Pierre Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life

21 September 2026 – Pierre Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life 

Pierre Hadot (1922 to 2010) wrote a lot about Ancient Philosophy and what I call Late Classical Philosophy as well as early Christianity.  Some of his books have been translated into English from the original French.  One of them is called Philosophy as a Way of Life which contains a collection of essays that Hadot wrote on the theme that Ancient and Classical Philosophy were transformative and involved commitments to particular ways of life.  One of the essays is also titled ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ and it begins with a quote from Philo (about 20 BCE to 50 CE).

“Every person – whether Greek or Barbarian – who is in training for wisdom, leading a blameless, irreproachable life, chooses neither to commit injustice nor return it unto others, but to avoid the company of busybodies, and hold in contempt the places where they spend their time – courts, councils, marketplaces, assemblies – in short, every kind of meeting or reunion of thoughtless people.  As their goal is a life of peace and serenity, they contemplate nature and everything found within her: they attentively explore the earth, the sea, the air, the sky, and every nature found therein.  In thought, they accompany the moon, the sun, and the rotations of the other stars, whether fixed or wandering.  Their bodies remain on earth, but they give wings to their souls, so that, rising into the ether, they may observe the powers which dwell there, as is fitting for those who have truly become citizens of the world.  Such people consider the whole world as their city, and its citizens are the companions of wisdom; they have received their civic rights from virtue, which has been entrusted with presiding over the universal commonwealth.  Thus, filled with every excellence, they are accustomed no longer to take account of physical discomforts or exterior evils and they train themselves to be indifferent to indifferent things; they are armed against both pleasures and desires, and, in short, they always strive to keep themselves above passions . . . they do not give in under the blows of fate, because they have calculated its attacks in advance (for foresight makes easier to bear even the most difficult of the things that happen against our will; since then the mind no longer supposes what happens to be strange and novel, but its perception of them is dulled, as if it had to do with old and worn-out things).  It is obvious that people such as these, who find their joy in virtue, celebrate a festival their whole life long.  To be sure, there is only a small number of such people; they are like embers of wisdom kept smouldering in our cities, so that virtue may not be altogether snuffed out and disappear from our race.  But if only people everywhere felt the same way as this small number, and became as nature meant for them to be: blameless, irreproachable, and lovers of wisdom, rejoicing in the beautiful just because it is beautiful, and considering that there is no other good besides it . . . then our cities would be brimful of happiness.  They would know nothing of the things that cause grief and fear, but would be so filled with the causes of joy and well-being that there would be no single moment in which they could not lead a life full of joyful laughter; indeed, the whole cycle of the year would be a festival for them.”

(Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life¸ translation of Philo by Hadot, translation from the French by Michael Chase, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 1995, pages 265-266, ISBN: 9780631180333)

1.  Hadot views this passage as primarily Stoic, but I tend to see it as a weaving of both Platonic and Stoic themes, which was not unusual at that time.  The emphasis on wisdom is shared by both Stoicism and Platonism, though I would say that Platonism is more oriented towards the transcendental than Stoicism, or this particular passage.  There may also be an Epicurean seasoning in the quote; I’m thinking of the emphasis on withdrawing from courts, councils, assemblies and marketplaces, which was a distinctive theme of the Epicurean tradition.

2.  The idea of never committing an injustice, nor returning an injustice, is a specifically Platonic theme found in dialogues such as Crito, The Republic, and Gorgias.  Injustice in this context is also often translated as ‘harm’, meaning that a Platonist should never harm another, even if that person has harmed him, the Platonist. 

3.  Being armed against both pleasures and desires is an important theme in Platonism; a lot of time is spent on this in Laws, to pick one example.  In Laws there is a discussion about how Spartan society trained young men to resist, or be indifferent to, pain, but the Athenian Stranger then argues that it is equally important, perhaps more important, to resist, or be indifferent to, pleasures.  The ascetic nature of Platonism is found in this indifference to pleasure.  Indifference to pleasure means not thinking of pleasure as a guiding principle in one’s life, not ordering one’s life and its activities by using pleasure as a standard.  This transforms the philosophical way of life into something that is clearly distinguishable from the life of most people.

4.  Philo considers this kind of life rare and compares such people to embers that have not been snuffed out.  They are embers of wisdom.

