Are Platonists Lonely?

31 August 2026

Are Platonists Lonely?

1.  “This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.9, On the Good or the One, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 345, ISBN: 9780674995154)

Armstrong has a footnote, on page 344 and 345, to this quote, “These last words, in the common translation ‘flight of the alone to the Alone’, are the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered.  He uses the ‘alone to the alone’ formula elsewhere in the Enneads when speaking of our encounter with the Good (1.6.7.8; VI. 7. 34.7) It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase, generally, but not always in a religious context.  The closest parallel to Plotinus’ use of it is in Numenius fr. 2 . . . See E. R. Dodds ‘Numenius and Ammonius in Les Sources de Plotin . . . It does tell us something important about the mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered in isolation from the rest of his writing about the spiritual life and Porphyry’s account of Plotinus as he knew him.”

It’s interesting that the ‘alone to the Alone’ seems to have been displaced by the use of ‘solitary’ and ‘solitude’ in recent translations such as this Armstrong quote, and others; see below.

2.  “This is the way of life of gods, and divine, happy human beings, the release from everything here, a way of life that takes no pleasure in things here, the refuge of a solitary in the solitary.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.9: On the Good or the One, translated by Lloyd Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 902 (second edition), ISBN: 9781009604970)

3.  “This is the life of gods and of the godlike and blessed among men, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, the passing of solitary to solitary.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, VI.9, On the Good or the One, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, 1992, page 709, ISBN: 9780943914558)

There is some confusion about the MacKenna translation.  It appears that in the earliest edition MacKenna uses ‘the alone to the Alone’ phrasing.  In 1917 MacKenna published Ennead I together with a ‘Conspectus’ (a summary or overview of Plotinus) and it is in the Conspectus that the ‘alone’ phrasing is used.  MacKenna may have also used that phrasing when he first published his fifth volume of the complete Enneads in 1930.  But the details are murky.  Here is what I found online at Internet Archive, for MacKenna’s earlier translation:

“This is the life of the gods and of godlike and blessed men, a liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, a flight of the alone to the Alone.”

4.  “THE SOUL’S ULTIMATE FATE IS DETACHMENT AND FLIGHT.

“Such is the life of the divinities; such is also that of divine and blessed men; detachment from all things here below, scorn of all earthly pleasures, and flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she shall see face to face (that is, ‘alone with the alone,’ as thought Numenius).”

(Plotinus, Complete Works, Ennead VI.9, Of the Good and the One, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, First Edition 1918, Reprinted 2017 by Kshetra Books, Jon W. Fergus editor, page 94, ISBN: 9781974518968)

Both Guthrie and Armstrong reference Numenius as a source for the phrase ‘alone with the alone (or Alone)’.  Guthrie published his edition in 1918 so the Numenius edition Guthrie is referring to is before 1918; but I don’t know the specifics about the source Guthrie uses, though Armstrong does provide more detail.  I suspect that the Numenius translation may be the original source for this phrase, but I’m not sure about that.  Both Armstrong and Gerson indicate that the phrase is used in other places in the Enneads and Armstrong suggests it was used in various religious and non-religious contexts.

4.1  ‘Solitary’ and ‘alone’ overlap, but they also have their differences.  For example, the life of Plotinus was not solitary; neither was the life of Plato.  The house where Plotinus gave his lectures and where his students met, according to Porphyry’s description in The Life of Plotinus was a busy place with people coming and going and even the presence of children who were left in the care of Plotinus when their parents died.  Plato founded an Academy inhabited by students who were guided by Plato and perhaps other teachers as well.

But you can be alone even in the midst of other people.  This is a common observation and something that many people experience. 

4.2  It appears to me that ‘alone’ is a slightly more helpful translation because I think it is easier to link being alone to the inward turning that is at the heart of Platonic practice.  And I think it is easier to explain that this aloneness, this inward turning, is not a negative experience.

5.  The sentence opens by stating whom the sentence refers to, “This is the life of gods and godlike men.”  The opening refers to gods and godlike men.  I read this as indicating that gods and men have the ability to engage in the philosophical ascent to the Good and the One.  I interpret this as putting gods and humans on the same level in terms of their spiritual capacity or potential.  Gods can make the divine ascent if they pursue the path of renunciation and contemplation found in the Platonist tradition.  As I just mentioned, it places gods and humans on the same level.  Humans can ascend to the Good and the One and so can gods.  But most humans will not do so, and most gods will not do so.  This is because most gods and humans are distracted by sensory attractions and mental fabrications and desires.

