On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

11 May 2026

On the Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

1.  Among contemporary academic scholars of the Platonic tradition there is disagreement about the continuity of the Platonic tradition, meaning whether or not there is a demonstrable unity to be found in Platonism across the thousands of years of the Platonic tradition’s history.  This is not surprising.  I think it arises, at least in part, from disputes about whether Plato’s thought developed over the course of the Dialogues or if Plato’s writings present a unified vision.  Some argue for a developmental view; for example, they interpret the dialogue Parmenides as, in part, a refutation, or a reconfiguration, of the theory of forms (noetic realities, eternal objects) of the way this view is presented in dialogues like Phaedo and The Republic.  Those who hold to the dialogues as presenting a unified vision interpret Parmenides as a further elaboration of the theory of forms rather than displacing an earlier understanding of this theory.

I also find this view of disjunctive developmentalism in the history of the Platonic tradition in the way that Plotinus is treated by many (perhaps most?) Platonic scholars today.  It is often stated that Plotinus is ‘the founder of Neoplatonism’, meaning that Plotinus presented a new interpretation of the tradition.  That view is nowhere to be found in the actual writings of Plotinus, nor is it to be found in any contemporary of Plotinus, but that’s the way Plotinus is often presented these days.

I think these disjunctive interpretations of Platonism (Plato himself and Platonism’s history as a whole) partly arise because of the influence of the theory of deconstruction that became widespread in the late 20^th century and continues today in the 21^st.  The procedures of deconstruction are designed to be disruptive and disjunctive so it’s not a surprise that analyses based on the theory of deconstruction will result in a disjunctive view of Platonism.

2.  Though this view that Platonism lacks a clear sense of unity over time (history), or even within the Dialogues of Plato, is widespread, this view does have its opponents within academia.  I have observed two different approaches for defending, or apologizing for, the unity of the Platonic tradition.  The first is presented by Lloyd P. Gerson in his book From Plato to Platonism.  The second is presented by David J. Yount in two published books (Plotinus the Platonist and Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics). 

2.1  Gerson’s approach is to present what Gerson refers to as a ‘via negativa’ to define what Gerson refers to as ‘Ur-Platonism’ meaning core perspectives that are essential to what Platonism means.  Gerson's approach is a ‘negative way’ because Gerson’s Ur-Platonism is a list of five types of philosophical understanding that Platonism rejects (hence a negative way).  Gerson writes, “The elements of UP [Ur-Platonism] according to my hypothesis are antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.” (Page 10)  Gerson’s view is that Platonism is opposed to the five teachings of materialism, mechanism, nominalism, relativism, and skepticism.  In this way Gerson distinguishes Platonism, and the Platonist tradition as a whole, from other philosophical traditions and frameworks.  I think it is noteworthy that this negative approach leads to a fairly broad and inclusive view as to what Platonism is: for example, Christian Platonism would be included in the Platonist tradition when using this negative definition and, in addition, contemporary Pagan Platonism would also be included.  I think this is a strength of Gerson’s approach.

2.2  In contrast to Gerson’s approach, David J. Yount’s approach to arguing for the continuity of the Platonist tradition over time is to take various topics, such as Mysticism and Ethics, and so forth, present how Plato understands these topics by quoting relevant passages from the Dialogues and then comparing these quotes from Plato with quotes from the Enneads of Plotinus to show that the two philosophers share an understanding regarding these topics.  Further, Yount then discusses various critiques by other philosophers as to the commonality of the Platonic and Plotinian interpretations of the topic.  Yount counters these criticisms by showing what Yount regards as the shortcomings of these criticisms.  In this way Yount presents the reader with a case for the continuity of the Platonic tradition at a point in its history where it is common to regard the Platonic tradition as morphing into something new and fundamentally different.  I have found Yount’s presentations to be valuable and helpful, as well as convincing.

2.3  Yount’s presentation is not a negative way to the unity of the Platonic tradition.  This is a contrast with Gerson, though it does not contradict Gerson’s approach; for example, Gerson’s five negations could be applied to Plotinus without effecting Yount’s analysis.  Together these two approaches provide useful tools for understanding the continuity of the Platonic tradition. 

