Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 94

28 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 94

1.  The Soul of Philosophy

Recently I listened to an interview with Robert Greene.  Robert Greene is an author of popular self-help books.  Unlike most self-help books, Greene’s books are thick.  His best-selling book is The 48 Laws of Power, but other titles are similar in format but focus on other topics.  Greene’s approach is to tell stories, mostly from history, to illustrate the point he is making or the topic he is writing about.  This approach is an engaging format and has been well-received.

The interview was between a British Podcaster and Greene.  At one point the interviewer asks Greene to comment on what happened to philosophy in the 20^th century.  Greene responds by saying that ‘philosophy lost its soul’ starting in the early 20^th century.  I thought that was an interesting answer.  Greene is not a Platonist, as far as I know he is a secular materialist; this means that he is not using ‘soul’ in the way a Platonist would use the word.  But I found it intriguing that Greene chose to use that particular word; this kind of response isn’t typical of the way Greene talks.

Whatever Geene meant by the word ‘soul’ I am comfortable using a Platonic perspective to interpret what was said even if Greene would not sign onto that interpretation.  I have an overall agreement with Greene’s description of what happened to Philosophy.  I also suspect that at least some philosophers would also agree with Greene but would likely celebrate that loss because they think of this situation not as a loss, but as progress; I am thinking of materialist philosophers who are proud of their dismissal of anything transcendental, as well as an ethic that is disconnected to metaphysics and arrived at through the process of purification.  Materialist philosophers, what Plato through Gerson describe as ‘naturalists’, dismiss the idea of a soul, just as they dismiss the idea of Ideas. 

It would be interesting to find out if Greene has unpacked this observation in one of his numerous volumes; if anyone knows where such comments can be found, please indicate in the comments section.  Thanks.

2.  The Beauty of Metaphysics

There is something almost miraculous about the heritage of metaphysics.  When I use the word ‘miraculous’ what I mean is that it is difficult to square how material beings, such as human beings, could move beyond the material, the physical, and dwell enough in the metaphysical to unpack what they found to the best of their abilities after their return to the material domain.  If human beings were merely physical, I suggest that it would be impossible to do so.  The fact that there is metaphysics at all indicates that human beings are not reducible to their physical components.

3.  Ethical Restraints and the Virtues

I have been thinking a lot about the ethical restraints as they are found in Platonism for a long time.  One thing that I have noticed is that there is a lot written about the Platonic Virtues.  Most of the writing on the Virtues has blossomed from the seed of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  It’s not difficult to find books dedicated to the Platonic Virtues.

But the ethical restraints are not written about with the same focus and dedication.  Porphyry writes about them in several of his works, but Porphyry did not receive the approval that Aristotle did and though Porphyry’s influence is profound, it’s not the same as that of Aristotle’s influence.  My point is that Porphyry’s writings on ethical restraint and asceticism did not act as a catalyst for a lot of writing about the place that restraints have in the Dialogues of Plato. 

I would like to see greater attention placed on the ethical restraints, or asceses, that are found in the Platonic corpus as a whole.  One reason I would like to see this is that from my perspective the idea that Platonism is a Way of Life only makes sense if the restraints, or asceses, are looked at as foundational for such a project.

4.  Proclus and Plotinus

I listened to two Platonist philosophers talking about their favorite subject, Platonism, the other day on a long YouTube podcast.  At one point they agreed that they don’t find Proclus of much value. 

This reminded me of how, even today, Platonists tend to divide into two groups with one group finding satisfaction with Plotinus and the other group thinking of Proclus as going beyond what Plotinus had to say.  I fall in the first group; the one that finds satisfaction, and inspiration, in Plotinus but doesn’t find those qualities in Proclus. 

This has led me to think that perhaps this division is, at least in part, a difference in personality types.  Proclus is highly analytical and deductive; Iain McGilchrist would say that Proclus is ‘left brained.’  Plotinus can be analytical; for example I just finished reading Enneads VI.1, 2, and 3 which is Plotinus’s analysis of Aristotle’s categories.  It is very dense and contains discussions about the nature of substance, form, and intellect.  But even here Plotinus’s approach differs from that of Proclus in that Plotinus will often circle around an issue, presenting various possibilities, before settling on what Plotinus offers the reader as his own solution.  In contrast, Proclus often goes straight for a deduction with much less of this kind of circling motion of thought.

