Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 96

25 May 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 96

1.  More on the Unity of the Platonic Tradition

I was thinking about my previous post that focused on the disagreements among scholars regarding the continuity of the Platonic tradition.  To refresh readers, some scholars take a developmental approach both to the tradition of Platonism as a whole, and also to Plato as an individual thinker and philosopher.  Others regard the Platonic tradition, and the thought of Plato, as fundamentally unified both in the individual thought of Plato and in the Platonic tradition as a whole.

What I have been thinking is that the unity of the Platonic tradition, and of Plato’s writings, flows from the unity of the tradition’s primary focus which is the Good and the One, the ineffable transcendental.  Ultimate reality, that reality from which all else emerges, is primal, changeless, unending, unlimited, beyond affirmation and negation.  Platonism is rooted in the experience of this reality of an eternal transcendent unity and I think it is this that gives Platonism its own sense of being a unified tradition.

2.  The Political Perspective

One aspect of contemporary Platonism that I have noticed is a tendency to view Platonism through a political lens and/or through ideological categories.  One of the most influential streams of contemporary Platonism is the one that is rooted in the analyses of Leo Straus who has had a significant impact on many people’s interpretation of Plato at this time.  There is a lot of controversy around Strauss and how his views have impacted specific events over the last few decades.  But that’s not what I want to focus on (as an aside, both Strauss’s detractors and defenders regarding these events make what I call a ‘good case’ for their points of view).  I want to offer that Strauss’s emphasis on politics in Platonism is in itself problematic.  What I have observed is that his critics, with some exceptions, tend to accept that Plato is primarily, or at least significantly, a political philosopher and both Strauss himself, Strauss’s followers, and Strauss’s critics, for the most part, share this perspective.  This sidelines what I consider to be the actual focus of Plato’s teachings which is to transcend the material world, including politics, but not exceptionally politics.  

The emphasis on politics turns Plato into a worldly philosopher who can be compared to other political philosophers; this in turn transforms Plato into a modernist by shaping Platonism into an ideological theory like other ideological theories.  I think this is unfortunate.

I don’t mean to say that Plato does not speak about politics.  But Plato writes about many things and I don’t see politics as having a special emphasis in his writings.  For example, Plato writes a lot about poetry and its effect on the soul and on the human community; but I don’t think that means that Plato has a primary focus on aesthetics (on the other hand, Plato does have a primary focus on beauty because beauty can lead to the Good and the One).  Another example is Plato’s writings on music; but I don’t think these passages about music turn Plato into a music theorist.  In a similar way, when Plato does talk about politics, which I think is rarer than is often suggested, I don’t infer from this that Plato is a political philosopher.

I think it is difficult to see this comparison (between Plato’s writings on politics and Plato’s writings on poetry or music) because at this time our culture overemphasizes the significance of politics.  I’m not saying that politics has no significance, but I wouldn’t say music has no significance either.  My suggestion is that politics is just one aspect of our lives in this material world and not the most important aspect.

What I think is necessary for Platonists today is to view Platonism as primarily a spiritual tradition and to view Plato as a spiritually realized human being whose writings are a roadmap to the transcendental. 

3.  Some Remarks about Soul

It has occurred to me that the disputes about soul, the soul’s nature, its placement in the metaphysical layers (hypostases) of Platonism, and other issues, has come about because Platonism has presented us with a view of soul that is complex and that this complexity invites variations in understanding and emphases.  I started thinking this way after two brief essays about soul in Platonic Pathways which is a collection of essays from the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies.  The first essay is by Gregory Shaw, ‘Alienation and Divinization: Iamblichus’ Theurgic Vision’, and the second is by Sam Webster, ‘Iamblichus’ Method for Creating Theurgic Sacrifice’.  When I was working at a Spiritual Bookstore, I met Sam Webster and had some discussions with him at dinner after the event.  I’ve never met Gregory Shaw, but Shaw is well known for interpreting Platonic theurgy as a kind of Western Tantra.  In both of these essays the complex soul found in Platonist works is accepted as a kind of starting point.  This seems to be normal for the Platonic tradition; for example, you find Plotinus discussing the parts of the soul, how these parts function, how these parts relate to each other, how these parts interact with the metaphysical levels of existence, and so forth.  It seems to be the case that Platonists don’t disagree about the complexity of the soul, but they do disagree about how that complexity is distributed.