2.3.1  I think it is worth pointing out that Yount’s method could be applied to any Platonist.  I mean that, for example, it would be possible to compare the Cambridge Platonists to Plato by using various topics, such as the topics used by Yount, and then quoting passages from Plato relevant to this topic and compare them to what the Cambridge Platonists have to say on the same topic.  As a method I think it could be quite fruitful; I am thinking of how such an approach might illuminate Whitehead’s relationship to the Platonic tradition.

2.4  I see these two different approaches to defending the unity of the Platonic tradition, the approach used by Gerson and the approach used by Yount, as tools that the dedicated Platonist can use when they are in a situation where the issue of the unity of Platonism arises.  Both Gerson and Young have given the Platonic community these tools which, when understood, can increase the confidence in the reality of an actual Platonic tradition spanning many centuries.

3.  Using Gerson’s method for defining the Platonic tradition through negations you could define Christianity by saying Christianity is anti-pagan, anti-materialist, anti-fatalistic, anti-eternalist (in the sense of material cosmology), and so forth.  What this leaves out is the communal worship and ceremonies like Holy Communion as defining characteristics of the Christian tradition.  And I wonder if the same applies to Platonism?

3.1  From my perspective what is left out of Platonism in the Gerson analysis are things like ethics and virtues and their connection to metaphysical reality through the process of purification.  I am thinking specifically of the ethical restraints that are taught in the Dialogues and referred to consistently by subsequent Platonic Sages.  In other words, I am thinking that a philosophical tradition is not defined solely by its doctrines, or by the doctrines it rejects.  The ethical restraints indicate how a philosopher should act in the world, what they should do, what they should embody, in order to be a Platonist, which is to say to be a philosopher.  I see the ethical restraints of Platonism as defining Platonism in significant ways.  I don’t think the ethical restraints are an all-encompassing definition; it is more like a ‘pillar’ of Platonism, one of several pillars.  Additional pillars would include an understanding of the levels, or hypostases, of the metaphysical cosmos, an understanding of rebirth, an understanding of the virtues, the practice of contemplation, and a commitment to the regular reading of the Platonist classics such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus.  But to be fair to Gerson, I don’t think Gerson is engaged in offering a full-blown definition of Platonism; rather the five antis that Gerson offers are a method for distinguishing Platonism from other philosophies and that, Gerson argues, demonstrates the consistency of the Platonic tradition.

3.2  To put it another way, you could say that Gerson’s approach, the negative way, could be viewed as the skeleton of Platonism and the ethical restraints as the musculature.  Or you could say that they are two wings of Platonism that when the student matures in their understanding allows the student to fly to the higher hypostases.

3.3  This understanding of Philosophy as a way of life with ethical requirements and spiritual exercises isn’t new; it was put forth by Pierre Hadot, but I don’t see that it has caught on.  As far as I can tell the centrality of ethical restraints for Platonism is not, at this time, looked at as having the same kind of significance as comprehending metaphysical views.  I can understand that.  For a long time Western Philosophy has been primarily a way of analysis and the connection between Platonism and mathematics has, I think, helped to center that way of looking at Platonism. Most people do not think that the study of mathematics entails ethical commitments and if Platonism is looked at in this way the question of ethical restraints and their place in the philosophy of Platonism would probably not arise.

3.4  But perhaps the time has arrived to reconsider the ethical restraints of Platonism and their role in the Platonic tradition.  Here the Indian Dharma traditions can be of assistance.  The role of ethical restraints in most Dharma traditions (by Dharma Traditions I mean Indian traditions like Hinduism, Classical Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and so forth) is prominent and explicitly incorporated into the tradition through presentations and ceremonies.  The five minimal restraints offered in these traditions are considered foundational and necessary for walking the spiritual path.  I feel the same about Platonism.

