2 November 2026

2 November 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 112

1.  Love and Grace in Plotinus: 1

For a long time, I have thought of grace as having a significant place in the Platonic tradition.  Grace is not often mentioned in discussions of Platonism and I think one of the reasons is that it is not overtly mentioned in important Platonic works very often.  A second reason is that I think the strong association of grace with Christianity means that secular scholars tend to interpret Platonic grace in Christian terms and while this makes historical sense, it is, I think, a barrier to accessing how grace functions in the Platonic tradition.

There are, however, a few places where Plotinus writes about grace, and there are a few scholars who have examined what Plotinus has to say.  Pierre Hadot wrote a short book about Plotinus called Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision and in that book Hadot briefly talks about Plotinus’s understanding of grace and love.  Here is a quote from Hadot’s book:

“For Plotinus, if things were nothing other than what they are, in their nature, essence and structure, they would not be lovable.  In other words, love is always superior to its object, however lofty the latter may be.  Its object can never explain or justify it.  There is in love a ‘something more,’ something unjustified; and that which, in objects, corresponds to this ‘something more’ is grace, or Life in its deepest mystery.  Forms and structures can be justified, but life and grace cannot.  They are ‘something more,’ and this gratuitous surplus is everything.  In it, Plotinus recognizes ‘the trace of the Good’: ‘Each form, taken by itself, is [only] what it is; but it becomes desirable once the Good diffuses the color of its light over it . . . awakening love in those who desire it’ (VI 7, 22, 5-7).

“What Plotinus calls the Good is thus, at the same time, that which, by bestowing grace, gives rise to love, and that which, by awakening love, causes grace to appear.  The Good is what all things desire; it is what is desirable in an absolute sense.  We asserted that love and grace are unjustified; likewise, the Good itself is absolutely unjustified.  It is not random or accidental, but by willing itself and being what it wants to be, it freely creates the love that beings feel for it, as well as the grace they receive from it.  All these formulations are, in any case, unable to translate what the soul knows of the Good when it goes through the experience of love.”

(Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, translated by Michael Chase, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pages 50 and 51, ISBN: 9780226311944)

1.1  Hadot refers to ‘something more’ in the things of this world.  I think that is an excellent way of looking at how Platonism, and Platonist practitioners, stand in the world.  Platonism is focused on this ‘something more.’  This is one of the primary differences between naturalism and Platonism; in naturalism, or materialism, things are thought of as being sufficiently, and completely, depicted by their natural, material features.  In Platonism the natural features of any given thing are the result of the something more of existence, of the Platonic Forms, of the Good and the One. 

I think Plotinus is connecting with the dialogue Phaedo and that wonderful section where Socrates gives a brief intellectual, or philosophical, biography.  I have mentioned this section on several posts before, it is where Socrates explains that he was, at first, attracted to the philosophy of Anaxagoras, but then later saw through its limitations which are that Anaxagoras explains things through reducing them to natural and material causes alone (and it seems that Socrates is suggesting that even mind in Anaxagoras was explained in this way).  Anaxagoras is the naturalist, the reductionist, in this telling, while Socrates is the one who is rooted in the transcendental.

1.2  Hadot links love and grace in what I have quoted.  I read this as grace being the overflowing of the Good and the One, which in turn generates in material beings love for the Good and the One and the desires to return to the One.  The way Hadot puts it is that grace bestows love.

This love is, at times, given an erotic description, particularly in the Symposium where the Diotima’s ladder of beauty begins with the contemplation of attractive bodies.  At first this may appear to conflict with the ascetic teachings of Plato found in Phaedo and other dialogues.  But what Diotima teaches is to ascend to the transcendental by turning away from material beauty to that which is beautiful as such; that is to say to the beauty of the noetic.  In addition, Socrates is praised in the Symposium for not succumbing to the attempted seduction of Alcibiades, an example of someone who has transcended the seduction of material beauty.

1.3  Hadot uses the word ‘unjustified’ to describe love and grace.  I think this is an aspect of grace that disturbs many people.  That someone will receive the grace of the One even if they have not lived an exemplary life runs counter to our sense of fairness; it can even feel arbitrary.

The metaphor I use for Platonic grace has helped me to understand how this works.  I use the metaphor of moonlight shining on a mountain path that branches of the main path.  A hiker notices this path and turns to hike that path to its conclusion.

The moonlight is the symbol of grace.  The moonlight was shining on the path but wasn’t shining specifically for that individual hiker; moonlight simply shines because that is its nature.  I think that in this sense grace is ‘unjustified’ because the path that is being shown in the moonlight is simply being shown; the presence of the path is not noticed due to some kind of transaction.  The presence of the path is a gift in the sense that it comes to the hiker freely, without calculation.

1.4  A few paragraphs later, Hadot writes, “The grace he (Plotinus) speaks of reveals to use the gratuitousness of divine initiative.  Let the reader be reassured: this is not an attempt to Christianize Plotinus.  It is too obvious that he is unaware of or opposed to the idea of a new creation in Christ, which constitutes the content of the specifically Christian concept of grace.  The gratuitousness of divine initiative is only ne element of this concept, and not the most characteristic one at that.  If philosophical reflection goes to its own extreme, and still more if it attempts to express the content of the mystical experience, it, too, will be led to this notion of gratuitousness.  It will, moreover, become clear upon reflection that all necessity and all duty presuppose the absolute initiative of an original love and freedom.”  (Ibid, page 51)  And I would add an original grace.