5.  Following the quote from Philo, Hadot writes, “In this passage from Philo of Alexandria, inspired by Stoicism, one of the fundamental aspects of philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman eras comes clearly to the forefront.  During this period, philosophy was a way of life.  This is not only to say that it was a specific type of moral conduct; we can easily see the role played in the passage from Philo by the contemplation of nature.  Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s life.” (Ibid, page 265)

5.1  I think this transformation has two aspects.  The first is the transformation of the understanding, or mind.  This consists of an increased understanding of the material realm in which we live (which Philo mentions) as well as a shift of the mind from the material to the non-material and the transcendental (which is what Platonism specializes in).  I like to say that it is a shift of attention from the ephemeral to the eternal. 

Normally the mind is caught up by, and dominated by, material reality.  The shift of the mind to non-material and eternal realities is wisdom.

The second aspect is the training of the body so that it is not so demanding of the mind’s attention; in other words, asceticism.  It is withdrawing from a life in which the demands of the body have first priority.  The first and second aspects of this transformation work together and mutually reenforce each other.

6.  It was Hadot’s contribution to the study of Ancient and Classical Philosophy that these traditions were based on commitments, largely ethical, that were observable and that taking on these commitments was the start of wisdom. 

7.  Later Hadot writes, “In order better to understand in what way ancient philosophy could be a way of life, it is perhaps necessary to have recourse to the distinction proposed by the Stoics, between discourse about philosophy and philosophy itself.” (Ibid, page 266)

Discourse about philosophy serves philosophy itself.  For example, the study of logic serves to make clear distinctions between that which is eternal and that which is ephemeral.  And analysis enlightens us as to the nature of injustice and harm so that we can become philosophers by refraining from injustice and harm.

Hadot clarifies this by quoting Polemon who succeeded Xenocrates as the head of the Platonic Academy, “We should exercise ourselves with realities, not with dialectical speculations, like a man who has devoured some textbook on harmonics, but has never put his knowledge into practice.  Likewise, we must not be like those who, when it comes to their own lives, contradict their own teachings.” (Ibid, page 267)

7.1  Putting one’s knowledge into practice is, to pick one example, applying the understanding of non-harming and non-retaliation to the way we live our lives so that we assume a vegetarian, or vegan, way of life.

7.2  A little later, Hadot, writes, “An Epicurean saying puts it clearly, ‘Vain is the world of that philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man.’  Philosophical theories are in the service of philosophical life.” (Ibid, page 267)

8.  “Does the philosophical life, then, consist only in the application, at every moment, of well-studied theorems, in order to resolve life’s problems?  As a matter of fact, when we reflect on what the philosophical life implies, we realize that there is an abyss between philosophical theory and philosophizing as living action.  To take a similar case: it may seem as though artists, in their creative activity, do nothing but apply rules, yet there is an immeasurable distance between artistic creation and the abstract theory of art.  In philosophy, however, we are not dealing with the mere creation of a work of art: the goal is rather to transform ourselves.  The act of living in a genuinely philosophical way thus corresponds to an order of reality totally different from that of philosophical discourse.”  (Ibid, page 268)

8.1  The activity of musicianship is playing an instrument.  The activity of baking is kneading bread dough.  The activity of philosophy, the way of life of philosophy, is to live in accordance with certain requirements that the tradition upholds.  In Platonism, the Way of Philosophy is determined by the practices of renunciation found in the Platonic tradition, as well as the study of central writings of the tradition such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.

9.  “Thus, as we have seen, philosophy in the Hellenistic and Greek period took on the form of a way of life, an art of living, and a way of being.  This, however, was nothing new; ancient philosophy had had this character at least as far back as Socrates [Pythagoras?].  There was a Socratic style of life (which the Cynics were to imitate), and the Socratic dialogue was an exercise which brought Socrates’ interlocutor to put himself in question, to take care of himself, and to make his soul as beautiful and wise as possible.  Similarly, Plato defined philosophy as a training for death, and the philosopher as the person who does not fear death, because he contemplates the totality of time and of being.”  (Ibid pages 268-269)

10.  “Above all, the conception of philosophy as an art and form of living is not linked to political circumstances, or to a need for escape mechanisms and inner liberty.  Philosophy did not change its essence throughout the entire course of its history in antiquity.”  (Ibid page 269)

10.1  I think what Hadot is getting at in this quote is that philosophy as a way of life did not modify its commitments when political circumstances shifted; for example, the specifics of renunciation, or asceses, remained a constant in the Platonic tradition, and the need for retreating from political contexts remained a constant for Epicureans, and so forth.  It is true that Ancient and Classical Philosophy did have things to say about politics, just as they had things to say about running a household (see, for example, Plutarch).  But those things did not impinge on what it meant to live a philosophical life.

11.  “In general, historians of philosophy pay little attention to the fact that ancient philosophy was, first and foremost, a way of life.  They consider philosophy as, above all, philosophical discourse.”

