Brief Notes on Various Topics - 102

27 July 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 102

1.  The Tradition of Orpheus

The Orphic tradition is mentioned a few times in Plato’s Dialogues.  I get the impression that Orphism had a significant place in Plato’s thought, just as the Pythagorean tradition did.  But it is difficult to get a clear picture of what the Orphic tradition taught, the nature of its rituals, and how its members’ lives embodied the tradition.

The Loeb Classical Library has just released a new book on the Orphic tradition titled Orphic Collection.  The scholar who brought the Orphic material together is Alberto Bernabe (the translator is Michael Chase).  The collection includes recent material the was found by archeologists in buried mausoleums.  The collection does not include the  Hymns of Orpheus which have been translated several times.  In the ‘Introduction’ the author explains his reasons for not including them such as their very late provenance and other criticisms.  I’m not qualified to have an opinion about this.  But however one thinks about these issues, the Orphic Collection is a significant contribution to our understand because it brings together a great deal of early material from the tradition of Orpheus that has only existed scattered in academic journals or in monographs on specific documents as opposed to having an overview of the tradition. 

The collection also includes citations from varied sources where the source quotes older material.  These citations are wide ranging and include quotes from philosophers such as Proclus, historians such as Herodotus, and early Christian writers.  This is another example of how this Collection brings together scattered references, making access to them more available.

For those interested in the pre-history of Platonism I think they will find this work to be helpful.

1.1    Here is an example of Plato referencing the Orphic tradition from his Dialogue Laws:

The Athenian Stranger:  “In fact, we see that even now the practice of human beings sacrificing one another still persists among many people.  And we hear just the opposite about other peoples: how there was once a time when we did not dare to taste cattle, and sacrificed to the gods no animals, but instead gruel and fruits soaked in honey and other such hallowed sacrifices.  They abstained from flesh on the grounds that it wasn’t pious to eat it or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood.  Those of us who existed then had ways of life that were what is called ‘Orphic’: we partook of everything that lacked soul but abstained from the opposite, from everything that possessed soul.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VI, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press Chicago, 1980, page 171, 782c-782d, ISBN: 0226671100)

1.1.1  It’s interesting to me that Plato, in this passage, links cannibalism and meat eating.  Centuries later Porphyry would make the same linkage in his On Abstinence.  This connection found in Porphyry then became a topic of discussion in Renaissance Europe after On Abstinence was translated into a number of European languages. 

1.1.2  Plato mentions how Orphism rejected sacrificing animals on their altars to the Gods because to do so was a kind of pollution.  This view would apply to any contemporary tradition that sacrifices animals, including theurgy.

1.1.3  I’ve mentioned in comments on some quotes from Plato’s Laws that there are times when Plato seems to withdraw from the focus on constructing laws, and lifts his view to a more ethical, or even metaphysical, domain.  I see these as reminders that Laws is primarily focused on metaphysics and only secondarily on the political dimension of constructing laws.

1.1.4  Plato uses the construction of those things with soul verses those things that lack soul.  It is OK to eat those things lacking soul but one should refrain from eating those things that do have soul.  This is an interesting way of looking at the issue of vegetarianism (Plato doesn’t use the word ‘vegetarian’ in this quote, though some translators do) but it does raise some difficulties.  For example, I’m not convinced that plants don’t have souls.  Plato, in Timaeus, states that plants have a ‘third kind of soul . . . which shares not at all in opinion and reasoning and mind but in sensation, pleasant and painful, together with desires.’  (Timaeus, 77a-77b, R. G. Bury translation, Loeb Classical Library)  This means there is a bit of contrast between Plato’s description of plants in an Orphic context and the description in the context of Timaeus.  It’s possible that in the Orphic tradition when they say that plants ‘lack soul’ it means that they lack the soul that reasons and has opinions and this would be consistent with Plato saying that plants have a ‘third kind of soul’.  At times these three kinds of soul are laid out as, first, the rational soul which is primarily found in humans, second is the spirited soul that is often associated with emotions and inclinations such as courage and anger and is found in humans and animals, and third is the appetitive soul that is concerned with nutrition, growth, and responses to the environment such as when it gets cold or hot. 

It is interesting that the Jains also have a system of classification of different types of souls, though I don’t recall exactly its details; but in both the Jain and Platonic context the difference in types of soul is one of the reasons for refraining from eating or sacrificing animals but allowing for the consumption of plants.

1.1.5  There may be a reference to rebirth in this quote where Plato writes, ‘those of us who existed then’, meaning during the ancient times when people refrained from eating or sacrificing animals.  I think this could be read as implying a previous birth on the part of Plato and maybe the other two participants in the dialogue as well.  The quote could also be interpreted as saying something like an archaeologist today saying ‘we humans who existed 40,000 years ago’, referring to prehistoric human history.

But I incline to a reference to rebirth because I suspect that one of the reasons for refraining from harming animals by eating or sacrificing them is that to do so has consequences for rebirth, and the consequences are negative.  My view is that the rebirth interpretation of the quote fits will with the overall context.