I suspect that one of the reasons that I shifted my understanding of soul from this complex cluster of parts view to the idea that the soul is partless was in part (no joke intended) due to a desire to simplify the presentation of soul in Platonism, though I wasn’t aware of this consciously.  And there are passages in Ennead VI where Plotinus refers to the inherent simplicity of the soul and that the soul, or at least the higher part of the soul, is undivided; as I recall Plotinus is contrasting the divdedness of the material body with the simplicity, and implied unity, of the soul.  I’m not saying that Plotinus views the soul as partless in the way I am suggesting; on the other hand, the simplicity of the soul leans in that direction.

As I have said before, I view the soul as the presence of transcendent unity, the Good and the One, in the material individual.  Without the presence of this transcendent unity there would be no particular things, no things at all.  It is soul, as the instantiation of the One, the instantiation of transcendent unity, that provides a sense of unity to our lives.  This happens because the soul is everywhere (a point Plotinus makes) and therefore permeates bodily existence.

The ‘presence’ I am referring to is like the presence of moonlight in a pond.  It seems that the moonlight in the pond is a separately existing entity but that is a mistake in perception.  Moonlight is actually ‘everywhere,’ but only appears to be isolated in the pond.  Similarly, the individual soul is the everywhere of the One when manifesting in the realm of time and matter; time and matter produce the misunderstanding of the soul’s limitation and separation and perhaps time is the ultimate origin of the complexity of theories about the soul.

In Platonist literature the soul has many functions; that is why the soul is complex in the writings of Platonism.  Conceptually, I transfer these functions of the complex soul to mind and thereby preserve the functions of traditional Platonism even as I alter the placement of these functions.  My view is that whenever I notice that a function of soul is an act of differentiation, or depends on differentiation, I use that as a signal to transfer that function to mind.  By ‘mind’ I am referring specifically to the act, or function, of differentiation in the individual.  The noetic is the source of differentiation because it is at nous that differentiation first appears.  Mind, then, is the presence of the noetic function of differentiation in the material individual.

This view of soul differs from the standard view of Platonism in that Platonic literature usually views the individual soul as emerging from the world soul; in other words, the world soul is an emanation of nous.  I take a different view.  I think of soul as a ‘first thing’ which means soul is a seemingly separate manifestation of the everywhere and everywhen nature of the Good and the One.  Mind is a ‘second thing’, that is to say a noetic thing and it is in mind that differentiation is found.  The soul does not make differentiations because the Good and the One are unity as such.  Due to the third level’s nature as temporal and material, the soul seems to be individuated and differentiated from other souls. 

From the theurgic perspective, the soul is separated from the One and ‘trapped’, or ‘isolated’, from the Good and the One.  From the perspective of traditional Platonism the soul is an emanation from nous and has knowledge of, and/or experience of, the Good and the One when the soul turns to that which is higher than the noetic; or part of the soul has this background. 

From the perspective of what I have outlined as the partless nature of the soul, the soul does not descend, the soul does not completely descend as in the theurgic perspective, nor does it partially descend as in the traditional perspective found in Plotinus.  Instead, I am suggesting that the soul is the actual presence of the Good and the One, the actual presence of eternity, in the material individual, but that this does not happen through emanation; instead it happens through differentiation.  This presence happens because of the everywhere, everywhen, and everything nature of the Good and the One, which is also true of the soul because the soul is the presence of the Good and the One.  Here is a schematic for comparing these views:

Traditional Platonism -- The soul is partially descended into  the body

Theurgic Platonism -- The soul is fully descended into the body

My reconfiguration -- The soul has never descended into the body but the soul is present to the body; the soul is the presence of eternity

3.1  I suspect that the complexity of the Platonic view of the soul may be an indication of, or due to, accretions over time.  This is a view that some Platonic scholars have held and it makes sense to me.  I think these accretions have their source in traditions before Platonism emerged.  Platonism inherited a range of views from earlier traditions such as Pythagoreanism, Orphism, Egyptian spirituality, and perhaps some Mystery traditions as well.  The complexity of the soul in Platonism might be due to these multiple sources and an attempt to reconcile different ways of viewing the nature of the soul and how the soul works.