The use of the word ‘gratuitous’ I read as emphasizing that the grace of the Good and the One is beyond affirmation and negation; as I mentioned above, it is not calculated.  I also think the usage of ‘gratuitous’ emphasizes that the Good and the One are beyond being, mind, and life.  I think it is a way of talking about the ineffable that is particularly effective.

1.5  The moonlight on the mountain path is a metaphor I like because it doesn’t negate the need for purification.  The hiker does need to notice the path, does need to turn to the path, and needs to consider the path valuable enough to turn away from, to renounce, other possible paths.  In this way purification and grace can be understood to work together.

1.6  Again, I have not observed much writing on the topics of grace and love in University Platonism.  And I suspect that one of the reasons is that to think of grace and love as significant, even foundational, is to move the Platonic tradition to another dimension of reality that modern philosophy has for the most part rejected. 

1.7  Hadot’s description of love and grace also connects love and grace with beauty.  Beauty is ‘something more’ just as love and grace are something more.  I think this explains why Plotinus, following Plato, spends so much energy referring to beauty and the illuminating presence of Beauty.  Beauty is the presence of grace perceived.

2.  Plotinian

I have started thinking of myself as a ‘Plotinian.’  I think of this as similar to a Christian who refers to himself as an ‘Augustinian.’  In other words, Plotinian refers to a stream of, or tradition of, Platonism.  I feel attracted to this way of speaking because of the vastness of the Platonic tradition and how this vastness facilitates misunderstandings; ‘Plotinian’ narrows the focus.

My only hesitancy about the term ‘Plotinian’ is that it is still common, unfortunately, for people to refer to Plotinus as the ‘father of Neoplatonism.’  I’ve posted before about why I think this is misguided; it’s kind of like referring to Augustine as ‘the father of Neochristianity.’  No one does that because it would be laughable to do so.  In a similar way, I think associating Plotinus with ‘Neoplatonism’ misunderstands what Plotinus was doing and who he was.

But there’s nothing I can do about that, other than to offer my own understanding, along with others who agree and let people decide for themselves as to this usage.  In the meantime, I will try on the Plotinian hat and see if it fits.

3.  The Demise of Postmodernism?

I recently saw a few videos on YouTube that share the theme of the approaching end of postmodernism.  That’s interesting; I think this is the first time I’ve seen young people talk in this way.  I don’t know what the future will bring, but I can kind of see that postmodernism has a faddish quality to it.  And its opaque use of language guaranteed that it would exclude most people from understanding what it was about and that it would remain primarily of interest to academics.

For Platonists, modernism and postmodernism created an intellectual environment that was casually hostile to its primary concerns such as the nature of the transcendental, the manner in which Platonic forms work, asceticism and the cultivation of virtue, and a strong interest in the nature of beauty.  If it is true that postmodernism is reaching a conclusion that doesn’t guarantee that what follows it will be more congenial to Platonism.  On the other hand, its demise might create more space for Platonism to present itself as a way of life that is just as valid today as it was thousands of years ago.

4.  Aphorisms

I consider the Letters of Plato as a warning Plato left for his students so they would not pursue political careers or engagement.

Sometimes I feel profoundly tired of this world.

Reading different translations of Plotinus resembles listening to different conductors conduct the same symphony.

The instantiation of beauty fades but beauty as such does not fade.

Contemplation is the conversion of attention from the dispersions of the material world to the unity of the One which is found within.

A strange thing I have noticed about nihilists is that they seem to find meaning in the meaninglessness of nihilist teachings.

I found a fossil in the desert.

The material world is dominated by the cacophony of differentiation but there are hidden appearances of eternity here and there, now and then.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 111

26 October 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 111

1.  Dharma

I have often suggested that it is more accurate to think of Platonism as a Dharma tradition than it is to think of Platonism as a type of contemporary philosophy.  What I thought I would do here is to list the points of comparison I am thinking of when I make statements like this.

1.1  First, both Dharma traditions and Platonism are salvific.  That is to say that Dharma traditions are structured in such a way that the practice of those traditions are presented as leading to liberation, moksha, nirvana, and, in general, transcendence.  The different Dharma traditions describe the nature of salvation differently, but they are all directed towards salvific ends.

Platonism is similarly structured.  Platonism is presented as a path that will take us out of the cave of ignorance and delusion to the sunlit presence of eternity, of the Good and the One.  This is the promise of Platonism.  All of the discussions, analyses, allegories, and teachings are for the purpose of awakening to, or attaining, that transcendental understanding.

1.2  In both Platonism and Dharma traditions the idea of rebirth plays a major role.  In Plato’s dialogue Phaedo Plato presents multiple arguments for the immortality of the soul and for the reality of rebirth.  Plato also presents a mythic unfolding of the process of rebirth; it is very Platonic to present both a reasoned analysis and a mythic, or allegorical, understanding of a topic, and rebirth is an excellent example of this.