1.1.6  This quote is a good example of Plato’s awareness of his predecessors' impact on his own teachings.  The predecessors I am thinking of are Orphism, Pythagoreanism, and possibly some mystery traditions that may be hinted at in a dialogue like Phaedo.  This suggests that the foundations of Western philosophy are broader, and more complex, than is often presented when Western philosophy is said to begin with Thales and other presocratic philosophers.  Perhaps the beginning of Western philosophy is more rooted in traditions like Orphism.

2.  Counterculture

For a long period of time Platonism was at the center of the culture.  This was true during the classical period from Plato through Proclus and Boethius.  And because Platonism was at the center its influence over other traditions and branches of philosophy was extensive. 

Times change.  Today I think it is the case that Platonism is a counterculture.  By counterculture I mean that Platonism is on the fringe rather than the center.  I mean that the major philosophical commitments that are offered today are either non-Platonic or anti-Platonic: these include materialism, reductionism, scientism, anti-transcendentalism, nihilism, and so forth. 

I think it is helpful for those studying Platonism and those who self-identify as Platonists today to consider their countercultural place.  For example, if you are part of a counterculture, you are in a position where you are frequently asked to justify your assumptions, whereas if you are part of the cultural center this happens rarely.  And if you are part of a countercultural presence, it is sometimes the case that your views will be casually dismissed by the role of someone’s eyes, or other dismissive gestures.

I don’t think this is a bad thing.  Such a situation means that contemporary Platonists need to really think about, and contemplate, what the Platonist tradition consists of, what its virtues are, and if there is anything that might be better stated or needs clarification.  That’s an opportunity.

3.  Sunset

The setting summer sun casts long shadows on the desert sand.  As the sun slowly falls behind the western mountain range the sky puts on a beautiful display of colors; like a painful goodbye ending in a sigh.  The shadows merge and unite in darkness as the stars speak to each other in a language inaccessible to mere mortals. 

A peacock shrieks and flies into the branches of a desert pine where it will spend the night.  Soon people are preparing for their journey to the land of dreams.

I turn the pages of a Dialogue by Plato and suddenly my room is filled with light.

4.  AI Philosophy Books

There seems to be a lot of AI generated books on philosophy these days.  Often these books are published in a series with all the books being issued in a short amount of time.  One series includes Pythagoras, Plato,. Plotinus, and many others.  I spent some time trying to track down the author but was unable to find any indication of an actual person.  The books themselves all follow the same format, which AI does well, but completely lack any information about the author, with no footnotes or bibliography, and no references, even passing references to source material or recommendations for further study.

The author’s name may not be the name of an individual; rather it might be the name used for all the books in the series and in the format being used.  It might be the name of an organization dedicated to generating these kind of books.  It’s not clear.  What I would like is clarity; if the author’s name is a stand-in for the name of an organization then it should say so on the copyright page, and possibly on the back cover. 

Another series uses the 366 Days a Year format.  This format is very popular.  When I worked at a spiritual bookstore we had a separate section devoted to this kind of book.  Some of these books were recovery related, some were devoted to quotations from famous people, some were more topical, like 366 thoughts on nature featuring famous quotes from well-known people, some were about relationship, and so forth.  This series has a 366 quotes from Plato as one example of its series.

I don’t have any problem with people using AI to assist in writing a book.  But what I would like is transparency; I mean that somewhere in the book, like on an acknowledgements page, the usage of AI, and the extent of that usage, should be explicitly stated. 

There is a teaching in economics, attributed to Thomas Gresham, that says, ‘bad money drives out good money.’  Perhaps we should apply this to the sale of books in the context I’m referring to.  A good book on Pythagoras will likely be priced higher than the book on Pythagoras from the first series I talked about.  But the very cheap price of the AI generated book on Pythagoras will naturally attract people, thus decreasing the sales of the book written by a qualified author or authors.  That’s why I think it is helpful to have the role that AI played in producing the book clearly stated; it’s kind of like labels on food products letting you know how much sugar is in the product you are buying.

Again, I’m not inherently against using AI in book production.  I just think we should be able to make an informed decision about such usage rather than having to do independent research on it; it should be right there for any reader to see.

4.1  Upon rereading this, it occurs to me that it won’t be long before we have AI generated translations.  And this will happen in the field of philosophy.  Think of a translation of Plato’s Dialogues or Plotinus’s Enneads done by AI.  Such a translation process will be less expensive than having a translator, or team of translators, getting paid for their time and their valuable expertise.  Just to repeat, I don’t think this is inherently a bad thing; it depends on the nature of the AI program being used; as many have noted AI today makes significant mistakes on a regular basis and one would expect translation mistakes in such a context.  On the other hand, potentially AI would have access to broad range of usages for a word, a phrase, or a sentence that AI could use to generate its own version.

For me, the biggest problem, and I’m speaking from a contemplative perspective, is that I don’t think that AI could read these Classical Platonist works from am experiential basis of contemplation, or from the experience of ascetic practices.  I think this would be a serious barrier to how deeply AI could mine for meanings in these works.  And even the way Plato, for example, uses allegory and metaphor might be difficult for AI to recognize. 