11.1  I have often referred to Platonism as a type of Dharma; that is to say, that Platonism more closely resembles the way Indian Dharma traditions manifest than the way modern philosophy manifests.  And my reasoning is that the Dharma traditions of India are not just discourses and the clarification of propositions; they are also specific ways of life, identifiable ways of life, shaped by commitments that transform body and mind and shift one’s attention to one’s soul.  This is also true for Stoicism and Epicureanism.

11.2  If you want to grasp what it meant for Platonism and other philosophical traditions to lose the way of life that defined its existence in the Classical world, think of Buddhism having lost all connection with its ethical disciplines from the five basic precepts to the monastic Vinaya.  What remains?  Exactly what we have in modern philosophy; a focus on analytical discourse and not much else.

11.3  Hadot follows the above quote, quote 11, with a long discussion as to how philosophy lost its connection to its Ancient and Classical ways of life.  It’s a complex history involving the way Christianity reconfigured the place that philosophy has in a spiritual context, the rise of Universities in the later Middle Ages, along with the increased specialization of vocabulary and technical tools of analysis. 

11.4  “Ancient philosophy proposed to mankind an art of living.  By contrast, modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for specialists.” (Ibid page 272)

12.  “Such is the lesson of ancient philosophy: an invitation to each human being to transform himself.  Philosophy is a conversion, a transformation of one’s way of being and living, and a quest for wisdom.  This is not an easy matter.  As Spinoza wrote at the end of the Ethics: ‘If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  It must indeed be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be possible, if salvation were easy to find, and could without great labour be found, that it should be neglected by almost everybody?  But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.’”  (Ibid page 275)

 

 

Hesiod on Strife

14 September 2026

Hesiod on Strife

“Muses, from Pieria, glorifying in songs, come here, tell in hymns of your father Zeus, through whom mortal men are unfamed and famed alike, and named and unnamed by the will of great Zeus.  For easily he strengthens, and easily he crushes the strong, easily he diminishes the conspicuous and increases the inconspicuous, and easily he straightens the crooked and withers the proud – high-thundering Zeus, who dwells in the loftiest mansions.  Give ear to me, watching and listening and straighten the verdicts with justice yourself; as for me, I will proclaim truths to Perses.

“So there was not just one birth of Strifes after all, but upon the path there are two Strifes.  One of these a man would praise once he got to know it, but the other is blameworthy; and they have thoroughly opposed spirits.  For the one fosters evil war and conflict – cruel one, no mortal loves that one, but it is by necessity that they honor the oppressive Strife, by the plans of the immortals.  But the other one gloomy Night bore first: and Cronus’ high-throned son, who dwells in the aether, set it in the roots of the earth, and it is much better for men.  It rouses even the helpless man to work.  For a man who is not working but who looks at some other man, a rich one who is hastening to plow and plant and set his house in order, he envies him, one neighbor envying his neighbor who is hastening toward wealth: and this Strife is good for mortals.  And potter is angry with potter, and builder with builder, and beggar begrudges beggar and poet poet.”

(Hesiod, Works and Days, translated by Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2018, pages 87-89, lines 1-25, ISBN: 9780674997202)

1.  This opening passage of Works and Days is famous and well-known.  It has a dramatic feeling to it that draws the reader into the work from the first words.

2.  After Hesiod’s appeal to the Muses the passage opens with a depiction of how Zeus treats human beings; Zeus gives them fame and then removes it, he strengthens and crushes the strong.  This is a description of strife, or one facet of strife, that human beings are intimately acquainted with; that the powers that be may grant favors and then remove them for reasons that we do not know and cannot access.

2.1  This section is similar to the ‘Wheel of Fortune’ depictions in Medieval Europe; in fact the capacity of Zeus to lift people up and then to have them thrown down is very similar to how the Goddess Fortune is depicted.  You can find this kind of thinking in works from The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius in the poems of Carmina Burana, particularly the opening poem, ‘O Fortuna’. 

3.  The opening paragraph ends with the author saying he will give truths to Perses.  Perses was one of the sons of Helios.  Hesiod is addressing his subsequent observations about strife to the son of Helios, the Sun.  This gives a further cosmological dimension to this passage.  The name ‘Perses’ may be related to ‘pertho’ which means to sack or destroy; an appropriate god to address when discussing strife.

