Brief Notes on Various Topics - 87

9 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 87

1.  Beauty Redeems the World

1.1-There is a theme that flows through several of the Enneads of Plotinus: ‘Against the Gnostics,’ (Ennead 2.9), ‘On Providence,’ (Enneads 3.2 and 3.3).  I am referring to Plotinus talking about the negatives of embodied, or material, existence and how to comprehend them.  The main thrust of Plotinus’s presentation as I understand it is that people tend to make too much of, or overinterpret, these negativities.  The result is that they misunderstand the nature of embodied existence and all of its manifestations; for example they are unable to comprehend that all of embodied existence flows from a shared principle because they are kind of hypnotized by the presence of negativities and fail to notice, for example, the presence of beauty in embodied existence, and the significance of that presence.

1.2 – Plotinus isn’t shy about giving examples of these negativities such as war, assaults of various kinds, deceitfulness, and so forth (he even uses the example of a snake).  But Plotinus argues that all of these mishaps in life are like what happens on a stage and we are watching the play.  The actors are not actually harmed and the negativities in the action of the play are there for balance and to give a kind of form to the play.

1.2.1  I think many people would have difficulty accepting this kind of analysis.  But in thinking about this, and focusing more on the providential nature of the higher hypostases, I think it is possible to comprehend what Plotinus is referring to.  For example, someone might get fired from a job unjustly; unjust because they have, in fact, done very good work at this job.  At first they may feel angry, or hurt, and they may want to lash out at those responsible for these circumstances.   But a few months later they have found a new job which pays better and offers other rewards.  Their view of what happened to them now changes; they may view getting fired as ‘the best thing that ever happened to me.’

1.3  The primary antidote to getting entangled in worldly negativities, according to Plotinus, is Beauty.  For Plotinus, Beauty is not just decorative; the presence of Beauty is a sign, or symbol, of the higher hypostases (or levels of reality).  And Plotinus’s view on this is drawn from Plato’s Symposium primarily, but also from the Phaedrus.  Particularly in the Symposium beauty is spoken of by Diotima (as quoted by Socrates) as the presence that can lead a student of philosophy to the divine and transcendental.  The idea is to follow beauty back to its source which is non-material.  In a sense, Plato and Plotinus are saying that Beauty is not of this world, that the presence of Beauty in this world is not a result of material conditions; rather it is the result of the Noetic and Transcendental breaking through to material reality.  Both Plato and Plotinus offer contemplative exercises to follow beauty back to its source.

1.4  For Plotinus, the presence of Beauty is what, ultimately, undermines the Gnostic view that the world is evil without any redeeming aspect.  This critique of Gnosticism, and the inability of Gnostics to understand the function of Beauty in the world, is powerful and distinguishes Gnosticism from Platonism in important ways. 

The Enneads on Providence (which was originally a single Ennead which Porphyry separated into two parts) place the function of Beauty into the larger context of Providence; relating these two important realities.  You could say that the presence of beauty is providential in that in spite of the negativities of material existence, Beauty redeems the world.

2.  Geology

Years ago I was walking with a friend who was a geologist.  We were walking past a cliff.  My friend the geologist began to explain what all the layers were, how they were formed, and what their presence signified, and roughly the timespan involved.  It was a very enjoyable walk for me.

I was thinking about this, and I noticed how this experience of mine resembles how one goes about experiencing the higher hypostases, or realities, that are referred to the in the Platonic tradition.  That’s probably not obvious, but bear with me.

Both I and my geologist friend were looking at the same cliff, but our perception and understanding differed depending on our level of training.  My friend had trained in geology for many years and this training shaped his perception of the cliff making facets of meaning and understanding available to him, but which were unavailable to me because I had not undergone the necessary training.

In Platonism it is the training of ethical restraint, the asceses, that refines and reshapes our perception, both inner and outer, so that we can become aware of these other realities which were previously hidden from us due to the unrefined nature of our mind.  This suggests that becoming aware of noetic realities and transcendental reality, is not a matter of a mystical ascent, it’s a matter of refining our awareness, of being able to shift our attention from the ephemeral to the eternal.  It is mysticism, but it is the mysticism of presence rather than the mysticisms of ascent.