Because both Dharma traditions and Platonism have a deep understanding of rebirth these traditions tend to have a very long view of the journey of the soul to ultimacy, however that ultimacy is understood in each specific tradition.  This long duration perspective conflicts with modernist understanding of what it means to be a human being; the tendency is to think of a human being as having only a single life without consequences for future rebirth. 

In understanding Platonic ethics, both the virtues and the restraints, it is important to place these ethical commitments in the context of multiple births.  The idea is that work done on ethical commitments takes multiple births to come to fruition. 

1.3  I often like to say that Platonism is a wisdom tradition.  In a Platonic context wisdom means using the mind’s capacities, such as the mind’s capacity for differentiation, to assist in the journey to the Good and the One.  And this is similar to how wisdom is understood in Dharma traditions.  The point is that wisdom in these contexts refers to transcendent wisdom as opposed to wisdom about some topic such as being wise in the ways of woodworking, or wise in the ways of chemistry or music. 

1.4  I think of Platonism as a mystical tradition.  ‘Mystical’ in this context refers to experiences that take us beyond cognition, beyond name and form, beyond affirmation and negation.  This is accomplished through contemplation. 

The place of mystical practice in Dharma traditions varies among traditions.  But there appears to be an emphasis on mysticism, or traditions within an overall tradition, that emphasizes these kinds of experiences. 

Not everyone in a Dharma tradition is a mystic; most are not.  And that is also true for Platonists; most people who think of themselves as Platonists are not themselves mystics in the sense of mystical I am using.  But the point is that mystical experiences are a part of these traditions and recognized as significant.  These kinds of experiences are explicitly depicted in dialogues such as the Symposium where such experiences are depicted twice, and Phaedrus.  And they are discussed by other Platonists such as Maximus of Tyre, and especially Plotinus.

1.5  Contemplation is a big topic; there are many types of contemplation and even in a single Dharma tradition there are likely to be multiple methods of contemplation.  But for the purposes of this brief list I simply want to point out that contemplation, the practice of turning inward, is central to these traditions and a practitioner will at some point be expected to spend time on cultivating contemplation.

1.6  One thing that these Dharma traditions and Platonism share is what I like to call the ‘Ascetic Ideal.’  This means living a life of renunciation.  This means living a life where pursuing pleasure is not the guiding principle.  This is why traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism have an organized monastic structure that provides a context for the cultivation and practice of various ascetic practices.  The key dialogue in Platonism for the practice of the Ascetic Ideal is Phaedo where the philosophical life is explicitly depicted as a life of renunciation.  Comments on renunciation also appear in many other dialogues.

There is a contrast between Platonist asceticism and Dharma traditions’ asceticism.  Dharma traditions have a highly structured and written out program for the practice of the Ascetic Ideal.  For example, in Buddhism the practice of the Ascetic Ideal is contained in the Vinaya, which is six volumes of meticulous rules that govern all aspects of a practitioner’s life.  In Platonism no such documents have appeared in the tradition.  Instead there are scattered mentions of ascetic practices (asceses) and commitments in various dialogues.  The Platonist practitioner gleans these practices from his reading of the dialogues and then applies them to daily life as best he can.  This will vary depending on a particular person’s situation, but the overall direction is clear.  In my past, decades ago, I was a Buddhist Monk for about six years.  And when I first encountered Platonist asceticism I was disappointed that there wasn’t something like the Vinaya, or even something like the Rule of St. Benedict, that could function as a guide.  Gradually, though, I found the Platonist approach highly enriching because it places the burden of following the practices of the Ascetic Ideal on oneself.  It’s a bit like when a musician decides to make the practices of musicianship part of his life, or when an athlete decides to regularly practice exercises to refine his athletic skill.  In the same way a Platonist practitioner dedicated to the Ascetic Ideal makes a decision to incorporate these ascetic practices in his daily life.

1.7  Vegetarianism is another facet of Dharma traditions that is shared with Platonism.  Not all Dharma traditions are vegetarian, but some, like Jainism and Classical Yoga are and they have had an effect on Indian society at large.  Platonism has vegetarian commitments that a number of Platonist authors have focused on; the most famous is On Abstinence by Porphyry.

Vegetarianism in Dharma traditions and in Platonism isn’t advocated for reasons of health or for the idea of animal rights (although Plutarch’s writings on this topic come close to that perspective).  Instead, vegetarianism is considered to be a basic practice of purification and that a vegetarian life helps to align the soul with the transcendental.  In other words, vegetarianism is a foundational spiritual practice for these traditions.

1.8  The final item I will mention is that in Dharma traditions and in Platonism their respective traditions are considered to be a way of life.  This contrasts with contemporary philosophy where there is no sense of a commitment to manifest philosophy in one’s everyday life.  In fact that idea is considered strange by contemporary philosophers, but it was the norm in the Classical period.  Pierre Hadot has left us several books that illuminate Classical Philosophy as a way of life.

I see this way of life as defined by commitments to ethical restraints.  In Dharma traditions these are basic precepts, usually five in number, that a person will commit themselves to, usually in a ceremonial context, and that align the individual with the ethical practices and heritage of the spiritual community they are joining.  In Platonism, as I previously mentioned, these ethical restraints are mentioned in various dialogues and the dedicated Platonism has to take on the practice of these restraints; this is done by reading these passages as instruction rather than just interesting data or information.

