Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 113

2026 November 9

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 113

1.  Thinking about a Plotinus Society

There are a number of Societies and Associations in the U.S. and the anglosphere that are dedicated to a particular philosopher or philosophical moement.  There is one for William James, one for Immanuel Kant, and so forth.  As I mentioned last week, I’ve been thinking of myself as a ‘Plotinian’ and following up on that I tentatively thought it would be a good idea to have a Plotinus Society, or the American Plotinus Society, or something like that.  It would be devoted to the study and practice of Plotinus’s philosophy and way of life. 

I would like to see a Plotinus society because I think Plotinus deserves that kind of focus.  There is at this time an International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, but, leaving aside their troublesome use of the word ‘Neoplatonic’, the Society covers too wide a range of topics to have the understanding of Plotinus take center stage.  I’d like to see Plotinus taken on his own terms rather than as part of a group that advocates for very different understandings of metaphysics, ethics, purification, and the nature of the philosophical ascent to the Good and the One.

A Plotinus Society would have the space to focus on what Plotinus means by contemplation, his understanding of purification, his view of the soul, and his view of mystical union with the Good and the One.  Personally, I think the Enneads of Plotinus are unsurpassed as spiritual literature and deserve their own home.

2.  Aetius

I recently became aware of a work of philosophy by the author Aetius.  He wrote a book called ‘Placita’ which refers to a collection of views held by various philosophers at the time Aetius was writing. Placita was a genre of writing at that time.  Nothing is known about Aetius.  The collection is dated to the late first or early second century C.E., based on internal evidence such as the philosophers that are referred to.

The original work has been lost.  But scholars have reconstructed more than 80% of the work; they base this 80% estimate on the structure of the book which has numbered sections and items.  Long quotes from Aetius appear in several late classical writers and scholars and there are some Arabic sources as well.  Scholars have pieced together these quotations and come up with a nearly complete collection.  (As an aside, this is the kind of thing that leads me to admire the scholarly community.  Such work requires a great deal of study and training and a very focused mind.  I find it admirable and I am very grateful for the scholars who have done this kind of work.)

There are five sections: First Principles, Cosmology, Meteorology and the Earth, Psychology, and Physiology.  Each of these five sections is then divided into multiple topics.  Under each topic are pithy summaries of various philosophers.  Most of these summaries are brief, but a few run to a full page or more.  Here is an example from Section 4, Psychology, Topic 4, On the parts of the soul:

"4.4 On the Parts of the soul

1.     Pythagoras and Plato according to their most general definition say that the soul is        bipartite, for it has a rational part on the one hand and an irrational on the other.  But            according to what is proximate and precise it is tripartite, for they divide the irrational            into the spirited and the concupiscible

2.     Xenocrates says that one part of the soul is perceiving, and the other rational.

3.     Aristotle said there are five activities of soul, the appetitive, the nurturing, the perceiving, the locomotive, the cogitating.

4.     The Stoics say the soul consists of eight parts: five perceiving parts, viz. seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching; as sixth the speaking part; as seventh the seminal part; as eighth the regent part itself, from which all these other parts are extended through their own organs, similarly to the tentacles of an octopus.

5.     Apollophanes (says that the soul consists of nine parts).

6.     The successors of Pythagoras, positing that the body is a blend of five elements – for to the four they added the ethereal element – said the powers of the soul too are in respect of this division equal in number, and these they called intelligence and understanding and knowledge and opinion and sensation."

(Aetius, Placita, translated by Jaap Mansfeld and David T. Runia, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2023, pages 329-331, ISBN: 9780674997592)

Some topics have more items; for example, the previous item, Whether the soul is a body and what its substance is, has eleven summaries and some of those summaries contain multiple, maybe three to five, philosophers who share a common view.  And some topics have fewer items and summaries.

What I like about Placita is that it offers the reader a summary overview of the various views on various topics that is easy to access and the collection benefits from being closer to the sources by many centuries than we are today.  I quoted the topic about the parts of the soul because I have become very interested and focused on the complexity of the soul in the Platonic tradition and how that complexity carries through many centuries.  What I find interesting in the above quote is that it seems that the complexity of the soul was a very widespread understanding, though the degree of the complexity varies.  This allows me to understand that the complexity of the soul in Platonism wasn’t an outlier or something unique to the Platonic tradition.