My sense is that some people very much like, and are attracted by, structures of deduction.  And when I say ‘deduction’ I mean reasoned inference in a manner consistent with the logical works of Aristotle and subsequent logicians.  In contrast, there are others, like myself, who enjoy the way Plotinus ‘circles around’, some would even say ‘drifts here and there within the range of the topic he’s discussing.’  I think people who admire this about Plotinus are often, not always, people who enjoy, and learn from, things like metaphor, myth, and allegory.

The Dialogues of Plato contain examples of both approaches; but Plato is exceptional in having the ability to write in many philosophical modes with equal skill (like a composer who can write equally well in major, minor, and modes like the pentatonic scales).  Most philosophers tend to lean in one direction or another.

5.  Haiku

Wandering mountains

Sing hymns to the end of time –

Dry creek, empty sky.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

13 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

1.  The First Principle’s Presence

“Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, Second Edition, edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 582, ISBN: 978009604970)

“. . . all [things are] imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, That Which is after the First, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 143, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“. . . all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.”

“Plotinus, The Enneads, Enneads 5.4.1, The Secondaries and the First, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 461, ISBN: 978943914558)

1.1  There are single sentences in Plotinus that are exquisite, filled with meaning and beauty.  This is one of those sentences.

1.2  In the clause closing the sentence before the one quoted Plotinus refers to fire warming things, to snow cooling things.  And then he moves into a generalization from this observation to an insight about ‘all things’.  That insight is that all things are imitating the nature of the ultimate in accordance with their specific, limited, nature. 

How are things imitating ultimate nature?  By generation, by productive activity.  Fire is hot and the heat of fire produces warmth in objects that are near it.  Snow is cold and the coldness of snow cools those things close to it.  I take these to be analogies to how The One overflows and creates, emanates, generates, the world.  When looked at in this way we can sense the presence of the One even in ordinary material things.  This brings the highest metaphysics of Plotinus down to the material realm so that the material realm is not isolated, or separate from, the transcendental.  The transcendental and the material are not the same, but they are related in a manner that, once recognized, assists the philosopher in his journey of ascent to the Good and the One.

1.3  I view the phrase ‘eternity and goodness’ as a way of saying the One and the Good.  Here I would say that ‘eternity’ is a way of speaking about the One.  The One is ultimately ineffable, but there are names for the One that are used to communicate with each other about this transcendental reality.

Frequently in the Enneads ‘eternity’ or ‘the eternal’ is used to refer to the noetic, the second hypostasis, rather than the One.  It is not unusual for Plotinus to use terms that subtly change their meaning depending on which level, or hypostasis, Plotinus is referring to.  And Plotinus does not always signal a shift of meaning of this kind.  As a reader becomes more familiar with how Plotinus makes these shifts the reader becomes more tuned in to when that happens.

1.4  It is possible to interpret ‘eternity and goodness’ as meaning that everything imitates the noetic forms that are the source of particular things, and following that imitates the ultimate through generous creativity, or goodness.  I can understand this kind of interpretation because it elegantly encapsulates the three levels of existence, or hypostases, starting with material things, then rising to the noetic, and then rising further to the transcendental Good. 

But Armstrong’s translation leans towards seeing this phrase as another way of expressing the One and the Good.  Armstrong translates that all things are imitating the First Principle and Armstrong does not distinguish between everlastingness and generosity as to their level, which hypostasis they reside in; suggesting that both are ways of talking about the ineffable, the transcendental.

MacKenna seems to be making the same point when he says that all things are imitating the ‘Source.’  The ultimate source is the ineffable One.  I don’t read MacKenna as saying that ‘eternity’ and ‘service’ represent names for different hypostases.

It may be the case that Plotinus is compressing multiple meanings in this sentence and that reading eternity as referring to the noetic is one reading Plotinus had in mind, while reading eternity as another way of talking about the ineffable is another reading.  Multiple meanings are not unusual in Plotinus (or Plato) so it would not surprise me if this is the case here.

