Brief Notes on Various Topics - 87

9 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 87

1.  Beauty Redeems the World

1.1-There is a theme that flows through several of the Enneads of Plotinus: ‘Against the Gnostics,’ (Ennead 2.9), ‘On Providence,’ (Enneads 3.2 and 3.3).  I am referring to Plotinus talking about the negatives of embodied, or material, existence and how to comprehend them.  The main thrust of Plotinus’s presentation as I understand it is that people tend to make too much of, or overinterpret, these negativities.  The result is that they misunderstand the nature of embodied existence and all of its manifestations; for example they are unable to comprehend that all of embodied existence flows from a shared principle because they are kind of hypnotized by the presence of negativities and fail to notice, for example, the presence of beauty in embodied existence, and the significance of that presence.

1.2 – Plotinus isn’t shy about giving examples of these negativities such as war, assaults of various kinds, deceitfulness, and so forth (he even uses the example of a snake).  But Plotinus argues that all of these mishaps in life are like what happens on a stage and we are watching the play.  The actors are not actually harmed and the negativities in the action of the play are there for balance and to give a kind of form to the play.

1.2.1  I think many people would have difficulty accepting this kind of analysis.  But in thinking about this, and focusing more on the providential nature of the higher hypostases, I think it is possible to comprehend what Plotinus is referring to.  For example, someone might get fired from a job unjustly; unjust because they have, in fact, done very good work at this job.  At first they may feel angry, or hurt, and they may want to lash out at those responsible for these circumstances.   But a few months later they have found a new job which pays better and offers other rewards.  Their view of what happened to them now changes; they may view getting fired as ‘the best thing that ever happened to me.’

1.3  The primary antidote to getting entangled in worldly negativities, according to Plotinus, is Beauty.  For Plotinus, Beauty is not just decorative; the presence of Beauty is a sign, or symbol, of the higher hypostases (or levels of reality).  And Plotinus’s view on this is drawn from Plato’s Symposium primarily, but also from the Phaedrus.  Particularly in the Symposium beauty is spoken of by Diotima (as quoted by Socrates) as the presence that can lead a student of philosophy to the divine and transcendental.  The idea is to follow beauty back to its source which is non-material.  In a sense, Plato and Plotinus are saying that Beauty is not of this world, that the presence of Beauty in this world is not a result of material conditions; rather it is the result of the Noetic and Transcendental breaking through to material reality.  Both Plato and Plotinus offer contemplative exercises to follow beauty back to its source.

1.4  For Plotinus, the presence of Beauty is what, ultimately, undermines the Gnostic view that the world is evil without any redeeming aspect.  This critique of Gnosticism, and the inability of Gnostics to understand the function of Beauty in the world, is powerful and distinguishes Gnosticism from Platonism in important ways. 

The Enneads on Providence (which was originally a single Ennead which Porphyry separated into two parts) place the function of Beauty into the larger context of Providence; relating these two important realities.  You could say that the presence of beauty is providential in that in spite of the negativities of material existence, Beauty redeems the world.

2.  Geology

Years ago I was walking with a friend who was a geologist.  We were walking past a cliff.  My friend the geologist began to explain what all the layers were, how they were formed, and what their presence signified, and roughly the timespan involved.  It was a very enjoyable walk for me.

I was thinking about this, and I noticed how this experience of mine resembles how one goes about experiencing the higher hypostases, or realities, that are referred to in the Platonic tradition.  That’s probably not obvious, but bear with me.

Both I and my geologist friend were looking at the same cliff, but our perception and understanding differed depending on our level of training.  My friend had trained in geology for many years and this training shaped his perception of the cliff making facets of meaning and understanding available to him, but which were unavailable to me because I had not undergone the necessary training.

In Platonism it is the training of ethical restraint, the asceses, that refines and reshapes our perception, both inner and outer, so that we can become aware of these other realities which were previously hidden from us due to the unrefined nature of our mind.  This suggests that becoming aware of noetic realities and transcendental reality, is not a matter of a mystical ascent, it’s a matter of refining our awareness, of being able to shift our attention from the ephemeral to the eternal.  It is mysticism, but it is the mysticism of presence rather than the mysticisms of ascent.

I think that the idea that our body and minds need to be purified in order to become a philosopher is today a strange one.  This is due, I think, to the way philosophy has become centered on thinking, differentiation, and mental analysis.  For most philosophers today thinking, differentiation, and mental analysis are philosophy.  Purification through ethical restraint isn’t part of their program; but it was part of the program in Platonism. 