I don’t exactly know how the book was used.  But I can imagine it being something a teacher might use to track down a reference when asked a question about a specific topic.  It has the feeling of a catalog or an appendix. 

Plato is frequently presented on the various topics and because of this it is possible to learn what some people in the late first or early second century understood to be Platonic views; and at the same time the reader can contrast those with those of others.  There are also references to early Platonists such as Xenocrates, as in the quote above.  Because of the structure of the book, you can look up specific topics, turn to that topic, and then find out what people considered to be the Platonic interpretation, along with the interpretations of others.  I find the organization of the book to be remarkably well constructed.  For those interested in Platonism at that time I think this is very helpful.

3. Starting Points

One way of looking at Platonism, or any spiritual or philosophical tradition is by determining the starting point of that tradition.  By ‘starting point’ I mean something like a First Principle, a basic statement that functions like the foundation of a building.  Sometimes that is easy to determine because a tradition might be explicit about stating their starting point, or their first principle.  ‘Jesus is Lord’ is a good example from the Christian tradition.  In Buddhism the First Noble Truth is that life is suffering which functions as the starting point out of which other insights and practices grow.  In Platonism there is the view that the first principle is the Good and the One.  Starting Points don’t necessarily make things simple because different members of the tradition may interpret the starting point, or first principle, differently.  But having such a starting point simplifies discussions about the tradition by clearly articulating its foundation and by distinguishing a tradition from another tradition that has a different starting point.

It seems to me that starting points, or first principles, are most often metaphysical in nature.  But they can also be ethical in nature.  For example, in the Jain tradition non-harming, or Ahimsa, is the starting point.  Non-harming is an ethical commitment rather than a metaphysical statement regarding the nature of existence.  In Jainism all the other insights and practices flow from the ethical principle of non-harming/Ahimsa.

And here I’d like to raise the question regarding Platonism whether its first principle, or starting point, is metaphysical or ethical.  (I recognize that the separation of ethics and metaphysics has its own problems; but for the purposes of this post, I’m going to treat them as different in that an ethical starting point does not, in itself, determine a metaphysical position, and vice versa.  I mean that individuals can be committed to non-harming and at the same time adhere to different metaphysical commitments.  For example, both Jainism and Classical Yoga are committed to Non-harming/Ahimsa, but they have different metaphysical views.)

When I ask this question, I am contrasting in my own mind the idea that the Good and the One are the first principle of Platonism in contrast to asserting that non-harming, or justice (which Plato equates with non-harming) is the first principle.  I think the norm is to assert that the Good and the One is the First Principle and the starting point for Platonism.  This partially explains why the teachings on non-harming found in Platonism are not treated as extensively as the metaphysics of Platonism.

In the history of Platonism, the Platonist who comes closest, it seems to me, to viewing non-harming as the, or a, first principle is Porphyry, particularly in his work On Abstinence.  But one can also see this stance in Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo.  I don’t mean that Porphyry explicitly states that non-harming is the first principle of Platonism.  He doesn’t do that.  But what I am suggesting is that it makes sense to interpret a work like On Abstinence as functionally equivalent to regarding non-harming as the first principle of Platonism, as Platonism’s starting point.  I say this because Porphyry links the focus of that work, vegetarianism, to contemplation, to the nature of soul, to purification, and many other topics which is typical of how a first principle works; kind of like an axiom in geometry.  (For those interested in Porphyry’s perspective I recommend Book III, paragraphs 26 and 27 of On Abstinence which are found on pages 97 and 98 in the translation by Gillian Clark.)