3.4.1  I’m not saying that Platonism is, or isn’t, influenced directly by these Dharma traditions; I’m neither for nor against this view.  I don’t know enough to have an opinion about it.  What I am noticing is that there is a shared interest in, and emphasis on, ethical restraints in both Platonism and Dharma traditions and furthermore that these restraints are, for the most part, the same across traditions.  Because of this I think that Dharma traditions can shed some light on how to bring forth the ethical restraints of Platonism that are taught in various dialogues, scattered here and there amongst the classics of Platonism.  What Dharma traditions offer Platonism on this topic is a time-tested method for presenting these restraints and using them explicitly. 

3.4.2  In a way, what I am suggesting for the ethical restraints found in Platonism is what has already happened for the Virtues.  The virtues, like the restraints, are commented on in scattered Platonic Dialogues.  But for purposes of presentation and teaching the Virtues have been gathered together and presented as a whole ethical teaching.  There has been a lot written about the Virtues beginning with the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, down to the present day.  But the restraints have not been treated in the same way.  What I am suggesting is treating the restraints in a manner that highlights them and centers them for the Platonic tradition and that the Dharma traditions are a resource for Platonists wishing to do so in the sense that Dharma traditions have forms and procedures that are focused on these kinds of teachings.  I don’t think borrowing these ways of presenting the ethical restraints of Platonism is illegitimate nor do I see it as cultural appropriation; just as Platonist mathematicians use Arabic numerals rather than Roman numerals, so also I think it would be legitimate to borrow the methods and procedures of Dharma traditions regarding the Platonic ethical restraints (asceses). 

4.  Gerson’s five antis is a very useful tool for discussing Platonism in certain contexts.  I am thinking specifically of the contemporary University context.  The doctrines that Gerson lists as doctrines that Platonism rejects are widespread in Academia today and it is therefore helpful to have them highlighted and pointed out as not the way Platonism views philosophy or the cosmos.  It’s an easy list to remember and can come in handy in intellectual discussions about philosophy.

But I think Platonism also needs to present itself as a kind of transformative praxis and it is here that the ethical restraints find their place.  This turns Platonism into a lived vocation.

The Good and the One and Their Relationship to the Noetic

4 April 2026

The Good and the One and Their Relationship to the Noetic

“But then, someone will say, why do we not stop at Intellect and postulate this as the Good?  For both soul and life are traces of Intellect, and soul desires it (Intellect).  Soul judges and thereby desires Intellect, judging justice better than injustice, and putting every form of excellence before every form of vice, and it honours the identical things it chooses.  But if it (soul) desires only Intellect, it would presumably need more argument to show that Intellect is not the ultimate thing; and while not everything desires Intellect, everything desires the Good.

“And even among things without intellect, not all try to come to possess it, and those who do have it do not stop there but go on to look for the Good; they look for Intellect on the basis of calculative reasoning, whereas they look for the Good prior to reason as well.

“But if they desire life and eternal existence and activity, then the object desired is not desired as Intellect, but as Good, as deriving from the Good and leading to the Good; for that is the way life is.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 6.7.20, How the Multiplicity of the Ideas Came to Exist, and on the Good, translated by Lloyd Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 2025, pages 831-832, ISBN: 978009604970)

“Why then, someone will say, do we not stop at Intellect and posit this as the Good?  For soul and life are traces of Intellect, and it is this Intellect that soul desires.  And so in its judgements also it desires Intellect, judging righteousness better than unrighteousness, and preferring each form of virtue to the [corresponding] form of vice, and judging more valuable the same things which it chooses.  But if it only desires Intellect, perhaps it might be in need of further reasoning to show that Intellect is not the ultimate and that not all things desire Intellect but all things desire the Good.  And not all of the things which do not have intellect seek to gain possession of it, and the things that have intellect do not stop there, but again seek the Good, and they seek Intellect from their reasoning, but the Good even before reason.  And if they also seek life, and everlasting existence and activity, what they desires is not Intellect in so far as it is Intellect, but in so far as it is good and from the Good and directed to the Good: since this is so also with life.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.7.20, The Forms and the Good, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 153, ISBN: 9780674995154)

“Why not halt, then – it will be asked – at Intellectual-Principle and make that The Good?  Soul and life are traces of Intellectual-Principle; that principle is the Term of Soul which on judgement sets itself towards Intellectual-Principle, pronouncing right preferable to wrong and virtue in every form to vice, and thus ranking by its choosing.