I don’t think it is too difficult to understand why purification is necessary; we can compare purification practices in more mundane activities to understand the place of purification in philosophy.  For example, a coach may instruct athletes in training to refrain from, or at least limit, alcohol and drug use because it makes it more difficult, perhaps impossible, to concentrate on physical development and athletic prowess.  A musician may be told by an instructor to refrain from spending so much time on social media, that the student needs to spend more time on practicing their craft of musicianship.  A carpenter may see that an apprentice is not making progress and suggest that the apprentice limit distractions.  Such advice is common.  And I suggest that ethical restraint in philosophy is similar to this kind of advice.  However, there is a primary difference; the goal in mundane activities is a worldly goal (to become a musician, and athlete, a carpenter, and so forth).  The goal of philosophical purification is awareness of, and experience of, non-material realities.  In this context restraint is not just a tool for worldly accomplishments.  Rather ethical restraint is an alignment with the higher realities by transforming the student in a manner that leads to the student resembling these higher realities; living a life that, as far as possible in a material body, is like that found in the noetic and transcendental realities. 

In a philosophical context, ethical restraint, asceses, brings us closer to the everlasting realities of nous, and to the ineffable reality of the Good and the One.

3.  New Porphyry Translations

New translations of two of Porphyry’s works, Letter to Anebo and Philosophy from Oracles, has just been released on Amazon.  (The copyright states the book was published in 2025, but it wasn’t available until last month on Amazon.)  The author is Fabien Muller.  The publisher is The Center for the Study of World Religions, and the distributor is Harvard University Press.

Both of the translations have facing English and Greek or Latin pages which allows those with knowledge of these languages the opportunity to compare the original with the English.  Both of these works come down to us in a fragmentary state.  Most of the fragments of the Letter to Anebo come to us through Iamblichus’s response to Porphyry’s Letter in On the Mysteries.  Iamblichus’s response is very critical and dismissive of Porphyry which must be kept in mind when reading the quotes from Iamblichus’s work.  But there are additional Latin sources such as Augustine and Eusebius, which are included in this publication.  Again, Augustine and Eusebius have differing levels of hostility to Porphyry (though based on different reasons from that of Iamblichus).  In the case of the Letter we have quite a lot of quotations and what comes through seems to be consistent with Porphyry’s overall views of Platonism.

The second work, Philosophy from Oracles, is more fragmentary and it is more difficult to access what Porphyry may have been saying.  In the Introduction it is pointed out that some scholars regard these two works as in some way contradictory or at least expressing different views.  The idea is that the Letter is highly critical of theurgy (which is true), but the Philosophy from Oracles uses Oracular statements as a source for philosophical insight.  Personally, I don’t think there is a contradiction.  Porphyry’s comments on the oracles are philosophical.  There is a long history in Platonism of writing comments, sometimes full-blown commentaries, on non-philosophical works; for example there are commentaries on Homer from within the Platonic tradition.  In other words, I think Porphyry’s Philosophy from Oracles is part of this Platonic heritage, just as Porphyry’s criticisms of theurgy come from the same heritage. 

The Introduction’s presentation of the nature of the disagreements between the Letter and Oracles is nuanced and helpful in understanding the particular passages and issues involved.  The Introduction mentions that these disagreements or contradictions ‘extend only to a certain point.’ (page 50)  Ultimately, due to the fragmentary nature of Oracles in particular, a resolution of these issues that is completely satisfactory is unlikely to emerge (unless more complete copies are found, buried in the desert sand, than we have at present).  But I very much appreciate the way the Introduction spells out these issues in a meticulous way.

I have some experience in the kind of commentary that Porphyry undertakes in his book on Oracles.  I like to interpret popular songs from a Platonic perspective.  I have posted several such commentaries on this blog and hope to do more in the future.  I think popular culture can be surprisingly insightful about the human condition and situation in a way that illuminates Platonism or can represent Platonism.  I’m not claiming that these songs were written by Platonists or philosophers.  But I think it is helpful to see the reality that Platonism refers to having a voice in a popular context.  I think accessing oracles seems to have been a popular activity in Greek religion and suggest that Porphyry is linking Platonism to this popular activity without necessarily claiming that the Oracles were spoken by a Platonist Sage.

I have been waiting for this translation for quite some time and I’m glad to finally get a copy.  It’s great to see an emerging interest in Porphyry resulting in such a well-done book on these two works.  For those interested in Porphyry and in the world of Late Classical Platonism, I highly recommend this book.