I think that the idea that our body and minds need to be purified in order to become a philosopher is today a strange one.  This is due, I think, to the way philosopher has become centered on thinking, differentiation, and mental analysis.  For most philosophers today thinking, differentiation, and mental analysis are philosophy.  Purification through ethical restraint isn’t part of their program; but it was part of the program in Platonism. 

I don’t think it is too difficult to understand why purification is necessary; we can compare purification practices in more mundane activities to understand the place of purification in philosophy.  For example, a coach may instruct athletes in training to refrain from, or at least limit, alcohol and drug use because it makes it more difficult, perhaps impossible, to concentrate on physical development and athletic prowess.  A musician may be told by an instructor to refrain from spending so much time on social media, that the student needs to spend more time on practicing their craft of musicianship.  A carpenter may see that an apprentice is not making progress and suggest that the apprentice limit distractions.  Such advice is common.  And I suggest that ethical restraint in philosophy is similar to this kind of advice.  However, there is a primary difference; the goal in mundane activities is a worldly goal (to become a musician, and athlete, a carpenter, and so forth).  The goal of philosophical purification is awareness of, and experience of, non-material realities.  In this context restraint is not just a tool for worldly accomplishments.  Rather ethical restraint is an alignment with the higher realities by transforming the student in a manner that leads to the student resembling these higher realities; living a life that, as far as possible in a material body, is like that found in the noetic and transcendental realities. 

In a philosophical context, ethical restraint, asceses, brings us closer to the everlasting realities of nous, and to the ineffable reality of the Good and the One.

3.  New Porphyry Translations

New translations of two of Porphyry’s works, Letter to Anebo and Philosophy from Oracles, has just been released on Amazon.  (The copyright states the book was published in 2025, but it wasn’t available until last month on Amazon.)  The author is Fabien Muller.  The publisher is The Center for the Study of World Religions, and the distributor is Harvard University Press.

Both of the translations have facing English and Greek or Latin pages which allows those with knowledge of these languages the opportunity to compare the original with the English.  Both of these works come down to us in a fragmentary state.  Most of the fragments of the Letter to Anebo come to us through Iamblichus’s response to Porphyry’s Letter in On the Mysteries.  Iamblichus’s response is very critical and dismissive of Porphyry which must be kept in mind when reading the quotes from Iamblichus’s work.  But there are additional Latin sources such as Augustine and Eusebius, which are included in this publication.  Again, Augustine and Eusebius have differing levels of hostility to Porphyry (though based on different reasons from that of Iamblichus).  In the case of the Letter we have quite a lot of quotations and what comes through seems to be consistent with Porphyry’s overall views of Platonism.

The second work, Philosophy from Oracles, is more fragmentary and it is more difficult to access what Porphyry may have been saying.  In the Introduction it is pointed out that some scholars regard these two works as in some way contradictory or at least expressing different views.  The idea is that the Letter is highly critical of theurgy (which is true), but the Philosophy from Oracles uses Oracular statements as a source for philosophical insight.  Personally, I don’t think there is a contradiction.  Porphyry’s comments on the oracles are philosophical.  There is a long history in Platonism of writing comments, sometimes full-blown commentaries, on non-philosophical works; for example there are commentaries on Homer from within the Platonic tradition.  In other words, I think Porphyry’s Philosophy from Oracles is part of this Platonic heritage, just as Porphyry’s criticisms of theurgy come from the same heritage. 

The Introduction’s presentation of the nature of the disagreements between the Letter and Oracles is nuanced and helpful in understanding the particular passages and issues involved.  The Introduction mentions that these disagreements or contradictions ‘extend only to a certain point.’ (page 50)  Ultimately, due to the fragmentary nature of Oracles in particular, a resolution of these issues that is completely satisfactory is unlikely to emerge (unless more complete copies are found, buried in the desert sand, than we have at present).  But I very much appreciate the way the Introduction spells out these issues in a meticulous way.