 

The Voyage of Existence

20 July 2026

The Voyage of Existence

The Athenian Stanger:  “It is evident to me that what I’m doing here myself is much the same as what a shipwright does in beginning to build ships, when he sketches the shape of ships in outline by laying down the keels.  I’m trying to distinguish the outline of ways of life as they accord with characteristics of soul, and thus really ‘laying down their keels’ – investigating, in the correct way, what device we should use and what characteristics we should at any time incorporate if we are going to be carried through this voyage of existence on the best way of life.  Of course, the affairs of human beings are not worthy of great seriousness; yet it is necessary to be serious about them.  And this is not a fortunate thing.  But since we’re here, if somehow we would carry out the business in some appropriate way it would perhaps be a well-measured thing for us to do.  But whatever am I saying?  Someone would perhaps be correct to take me up in this very way.

Kleinias:  “Indeed!

The Athenian Stranger:  “I assert that what is serious should be treated seriously, and what is not serious should not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete, blessed seriousness, but that what is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything of god, and that this is really the best thing about it.  Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing the noblest possible games, and thinking about them in a way that is the opposite of the way they’re now thought about.

Kleinias:  “How’s that?

The Athenian Stranger:  “Nowadays, presumably, they suppose the serious things are for the sake of the playful things: for it is held that the affairs pertaining to war, being serious matters, should be run well for the sake of peace.  But the fact is that in war there is not and will not be by nature either play or, again, an education that is at any time worthy of our discussion; yet this is what we assert is for us, at least, the most serious thing.  Each person should spend the greatest and best part of his life in peace.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VII, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, pages 192-193, 803a-803d, ISBN: 022667110)

The Athenian Stranger:  “Just as a shipwright at the commencement of his building outlines the shape of his vessel by laying down her keel, so I appear to myself to be doing just the same – trying to frame, that is, the shapes of lives according to the modes of their souls, and thus literally laying down their keels, by rightly considering by what means and by what modes of living we shall best navigate our barque of life through this voyage of existence.  And notwithstanding that human affairs are unworthy of earnest effort, necessity counsels us to be in earnest; and that is our misfortune.  Yet, since we are where we are, it is no doubt becoming that we should show this earnestness in a suitable direction.  But no doubt I may be faced – and rightly faced – with the question, ‘What do I man by this?’

Cleinias: “Certainly. 

The Athenian Stranger: “What I assert is this, - that a man ought to be in serious earnest about serious things, and not about trifles; and that the object really worthy of all serious and blessed effort is God, while man is contrived, as we said above [before], to be a plaything of God, and the best part of him is really just that; and thus I saw that every man and woman ought to pass through life in accordance with this character, playing at the noblest of pastimes, being otherwise minded than they now are.

Cleinias:  “How so?

The Athenian Stranger:  “Now they imagine that serious work should be done for the sake of play; for they think that it is for the sake of peace that the serious work of war needs to be well conducted.  But as a matter of fact we, it would seem, do not find in war, either as existing or likely to exist, either real play or education worthy of the name, which is what we assert to be in our eyes the most serious thing.  It is the life of peace that everyone should live as much and as well as he can.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VII, translated by R. G. Bury, Aquilla Press (a reprint house that specializes in reprints of Loeb editions), 2021, pages 30-32, ISBN: 9798328186223.  I double checked the Aquilla Press reprint by using the online site archive (dot) org which has the 1926 edition, published by William Heinemann in London)

1.  There is a paradox, or a seeming paradox, in this passage which is that the dialogue Laws is focused on taking human affairs seriously enough so that the three old men of this dialogue are spending their time discussing what would be the best laws for the proposed new city of Magnesia.  But the Athenian Stranger puts forth the idea that human affairs, which would include the making of laws, should not be taken seriously. 

I think a passage like this is Plato’s way of reminding the reader that the human context is embedded in a much grander cosmos than appears when we focus on the human situation.  People have the tendency to inhabit the human situation and context in a way that forgets about the overall cosmos in which humans dwell.  I think this is natural; human beings have to cook meals, go to work, take care of children and the elderly, grow food, build buildings, make laws, and so forth.  The body demands that we pay attention to these kinds of activities, a point that Plato makes in a number of dialogues.  Such activities consume most of our time.  The time remaining for spiritual practice, such as contemplation and spiritual reading, is small; and it is a consistent struggle to carve out time for these kinds of activities.

The contrast that Plato makes is between human affairs and God (as an aside, it’s  interesting to me that the Pangle translation uses the lower case ‘god’, while the Bury translation uses the upper case ‘God’.  It’s a small thing, but I suspect it emerges from a difference in the translators’ understanding of the significance of the word in this context.  Classical Greek does not use upper and lowercase letters, so such usage in a context like this reflects the choices the translators are making.) 