 

  

Porphyry's Task

29 December 2025

Porphyry’s Task

“During his (Plotinus’s) lifetime, Christianity attracted a diverse popular following, as did movements which drew on ancient philosophy . . . They deceived many people indeed, they were themselves deluded.  As if Plato had not come to grips with the profundity of intelligible substance!  Plotinus himself refuted them on many points in the course of our seminars, and he wrote a book which we called ‘Against the Gnostics’ [Ennead 2.9]; but he left it to us (meaning Porphyry and other students of Plotinus) to judge the rest.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by a committee of scholars, edited by Lloyd P. Gerson, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2025, page 30, paragraph 16, ISBN: 9781009604970)

1.  Plotinus lived in the third century of our era, from 204 or 205 to 270.  Christianity at that time had not achieved complete dominance but was emerging as a pervasive cultural force.  (It was in the fourth century that Christianity’s political power would become overwhelming.) 

2.  The above quote is an interesting look at how a non-Christian philosopher dealt with the increasing Christian presence both in its Orthodox forms and in its Gnostic branches.  It seems that Plotinus dealt with these representatives of various Christian groups by engaging with them in the usual question and answer format of Plotinus’s gatherings.  But Plotinus also took the time to particularly focus on the Gnostics by writing an essay which is now called ‘Against the Gnostics.’  The reason for such a focus is that from the perspective of Plotinus (and Porphyry) the Gnostics misrepresented Plato and Plotinus wanted to correct these misrepresentations.

3.  This is speculative, but I think this kind of engagement might be what led Porphyry to write his work ‘Against the Christians.’  I mean that Porphyry may have been directly inspired to do so by the precedent of Plotinus’s ‘Against the Gnostics’ and the instructions of Plotinus to his students to ‘judge the rest.’ 

4.  Evidently Porphyry’s book, ‘Against the Christians’, was very offensive and irritating to Christianity and it was condemned by name by three emperors as well as some councils.  This led to its destruction so that we have only quotes from various sources as surviving fragments.  (The latest translation of these fragments is by David Litwa in his book A Reconstruction of Against the Christians by Porphyry of Tyre which was published this year, 2025.)  The essay by Plotinus, ‘Against the Gnostics’ had a better fate because Orthodox Christianity opposed the Gnostics, though for different reasons.

5.  Thinking about this, I began to consider Porphyry’s ‘Letter to Anebo’ as in the same vein as ‘Against the Christians.’  What I mean is that in many ways the ‘Letter to Anebo’ is a critique of theurgy and shares, I think, a similar purpose as ‘Against the Christians.’  I started to think of the ‘Letter to Anebo’ as a kind of ‘Against the Theurgists.’ 

6.  In the quote above Porphyry expresses irritation with the Christians, particularly Gnostics, who misrepresent Plato as being deficient because they suggested that Plato did not understand the intelligibles and the noetic realm.  Porphyry thought of Plato’s insights into this dimension of existence as sufficient and based on contemplative experience; they did not need to be reworked into elaborations that were complex and opaque. 

7.  But it appears to me that Porphyry had similar views about theurgy and its interpretation of Platonism.  Theurgy also unnecessarily complicated Plato’s insights by multiplying noetic entities and creating additional hypostases.  Because of this he wrote his ‘Letter to Anebo’ in order to counter the growing tendency to dilute Plato’s teachings by adding unnecessary theurgic complexities and practices.  From the perspective of Porphyry theurgy did not solve any alleged problem in Platonism; instead theurgy created problems and obstacles that made it more difficult to understand Platonism.

8.  I think a reader can also see this kind of task in Porphyry’s On Abstinence which was Porphyry’s extensive apology for vegetarianism in a Platonic context.  Porphyry observed that his friend Firmus had abandoned a vegetarian diet and had returned to eating meat.  I suspect, though Porphyry does not say so, that this was not the first time Porphyry had observed this kind of return to meat eating, or the sacrificing of animals; I mean that Firmus may have been a symbol for Porphyry of this kind of loss of commitment. 

In ‘On Abstinence’ Porphyry takes on the same task as he did with ‘Against the Christians’ and ‘Letter to Anebo’ which is to put forth the view of the Platonic tradition as it had been presented since Plato’s time (and one could argue even before Plato this was the view of Philosophy as the fount of wisdom and as a way of life.)