5.1  My own view is a bit broader than this; I admit it is eccentric.  But I would not confine access to the divine ascent to the Good and the One to gods and humans.  I’ve mentioned this before, but I consider birth as an oak tree to be an auspicious birth because it allows for a contemplative existence and an embodied stability that would bring the oak, or could bring the oak, to the noetic.  In other words, I don’t map spiritual capacity based on evolutionary placement; I mean that just because a creature is more ‘advanced’ from an evolutionary perspective, does not mean that they are inherently more spiritually advanced.  Again, I realize this is a bit eccentric; I offer it for your consideration.

6.  The next phrase reads, “deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world.”  This sums up the essence of the Platonic Way of Life.  You can read about this in Dialogues like Phaedo.  It is a step by step, gradual path.  First you learn to withdraw from obviously harmful things of this world; you learn this through the system of ethical restraints which, again, are found in Dialogues like Phaedo.  You become a vegetarian, withdraw from harming animals by eating them or sacrificing them for the purposes of misguided rituals.  You refrain from acquiring luxuries.  And so forth.  This process of withdrawing, also often referred to as ‘turning away’, becomes broader and at the same time more subtle.

This is a life that has found the peace of transcendence; even if it is just a glimpse of that reality.  That peace surpasses the ‘delights’ of the things of this world.

Such a journey is slow and takes focus and dedication.  Indeed, it takes many lifetimes. 

7.  The closing phrase is famous, “escape in solitude to the solitary”, or “a flight of the alone to the Alone.”  As I said above, I prefer the ‘alone to the Alone’ over ‘solitude to the solitary’ because I think that ‘solitary’ doesn’t indicate strongly enough that this is an inward, contemplative, journey.  The usage also does not, in my opinion, really align with the lives of Platonists.  I mean by this that neither Plato nor Plotinus were solitaries (and, in addition, neither was Socrates).  There are examples in Platonic history of solitary practitioners (and I suspect that at this time and in this culture the way of the solitary practitioner might be particularly suitable) but the point is that physical solitude does not seem to be required for the ascent to the Good and the One if we go by the biographies of Plato and Plotinus.  And since this is Plotinus we are quoting, I think it is a particularly relevant point.

8.  But the usage of ‘alone’ has its own difficulties because many people equate ‘alone’ with loneliness; hence the title of this post.  I asked this question about Platonists and loneliness because I have heard Platonists mention this, and talk about this, over the years.  This comment about Platonists being lonely, or the Platonic Path being a lonely path, comes from a variety of perspectives; it’s not confined to a particular type of contemporary Platonism.  I think there are a number of reasons why this comes up.

8.1  The first is peculiar to our time and place.  To be a Platonist at this time and in this culture, is to be a stranger in a strange land.  Platonism is not in sync with the broad assumptions and first principles of the world we live in today.  Plato writes in some of his Dialogues about the philosopher who is culturally clumsy and the object of humor, or even derision; so this difficulty is not new.  But I do think the difficulty is more acute today simply because it is difficult to find others who regard Platonism as a spiritual path rather than just another philosophy like empiricism or naturalism or materialism. 

8.2  A second reason is that the specific path of Platonism has a different understanding of what today we call spirituality than is the one widely used.  Today ‘spirituality’ is primarily connected with self-help and is often explicitly oriented towards material goals, such as improving one’s job performance.  In contrast, Platonism is a renunciant tradition and advocates a life lived as simply as possible.  Platonism’s view was, for a long time, actually the dominant view of what spirituality means.  But in modernity terms like spirituality were transformed, often by psychology, into a therapeutic modality which in traditional terms is very far from spiritual commitments.  This is difficult for people to see because the therapeutic model is pervasive.

8.3  It is reasonable that a Platonist in today’s world would feel alone, and that this feeling of being alone would, at times, manifest as loneliness.  That is a natural consequence of the Platonic spiritual path in a culture that is focused on material gain and the cultivation of strife.

9.  But I don’t think that the term ‘alone’ in the sentence that is quoted actually refers to loneliness.  I suspect that the term refers to the way the Good and the One are sufficient unto themselves; that the Good and the One are ‘alone’ in the sense that the Good and the One are not reliant on anything else.  Rather, everything else is reliant on, dependent upon, the Good and the One, upon the transcendental, the transcendental as such. 

In this context the ‘alone’ here refers to the uniqueness of the Good, of the One, of the Eternal.  The Platonic path is a flight of the alone to the Alone because the Good and the One are present within us so that this unique, and eternal, presence is not far away.  I refer to this presence as our soul and it is turning away from that which is sensory to the soul, the presence of the Good and the One in the individual, that is the Platonic journey.