1.5  Ennead 3.7, Eternity and Time, deals with how Plotinus understands the relationship between these two realities.  Plotinus unpacks his understanding of eternity and time in a way that at first seems complex, but after a second or third reading it comes into clearer focus.  Here is a quote from Ennead III.7 that I think is relevant to the quote from Ennead 5.4:

“What, then, should we say eternity is?  That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the entire heaven, that is, the cosmos?  For they [the Pythagoreans – translator’s footnote] say that some hold this latter belief about time.  For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them.  And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.

“But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ [Timaeus 37D3 – translator’s footnote] – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it.  But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity.  For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other.  And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.”

(Gerson, see above, page 337)

Here is the passage from Timaeus, 37D3, that the translator referenced in a footnote:

“Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper; Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, page 1241, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see the quote from Ennead 3.7 as indicating that Plotinus does not consider the intelligible, or the noetic, and eternity to be the same.  Eternity is present to the intelligible, but I would say that eternity comes before the intelligible.  I suggest this because the intelligible, that is to say noetic realities, arise due to differentiation, and the eternal is before differentiation.  When the eternal is subject to differentiation, we get the moving image of eternity that is time.

Eternity and the noetic are intimately related and because of that noetic objects are eternal; but the eternity of noetic objects (which, tellingly, Whitehead refers to as eternal objects) is due to proximity to the One.  Eternity is another way of saying Unity.  The unity of noetic objects is also due to their proximity to the One, and to their proximity to the Eternal. 

1.6  The place that eternity holds in Platonism is a difficult topic.  It is not easy to sift through what Plotinus says about this and because of that difficulty people can come to different conclusions.  Some have said that the One is beyond eternity just as the One is beyond being.  But the One is also beyond Unity, beyond the One.  As Plotinus writes, whatever anyone says about the One falls short of its actuality, for the One is even beyond actuality.  In other words, I agree that what is ultimate transcends eternity, but I think there are good reasons to think of ‘eternity’ as a useful name for that which transcends name and form.

And, to be honest, I think that Plotinus does use ‘eternity’ as another name for the One; now and then, not always.  Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, Plotinus uses eternity, or the eternal, when referring to noetic realities, the intelligibles.  But just as Plotinus will use terms like unity to refer to noetic realities as well as the unity of the One, so also Plotinus will skillfully unpack eternity in ways that depend on the level of reality, or hypostasis, that is being referred to.

1.7  All of the writings of Plotinus are based on his experiences of the noetic and the transcendental (the intelligible and the One).  Reaching out across the chasm that separates the material world from that which is incorporeal, Plotinus illuminates that which is eternal by proximity, and that which is eternal remaining in unity.

2.  Stages of the Practice of Ethical Restraint

There is not a lot of writing about ethical restraint in the Platonist tradition or in how ethical restraint is presented in the Dialogues of Plato.  But restraint is discussed outside of this context, and surprisingly it is usually in a therapeutic context, often centered on addiction.  In this kind of literature ‘restraint’ has a practical focus on how someone can actually overcome the sensory, and sensual, thing(s) that seem to control their lives.  Often there is a three stage presentation of how restraint works:

The first stage is avoidance.  Sometimes the expression ‘just don’t go there’ is used; as in an alcoholic should just not go to a bar, or to a party where alcohol is served.  This has application to a large variety of situations where people are trying to overcome the seductions of the senses.

The second stage is sometimes called ‘self-command.’  This is learning how to make initial steps in internalizing effective resistance to sensory seductions.  A lot of literature is centered on this second stage and the authors of these works offer simple means for reminding the person on the path of renunciation (in a lay and secular context) is helped because most of these suggestions are internal reminders, sometimes prayers, that serve to deflect the seduction of the senses when it appears.  It might be as simple as ‘day after day I will reject alcohol.’  Or it might be simpler, ‘I reject alcohol.’  Or it might be longer such as the much used Serenity Prayer.  The Serenity Prayer might be condensed to the person saying ‘courage’ in their mind to remind them to pull away from what is tempting them.

This second stage is a kind of internal civil war where old and powerful habits are being contested by a new perspective.  This conflict between the older way of life with the possibility of a new way of life can become intense.  These internalized sayings, or prayers, are reminders that the individual wants to move into a new situation and wants to give up on habits that are self-destructive.