Scholars don’t see On Abstinence in this way, as an elaboration of non-harming as a first principle; on the other hand, scholars tend to have come to the conclusion that the Good and the One is the first principle, so they wouldn’t be looking for another candidate.  (As an aside, I understand why people, many people, regard the Good and the One as the first principle of Platonism; there is a lot of writing that is consistent with that presentation that can be found in early sources such as Plato and Aristotle and so forth over many centuries.  I’m not dismissing that out of hand.  In a way I’m offering the idea that non-harming is the first principle of Platonism as a kind of thought experiment to see where it would lead; perhaps viewing non-harming as the first principle of Platonism will clarify some issues or bring certain insights forward that we have not observed clearly in the past.  That’s my hope, but we shall see.)

If non-harming is the first principle, the ultimate starting point, of Platonism how would that impact the place that the Good and the One hold?  I suspect that if we take non-harming as the first principle then the Good and the One, along with the metaphysical cosmology of Platonism, become inferences (broadly speaking) from the axiom, or starting point, or first principle of non-harming.  In other words, the Good and the One, as understandings, are subsequent to the intuition, the insight, the primal source of non-harming. 

I think there exist good textual reasons for looking at non-harming this way in a Platonist context; particular in the dialogue Crito.  This dialogue depicts Socrates as so committed to non-harming that he is willing to die rather than forgoing its teaching.  And in several dialogues, it is stated that it is better to suffer an injustice/harm than it is to commit an injustice, even in retaliation.  This kind of writing is powerful and can be understood as saying that the ethical commitment of non-harming is the primary teaching, the starting point, of Platonic teachings.

4. Aphorisms --

The geraniums of time.

There is something a bit humorous in writing about eternity using an aphorism.

You cannot use the same word twice.

In the philosophical ascent some things become clearer and at the same time other things become more mysterious.

All nations are unstable.

Grace is the atmospheric condition that allows philosophy to happen.

Philosophical analysis is not an end in itself.

Poetry is a craft like baking bread or sewing quilts.

In my old age I find that I am content and I think that is due to decades of spiritual practice.

The gods are not immortal.

I’m probably in the minority on this point; but I don’t regard a human birth as particularly auspicious in terms of spiritual development, understanding, and realization.

There is a place, or, better, a presence, that I have come to call the ‘grotto of eternity.’

 

 

 

 

2 November 2026

2 November 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 112

1.  Love and Grace in Plotinus: 1

For a long time, I have thought of grace as having a significant place in the Platonic tradition.  Grace is not often mentioned in discussions of Platonism and I think one of the reasons is that it is not overtly mentioned in important Platonic works very often.  A second reason is that I think the strong association of grace with Christianity means that secular scholars tend to interpret Platonic grace in Christian terms and while this makes historical sense, it is, I think, a barrier to accessing how grace functions in the Platonic tradition.

There are, however, a few places where Plotinus writes about grace, and there are a few scholars who have examined what Plotinus has to say.  Pierre Hadot wrote a short book about Plotinus called Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision and in that book Hadot briefly talks about Plotinus’s understanding of grace and love.  Here is a quote from Hadot’s book:

“For Plotinus, if things were nothing other than what they are, in their nature, essence and structure, they would not be lovable.  In other words, love is always superior to its object, however lofty the latter may be.  Its object can never explain or justify it.  There is in love a ‘something more,’ something unjustified; and that which, in objects, corresponds to this ‘something more’ is grace, or Life in its deepest mystery.  Forms and structures can be justified, but life and grace cannot.  They are ‘something more,’ and this gratuitous surplus is everything.  In it, Plotinus recognizes ‘the trace of the Good’: ‘Each form, taken by itself, is [only] what it is; but it becomes desirable once the Good diffuses the color of its light over it . . . awakening love in those who desire it’ (VI 7, 22, 5-7).

“What Plotinus calls the Good is thus, at the same time, that which, by bestowing grace, gives rise to love, and that which, by awakening love, causes grace to appear.  The Good is what all things desire; it is what is desirable in an absolute sense.  We asserted that love and grace are unjustified; likewise, the Good itself is absolutely unjustified.  It is not random or accidental, but by willing itself and being what it wants to be, it freely creates the love that beings feel for it, as well as the grace they receive from it.  All these formulations are, in any case, unable to translate what the soul knows of the Good when it goes through the experience of love.”

(Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, translated by Michael Chase, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pages 50 and 51, ISBN: 9780226311944)

1.1  Hadot refers to ‘something more’ in the things of this world.  I think that is an excellent way of looking at how Platonism, and Platonist practitioners, stand in the world.  Platonism is focused on this ‘something more.’  This is one of the primary differences between naturalism and Platonism; in naturalism, or materialism, things are thought of as being sufficiently, and completely, depicted by their natural, material features.  In Platonism the natural features of any given thing are the result of the something more of existence, of the Platonic Forms, of the Good and the One. 

I think Plotinus is connecting with the dialogue Phaedo and that wonderful section where Socrates gives a brief intellectual, or philosophical, biography.  I have mentioned this section on several posts before, it is where Socrates explains that he was, at first, attracted to the philosophy of Anaxagoras, but then later saw through its limitations which are that Anaxagoras explains things through reducing them to natural and material causes alone (and it seems that Socrates is suggesting that even mind in Anaxagoras was explained in this way).  Anaxagoras is the naturalist, the reductionist, in this telling, while Socrates is the one who is rooted in the transcendental.

1.2  Hadot links love and grace in what I have quoted.  I read this as grace being the overflowing of the Good and the One, which in turn generates in material beings love for the Good and the One and the desires to return to the One.  The way Hadot puts it is that grace bestows love.

This love is, at times, given an erotic description, particularly in the Symposium where the Diotima’s ladder of beauty begins with the contemplation of attractive bodies.  At first this may appear to conflict with the ascetic teachings of Plato found in Phaedo and other dialogues.  But what Diotima teaches is to ascend to the transcendental by turning away from material beauty to that which is beautiful as such; that is to say to the beauty of the noetic.  In addition, Socrates is praised in the Symposium for not succumbing to the attempted seduction of Alcibiades, an example of someone who has transcended the seduction of material beauty.

1.3  Hadot uses the word ‘unjustified’ to describe love and grace.  I think this is an aspect of grace that disturbs many people.  That someone will receive the grace of the One even if they have not lived an exemplary life runs counter to our sense of fairness; it can even feel arbitrary.

The metaphor I use for Platonic grace has helped me to understand how this works.  I use the metaphor of moonlight shining on a mountain path that branches of the main path.  A hiker notices this path and turns to hike that path to its conclusion.

The moonlight is the symbol of grace.  The moonlight was shining on the path but wasn’t shining specifically for that individual hiker; moonlight simply shines because that is its nature.  I think that in this sense grace is ‘unjustified’ because the path that is being shown in the moonlight is simply being shown; the presence of the path is not noticed due to some kind of transaction.  The presence of the path is a gift in the sense that it comes to the hiker freely, without calculation.

1.4  A few paragraphs later, Hadot writes, “The grace he (Plotinus) speaks of reveals to use the gratuitousness of divine initiative.  Let the reader be reassured: this is not an attempt to Christianize Plotinus.  It is too obvious that he is unaware of or opposed to the idea of a new creation in Christ, which constitutes the content of the specifically Christian concept of grace.  The gratuitousness of divine initiative is only ne element of this concept, and not the most characteristic one at that.  If philosophical reflection goes to its own extreme, and still more if it attempts to express the content of the mystical experience, it, too, will be led to this notion of gratuitousness.  It will, moreover, become clear upon reflection that all necessity and all duty presuppose the absolute initiative of an original love and freedom.”  (Ibid, page 51)  And I would add an original grace.

The use of the word ‘gratuitous’ I read as emphasizing that the grace of the Good and the One is beyond affirmation and negation; as I mentioned above, it is not calculated.  I also think the usage of ‘gratuitous’ emphasizes that the Good and the One are beyond being, mind, and life.  I think it is a way of talking about the ineffable that is particularly effective.

1.5  The moonlight on the mountain path is a metaphor I like because it doesn’t negate the need for purification.  The hiker does need to notice the path, does need to turn to the path, and needs to consider the path valuable enough to turn away from, to renounce, other possible paths.  In this way purification and grace can be understood to work together.