The ‘alone’ is the presence within of the ‘Alone’ that is transcendental and eternal.  Awakening to that presence is the sublime possibility of a human life.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 106

24 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 106

1.  Dwelling in the Past Because it is our Home

I was listening to a young, contemporary, British philosopher who, like many young British philosophers, is committed to the analytic tradition.  He had a quick, breezy way of talking about philosophy; and a kind of confidence that doesn’t seem to rest on broad learning.  He was suggesting that contemporary philosophers and students of philosophy should not waste their time reading philosophers from the past because only contemporary philosophers really know what they are talking about.  His conception of ‘philosophers from the past’ was vast and included Plato as well as figures like Wittgenstein, which surprised me.  But perhaps I should not have been surprised; the hostility towards the past is a defining feature of modernity and of ideological thinking (for example, Chairman Mao’s attack on the ‘four olds’ or the French Revolution’s systematic attempts to erase the past from France).  If you are able to see how this operates in contemporary thought and approaches to issues, strange as this talk I listened to may seem, it actually makes sense.  I admit I was somewhat surprised that Wittgenstein was included in the list of ‘past philosophers’ that we should not waste our time on; but modernist movements have a long history of turning on their own members as the movement inevitably breaks apart into differentiated factions (and in Laws Plato points out that factional disputes can be the most destructive kind of disagreement).

I’ve posted on this topic before, but I’m doing so again because it was such a pure example of this tendency to view the past solely as something to overcome rather than as a source of wisdom and insight.  I have difficulty thinking of a contemporary philosopher that rises to the level of Plato or Plotinus; I could be wrong, and that would make me happy.  But that’s how I see it.

So let us honor our philosophical ancestors by reading their works, contemplating their insights, and living the way of life that they have kindly placed before us.

2.  Private Shrines

Athenian:  “No one is to possess shrines in private households.  When someone has it in mind to sacrifice, he is to go to the public ones and sacrifice, and hand over his offerings to the Priests and Priestesses who supervise their purification; and he is to join in the prayers, and anyone else he wishes is to join in the prayers with him.

“These things are to be done for the following reasons: Shrines and gods are not easy to establish; doing this sort of thing correctly requires a certain amount of thought.  Yet it’s customary, especially for all women, and for those who are sick in some way, or in danger, or at a loss (in whatever way someone might be at a loss), or, conversely for those who’ve received a stroke of good luck, to make sacred whatever happens to be at hand at the time and promise to establish shrines to gods, daimons, and the children of gods; and through fears caused by waking phantoms or by dreams, and likewise when recalling many such visions, they produce remedies against each of them by filling every house and every district with altars and shrines, establishing them in open places and wherever someone happened to have such experiences.  For all these reasons, one must act in accord with the law now stated [against private household shrines]; . . . There is to be no possession of shrines in private households.”

(Plato, Laws, Book X, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 2022, pages 353-354, 909d-910c, ISBN:9781647920463)

2.1  I have to admit to being puzzled by this particular teaching.  There are several reasons.  First, I have a lot of experience with home altars, particularly from my period of Buddhist study and practice.  I am also familiar, from my studies in Japan, that those who practice Shinto often have a home altar known as a Kamidana.  And there are many other examples of traditions that suggest their practitioners have a modest home altar.  I have difficulty seeing this as disruptive or damaging.

2.2  People spontaneously create shrines at locations where something significant has happened to them.  The most common example I can think of in the U.S. are roadside shrines that mark where a car crash happened; these roadside shrines are usually a kind of memorial for someone who died in the crash.  Again, I have difficulty thinking of these as somehow damaging to good order in a political sense, or damaging to our relationship to the divine.

2.3  In East Asia, and many other cultural spheres, a shrine to the residents’ ancestors is common.  Regular rituals are conducted at the shrine for the ancestors. 

2.4  Plato seems to be concerned with the arising of what we might call ‘weird’ cults and these cults might find a foothold in a household context.  That is a problem; but so is the behavior of officials, like Priests, at public shrines, and I have difficulty distinguishing the dangers that either might generate.

2.5  I could see, for example, a household shrine for honoring our Platonic Ancestors.  I’m not thinking of anything elaborate (nothing theurgic); but my taste tends towards minimalism and others might want more elements on their Platonic Ancestors Altar than I would.  I don’t have a problem with that.  Such an altar would be for the purpose of veneration rather than sacrifice; I’m thinking it might mimic how ancestor veneration is done in various spiritual contexts.  Perhaps Plato would not be put off by such an arrangement because such veneration would not be a result of a private experience, nor would it be an attempt to introduce a new deity or form of worship; and these seem to be concerns of Plato in the quoted passage.

I’m not saying that such a Platonic Shrine should be required.  On the other hand, I don’t think it should be prohibited either.  And, in a way, I don’t think you can really effectively prohibit such activity because people, as I mentioned above, spontaneously produce such shrines in a variety of circumstances.