The third stage is sometimes called ‘mastery’ but I prefer the term ‘stability’ meaning that the change to a new way of living has stabilized and the internal civil war is basically over.  There is a greater sense of calm and also a feeling of accomplishment.  Of course it is always possible to slide back into old habits and for that reason the practices of the second stage remain a part of the person’s inner life.

I don’t recall in Platonist literature this kind of analysis where the stages of renunciation are discussed; it might be in the literature somewhere, but I don’t recall running across it.  My feeling is that this kind of information would be something that would be discussed between teacher and student rather than being the topic of an essay; or at least it looks that way to me. 

In the Platonist literature there is some indication that people did fall away from the practices of ethical restraint.  For example, in the opening section of Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry writes to Firmus, a friend of Porphyry’s, that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has fallen away from vegetarianism and returned to eating meat.  Porphyry views this as Firmus having given up on the Way of Philosophy and is writing to Firmus to encourage him to return to a philosophical life, a vegetarian life. 

This kind of falling away is common; it happens to many people.  Overcoming sensual seductions, even when a person knows that succumbing to them is unhealthy and damaging to themselves and others, is not easy.  Knowing this, one can be sympathetic.  The important thing is to encourage the individual who has fallen away from their renunciation practice to try again.  It may take many tries.  But that’s OK.  Just keep trying and eventually the new way of life will establish itself, stabilize itself.

3.  William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is a Protestant Christian Apologist.  Craig has a large following.  Craig has studied philosophy extensively and is familiar with contemporary approaches to philosophy.  Craig is familiar with logic and modern modes of analysis from the analytic tradition (a surprising number of Christian apologists use tools from the analytic tradition in their work).  Craig is an effective apologist for his tradition.

Craig has written one book (“God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism”), and posted several videos, where he criticizes adopting Platonist metaphysics in the Christian tradition (this is more common in the Protestant tradition than it is in Catholicism or Orthodoxy).  Craig is aware of the influence that Platonism has had on Christianity, but Craig thinks that the Platonic influence undermines Christianity in significant ways.

If I understand Craig correctly, Craig is disturbed by the way Plato talks about intelligibles, or noetic objects, also known as eternal objects.  Craig refers to these as ‘forms’ which is a standard usage.  Craig’s understanding of Platonic forms is that they are eternal and unchanging; that’s true, I mean that the forms are understood to be that way in Platonism.  But Craig argues that this undermines the uniqueness of God because being eternal and unchanging are characteristics of God that are considered by Craig in the exegetical tradition he grows out of, to be unique characteristics of God.  It follows that this undermines the independence and uniqueness of God because there are other things in the cosmos that share at least some of the attributes of God.

Craig offers that a way of resolving this, which Craig argues is something that at least some Christian Platonists took, is to reconfigure the forms as ‘ideas in the mind of God.’  I think Craig is right that this is a way that Christians can retain a sense of the noetic while at the same time arguing for the uniqueness, the divine aseity, of God.  However, according to some histories of Platonism I have read, the view that Platonic forms are ideas in the mind of God was put forward in a Platonist context among the Middle Platonists and was likely absorbed into Christianity from those resources.

Personally, I prefer a more traditional way of viewing the forms; that the forms are emanations of the One, of the fully transcendental, of God.  The difference between the forms and the One is that the forms are differentiated from each other whereas the One is undifferentiated unity that is beyond differentiation, before differentiation.  If you want to understand the presence of differentiation in the forms, consider that the eternity of the forms differentiates them from all that is ephemeral.  In addition, forms are differentiated from each other, but at the same time fully transparent to each other. 

The view that forms are ideas in the mind of God collapses the noetic realm into the realm of that which is ultimate; in this case God.  From this perspective, the three hypostases now become two and the noetic realm of forms disappears. 

I think that Craig thinks of God as having characteristics which is standard Christian theology; with the exception of some Christian mysticism.  In contrast the One is beyond characteristics and beyond being.  The One is beyond affirmation and negation, whereas the forms do have characteristics and traits.

The discussion between Christianity and Platonism has been going on for two thousand years.  The discussion has a dialectical feel to it in the sense that both sides are committed to uncovering metaphysical truth.  I think the differences between the two traditions is a kind of creative, fire producing, light giving, presence that has led participants to focus on certain issues intensely.  I think that is a good thing. 

