19 October 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics 110

19 October 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics 110

1.  Gerson’s New Book

Readers here might like to know that Lloyd Gerson is publishing a new book scheduled for release next month, November 2026.  The title is Unearthing Platonism and according to the Amazon writeup the new book focuses on Platonism as a tradition with a particular view and understanding of the world.  The writeup says that the collection of essays approaches this idea both from historical and theoretical views.

This is a perspective that Gerson has focused on for a long time.  The dominant view in academia today is fragmented, but it tends to reject that Plato and Platonism are an actual ‘system’, meaning that there is a recognizable and consistent perspective that Platonism has held during the many centuries of Platonism’s existence.  This is consistent with the perspective advanced on this blog.  Although Gerson is not the only contemporary scholar to think of Platonism in this way, he seems to be the most prominent at this time.

I think that one of the reasons why many academics at this time reject the idea of a Platonist ‘system’, a consistent set of concerns and responses to those concerns over many centuries, is that the impact of philosophers such as Spinoza has shaped how modern philosophers understand what ‘systematic’ means.  In addition, analytic philosophy has emphasized a methodologically strict approach to what systematic means.  In modern philosophical parlance ‘systematic’ means something like generating a deductive, inferential, logically coherent, structure in the manner of a philosopher like Spinoza or Proclus (Euclid’s Elements consistently hover in the background of this discussion.)  Plato doesn’t write that way; neither does Plotinus.  The core views of Platonism are not presented as axiomatic premises from which other propositions (which can then be analyzed) are drawn.  Rather, Plato presented his views in multiple ways and in differing contexts such as the interlocutors in a specific dialogue.  Plato will present his views on transcendence, for example, using allegory, symbol, as well as discursive modes.

The ‘systematic’ nature of Plato’s writings is more like the systematic nature of a symphony than it resembles Euclid’s approach.  I’m not objecting to philosophers like Proclus and Spinoza who want to use a Euclidean approach to philosophizing; I’m suggesting that this approach is not what is typical of the Platonic tradition as a whole, nor of Plato in particular.

Gerson is my favorite contemporary scholar of Buddhism and I look forward to reading his new collection.

2.  The Dialogues of Plato as a Single Book

I may have mentioned in a previous post that I approach the Dialogues of Plato as if the collection is a single book.  I think of the individual dialogues as chapters of the book.  On a practical level this means that I consider cross-referencing dialogues when discussing a point focused in one dialogue is a legitimate procedure because the dialogues aren’t standalones.

As I was thinking about this the other day it came to mind that there is a classic of Japanese literature that is similar to the Dialogues; that is The Tale of Genji by Murasaki Shikibu.  Each chapter of Genji is a complete scene and as you go from chapter to chapter you may move in time from a few days to a few years.  Sometimes a character who has appeared in an early chapter reappears in a much later chapter which I think is similar to the way a topic appears in one of the dialogues and then can reappear much later. 

There is another similarity and that is the setting in both collections is meaningful.  In Genji the setting almost becomes a character in each chapter.  The setting of the specific dialogues also impacts how the meaning of the dialogue is communicated to the reader.  Think of the setting of the Symposium.  And in both collections settings that appear in one chapter or dialogue can reappear in the further chapters or dialogues.  Think of how the setting for Phaedrus is replicated, not completely but recognizably, in Plato’s Laws.  Both dialogues occur outside the city.  Both are involved with sacred precincts which are a part of the landscapes.  Both dialogues occur in the summer heat.  This links the dialogues together and offers a basis of unity between them.  I’m not saying that the primary focus is identical, but that they are related.

There are other noteworthy similarities such as scholars having debates about authenticity; this happens for various chapters of Genji and for various dialogues of Plato. 

I don’t want to stretch this too far.  Genji is a novel, a narrative with a huge cast of characters.  The Dialogues of Plato are inquiries into ultimate nature.  Still there are structural similarities that I think are illuminating.

3.  Aphorisms

Philosophical traditions can be more intelligent than any individual philosopher.     (ChatGPT)

To be at once exceedingly wealthy and good is impossible.  (Plato, Laws, 742e, A. E. Taylor translation)

With a few exceptions, the gods are not wise.

To perceive the soul is to perceive eternity.

The eros of silence.

The colors of a sunset sky do not clash.

In some ways Platonism is systematic but it’s not systematic in the way that Euclid or Proclus or Spinoza are systematic.

Vegetarianism (and Veganism) are foundational for the practice of Platonism.

The body vanishes.

At times living a Platonist life resembles rowing upstream against a strong and swift current.

Reading The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius resembles praying.