4.  The second paragraph begins by suggesting that there are two ‘Strifes’, not just one.  It is interesting to me that this kind of analysis is what we would today call a ‘philosophical move’ by which is meant in this instance, the unpacking of the meaning of a word.  By disclosing two distinct meanings, where previously it was thought that there was one, Hesiod is functioning philosophically.  You can see this kind of approach in Plato and Plotinus when they take a term and point to two or more meanings for that word; for example the word ‘logos’, or the word ‘beauty’, or other key terms.  Hesiod does not present these two Strifes by telling us a myth or allegory about how the gods divided Strife.  This is a kind of shift in reasoning and analysis that is taking place very early in Greek thought.

4.1  Notice that this kind of analysis relies on differentiation which is a noetic function because it is in Nous that differentiation first appears.  Here, Hesiod is using differentiation for the purpose of furthering the reader’s understanding.  When differentiation is used by the mind to further genuine understanding, that is wisdom.  When differentiation is used by the mind to generate anger, bitterness, and battle, that is ignorance.

5.  One Strife is ‘blameworthy’ because it fosters evil war and conflict.  I would put it that this is differentiation serving material ends and what we would call egoic concerns.

5.1  Hesiod states that humans only honor this type of strife out of necessity.  I suspect that this kind of honoring is perhaps making offerings to this kind of Strife, and Strife’s servants, to keep it at bay.  It is kind of like paying off someone who threatens you.  This is a major preoccupation of popular religion; if you don’t make offerings to this kind of Strife, bad things will happen to you.

6.  The second Strife, according to Hesiod, ultimately benefits humans by facilitating, or encouraging, them to work for their livelihood.  The primary motivator that Hesiod offers as an example of the second type of Strife is jealousy; one man has plenty of food and is on his way to becoming rich because he is working very hard.  This propels someone who is lazy to wake up in the morning so that by imitating the guy he resents, he too might become wealthy and productive.

The translator uses the word ‘envy’ rather than jealousy.  So envy is considered to a type of strife that generates competitiveness between people.  However, that competitiveness born of envy has the possibility of a positive outcome. 

I think this is a subtle, and fascinating, analysis.

6.1  It appears that human beings think of both of these Strifes as one thing; that is the psychology at any rate.  It seems to me that we tend to think of both kinds of Strife as the same because both of them generate conflict and that feels the same both at the level of body and mind. 

If we make a simple contrast perhaps we can get closer to what Hesiod is offering.  If we compare war with a competitive game (everything from wrestling to chess) I think it is possible to see the difference.  War is destructive; and in modern times the destructiveness has become amplified to an incredible degree.  Competitive games can, and often do, lead to tensions of various kinds, but they also lead to a kind of camaraderie among competing participants.  In other words, competition isn’t necessarily destructive.  This analysis has its limitations, and perhaps there is a better, or clearer, way of understanding the distinction that Hesiod is making; but for now, this is the best I can do.

7.  Hesiod’s analysis of Strife has had a lasting and profound impact on philosophy, particularly Classical Greek Philosophy.  Scholars suggest that this kind of analysis was picked up by both Heraclitus and Empedocles, both of whom viewed Strife as a cosmological, or elemental, principle.  Looked at in this way, that Strife is a cosmological or elemental principle, means that both kinds of Strife cannot be done away with in this world.  More concretely it suggests that manifestations such as war (for the first kind of Strife), and competitiveness and envy (for the second kind of Strife) are not accidents that appear due to random material, or historical, causation.  Instead, they are part of the nature of material existence itself.

This is difficult to accept.  It can, and often does, feel disheartening.  Feeling disheartened is not an argument against this view, but it is a barrier to looking at it clearly.

8.  Plato was very familiar with these discussions.  Hesiod lived roughly around 750 BCE to 650 BCE; exact dates are not known.  Plato lived roughly 428 BCE to 348 BCE.  This means that the topic of strife and its impacts on humanity had already taken place for about 200 years. 

It’s possible to see Plato integrating understandings of strife in works like the Republic and Laws when Plato talks about types of civil discord and also family discord.  But I am more interested in how these discussions impacted Plato’s metaphysics.

It is helpful, I think, to point out that Hesiod depicts the gods as deeply involved with strife; and not just the competitive kind.  The gods also participate in the first, destructive kind.  I think this is an indication that the gods are simply creatures, a type of living being residing in the material world.  In other words, the gods are not transcendent or even particularly wise.  The are long-lived and powerful, but in psychological terms they are human in every respect.  Therefore we cannot turn to the gods to resolve questions about strife and its place in the cosmos.

8.1  But there are questions and experiences that arise about the status of strife that turn us in a different direction.  There is the experience of beauty which seems to be in some sense beyond the concerns of strife.  Nor does a sunset generate a sense of competition.