Returning to the contrast Plato makes; God deserves to be taken with utmost seriousness while human affairs are not to be taken seriously.  Why does Plato say that human affairs should not be taken seriously, what is Plato getting at?  I think a good example is how, in contemporary democracies, every election is depicted as of great significance and how the fate of humanity will be decided by the results.  Yet the truth is that this is hardly ever the case (I think you could make a case that, in fact, it is never the case).  Elections come and go.  The issues people were passionate about disappear so that after only a few decades only specialist historians will even know what the issues were.  In a society like ours, where ideological thinking saturates the public sphere, it is difficult to see this.  But I think what Plato is getting at by contrasting human affairs with God is that ‘God’ is an indicator of that which is eternal; the contrast is between the ephemeral nature of human activity and the eternal presence of God, of the Divine.  I like to say that the spiritual path involves a shift of attention from that which is ephemeral to that which is eternal and I think that is what is behind what Plato is saying.

2.  My own view is that gaining perspective on this contrast between human affairs and God happens when we become aware of impermanence and the range of impermanence.  That is why I think it is a good idea to study impermanence, to get an understanding of the impermanence so that it saturates one’s understanding.  Plato does not touch on impermanence in this passage, but that is what came to my mind when reading it.

3.  The Athenian Stranger speaks at the opening of this passage with a metaphor of laying down a keel; the function of a keel is to keep a ship from tipping over as it sails to its destination.  I think Plato is communicating to the reader that Plato’s purpose in writing Laws is to point out what kind of life will lead us to the transcendental.  We have to cross the ocean of obstacles by leaving the harbor of material concerns.  To do this we need to align the ship of our lives to the distant shore of serenity and peace.  The laws of Laws are instructions on how to do that.  At times this dialogue appears to be overly detailed, but I’m beginning to think that the details resemble the detailed regulations that we find in a work like the Buddhist Vinaya or some other monastic rules.  The detail is there so that we can understand how the guidance of the law under consideration functions in different circumstances.  Of course not every circumstance can be covered; there are just too many.  But by offering some details of application we are shown how to apply a regulation to multiple situations.

4.  Did Plato think of the dialogue Laws as something that could actually be applied in real life?  Did Plato think of the dialogue Laws as a blueprint for an actual city-state?  I lean toward the idea that this is not an accurate portrayal of what Plato was trying to communicate to the reader.  I think that what Plato is doing in Laws is communicating how to live a life that is serious, a life that is dedicated to the transcendental, to God. 

I think Plato’s view is that aligning with the transcendental, living a life that is focused on that which is eternal, is not easy; and, furthermore, that such a life requires dedication in both large and small ways.  In the quote above Plato is, I think, revealing his purpose, not just for this particular dialogue, but overall.

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 101

13 July 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 101

1.  The Political Perspective

I listened to a brief presentation by a professor of philosophy regarding Plato.  He argued in favor of the interpretation of Leo Strauss; I mean that the professor argues that Strauss is the most insightful recent scholar on Plato.  And the reason given for the importance of Strauss is that Strauss abandoned metaphysical and mystical interpretations of Plato’s Dialogues and brought out the political nature of Plato’s works.  I have read this kind of interpretation before (I am also aware that there are those that disagree that this is how Strauss treats Plato, but that’s another issue.  The view of Strauss presented by this philosophy professor is widespread.) 

As I mentioned, the video was brief, only a few minutes, and I hesitated to respond.  But he invited people to comment, so I asked him, given his views, how would he handle the episodes in the Dialogues where Socrates goes into some kind of trance, or meditative state.  I mentioned specifically the Symposium and Phaedrus.  I suggested that, given these episodes, it is difficult to maintain that Plato was in some sense anti-mystical, that Plato was kind of a proto-analytic philosopher who specialized in political philosophy.  The professor responded by saying that what Strauss had accomplished was a realignment (his word) of what is significant in the Dialogues; that is to say that Strauss foregrounds political thought which earlier Platonists (he specifically mentions Christian Platonism as an example) had neglected.

Needless to say, this is not my point of view.  It isn’t only the episodes depicting trance states that are significant.  A Dialogue like Phaedo which is focused on the nature of the soul, the teachings of rebirth, and the practices of asceticism, is entirely devoted to non-material realities and mystical experiences that are depicted in the penultimate section of mythic unfolding.

The separation of Western Philosophy from its spiritual roots is, to my mind, a kind of cultural tragedy; but that is what has happened.  And that is the what Universities are structured to present as philosophy.  From the perspective of this kind of separation, the history of philosophy is understood to be a kind of freeing itself from superstitions such as mysticism and spirituality. 

For the contemporary Platonist who wants to actually practice the Platonic Way or Path, I think one important step to take is to let the Dialogues speak in their own voice, without bringing to them contemporary assumptions such as materialism, reductionism, and so forth.  When this step is taken the Dialogues of Plato open up a vaster and richer understanding of the cosmos, an understanding that can be pursued and practiced for many lifetimes.

2.  Monism

The term ‘monism’ emerged, I think, in the 18^th or 19^th century.  It appeared as part of an effort, centered in Germany, to approach the history of philosophy through classification systems that in some ways mimicked scientific systems of classification, such as the periodic table of the elements and biological classifications, that have had great success in their respective fields.  ‘Monism’ came with ‘dualism’ and ‘pluralism.’  In general, I think that this specific classification of monism, dualism, pluralism has been successful and has its uses.  But it is good to keep in mind that, for example, Platonists did not refer to themselves as monists; the term has been applied to some Platonist philosophers, such as Plotinus, retroactively.