9.   A counter to this way of interpreting the writings of Porphyry would be Porphyry’s engagement with the ‘Chaldean Oracles.’  Last week I posted about the Chaldean Oracles and mentioned that both Iamblichus and Proclus wrote commentaries on them; both of which are now lost.  But Porphyry also wrote a commentary on the Chaldean Oracles and he did so before Iamblichus (and, obviously Proclus).  This work is also lost.  The question is, does the fact that Porphyry spent time with the Chaldean Oracles negate, or undermine, the idea that Porphyry’s ‘Letter to Anebo’ was, in a sense, an overall rejection of theurgy and had the same function in a theurgic context as ‘Against the Christians’ had in a Christian context?  It’s a good question.  Here are a few observations:

9.1  I tend to see Porphyry’s involvement with the Chaldean Oracles as resembling the way Chinese philosophers and sages were involved with the Book of Changes, also known as the I Ching.  There are countless commentaries on the Book of Changes written over many centuries.  Most of these commentaries are Confucian, meaning that they use their commentaries to affirm Confucian spirituality.  (The Book of Changes was, after all, a Confucian Classic.)  Some of the commentaries are Daoist, some are Buddhist, and some are more practical in that they are focused on the art of war, or martial arts, or even business and governing.  My point here is that the Book of Changes was flexible enough to allow for a variety of interpretations and uses.

I think Porphyry’s use of the Chaldean Oracles follows a similar pattern in that Porphyry seems to have put forth a traditional Platonic interpretation of its cryptic sayings.  In contrast, it seems to be the case that Iamblichus would use the Chaldean Oracles to justify a complete reinterpretation of Platonism.  Thus their purposes greatly differed and the results also differed.  (This is speculative since all of the commentaries are lost.)

9.1.1  I think it is possible for us today to connect with how Porphyry related to Oracles and other such practices by connecting with how we in the West use the Book of Changes.  We are not Chinese Sages and we have not inherited a long tradition regarding this work.  We tend to approach the Changes in an open way, but not in a way that would treat the Changes as infallible.  There is a certain respect a Westerner has when using the Changes, but it is not what one might call submission. 

9.1.2  Relating to the Changes, or the Oracles, resembles the way we relate to poetry.  I say this because poetry is obscure, the language is often difficult to understand, yet there is a sense of meaning that speaks to us in the way that music speaks to us.  As philosophers, we subject such works to dialectic even when, as Plato wrote in Phaedrus, we know that written works can’t defend themselves.  But is that true?  If we enter into dialectic then these works can ‘speak’ and we can enter into a dialectical relationship with them.  This is how I think Porphyry treated poetry, Oracles, and how he would have treated the Book of Changes.

9.2  Porphyry spent time studying philosophical and spiritual traditions other than Platonism, even those contrary to Platonism.  I don’t think that was unusual in the culture of that time.  For example, in ‘Against the Christians’ Porphyry demonstrates familiarity with Christian scriptures.  (And as an aside, Porphyry was very familiar with Aristotle and other significant philosophers.)  I bring this up because Porphyry’s writings on the Chaldean Oracles may have been more ‘comments on’ rather than a genuine commentary; what I’m getting at is that writing about the Chaldean Oracles does not, by itself, constitute commitment to them as a source of spiritual nourishment.  Porphyry’s studies of Christianity did not eventuate in a commitment to Christianity, and Porphyry’s studies of Aristotle did not lead Porphyry to become a Peripatetic.  Porphyry interpreted all of these approaches through a Platonic lens, preserving the view that Platonism was sufficient and a complete spiritual system.  In contrast, Iamblichus used the Chaldean Oracles to undermine the position of Platonism by insisting that additions needed to be made, of a theurgic kind, because wisdom was insufficient to bring practitioners to the salvific goal of Platonism which is union with the Good and the One. 

9.3  I’m not saying that Porphyry was disinterested in oracles; it seems that Porphyry used oracles found at temples in the same way that today many people use the Book of Changes.  And sometimes Porphyry would write about the oracles he received.  I think Porphyry was interested in the questions surrounding how to interpret such utterances, what status we should give them, and how we should respond to them.  These are the same kinds of questions that people today ask about the Book of Changes or the Tarot.  These strike me as legitimate philosophical questions that would arise naturally in a Platonic context that is rooted in Plato’s Dialogues wherein one finds lots of allegorical, mythic, and metaphorical writing.  I say that these questions would arise naturally in this context because an oracle’s pronouncements might use some of these devices and Platonists would be familiar with them and know how to unpack them.  The point is that Porphyry treated the Oracles as opportunities for dialectic whereas Iamblichus used the Oracles as opportunities for commanding subversion of traditional Platonism.

9.4  I don’t see any evidence that Porphyry signed on to theurgy under the influence of the Chaldean Oracles.  As far as I can tell, Porphyry never suggests that theurgic ritual is higher than wisdom, or that theurgic ritual is necessary for the philosophical ascent to bear fruit.  That would happen with Iamblichus and it is a striking difference between the two.

