to support the practice of vegetarianism; for example, that eating animals undermines the virtues such as temperance, piety, and living a simple life (which I take as meaning a life with few possessions).  Porphyry particularly emphasizes how eating meat ‘opposes’ contemplation, which is a point Porphyry makes in the opening of the first Book, or letter, to Firmus.  Notice also how Porphyry states that eating meat undermines justice and holiness towards the gods. 

This is followed by Porphyry arguing against the idea that the pleasure of eating meat somehow justifies such a practice, reminding the reader that Socrates argued against such an approach to ethics. 

Porphyry also integrates the Platonic teachings on non-harming into his overall critique of killing animals.  This passage is dense with reasonings on why eating and killing animals should be avoided with the primary message being that such a practice is contrary to what it means to live a philosophical life.

6.2  Later in Book 3, at paragraphs 26 Porphyry expands on the theme of harmlessness:  “When the passions have been abased and appetite and anger have withered, and the rational part exercises the rule which is appropriate for it, assimilation to the Greater follows at once.  The Greater in the universe is altogether harmless, and itself by its power safeguards all, does good to all, and lacks nothing . . . “ (As above, page 98)

6.3 And in paragraph 27 Porphyry writes: “A man who is led by passions and is harmless only to his children and his wife, but contemptuous and aggressive towards others, is aroused and dazzled by mortal things because the irrational dominates in him.  In the same way, the man who is led by reason maintains harmlessness towards fellow-citizens too, and further still towards strangers and all human beings; he keeps irrationality subjected, and is more rational than those others and thereby also more godlike.  Thus someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other animals is more like the god . . . “ (Ibid, pages 98-99)

7.  On a Summer evening, the evening of the Summer Solstice, Plato walks through a northern Wisconsin forest on a broad path that most people do not see.  Beside Plato is a brown bear; they are walking together.  Now and then Plato scratches the bear behind the bear’s ears.  The slope of the path begins to descend to a small lake where there is a dock with Plato’s canoe tied to a post.  Sunset approaches.  Plato and the brown bear arrive at the shore of the placid lake.  They pause to look at the sunset.  The bear is glowing in the sunset light and with an inner glow as well.  The glow slowly becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes the sparks of starlight swirling in a disc like a galaxy.  The swirling light slowly fades.  Plato, standing on the shore, smiles.  The sun has disappeared but the night sky is clear.  Plato walks down the wooden dock to his canoe.  He unties it and steps into the canoe.  Plato takes a paddle and steers the canoe to the middle of the lake, turns the canoe to the right, and paddles down the middle of the lake.  The Milky Way is reflected in the water so that Plato is paddling on a path of stars.  The lake disappears.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 39

3 March 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 39

1.  I’m enjoying the new book on Plotinus, Perspectives on Plotinus: The Collected Essays of John Dillon.  They seem to be written with great clarity and dedication.  Some of the essays are technical and require a background in Late Classical Platonism to access.  But many of them are written at what I think of as a college level.  

I previously mentioned that I was looking forward to Dillon’s essay on grace in Plotinus, “A Kind of Warmth.”  I’m happy to report that it surpassed my expectations.  It is the best essay on grace in Late Classical Platonism that I have come across.  There are other essays on this topic that I have read that I enjoyed and learned from; but these others were written by committed Christian authors and Dillon brings a non-Christian perspective to the topic.  For me grace is a significant topic because I view grace as essential to understanding the nature of the One.  Dillon points out in the first paragraph of the essay that for most people it is difficult to think of grace as part of a metaphysical system where the ultimate, The One, is non-personal.  But I don’t think that grace is necessarily connected to metaphysical personalism.  In any case, I think this essay will be a catalyst for a reconsideration of the role that grace plays in Platonism.

2.  It is revealing how strongly ascetic the life of a guardian, as depicted in The Republic is supposed to be.  At the end of Book III this is emphasized:

“Consider, then, whether or not they (the guardians) should live in some such way as this, if they’re to be the kind of men we described.  First, none of them should possess any private property beyond what is wholly necessary.  Second, none of them should have a house or storeroom that isn’t open for all to enter at will.  Third, whatever sustenance moderate and courageous warrior-athletes require in order to have neither shortfall nor surplus in a given year they’ll receive by taxation on the other citizens as a salary for their guardianship.  Fourth, they’ll have common messes and live together like soldiers in a camp.  We’ll tell them that they always have gold and silver of a divine sort in their souls as a gift from the gods and so have no further need of human gold. Indeed, we’ll tell them that it’s impious for them to defile this divine possession by any admixture of such gold, because many impious deeds have been done that involve the currency used by ordinary people, while their one is pure.  Hence, for them alone among the city’s population, it is unlawful to touch or handle gold or silver.  They mustn’t be under the same roof as it, wear it as jewelry, or drink from gold or silver goblets.  In this way they’d save both themselves and the city.  But if they acquire private land, houses, and currency themselves, they’ll be household managers and farmers instead of guardians – hostile masters of the other citizens instead of their allies.  They’ll spend their whole lives hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, more afraid of internal than of external enemies, and they’ll hasten both themselves and the whole city to almost immediate ruin.  For all these reasons, let’s say that the guardians must be provided with housing and the rest in this way, and establish this as a law.”

2.1  Overall, this is a description of a life that resembles a life vowed to poverty.  Minimal possessions, no ownership of private property, and no interaction with wealth symbolized by gold and silver.  

2.2  The rejection of gold and silver is complete; the guardians are not even to be in the same room.  Plato seems to be very aware of how corrosive wealth is, meaning how wealth turns one’s attention away from spiritual life and eventually spirituality completely fades from sight.

2.3  On one level this is a description of how the higher, sometimes called ‘rational’, soul should function.  The higher soul, which supervises the appetitive soul and the emotional soul, has to be strict in order to serve its functions of maintaining balance between the parts of the tripartite soul.  

2.4  On a social level, I think a passage like this is descriptive of the ideal philosopher whose rational soul has guided him for a long time.

(Plato, The Republic, Book III, translated by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1052, 416d-417b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

3.  I think there are two arguments supporting vegetarianism within a Platonic context.  The first is the one put forth by Porphyry in his treatise on abstaining from eating or sacrificing animal flesh.  Porphyry’s view, which is stated early in the treatise, is that a vegetarian diet is necessary for a philosopher in particular because such a diet is supportive of the practice of contemplation.  From this perspective, vegetarianism is a tool for walking the Platonic path that resembles reading Plato’s Dialogues, or studying mathematics, or understanding the nature of emanation.

The second argument is that killing animals either for food or for the purposes of ritual sacrifice, as in theurgy, is deliberately harming living beings and doing so unnecessarily; that is to say there is no good reason to slaughter animals.  This argument focuses on the harm done to the animals that are slaughtered for food or for ritual purposes.  This is the argument that Plutarch seems to favor (because Plutarch’s essays on vegetarianism survive in only a partial state it’s not possible to state this definitively.)

The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive; both, I think, are valid and you will find aspects of the second argument in Porphyry and the first argument in Plutarch.  

A third presentation of vegetarianism in the Platonic tradition isn’t exactly an argument, but it is worth mentioning.  I am thinking of ancient biographies of Plato that depict Plato being vegetarian from birth and suggesting that Plato’s parents were vegetarian.  I see this as a symbolic sign of what one might call the ‘holiness’ of Plato.  It indicates that vegetarianism was a longstanding practice of philosophers in the Ancient Classical World.

4.  I live in the desert.  Summer in the desert here can be very hot, up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, or 49 degrees Celsius.  A glass of cool water is very refreshing on days like that, even though I have air conditioning.  Reading Plato’s dialogues resembles that experience; reading the dialogues is refreshing because their source is the refreshing spring of eternity.

5.  One of the differences between the contemplative branch of Platonism (Plotinus, Porphyry) and the theurgic branch (Iamblichus, Proclus) is their method of presentation.  In the contemplative branch there is a lot of use of techniques like allegory, metaphor, symbol, and so forth.  The reader finds these in Plato and Plotinus, but most richly in Plato.

In the theurgic branch there is a tendency toward greater rigour as is found in Proclus.  This rigour is based on Euclid’s Elements which Proclus wrote a commentary on.  The Elements of Theology by Proclus attempts to use this kind of method to present his understanding of Platonic cosmology and metaphysics.

I favor the approach found in Plato because I think it uses all the capacities of the human mind and appeals to a wide range of types of mental comprehension.  I think this reflects the ability of Plato to use numerous structures in his dialectic, including allegory, simile, symbol, myth, syllogistic, and so forth.  In Plato the reality of the teaching exists before the method of presentation.  In Proclus the method preempts the teaching.  Or you could say that in contemplative Platonism the reality gives birth to method(s) whereas in theurgy the method preempts the teaching.