I think of myself as a monist, and think that monism is a good descriptor of the Platonist tradition, while recognizing at the same time that there is variation among specific Platonist authors; that’s not unusual.  My view is that in Platonism there is one thing, the Good and the One, that is completely real in Platonist term.  But unlike some other examples of monism, Platonism does not consider the material world unreal.  Instead, Platonism views material entities as derivative of the ultimate and unique source, the One.  Material things are real, but they are less real than the One or the Noetic realities such as abstract objects and Platonic Forms.

Sometimes I read in scholarly works that Plato did not really commit himself to a specific metaphysical position.  I think this is mistaken.  I suspect that what is going on with that kind of assertion is that the scholar, or University Platonist, is looking for some kind of clear statement as to affiliation in the way that some philosopher today might say they are an existentialist, or a materialist, or a monist, pluralist, or dualist, and so forth.  What I suggest is that Plato does not seem to normally choose that way of speaking to present his metaphysics.  My observation is that Plato usually uses allegories and myths to express metaphysical truths, especially when Plato is dealing with realities that are difficult to present in terms of affirmations and negations.  I think the primary example of this is the allegory of the cave which, in my reading, culminates in a monist vision of the metaphysical sun.  And the sun is a symbol of what Platonist monism means.  In other words, the allegory of the cave is Plato’s statement on his metaphysical commitments and I think that allegory expresses a metaphysics that is consistent with monism.

Ultimately all things emanate from the transcendental sun of the One and are dependent upon the One.  In addition, the One is ineffable and beyond affirmation and negation.  This means that ultimate reality is unknowable through intellect and reason, but is approachable through intellect and reason.  Terms we use to designate the One are analogies of that which is beyond our grasp, of that which is the source of all that exists.

3.  Plato on Change

The Athenian Stranger: “Change, we shall find, is much the most dangerous thing in everything except what is bad – in all the seasons, in the winds, in bodily habits, and in the characters of souls.  It isn’t the case that change is, so to speak, safe in some things and dangerous in others, except, as I just now said, in bad things.

“Thus, if one were to look at bodies, one would see how they become accustomed to all foods and all drinks and exercises, even if at first they are upset by them; one would see how, with the passage of time, they grow, out of these very materials, flesh that is akin to these things, and come to like, be accustomed to and familiar with, a whole regimen – thriving on it in the best way from the point of view of both pleasure and health; one would see that if someone is ever compelled to change back to one of the reputable diets, he is at first upset with sickness, but then once again with difficulty recovers, by regaining a habituation in the food.  Now one must hold that this very same thing applies to the thoughts of human beings and the natures of their souls.  If they’re brought up under laws which by some divine good fortune have remained unchanged for a great length of time, if they neither remember nor have heard that these things were ever otherwise than they are at present, then the entire soul reverences and fears changing any of the things that are already laid down.  Somehow or other the lawgiver must think up a device by which this situation will prevail in the city.  The following is what I at least have discovered: as we said before, everyone thinks that very great and serious harm can’t follow from changes in the games of the young, on the grounds that these are really just games.  As a result, they don’t prevent such changes but give in to and follow them, not taking into account the fact that these boys who practice innovations in their games must necessarily grow up to be men who are different from those the earlier children grew into; being different, they seek a different way of life, and in seeking it they desire different practices and laws; from this it follows that none of them fears the arrival of what was now said to be the greatest evil for cities.  There are, indeed, other changes – those affecting outward appearance – that would do less damage; but whatever brings about frequent change in the praise and blame accorded to dispositions is the greatest of all changes, I believe, and would require the most attentive watching.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VII, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, pages 186-187, 797d-798d)

3.1  Plato talks about change and stability in Laws as well as in other Dialogues.  The passage quoted is one of the longer and more thorough on the subject.

3.2  In Laws Plato wants the laws of the proposed new city-state to be written in a manner that aligns the citizens to higher realities.  Higher realities, such as Nous and the One, are stable and unchanging.  Therefore, in order to live in accordance with these higher realities at least the appearance of stability needs to be cultivated and in this dialogue that means laws that are so well written that they do not change over long stretches of time.

3.2.1  I believe ‘long stretches of time’ means thousands of years, even ten thousand years, in Plato’s mind because in Laws the Egyptians are admired because their regulations for painting have not changed for thousands and thousands of years.

3.3  It is somewhat a puzzle for me that Plato argues that the changing seasons and the shifting of the wind are negative changes rather than, say, neutral, or perhaps even positive.  Perhaps these are symbols of instability for Plato as opposed to the sun and its light which is a symbol of stability.  I’m not sure of that, and I’m not aware of another dialogue where Plato unpacks the meaning of the changing seasons and the wind.  Nevertheless it is a puzzle to me because the changing seasons proceed in an orderly manner; yes the seasonal changes are changes, but the manner of the changes is predictable and points to a deeper stability.  It’s just not clear to me why this would be a problem.