This is similar to the way Platonism reconciled divergent Presocratic views such as that of Parmenides and Heraclitus; by placing the views of Heraclitus as applicable to the material realm, while the view of Parmenides is applicable to the Noetic, and particularly Being as such.

This complexity continued within the Platonist tradition, particularly in the tradition’s post-Plotinian period.  I’m referring to the disputes about whether the soul is fully descended or partially descended, a dispute that continues to this day.  The complexity of the soul presented in the dialogues may have created fertile ground for generating further differences of view within the Platonist tradition itself.

3.2  There seems to be a natural tendency to make systems of thought complex over time.  Plotinus criticizes the Gnostics for unnecessarily making Plato’s intuition about hypostases and how they work into a complex, and at times difficult to access, multiplication of levels and regions.  Some people enjoy the mental gymnastics such complex systems of thought are dependent upon, but Plotinus regards Gnostic complexities as distractions and I also think that Plotinus thinks these complexities are mental creations that are not based on actual experience of these multiplied levels and regions.

But here is my intuition about the soul: I don’t think the complexity of the soul in Platonism is necessary.  Perhaps I am wrong about that; nevertheless, I am following the path of understanding that this intuition has opened.

3.3  I have posted about this in the past.  I bring it up again because I like to share my thoughts about this topic (the nature of the soul) and because as my investigations into this topic proceed I uncover new insights that I want to share with readers.  Putting these thoughts down and posting them is in itself a way of ‘thinking out loud’ about the soul; through the process of writing them down and sharing them with others I am able to see more clearly what my thoughts are and where they are leading.

4.  Alienation

I’ve been thinking that as someone becomes more and more steeped in Platonism, and becomes more and more of a Platonist, that a sense of alienation from the society at large is an almost inevitable result.  I see this particularly with the impact of Platonist ethics on someone who practices the path of Platonism and cultivates both the Virtues and the Restraints.  Take, for example, Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation found in Crito and The Republic.  This is not how people normally live their lives; these teachings are a great challenge and internalizing them, living by them, emphasizes how the life of a Platonist differs from the life that is offered by the society in which the Platonist dwells.

5.  War as Anti-Ethics

An important feature of war is that during war participants are allowed, and even honored, to engage in actions that when done in peacetime are considered immoral, even heinous.  Killing another person during peacetime will bring to the person who did this a great deal of condemnation.  During war, in contrast, killing others, many of whom are total strangers, may bring praise and lifelong admiration.  This is true even when the usage of modern weaponry results in mass casualties.

It is in this context that I read the opening section of Laws where the three participants in the dialogue discuss if the laws of a State should be for the purpose of always being ready for war, or whether they should be for the purpose of creating and upholding peace.  I think it is the longest discussion of peace and war in the Platonic Dialogues and I think its reasoning is deep and subtle.

Ethics in Platonism, including the Virtues and the Restraints, are principles which in turn are instantiations of the principle of the necessity for purification.   Causing harm disorders the soul and makes it more difficult to access higher realms of existence.  And because this is a principle, it is generally applicable, without carveouts for exceptions such as war. 

I write this on Memorial Day here in the U.S.  May peace blossom in the hearts of all.

6.  Is Western Philosophy Exhausted?

Now and then I run into a contemporary philosopher who thinks of Western Philosophy as done; that basically Western Philosophy has run its course and is unable to generate any further insights or make progress.  I have a different view.  Looking at metaphysics, I don’t see the goal of metaphysics as one of reaching a final and complete statement about ultimate reality.  I see the work of metaphysics as presenting understanding of ultimate reality, but because ultimate reality is beyond affirmation and negation, because ultimate reality is eternal, all metaphysical statements regarding ultimate reality hover around what they are talking about but are not what they are talking about as such.

There’s nothing wrong with this; I don’t even think it is particularly exceptional.  Cookbooks present variations on how to make bread; there is no final recipe for making bread.  It is an activity that continually renews itself.