2.6  When I run into a teaching like this, where I have difficulty understanding what Plato (or Plotinus, when I’m reading Plotinus) is offering, I’ve learned to bracket the teachings and simply let them settle in my own mind.  I often find that later on, sometimes weeks later, sometimes much later, the purpose of the teaching becomes clear.  Perhaps this is such an example.

3.  Dionysius the Areopagite: Letter One

“To the monk Gaius:

“Darkness disappears in the light, the more so as there is more light.  Knowledge makes unknowing disappear, the more so as there is more knowledge.

“However, think of this not in terms of deprivation but rather in terms of transcendence and then you will be able to say something truer than all truth, namely, that the unknowing regarding God escapes anyone possessing physical light and knowledge of beings: His transcendent darkness remains hidden from all light and concealed from all knowledge.  Someone beholding God and understanding what he saw has not actually seen God himself but rather something of his which has being and which is knowable.  For he himself solidly transcends mind and being.  He is completely unknown and non-existent.  He exists beyond being and he is known beyond the mind.  And his quite positively complete unknowing is knowledge of him who is above everything that is known.”

(Dionysius the Areopagite, Letter One, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, translated by Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, Paulist Press, New York, 1987, page 263, ISBN: 9780809128389)

3.1  There are ten letters of Dionysius of various lengths.  Letter One is, I think, the shortest.  The focus of this Letter One is the nature of contemplation and what it means to be fully transcendent.

3.2  There is a strong thematic connection between Letter One and Mystical Theology, the brief, five page essay on the nature of the divine ascent.  It’s almost like Letter One is a kind of addendum to Mystical Theology.

3.2.1  For example, both Mystical Theology and Letter One play with the images of darkness and light; in Letter One the ultimate is at one point referred to as ‘transcendent darkness.’  (I like to use the phrase ‘luminous darkness’ when referring to the way Dionysius talks about the mystical and transcendental.)

3.3  Brief as Letter One is, there is a progression embedded in it.  The opening paragraph, two sentences long, offers us two examples of how opposites work.  First there is the relationship between darkness and light; light disappears darkness.  Then there is the relationship between knowledge and unknowing; just as light makes darkness disappear, knowledge makes unknowing disappear.  These are two examples of how some types of opposites are mutually exclusive.

3.3.1  The use of the word ‘unknowing’ is a usage that readers find scattered through his writings.  In the context of the second sentence of the first paragraph, the word ‘unknowing’ would appear to mean ‘ignorance’; that it to say that knowledge makes ignorance disappear.  But Dionysius uses ‘unknowing’ because he wants to make a point about how knowledge of the divine is also a kind of transcendental unknowing; see below.

3.3.2  This usage of the word ‘unknowing’ was used widely in subsequent Christian Mysticism.  A good example is The Cloud of Unknowing which is an anonymous text of mystical theology written in England in the late 14^th century.

3.4  In the first sentence of paragraph 2 (the third sentence) Dionysius suggests that we should not think of what he is referring to in terms of deprivation; rather we should think of what he is referring to in terms of transcendence.  It is natural to think of light and darkness by noting that light deprives us of the experience of darkness.  Similarly, knowledge deprives us of ignorance, or to use Dionysian terminology, of unknowing.

Instead, Dionysius offers that when encountering God through unknowing we ‘escape’ physical light and ‘knowledge of beings.’  I see this as Dionysius’s way of transcending being; in Platonic terms the Good and the One are beyond being.  In Dionysian terms, God is beyond light and knowledge of beings. 

In the next sentence Dionysius clarifies that transcendent darkness is hidden from light; I read this as meaning that the transcendental is metaphysically before light, prior to light, because transcendent darkness is the cause of light. 

3.5  “Someone beholding God and understanding what he saw has not actually seen God himself but rather something of his which has being and which is unknowable.”

This sentence is making the point that the ultimate is beyond our understanding.  The implication is that if we have a spiritual experience that also includes understanding then that is not the experience of God, or of the Good and the One.  An experience that includes understanding may be valuable, but it is an experience that is on the way to the ultimate, not the ultimate itself or as such.

3.6  There are three levels operating in this brief letter.  The first level is the sensory; for example the sensory experience of light.  The second level is the realm of being or nous or the realm of Platonic Forms.  These are abstract realities which can be accessed by mind which is why, I think, at one point Dionysius pairs mind and being.  The third level, the highest level, is beyond being and mind and is accessed only through mystical contemplation.  It is not difficult to see how this three tiered metaphysical cosmology is rooted in the Platonic tradition.