3.3.1  But there is an example where Plato has a constructive relationship to a natural phenomenon; I am thinking of the sound of the cicadas in Phaedrus.

3.3.2  Perhaps Plato is thinking along the lines that the changing seasons in some way ‘teach’ young people that change and innovation in a city’s laws might lead to misalignment for the souls of its citizens.  I get the overall impression that Plato is concerned here, and in other places in Laws with the effect of precedent; the idea that if change is permitted, or even admired, in one context then change will be introduced into a context where it is inappropriate. 

3.4  If the reader interprets Laws as teachings that are applicable to one’s own life as a practitioner of the way of philosophy, then a passage like this is directing the person dedicated to philosophy to be very cautious about introducing changes into a traditional spiritual practice.  In today’s culture, which exalts change and alteration simply for the sake of change and alteration, as if they are inherently a good thing, such changes are introduced, even demanded, of spiritual traditions that are many thousands of years old, and they are often introduced thoughtlessly; kind of in the way a cultural fad is introduced.  Plato resists that kind of approach. 

3.4.1  A Daoist teacher once told me that Daoists are people who show up at an open village meeting to discuss the village’s plan for a new bridge and then ask if such a bridge is necessary, pointing out that the city has been in its current location for a long time and is doing just fine.

3.4.2  In my long involvement with Buddhism in the West, I have observed such innovations being introduced frequently and often adopted.  Because I studied overseas in Korea and Japan, I was sometimes aware of how this innovation or change would diminish the tradition; I rarely brought this up because there was no context to do so.  But sometimes in conversations with individuals it could be discussed, with mixed results.

3.4.3  Looking at a passage like this as instruction for practitioners of the way of philosophy helps to cultivate patience and endurance.  The ascetic practices of Platonism bear fruit, but that does not always happen immediately.  Contemplation bears fruit, but that does not always happen right away.  Dialectic bears fruit, but it can take time to learn how dialectic works.

3.5  Plato writes that changes of the negative kind (and negative changes are changes that make it more difficult to align with the transcendent) require ‘attentive watching.’  I think this is a good instruction for life in general; I mean that if you introduce a change into your spiritual practice, it is good to attentively watch how it impacts your spiritual development, whether or not the change is a step forward or a step back. 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 100

6 July 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 100

1.  Money

In Laws Plato makes numerous comments on the way money corrupts politics and human relations in general.  Plato’s remarks on this topic sound surprisingly modern.  The role that the super wealthy play in politics these days is something Plato warned about.  But it’s not something that people in general have learned.

2.  Aligning the Mind with the Good and the One

My view is that the soul doesn’t change, does not develop, nor does the soul deteriorate under the influence of materiality.  I understand the soul to be still, passive, spacious, silent, and eternal. 

Because of this reason when I read passages in Platonic literature that speak of purifying the soul, or changing the soul, or a part of the soul, in some way, I reconfigure that in my own mind as some kind of change, such as purification, happening in the mind rather than the soul.  I say this because I understand the mind to be the seat, or origin, of differentiation in the individual; and that the mind is the presence of the noetic, or Mind, in the individual.

Because the nature of mind is differentiation, its energies are naturally focused on the many needs of the body and how to best fulfill them.  But if the mind begins, and the beginning can be very subtle, to differentiate between the agitations of the body and the placid nature of the soul, then it is possible for the mind to turn to the soul which is the source of that stillness.  Then the mind can make differentiations for the purpose of aligning the mind with the One, because the soul is the presence of the One in the individual.  This is how I understand differentiation and how it functions within a Platonic context.

The separation of body and soul that is spoken of in Dialogues like Phaedo, is accomplished by the mind’s ability to differentiate between that which aligns with the body and that which aligns with the soul, that which aligns with the ephemeral and that which aligns with the eternal.  This is the cultivation of wisdom and its application in practices such as purification through ascetic commitments.

3.  Old Age

I’ve been reading Plato’s Laws.  The three characters in the dialogue are all old men and this has led me to think about how old age impacts how one views the world.  When you reach old age, you realize that there are things you have often thought of doing that you will never do, that you do not have time to read all the books on that list of books you want to read, that most of the people you know have passed away and they are not being replaced by others (your social circle shrinks), and that a sunset is more enticing than the latest movie.  (As an aside, I have a fond memory of my grandparents, my father’s mother and father, who on most evenings would watch the sun set behind a stand of trees that was on the border of a state nature reserve that bordered their own property.  There was something very attractive about this custom of theirs that appealed to me even as a child.)

Plato does not specifically talk about old age in Laws (but Plato does talk about old age in the Republic).  But the circumstances of the dialogue are shaped by the fact that the three participants in the dialogue are elderly.  For example, the three participants walk at a slow pace because of their age (and because of the summer heat), and they stop frequently at shady spots by the road, or path, to refresh themselves before walking again.  I think this pace is embodied in the dialogue itself; in the way a topic is lingered over in remarkable detail before moving on to another topic.  It’s like the conversation has paused in some philosophical shade and when they finish the topic, then they start on the path of inquiry again. 