And there is the experience of mathematics that opens our minds to a domain that is free from strife.  I don’t mean that mathematicians are immune from strife, particularly competitive strife.  I mean that numbers themselves, and their relations, are not hounded by strife.

And there is the experience of contemplation which is a turning within to a realm of silence and stillness.  I consider the experience of contemplation to be foundational for Platonism.  Contemplation is depicted in dialogues like The Symposium and Phaedrus.  Personally, I don’t think it is possible to understand Platonism without taking into account the practice of contemplation.

8.2  Plato’s great skill is that he fully acknowledges the presence of strife in the material world, but he also knows from personal experience that there are realms that are free from strife; primarily the noetic realm and the realm of the Good and the One.  It is because these realms are free from strife, both kinds of strife, that we are not trapped in the domain of strife, fated to endure strife’s arbitrary blows.

8.3  What Plato offers us is a roadmap to that which is beyond strife.  Strife is a constant presence in the material world, but the material world is a distorted image of the noetic where strife is absent.  But because the material world is an image, however distorted, of the noetic there are traces in the material world of that which is transcendent and beyond strife, discord, and suffering. 

What Plato has done, with great precision, is to show us (through reason, through myth, through allegory, through analysis) how to turn away from this realm of Strifes and Sorrows, to leave it behind, and return to the ineffable Good and the One.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 107

9 September 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 107

1.  Methods for Reading Platonism

When we are reading the classics of Platonism, such as the Dialogues of Plato, or the Enneads of Plotinus, we tend to read them with what might be called as a primal question in mind that is focusing our reading.  We might hold this question consciously or unconsciously.  And the primal question isn’t necessarily the same each time we read from the classics of Platonism, which is one reason why rereading these classics often uncovers new insights that we didn’t notice before.  Here are a few examples of what I mean:

1.1  We might read Plato and Plotinus with the question in mind “What did Plato or Plotinus actually say?”  This might be thought of as ‘historical Platonism’ because we are  trying to place Plato and Plotinus in the stream of ancient philosophical history.  It’s not always easy, and is often quite difficult, to determine what Plato or Plotinus were actually saying.  It seems to me that this way of reading Platonic classics is the main one found in the Universities today.

1.2  We might read the classics of Platonism with the question in mind “What can we do with Plato’s, or Plotinus’s, ideas?”  At this level we are dealing with the metaphysical structure of Platonic thought and how its teachings, its categories, fit together (or don’t fit together).  Some Platonic philosophers are highly focused, and very concerned, with this question and tend to focus on Dialogues or Enneads that are metaphysical in nature, while at the same time sidelining, to various degrees, those works that are not primarily metaphysical in nature.  It is at this level where we have discussions about the nature of the levels, or hypostases, or about soul and its nature, or about emanation and how it works, and so forth.

1.2.1  Another level of focusing on “What can we do with Platonic ideas?” will look for instruction as to how to live one’s life.  The above entry, 1.2, is about understanding Platonism; but at this level it is about behavior with the main focus being ethics as found in the Virtues and the teachings on Ethical Restraints.  Here the reader is gleaning from the classics of Platonism the teachings on how to live in accordance with Platonist teachings such as non-harming, vegetarianism, refraining from sexual misconduct, refraining from acquiring too many possessions or too much wealth, and so forth. 

1.3 The last approach I offer is “Where might these ideas, the ideas found in the classics of Platonism, lead?” if given a new lease on life under circumstances that differ from those that Plato and Plotinus lived under.  Here we are using the classics of Platonism as a resource for addressing the contemporary world in which we live.  A good example of this is how Plotinus spends time writing about Astrology which Plato barely mentions.  This is because the period in which Plotinus wrote was a high point in Roman and Greek thought regarding Astrology which was very widespread.  Another example is how Plotinus addressed the emerging Gnostic movements; Plato does not talk about Gnosticism because there were no Gnostics during Plato’s lifetime. 

Platonism has been very successful throughout its long history in addressing these new concerns and understandings.  I believe this openness to addressing these new concerns is one of the primary things that keeps Platonism fresh and relevant as the specific circumstances change and create new, and previously unaddressed, ways of comprehending the world in which we live.

2.  Pangle’s ‘Interpretive Essay’

At the conclusion of Thomas Pangle’s translation of the Laws of Plato Pangle has an ‘Interpretive Essay’.  It’s about 125 pages.  It is meticulous and brings up certain aspects of the dialogue that, I suspect, are easy to overlook.