White lily.

 

12 October 2026

12 October 2026

1.  Plato on the Soul in Books V and X of the Laws

I have noticed that Plato wrote a great deal about the soul in his last dialogue, Laws.  Here I’d like to comment on what Plato says in Books V and X because I think what each Book says illuminates what the other has to say.

Book V of Laws is a long speech by the Athenian Stranger with Cleinias having only a single sentence at the conclusion of the dialogue.  The speech begins with the Athenian Stranger referring to the singular importance of the soul:

“Athenian:  Of all a person’s own belongings, you see, the most divine after the gods is his soul, since it is most his own.  And everything that belongs to a person invariably falls into two classes.  One lot, stronger and better, does the mastering, while the other lot, weaker and worse, are slaves.  And so, he must always prefer his master possessions to his slave ones.  So, when I say that in second place after the gods, who are our masters, and the beings that follow them [footnote: daimons and heroes], one must honor one’s soul, my prescription is correct.  But practically none of us confers honor correctly, though we believe we do.  For honor is, I take it, a divine good, and no evil thing can confer honor.  The person who thinks that he is honoring his soul with words, gifts, or by indulging it in certain ways, yet fails to change it from worse to better, believes he is honoring it, but in fact this is not what he is doing at all.

“For example, every boy, as soon as he becomes a man, regards himself as capable of judging everything, thinks he is honoring his soul by praising it, and eagerly tells it to do what it wishes.  But what is now being said is that by doing these things he harms rather than honors it, whereas we say that it must be honored second after the gods.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 2022, page 134, 726a-727b, ISBN: 9781647920463)

1.1  Notice how the soul is depicted as having at least two facets: a facet, or function, ‘does the mastering’ while the other facet is ‘weaker and worse’ and ‘are slaves.’  This will be unpacked in more detail in Book X.

1.2  The quote then notes that, in general (‘none of us’) honors the soul correctly and an example of that incorrectness is given; a young man who is overconfident in his judgments about his soul, and about soul in general.

1.3  Notice how in this quote the soul is depicted as malleable.  The soul can be harmed.  The soul can become worse or better.  In think the implication of this is that it is important to understand the nature of the soul, to cultivate the soul so that the soul is improved rather than harmed, but most people lack such knowledge.  In the context of the Laws this situation is seen as a primary purpose of legislation, to create a social, or political, situation that benefits the soul rather than harming the soul.  Book V is a bridge between the topics of the first four books and the books following Book V that deal with specific legislation and part of the purpose of this quote is to emphasize that legislation needs to serve the cultivation of the soul.

1.4  In Book X the full complexity of the soul is presented in remarkable detail which helps us to understand why the soul can become ‘stronger and better’ or ‘weaker and worse.’  I am going to simply list the many aspects, functions, or ‘motions’ of the soul that Plato lists; the whole passage is worth reading (in the C. D. C. Reeve translation you can find it on pages 333-335, 896b-897b).  But for the purposes of this post listing the aspects or ‘motions’ of the soul is sufficient to highlight the complexity of the soul and why people need to cultivate a deep understanding and awareness of soul. 

The first group of functions or motions lists temperaments, character types, wishes, rational calculation, true beliefs, sorts of supervision, and memories (different translations use different English words for the items in these lists.)

The second group states that the soul is the cause of good things and bad, fine things and shameful, just things and unjust ones, and of all the opposites.

The third group has the largest number of items which in this case I will quote, “So soul leads [is prior to] all things in the heavens, earth, and sea by its own movements, which are named ‘wishing,’ ‘investigating,’ ‘supervising,’ ‘deliberating,’ ‘believing correctly and falsely,’ ‘being pleased,’ ‘being pained,’ ‘being confident,’ ‘being afraid,’ ‘hating,’ and ‘loving,’ and by all the related or primary-working movements which, taking over, in turn the secondary movements of bodies, lead all things to increase and decrease, disaggregation and aggregation, and to what follows on these, namely, heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hard and soft, white and black, bitter and sweet .“ (Ibid, pages 334-335)

1.4.1  The Platonic soul is dynamic, in the sense that the movements of the soul generate the items on these lists.  Plato also includes ‘secondary movements’ which occur as movements that result from one of the primary movements of the soul (this is found in the third group or list).  This division into primary and secondary movements happens because the soul is a kind of unmoved mover, meaning that the soul generates movement but is itself not moved in the process of that generation.  The secondary movements are movements that occur due to something that generates movement but does not itself move which is the soul.  The soul is not in motion, but generates motion; these generated motions in turn generate secondary motions.