(As an aside, when I say these kinds of discussions have a long history, a good example of this centered on a treatise written by Proclus called On the Eternity of the World.  It contains eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.  It is my personal favorite of the works of Proclus.  This work was disliked by Christians because Christians have the view that the world was created by God and will end at some point in the future as part of God’s plan.  From this perspective the world is not eternal.  In response to this treatise of Proclus, a Christian writer, Philoponus, wrote a critique of this work by Proclus titled Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.  I think I have mentioned this before on this blog, but it has been a while and I think it fits in with the discussion about William Lane Craig.  The dispute between Proclus and Philoponus is not exactly the same point of divine aseity, but both of them are engaged in distinguishing Christianity from Platonism; and I think the points they raise are related.)

4.  Haiku

The sound of spring wind

Isn’t the same as the sound

Of eternity.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 72

10 November 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 72

1.  Evaluating the Relationship between Christianity and Platonism

I was listening to a short video on an atheist channel because the channel had a focus on Platonism and I was wondering what contemporary atheists might think about the Platonic tradition.  (As an aside, Book X of Laws, where Plato offers an extended critique of atheism was not mentioned.)  The question was focused on whether or not Plato would have approved of the way Christianity incorporated Platonism into its theology.  The discussion remained at an abstract level; by ‘abstract’ I mean that the historical context in which this process of the absorption of aspects of Platonism into Christianity was not mentioned.  Personally, I think it is crucial to take the specific historical context into account.  Here are a few comments:

1.1  By historical context I mean that Platonism was dealing with two strong interpretations of the world that ran counter to what traditional, or Orthodox, Platonism presented.  These two were Christianity and Theurgy as presented by Iamblichus.  What I’m getting at is that for Platonism the historical situation wasn’t a choice between Christianity and traditional Platonism.  Instead, I see the historical situation as a choice between two views that equally diverged from what Platonism had previously, or originally, taught.

1.1.1  I think it is helpful to look at the specific teachings that I see as running counter to what I call Orthodox Platonism.  For example, Christianity offered a personal view of ultimate nature in the person of Jesus Christ.  In contrast Platonism’s philosophical path to the ultimate was a journey to the impersonal transcendental; an ineffable realm without any material features that would form a personality.

1.1.2 Platonism also rejected the idea of bodily resurrection; even some early Christian Bishops, such as Synesius of Cyrene (373-414), rejected bodily resurrection on Platonist grounds.  Bodily resurrection is taken very seriously in Christianity, but in Platonism the path to the ultimate divests the practitioner of individuation, particularly the individuation of the body.

1.1.3 Platonism argued for the everlasting nature of material existence, the material cosmos.  Christianity argued for the creation of the material cosmos by God at a specific point in time.  In addition, Christianity argued for the dissolution of the material cosmos at the end times.  Proclus wrote a treatise called On the Eternity of the World which contained 18 arguments supporting the everlasting nature of the material cosmos.  This irritated Christians; John Philoponus wrote a treatise attacking the treatise written by Proclus.  There was a lot of theological and philosophical activity centered on this issue because how one views this issue shapes one’s conception of creation, God, and the transcendental.

1.1.4  There were other disagreements, but the above touches on some significant disagreements that, ultimately, could not be reconciled.  Instead of reconciling these differences, Christianity chose a supersessionist approach in which Christianity was presented as the completion of philosophy (you could also call it the correction of philosophy).  Plato was thought of as wise, but unable to encounter the whole truth because he was born before Christ.  This allowed Christianity to absorb what was consistent with Christianity and at the same time to put aside those aspects of Platonism that were not consistent.

1.2.1  It is also useful to list aspects of Theurgy that were undermining traditional Platonism, or were in conflict with traditional Platonism.  These differences, or conflicts, were presented by Iamblichus in various writings.  The first conflict centered on vegetarianism and the sacrifice of animals for ritual purposes.  Traditional Platonism rejected such sacrifices and took a vegetarian approach to diet which Platonism absorbed from Pythagoreanism and Orphism.  In contrast, the Theurgy of Iamblichus vehemently argued for the necessity of animal sacrifice in certain circumstances, such as when a particular deity required such sacrifice in order to make contact with that deity.  This was a direct attack on the heritage of Platonism in general, on Platonism’s ancient foundations (the above-mentioned Pythagoreanism and Orphism), and on Porphyry in particular who wrote two treatises arguing for abstaining from either eating animals or sacrificing animals for the purposes of ritual efficacy. 