“The soul aiming only at that Principle would need a further lessoning; it must be taught that Intellectual-Principle is not the ultimate, that not all things look to that while all do look to The Good.  Not all that is outside of Intellectual-Principle seeks to attain it; what has attained it does not halt there but looks still towards good.  Besides, Intellectual-Principle is sought upon motives of reasoning, The Good before all reason.  And in any striving towards life and continuity of existence and activity, the object is aimed at not as Intellectual-Principle but as good, as rising from good and leading to it: life itself is desirable only in view of good.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.7.20, The Multiplicity of Ideal Forms, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 655, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  This quote from the Enneads is one of the clearest, perhaps the clearest, statement from Plotinus why the divine ascent transcends even the Noetic (what the translators refer to as Intellect or Intellectual-Principle.)  I have mentioned this before, but I think it is worth repeating, and that is that I would prefer the use of the word ‘mind’ or ‘Mind’ for nous rather than Intellect.  It’s not that I think ‘Intellect’ is wrong; there is a long tradition of translating nous that way and that is a consideration that carries weight.  But over time I think the word intellect has taken on meanings that are primary that undermine its usage in the context of the Enneads.  That context is that ‘intellect’ is often a synonym for someone who is ‘smart’ as in ‘he’s an intellectual’ and therefore lives primarily through applying his brain to analytical approaches to problems.  In contrast the word ‘mind’ has a broader base of meaning, particularly when comparing its usage to non-Western spiritual literature.  It’s not a big deal, but it is a point I like to bring up when I have an opportunity to do so.

2.  “. . . not everything desires Intellect but everything desires the Good.” (Gerson et al)  That’s an interesting contrast.  You could put it that all things desire the One; all things desire to return to the One. 

2.1  It’s remarkable that the word ‘desire’ is used in this context.  I say this because overcoming desire is the basis for ethical restraints, asceses, in Platonism.  This is explicitly stated in Phaedo and The Republic.  But in the context of the One desire is seen as that which propels the philosopher to that transcendental and ineffable realm.

This suggests that it is not desire as such that is the problem, or that Platonism is advocating for the end of desire (or as Buddhists would say ‘the cessation of desire.’)  Rather, the philosopher needs to distinguish between those desires that need to be overcome (broadly speaking, bodily desires) and those desires that assist the philosopher on the path to awakening to the presence of eternity.

2.1.1  Those kinds of differentiations are a function of the noetic in the sense that it is at the level of nous where differentiation first appears.  Mind is the instantiation of, or the presence of, nous in the human being.  It is Mind that both makes these kinds of differentiations (and differentiating between desires that need to be overcome and desires that assist the philosopher on the path is a subtle process) and guides the philosopher as to the application of those differentiations; that is to say how such differentiations will impact the life of the philosopher.

2.1.2  I have to admit (this is a bit of a personal confession) that the idea that all things desire the Good and the One is a difficult one for me to accept.  It does not seem to me that when I watch and try to understand the activity of living beings, or even just human beings, that their activity is in some sense directed towards the ineffable One.  Alas, that is not what I observe.  Instead, I observe, among many, perhaps among most, a desire to increase fragmentation, a desire to cultivate separation in the sense of acting as if we do not have a common source or a shared life and destiny. 

Perhaps I am a bit of a philosophical pessimist in this regard (I’m thinking of philosophers like Schopenhauer).  Perhaps this inclination of mine is due to my age; I was much more willing when I was younger to think of all human beings as in some sense good and well-intentioned.  But I no longer think this is the case.