1.4.2  The items are numerous and cover a lot of topics, or experiences.  I think this is a primary example of just how complex the Platonic soul is, which, in turn, helps us to understand the extent, even grandeur, of the task of reforming, or purifying, the soul is.

1.4.3  Many of the items on these lists are what we today would call psychological states such as confidence, hating, loving, believing, fear, and so forth.  From a modern perspective one might think of the purification of these ‘motions of the soul’ to be a kind of therapy; though I am not aware of a therapeutic modality that uses the Platonic understanding of the soul as its foundation.

1.4.4  Some of the items are emotions and some of the items are functions.  Hating and being pleased would seem to be examples of emotions.  Calculation and deliberating seem to me to be aspects of reasoning and therefore what I would call functions.

1.4.5  This passage also says that ‘soul leads all things in the heavens, earth, and sea’ and that soul ‘manages the universe.’  This is a metaphysical statement.  It means that soul is necessary for all these movements to appear; but this relationship is not reciprocal.  I mean that the items on the list are not necessary for the appearance of soul but the existence of the soul is necessary for the appearance of the items on these lists.  The relationship between soul and these items is, therefore, hierarchical.

1.4.6  Given the complexity, when taken together, of the items on this list, it is not surprising that people have difficulty relating to the soul and reforming, or purifying the soul.  When the opening quote refers to a young man overestimating his own understanding of the soul it is not difficult to understand why this happens.  For example, if a young man focuses on one of the functions, or movements, on these lists, such as deliberating or believing falsely, this can be felt as a genuine achievement, and in a way it is.  Unaware of the vastness of the topics, aspects, and movements of the soul the young man becomes overconfident and it seems to me that this is quite natural.  This is a place where elders with more experience can be very helpful.

1.5  As I just mentioned, many of the items on these lists can be understood as psychological occurrences or tendencies or possibilities.  Some of them are ethical such as good and bad things, just and unjust things.  Some of them are analytical such as calculation and deliberation.  But I think what all the items on these lists have in common is that they are differentiations.  In the Platonic sense they are differentiated ‘movements.’  None of them are movement as such, but they are derived from movement and then distinguished from each other.  In a more contemporary way of looking at it, all the items are differentiated mental states, or mental inclinations, but they all have to do with mind, or what Plotinus would call nous. 

I’m not saying that all the items on these lists are Platonic forms; I am suggesting that the items are differentiations of a higher reality.  It is differentiation itself that I am focusing on; all these items emerge from differentiating a higher reality into various manifestations in the material world, the way a crystal differentiates white light into many colors.

1.6  There is an item, or topic, that does not appear on this list and that item is continuity or unity.  (As an aside, I think Plato does refer to the unity of the soul, at least obliquely, in Phaedo, but I still think the absence of unity or continuity on these lists is noteworthy.)  Perhaps this absence is noteworthy for me because of my Buddhist background.  The experience of an underlying continuity, a ‘feeling’ that is not a sensation, of a ground of unity, in contemplation was one of the things that drew me to the world of Platonism as opposed to the world of Buddhism.

In Buddhism, particularly in Buddhist psychology such as found in Abhidhamma, moments of feelings and mental formations are said to arise due to causal interactions and then to disperse soon after arising.  In Buddhist psychology there is no underlying unity from which these formations emerge and this is part of what the Buddhist traditions mean by ‘no-self’, ‘no-soul’, or ‘anatman.’  But I was unable to dismiss my own contemplative experiences of exactly that kind of ‘ground,’ experienced as a kind of light, or inner light.

But this inner light, this transcendental source, is not an arising phenomenon; it is presence we become aware of.  I began to speak of it as ‘the presence of eternity.’  And after a long period of study, I began to think of it this way: the soul is the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.

1.6.1  After living with this understanding for a long time I began to think of the unity of the soul as the presence of the One, the pure unity of the transcendental, as the nature of the soul, as what the soul actually is, and worked with the idea that any additional functions, aspects, or movements should be understood as movements of the Mind rather than movements of the soul.  I am aware that this reconfigures what Plato says, quoted above.  And, yes, I do find that a bit intimidating.  On the other hand, I think this kind of reconfiguration does not disfigure the Platonic tradition in the sense that all the movements named in the above quotes remain and I think as a structure it has some consequences that are beneficial.

1.6.1.1  The first consequence is that the soul becomes much simpler.  As the presence of eternity, the presence of the One, the presence of Unity as such, this simplified soul grounds the experience of personal unity as well as the unity we perceive in others.  I don’t think that is a small thing.  What I am getting at, is that without the presence of the One there would not be any individuals, or any things, at all.