1.9  I have avoided comparing things like metaphysics and cosmology, as well as views on causation, because, as interesting as these topics are, the truth is the traditions have major differences at this level.  I don’t regard that as a problem, in fact I think that it is a good thing that there are these differences.  The similarities between Dharma traditions and to Platonism exist at a more foundational level of everyday practice; that is where one can observe their commonalities and benefit from comparisons.

2.  An Irish Scholar

Deirdre Carabine is an Irish scholar who has specialized primarily in Duns Scotus Eriugena and Plotinus.  She was born in 1956 in Belfast, Northern Ireland.  In some ways Irish scholarship is a bit hidden from the U.S.  I mean that there often seems to be a delay between the publication of Irish scholarly works and when they are available in the U.S.  Two examples are a translation of the Periphyseon by Eriugena which took a long time to reach the U.S.; I think it became available just a year or two ago.  Another example is David Horan’s new translation of the Dialogues of Plato which is similarly taking its time to reach the U.S. 

There are a small number of videos on YouTube that feature Carabine and I find them worth watching.  In one video she briefly talks about her scholarly career which began with work on Eriugena and then moved to Platonism.  She offered that she didn’t find Plato to be personally inspiring and the Middle Platonists had a similarly tepid response from her.  Then she found Plotinus and she says that she ‘fell in love with Plotinus’ and she still feels that way.  Her voice and posture changed when she brought up Plotinus.

Carabine mentions that some of what she regards as important work she has authored is placed in anthologies gathered by scholarly publishers.  She openly expresses irritation at how expensive some of these volumes are because she would like her work to be more accessible.  This is an ongoing problem in academia that I have mentioned more than once; Carabine is a rare case of a scholar who expresses irritation at this system.

She published a book called The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena which has received a lot of attention and praise from those interested in this topic; people like A. H. Armstrong.  I have not read it yet myself, but I hope to do so in 2027.  Eriugena is one of my favorite early Medieval authors; he translated the Mystical Theology by Dionysius the Areopagite into Latin.  Eriugena was also Irish and it is surprising how significant the contribution of Irish scholars has been down through the centuries.

I just posted this to express my appreciation of her work and dedication.  When she retired she moved to Uganda; that was about 20 years ago.  She works, teaches, and studies there to this day.

3.  Cynicism

I have noticed on YouTube that young philosophers with academic credentials often have a very cynical way of talking about philosophy that seems to be distinctive; at least I don’t recall seeing it before.  I mean that I frequently run into presentations that are sarcastic, dismissive, flippant, and accompanied by copious eye-rolls and sighs and painful laughter pointed at the philosopher in question.  This is not good-natured laughter; it is meant to depict the YouTuber as above, and smarter than, the philosopher they are talking about.

It’s not universal among young philosophers; there are exceptions.  Because of this I wasn’t sure I was observing an actual, distinctive, approach.  So I asked AI if what I was observing was actually there or if I was exaggerating in my own mind.  AI responded that this characteristic way of presenting philosophy, and particular philosophers, has been commented on by numerous people and that no, I wasn’t exaggerating.

AI suggested that one of the reasons for this kind of cynical presentation is that YouTube as a platform encourages ‘performance’ in the sense that being sarcastic and dismissive is something that viewers will remember and perhaps lead them to return to the channel.  The performance aspect of YouTube isn’t something I had considered.  But I wonder if the performance aspect was also present when professors were giving lectures in classes?  Perhaps the face to face aspect of a classroom differs from the video presentations on YouTube where you can say something flippant or dismissive and there are no audience responses to give you feedback on how that lands.  I’m not sure.

At another level, AI suggested that younger academic philosophers have likely absorbed the pervasive modernist assumption that the past has no value and is significant only in the sense that we advanced moderns need to overcome it.  If this view is absorbed from their own professors it makes sense that they would openly display contempt for ancient teachings.

What has struck me in watching these YouTube presentations is that lack of generosity.  In everyday life it is common that friends will not always agree; you may even have a friend that on one or two issues has very eccentric views.  But you learn to live with it because the benefits of the friendship are real and worth cultivating.  But that kind of generosity, or spaciousness, is simply lacking among the group I am referring to.

If you approach a philosopher with an obsessively critical mind you will find things, even embarrassing things, that don’t align with your own views.  It is inevitable.  It is also not a problem unless you are a committed ideologue or a rigid perfectionist. 

As I mentioned, this is not universal; there are young academic philosophers who are much more relaxed about flaws in the writings of philosophers.  But I have noticed something that I think is interesting in this context; and that is that it seems to me to be often the case that young philosophers who are more relaxed end up leaving the university and often they talk about this openly.  They have various reasons; some are practical like needing to earn a living.  But others refer to the overly critical and dismissive atmosphere of university departments of philosophy is difficult to deal with over an extended period of time.  I have seen similar presentations from people who have left literature departments. 

The word philosophy means love of wisdom.  When you love someone you still recognize their flaws, but you continue with the relationship.  And if you love wisdom you accept that the imperfections of being human will be there even in the midst of sublime philosophical works.

4.  Aphorisms

“I’m getting older too.”  (Fleetwood Mac, Landslide)

Platonism isn’t about domination.