This attack on Platonism by Iamblichus undermined Platonist ethics as well as to how Platonism understood how reincarnation works.  This usage of animal sacrifice also ignores the teachings of Platonism on non-harming and non-retaliation. 

1.2.2  The second disagreement that arose from Iamblichus’s teachings was the idea that the soul is fully descended from higher realities such as the noetic and the transcendental; that is to say the soul is separated from these higher realities by falling into materiality and has no ability to ascend to higher realities. 

In contrast, Orthodox Platonism regarded the soul as in some way always in contact with higher realities and for that reason when we follow the soul we find the path to the divine. 

1.2.3  These two disagreements are connected.  The inability of human beings to ascend to higher realities means that they must depend on the rituals of Theurgy because human beings need the assistance of the Gods who are contacted through these rituals. 

1.2.4  I should also mention that Iamblichus didn’t consider the traditional Platonist approach of wisdom, and the approach of Theurgy to be alternate paths to the divine.  Iamblichus and his heirs, like Proclus, dismissed the approach of wisdom as inefficacious; from their perspective only Theurgy, including animal sacrifice, could lead someone to the divine.

1.2.5  From the perspective of wisdom (sophia), the teachings of Iamblichus were, and are, more pernicious for Platonism than those of Christianity.  I say this because Christians didn’t claim that, for example, creation at a moment in time was what Platonism really taught.  In contrast, Iamblichus argued that animal sacrifice, and the fully descended soul are actual Platonism and this sleight of hand remains with us today.

1.3  Given the historical circumstances I think Plato would have approved of the absorption of Platonism into Christianity as a means of preserving the teachings and passing them on into the future.  When I say ‘approved’ I don’t mean ‘agreed’; rather I mean something closer to ‘accepting.’  I say this because Plato was familiar with the ups and downs of political strife and the shifting nature of political power.  Plato lived through several dramatic changes in how Athens was run by different political groups; it was a politically chaotic period.  This kind of background gives people who experience intense political strife both the capacity for resilience and the strength of endurance.  Based on this, I speculate that Plato would have been fine with Christianity’s appropriation of Platonism for its own purposes, knowing that this would eventually pass.

2.  Tim Addey on Philosophy as a Yoga

Last week I posted from an essay by Eric Fallick on Platonism as a type of Dharma, akin to the Dharma traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism (as well as Pythagoreanism and Orphism).  Continuing with this theme of Philosophy in general, and Platonism in particular, as a spiritual tradition that resembles Indian spiritual traditions, or Dharmas, here is a quote from Tim Addey’s Preface to the book Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth: From Ancient Egypt to Neoplatonism by Algiz Uzdavinys:

“Ancient understanding viewed reality as a series of descending steps, starting with the most ineffable and most simple which is first unfolded through divinity and then moves down through varying conditions of existence – the highest of which are closest to the originating simplicity and are purely intelligible, but the lower being increasingly complex and changeable, ultimately becoming perceptible to the senses.  These lower conditions of existence were not rejected as evil or illusive, but they were seen as deriving their worth and trustworthiness from their relation to the highest.  Each plane of reality had its answering correspondence in the nature of the human being.  Since the highest levels possessed the greatest intelligibility and stability, it was here that philosophers sought to centre the art and science of philosophy.  For this reason philosophy was seen as an interior discipline which allowed a conscious and active participation in a divine and intellectual drama – in more modern terms it was considered to be a spiritual path, or a yoga of enlightenment.”

(Page i from Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth by Algiz Uzdavinys, ISBN: 9781898910350)

2.1  Tim Addey is one of the leaders of the Prometheus Trust in England.  The Trust is focused on making available the translations of Platonist works through the translations of Thomas Taylor.  The Trust also publishes books by contemporary authors and scholars on the Platonist tradition.

2.1.1  As an aside, many of the Trust’s publications are at very reasonable prices.  This is noteworthy because many academic publications on Platonism are very expensive and I want to take a moment to express my thanks for the Trust’s pricing policies.