I have some experience in the kind of commentary that Porphyry undertakes in his book on Oracles.  I like to interpret popular songs from a Platonic perspective.  I have posted several such commentaries on this blog and hope to do more in the future.  I think popular culture can be surprisingly insightful about the human condition and situation in a way that illuminates Platonism or can represent Platonism.  I’m not claiming that these songs were written by Platonists or philosophers.  But I think it is helpful to see the reality that Platonism refers to having a voice in a popular context.  I think accessing oracles seems to have been a popular activity in Greek religion and suggest that Porphyry is linking Platonism to this popular activity without necessarily claiming that the Oracles were spoken by a Platonist Sage.

I have been waiting for this translation for quite some time and I’m glad to finally get a copy.  It’s great to see an emerging interest in Porphyry resulting in such a well-done book on these two works.  For those interested in Porphyry and in the world of Late Classical Platonism, I highly recommend this book.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 86

2 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 86

1.  Some Remarks on Metaphysics

I’m a fan of metaphysics.  I don’t mean only the metaphysics found in Western Philosophy.  I also mean metaphysical thought found in cultures like India and China; though India and China use different vocabularies than what is in use in the West.  The connection I see is that metaphysics focuses primarily on the transcendental and on immaterial realities (hence ‘after physics’) and one can certainly find profound works with that kind of focus in these non-Western cultures. 

I view Plato as primarily a metaphysician in the sense that Plato’s writing has the overall purpose of guiding people to the Good and the One which is an immaterial reality and the immaterial source for all things; I like to refer to this as ‘the presence of eternity.’  I think this is the focus of the Platonic tradition as a whole.  Many other things are discussed in Platonism, but it is my feeling that these other things that are discussed are discussed because they assist in the journey to the One.  For example, the Platonic tradition’s focus on ethical restraints and the virtues has the function of showing people how to purify themselves, how to become less distracted by sensory experience, and this assists people in turning towards the Good, the One, and the Beautiful. 

Because I have this view I, at times, spend time on uncovering why metaphysics came under such widespread attack in the modern period (beginning approximately with Hume and Descartes) in the West.  It helps me to understand where I am in terms of the culture that I inhabit and why I sometimes feel so estranged from it. 

After a lot of study, I have come to a few conclusions (which are subject to revision).  The most important for me is that metaphysics never really disappeared in the modern period.  The announcement by various modernist philosophers that metaphysics was done was an expression of a wish, or hope, on their part; it was prescriptive.  What they were really saying to young philosophers is that you shouldn’t bother with metaphysics.  But work in metaphysics continued among some philosophers anyway (the most notable case is Alfred North Whitehead). 

It is striking to me that those who continued to engage with metaphysics do not seem to have been interested in responding to those who viewed metaphysics as over and done with; at least I have not found essays that I might consider to be apologias for metaphysics.  Instead, they simply proceeded to engage with the tradition and let those interested find what they had written.  I think this shows some wisdom.  And it shows some patience.  I think the wisdom and patience shown here is a natural result of engaging with the transcendental, of understanding things from the perspective of eternity.

2.  The Individual in Modernity

I’ve become more aware that one of the striking differences between philosophy in the modern period in contrast to philosophy in the classical period is that in the modern period, the period we reside in, it is the individual mind that is the starting point but in the classical period it is what arises in interaction that is the starting point.  For example, Plato’s philosophy emerges from dialogue and dialectic; it would be difficult to think of Socrates as acting like Descartes and thinking of his ego as the starting point of his inquiries.  And this is true throughout the classical period of Platonism; think of Plotinus presenting his essays to his students and getting feedback from them.

This has often been observed; I mean the shift to the individual mind and ego from the ground of interaction and what emerges in a more communal context.  In modern philosophy it is the individual philosopher who critiques and renders judgment.  In Platonic philosophy it is what emerges from interaction, particularly dialectic, that sheds light on the questions being discussed.  These are different processes.  Modern philosophy is critical, classical philosophy is constructive due to its basis in interaction.