If we keep in mind this three-fold metaphysical cosmology we can comprehend that the shifting meanings of words like ‘dark’ and ‘light’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘unknowing’ take on different meanings depending on which level the term is pointing to.  This is similar to the way the word beauty is used in Plotinus and how the meaning of beauty shifts depending on if it is sensory beauty, noetic beauty, or transcendental beauty.

3.7  Dionysius concludes, “And this quite positively complete unknowing is knowledge of him who is above everything that is known.”  Here Dionysius is saying that unknowing leads to the knowledge of that which is above everything that is known.  Earlier Dionysius uses unknowing almost as a synonym for ignorance.  But here, at the conclusion, unknowing is transformed into the knowledge of God, the transcendental, what I would call the presence of eternity. 

3.8  I think the most important prior Platonic works for understanding Dionysius are Plato’s Parmenides and Enneads V and VI, particularly VI.9, by Plotinus.  Reading these before reading Dionysius will clarify many of the seemingly paradoxical passages of Dionysius, both in this Letter One and in Mystical Theology.

I have been told that there is strong evidence that Dionysius was familiar with the commentary on Plato’s Parmenides by Proclus.  I have not read this particular work, but if you are so inclined you might want to find the connections that scholars refer to.

3.9  The influence of Dionysius on Christian Mysticism is extensive and profound; both in Catholic and Orthodox traditions.  Dionysius is one of the most successful transplants of the Platonic tradition into another spiritual context where Platonism in this new environment was able to flourish.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 105

17 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 105

1.  The Crisis of Quietism

Now and then I search YouTube using the key words ‘Quietism’ and ‘Quietists’ because I want to see if anyone has posted something new on that topic.  There are not a lot of posts about Quietism and often when I search nothing new has been posted.  But now and then there is something new.

There was a period in my life when I studied the Quietists of the 17^th century; people like Miguel de Molinos, Madame Guyon, Archbishop Fenelon, Francois Malaval, and other more minor participants in that short-lived spiritual movement.  I still find their works attractive and insightful.

It is instructive that there are more than a few posts that criticize the ‘heresy’ of Quietism.  This is because, after an initial period of acceptance and even encouragement, the Catholic Church declared Quietism to be a dangerous heresy and suppressed the movement and its writings.  I think the main reason for the suppression of Quietism is that the Church came to the conclusion that Quietism undermined the place that rituals and practices such as the Eucharist and Rosary, have in the lives and practice of the Church and, further, that this would undermine the role of Priests and other Hierarchs.

There is some truth to this view; for example, there were documented instances where nuns stopped the practice of the rosary and instead practiced the prayer of interior silence.  I see this as a shift from meditation with a cultivation of mental focus, to contemplation which, using the Quietists’ mode of expression, lifts the soul to the presence of God who is beyond and prior to all forms. 

This step from a spiritual practice that is, in some sense, based on material realities, to the contemplation of that which transcends material realities is a difficult one.  I think this is understandable.  To let go of, to separate the soul from, all material realities, including intellectual or mental realities, is a simple but subtle practice.  The experience of the fully transcendental is sublime, but it is also unstable.  Plotinus writes about this, describing how his experience of the One ends with a return to the body, how the pull of the body makes stabilization of the experience of the transcendental delicate. 

It has been my experience that in many instances when people are introduced to the idea of contemplation that transcends all bodily and material reality, it is hard to understand what they are being asked to do.  That was my initial experience with contemplation.  The instructions for contemplation are not complex, but it is often difficult for people to understand how to actually do it and how to know that their practice has been fruitful.

There is another dimension to this difficulty and that is that material practices, or sensory based practices, can be the basis for constructing an institution; some of these institutions have great power by possessing a particular sensory practice.  Institutions are reluctant to allow for something that is ‘beyond’ their range of power and because of this there is a tendency to view such a practice as contemplation negatively.

Platonism is not immune from this tension.  Although a writer like Plotinus is remarkably clear about stepping into the beyond that is beyond being, beyond intellect or nous, not all subsequent Platonists agree with this kind of presentation (see especially Ennead VI).  Some Platonists after Plotinus directly attacked this idea and offered instead a view that it includes complex ceremonials as the ultimate means for aligning with the ultimate, and that ultimate is a bodily, material, manifestation, usually the gods.  I suspect that this kind of tension, the tension between going ‘beyond’ all material manifestation, including the manifestations of intellect, and the idea that there is a material practice that in some sense is the ultimate, is found in most spiritual traditions, if you look hard enough.