My feeling is that when I run across this kind of sentiment it is always, if memory serves, from someone who is affiliated with a University.  I can understand how such feelings would arise in this context because the liberal arts are being steadily trimmed, and even ejected, from Colleges and Universities and there doesn’t seem to be anything to be done about it at this time.  But the field of philosophy is not confined to any specific institution; you find it wherever someone seeks a resolution to the question of eternity.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 95

18 May 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 95

1.  Some Notes on the Periphyseon

I’ve been reading the Periphyseon: The Divisions of Nature by Johannes Scotus Eriugena, translated by I. P. Sheldon Williams.  I find it inspiring.  Eriugena lived about 810-877.  He was an Irish monk who ended up at the court of Charles the Bald, Emperor of the Carolingian Empire and grandson of Charlemagne.  The Periphyseon is a masterpiece in philosophy and theology that is heavily influenced by Platonism.

Eriugena translated from Greek to Latin the Mystical Theology, a short work, about five or six pages long.  Mystical Theology is one of several works attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite.  This short treatise is foundational for Christian Mysticism both in the Latin West and the Orthodox East, its influence being extensive to the present day.  I’ve covered this before, but the dating of Dionysius and his works is highly controversial.  I won’t go into the details of these disputes, but for our purposes it is sufficient to know that Mystical Theology was written centuries before Eriugena and at the time of Eriugena there were no disputes about its authenticity or dating.

By bringing the Mystical Theology to the Latin West Eriugena was instrumental in transmitting the perspective of Mystical Platonism because the structure of both Mystical Theology and the Periphyseon are thoroughly Platonic.  For example, the emanationist structure of the hypostases is found in all these philosophers.  And the vision of a return to the ultimate, to the One, to God, is seen as the purpose of human life and it is what constitutes the task of the philosopher.

1.1  In the ‘Introduction’ to the Periphyseon Eriugena is quoted as writing, “no one enters  into heaven except through philosophy.”  This quote is not from the Periphyseon; rather it is from another of Eriugena’s works, a commentary on The Wedding of Philology and Mercury by Martianus Capella (who flourished in the early 400’s, or fifth century).  Unfortunately I have not read this work; it sounds very interesting.  It had a big impact on the Late Roman Empire and was widely read.  It is an elaborate allegory and is described as having weird or bizarre metaphors.  Eriugena knew the work well enough to write a commentary on it, which points to Eriugena’s wide reading and study.

1.2  But I want to return to the quote “no one enters into heaven except through philosophy.”  What I find in this quote is that Eriugena retains the view that philosophy is salvific.  And what Eriugena means by ‘philosophy’ is Platonism.

1.2.1  To give an idea of how thoroughly Eriugena has absorbed the Platonic tradition, here is a quote from the Periphyseon:

“For as there is nothing that is good by its nature, except (the divine nature) itself, but everything which is said to be good is so by participation in the One Supreme Good, so everything which is said to exist exists not in itself but by participation in the Nature which truly exists.”  (Page 40)

I see a quote like this as embedded in the Platonist tradition, particularly in Plotinus.

1.2.2  I think that the way Eriugena views philosophy as salvific is also to be found in the Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius.  It is Lady Philosophy who guides Boethius in his hour of need to a deeper understanding of his situation and how to transcend it.

1.2.3  What I think this suggests is that there is an early period of Christian philosophy that was prior to the separation of philosophy and theology in the Christian tradition.  What I pick up from works like the Consolation and Periphyseon is that there is an early period where Christianity was more porous, more open to, and had a less guarded attitude towards, Greek and Roman philosophy.  This is complicated because I think that there were definitely early Christian theologians who wanted to separate theology and philosophy.  But what Boethius and Eriugena suggest is that this view was not a done deal at the time, and that there were others who didn’t feel conflicted when they saw Philosophy, and Platonism in particular, as salvific; I mean that they didn’t see that being Christian and regarding philosophy as salvific as somehow undermining their Christian commitments.

I think that is difficult for us to grasp because for many centuries that is what Christianity has taught.  I mean that Christianity has taught that Philosophy is deficient, that Philosophy cannot, therefore, be salvific.  I’m not sure exactly when the shift occurred, but I doubt it was very long after Eriugena.  More study is necessary.