1.6  Again, I have not observed much writing on the topics of grace and love in University Platonism.  And I suspect that one of the reasons is that to think of grace and love as significant, even foundational, is to move the Platonic tradition to another dimension of reality that modern philosophy has for the most part rejected. 

1.7  Hadot’s description of love and grace also connects love and grace with beauty.  Beauty is ‘something more’ just as love and grace are something more.  I think this explains why Plotinus, following Plato, spends so much energy referring to beauty and the illuminating presence of Beauty.  Beauty is the presence of grace perceived.

2.  Plotinian

I have started thinking of myself as a ‘Plotinian.’  I think of this as similar to a Christian who refers to himself as an ‘Augustinian.’  In other words, Plotinian refers to a stream of, or tradition of, Platonism.  I feel attracted to this way of speaking because of the vastness of the Platonic tradition and how this vastness facilitates misunderstandings; ‘Plotinian’ narrows the focus.

My only hesitancy about the term ‘Plotinian’ is that it is still common, unfortunately, for people to refer to Plotinus as the ‘father of Neoplatonism.’  I’ve posted before about why I think this is misguided; it’s kind of like referring to Augustine as ‘the father of Neochristianity.’  No one does that because it would be laughable to do so.  In a similar way, I think associating Plotinus with ‘Neoplatonism’ misunderstands what Plotinus was doing and who he was.

But there’s nothing I can do about that, other than to offer my own understanding, along with others who agree and let people decide for themselves as to this usage.  In the meantime, I will try on the Plotinian hat and see if it fits.

3.  The Demise of Postmodernism?

I recently saw a few videos on YouTube that share the theme of the approaching end of postmodernism.  That’s interesting; I think this is the first time I’ve seen young people talk in this way.  I don’t know what the future will bring, but I can kind of see that postmodernism has a faddish quality to it.  And its opaque use of language guaranteed that it would exclude most people from understanding what it was about and that it would remain primarily of interest to academics.

For Platonists, modernism and postmodernism created an intellectual environment that was casually hostile to its primary concerns such as the nature of the transcendental, the manner in which Platonic forms work, asceticism and the cultivation of virtue, and a strong interest in the nature of beauty.  If it is true that postmodernism is reaching a conclusion that doesn’t guarantee that what follows it will be more congenial to Platonism.  On the other hand, its demise might create more space for Platonism to present itself as a way of life that is just as valid today as it was thousands of years ago.

4.  Aphorisms

I consider the Letters of Plato as a warning Plato left for his students so they would not pursue political careers or engagement.

Sometimes I feel profoundly tired of this world.

Reading different translations of Plotinus resembles listening to different conductors conduct the same symphony.

The instantiation of beauty fades but beauty as such does not fade.

Contemplation is the conversion of attention from the dispersions of the material world to the unity of the One which is found within.

A strange thing I have noticed about nihilists is that they seem to find meaning in the meaninglessness of nihilist teachings.

I found a fossil in the desert.

The material world is dominated by the cacophony of differentiation but there are hidden appearances of eternity here and there, now and then.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 111

26 October 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 111

1.  Dharma

I have often suggested that it is more accurate to think of Platonism as a Dharma tradition than it is to think of Platonism as a type of contemporary philosophy.  What I thought I would do here is to list the points of comparison I am thinking of when I make statements like this.

1.1  First, both Dharma traditions and Platonism are salvific.  That is to say that Dharma traditions are structured in such a way that the practice of those traditions are presented as leading to liberation, moksha, nirvana, and, in general, transcendence.  The different Dharma traditions describe the nature of salvation differently, but they are all directed towards salvific ends.

Platonism is similarly structured.  Platonism is presented as a path that will take us out of the cave of ignorance and delusion to the sunlit presence of eternity, of the Good and the One.  This is the promise of Platonism.  All of the discussions, analyses, allegories, and teachings are for the purpose of awakening to, or attaining, that transcendental understanding.