On the other hand, I was struck by how Pangle’s approach avoids metaphysics and mysticism.  Pangle’s approach is to view Laws as a political treatise; that is common these days. 

Pangle was heavily influenced by Leo Strauss.  Pangle studied under Alan Bloom who studied under Leo Strauss.  I’ve mentioned this linkage before, but I bring it up again here because I think it is a good illustration of Strauss’s influence.  What I am highlighting is how Strauss tended to view Plato’s Philosophy as a whole as a political project.  According to what I have read, Strauss was reluctant to engage in Platonic metaphysics, and seems to have had the idea that Late Classical Platonism (which he refers to as ‘Neoplatonism’) with its emphasis on metaphysics as somehow distorting Plato’s thought.

I suspect that Strauss inherited this view from 19^th century German Historiography; it was widespread in Germany that the Late Classical Platonists had in some sense deformed Platonism due to their interest in elaborating metaphysics as well as their interest in mysticism.  Mysticism was viewed negatively as opposed to a ‘scientific’ approach.  The overall idea is to advocate for a Plato who was a proto-analytic philosopher; looked at from this perspective, the mystical elements in Plato and Platonism can be ignored as backwards and superstitious.

I don’t think Strauss or Pangle were that extreme.  I am not widely read in Strauss, but from what I have read I think Strauss accepted Plato as having metaphysical and mystical interests (meaning that Plato was not a proto-analytical philosopher).  But I do think that Strauss thought it was more significant to sift a view of politics from Plato than to sift a metaphysics from Plato.

I view this as yet another example of the anti-metaphysical bias of modernity.  It is very pervasive.  And I think of this bias as a significant, perhaps the most significant, barrier that a modern reader has to overcome if they really want to access the world that Platonism uncovers.  There is a range of anti-metaphysics; it can be sarcastic and dismissive as in Hume, it can be embedded in progressive thought as in Carnap and Ayer, it can be rooted in historicism and reductionism as in Heidegger, and so forth. 

The anti-metaphysical stance can be observed mostly as critical absences when considering what a modern philosopher or scholar writes about Plato.  If metaphysics is simply absent from their work on Plato, that is a sign that the scholar has absorbed, or actively accepted, the anti-metaphysical bias of our time.  The examples can be general (such as not dealing with the hypostases), or they can be very specific (such as refusing to deal with, touch on, or examine, Plato’s teachings on rebirth even when holding a class on a dialogue where rebirth is extensively discussed).  Absences are harder to spot than presences.  The absence of metaphysics in modernity is not normally noticed because it is the norm.  But as you become more and more familiar with Plato’s views you begin to notice that certain aspects of his philosophy are often neglected and that those aspects are either explicitly metaphysical in nature, or emerge from Plato’s metaphysical commitments.

2.1  The contemporary bias against metaphysics, while directly impacting modern interpretations of Platonism, also impacts other spiritual traditions.  During my period of studying Buddhism I often heard people, sometimes scholars, say that, for example, the Buddha was uninterested in metaphysics.  It took me a long time to realize that this view of the Buddha, and the Buddhist tradition, is a projection of the anti-metaphysical bias of Western modernity onto an ancient Indian tradition.  Once you see this anti-metaphysical bias operating in the West, you can also see it operating in how the West treats non-Western traditions; and this opens up these non-Western traditions, such as Buddhism and Jainism in a surprisingly rich way; by ‘rich’ I mean multifaceted in a way that adds depth and complexity to those traditions that often was previously missed.

2.2  Returning to Western philosophy, once you see the anti-metaphysical bias of modernity you begin to see how contemporary Western philosophy, despite its claims, is just as metaphysical as other metaphysical systems; that modernist philosophy has its own first principles, to pick one important example.  This shifts one’s understanding of modern philosophy significantly as you begin to see it in a larger context.

2.3  One of the results of uncovering the absence of metaphysics in contemporary Western philosophy is that other dimensions of meaning emerge that were not noticed before.  For example, it becomes clear why Plato would present some of his most significant teachings in the form of myths and allegories; because metaphysical truths sometimes need those kinds of structures in order to present and discuss them.

There is a kind of flatness to a lot of modern Western philosophy and I think that is because the metaphysical dimension has been, for the most part, with significant exceptions, lost.  When we read from the Platonic classics we become aware of that metaphysical dimension and the world we live in becomes richer and full of possibilities that we had previously overlooked.

 

 

 

  

Are Platonists Lonely?

31 August 2026

Are Platonists Lonely?