1.3  It is the salvific nature of Platonism that I am primarily referring to when I say that Platonism more closely resembles Dharma traditions than what philosophy has become in the modern period in the West.  The West has lost (abandoned?) the idea that philosophy has a purpose, a transcendental purpose, and without that purpose philosophy loses its center and wanders around in various analytical endeavors. 

Platonism offers the possibility of returning to a salvific understanding of philosophy, a return to transcendence and wisdom.

2.  The Spirituality of the Text

I was talking the other day, on the phone, with a friend who, like me, has a fondness for Plotinus.  One of the things we talked about was experiencing a kind of spiritual energy flowing from the Enneads when reading it.  It feels like a transmission of higher energy or higher wisdom.  It’s not easy to describe, but it’s there; kind of like the way it is difficult to describe how a piece of music has impacted one’s life.  We also talked about how this happens even though both of us read translations of Plotinus.  I think this indicates that there is a source that is prior to language which is being communicated through language in the writings of Plotinus.

3.  Paul Brunton Wanders the World

I was listening to a talk about Paul Brunton the other day.  The talk began with a brief biography.  One thing that struck me is that Brunton (1898 to 1981) had to do a lot of traveling to meet teachers from various traditions.  This included sojourns to India, Egypt, and other locations.  It was quite a journey.

This contrasts with our experience today where all the material that Brunton sought out is now available online making it easily accessible.  Brunton is a good contrast because he lived a short time ago and this shows us how the situation has dramatically changed in terms of accessing texts and teachers.  Even in my own life I can recall when I was in High School going to a bookstore and finding only a single work on Buddhism, a collection of edited quotes from various sources.  That began to change in the 60’s. 

I don’t think that makes the spiritual journey easier necessarily, but it is a change in the context of spirituality at this time compared to when Brunton was making his journeys.

4.  Edward P. Butler’s New Book

Edward P. Butler has published a collection of his essays through the Prometheus Trust (for those in the U.S. Prometheus Trust books are available at kindredstarbooks (dot) com).  The book promptly sold out after its release, which I think was last month.  I’m not sure when it will be back in stock, but the Prometheus Trust is fairly good about keeping its books available to people (I once saw that Thomas Taylor’s treatise on Aristotle sold out but it was soon back in stock). 

Butler is a prominent Neo-Pagan Platonist who is steeped in the writings of Proclus in particular.  He has worked on developing a Polytheistic Metaphysics and, as I understand it, argues that Polytheism as a metaphysical stance more closely aligns with Platonism than the other interpretations often associated with the Platonic tradition.

Personally, I lean towards a monistic interpretation of Platonism, but I think it is always helpful to test one’s understanding against what others think because even if one does not change one’s mind, such testing sharpens one’s understanding and clarifies why one has adopted the interpretation one has adopted.

5.  On Ritual

I have a fondness for ceremony and ritual.  When I was studying Buddhism one of the things I liked about Buddhism was the rich ceremonial life found in the Buddhist tradition.  Some spiritual traditions consist mostly of rituals with very little in the way of doctrine, theology, or philosophy; I am thinking in particular of the Shinto tradition.

At the same time, I have an aversion to theurgy; in particular the way theurgy was injected into Late Classical Platonism.  To my mind, theurgy weakened and undermined Platonism and continues to do so; I say this because from my perspective, theurgy undermines the ethics of Platonism as well as the metaphysics of Platonism.  I have posted about this before so I won’t repeat the sources of my aversion.

For those of us who think that ritual and ceremony can serve a useful function in spiritual traditions, and therefore a useful function in Platonism, I suggest that we need to break free from the virtual monopoly that theurgy has held on ritual in the Platonic tradition and explore other ritual modalities that might prove more useful and more aligned to Platonism as we see it.

A simple example is ritual veneration of Platonist Ancestors.  This has precedence in Platonic history and is mentioned in Porphyry’s The Life of Plotinus.  The ceremony consists of a shared vegetarian meal on the day dedicated to Plato and Socrates.  After the meal those present would share an essay, or an insight, related to Platonism.  We don’t have all the details of how this was done, exactly, at the home (ashram) of Plotinus, but we have the general outline.