1.2  In both Platonism and Dharma traditions the idea of rebirth plays a major role.  In Plato’s dialogue Phaedo Plato presents multiple arguments for the immortality of the soul and for the reality of rebirth.  Plato also presents a mythic unfolding of the process of rebirth; it is very Platonic to present both a reasoned analysis and a mythic, or allegorical, understanding of a topic, and rebirth is an excellent example of this.

Because both Dharma traditions and Platonism have a deep understanding of rebirth these traditions tend to have a very long view of the journey of the soul to ultimacy, however that ultimacy is understood in each specific tradition.  This long duration perspective conflicts with modernist understanding of what it means to be a human being; the tendency is to think of a human being as having only a single life without consequences for future rebirth. 

In understanding Platonic ethics, both the virtues and the restraints, it is important to place these ethical commitments in the context of multiple births.  The idea is that work done on ethical commitments takes multiple births to come to fruition. 

1.3  I often like to say that Platonism is a wisdom tradition.  In a Platonic context wisdom means using the mind’s capacities, such as the mind’s capacity for differentiation, to assist in the journey to the Good and the One.  And this is similar to how wisdom is understood in Dharma traditions.  The point is that wisdom in these contexts refers to transcendent wisdom as opposed to wisdom about some topic such as being wise in the ways of woodworking, or wise in the ways of chemistry or music. 

1.4  I think of Platonism as a mystical tradition.  ‘Mystical’ in this context refers to experiences that take us beyond cognition, beyond name and form, beyond affirmation and negation.  This is accomplished through contemplation. 

The place of mystical practice in Dharma traditions varies among traditions.  But there appears to be an emphasis on mysticism, or traditions within an overall tradition, that emphasizes these kinds of experiences. 

Not everyone in a Dharma tradition is a mystic; most are not.  And that is also true for Platonists; most people who think of themselves as Platonists are not themselves mystics in the sense of mystical I am using.  But the point is that mystical experiences are a part of these traditions and recognized as significant.  These kinds of experiences are explicitly depicted in dialogues such as the Symposium where such experiences are depicted twice, and Phaedrus.  And they are discussed by other Platonists such as Maximus of Tyre, and especially Plotinus.

1.5  Contemplation is a big topic; there are many types of contemplation and even in a single Dharma tradition there are likely to be multiple methods of contemplation.  But for the purposes of this brief list I simply want to point out that contemplation, the practice of turning inward, is central to these traditions and a practitioner will at some point be expected to spend time on cultivating contemplation.

1.6  One thing that these Dharma traditions and Platonism share is what I like to call the ‘Ascetic Ideal.’  This means living a life of renunciation.  This means living a life where pursuing pleasure is not the guiding principle.  This is why traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism have an organized monastic structure that provides a context for the cultivation and practice of various ascetic practices.  The key dialogue in Platonism for the practice of the Ascetic Ideal is Phaedo where the philosophical life is explicitly depicted as a life of renunciation.  Comments on renunciation also appear in many other dialogues.

There is a contrast between Platonist asceticism and Dharma traditions’ asceticism.  Dharma traditions have a highly structured and written out program for the practice of the Ascetic Ideal.  For example, in Buddhism the practice of the Ascetic Ideal is contained in the Vinaya, which is six volumes of meticulous rules that govern all aspects of a practitioner’s life.  In Platonism no such documents have appeared in the tradition.  Instead there are scattered mentions of ascetic practices (asceses) and commitments in various dialogues.  The Platonist practitioner gleans these practices from his reading of the dialogues and then applies them to daily life as best he can.  This will vary depending on a particular person’s situation, but the overall direction is clear.  In my past, decades ago, I was a Buddhist Monk for about six years.  And when I first encountered Platonist asceticism I was disappointed that there wasn’t something like the Vinaya, or even something like the Rule of St. Benedict, that could function as a guide.  Gradually, though, I found the Platonist approach highly enriching because it places the burden of following the practices of the Ascetic Ideal on oneself.  It’s a bit like when a musician decides to make the practices of musicianship part of his life, or when an athlete decides to regularly practice exercises to refine his athletic skill.  In the same way a Platonist practitioner dedicated to the Ascetic Ideal makes a decision to incorporate these ascetic practices in his daily life.