10.  I’m not saying that this task of passing on the inherited tradition of Platonism by critiquing deviations from it, such as theurgy and meat eating, was the only thing Porphyry did during his productive life as a philosopher.  For example, Porphyry also wrote works that were addressed to beginners, such as Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella and works such as his Sentences which is a subtle presentation on the finer aspects of Platonism. 

Nevertheless, I think much of what Porphyry did was to write what might be called apologetic treatises for Orthodox, or traditional, Platonism at an historical moment when multiple attempts were being made to subvert that inheritance. 

11.  Was Porphyry successful in these apologetic efforts?  In the immediate historical context I think we would have to say ‘no’, he wasn’t.  I mean that Christian Platonism found a place and created a way of interpreting Platonism that presented Platonism as incomplete and deficient.  In addition, theurgy undermined Platonist ethics, its metaphysics, and shifted the tradition from Philosophy, love of wisdom, to Theurgy, love of ritual, and to a focus on theology rather than philosophy.  (Those who follow Theurgy today retain these anti-Platonist views to some extent which varies from person to person and group to group.) 

On the other hand, when looked at from a longer historical view, Porphyry passed on to the future the tradition that he loved and made it available and accessible to many people.  This reconnection to Orthodox Platonism via Porphyry’s writings began in the Renaissance; one example is a reconnection to vegetarianism with the discovery, and then the wide distribution, of his On Abstinence in Europe.  In some ways, I think the full significance of Porphyry’s writings, and the full impact of those writings, has not yet emerged but is likely to blossom in the future; that is, of course, speculation.  But I think it is informed speculation.  I say this because I sense that some people, more with the passing of time, seem to be interested in learning Platonism on its own terms instead of through the distorting lenses of Christianity and Theurgy.  And Porphyry’s writings are an excellent way to access the tradition as it existed before it was subject to these distortions; that is my hope and perhaps the hope of others as well.

12.  What about today, our contemporary situation?  I think that Porphyry offers us a model of how a Platonist can interact with other philosophical and spiritual systems without succumbing to those traditions and at the same time retaining a sense of one’s own place and wisdom.  I mean that in our contemporary situation we have many people wanting to adjust, reinterpret, or in some way undermine Orthodox Platonism so that it will serve some other system’s purposes.  For example, the practice of Theurgy is advocated for by a number of non-academic Platonist groups who configure the practice of Theurgy as in some way a significant Platonic practice.  I think Porphyry shows us how to relate to these kinds of claims. 

We also have those who want to subsume Platonism under their own political agenda.  Some examples of this have had significant influence such as the teachings of Leo Straus.  Porphyry does not write specifically about politics, but he offers a sense of stability when faced with misinterpretations of Platonism that can be applied to a political context.

In contemporary Universities there is a strongly held view that Platonism is best understood through the analytic tools of contemporary philosophy thus transforming Plato into a proto-analytic philosopher and relegating mystics like Plotinus to the fringes.  Porphyry shows us that misinterpretations of Platonism can be subjected to dialectical investigation and that this leads to understanding Platonism on its own terms rather than interpreting Platonism through a different, in this case secular, lens.

I also think that Porphyry informs us how to retain our equanimity in the thick of the confusion of competing claims and critiques.  As mentioned above, in the short term, Porphyry’s apologias for traditional Platonism did not win out.  But if one looks at this kind of situation from the perspective of wisdom, from the perspective of eternity, that is not disturbing. 

In short, I think Porphyry is the ancient Platonist who is best equipped to show us moderns how to move forward in a world that feels just as chaotic as the world in which Porphyry lived; a world in which, if we take the long view, he thrived.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 65

22 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 65

1.  Dionysius the Areopagite and Contemplative Platonism

Last week I mentioned Johannes Scotus Eriugena and his work The Periphyseon.  I mentioned in passing that Eriugena had translated into Latin the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, in particular Mystical Theology.  Here I want to post some thoughts about Dionysius and his role in Late Classical Platonism as well as Christian Mysticism, also known as Contemplative Christianity.  I think it is an intriguing history of how Platonic Mysticism was transmitted to Christianity, impacting Christian Theology in general, and Christian Mysticism in particular.

Not much is known about Dionysius beyond the works he wrote (or the works attributed to him).  The traditional view of Dionysius, held by orthodox Christians for many centuries, is that he was the Dionysius who appears briefly in the Book of Acts in the scene where Paul preaches to the Athenians at the Areopagus.  In the Book of Acts it mentions by name several people who converted to Christianity at that time, one of whom was Dionysius.  Since Dionysius is a very common Greek name at that time, he is distinguished from others of the same name by referring to him as Dionysius the Areopagite.  The orthodox tradition has the view that the works attributed to Dionysius (both the ones that we have and a few that have not survived) were written by this Dionysius from the Book of Acts. 