1.6.1.2  A second consequence is that the mind becomes more complex, but does not change its essential nature.  I think of differentiation, making distinctions, as the primary function of the mind.  These distinctions range from very basic (like the difference between a boulder and a truck) to very subtle (like distinguishing aspects of being).  I think of the topics quoted above as differentiations and for that reason I think of those topics, the items on the lists, as mind-based rather than soul-based.

1.6.1.3  A third consequence is that this reconfiguration (placing these topics in Mind and understanding soul as the presence of the One within the individual) offers an alternative to a debate, sometimes a rancorous one, that has been going on within the Platonic tradition for many centuries.  I am referring to the debate about whether the soul is ‘fully descended’ or ‘partially descended.’  This debate goes back to the third century C.E.  Plotinus understood the soul to have higher and lower parts, which is consistent with Plato’s presentation.  Plotinus thought of the higher part of the soul as remaining in higher realities such as nous, the noetic realm, while the lower part, or parts, of the soul remain in the material world.  This view was rejected by Iamblichus and Proclus, and others, who regarded the soul as fully descended. 

From the perspective of the reconfigured soul as the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual, the presence of pure Unity in the individual, the soul is understood to not descend at all.  This is because the soul as eternity has no boundaries.  And because the soul is immaterial it does not move from here to there (from the noetic to the material, for example). 

The appearance of individual souls, which seems to be an example of material multiplicity or fragmentation, is a misunderstanding of our perception and understanding (a misunderstanding of body and mind).  Individual souls resemble moonlight shining in many bodies of water, many lakes, many ponds, many streams.  Each appearance of moonlight in a pond seems separate from moonlight in other ponds; but they are not separate.  Similarly, the light of the soul appears in the material individual and appears to be distinct from other souls; but that is a mistake of our perception and understanding which is under the reign of time in the third, material, hypostasis.  The light of the One, the light of the soul, is everywhere (because it is immaterial), everywhen (because it is transcendental), and everything because without the presence of the One things would not appear at all.

1.6.1.4  I am not sure if all soul-related items can be securely moved to Mind.  This reconfiguration is new for me and I am still exploring it.  One item that I hesitate over is love.  When I think of love as a function of grace I tend to think of love as a function, or aspect, of the soul as the presence of eternity.  But people mean very different things by love, including purely material and sensory understandings.  Perhaps what is needed is greater precision in using the word ‘love’ or an expanded vocabulary for the many meanings we currently have of love.

1.7  If we simplify the soul by placing all these ‘motions’ in Mind rather than Soul, what remains?  I mean how would we describe this presence of eternity, this presence of the One in the ephemeral individual?  Looking at the soul as this kind of presence the soul is understood as our refuge and rest.  It is the source and presence of peace.  It is unchanging because it is pure unity.  It is motionless and therefore cannot be cultivated or become better or worse because eternity cannot become better or worse.  It is timeless without any before or after.  It has no qualities.  It is stillness and silence.  It is the light that we discover within when all motions and mental formations, all affirmations and negations, all desires, are calmed.  It is sublime.

1.8  This reconfiguration of Mind and Soul and how they are understood impacts the way the hypostases, levels of metaphysical reality, are understood and how they relate to each other.  Or perhaps you could say that this reconfiguration of Mind and Soul rest on a reconfiguration of the three hypostases; it is difficult for me to know which came first. 

In traditional Platonism the three hypostases are the Good and the One, which overflows into the second hypostases which is nous (also known as intellect or mind) which is the realm of eternal Platonic Forms.  Nous is where differentiation first appears; the Good and the One have no differentiation as they are pure unity.  Nous gives rise to soul which then, through the motions of the soul as described by Plato in the quotes above, generates material existence.

In the reconfiguration I have suggested the first hypostasis is the Good and the One (pure unity) which overflows into the second hypostasis, the realm of eternal Platonic Forms.  The overflowing of undifferentiated reality known as the Good and the One to differentiated eternal realities in nous is followed by the continued overflowing of differentiation into time; time gives rise to the material realm.  Time is post-noetic differentiation. 

The three reconfigured hypostases are present in living individuals.  The Good and the One are Soul in the temporal individual.  The Noetic is present as Mind in the temporal individual and as the function of differentiation.  And Time is present as the body of the individual. This links the metaphysics of the hypostases to the architecture of human existence (and likely all living existences).  In this way our individual existence can be seen, or understood, as a microcosmos of metaphysical reality.

This is a bit complicated, but I don’t think the reconfiguration is any more complicated than traditional Platonic metaphysics and cosmology. 