How does that impact my reading of this passage?  I tend to read it as suggesting that the ascent to the One, the Good, to the Eternal, is always available to all beings.  But that availability is a choice that only a very small number of living beings will take.  I’ve come to the view that there is nothing wrong with this way of looking at living beings.  For example, every human being (who is not deaf) has musical capacity, but only a small number become composers.  Every human being has mathematical capacities, but only a very small number become mathematicians.  And so forth.  I look at spirituality and living in accordance with the demands of spirituality, in a similar way.

Partly this is a difference between a universal vision of spirituality and a restricted view of spirituality.  There is a strong view that spiritual traditions should be universal in their application.  This is a legacy of traditions like Christianity and Buddhism.  But, ironically, this is not a view that is universally held.  For example, in Jainism it is the view, as I understand it, that only a very small number of people, the number is so small you could easily count them, attain moksha, liberation.  For the vast majority of living beings simply continue cycling through samsara, life after life after life. 

But regardless of whether or not all beings desire the Good, if someone is such a being, a being who desires the Good, the guidance of Plotinus is assuredly helpful and nourishing to accomplish the task of returning to the One.

3.  It is stated that people look for Intellect (Nous, Mind) through reason, but the Good is ‘prior to reason.’  My understanding of this is that eternal objects in the Noetic realm are differentiated.  I understand differentiation to be foundational for reason which suggests that the cultivation of reason (broadly speaking) is necessary for experiencing Nous, even if the technique for doing so is contemplation (because it is reason that will guide the philosopher to contemplation). 

The Good is ‘prior to reason’ because the Good is the complete unity of the One.  And in complete unity there is no differentiation and therefore the Good does not reason.  Differentiation flows out of the Good and generates reason in the way that the light of the sun flows out of the sun and illuminates our world.

4.  I’m not sure how to interpret the closing sentence, the one about the desire for life, eternal activity and existence.  At first glance the sentence suggests to my mind something close to what heaven in Christianity might be described.  That doesn’t fit the context of this Ennead.  So we need to shift gears.

4.1  In thinking about this sentence perhaps Plotinus is referring to the eternal overflowing of the Good and the One into the Noetic, and the eternal overflowing of the Noetic into the material world.  This eternal overflowing (a kind of generating process) is a kind of activity, an eternal activity.  Again, it is like the light of the sun understood as an overflowing of the sun’s presence.  Or it is like the way beauty flows from a mountain landscape.  I think what Plotinus is suggesting is that part of the reason we desire to return to the One is to be a part (though ‘part’ is in some ways a problematic word in this context) of this eternal activity found in the Good and the One.  I mentioned that ‘part’ is a problematic word in this context because it might be suggestive of individuated existence in the One, whereas I see the Good and the One, and unifying with the Good and the One, as the dissolution of individuation which is an illusion in itself, and the source of many other illusions and misunderstandings.  But I can’t figure out a clearer why of referring to what I think is being suggested in this closing sentence.

4.1.1  This eternal process that Plotinus seems to refer to contrasts with the view that the Good and the One are unchanging.  I think the resolution to this can be found by thinking of process as an ultimate category so that what is unchanging is the process of eternal overflow of the presence of the Good and the One, the overflow of that which is eternal into the realm of time.  (If I were still a Buddhist I might put it this way: “Change does not differ from eternity, eternity does not differ from change.  Change is eternity, eternity is change.”  But this is a topic for another time.)

5.  Reading Plotinus is endlessly rewarding. 

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 94

28 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 94

1.  The Soul of Philosophy

Recently I listened to an interview with Robert Greene.  Robert Greene is an author of popular self-help books.  Unlike most self-help books, Greene’s books are thick.  His best-selling book is The 48 Laws of Power, but other titles are similar in format but focus on other topics.  Greene’s approach is to tell stories, mostly from history, to illustrate the point he is making or the topic he is writing about.  This approach is an engaging format and has been well-received.

The interview was between a British Podcaster and Greene.  At one point the interviewer asks Greene to comment on what happened to philosophy in the 20^th century.  Greene responds by saying that ‘philosophy lost its soul’ starting in the early 20^th century.  I thought that was an interesting answer.  Greene is not a Platonist, as far as I know he is a secular materialist; this means that he is not using ‘soul’ in the way a Platonist would use the word.  But I found it intriguing that Greene chose to use that particular word; this kind of response isn’t typical of the way Greene talks.