I’m going to offer another example of a ritual that might find a home in the Platonic tradition if people find it inspiring enough.  I read about this ceremony many years ago in a book about Daoism, but I can’t recall which one (possible the book by Maspero, or perhaps John Blofeld).  I’m recalling the general outlines of the ceremony rather than the details; I’m not claiming that what is written below is a ‘Daoist Ritual’.  I’m using it because both Daoism and Platonism are emanationist traditions and the ritual emphasizes that understanding.

The ceremony begins in a darkened room, which means the curtains might be drawn and that the lighting should be muted. 

When the ceremony begins someone lights a large white candle on a table (note: today the candle might be an electric candle in which case the candle would be turned on).

Then the flame of the large white candle is used to light three candles that form a circle, or a triangle, around the central candle, or an arc in front of the central candle.  These three candles can be different colors and they should be smaller than the central candle.  From these three candles further candles are lit at various distances from the three candles; these are smaller still (they could be birthday cake size) and they are scattered throughout the room.  (If you are using electric candles all that is necessary is to walk from one candle to the next one and turn the candle on.)

Following some silence, the process is reversed until only the large white central candle remains lit.  The large central candle is extinguished and there is a period of silence as the room returns to muted darkness.  The ceremony could close by turning on the house lights and having a shared meal.

This is very simple.  It is also flexible.  In the Daoist ceremony, passages from the Dao De Ching that focus on emanation are chanted.  Something similar could be done in Platonism by reading topically relevant passages from the Dialogues or the Enneads.  And a simple chant, like ‘Return to the One’ could be effective.

Although I think this ceremony could be done at any time during the year, I also think it would be helpful to time, to align, the ceremony to one of the solar stations; personally I think the Spring Equinox is a good candidate, but other solar stations could also be used, and it would be possible to have this ceremony on more than one of the solar stations.  I make this suggestion because the sun is a major symbol in the Platonic tradition that is rich in meaning and it is, I think, helpful to connect with that symbolism. 

This is a simple ritual which is a kind of ceremonial metaphor for the process of emanation and its connection to the philosophical ascent.  It’s not difficult to access.  It’s not esoteric.  It’s a celebration of the One that gives rise to all things.

6.  Desert Wind

It has been very windy in the desert valley where I live.  The valley is surrounded by mountains, but there are two breaks in the mountain ranges and if the wind is coming from just the right direction it comes through and cools the heat of the desert valley. 

In a way spiritual experiences resemble a great wind.  Often spiritual experiences undermine how we previously viewed the world.  And this kind of experience isn’t like changing one’s mind about who is the best composer or who one should vote for.  A spiritual experience can be much more fundamental, impacting what we think the nature of existence is and what the purpose of human life is.

On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

11 May 2026

On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

1.  Among contemporary academic scholars of the Platonic tradition there is disagreement about the continuity of the Platonic tradition, meaning whether or not there is a demonstrable unity to be found in Platonism across the thousands of years of the Platonic tradition’s history.  This is not surprising.  I think it arises, at least in part, from disputes about whether Plato’s thought developed over the course of the Dialogues or if Plato’s writings present a unified vision.  Some argue for a developmental view; for example, they interpret the dialogue Parmenides as, in part, a refutation, or a reconfiguration, of the theory of forms (noetic realities, eternal objects) of the way this view is presented in dialogues like Phaedo and The Republic.  Those who hold to the dialogues as presenting a unified vision interpret Parmenides as a further elaboration of the theory of forms rather than displacing an earlier understanding of this theory.

I also find this view of disjunctive developmentalism in the history of the Platonic tradition in the way that Plotinus is treated by many (perhaps most?) Platonic scholars today.  It is often stated that Plotinus is ‘the founder of Neoplatonism’, meaning that Plotinus presented a new interpretation of the tradition.  That view is nowhere to be found in the actual writings of Plotinus, nor is it to be found in any contemporary of Plotinus, but that’s the way Plotinus is often presented these days.

I think these disjunctive interpretations of Platonism (Plato himself and Platonism’s history as a whole) partly arise because of the influence of the theory of deconstruction that became widespread in the late 20^th century and continues today in the 21^st.  The procedures of deconstruction are designed to be disruptive and disjunctive so it’s not a surprise that analyses based on the theory of deconstruction will result in a disjunctive view of Platonism.