When I did my recent search on YouTube using the word ‘Quietism’, sure enough there were some new posts, or posts I hadn’t noticed before, focusing on the heretical nature of contemplation and the practice of interior silence.  For those of us who understand Platonism to be a contemplative tradition, I think that it is helpful to understand the way contemplation was treated, and is still treated, by many who have a strongly negative view of ‘separating the soul from the body.’  Understanding this tension and its sources has helped me to understand the difficult place that contemplation holds in our society today and in the world of spirituality in general.  And this understanding has helped me clarify in my own mind, what it is that contemplation offers, which is access to, and understanding of, the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, and the presence of Eternity.

2.  What is a Platonist?

I had a thought this last week; it is that a Platonist is someone who enjoys, and looks forward to, reading the Dialogues of Plato.  This probably sounds too simple, and I suppose it is.  But at another level I think it points out something about being a Platonist, or perhaps what I might refer to as the ‘activity’ of Platonism. 

A Platonist has a strong, one might say intimate, relationship to Plato’s writings.  These writings are considered to be a source of wisdom and of insight across a wide range of human activity and endeavors.  And Plato’s writings are inexhaustible which means that a Platonist can return to them and find new insights and practices each time the Platonist engages with these writings.

The closest example to this is, in my opinion, found in the Confucian tradition and how the Confucian Sage is thought of as deeply involved with the Confucian Canon of writings such as the Analects and the Great Learning and so forth.  In a similar way, a Sage in Platonism is someone who is deeply committed to a lifelong engagement with the writings of Plato.

3.  A Friend’s Comments

A friend is visiting and I am enjoying the company.  He has been reading Blogging Platonism, Volumes 1, 2, and 3 which I put together from my posts here and publish in book form, available on Amazon.  He has been enjoying them and has some good questions about some of my posts.  It’s interesting to me, and instructive, to learn what people who read the blog posts find significant and what kinds of questions arise from those posts.  It’s helpful to get that kind of feedback. 

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 104

10 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 104

1.  The Human Condition

As I’ve been rereading the Laws of Plato I have been struck by how little the human condition has changed.  This morning I read a section in Book XI which discusses conflict within the family that law needs to address.  The two specific examples are when a father wants to disown a son and remove the son from the family altogether, and when a son has concluded that a father is no longer of sound mind and needs to be removed from making binding decisions.  In the first case, where the father wants to disown and remove a son from the family, the law that Plato proposes is that the father has to gather a significant number of relatives from both the father’s and mother’s sides to whom the father presents his case.  The son then defends himself from the father’s accusations.  And the gathering of relatives, minus the father, mother, and son, then votes; if more than half of the gathering votes to disown the son then that is what happens.  In the case of a son dealing with a father who is no longer of sound mind, the son is to present his case to some elders who then make the determination.

These are very human situations that people still deal with today.  In fact, as we live longer, it has become fairly common for children to figure out how to take care of their parents as their capacities dwindle. 

The tendency in our culture is to think of ourselves as having advanced beyond previous cultures and their concerns; but passages like this one (and there are many in the Laws) suggest that the human condition is what it was and always will be.

2.  Comparing Buddhism and Platonism

I have often compared Buddhism and Platonism because I spent decades studying and practicing Buddhism, reading many of its key texts, reading Sutras and Commentaries, and having endless conversations with Buddhist friends.  Buddhism was a big part of my life.  I’m not the only one who is making this kind of comparison; there seems to be a steady flow of Westerners who studied and practiced Buddhism and then at some point turned to Platonism as the focus of their spiritual understanding and as the guide to a genuine spiritual path.  How these comparisons are made varies depending on what kind of Buddhism was being practiced.  I have noticed, for example, that hose who practiced Buddhist Tantra, also known as Vajrayana, tend to focus primarily on metaphysics and they tend to compare and contrast Buddhist and Platonist metaphysics and/or cosmology. 

What I have consistently noticed is that comparing the metaphysics of Buddhism and Platonism quickly becomes complicated.  I think it is difficult, or at least a challenge, to meaningfully compare the two spiritual traditions from the perspectives of metaphysics and cosmology.  It can be done, but doing so seems to stretch one or both of the traditions so that one can find points of association or contact.

It is my own opinion that where Buddhism and Platonism really meet is in the cultivation of ethical restraints, that is to say the cultivation of asceses, or asceticism.  There is a remarkable commonality between the two traditions as to what kinds of ethical restraints and prohibitions should be practiced.  I’m not saying the two systems of ethical restraints are identical, but I am saying that there are a surprising number of shared demands on practitioners as to what ethical restraints are essential for purification and spiritual growth. 

3.  Humpty Dumpty

I sometimes humorously think of contemporary Platonism as resembling Humpty Dumpty from the famous children’s rhyme.  For those not familiar, Humpty falls off a brick wall and breaks into pieces, “All the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put Humpty together again.”

I say this because of the great variety of interpretations of Platonism circulating in the world today.  And, furthermore, that these interpretations are at times incompatible. 