Whatever Geene meant by the word ‘soul’ I am comfortable using a Platonic perspective to interpret what was said even if Greene would not sign onto that interpretation.  I have an overall agreement with Greene’s description of what happened to Philosophy.  I also suspect that at least some philosophers would also agree with Greene but would likely celebrate that loss because they think of this situation not as a loss, but as progress; I am thinking of materialist philosophers who are proud of their dismissal of anything transcendental, as well as an ethic that is disconnected to metaphysics and arrived at through the process of purification.  Materialist philosophers, what Plato through Gerson describe as ‘naturalists’, dismiss the idea of a soul, just as they dismiss the idea of Ideas. 

It would be interesting to find out if Greene has unpacked this observation in one of his numerous volumes; if anyone knows where such comments can be found, please indicate in the comments section.  Thanks.

2.  The Beauty of Metaphysics

There is something almost miraculous about the heritage of metaphysics.  When I use the word ‘miraculous’ what I mean is that it is difficult to square how material beings, such as human beings, could move beyond the material, the physical, and dwell enough in the metaphysical to unpack what they found to the best of their abilities after their return to the material domain.  If human beings were merely physical, I suggest that it would be impossible to do so.  The fact that there is metaphysics at all indicates that human beings are not reducible to their physical components.

3.  Ethical Restraints and the Virtues

I have been thinking a lot about the ethical restraints as they are found in Platonism for a long time.  One thing that I have noticed is that there is a lot written about the Platonic Virtues.  Most of the writing on the Virtues has blossomed from the seed of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  It’s not difficult to find books dedicated to the Platonic Virtues.

But the ethical restraints are not written about with the same focus and dedication.  Porphyry writes about them in several of his works, but Porphyry did not receive the approval that Aristotle did and though Porphyry’s influence is profound, it’s not the same as that of Aristotle’s influence.  My point is that Porphyry’s writings on ethical restraint and asceticism did not act as a catalyst for a lot of writing about the place that restraints have in the Dialogues of Plato. 

I would like to see greater attention placed on the ethical restraints, or asceses, that are found in the Platonic corpus as a whole.  One reason I would like to see this is that from my perspective the idea that Platonism is a Way of Life only makes sense if the restraints, or asceses, are looked at as foundational for such a project.

4.  Proclus and Plotinus

I listened to two Platonist philosophers talking about their favorite subject, Platonism, the other day on a long YouTube podcast.  At one point they agreed that they don’t find Proclus of much value. 

This reminded me of how, even today, Platonists tend to divide into two groups with one group finding satisfaction with Plotinus and the other group thinking of Proclus as going beyond what Plotinus had to say.  I fall in the first group; the one that finds satisfaction, and inspiration, in Plotinus but doesn’t find those qualities in Proclus. 

This has led me to think that perhaps this division is, at least in part, a difference in personality types.  Proclus is highly analytical and deductive; Iain McGilchrist would say that Proclus is ‘left brained.’  Plotinus can be analytical; for example I just finished reading Enneads VI.1, 2, and 3 which is Plotinus’s analysis of Aristotle’s categories.  It is very dense and contains discussions about the nature of substance, form, and intellect.  But even here Plotinus’s approach differs from that of Proclus in that Plotinus will often circle around an issue, presenting various possibilities, before settling on what Plotinus offers the reader as his own solution.  In contrast, Proclus often goes straight for a deduction with much less of this kind of circling motion of thought.

My sense is that some people very much like, and are attracted by, structures of deduction.  And when I say ‘deduction’ I mean reasoned inference in a manner consistent with the logical works of Aristotle and subsequent logicians.  In contrast, there are others, like myself, who enjoy the way Plotinus ‘circles around’, some would even say ‘drifts here and there within the range of the topic he’s discussing.’  I think people who admire this about Plotinus are often, not always, people who enjoy, and learn from, things like metaphor, myth, and allegory.