Modern scholars almost universally disagree with this attribution for various reasons such as linguistics, quotations from later sources; things like that.  But pinning down who Dionysius was has proven difficult and there are many theories about who he was and when he wrote.  I’ve read theories that place Dionysius anywhere from the 300’s to the mid 500’s.  And there are many theories as to who Dionysius was and where he was from.  One interesting theory I’ve encountered is that Dionysius was a pen name for Damascius who was the last head of Plato’s Academy when it was closed by Justinian in 529 CE.  The idea is that Damascius, or possibly a Christian member of the Academy at the time of the closing, penned the works attributed to Dionysius as a way of preserving some basic teachings of Platonism in the new context of Christianity which had triumphed over Paganism.  On the other hand, a recently published work that translates a 9^th century biography of Dionysius offers an extensive apology for the traditional, orthodox, view that Dionysius was the Apostle of Paul from the Book of Acts.

For those interested in the orthodox view the latest book presented this perspective is The Life of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, published in January 2024.  For those interested in the idea that Dionysius was actually Damascius, in 2006 Carlo Maria Mazzucchi wrote an article presenting this perspective, though I’m not sure of the journal. 

Mystical Theology is a brief work; something like five to seven pages, depending on the layout.  In five sections it describes the mystical ascent in terms of entering into a luminous darkness, an ineffable presence beyond affirmation and negation.  Those familiar with Plotinus can see the connection to passages in the Enneads where Plotinus talks about turning away from the material realm, then turning away from the noetic, in order to become absorbed in that which is beyond being, the Good and the One. 

The mystical ascent in Platonism, and in Dionysius specifically, is about divesting yourself of differentiation and individuation.  I think that is why Dionysius uses the vocabulary of ascending into darkness; because this realm is beyond the light of reason.

This understanding of mysticism is the root of Christian mysticism and it has a Platonic origin.  Mystical Theology had, and still has, a profound impact on orthodox Christianity; for example, a work like The Cloud of Unknowing is rooted in Mystical Theology as are many other works down to the current day.

2.  The Modern World and Mysticism

I saw a talk online that suggested that mystics are vanishing from society.  I wonder if that is true.  My inclination is to think that it is harder these days for a mystic to find a place or organization that is devoted to pursuing mystic realization and living in accordance with the disciplines and ethical restraints that are foundational for mysticism.  We live in a society that rejects the idea of transcendence, a society that is secular, reductionistic, and materialistic; these are not nourishing to an understanding of mysticism.

The talk I listened to quoted Jung as having this view; the view that mystics are vanishing from society.  Personally, I don’t consider Jung to be a mystic, but putting that aside, he may have spotted this kind of trend decades ago.  I suspect others have as well.

But I have also observed that mystics seem to be up to the challenge of the modern world; I mean that mystics do the best they can given the circumstances, which, I think, has always been the case. 

Today a mystic faces the challenge of figuring out how to walk his path without social approval or support.  There are very few teachers or resources or institutions that will assist someone trying to walk this path.  But that’s OK; it’s a challenge for sure, but the difficulties are not insurmountable. 

3.  Precepts of Platonism

If I were to mimic Dharmic traditions by generating a list of core precepts that I think capture the heart of the Dharma of Platonism, I think it would look something like this:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

3.1  These are based on the five precepts, or vows, found in Dharmic traditions such as Classical Yoga and Jainism, as well as Buddhism.  I believe I have posted these previously, but I’m going to put them here to make it easy to compare them:

Classical Yoga and Jainism

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

Here is the Buddhist version:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

3.2  I have used a formulaic approach to the language of these precepts; books readers might consult may use a different kind of language structure, but I do not think these lists are misleading.  I am taking the view that the ethical injunctions are all ethical restraints and the formula I am using emphasizes that perspective.

3.3  Classical Yoga and Jainism share a common fifth precept; to refrain from acquiring unnecessary possessions.  Buddhism has a different fifth precept; to refrain from intoxicants.  I decided to include both of them since both of these restraints are found in Platonic writings.