1.  “This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.9, On the Good or the One, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 345, ISBN: 9780674995154)

Armstrong has a footnote, on page 344 and 345, to this quote, “These last words, in the common translation ‘flight of the alone to the Alone’, are the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered.  He uses the ‘alone to the alone’ formula elsewhere in the Enneads when speaking of our encounter with the Good (1.6.7.8; VI. 7. 34.7) It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase, generally, but not always in a religious context.  The closest parallel to Plotinus’ use of it is in Numenius fr. 2 . . . See E. R. Dodds ‘Numenius and Ammonius in Les Sources de Plotin . . . It does tell us something important about the mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered in isolation from the rest of his writing about the spiritual life and Porphyry’s account of Plotinus as he knew him.”

It’s interesting that the ‘alone to the Alone’ seems to have been displaced by the use of ‘solitary’ and ‘solitude’ in recent translations such as this Armstrong quote, and others; see below.

2.  “This is the way of life of gods, and divine, happy human beings, the release from everything here, a way of life that takes no pleasure in things here, the refuge of a solitary in the solitary.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.9: On the Good or the One, translated by Lloyd Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 902 (second edition), ISBN: 9781009604970)

3.  “This is the life of gods and of the godlike and blessed among men, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, the passing of solitary to solitary.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, VI.9, On the Good or the One, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, 1992, page 709, ISBN: 9780943914558)

There is some confusion about the MacKenna translation.  It appears that in the earliest edition MacKenna uses ‘the alone to the Alone’ phrasing.  In 1917 MacKenna published Ennead I together with a ‘Conspectus’ (a summary or overview of Plotinus) and it is in the Conspectus that the ‘alone’ phrasing is used.  MacKenna may have also used that phrasing when he first published his fifth volume of the complete Enneads in 1930.  But the details are murky.  Here is what I found online at Internet Archive, for MacKenna’s earlier translation:

“This is the life of the gods and of godlike and blessed men, a liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, a flight of the alone to the Alone.”

4.  “THE SOUL’S ULTIMATE FATE IS DETACHMENT AND FLIGHT.

“Such is the life of the divinities; such is also that of divine and blessed men; detachment from all things here below, scorn of all earthly pleasures, and flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she shall see face to face (that is, ‘alone with the alone,’ as thought Numenius).”

(Plotinus, Complete Works, Ennead VI.9, Of the Good and the One, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, First Edition 1918, Reprinted 2017 by Kshetra Books, Jon W. Fergus editor, page 94, ISBN: 9781974518968)

Both Guthrie and Armstrong reference Numenius as a source for the phrase ‘alone with the alone (or Alone)’.  Guthrie published his edition in 1918 so the Numenius edition Guthrie is referring to is before 1918; but I don’t know the specifics about the source Guthrie uses, though Armstrong does provide more detail.  I suspect that the Numenius translation may be the original source for this phrase, but I’m not sure about that.  Both Armstrong and Gerson indicate that the phrase is used in other places in the Enneads and Armstrong suggests it was used in various religious and non-religious contexts.

4.1  ‘Solitary’ and ‘alone’ overlap, but they also have their differences.  For example, the life of Plotinus was not solitary; neither was the life of Plato.  The house where Plotinus gave his lectures and where his students met, according to Porphyry’s description in The Life of Plotinus was a busy place with people coming and going and even the presence of children who were left in the care of Plotinus when their parents died.  Plato founded an Academy inhabited by students who were guided by Plato and perhaps other teachers as well.

But you can be alone even in the midst of other people.  This is a common observation and something that many people experience. 

4.2  It appears to me that ‘alone’ is a slightly more helpful translation because I think it is easier to link being alone to the inward turning that is at the heart of Platonic practice.  And I think it is easier to explain that this aloneness, this inward turning, is not a negative experience.

5.  The sentence opens by stating whom the sentence refers to, “This is the life of gods and godlike men.”  The opening refers to gods and godlike men.  I read this as indicating that gods and men have the ability to engage in the philosophical ascent to the Good and the One.  I interpret this as putting gods and humans on the same level in terms of their spiritual capacity or potential.  Gods can make the divine ascent if they pursue the path of renunciation and contemplation found in the Platonist tradition.  As I just mentioned, it places gods and humans on the same level.  Humans can ascend to the Good and the One and so can gods.  But most humans will not do so, and most gods will not do so.  This is because most gods and humans are distracted by sensory attractions and mental fabrications and desires.