It is true that Plato depicts Socrates as withdrawing for the purposes of contemplation in Dialogues such as Phaedrus and The Symposium.  But this kind of contemplative withdrawal is not a withdrawal into the individual mind (small ‘m’ mind), it is an ascent to the noetic and the transcendent which is the ground for the emergence of wisdom.  In other words, it is not the individual mind that is the source of wisdom in classical philosophy, whereas in modernity there really isn’t anything that surpasses the individual mind.

Thinking about this, I wondered if it is possible to replicate the dialectical foundation of Platonism in the culture of today?  It may be that the emergence of dialectical discussion requires particular communal contexts; I’m not sure.  I have observed that it is difficult for contemporary philosophers to step away from the critical stance of modern philosophy.  But it’s not impossible; Whitehead managed to offer a constructive metaphysics in the classical manner.  And perhaps this is the key to reconnecting with a more dialectical philosophical involvement.  Whitehead was deeply involved in the history of philosophy and his attitude towards previous philosophy is what I might call ‘reverence’.  I mean by this that Whitehead often shows his appreciation for his predecessors and, at the same time, he is willing to modify their presentations or Whitehead will spotlight where he thinks they missed something of significance.  This is dialectical rather than critical.  Whitehead does not dismiss previous attempts at metaphysics, he learns from them and having absorbed what they have to say he ventures forth into new territory.  The individualist and hypercritical attitude of modern philosophy is often dismissive of the past and treats the past as if it has nothing of significance to offer.  Whitehead shows us why that attitude is deficient.

So I do think it is possible to replicate the kind of interactive exchange of insight and energy that is foundational for Platonic Philosophy.  Online interaction provides a venue for this, at least potentially.  But I think that most often this interaction happens when we engage deeply with the classic sources of Platonism such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.  It’s a matter of reading them receptively instead of in the modern manner of always having a critical stance.  When reading these works many people have a kind of experience of opening up to dialogue and dialectic.  Dialogue and dialectic take the reader out of their individual ego and their individual concerns and open the way to the larger realms in which our life unfolds.

3.  Plotinus on Renunciation

“Let the human being who lives in the world of corporeal goods be beautiful and tall and wealthy and the sort of ruler over people that one can be here, yet he ought not to be envied for these things, since he was deceived by them. But the wise person would perhaps not even have these to begin with, though if he did, he will lessen their impact, if indeed he cares for himself.  He will lessen their impact and extinguish the advantages of the body by his lack of interest in them, and he will let their power over him die.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads: Second Edition, Ennead 1.4.14, “On Happiness”, translated by Lloyd P. Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 85, ISBN: 978109604970)

3.1  Plotinus points to a gradual, step by step, renunciation.  The wise person will lessen the impact of ‘corporeal goods’ in his life.  I read this as saying that the wise person takes steps to turn away from ‘corporeal goods’ and these steps might be modest, at least at first.

3.2  It’s interesting, and meaningful, to me that often when Platonism talks about renunciation what we get are broad strokes rather than a meticulously laid out list; the kind of thing one finds, for example, in the Buddhist Vinaya (rule of life for monastics).  Specifics do appear now and then such as in the Phaedo, but even there, if you compare the instructions in renunciation to monastic rules it is pointers rather than a long list of specifics. 

This may indicate that Platonism as an ascetic tradition wants its practitioners to go in a certain direction, but trusts its followers to walk the path as best they can.  It’s kind of like giving advice to a hiker by telling them what kind of equipment they will need for the hike because you have the requisite experience.  But the new hiker will purchase their own equipment and it may contain additions or alternatives to what was suggested.