I’m aware that Platonism has been extremely fertile in presenting multiple interpretations of central insights and that this happened very early in the history of Platonism.  For example, Aristotle reconfigured the nature of Platonic Forms, and there have been other examples like this.  What I have observed, though, is that in Classical Platonism these kinds of variations didn’t seem to fragment Platonism into rival factions.  In fact, I see in Classical Platonism consistent attempts at reconciliation such as interpreting Aristotle in a way that diminishes, or eliminates, or subordinates, the differences between Aristotle and Classical Platonism as a whole.

Today the situation looks different to me.  Perhaps I am overinterpreting this, but the different streams of Platonism don’t seem to be inclined to interact and I have observed that in at least some cases a particular interpretation is adamant about its greater explanatory range and merit.

I don’t think there is anything that can be done about this; I think it is just a matter of letting this moment of intense differentiation within Platonism run its course.  Patience is, I think, the best response in this situation.

4.  Safe Harbor

Everyone knows that life is difficult; it’s not unusual for people to say exactly that.  Any human life is faced with challenges; happiness is rare and brief while strife is frequent and enduring.

When I read the works of Plato, when I read the works of the Platonic tradition such as the works of Plotinus, I feel like I have found a safe harbor from the inevitable difficulties, the inevitable storms, of life.  Reading even a few pages of one of Plato’s Dialogues, or a few paragraphs from the Enneads of Plotinus is in itself to experience the possibility of peace, serenity and transcendence.  This is a great gift; I would call it a grace.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 103

3 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 103

1.  Lloyd Gerson on Proclus

Lloyd Gerson has published his analysis of Proclus in his latest book, The Platonism of Proclus.  Its release date is not specified, but it looks like it will be some time this year.  It’s interesting to me that, according to the write-up on the book on Amazon, Gerson approaches Proclus through the commentaries that Proclus wrote on various Platonic dialogues.  According to the write-up there are about 3,000 pages of portions of these dialogues that have survived.

The choice Gerson has made to base his study of Proclus on these commentaries, instead of works like The Elements of Theology or Platonic Theology is unusual; at least as far as I have observed there is a tendency to focus on these kinds of works in contemporary scholarship on Proclus, though I might be wrong about that.  This shift in focus will, I think, generate a ‘different’ Proclus than the one who emerges from reading works like the Elements.

I’m not a fan of Proclus, but I am a big fan of Gerson.  I look forward to reading Gerson’s book on Proclus and finding out how Gerson interprets Proclus.

2.  Transcendence

There is a YouTube channel that I listen to now and then.  The presenter has studied the Dialogues of Plato thoroughly and can easily refer to them and often paraphrases key passages.  The presenter is focused on political philosophy and interprets Plato in the tradition of Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, and Alexander Dugan, among others.  His understanding of Plato’s philosophy is that Plato is primarily a political philosopher and he doesn’t really go into other aspects of Platonism.

When listening to one of his recent talks I became aware of how he uses the word ‘transcendence.’  He used the word frequently in this particular talk so I got a good sample of how he understands ‘transcendence.’  When he used the word transcendence what he meant was moving from a limited context to more encompassing context; meaning that when you shift your understanding from a more limited view to a less limited view you are ‘transcending’ the limited view or understanding. 

This is how he maintains his focus on Plato as a political philosopher (and I wonder if others who maintain this idea also use ‘transcendence’ in this way; I’ll have to listen to them to see if it is a general pattern).  So even when Platonist writings speak of the transcendental he interprets that in worldly terms. 

This is not unusual; many people use the word ‘transcendence’ in this way.  Carl Jung uses it that way.  And I once heard a recording of a talk by Roger Scruton in which he used the word in exactly that way which kind of surprised me. 

You might think of this way of understanding transcendence as ‘horizontal’, like shifting focus from a small forest grove to the forest as a whole; something like that.  Or, perhaps, shifting one’s focus from a particular symphony to the symphonic tradition as a whole.  Like I said, it’s a common way of understanding what ‘transcendence’ means.

But in Platonism transcendence is ‘vertical’; to transcend means to leave behind material reality as the focus of one’s attention.  This is done by turning away from sensory stimulation, whether pleasurable, painful, or neither pleasurable nor painful.  It is the practice of the asceses that trains us to engage in such turning away.

Transcendence in Platonism is not aimed at a larger context; it is aimed at the experience of the ineffable (which is prior to all contexts) rather than a more convincing explanation of some aspect of reality or mental formulation.  The Good and the One are ineffable; as Plotinus points out the Good is not good.  We call it the Good, as a kind of stand-in for its actual reality which is beyond affirmation or negation and beyond conceptualization. 