2.  Though this view that Platonism lacks a clear sense of unity over time (history), or even within the Dialogues of Plato, is widespread, this view does have its opponents within academia.  I have observed two different approaches for defending, or apologizing for, the unity of the Platonic tradition.  The first is presented by Lloyd P. Gerson in his book From Plato to Platonism.  The second is presented by David J. Yount in two published books (Plotinus the Platonist and Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics). 

2.1  Gerson’s approach is to present what Gerson refers to as a ‘via negativa’ to define what Gerson refers to as ‘Ur-Platonism’ meaning core perspectives that are essential to what Platonism means.  Gerson's approach is a ‘negative way’ because Gerson’s Ur-Platonism is a list of five types of philosophical understanding that Platonism rejects (hence a negative way).  Gerson writes, “The elements of UP [Ur-Platonism] according to my hypothesis are antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.” (Page 10)  Gerson’s view is that Platonism is opposed to the five teachings of materialism, mechanism, nominalism, relativism, and skepticism.  In this way Gerson distinguishes Platonism, and the Platonist tradition as a whole, from other philosophical traditions and frameworks.  I think it is noteworthy that this negative approach leads to a fairly broad and inclusive view as to what Platonism is: for example, Christian Platonism would be included in the Platonist tradition when using this negative definition and, in addition, contemporary Pagan Platonism would also be included.  I think this is a strength of Gerson’s approach.

2.2  In contrast to Gerson’s approach, David J. Yount’s approach to arguing for the continuity of the Platonist tradition over time is to take various topics, such as Mysticism and Ethics, and so forth, present how Plato understands these topics by quoting relevant passages from the Dialogues and then comparing these quotes from Plato with quotes from the Enneads of Plotinus to show that the two philosophers share an understanding regarding these topics.  Further, Yount then discusses various critiques by other philosophers as to the commonality of the Platonic and Plotinian interpretations of the topic.  Yount counters these criticisms by showing what Yount regards as the shortcomings of these criticisms.  In this way Yount presents the reader with a case for the continuity of the Platonic tradition at a point in its history where it is common to regard the Platonic tradition as morphing into something new and fundamentally different.  I have found Yount’s presentations to be valuable and helpful, as well as convincing.

2.3  Yount’s presentation is not a negative way to the unity of the Platonic tradition.  This is a contrast with Gerson, though it does not contradict Gerson’s approach; for example, Gerson’s five negations could be applied to Plotinus without effecting Yount’s analysis.  Together these two approaches provide useful tools for understanding the continuity of the Platonic tradition. 

2.3.1  I think it is worth pointing out that Yount’s method could be applied to any Platonist.  I mean that, for example, it would be possible to compare the Cambridge Platonists to Plato by using various topics, such as the topics used by Yount, and then quoting passages from Plato relevant to this topic and compare them to what the Cambridge Platonists have to say on the same topic.  As a method I think it could be quite fruitful; I am thinking of how such an approach might illuminate Whitehead’s relationship to the Platonic tradition.

2.4  I see these two different approaches to defending the unity of the Platonic tradition, the approach used by Gerson and the approach used by Yount, as tools that the dedicated Platonist can use when they are in a situation where the issue of the unity of Platonism arises.  Both Gerson and Yount have given the Platonic community these tools which, when understood, can increase the confidence in the reality of an actual Platonic tradition spanning many centuries.

3.  Using Gerson’s method for defining the Platonic tradition through negations you could define Christianity by saying Christianity is anti-pagan, anti-materialist, anti-fatalistic, anti-eternalist (in the sense of material cosmology), and so forth.  What this leaves out is the communal worship and ceremonies like Holy Communion as defining characteristics of the Christian tradition.  And I wonder if the same applies to Platonism?