3.3  I see this kind of relationship in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, in the section where Porphyry writes about various disciples.  The instantiation of the Platonic life varies in accordance with their circumstances, but the general direction of renunciation and asceticism is clear.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 85

16 February 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 85

1.  Another Youtube

I recently saw a youtube presentation about Platonic Theurgy.  The presenter was very enthusiastic about the topic and examined Theurgy as a type of magic and an  occult tradition.  What interested me, and I have posted about this before, is that he never mentions that Theurgy was designed to give a philosophical foundation for animal sacrifice, what is sometimes referred to as blood sacrifice.  I have found that this is common, though not universal.  There are a small number of books about theurgy that do refer to the way theurgy supports, and advocates for, blood sacrifice; but the large majority do not do so.

This is not just a theoretical issue.  Theurgy was used as the foundation for Julian’s very frequent and very numerous animal sacrifices.  This should be a painful heritage for contemporary theurgists but for the most part they simply dodge the issue.

From a Platonic perspective I tend to see theurgy as targeting, and undermining, Platonic ethics; in particular theurgy undermines the Platonic system of ethical restraints, or asceses.  I know I’ve talked about this before, but seeing yet another presentation on the topic led me to making another post about it.

2.  The Door to Dharma Traditions

One of the things that Indian Dharma traditions share is a process whereby someone becomes a member of that tradition by ceremonially affirming their commitment to the basic ethical commitments, or ethical restraints, of that tradition.  You find this in Buddhism, Jainism, Classical Yoga, Hinduism, and some forms of Shaivism.  The ceremony is simple; the individual(s) vocally affirm that they will live in accordance with these (often five) ethical principles.  Sometimes in large ceremonies those participating will collectively affirm their commitments; in small ceremonies it may be individuals who affirm their commitments one after another.

What I think this means is that taking a vow to maintain ethical restraints is the door to becoming a member of a particular Dharma tradition.  It is a visual and public affirmation of one’s commitments.

Platonism does not have such a ceremony.  But it does have ethical restraints that are referred to in various Dialogues of Plato.  I have adopted affirming my commitment to these Platonist ethical restraints as a part of my morning practice and ritual.  I simply affirm that I will follow these restraints as I live my life.  I’m the kind of person who needs a daily reminder of such commitments because my mind has a strong tendency to become distracted by other ‘interesting’ things (though that is diminishing with age).  I’ve known this about myself for a long time and that is the primary reason I do this ceremony on a daily basis.  In Indian Dharma traditions reaffirming commitment to basic ethical commitments is very rarely done on a daily basis after the initial ‘taking of the precepts’ ceremony.  However, the basic precepts are often included in other ceremonial contexts and celebrations; so there are regular reminders.

I think for Platonism the situation is that not very many people view Platonism as having basic ethical restraints that a practitioner of Platonism commits themselves to.  There is not a communal context where Platonists are regularly reminded of this and that is another reason why I find a daily reenactment of those commitments to be of assistance.

I think that these ethical restraints found in Platonist works are the door to an engagement with the Platonic tradition that goes beyond reading the primary texts of Platonism which are the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, as well as some secondary works.  These ethical commitments function in Platonism the same way that they function in Indian Dharma traditions by focusing the life of the Platonist on living in a way that aligns with the tradition as a whole (even before Platonism) and nourishes the Platonic tradition for the future. 

3.  Spacious

One of the aspects of Plato that has grown in my awareness is how ‘spacious’ his writing is.  I mean ‘spacious’ in the sense that Plato uses myth, allegory, metaphor, simile, and symbol in his works.  In addition, there are dialogues that do not come to a conclusion; instead they end ambiguously.  All of these contexts draw the reader into the dialogue(s); they invite the reader to participate and unpack the meaning of the dialogue.  Plato does not seem to be concerned with crafting a fully systematic presentation in the way that, for example, Spinoza does.  Plato is more concerned, I think, with the broad strokes of metaphysics and metaphysical cosmology because they assist people in aligning with the spiritual quest.