“. . . the hierarchy of Platonic thinking is a qualitative hierarchy, a hierarchy of value, with the absolute ruling principle being the Good.”  (Peter Kreeft, The Platonic Tradition, page 21)

The path to the Good and the One can be lit by moonlight, by the sun, by starlight, by a single candle, or by a luminous recollection.

“Aphele panta.”  (Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 ("Take away everything." A. H. Armstrong translation))

Not everyone will attain union with the Good and the One.

Without a doubt, vegetarianism is an aid to spiritual practice.  (Eric Clausen, Ascesis: The Handbook of Platonic Practice, page 57)

An immoral act done by an individual does not become moral when done by a group.

“Modern modes of thought seem somehow to incline one toward vice, and thus toward a wretched existence.”  (Mark Anderson, Pure, page 73.)

“Although in modern times the teaching of the divine Plato has, unfortunately, been presented as just ‘philosophy’ in the modern sense of the term as just thinking about things, it is, in fact, a spiritual and soteriological system more akin to the Indian systems and the Greek systems of Orphism and Pythagoreanism.”  (Eric Fallick, Platonist Contemplative Asceticism, page 35.)

Words are a river.

Dreams are as real as the waking world.

Platonism distinguishes between hierarchical dependencies with the Good and the One as the only reality which has no prior source.

The Good and the One have no boundary (apeiron).

 

  

19 October 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics 110

19 October 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics 110

1.  Gerson’s New Book

Readers here might like to know that Lloyd Gerson is publishing a new book scheduled for release next month, November 2026.  The title is Unearthing Platonism and according to the Amazon writeup the new book focuses on Platonism as a tradition with a particular view and understanding of the world.  The writeup says that the collection of essays approaches this idea both from historical and theoretical views.

This is a perspective that Gerson has focused on for a long time.  The dominant view in academia today is fragmented, but it tends to reject that Plato and Platonism are an actual ‘system’, meaning that there is a recognizable and consistent perspective that Platonism has held during the many centuries of Platonism’s existence.  This is consistent with the perspective advanced on this blog.  Although Gerson is not the only contemporary scholar to think of Platonism in this way, he seems to be the most prominent at this time.

I think that one of the reasons why many academics at this time reject the idea of a Platonist ‘system’, a consistent set of concerns and responses to those concerns over many centuries, is that the impact of philosophers such as Spinoza has shaped how modern philosophers understand what ‘systematic’ means.  In addition, analytic philosophy has emphasized a methodologically strict approach to what systematic means.  In modern philosophical parlance ‘systematic’ means something like generating a deductive, inferential, logically coherent, structure in the manner of a philosopher like Spinoza or Proclus (Euclid’s Elements consistently hover in the background of this discussion.)  Plato doesn’t write that way; neither does Plotinus.  The core views of Platonism are not presented as axiomatic premises from which other propositions (which can then be analyzed) are drawn.  Rather, Plato presented his views in multiple ways and in differing contexts such as the interlocutors in a specific dialogue.  Plato will present his views on transcendence, for example, using allegory, symbol, as well as discursive modes.

The ‘systematic’ nature of Plato’s writings is more like the systematic nature of a symphony than it resembles Euclid’s approach.  I’m not objecting to philosophers like Proclus and Spinoza who want to use a Euclidean approach to philosophizing; I’m suggesting that this approach is not what is typical of the Platonic tradition as a whole, nor of Plato in particular.

Gerson is my favorite contemporary scholar of Buddhism and I look forward to reading his new collection.

2.  The Dialogues of Plato as a Single Book

I may have mentioned in a previous post that I approach the Dialogues of Plato as if the collection is a single book.  I think of the individual dialogues as chapters of the book.  On a practical level this means that I consider cross-referencing dialogues when discussing a point focused in one dialogue is a legitimate procedure because the dialogues aren’t standalones.

As I was thinking about this the other day it came to mind that there is a classic of Japanese literature that is similar to the Dialogues; that is The Tale of Genji by Murasaki Shikibu.  Each chapter of Genji is a complete scene and as you go from chapter to chapter you may move in time from a few days to a few years.  Sometimes a character who has appeared in an early chapter reappears in a much later chapter which I think is similar to the way a topic appears in one of the dialogues and then can reappear much later. 

There is another similarity and that is the setting in both collections is meaningful.  In Genji the setting almost becomes a character in each chapter.  The setting of the specific dialogues also impacts how the meaning of the dialogue is communicated to the reader.  Think of the setting of the Symposium.  And in both collections settings that appear in one chapter or dialogue can reappear in the further chapters or dialogues.  Think of how the setting for Phaedrus is replicated, not completely but recognizably, in Plato’s Laws.  Both dialogues occur outside the city.  Both are involved with sacred precincts which are a part of the landscapes.  Both dialogues occur in the summer heat.  This links the dialogues together and offers a basis of unity between them.  I’m not saying that the primary focus is identical, but that they are related.

There are other noteworthy similarities such as scholars having debates about authenticity; this happens for various chapters of Genji and for various dialogues of Plato. 

I don’t want to stretch this too far.  Genji is a novel, a narrative with a huge cast of characters.  The Dialogues of Plato are inquiries into ultimate nature.  Still there are structural similarities that I think are illuminating.