The Dialogues of Plato contain examples of both approaches; but Plato is exceptional in having the ability to write in many philosophical modes with equal skill (like a composer who can write equally well in major, minor, and modes like the pentatonic scales).  Most philosophers tend to lean in one direction or another.

5.  Haiku

Wandering mountains

Sing hymns to the end of time –

Dry creek, empty sky.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 93

20 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 93

1.  Cicero, Alcinous, and Plato on Wisdom

“For Cicero, philosophy is the love of ‘wisdom’ (sapientia), and is ancient in fact if not in name.  Wisdom on the other hand is ancient in fact and in name, and can be defined as ‘the knowledge of divine and human things and of the beginnings and causes of each thing.’”

(Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1986, page 74, ISBN: 9780268014384)

Plato doesn’t talk about wisdom in this specific way as ‘knowledge of divine and human things.’  According to what I have found in some sources, this definition was widely used in Stoicism.  The merging of Stoicism and Platonism was not unusual.

We can see how widespread this way of understanding wisdom was by referencing the first section of The Handbook of Platonism by Alcinous:

“Philosophy is a striving for wisdom, or the freeing and turning around of the soul from the body, when we turn towards the intelligible and what truly is, and wisdom is the science of things divine and human.”

(Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, page 3, ISBN: 0198236077)

Dillon connects the definition above by Cicero and Alcinous to Stoicism in Dillon’s endnote on this section of the Handbook, “The definition of wisdom given here is Stoic in its inspiration, cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2.  35: ‘Wisdom is the science of the divine and the human . . . “ (as above, page 52)

Earlier in Dillon’s endnote he connects the definition of Alcinous to the work Definitions which is found in the Platonic corpus; however Definitions is not a dialogue.  It is simply a list of definitions of key terms in Platonic philosophy.  Most scholars doubt that it was written by Plato, but it seems to have circulated fairly early.  Dillon writes, “The initial definition of philosophy [by Alcinous], as orexis Sophias, ‘striving’ or ‘desire for wisdom’, seems to be just a watered-down version of that in the Platonic Definitions, where philosophy is defined as ‘the striving for knowledge of the eternally existent’ (tes ton onton aei epistemes orexis), but ultimately derives from Republic 5. 475B . . . “ (as above, page 51.)

The reference to Book V of The Republic is as follows:

“Then do you agree to this or not?  When we say that someone desires something, do we mean that he desires everything of that kind or that he desires one part of it but not another?

“We mean he desires everything.

“Then won’t we also say that the philosopher doesn’t desire one part of wisdom rather than another, but desires the whole thing?

“Yes, that’s true.”

(Plato, The Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, Plato, Complete Worbks, edited by John M. Cooper, Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis1997, Indiana, 1997, pages 1101 and 1102, 475b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.1  I enjoy seeing how these Platonic and Stoic views of wisdom merged and spread.  It’s an interesting episode in spiritual, and intellectual, history.  And it also demonstrates how porous the various Philosophies were to each other in the Classical period.

1.2  The strictly Platonic definition is highlighted in Alcinous when Alcinous highlights the ‘turning around the soul from the body’ and is, I think, based on Phaedo.  This separation of body and soul does not seem to be a focus in Stoic definitions of wisdom. 

1.3  The definitions above speak of knowledge of the human and the divine.  But the definition found in Definitions specifies what the divine is when it says that it is striving for the knowledge of ‘the eternally existent.’ 

What I see here is that wisdom is the use of the capacity for differentiation found in the human mind to distinguish, have knowledge of, that which is ephemeral from that which is eternal.  Human things, and their causes that are found in the material realm, are ephemeral.  Eternal things are noetic, or by analogy, that which is eternal is found in the Good and the One.

1.4  The separation of the soul from the body is the separation of that which is eternal (the soul) from that which is ephemeral (the body).  This will happen naturally when we pass away, but the philosopher enters into a discipline to enact that separation prior to nature’s processes because that separation is necessary in order to enter into the noetic and the realm of the One. 