Over the centuries there was a tendency in the Platonic tradition to become more systematic and to fill in what some might consider to be ‘gaps’ in Plato’s presentations.  This really took off in the Late Classical Period (roughly Iamblichus through Proclus).  There is a definite shift in tone in the sense that the Late Classical Platonists are not inviting us to participate in unpacking the meaning of what they have written.  Instead, they are talking down to the reader and insisting, sometimes very adamantly, that their interpretation is correct even when they know that lots of Platonists thought otherwise.  The writing is more tense.

There are exceptions, the most important ones I know of are Olympiodorus and Boethius.  Writers like these seem to want the reader to be a participant in what the author is offering.  But it is interesting to observe that both of these writers were not rooted in the Athenian tradition of Platonism and I suspect that there is a connection. 

I think this is helpful to understand because sometimes Late Classical Athenian Platonism (L-CAP for short?) is sometimes presented as the final and most profound unfolding of Classical Platonism.  I think that is doubtful.  Why do I say this? Well, I just don’t think it is necessary for someone to have absorbed the intricacies of their approach in order to understand and practice the Platonist tradition.  In a similar way, I don’t think it is necessary for a Mahayana Buddhist to comprehend the intricacies of Madhyamika, and its various tenets, in order to understand and practice that tradition.  (There are many similar comparisons like this one can make.)  We can look at it this way: if all the works of the L-CAP tradition had never been written, would that have any impact on how deeply we can comprehend Platonism?  Personally, I don’t think it would.  I realize that those who are dedicated to L-CAP will disagree; fair enough.  I’m simply presenting some conclusions I have come to that are based on my own reading and study.  Readers, of course, will come to their own conclusions.

I’m not opposed to someone studying the Late Classical Athenian Platonist tradition; there is a certain kind of person for whom that will be rewarding (just as there is a certain kind of person for whom studying the intricacies of Madhyamika will feel rewarding).  But I am skeptical that this L-CAP tradition has left us something essential that we must understand if we want to understand Platonism at all.  I think that is mistaken and leads at least some people astray.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 84

9 February 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 84

1.  The Ascetic Ideal

I often refer to Platonism as a spiritual tradition that has a foundation in asceticism and purification through the practice of various types of ethical restraint and renunciation.  For short I refer to this as The Ascetic Ideal; I mean that the practice of Platonism is built upon The Ascetic Ideal.

This Ascetic Ideal is woven into the fabric of Plato’s Dialogues, the Enneads of Plotinus, the writings of Porphyry, as well as appearing in other Platonic writings.  A singular feature of The Ascetic Ideal is that we should not base our lives on sensory stimulation, that sensory stimulation is a poor guide for living a good life.  Further, according to The Ascetic Ideal sensory stimulation should be, as far as possible, minimized. 

I was thinking about The Ascetic Ideal recently (I often think about it) because of the presence in the news of a very widespread corruption scandal that seems to be disclosing a network of misdeed among a very large number of elites.  Those who are part of this network, or who are alleged to be part of this network, seem to have lived lives of maximal sensory indulgence; the opposite of a life based on The Ascetic Ideal.

It came to mind while thinking about this, that Plato in both The Republic and Laws goes to great lengths to require rulers to live lives of renunciation.  In Laws rulers are required to not even have gold or silver present in their living quarters; and there are many more restrictions, or ethical restraints.

I think this shows how intensely aware Plato was regarding the temptations of sensory stimulation and how succumbing to those temptations leads not only to personal failings, but also to the corruption of society as a whole.  This is a view, the view of The Ascetic Ideal, that has almost vanished from discussions in the public sphere; for example, could you imagine elected officials being required to divest themselves of excess income (however the society would define excess)?  Or requiring those holding political office to be vegetarians?  And so forth, you get the idea.

We have lost contact with The Ascetic Ideal.

2.  Ennead 6.9.6

“How shall we speak of unity, and how is it to be made to be in accord with thinking?

“In fact, unity must be posited in more ways than a unit or a point is one.  For in these cases the soul takes away extension and numerical multiplicity and leaves off when it comes to the smallest thing, and rests at something indivisible; but a point is in that which is divisible, and a unit is in another thing.  But the One is ‘not in another thing’; it is neither in the divisible nor is it indivisible as being the smallest thing.  It [the One] is the greatest of all things, not in extension, but in power.  Indeed, even the Beings posterior to it [the intelligibles or noetic realities] are indivisible and without parts through their powers, and not magnitudes.