5.1  My own view is a bit broader than this; I admit it is eccentric.  But I would not confine access to the divine ascent to the Good and the One to gods and humans.  I’ve mentioned this before, but I consider birth as an oak tree to be an auspicious birth because it allows for a contemplative existence and an embodied stability that would bring the oak, or could bring the oak, to the noetic.  In other words, I don’t map spiritual capacity based on evolutionary placement; I mean that just because a creature is more ‘advanced’ from an evolutionary perspective, does not mean that they are inherently more spiritually advanced.  Again, I realize this is a bit eccentric; I offer it for your consideration.

6.  The next phrase reads, “deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world.”  This sums up the essence of the Platonic Way of Life.  You can read about this in Dialogues like Phaedo.  It is a step by step, gradual path.  First you learn to withdraw from obviously harmful things of this world; you learn this through the system of ethical restraints which, again, are found in Dialogues like Phaedo.  You become a vegetarian, withdraw from harming animals by eating them or sacrificing them for the purposes of misguided rituals.  You refrain from acquiring luxuries.  And so forth.  This process of withdrawing, also often referred to as ‘turning away’, becomes broader and at the same time more subtle.

This is a life that has found the peace of transcendence; even if it is just a glimpse of that reality.  That peace surpasses the ‘delights’ of the things of this world.

Such a journey is slow and takes focus and dedication.  Indeed, it takes many lifetimes. 

7.  The closing phrase is famous, “escape in solitude to the solitary”, or “a flight of the alone to the Alone.”  As I said above, I prefer the ‘alone to the Alone’ over ‘solitude to the solitary’ because I think that ‘solitary’ doesn’t indicate strongly enough that this is an inward, contemplative, journey.  The usage also does not, in my opinion, really align with the lives of Platonists.  I mean by this that neither Plato nor Plotinus were solitaries (and, in addition, neither was Socrates).  There are examples in Platonic history of solitary practitioners (and I suspect that at this time and in this culture the way of the solitary practitioner might be particularly suitable) but the point is that physical solitude does not seem to be required for the ascent to the Good and the One if we go by the biographies of Plato and Plotinus.  And since this is Plotinus we are quoting, I think it is a particularly relevant point.

8.  But the usage of ‘alone’ has its own difficulties because many people equate ‘alone’ with loneliness; hence the title of this post.  I asked this question about Platonists and loneliness because I have heard Platonists mention this, and talk about this, over the years.  This comment about Platonists being lonely, or the Platonic Path being a lonely path, comes from a variety of perspectives; it’s not confined to a particular type of contemporary Platonism.  I think there are a number of reasons why this comes up.

8.1  The first is peculiar to our time and place.  To be a Platonist at this time and in this culture, is to be a stranger in a strange land.  Platonism is not in sync with the broad assumptions and first principles of the world we live in today.  Plato writes in some of his Dialogues about the philosopher who is culturally clumsy and the object of humor, or even derision; so this difficulty is not new.  But I do think the difficulty is more acute today simply because it is difficult to find others who regard Platonism as a spiritual path rather than just another philosophy like empiricism or naturalism or materialism. 

8.2  A second reason is that the specific path of Platonism has a different understanding of what today we call spirituality than is the one widely used.  Today ‘spirituality’ is primarily connected with self-help and is often explicitly oriented towards material goals, such as improving one’s job performance.  In contrast, Platonism is a renunciant tradition and advocates a life lived as simply as possible.  Platonism’s view was, for a long time, actually the dominant view of what spirituality means.  But in modernity terms like spirituality were transformed, often by psychology, into a therapeutic modality which in traditional terms is very far from spiritual commitments.  This is difficult for people to see because the therapeutic model is pervasive.

8.3  It is reasonable that a Platonist in today’s world would feel alone, and that this feeling of being alone would, at times, manifest as loneliness.  That is a natural consequence of the Platonic spiritual path in a culture that is focused on material gain and the cultivation of strife.

9.  But I don’t think that the term ‘alone’ in the sentence that is quoted actually refers to loneliness.  I suspect that the term refers to the way the Good and the One are sufficient unto themselves; that the Good and the One are ‘alone’ in the sense that the Good and the One are not reliant on anything else.  Rather, everything else is reliant on, dependent upon, the Good and the One, upon the transcendental, the transcendental as such. 

In this context the ‘alone’ here refers to the uniqueness of the Good, of the One, of the Eternal.  The Platonic path is a flight of the alone to the Alone because the Good and the One are present within us so that this unique, and eternal, presence is not far away.  I refer to this presence as our soul and it is turning away from that which is sensory to the soul, the presence of the Good and the One in the individual, that is the Platonic journey.

The ‘alone’ is the presence within of the ‘Alone’ that is transcendental and eternal.  Awakening to that presence is the sublime possibility of a human life.