I also think that there is a connection between Laws and Phaedrus in that both dialogues take place in the open, outside of the city, and both dialogues take place in the heat of summer.  An openair setting is rare in Plato’s Dialogues.  And it is not often that Plato spends time on descriptions of the setting beyond a few masterful strokes.  But in Laws and Phaedrus Plato seems to spend time on the natural setting.  And the setting and season in some sense seems to shape both dialogues.  It’s not clear to me if there are specific topics that both dialogues explore; I can’t recall right now if that is the case.  But I think it’s a possibility that is worth exploring, especially if the reader also explores the undermeaning of the dialogues.

4.  Levels of Reading

The levels of reading we can engage in when reading Plato’s Dialogues resemble the levels of reality in Platonic Cosmology.  At one level the focus is on the material world of the Dialogue we are reading; things like the individuals involved in the verbal exchange, the location of the dialogue, the setting, the season, the activity that surrounds the dialogue (like a festival), and so forth.  At another level the focus is on the ideas being discussed; this is the noetic realm, the realm of Platonic Forms.  This is also where analytical tools such as reason and metaphor apply.  And finally, at another level still, the focus is on the transcendental, on the Good and the One, on that which is Eternal, eternity as such.  Sometimes one or the other levels takes center stage in a dialogue; but importantly, I think all three are present, either explicitly, or in the background, in each of the Dialogues.

5.  The ‘Brief Notes’ Series

This is the 100^th post in the Brief Notes series.  It took me awhile to find this way of writing about Platonism, but once I did, I found it very congenial.  Overall the Brief Notes series feels a bit like a collage where the individual pieces of the collage, as well s the overall presentation, both are attractive.  There are precedents for this way of writing philosophy.  I think the earliest example in the West is Heraclitus whose pungent and powerful sayings have impacted people for thousands of years.  Nietzsche is a modern example of someone who could write attractive aphorisms.  Outside of the West, a work like the Dao De Ching is a series of very brief notes on various topics that people have studied and commented on for thousands of years.  In India, the Yoga Sutras are also an example of short form sayings used to communicated an enduring metaphysical view.

There exists a collection of ‘Epigrams’ attributed to Plato; there are eighteen of them in the Hackett Complete Works.  Attribution is disputed.  But it does show a short form, the epigram, was at one point in Platonist history considered worthy of inclusion in collections of Plato’s writings.  In any case, Brief Notes seems to work well for me and I look forward to the next 100 Brief Notes in the years to come.

 

 

On Prayer

29 June 2026

On Prayer

“The Athenian Stranger: . .  this is what I assert: it is dangerous for one who lacks intelligence to pray, and the opposite of what he wishes comes to pass.  If you want to take me seriously here, you may.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by Thomas Pangle, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, page 72, 688b-688c, ISBN: 0226671100)

What the Athenian Stranger is referring to is petitionary prayer; that is to say making requests of the Gods for specific things.  This will become clearer with the additional quotes that follow.

“Socrates: . . .  you [Alcibiades] change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view – well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask, before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance – by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?

“Alcibiades:  Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, off hand.  Why, I take it to be a fatuous request, when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one’s good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, one change one’s tune and retract all one’s former prayers.”

(Plato, Alcibiades II, translated by W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1927, page 263, 147e-148b, ISBN: 9780674992214)

What Socrates is saying is that given the fickle character of Alcibiades it is likely that Alcibiades could easily change his mind about what he wanted from the gods to whom he was praying.  Alcibiades does not know how to respond to the point Socrates is making, but acknowledges that it is possible to pray for something that will prove harmful, both to oneself and to others; discovering that one has in fact made such a prayer will lead to wanting to pray to retract one’s former prayers.  Better to refrain from prayer until such time as one’s mind has stabilized.

The strongest critique of prayer from a Platonic perspective that I have run across is Oration 5 by Maximus of Tyre, simply titled ‘Prayer.’  Maximus begins by telling legends of how individuals were trapped by their prayer requests when the God that was prayed to granted the request in an unexpected way.  Some of these legends are famous such as the one about the Emperor who wanted to conquer a kingdom and asked an oracle about undertaking this conquest.  The Oracle responded by saying a great kingdom will be defeated if this project is undertaken.  The Emperor attacks and is defeated by the kingdom he attacks; the great kingdom that was defeated was his own.

It’s interesting to me that Maximus uses this as an example of why one should refrain from prayer because it shows that Maximus includes requests to Oracles as a type of prayer.  I find that interesting on a number of levels, not the least of which is that it differs from later Classical Platonists who tended to be more receptive to oracles.

Maximus also likes to emphasize that the gods are fickle and arbitrary in their granting of prayer requests, “When Priam offered prayers for his homeland, with daily sacrifices to Zeus of oxen and sheep, Zeus left them unfulfilled.”  And that’s just one example cited by Maximus.