3.4  I have an inclination to include a precept that emphasizes vegetarianism.  It might look something like this: I will refrain from harming animals by eating them, by wearing their skin or fur, or by sacrificing them for ritual or other purposes.  Both Classical Yoga and Jainism are vegetarian traditions, but they do not have a separate vow for vegetarianism; rather vegetarianism is considered to be the application of the first vow, the vow of non-harming, to the animal-human relationship.  I decided to go along with that; but I do feel a bit ambivalent about that.  My ambivalence is that by emphasizing vegetarianism with a separate vow a structure would be created that would point directly to the important place it has held in the Platonist tradition.  For those new to Platonism I think this could be very helpful.  I don’t think such pointing is necessary for Classical Yoga and Jainism because in their cultural context the practice of vegetarianism in these traditions is so widely known.

3.4.1  It’s worth noting that in East Asia there is a more complex series of ethical commitments referred to as the Bodhisattva Vows.  These vows are available to lay people who want to deepen their Buddhist commitments and practice.  In the East Asian Bodhisattva vows vegetarianism is explicitly required in the third of the 48 minor precepts (there are 10 major precepts) which has had an impact on East Asian culture in general.  I’m not going to list the Bodhisattva Vows here because they are too complex in comparison to the five vows of the Jains, Classical Yoga, and Buddhism.  But perhaps in a possible commentary I might bring them into the discussion.

3.5  My tentative plan is to expand on each of the Platonic Precepts of Philosophy by quoting passages from the Dialogues, the Enneads, and other Platonist sources so that the source from which the Precepts of Philosophy emerge can be made clear.  I have already done this with the First Precept of Non-Harming and posted them to this blog (to find these quotes click on ‘Non-harming’ on the list of topics to the right).  In some ways this is a big project, but I am willing to go at a slow pace to bring it to a conclusion.

3.6  An objection to this kind of project is that Platonism has not, in fact, generated such a list of Ethical Restraints or Precepts and therefore the list is misleading. 

3.6.1  My first response is that there are many ideas and interpretations in the history of Platonism that are not explicitly found in the Dialogues; and, in addition, this is true for all spiritual traditions. 

3.6.2  My second response is that such a list is a kind of a teaching device, a distillation, of Platonist Ethics and the practice of those ethics.  There have been many such distillations such as essays describing the different hypostases and how they interact. 

3.6.3  My third response is that the Platonic tradition seems to have lost sight of the ethical restraints found in Platonism.  When I say we have ‘lost sight’ of these practices, I mean that even though we may read about them, they don’t register as actual practices, actual things we can do to practice the Dharma of Platonism.  I feel that many people don’t know what to do to practice Platonism.  This structure opens the door to doing Platonism.

3.7  I like the idea of following how Jainism interprets their precepts, or vows (vrata), in several ways, depending on the life situation of the practitioner.  For monastics, their vows are interpreted very strictly.  For laypeople, much less so.  I think the same could be done successfully with these Precepts of Philosophy.

4.  The Sentences of Porphyry – Sentence 11

Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts, and multiplies about individuals with a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power.  (Thomas Taylor)

The incorporeal existences in descending are divided and multiplies into atomic things by a remission of power, whilst in ascending they are unified, and revert to inseparateness by superabundance of power.  (Thomas Davidson)

When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the individual.  When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and their power intensifies.  (Kenneth Guthrie)

When immaterial beings descend, they divide into parts and branch out, multiplying in their individual manifestations of power, but when they ascend, they unite and return to simultaneous existence in unity through increased power.  (Isaak Samarskyi)

4.1  I read this as an elegant summary by Porphyry of the process of descent into the material realm, followed by the process of the return to the noetic, and beyond the noetic to the One.  Porphyry manages to describe these processes concisely and at the same time, with insight.  I think it reflects, or embodies, Porphyry’s own experience of returning to the One.

4.2  Porphyry begins by explaining how the incorporeal, or immaterial, becomes, or descends, into the material realm.  Porphyry describes this as division of noetic, or hypostatic, unities into parts.  Because this is a highly condensed presentation, Porphyry does not go into the specifics of the process of division into parts that noetic unities undergo, though later Platonists, such as Proclus, will focus on this and offer their understanding of how this process unfolds.

I tend to use the concept ‘differentiation’ to describe the movement from unity to noetic realities, and then from noetic realities to material instantiations.  This process of differentiation resembles the way light breaks up into different colors when light flows through a crystal.  Or the way a river will branch out in a delta.  Or the way a song will be performed differently by different singers and musicians. 