3.  Aphorisms

Philosophical traditions can be more intelligent than any individual philosopher.     (ChatGPT)

To be at once exceedingly wealthy and good is impossible.  (Plato, Laws, 742e, A. E. Taylor translation)

With a few exceptions, the gods are not wise.

To perceive the soul is to perceive eternity.

The eros of silence.

The colors of a sunset sky do not clash.

In some ways Platonism is systematic but it’s not systematic in the way that Euclid or Proclus or Spinoza are systematic.

Vegetarianism (and Veganism) are foundational for the practice of Platonism.

The body vanishes.

At times living a Platonist life resembles rowing upstream against a strong and swift current.

Reading The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius resembles praying.

White lily.

 

12 October 2026

12 October 2026

1.  Plato on the Soul in Books V and X of the Laws

I have noticed that Plato wrote a great deal about the soul in his last dialogue, Laws.  Here I’d like to comment on what Plato says in Books V and X because I think what each Book says illuminates what the other has to say.

Book V of Laws is a long speech by the Athenian Stranger with Cleinias having only a single sentence at the conclusion of the dialogue.  The speech begins with the Athenian Stranger referring to the singular importance of the soul:

“Athenian:  Of all a person’s own belongings, you see, the most divine after the gods is his soul, since it is most his own.  And everything that belongs to a person invariably falls into two classes.  One lot, stronger and better, does the mastering, while the other lot, weaker and worse, are slaves.  And so, he must always prefer his master possessions to his slave ones.  So, when I say that in second place after the gods, who are our masters, and the beings that follow them [footnote: daimons and heroes], one must honor one’s soul, my prescription is correct.  But practically none of us confers honor correctly, though we believe we do.  For honor is, I take it, a divine good, and no evil thing can confer honor.  The person who thinks that he is honoring his soul with words, gifts, or by indulging it in certain ways, yet fails to change it from worse to better, believes he is honoring it, but in fact this is not what he is doing at all.

“For example, every boy, as soon as he becomes a man, regards himself as capable of judging everything, thinks he is honoring his soul by praising it, and eagerly tells it to do what it wishes.  But what is now being said is that by doing these things he harms rather than honors it, whereas we say that it must be honored second after the gods.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 2022, page 134, 726a-727b, ISBN: 9781647920463)

1.1  Notice how the soul is depicted as having at least two facets: a facet, or function, ‘does the mastering’ while the other facet is ‘weaker and worse’ and ‘are slaves.’  This will be unpacked in more detail in Book X.

1.2  The quote then notes that, in general (‘none of us’) honors the soul correctly and an example of that incorrectness is given; a young man who is overconfident in his judgments about his soul, and about soul in general.

1.3  Notice how in this quote the soul is depicted as malleable.  The soul can be harmed.  The soul can become worse or better.  In think the implication of this is that it is important to understand the nature of the soul, to cultivate the soul so that the soul is improved rather than harmed, but most people lack such knowledge.  In the context of the Laws this situation is seen as a primary purpose of legislation, to create a social, or political, situation that benefits the soul rather than harming the soul.  Book V is a bridge between the topics of the first four books and the books following Book V that deal with specific legislation and part of the purpose of this quote is to emphasize that legislation needs to serve the cultivation of the soul.

1.4  In Book X the full complexity of the soul is presented in remarkable detail which helps us to understand why the soul can become ‘stronger and better’ or ‘weaker and worse.’  I am going to simply list the many aspects, functions, or ‘motions’ of the soul that Plato lists; the whole passage is worth reading (in the C. D. C. Reeve translation you can find it on pages 333-335, 896b-897b).  But for the purposes of this post listing the aspects or ‘motions’ of the soul is sufficient to highlight the complexity of the soul and why people need to cultivate a deep understanding and awareness of soul. 

The first group of functions or motions lists temperaments, character types, wishes, rational calculation, true beliefs, sorts of supervision, and memories (different translations use different English words for the items in these lists.)

The second group states that the soul is the cause of good things and bad, fine things and shameful, just things and unjust ones, and of all the opposites.

The third group has the largest number of items which in this case I will quote, “So soul leads [is prior to] all things in the heavens, earth, and sea by its own movements, which are named ‘wishing,’ ‘investigating,’ ‘supervising,’ ‘deliberating,’ ‘believing correctly and falsely,’ ‘being pleased,’ ‘being pained,’ ‘being confident,’ ‘being afraid,’ ‘hating,’ and ‘loving,’ and by all the related or primary-working movements which, taking over, in turn the secondary movements of bodies, lead all things to increase and decrease, disaggregation and aggregation, and to what follows on these, namely, heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hard and soft, white and black, bitter and sweet .“ (Ibid, pages 334-335)

1.4.1  The Platonic soul is dynamic, in the sense that the movements of the soul generate the items on these lists.  Plato also includes ‘secondary movements’ which occur as movements that result from one of the primary movements of the soul (this is found in the third group or list).  This division into primary and secondary movements happens because the soul is a kind of unmoved mover, meaning that the soul generates movement but is itself not moved in the process of that generation.  The secondary movements are movements that occur due to something that generates movement but does not itself move which is the soul.  The soul is not in motion, but generates motion; these generated motions in turn generate secondary motions.