“The One must be understood to be unlimited not because it cannot be traversed either in extension or number, but by being incomprehensible in its power.  For whenever you understand it either as Intellect or as god, it [The One] is more.  And again, when you unify it by discursive thinking, then, too, it is more than you imagine, in being more unified than your thinking of it.  For it is in itself, since it has no attributes.

“One should think of its unity by means of its self-sufficiency.  Of all things it must be the most adequate and self-sufficient and least deficient.

“Further, any multitude, as long as it has not become a unity, is deficient.  Its substantiality is deficient relative to being a unity, whereas the One is not deficient of itself.  For it is itself.  By contrast, what is many needs all the things it is and each of these things, being with the others and not in itself, needs all these other things, and brings about a deficiency both in terms of a unity and terms of being a whole.  If then, there must indeed be something entirely self-sufficient, the One alone must be the kind of thing which is deficient relative neither to itself nor to anything else.  It seeks nothing, so that it may be, nor that it may be in a good state, nor so that it may be established in the intelligible world.  As it is the cause of other things, it does not get what it is from other things.  How can its good be outside it?  Thus, its good is not an attribute of it; for it is it itself.

“It has no place, for it has no need of a place to settle itself through being unable to support itself.  Something which settles is inanimate, a falling mass, as long as it does not settle.  Other things settle in a place because of the One.  Because of it, they exist at the same time as they take up the place assigned to them.  To seek a place is to be in need, and the principle is not in need of things posterior to it.

“The principle of all things is in no need of all things.  Anything in need, is in need because it desires the principle.  If the One needed something, it would be seeking to be not the One, so it would be in need of what will destroy it.  But everything that is said to be in need, needs its good, that is, what preserves it.  Thus, there is no good for the One, and so it does not have a will for anything.  [I.e., a will for anything other than itself. – translator’s footnote.]  It is beyond good and is good not for itself but for other things, insofar as other things can participate in the Good.

“Nor is it intellection, in order that it may have no difference in itself; nor motion, since it is prior to motion and intellection.  Indeed, what should it understand?  Itself?  So, it would be ignorant prior to its intellection, and it would be in need of intellection in order that it would know itself, whereas it is self-sufficient in itself.  So, it is not ignorant about itself, on the grounds that it does not know or think itself.  For ignorance comes to be about something else, whenever one thing is ignorant of a different thing.  It alone neither knows nor does it have anything which it is ignorant about, but being one and one with itself, it needs no intellection of itself.

“So, there is no need to add ‘being with itself’, to preserve its unity.  Indeed, one should take away from it both thinking and being with itself and the intellection of itself and of other things.  For it should not be ranked with something that thinks, but with the intellection itself.  The intellection does not think; it is the cause for something else thinking, and the cause is not identical with what is caused.  The cause of everything is none of these things.  So, this should not be called ‘good’, which is what it bestows on other things.  Rather, it is the Good in another way, above the other goods.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by a team headed by Lloyd P. Gerson, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2025, pages 893-895, ISBN: 9781009604970)

2.1  This is a sublime section of the Enneads.  The whole of Ennead VI is filled with insights and, at a literary level, flows from one section to another like a clear mountain stream.

2.2  This section of the Enneads is focused on unpacking the meaning of unity and the One.  Plotinus begins by comparing what one might call transcendental unity with mathematical unity by using concepts such as a mathematical point or a mathematical unit and suggesting that transcendental unity, or philosophical unity, differs from the unity found in a mathematical context.  Plotinus writes, “. . . the One is ‘not in another thing’; it is neither in the divisible nor is it [the One] indivisible as being the smallest thing.”  In this paragraph Plotinus points to the One, to unity, as beyond mathematical contexts, beyond extension (the context of physics), and beyond magnitudes (such as large and small).  “It [the One] is the greatest of all things, not in extension, but in power.”