1.7  Vegetarianism is another facet of Dharma traditions that is shared with Platonism.  Not all Dharma traditions are vegetarian, but some, like Jainism and Classical Yoga are and they have had an effect on Indian society at large.  Platonism has vegetarian commitments that a number of Platonist authors have focused on; the most famous is On Abstinence by Porphyry.

Vegetarianism in Dharma traditions and in Platonism isn’t advocated for reasons of health or for the idea of animal rights (although Plutarch’s writings on this topic come close to that perspective).  Instead, vegetarianism is considered to be a basic practice of purification and that a vegetarian life helps to align the soul with the transcendental.  In other words, vegetarianism is a foundational spiritual practice for these traditions.

1.8  The final item I will mention is that in Dharma traditions and in Platonism their respective traditions are considered to be a way of life.  This contrasts with contemporary philosophy where there is no sense of a commitment to manifest philosophy in one’s everyday life.  In fact that idea is considered strange by contemporary philosophers, but it was the norm in the Classical period.  Pierre Hadot has left us several books that illuminate Classical Philosophy as a way of life.

I see this way of life as defined by commitments to ethical restraints.  In Dharma traditions these are basic precepts, usually five in number, that a person will commit themselves to, usually in a ceremonial context, and that align the individual with the ethical practices and heritage of the spiritual community they are joining.  In Platonism, as I previously mentioned, these ethical restraints are mentioned in various dialogues and the dedicated Platonism has to take on the practice of these restraints; this is done by reading these passages as instruction rather than just interesting data or information.

1.9  I have avoided comparing things like metaphysics and cosmology, as well as views on causation, because, as interesting as these topics are, the truth is the traditions have major differences at this level.  I don’t regard that as a problem, in fact I think that it is a good thing that there are these differences.  The similarities between Dharma traditions and to Platonism exist at a more foundational level of everyday practice; that is where one can observe their commonalities and benefit from comparisons.

2.  An Irish Scholar

Deirdre Carabine is an Irish scholar who has specialized primarily in Duns Scotus Eriugena and Plotinus.  She was born in 1956 in Belfast, Northern Ireland.  In some ways Irish scholarship is a bit hidden from the U.S.  I mean that there often seems to be a delay between the publication of Irish scholarly works and when they are available in the U.S.  Two examples are a translation of the Periphyseon by Eriugena which took a long time to reach the U.S.; I think it became available just a year or two ago.  Another example is David Horan’s new translation of the Dialogues of Plato which is similarly taking its time to reach the U.S. 

There are a small number of videos on YouTube that feature Carabine and I find them worth watching.  In one video she briefly talks about her scholarly career which began with work on Eriugena and then moved to Platonism.  She offered that she didn’t find Plato to be personally inspiring and the Middle Platonists had a similarly tepid response from her.  Then she found Plotinus and she says that she ‘fell in love with Plotinus’ and she still feels that way.  Her voice and posture changed when she brought up Plotinus.

Carabine mentions that some of what she regards as important work she has authored is placed in anthologies gathered by scholarly publishers.  She openly expresses irritation at how expensive some of these volumes are because she would like her work to be more accessible.  This is an ongoing problem in academia that I have mentioned more than once; Carabine is a rare case of a scholar who expresses irritation at this system.

She published a book called The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena which has received a lot of attention and praise from those interested in this topic; people like A. H. Armstrong.  I have not read it yet myself, but I hope to do so in 2027.  Eriugena is one of my favorite early Medieval authors; he translated the Mystical Theology by Dionysius the Areopagite into Latin.  Eriugena was also Irish and it is surprising how significant the contribution of Irish scholars has been down through the centuries.

I just posted this to express my appreciation of her work and dedication.  When she retired she moved to Uganda; that was about 20 years ago.  She works, teaches, and studies there to this day.