2.2  This quote is a bit more general in focus than the quote I posted last week on this topic.  Nevertheless I think it is worth sharing because Addey has a gift for concisely writing about the past of Philosophy and how it contrasts with contemporary Philosophy. 

2.3  Addey writes that “philosophy was seen as an interior discipline.”  I take ‘interior discipline’ to mean a discipline that is based on withdrawing from a focus on the sensations of the world around us and turning inward to the realms of mind and soul.  There are practices and disciplines that were, and still are, used to assist in this turning to the interior and cultivating a relationship with this interior realm of clarity and peace.

2.4  Addey closes this paragraph by saying, “in more modern terms it [Philosophy – my addition] was considered to be a spiritual path, or a yoga of enlightenment.”

I’m not sure if Addey is using the word ‘yoga’ in the kind of loose way it is used in the West, or whether Addey is referring to the Classical tradition of Yoga as found in The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali.  But either way Addey is linking Ancient Philosophy with Dharma traditions by using this kind of reference. 

2.5  Addey continues by writing about the loss of a spiritual focus in Western Philosophy:

“But at some point in the passage between the ancient and modern era, this view of philosophy and its purpose was largely lost, and today we find that . . . what is still called philosophy has allowed its centre to slip down the levels of reality.  And, of course, the human faculties upon which modern philosophy is based are necessarily at the lower levels of thought: where philosophy was meditative, contemplative and even unitive, it is now confined to a narrow form of logical reason – forever stuck in the temporal world.  Reason, once valued as a launching point to the realm of eternal intellect and thence super-eternal divinity, is now an end in itself.  Modern philosophy has lost its nerve: like a pilot who no longer trusts his aircraft the forward thrust of reason races us along the ground but is never transferred to an upward movement into the free air.”

(Ibid)

2.6  I think this is beautifully put.  But it is worth noting that there are exceptions to this generalization.  For example, there are modern works of Indian philosophy that express this ‘upward movement’ that Addey is referring to.  Many of the contemporary works on philosophy that have this upward movement are commentaries on ancient works, but I would still consider them to be philosophical works in the sense that Addey is suggesting.

3.  No Gaps

I have commented now and then on this blog that philosophers in the East (India, China, Japan, and so forth) are often very well read on Western philosophy, but the opposite is not true.  However, there do seem to be signs that this is changing.  There is a series of books published that are collectively called The History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps.  It is a multi-volume work and is an ongoing project.  It includes Indian philosophy as well other regions such as Islamic philosophy.

My sense is that these works are introductory; they are modest in size and price.  I think that is a good thing because it offers those who are inclined to explore non-Western philosophy an entry point for their studies.  As someone who spent many years studying Buddhist philosophy, I am happy to see this kind of thing emerging.

4.  Haiku

Rereading a book,

Words run across the desert

In Autumn darkness.

5.  Time’s Arrow

It is said that time only flows in one direction and that it is not possible to recover the past.  I think about this in the context of Platonism because I am interested in shifting the way Platonism is thought about in modernity to something that, in my view, more closely resembles the spiritual tradition that it was in the Ancient period of its origin.  Perhaps that is futile.

The thing about modernity, for all of its flaws and drawbacks, which I tend get a bit obsessed about, there are also aspects of modernity which providentially serve Platonism and create a space in which Platonism might flourish.  I am thinking of what is often observed as the dissolving nature of modernity, how modernity disintegrates every tradition and every concern except those that are of a material nature. 

As an example, think of how modernity dissolves, or threatens to dissolve, the status of religious traditions that had been central for society until very recently.  This is true in the East and in the West.  From the perspective of Platonism this dissolving, this weakening, of dominant religious traditions creates an opening for Platonism, a kind of grotto for the contemplation of eternity.  It wasn’t too long ago when such a project as creating, or finding, a grotto of eternity for the study of Platonism would have been impossible because Platonism was not considered to be a complete spiritual tradition.  There are still many who think of Platonism as deficient in comparison with dominant spiritual traditions.  But that view of the deficiency of Platonism is no longer enforced.

I don’t know exactly what Platonism will look like if Platonism does find its grotto of eternity.  It will bear some resemblances to the past, but in significant respects it will differ from the means and methods whereby Platonism was presented in the past and transmitted to the future.