2.3  Plotinus further unpacks the understanding of the power of the One in the next paragraph, “The One must be understood to be unlimited not because it cannot be traversed either in extension or number, but by being incomprehensible in its power.  For whenever you understand it either as Intellect or as god, it is more.”  It is therefore beyond discursive thinking because “it has no attributes.”

2.4  It is helpful to note that Plotinus uses both negations and affirmations when discussing the One.  For example, Plotinus uses the terms ‘unlimited’ and ‘incomprehensible.’  But Plotinus also uses affirmations to illuminate the nature of the One by referring to the One’s ‘self-sufficiency.’  Plotinus then further unpacks the nature of self-sufficiency in the following paragraph after introducing this perspective.

2.5  The contrast is that all created things are not self-sufficient; they rely on causation to bring them into becoming “. . . whereas the One is not deficient of itself.  For it is itself.”  In contrast, things need all the things that it is and needs other things as well.  But the One is deficient neither to itself nor to anything else.  I interpret this as meaning that the One does not arise due to causation; that is to say there are no conditions that give rise to the One.  Plotinus puts it this way, “It [the One] seeks nothing, so that it may be.”

2.6  Plotinus then goes on to point out that the One is the cause of other things, but the One does not ‘get’, or become, what it is from other things because the One is prior to all other things, including noetic things.

2.7  Now Plotinus returns to the use of the negations by stating that the One has no place. 

2.8  Then Plotinus returns to using an affirmation by referring to the One as ‘the principle of all things’ that is in no need of all things.  In McKenna’s translation he refers to a sovereign self-sufficiency as the principle being pointed to, which I find helpful.

2.9  I think it is significant that Plotinus uses both affirmations and negations in this part of the Enneads.  I sometimes read that Plotinus is using the approach of negative theology, meaning that the ultimate, or the One, can only be approached through the use of negations.  I can understand why people interpret passages like this in that way because the negations are very striking.  But if I closely read a passage like this what I observe is a kind of going back and forth between the use of affirmations and negations that suggests that the One is beyond both affirmations and negations.  I wouldn’t call this ‘negative theology’; I would be more inclined to call it ‘transcendental theology.’  The difference is that in negative theology all affirmations are rejected as being inadequate, but in transcendental theology the function of both affirmations and negations is to assist the reader in going beyond both affirmations and negations.  It is not that these are rejected; rather their context and range are more focused and both affirmations and negations are used to move us into a context that is both beyond, and prior to, any becoming and begoning.

2.9.1  This quote from Plotinus had an impact on Christianity through the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, in particular his Mystical Theology.  The closing of Mystical Theology states that the ultimate is beyond any affirmation or negation.  This is consistent with Plotinus’s usage of affirmations and negations in this passage and, I suspect, was directly influenced by this passage.

2.9.2  This section of the Enneads also influenced Maimonides in his treatise The Guide to the Perplexed.  This is found in Chapter 57 (I’m using a new translation by Lenn E. Goodman and Phillip I. Lieberman).  Maimonides unpacks the ambiguities generated by the way language is used in this context; he suggests using ‘one’ but not ‘oneness’ and other suggestions for structuring language in such a way as to retain clarity in a transcendental context.

2.9.3  And finally this passage appears in the Islamic world in a work known as the Theology of Aristotle; it was thought for a long period that the Theology of Aristotle was written by Aristotle, but it turns out that it is a collection of passages from Plotinus.  I don’t know the original source of the confusion, but it appears the collection was a work of Porphyry’s, then was translated into Syriac, and then into Arabic where it had a big influence (that’s quite a journey).  I don’t know when it took on Aristotle’s name (presumably Porphyry would not have been confused about that.)  But this passage of Plotinus had an impact on a number of Islamic philosophers and theologians.

2.9.4  It would be interesting to see if modern writers who are interested in Plotinus also reference this passage.  But that’s a project for another day.