4.3  Interestingly, there is the idea in this Sentence that there is a loss of ‘power’ as differentiation increases; the more a material entity is the result of a series of differentiations, the less power it has.  I think the term ‘power’ here means ‘metaphysical power’ and, further, that this is referring to a thing’s potentialities.  For example, the number 7 in the noetic hypostasis has enormous potential, unlimited possibilities.  But because noetic numbers have no content, this power of possibilities remains a potential.  In contrast, 7 apples is a limited manifestation of the noetic reality of 7.  7 apples are differentiated from 7 chairs, 7 days, and 7 stars.  7 chairs have some potential; for example, it could potentially refer to 7 oak chairs, 7 old chairs, 7 rocking chairs, and so forth.  But all of those potentialities are contained in 7 as a noetic reality so the potentiality of 7 chairs is less than, which is to say has less power than, 7 as a noetic presence.

4.4  The Sentence then reverses the process to describe the ascent to the noetic from the material.  When we ascend, we become more unified, less differentiated, but at the same time we have more power in our understanding, vision, and potential.  Finally, there is a return to unity as such, meaning a return to the One.

5.  Whitehead and Heidegger

I found an essay online that is a thoughtful presentation of the differences between Heidegger and Whitehead.  The essay is by Jay McDaniel whom I have not heard of before.  He is a philosopher, evidently a follower of Whitehead, who likes to post essays on various topics at his blog called Open Horizons which is found at openhorizons (dot) org.  The specific essay I’m referring to is titled “Love and Mystery.”  If you are interested in the differences and overlaps between Whitehead and Heidegger I recommend the essay as a good summary.

McDaniel, in one section of the essay, lists the various critiques Heidegger had of metaphysics.  In item 6 McDaniel writes “Heidegger argues that metaphysics has exhausted itself and reached its ‘end.’  This does not mean metaphysics has been resolved or completed, but rather that it has reached a point where it can no longer meaningfully address the question of being.”

This perspective is a primary reason why I ultimately rejected Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of philosophy.  But I want to make one point that McDaniel doesn’t touch on; and that is that this idea of the ‘end of metaphysics’ is, surprisingly, a typical modernist stance regarding the past and what the past has to offer us.  I mean that one of the foundations of modernism is that it regards the past as void of any positive content, void of wisdom or insight, that the past is solely something to overcome and to leave behind. 

It is typical of modernist views that those who offer them want to start over; a kind of Year Zero project.  I think the first manifestation of this was the French Revolution which sought to eliminate all traces of the past; those who were seen as clinging to the past were to be eliminated. 

If you read modernist theory, particularly in the realm of politics and related fields, this idea is a steady drumbeat.  It seems to me that Heidegger is marching to that drum.  In other words, Heidegger’s rejection of the tradition of metaphysics fits right in with modernity’s overall project of starting over with Year Zero.

From this perspective, the perspective of modernity, those who engage in metaphysics are by that very engagement reactionaries.  McDaniel writes, “. . . the Heideggerians I encountered were profoundly suspicious of metaphysics, often rejecting it outright.”  As I mentioned in a previous post, from this perspective analytic philosophy and Heidegger’s philosophy have the same anti-metaphysical impact.

In a way, we can think of a work like Whitehead’s Process and Reality as a refutation of Heidegger’s thesis about the ‘end of metaphysics.’  Process and Reality is consciously rooted in the heritage of metaphysical thought going back to Plato.  Whitehead finds that heritage nourishing and vividly interacts with it to make his own original observations.  (Perhaps this positive view of the heritage of metaphysics was shaped by Whitehead’s interest in mathematics; it would be difficult for a mathematician to reject the history of mathematics in the way modernity rejects so much else.)  I’m not saying that Whitehead wrote Process and Reality in order to refute Heidegger; McDaniel writes that, as far as scholars can tell, the two were almost entirely unaware of each other.  I mean that Process and Reality is a rejection of Heidegger’s views on metaphysics because it is a demonstration that metaphysics has not, for example, reached its ‘end.’

For contemporary Platonists I think it is helpful to get some clarity about what Heidegger says about metaphysics in general and about Plato in particular.  Some of the strange hostility to metaphysics one encounters these days is rooted in Heidegger’s application of modernity’s hostility to the past to metaphysics.  As I mentioned in a previous post about this, the best way to counter these kinds of ideas is simply to continue one’s studies of metaphysics and to apply such studies to how one lives one’s life.  In this way the great garden of metaphysics will continue to blossom.

6.  It is late at night.  There was another brief rain today in the desert where I live.  This cleared the air and when the sun set behind the mountain range in the distance the air was exceptionally clear. 

There are times when I feel a deep sadness at the state of the world and the fate that human beings have made their destiny.  But there are consolations, messages from the noetic, that can soothe the sense of alienation from this world.  An astonishingly beautiful sunset is one such message.  The cooling stillness of contemplation is another.  The writings of the Platonic tradition are yet another.  Experiences like this are like opening a gate to the grotto of eternity.