1.9  I am not claiming that this reconfiguration is superior to Plato’s; I don’t think of myself as ‘correcting’ Plato.  Rather, I think of this reconfiguration as another way of looking at the hypostases, or levels of metaphysical reality.  I’m not committed to metaphysical finality; by that I mean that I’m not committed to the idea that it is the job of metaphysics to offer a system of understanding that will never be altered or stand next to, or hold its own in contrast to, another interpretation.  I think of different interpretations of Platonic metaphysics as similar to variations on a theme; the variations are recognizably related, but they have differences that are meaningful, and no one variation is final and exhaustive.  Or you can think of these different presentations as petals on a rose.  What I look for is coherence and clarity and spaciousness and I believe that this reconfiguration has those qualities.  Time will tell.

2.  Aphorisms

The sound of a sunrise is the sound of eternity.

The teachings of Platonism are hidden in plain view.

The desert clouds vanish after the rain.

Most people have no interest in living a spiritual life; that’s not a bad thing.

Desert rabbits are very well camouflaged; like the presence of eternity.

The contractor builds a house from a blueprint.

The baker tries a new recipe he received from the mother of a friend.

A boulder and a palm tree discuss the nature of eternity and time.

After the last star vanishes, eternity abides.

An old monk copies the Enneads of Plotinus by hand.

5 October 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics - 109

5 October 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics – 109

1.  Applying Plotinus’s ‘Against the Gnostics’ to Other Traditions

I have previously posted that my overall view of the situation of Platonism in the third and four centuries C.E.  That view is that Platonism was being squeezed from multiple sides; or you could say Platonism was between a rock and a hard place.  From one side Platonism was being absorbed and reconfigured by Christianity.  From another side Platonism was being used by Theurgy to reconfigure Platonism extensively so that Platonism could be thought of as conforming to Theurgic perspectives.  In this post I want to expand a bit on that view.

I think it is helpful to note that two branches of Christianity were involved in reconfiguring Platonism.   The first branch was Orthodox Christianity represented by Augustine and others who were committed to what we today think of as Christian Orthodoxy.  The second branch was Gnosticism.  At the time that Plotinus was teaching, Gnosticism seems to have been fairly widespread, enough so that Plotinus wrote Ennead II.9 which is titled ‘Against the Gnostics.’ 

What these three teachings (Gnosticism, Orthodox Christianity, and Theurgy) had in common was that all of them viewed philosophy in general, and Platonism specifically, as deficient.  I mean by deficient that philosophy by itself could not elevate a student to an ultimate realization, could not lift a student to the transcendental, lacked crucial insights for entrance into the ineffable source of all things.  Although these three teachings disagreed with each other on many topics, they were united in their understanding of the insufficiency of philosophy to elevate the soul to ultimacy. 

For Orthodox Christianity it was the lack of Jesus that was primarily responsible for what Orthodox Christianity viewed, and still views, as the insufficiency of philosophy.  For Gnosticism it was the lack of access to secret, or initiation based, knowledge that made philosophy insufficient.  For Theurgy it was the lack of understanding the gods and their taxonomy, as well as the efficacious rituals that provided understanding and contact with the gods, that made philosophy secondary and insufficient.  (There are many additional differences between the four traditions (Orthodox Christianity, Gnosticism, Theurgy, and Platonism or Philosophy; this summary isn’t meant to be complete.  For example, there are differences in the way these traditions understand the soul that also impact the issue of sufficiency.  Perhaps I will make a post on that specific difference in the future.)

What I want to suggest, and this is the primary reason for this post, is that Ennead II.9, ‘Against the Gnostics’ applies to all three of these traditions that are critical of philosophy and Platonism.  I mean that the arguments presented by Plotinus that are critical of Gnosticism in many cases apply not just to Gnosticism, but also to Orthodox Christianity and Theurgy as well. 

To pick one example, Plotinus criticizes the Gnostic tendency to elaborate multiple realms and entities, a complexity that Plotinus sees as unnecessary and subversive to Platonism.  But this is also true of Orthodox Christianity with its angels, seraphim, and so forth.  And it is also true of Theurgy with its taxonomy of various kinds of gods functioning in much the same way.

This is speculative, but I wonder if Porphyry saw this, the way the arguments in ‘Against the Gnostics’ applies also to Orthodox Christianity and Theurgy.  And perhaps, after seeing this, Porphyry saw it as an opening to write a critique of Christianity which we now know as ‘Against the Christians.’  Following this logic, Porphyry’s work ‘On Abstinence’ was a kind of ‘Against the Theurgists’. 