3.  Cynicism

I have noticed on YouTube that young philosophers with academic credentials often have a very cynical way of talking about philosophy that seems to be distinctive; at least I don’t recall seeing it before.  I mean that I frequently run into presentations that are sarcastic, dismissive, flippant, and accompanied by copious eye-rolls and sighs and painful laughter pointed at the philosopher in question.  This is not good-natured laughter; it is meant to depict the YouTuber as above, and smarter than, the philosopher they are talking about.

It’s not universal among young philosophers; there are exceptions.  Because of this I wasn’t sure I was observing an actual, distinctive, approach.  So I asked AI if what I was observing was actually there or if I was exaggerating in my own mind.  AI responded that this characteristic way of presenting philosophy, and particular philosophers, has been commented on by numerous people and that no, I wasn’t exaggerating.

AI suggested that one of the reasons for this kind of cynical presentation is that YouTube as a platform encourages ‘performance’ in the sense that being sarcastic and dismissive is something that viewers will remember and perhaps lead them to return to the channel.  The performance aspect of YouTube isn’t something I had considered.  But I wonder if the performance aspect was also present when professors were giving lectures in classes?  Perhaps the face to face aspect of a classroom differs from the video presentations on YouTube where you can say something flippant or dismissive and there are no audience responses to give you feedback on how that lands.  I’m not sure.

At another level, AI suggested that younger academic philosophers have likely absorbed the pervasive modernist assumption that the past has no value and is significant only in the sense that we advanced moderns need to overcome it.  If this view is absorbed from their own professors it makes sense that they would openly display contempt for ancient teachings.

What has struck me in watching these YouTube presentations is that lack of generosity.  In everyday life it is common that friends will not always agree; you may even have a friend that on one or two issues has very eccentric views.  But you learn to live with it because the benefits of the friendship are real and worth cultivating.  But that kind of generosity, or spaciousness, is simply lacking among the group I am referring to.

If you approach a philosopher with an obsessively critical mind you will find things, even embarrassing things, that don’t align with your own views.  It is inevitable.  It is also not a problem unless you are a committed ideologue or a rigid perfectionist. 

As I mentioned, this is not universal; there are young academic philosophers who are much more relaxed about flaws in the writings of philosophers.  But I have noticed something that I think is interesting in this context; and that is that it seems to me to be often the case that young philosophers who are more relaxed end up leaving the university and often they talk about this openly.  They have various reasons; some are practical like needing to earn a living.  But others refer to the overly critical and dismissive atmosphere of university departments of philosophy is difficult to deal with over an extended period of time.  I have seen similar presentations from people who have left literature departments. 

The word philosophy means love of wisdom.  When you love someone you still recognize their flaws, but you continue with the relationship.  And if you love wisdom you accept that the imperfections of being human will be there even in the midst of sublime philosophical works.

4.  Aphorisms

“I’m getting older too.”  (Fleetwood Mac, Landslide)

Platonism isn’t about domination.

“. . . the hierarchy of Platonic thinking is a qualitative hierarchy, a hierarchy of value, with the absolute ruling principle being the Good.”  (Peter Kreeft, The Platonic Tradition, page 21)

The path to the Good and the One can be lit by moonlight, by the sun, by starlight, by a single candle, or by a luminous recollection.

“Aphele panta.”  (Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 ("Take away everything." A. H. Armstrong translation))

Not everyone will attain union with the Good and the One.

Without a doubt, vegetarianism is an aid to spiritual practice.  (Eric Clausen, Ascesis: The Handbook of Platonic Practice, page 57)

An immoral act done by an individual does not become moral when done by a group.

“Modern modes of thought seem somehow to incline one toward vice, and thus toward a wretched existence.”  (Mark Anderson, Pure, page 73.)

“Although in modern times the teaching of the divine Plato has, unfortunately, been presented as just ‘philosophy’ in the modern sense of the term as just thinking about things, it is, in fact, a spiritual and soteriological system more akin to the Indian systems and the Greek systems of Orphism and Pythagoreanism.”  (Eric Fallick, Platonist Contemplative Asceticism, page 35.)

Words are a river.

Dreams are as real as the waking world.

Platonism distinguishes between hierarchical dependencies with the Good and the One as the only reality which has no prior source.

The Good and the One have no boundary (apeiron).