3.1  From my perspective what is left out of Platonism in the Gerson analysis are things like ethics and virtues and their connection to metaphysical reality through the process of purification.  I am thinking specifically of the ethical restraints that are taught in the Dialogues and referred to consistently by subsequent Platonic Sages.  In other words, I am thinking that a philosophical tradition is not defined solely by its doctrines, or by the doctrines it rejects.  The ethical restraints indicate how a philosopher should act in the world, what they should do, what they should embody, in order to be a Platonist, which is to say to be a philosopher.  I see the ethical restraints of Platonism as defining Platonism in significant ways.  I don’t think the ethical restraints are an all-encompassing definition; it is more like a ‘pillar’ of Platonism, one of several pillars.  Additional pillars would include an understanding of the levels, or hypostases, of the metaphysical cosmos, an understanding of rebirth, an understanding of the virtues, the practice of contemplation, and a commitment to the regular reading of the Platonist classics such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus.  But to be fair to Gerson, I don’t think Gerson is engaged in offering a full-blown definition of Platonism; rather the five antis that Gerson offers are a method for distinguishing Platonism from other philosophies and that, Gerson argues, demonstrates the consistency of the Platonic tradition.

3.2  To put it another way, you could say that Gerson’s approach, the negative way, could be viewed as the skeleton of Platonism and the ethical restraints as the musculature.  Or you could say that they are two wings of Platonism that when the student matures in their understanding allows the student to fly to the higher hypostases.

3.3  This understanding of Philosophy as a way of life with ethical requirements and spiritual exercises isn’t new; it was put forth by Pierre Hadot, but I don’t see that it has caught on.  As far as I can tell the centrality of ethical restraints for Platonism is not, at this time, looked at as having the same kind of significance as comprehending metaphysical views.  I can understand that.  For a long time Western Philosophy has been primarily a way of analysis and the connection between Platonism and mathematics has, I think, helped to center that way of looking at Platonism. Most people do not think that the study of mathematics entails ethical commitments and if Platonism is looked at in this way the question of ethical restraints and their place in the philosophy of Platonism would probably not arise.

3.4  But perhaps the time has arrived to reconsider the ethical restraints of Platonism and their role in the Platonic tradition.  Here the Indian Dharma traditions can be of assistance.  The role of ethical restraints in most Dharma traditions (by Dharma Traditions I mean Indian traditions like Hinduism, Classical Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and so forth) is prominent and explicitly incorporated into the tradition through presentations and ceremonies.  The five minimal restraints offered in these traditions are considered foundational and necessary for walking the spiritual path.  I feel the same about Platonism.

3.4.1  I’m not saying that Platonism is, or isn’t, influenced directly by these Dharma traditions; I’m neither for nor against this view.  I don’t know enough to have an opinion about it.  What I am noticing is that there is a shared interest in, and emphasis on, ethical restraints in both Platonism and Dharma traditions and furthermore that these restraints are, for the most part, the same across traditions.  Because of this I think that Dharma traditions can shed some light on how to bring forth the ethical restraints of Platonism that are taught in various dialogues, scattered here and there amongst the classics of Platonism.  What Dharma traditions offer Platonism on this topic is a time-tested method for presenting these restraints and using them explicitly. 

3.4.2  In a way, what I am suggesting for the ethical restraints found in Platonism is what has already happened for the Virtues.  The virtues, like the restraints, are commented on in scattered Platonic Dialogues.  But for purposes of presentation and teaching the Virtues have been gathered together and presented as a whole ethical teaching.  There has been a lot written about the Virtues beginning with the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, down to the present day.  But the restraints have not been treated in the same way.  What I am suggesting is treating the restraints in a manner that highlights them and centers them for the Platonic tradition and that the Dharma traditions are a resource for Platonists wishing to do so in the sense that Dharma traditions have forms and procedures that are focused on these kinds of teachings.  I don’t think borrowing these ways of presenting the ethical restraints of Platonism is illegitimate nor do I see it as cultural appropriation; just as Platonist mathematicians use Arabic numerals rather than Roman numerals, so also I think it would be legitimate to borrow the methods and procedures of Dharma traditions regarding the Platonic ethical restraints (asceses). 

4.  Gerson’s five antis is a very useful tool for discussing Platonism in certain contexts.  I am thinking specifically of the contemporary University context.  The doctrines that Gerson lists as doctrines that Platonism rejects are widespread in Academia today and it is therefore helpful to have them highlighted and pointed out as not the way Platonism views philosophy or the cosmos.  It’s an easy list to remember and can come in handy in intellectual discussions about philosophy.

But I think Platonism also needs to present itself as a kind of transformative praxis and it is here that the ethical restraints find their place.  This turns Platonism into a lived vocation.