Look at the situation for Platonism in the third and fourth centuries from the perspective of a traditional, or contemplative (what Gerson would call an Orthodox) Platonist.  From this perspective, the three non-Platonic approaches (Orthodoxy, Gnosticism, and Theurgy) all rely on arbitrary add-ons rather than completions of Platonism.  They are disruptive of the Platonist tradition, or subversive, or transgressive to it.  And ‘Against the Gnostics’ is the antidote to this kind of subversion.

Part of the add-ons consisted of additional texts beyond those that were significant for Platonism itself.  For Orthodox Christians it was the Bible and the Church Fathers that were central to their tradition.  These texts were used to critique what they viewed as the limited range of Platonism (see Eriugena’s Periphyseon or The Divisions of Nature as an example).  The Gnostics had their own scriptures which they considered authoritative beyond other Christian scriptures and philosophical works.  For the Theurgists it seems to have been the Hermetica and the Chaldean Oracles that functioned as authoritative sources for their Theurgic program.  For example, Iamblichus opens his work On the Mysteries by referring to Hermes and how the ‘ancestors’ of these teachings dedicated their writings to Hermes, a likely reference to the works of the Hermetic tradition.  In other words, Iamblichus is giving prominence to the works of the Hermetic tradition in the way that Orthodox Christians give prominence to Biblical teachings as well as the teachings of the Church Fathers.  What this means is that prominence is not given to the Dialogues of Plato or other works of the Platonic tradition.  That’s their choice, of course; I’m not saying it’s wrong to do that.  If you are a Christian, you would, of course, give prominence to the central works of Christianity.  What I am suggesting, and what I think has been overlooked, is that Theurgy at that time was doing the same thing, engaging in the same displacement.

Another way of looking at this historical situation is to engage in an overview of Platonism prior to this time.  If we start with Plotinus and then look backwards in time, it is noteworthy that Plotinus considers Platonism in its contemplative teachings to be completely sufficient for a full realization of the Absolute, the Good and the One.  Plotinus even describes his own experiences of such realization.  And this is accomplished entirely within the teachings laid out by Plato, and sustained through the centuries.  There is no sense of insufficiency towards Plato’s teaching in Plotinus.

When I say ‘sustained through the centuries’ I am thinking of works like the Orations of Maximus of Tyre, of the Handbook by Alcinous, and so forth.  All of these works regard philosophy as salvific and not requiring additional add-ons to bring Platonism to completion.  Many of these works, like Maximus’s Orations, speak directly of the contemplative basis of the Platonic tradition (in other words contemplation in Platonism isn’t something that Plotinus made up; contemplation is found in Plato’s Dialogues such as the ‘Symposium’ and ‘Phaedrus’ and ‘The Republic’ and ‘Phaedo’ and so forth.) 

The situation today differs from that of the third and fourth centuries.  Though the four traditions discussed above have their differences and disagreements, one thing all four share is a view to the transcendent.  That is no longer true today.  The default position today is materialism, reductionism, and similar views.  I don’t think ‘Against the Gnostics’ would be effective in countering the contemporary situation.  Instead, I think there are other resources in the Platonic tradition that I would point to.  The first example would be Plato’s Phaedo, in particular the passage where Socrates relates his biography and his early interest in Anaxagoras.  Ultimately Socrates pulls away from Anaxagoras and the kind of teachings Anaxagoras offered. 

The second example is Book X of ‘The Laws’ which deals with, among other things, atheism as it manifested in the Athens of Plato’s time.  But even though that was long ago, the analysis of atheism, and by implication materialism, is remarkably pertinent and applicable today.

People haven’t changed much.  If you look at people from a traditional philosophical perspective, human beings are subject to the same flaws that are discussed in Ancient Philosophy; I think that is one of the reasons that traditions like Stoicism have made a significant comeback (and, interestingly, Epicureanism seems to be making its first tentative steps at establishing itself as a present option.)  Perhaps this kind of turning that is taking place towards Ancient Philosophy will stimulate a growing interest in Platonism; I don’t see that this has happened yet, but I am optimistic.

2.  Aphorisms

An oak tree has a better chance of ascending to the Good and the One, of experiencing the presence of eternity, than a human being.

Following Plato himself, Plotinus is the pinnacle of the Platonic tradition.

I prefer Platonic writers like Plutarch (when he’s writing about Platonism), Alcinous, and Maximus to Iamblichus.

I suspect that The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius has more to offer a student of Platonism than The Elements of Theology by Proclus.

Asceticism is the nectar that nourishes wisdom.

If I were to confine my reading of Plato’s Dialogues to a single one, it would be ‘Phaedo.’