I think this is difficult for people to understand.  The contemplation of the ineffable is simple, but it is, at first, difficult to recognize, and difficult to stabilize.  But that is the reality of transcendence that Platonism asks of us.

3.  Hidden Heritage

I listened the other day to another person who wants to merge Platonism with Buddhist Tantra.  Naturally they think of theurgy as the culmination of Platonism and draw upon the authors who wrote from a theurgic perspective and then attempt to show significant similarities between Theurgy and Tantra (usually Tibetan Buddhist Tantra, but they sometimes make brief references to Shaivism and its Tantric manifestations as well).

What came to mind after listening to the presentation is the idea that Platonism is, in a sense, a hidden heritage.  By that I mean that for over one thousand years, Platonism was embedded in other spiritual traditions who interpreted Platonism as insufficient on its own terms and needed something additional in order to be complete; this additional something was supplied by the non-Platonist tradition.  Christianity was the most successful among those traditions that took this approach.

When I say that Platonism is a ‘hidden heritage’ I mean that Platonism as a sufficient spiritual tradition that does not need supersessionist assistance.  What I am intuiting is that contemporary theurgy is replicating this context by arguing that wisdom is insufficient for the divine ascent and that therefore carefully crafted rituals (some of which can violate, or at least undermine, basic Platonist ethics) is essential.  It’s like the centuries long habit of having Platonism embedded in other spiritual contexts is internalized, but instead of using Christianity, they use theurgy.

This is just an intuition, but it arises out of my reading of theurgic works both ancient and modern and being impressed by how casually ceremonial efficacy is substituted for wisdom. 

3.1  Rereading this, it came to me that perhaps I mean something more like a ‘hidden hermitage’ than ‘hidden heritage’.  The two aren’t contradictory, but I think the image of Platonism as a hidden hermitage leads in nourishing directions.  Platonism is about turning away from, or turning around (periogoge, apostrophe).  It is a turning away from basing one’s life on sensory gratification and fulfilling pleasures.  It is a turning towards soul and its presence and following its guidance to the One.  It is a turning away from the unsatisfactory nature of material existence to the serenity of the hermitage of the transcendental.

3.2  Rereading this again, I think what I posted could be construed as asserting that Platonism, or Orthodox Platonism, to use Gerson’s phrase, is in some way sealed off from interacting with other traditions.  That isn’t what I am getting at.  What I am getting at is that a tradition like Buddhism does not normally think of its tradition as needing ‘completion’ by following, say for example, Confucianism.  Imagine if East Asian Buddhism elevated the teachings of Confucius above, or over, those of the Buddhist tradition itself.  I’m not saying that East Asian Buddhism was not influenced by Confucianism, I’m pointing out that the relationship between East Asian Buddhism and Confucianism was not one of supersessionism.  In contrast, the Platonic tradition has been in a relationship with other spiritual traditions in exactly that way, primarily through the way traditions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have placed Platonism in a ‘handmaid’ role.  It is my view that Theurgy does exactly the same thing to Platonism and that the move that Theurgy makes vis a vis Platonism is structurally the same as other spiritual traditions; that is to say the Theurgic tradition's relationship to traditional, or Orthodox Platonism, is that of supersessionism.

What I think is needed is for Platonism to become confident of itself in the sense that Platonism is a complete spiritual tradition with the insights and resources to function as a guide for spiritual understanding, transcendence, and awakening to the presence of eternity. 

4.  Natural

There is a section in Laws, Book X, beginning about 891c, where Plato discusses first principles.  Plato contrasts those who think of first principles as found in nature with those who think of first principles as transcendental.  Plato begins by referring to those who consider fire, water, earth, and air are the first principles.

This reminded me of the discussion in Phaedo where Socrates talks about how he was, as a young man, initially attracted to Anaxagoras, but was disappointed by Anaxagoras’s material explanations of causation (even though Anaxagoras seemed, when Socrates first encountered him, to place Mind as a first principle).  In Laws Plato points out that those who think of the elementals as first principles argue that soul is derivative of the elementals.  The Platonist view is that soul precedes elementals and material realities, that the immaterial precedes the material, and is the foundation for that which is material.  You can read modern philosophers such as Bernardo Kastrup arguing the same thing (I’m not saying that Kastrup is a Platonist). 

The more I read and reread Plato I find these kinds of connections between dialogues.  I sometimes like to say that Plato’s Dialogues are actually a single book with each dialogue being a chapter; one reason I say this is because of the way insights and themes are revisited, expanded, sometimes amended.  This offers the sense that the reader is sharing in the unfolding thoughts of Plato over time, even when Plato is talking about the timeless.  I find that feeling very inviting.