1.4.1  The primary means for such separation are the ascetic practices as found in Phaedo and other Dialogues.

1.5  The mind differentiates things, places them into categories; that is what the mind does.  The human mind is the presence of the Noetic in the individual.  It is in Nous where differentiation first manifests and this capacity for differentiation is passed down by emanation to the human mind.  In a sense you could say that the mind is a fragment of the Noetic or a pale representation of the Noetic.

1.6  Normally when the mind differentiates the mind does so in service to the body.  The body is the presence of time and of cyclic existence in the individual.  But if the mind starts to have a dim awareness of that which is eternal, the mind can then use the capacity for differentiation in service to that which is eternal.  This happens, if it does happen, gradually, step by step; like a flower blossoming in a glen.

1.7  The mind can sense the presence of eternity because of the silence and stillness of the soul.  The soul is the presence of the Good and the One in the individual.  Because of that presence there is a unity in the individual; it is the unity of the One, and its presence as soul, that makes an individual an individual rather than just a random collection of parts. 

Because the soul is silent, still, and partless, it is difficult for the mind to notice it.  When the mind serves the body the needs of the body are noticeable sensory things.  But the Good and the One are ineffable, and the soul shares in that ineffability.  Nevertheless, its presence, the presence of eternity, is detected by its stillness and silence which contrast with the noise and agitation of the body. 

1.8  The turning to eternity is something the mind can do, but it is not easy.  It requires studying the works of Plato and Plotinus, meditation and contemplation, and a love of the wisdom that leads to that which is eternal.

1.9  Alcinous talks about ‘striving’ and the word ‘philosophy’ refers to love.  I think this is why we find erotic imagery in the Dialogues; these images are symbols of the love for wisdom that blossoms in the heart of the philosopher.

2.  Immanence and Transcendence

I have given some thought recently to the question of whether or not the Good and the One are transcendent or immanent.  In many ways the Platonic tradition offers us a transcendental view of the ultimate.  The allegory of the cave supports a transcendent view.  And Plotinus will use words like ‘here’ for the sensory/material world and there, or There, for the noetic or ineffable ultimate.  These ways of talking about the Good and the One, as well as the Noetic, support a transcendental view of the spiritual journey where you abandon the material domain and ‘move’ to the transcendental domain.

The one exception to this way of speaking that I can think of is when writers in the Platonist tradition refer to higher realities, such as the Noetic and the Ineffable, as ‘everywhere’ and ‘everywhen’ (eternal).  I think this suggests (‘implies’ might be too strong a word) an interpretation of ultimate nature that is immanent; that is to say that the ultimate is, in some way, not separate from that which is not ultimate.

One solution to these different modes of speaking is to think of them as tools for talking about spiritual practice.  The transcendental way of speaking is very helpful in creating a sense of dedication to practice that resembles the way a musician will dedicate his time to mastering an instrument, or a carpenter dedicating his life to his craft, and so forth.  I have personally found this manner of speaking very helpful for my own spiritual journey.

The immanent way of speaking is a kind of antidote to thinking that the Good and the One are so far away, that it is impossible for an ordinary person like myself to rise to the level of experiencing the Good and the One.  It’s like a person with a badly broken leg trying to become a ballet dancer. 

I think that when Platonic literature talks about the importance and significance of beauty it feels like leaning towards a more immanent approach to the divine.  I know that structurally the origin of Beauty is in the Noetic (and at times the ineffable), and that the beauty here is a poor reflection of the Beauty There.  Nevertheless, the way Platonists talk about beauty shields Platonism from becoming filled with Gnostic repulsion for material existence as well as shielding Platonists from the widespread nihilism of our own culture.

A second solution to these different modes of speaking is to remind ourselves that the Good and the One are only names for the ultimacy that Platonism points to.  In this way transcendence and immanence are seen as provisional ways of speaking about the Good and the One; they are tools for shifting our attention from the material world to a way of seeing and comprehending a world, that is both here and There, and that is the end of sorrow.