Purification can be as difficult as removing a stubborn stain or as simple as washing one’s hands.

The path of Platonism might take ten thousand rebirths to reach completion; maybe more.

Each time we perceive the beauty of a sunrise we are taking a step on the path to the transcendental, to the Good and the One.

I’ve been thinking that I tend to take a more horizontal view of Platonist spirituality than the metaphor of Platonist ascent might be comfortable with.

People tend to think of asceticism as grim and grumpy, but in the writings of ascetics a common theme is the joy they feel at living a life of asceses, a life of renunciation.

Spiritual practice resembles setting a dining table for an honored guest but you don’t know exactly when the guest will arrive.

Some flowers can bloom in the desert and Platonism can bloom in the midst of modernity.

The Good and the One are a distant mountain that is not far away.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 108

28 September 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics - 108

1.  Across the Great Divide

The finest hour I have seen

Is the one that comes between

The edge of night and the break of day

When the darkness rolls away. 

            Kate Wolf – Across the Great Divide

Kate Wolf (1942-1986) was a folk singer and songwriter.  Perhaps her most influential song is ‘Across the Great Divide’ which has been covered by singers like Emmy Lou Harris and others.  The verse I quoted above is the final verse of the song which is followed by the repeated chorus.  The song consists of a series of images that speak to the passing of time in the manner of crossing a barrier.  The uniting metaphor, which appears in the repeated chorus, is the Great Continental Divide which separates North America into the regions where rivers flow to the west and regions where rivers flow to the east into the Mississippi.  The chorus repeats the image of standing on a mountainside ‘where the rivers change direction across the Great Divide.’

I’m very fond of the song and the closing verse is my favorite section of it.  It brings to my mind the symbolism of the sun in the Platonic tradition and why that symbolism is so fitting. 

2.  The Restaurant at the Intersection of Eternity and Time

Reading Plato’s Dialogues resembles going to a fine restaurant with a menu where each of the selections provides an excellent dining experience.  But instead of nourishing the body, the selections on the restaurant’s menu nourish the soul.  And by nourishing the soul we discover the end of becoming and begoning, the cessation of time, and the presence of eternity.

3.  Becoming More Selective about Reading

This year I told my friends when my birthday was coming round to refrain from buying me books.  It’s not that I spend less time on reading.  It’s more that what I read has become more and more selective.  I still do some ‘recreational’ reading, but that has become increasingly rare.

The biggest difference in my reading habits is that these days I want to reread the classics of Platonism rather than branch out to new authors and/or topics (new to me).  I prefer to spend my reading time rereading the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus; I always find such rereading to be very rewarding.  In contrast, many books are not nourishing for my spiritual journey.  I like to think that rereading Plato and Plotinus increases depth of understanding whereas continue to branch out and read many different authors and topics seems to preclude this kind of depth experience.  Perhaps I am just congratulating myself; I’m not sure.  But rereading Plato and Plotinus is something I always find rewarding.

4.  Festivals

I have often thought that it would be beneficial to Platonism to have community festivals to create a kind of Platonic culture.  I’m not thinking of anything grand; these festivals should be simple, inexpensive, and accessible.  The model I think of is found in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus where Porphyry describes how the community headed by Plotinus would celebrate the birth of Socrates and Plato on the same day by sharing a vegetarian meal, giving orations, and discussing philosophical themes.  This structure is a ritual, but it is the kind of ritual that is completely non-esoteric and nourishing to the cultivation of philosophy.

I am thinking of three such festivals.  The first would be the feast of Plato and Socrates as found in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus.  It provides a sense of continuity with what was happening in Rome at the time of the community of Plotinus (presumably Plotinus received this kind of celebration from others; perhaps this was done at the community of Ammonius Saccas).  This would take place in the month of May; the ancient Greek calendar does not map onto our Gregorian calendar very well, but I am told that May would be close enough.  (May 5^th might be a good day as that is the mid-point between the March Equinox and the June Solstice.  But those who are interested in this kind of festival will figure out timing; in our current culture it is often necessary to adjust the specific date of a festival so that it will fall on a weekend when more people can participate, and for other mundane reasons.)

The second festival would be the festival of the Academy.  It is a bit similar to honoring the Sangha in Buddhism.  The Academy seems to be the primary means whereby Platonism has been preserved and passed on.  This is true of the actual Platonic Academy in Athens founded by Plato, but it is also true down to the present day where I observe small groups of Platonists working with each other to study and practice the Platonic tradition.  The festival would be similar to the first one (the one Porphyry describes) but I might suggest a focus on education and friendship as they are presented in the Platonic tradition.  (As an aside, there is a Buddhist Sutta from the Theravada tradition where the Buddha is asked about the importance of the Sangha and the Buddha responds by saying that the Sangha is the whole of the Dhamma.  And traditionally, Buddhism doesn’t consider itself to have planted roots in another country or culture until a self-sustaining Monastic Sangha is functioning.)