1.4.2  The items are numerous and cover a lot of topics, or experiences.  I think this is a primary example of just how complex the Platonic soul is, which, in turn, helps us to understand the extent, even grandeur, of the task of reforming, or purifying, the soul is.

1.4.3  Many of the items on these lists are what we today would call psychological states such as confidence, hating, loving, believing, fear, and so forth.  From a modern perspective one might think of the purification of these ‘motions of the soul’ to be a kind of therapy; though I am not aware of a therapeutic modality that uses the Platonic understanding of the soul as its foundation.

1.4.4  Some of the items are emotions and some of the items are functions.  Hating and being pleased would seem to be examples of emotions.  Calculation and deliberating seem to me to be aspects of reasoning and therefore what I would call functions.

1.4.5  This passage also says that ‘soul leads all things in the heavens, earth, and sea’ and that soul ‘manages the universe.’  This is a metaphysical statement.  It means that soul is necessary for all these movements to appear; but this relationship is not reciprocal.  I mean that the items on the list are not necessary for the appearance of soul but the existence of the soul is necessary for the appearance of the items on these lists.  The relationship between soul and these items is, therefore, hierarchical.

1.4.6  Given the complexity, when taken together, of the items on this list, it is not surprising that people have difficulty relating to the soul and reforming, or purifying the soul.  When the opening quote refers to a young man overestimating his own understanding of the soul it is not difficult to understand why this happens.  For example, if a young man focuses on one of the functions, or movements, on these lists, such as deliberating or believing falsely, this can be felt as a genuine achievement, and in a way it is.  Unaware of the vastness of the topics, aspects, and movements of the soul the young man becomes overconfident and it seems to me that this is quite natural.  This is a place where elders with more experience can be very helpful.

1.5  As I just mentioned, many of the items on these lists can be understood as psychological occurrences or tendencies or possibilities.  Some of them are ethical such as good and bad things, just and unjust things.  Some of them are analytical such as calculation and deliberation.  But I think what all the items on these lists have in common is that they are differentiations.  In the Platonic sense they are differentiated ‘movements.’  None of them are movement as such, but they are derived from movement and then distinguished from each other.  In a more contemporary way of looking at it, all the items are differentiated mental states, or mental inclinations, but they all have to do with mind, or what Plotinus would call nous. 

I’m not saying that all the items on these lists are Platonic forms; I am suggesting that the items are differentiations of a higher reality.  It is differentiation itself that I am focusing on; all these items emerge from differentiating a higher reality into various manifestations in the material world, the way a crystal differentiates white light into many colors.

1.6  There is an item, or topic, that does not appear on this list and that item is continuity or unity.  (As an aside, I think Plato does refer to the unity of the soul, at least obliquely, in Phaedo, but I still think the absence of unity or continuity on these lists is noteworthy.)  Perhaps this absence is noteworthy for me because of my Buddhist background.  The experience of an underlying continuity, a ‘feeling’ that is not a sensation, of a ground of unity, in contemplation was one of the things that drew me to the world of Platonism as opposed to the world of Buddhism.

In Buddhism, particularly in Buddhist psychology such as found in Abhidhamma, moments of feelings and mental formations are said to arise due to causal interactions and then to disperse soon after arising.  In Buddhist psychology there is no underlying unity from which these formations emerge and this is part of what the Buddhist traditions mean by ‘no-self’, ‘no-soul’, or ‘anatman.’  But I was unable to dismiss my own contemplative experiences of exactly that kind of ‘ground,’ experienced as a kind of light, or inner light.

But this inner light, this transcendental source, is not an arising phenomenon; it is presence we become aware of.  I began to speak of it as ‘the presence of eternity.’  And after a long period of study, I began to think of it this way: the soul is the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.

1.6.1  After living with this understanding for a long time I began to think of the unity of the soul as the presence of the One, the pure unity of the transcendental, as the nature of the soul, as what the soul actually is, and worked with the idea that any additional functions, aspects, or movements should be understood as movements of the Mind rather than movements of the soul.  I am aware that this reconfigures what Plato says, quoted above.  And, yes, I do find that a bit intimidating.  On the other hand, I think this kind of reconfiguration does not disfigure the Platonic tradition in the sense that all the movements named in the above quotes remain and I think as a structure it has some consequences that are beneficial.

1.6.1.1  The first consequence is that the soul becomes much simpler.  As the presence of eternity, the presence of the One, the presence of Unity as such, this simplified soul grounds the experience of personal unity as well as the unity we perceive in others.  I don’t think that is a small thing.  What I am getting at, is that without the presence of the One there would not be any individuals, or any things, at all.

1.6.1.2  A second consequence is that the mind becomes more complex, but does not change its essential nature.  I think of differentiation, making distinctions, as the primary function of the mind.  These distinctions range from very basic (like the difference between a boulder and a truck) to very subtle (like distinguishing aspects of being).  I think of the topics quoted above as differentiations and for that reason I think of those topics, the items on the lists, as mind-based rather than soul-based.