(Maximus of Tyre, Oration 5: Prayer, translated by M. B. Trapp, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, page 43, ISBN: 0198149891)

Maximus undertakes an analysis of why things happen the way they do as an extended critique of why petitionary prayer is ineffective and unwise, “Of all the things which men pray to obtain, some are under the control of Providence, some are enforced by Destiny, some are at the mercy of fickle Fortune, and some are regulated by Science.  Providence is God’s work, Destiny the work of Necessity, Science the work of man, and Fortune the work of blind chance.  It is to the supervision of one or another of these four factors that the raw material of life is allocated.  What we pray for must therefore be attributed either to divine Providence, or to destined Necessity, or to human Science, or the vagaries of Fortune.

“If our objects are to be attributed to Providence, what place is there for prayer?”  Maximus makes a similar point with the other three factors of Destiny, Fortune, and Science.

(Ibid, pages 45-48)

Toward the conclusion Maximus does grant that philosophers such as Socrates and Pythagoras engaged in prayer.  But Maximus distinguishes between petitionary prayers and philosophical prayer, suggesting that philosophical prayer is a ‘conversation’ between the philosopher and the gods, “If you deprive life of philosophy, you have removed from it the living, breathing spark that alone knows how to pray.”

(Ibid, page 50)

It would appear that Maximus has the view that only a philosopher is mature enough to engage in prayer without exposing himself to strongly negative consequences.

These passages I have quoted are highly skeptical regarding the efficacy of prayer.  One might even draw the conclusion from these quotes that it is best to not engage in prayer, especially petitionary prayer.  The following quote from Phaedrus modifies that conclusion:

“Socrates:  I think he [Isocrates] has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind.  This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favourite Isocrates, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favourite.

“Phaedrus:  It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.

“Socrates:  Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we do?

“Phaedrus:  Of course.

“Socrates:  O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man.  May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure – Do we need anything more, Phaedrus?  For me that prayer is enough.

“Phaedrus:  Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common.

“Socrates:  Let us go.”

(Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, page 579, 279a-279c, ISBN: 0674990404)

Here we have a famous example of Socrates praying to Pan and the ‘gods of this place.’  We have an intriguing contrast between Socrates sharing a prayer with Phaedrus in the dialogue Phaedrus, and Socrates challenging Alcibiades about what will happen to him if he prays in Alcibiades II.  I think the resolution of this is that Phaedrus, in the dialogue that carries his name, is engaged in deep philosophical discussion with Socrates; one gets the impression that Phaedrus is a budding philosopher with a very developed and cultivated mind.  In addition, the grove, which is outside the city walls of Athens, is thick with deities of various sorts; even the cicadas are communing with the gods in the hot summer air.  I suggest that these conditions are ideal for entering into prayer (as an aside, the grove is in nature, it is not a temple, which suggests that efficacious prayer has a spontaneous aspect to it.)

In contrast, Alcibiades has not developed his mind or his character and under the questioning of Socrates it is clear to the reader that Alcibiades has not lived an ‘examined life.’  (This is true for both Alcibiades I and II.)  Nor does the location of the dialogue lend support to prayer done in a manner consistent with the philosophical vocation.

The conclusion, I think, is that Socrates regards prayer as something that only a philosophical mind can undertake without inviting considerable risk both material and spiritual.

Concluding Remarks

This Platonist perspective on prayer would distinguish the life of a philosopher from that of a participant in the civic religion of Athens.  Praying for things, petitionary prayer, was a very common practice both at home altars and at temples.  For a philosopher to suggest that petitionary prayer is not a good idea for an untrained mind would, I think, have been baffling, or even seen as foolish, by most people.

I studied Buddhism in Korea many decades ago.  And there I learned that for most lay Buddhists their relationship to the Dharma is to go to a Temple, make an offering, light incense and bow, and then pray to the Buddha, or a Bodhisattva, for specific things: a new car, to pass a test, easy childbirth, a good business contract, a new house, and so forth.  In my own imagination I think of the civic religion of Athens as similarly focused. 

I think we often get a distorted impression of what religion is like in most circumstances, particularly regarding religions we don’t know much about.  Western Buddhists are inclined to read very sophisticated Buddhist analyses and philosophy; but these kinds of texts have almost no impact on an average Buddhist practitioner who goes to the Temple to pray.  Similarly, with regard to Platonism, those of us interested in Platonism may have developed sophisticated analyses as to the nature of the gods; a good example is the henads found in Proclus and other Late Classical Platonists’ writings.  Popular religion is, for the most part, practical; that is to say popular religion is looked at as a way to align with unseen forces so that one can better achieve material goals.  I understand that appeal and I am in some ways sympathetic to it.

But just as a philosopher cultivates a certain diet as a matter of purification, so also a philosopher cultivates a way of relating to gods, or unseen forces, that is also a matter of purification.  In this case the purification is meant to align one’s understanding with a larger context.

Personally, I pray every day as part of my morning practice.  I pray for those whom I have loved and who have passed away that they may rest in peace with the Good and the One.  I pray to embody the precepts of philosophy (ethical restraints).  And I repent for the negative things I have done in my past, that I may not repeat them.  I think this is consistent with the prayer that Socrates offers at the conclusion of Phaedrus.  My hope is that my practice of prayer may make me beautiful within, or uncover the beauty within, that I may return to the Good and the One and the Eternal.