I would suggest the June Solstice for this festival.  I think it’s a nice progression from the May mid-point festival to a June Solstice festival.  But again, mundane considerations will likely intervene for groups.

The Third Festival would be the Festival of the Good and the One.  It would be a celebration of Platonism’s soteriological nature and the nature of that ultimate reality.  I suggest late December or early January; I lean somewhat to early January because I like the symbolism of the newness of the New Year and the constant unfolding and emanation of the One.  Also, on a practical level, early January doesn’t compete as much with the numerous holidays and festivals of late December.  But groups can find a time that works for them.

I have seen some calendars by contemporary Platonist groups that list Platonist Sages and indicating that a brief ritual of veneration should be offered for these Sages on their particular day.  This is actually a fairly big demand for people.  The list of names I’ve seen is fairly long and often consists of the heads of the Athenian Academy.  I have nothing against this, but I think such an approach is a kind of calling.  Naturally, if someone has the leisure and the inclination, I think it would be a worthwhile practice; veneration is a kind of method for purification. 

I don’t see these three festivals as onerous.  I see them as a means for cultivating a Platonist community and a sense of shared participation.

P.S.  While rereading this post I noticed that I was focusing on group participation.  I think that is because I based these festivals on Porphyry’s description of how Plotinus celebrated the birth of Socrates and Plato at his school in Rome, which was a group activity.  But in today’s culture many of us who walk the path of Platonism are not connected with any particular group, and others are connected only online. 

I think it is possible, though, to enact these three celebrations as an individual, or solitary practitioner.  It would take some adjustments.  For example, in the description of Plotinus’s celebration people offer orations on various Platonic topics.  In the case of a solitary practitioner this might be refocused to reading Platonic works that are relevant to the particular celebration, or perhaps, for those who are inclined, writing your own observations on some Platonic theme in a kind of journal. 

The Plotinian celebration involved sharing a meal.  If you are a solitary practitioner, it is still possible to celebrate with food, to dedicate a meal to Platonic practice, to express gratitude to the Good and the One from which is the ultimate source of the food one is eating. 

It will take some adjustments, but if a solitary practitioner is interested, and is generous to himself, I think it can be done.

5.  Alcinous on Injustice

“Injustice is such an evil that one should strive even more to avoid committing it than suffering it; for the former is the act of a wicked man, while being wronged is (merely) the misfortune of a weak man.  Both are shameful, but committing injustice is worse, in proportion as it is the more shameful.  It is advantageous for the wrongdoer to undergo punishment, even as it is for a sick man to submit his body to a doctor for treatment; for all punishment is a kind of cure for the soul that has sinned.”

(Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, page 42, ISBN: 0198236077)

I think this section of The Handbook is based primarily on Crito and Gorgias with possible influence from Laws regarding the use of punishment and what punishment should accomplish.  Plato links Injustice to Non-Harming which gives the Platonist view on Non-Harming a unique presentation compared to other traditions such as Classical Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and some branches of Hinduism. 

The radical point that is made in Plato’s Dialogues, such as Crito, and which is emphasized here, is that it is preferable to receive an injustice, or to be harmed than it is to commit an injustice; and Plato adds that this is true even if the person you are harming has committed that harm, or that injustice, against you.  In other words, Platonism teaches non-retaliation.

I see Plato’s teachings on non-harming, on refraining from committing injustice, as the wellspring of Platonic ethics.  This teaching is the ground from which all other Platonist ethical teachings, both ethical restraints and the cultivation of virtues, grow.

6.  Aphorisms

Beauty is another country.

Platonist spirituality isn’t about individuation which is a type of differentiation.

Platonism isn’t about voting for the right candidate.

Grace is the downward flow of the ineffable Good and the mysterious One.

Some people may view Platonism as harsh but that’s because they don’t see the world from the perspective of eternity.

The gods are creatures just like animals, plants, and human beings.

Venerating one’s ancestors has the virtue of helping one to understand the fragility of one’s own existence.

Rebirth is a reality in cyclic existence and the processes of rebirth are under the reign of time; rebirth is left behind with the ascent to the Noetic and the One because these realms are timeless.

I am more reticent to enter into public discussions about philosophical issues than Socrates was.

If I read only a few pages from the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus, that’s enough for me to call it a good day.