1.6.1.3  A third consequence is that this reconfiguration (placing these topics in Mind and understanding soul as the presence of the One within the individual) offers an alternative to a debate, sometimes a rancorous one, that has been going on within the Platonic tradition for many centuries.  I am referring to the debate about whether the soul is ‘fully descended’ or ‘partially descended.’  This debate goes back to the third century C.E.  Plotinus understood the soul to have higher and lower parts, which is consistent with Plato’s presentation.  Plotinus thought of the higher part of the soul as remaining in higher realities such as nous, the noetic realm, while the lower part, or parts, of the soul remain in the material world.  This view was rejected by Iamblichus and Proclus, and others, who regarded the soul as fully descended. 

From the perspective of the reconfigured soul as the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual, the presence of pure Unity in the individual, the soul is understood to not descend at all.  This is because the soul as eternity has no boundaries.  And because the soul is immaterial it does not move from here to there (from the noetic to the material, for example). 

The appearance of individual souls, which seems to be an example of material multiplicity or fragmentation, is a misunderstanding of our perception and understanding (a misunderstanding of body and mind).  Individual souls resemble moonlight shining in many bodies of water, many lakes, many ponds, many streams.  Each appearance of moonlight in a pond seems separate from moonlight in other ponds; but they are not separate.  Similarly, the light of the soul appears in the material individual and appears to be distinct from other souls; but that is a mistake of our perception and understanding which is under the reign of time in the third, material, hypostasis.  The light of the One, the light of the soul, is everywhere (because it is immaterial), everywhen (because it is transcendental), and everything because without the presence of the One things would not appear at all.

1.6.1.4  I am not sure if all soul-related items can be securely moved to Mind.  This reconfiguration is new for me and I am still exploring it.  One item that I hesitate over is love.  When I think of love as a function of grace I tend to think of love as a function, or aspect, of the soul as the presence of eternity.  But people mean very different things by love, including purely material and sensory understandings.  Perhaps what is needed is greater precision in using the word ‘love’ or an expanded vocabulary for the many meanings we currently have of love.

1.7  If we simplify the soul by placing all these ‘motions’ in Mind rather than Soul, what remains?  I mean how would we describe this presence of eternity, this presence of the One in the ephemeral individual?  Looking at the soul as this kind of presence the soul is understood as our refuge and rest.  It is the source and presence of peace.  It is unchanging because it is pure unity.  It is motionless and therefore cannot be cultivated or become better or worse because eternity cannot become better or worse.  It is timeless without any before or after.  It has no qualities.  It is stillness and silence.  It is the light that we discover within when all motions and mental formations, all affirmations and negations, all desires, are calmed.  It is sublime.

1.8  This reconfiguration of Mind and Soul and how they are understood impacts the way the hypostases, levels of metaphysical reality, are understood and how they relate to each other.  Or perhaps you could say that this reconfiguration of Mind and Soul rest on a reconfiguration of the three hypostases; it is difficult for me to know which came first. 

In traditional Platonism the three hypostases are the Good and the One, which overflows into the second hypostases which is nous (also known as intellect or mind) which is the realm of eternal Platonic Forms.  Nous is where differentiation first appears; the Good and the One have no differentiation as they are pure unity.  Nous gives rise to soul which then, through the motions of the soul as described by Plato in the quotes above, generates material existence.

In the reconfiguration I have suggested the first hypostasis is the Good and the One (pure unity) which overflows into the second hypostasis, the realm of eternal Platonic Forms.  The overflowing of undifferentiated reality known as the Good and the One to differentiated eternal realities in nous is followed by the continued overflowing of differentiation into time; time gives rise to the material realm.  Time is post-noetic differentiation. 

The three reconfigured hypostases are present in living individuals.  The Good and the One are Soul in the temporal individual.  The Noetic is present as Mind in the temporal individual and as the function of differentiation.  And Time is present as the body of the individual. This links the metaphysics of the hypostases to the architecture of human existence (and likely all living existences).  In this way our individual existence can be seen, or understood, as a microcosmos of metaphysical reality.

This is a bit complicated, but I don’t think the reconfiguration is any more complicated than traditional Platonic metaphysics and cosmology. 

1.9  I am not claiming that this reconfiguration is superior to Plato’s; I don’t think of myself as ‘correcting’ Plato.  Rather, I think of this reconfiguration as another way of looking at the hypostases, or levels of metaphysical reality.  I’m not committed to metaphysical finality; by that I mean that I’m not committed to the idea that it is the job of metaphysics to offer a system of understanding that will never be altered or stand next to, or hold its own in contrast to, another interpretation.  I think of different interpretations of Platonic metaphysics as similar to variations on a theme; the variations are recognizably related, but they have differences that are meaningful, and no one variation is final and exhaustive.  Or you can think of these different presentations as petals on a rose.  What I look for is coherence and clarity and spaciousness and I believe that this reconfiguration has those qualities.  Time will tell.

2.  Aphorisms

The sound of a sunrise is the sound of eternity.

The teachings of Platonism are hidden in plain view.

The desert clouds vanish after the rain.

Most people have no interest in living a spiritual life; that’s not a bad thing.

Desert rabbits are very well camouflaged; like the presence of eternity.

The contractor builds a house from a blueprint.

The baker tries a new recipe he received from the mother of a friend.

A boulder and a palm tree discuss the nature of eternity and time.

After the last star vanishes, eternity abides.

An old monk copies the Enneads of Plotinus by hand.