Monday, November 16, 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 114

16 November 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 114

1.  The Classics of Platonism

I’m working on a list I call ‘The Classics of Platonism.’  It’s a fun project for me.  It’s a simple list of works in the Platonic tradition that I think are worth reading.  The time period I’m covering is Plato through Porphyry, which I think of as Classical Platonism.  Most of the works are obvious choices.  The list begins with the Dialogues of Plato and then moves up to the works of Porphyry.  I have chosen not to include works and authors that exist only in fragments because I think the task of interpreting those fragments is more difficult than when reading whole works.  This leaves some time gaps, but that’s the way the remains of Classical Platonism are presented to us at this time.

I also include a few works that are about Platonism but not necessarily written by Platonists.  For example, I include Book III of Diogenes Lartius’s Lives of the Eminent Philosophers because Book III is about Plato and I think it gives readers a way of accessing how Plato was understood at that time.  I also include the Platonic works of Plutarch, which I think are significant.  Finally, I have included that Platonic works of Cicero and other Latin Platonists, to round out the list.  But the list is dominated by Greek Platonists such as Maximus and Plotinus.

I decided to cut off the list at Porphyry because after Porphyry Platonism fragments into traditions that are, in some cases, difficult to integrate into Classical Platonism; this is particularly true of those authors who attempt to integrate theurgy into their version of Platonism.  I am inclined to simply not include them in a list of books to read from the Classical Platonist tradition, primarily because of its ethical deficiencies, but for other reasons as well.  I’ll have to give this some thought.  Every great tradition has its embarrassing moments in its own history and the story of a tradition needs to tell of those embarrassing moments to be complete.  No tradition is completely pure or always lives up to its own stated ideals.  As I said, I’ll have to put some thought into this.  (As an aside, perhaps the Daoist Canon is a good guide as to how to proceed.  The Daoist Canon is capacious and includes material from a vast range of Daoist traditions.)

I think of this list of the works Classical Platonism as a resource for helping people access this world of wisdom and transcendence.  I was somewhat inspired to do so by the precedents of the Harvard Classics, which was published in 1909, and the Great Books, which was published in the early 1950’s.  Both of these collected works that they considered either foundational or central for a traditional liberal education.  There is some overlap between the Harvard Classics and the Great Books, but mostly they have different selections, which is interesting in itself.  While thinking about these collections it occurred to me that a collection focused on the tradition of Platonism might benefit some people.  I think most people are unaware of the range, depth, wisdom, and creativity of the Classical Period of Platonism and a collection of volumes focused on that tradition would be a gate into the wonders found therein.  In a way, this is what Thomas Taylor was doing with his translations and publications; but Taylor was focused on Late Classical Platonism, the brief period of the Platonic tradition that I personally find problematic.  

2.  Gerson on Proclus

I’ve been reading, off and on, Lloyd Gerson’s latest book Unearthing Platonism.  It is a collection of essays covering various topics in Platonism.  As far as I can tell, the essays are directed primarily at other academics, which makes sense since Gerson has dwelt in that environment for many decades.

I hope, after finishing the book, to write a review, but here I want to make some observations about Gerson’s essay on Proclus, “Taking Plato Seriously.”  What I want to say is a general comment rather than a response to specific assertions that Gerson makes.  That response is that I have noticed, for years now, that when authors decide to discuss Proclus, whether pro or con (though the examples I am thinking of at the moment are pro Proclus) there is a distinct and observable shift to a more complex and ‘academic’ discourse.  I particularly notice this in books where Proclus is not the main focus.  What I observe is that in the chapter(s) or section(s) where Proclus is discussed I, as a reader, have to slow down and deal with a highly specialized vocabulary, a vocabulary that is not part of the Platonic tradition as a whole.  Partly this is because the analyses become more itemized and recondite; in particular I notice the structure of laying out certain assumptions, that are often not offered as assumptions, and then drawing a conclusion, a ‘’therefore”, that, when you really look at it, does not always follow.  I think that the writings of Proclus encourage this kind of writing even in authors who do not customarily write in this way.  My intuition is that this isn’t conscious which, to my mind, makes it all the more significant, or at least interesting.  This shift to a more analytic approach to Platonism (as opposed to a literary, symbolic, mythic, and metaphorical approach) is, I think, one of the legacies of Proclus.  And it is one of the reasons that I find Proclus irritating.

I would like to offer that Ennead II.9, “Against the Gnostics”, by Plotinus is an (at first I wrote ‘the’) antidote to this kind of complex writing and elaborate approach to Platonism that Proclus presents.  I say this because one of the objections that Plotinus has regarding the Gnostics is how the Gnostics unnecessarily add complexities to Platonism’s metaphysical cosmology by adding realms, eons, and various kinds of deities.  I think this critique of unnecessary complexity is a perfect match for Proclus as well; both in terms of additional realms and deities in his presentation of henads, as well as his complex theories of procession, remaining, and return. 

Why do I refer to Proclean elaborations as unnecessary?  What I am getting at is that Proclus seems to be offering a solution to a problem, or problems, that does not exist.  I mean that the problems Proclus offers his solutions for have already been discussed at length.  I don’t mean that further investigation of, for example, how emanation works, should cease.  I mean that the way Proclus configures these discussions seems to imply that his own complex solutions are necessary because previous efforts have been inadequate.  I don’t think that is the case.

3.  Porphyry’s Asceticism

3.1  Gillian Clark translated Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals which I have mentioned a number of times on this blog.  Clark wrote an excellent ‘Introduction’ which includes a discussion titled ‘Philosophy and asceticism.’  I think it is well written.  Here are some excerpts from it:

“Porphyry’s true philosopher, one of a minority even among philosophers, is engaged in the purification of body and soul in order to rise towards God, ‘alone to the alone’.  Solitude and isolation are constant themes [in On Abstinence].  ‘Purification is separation from all these, purity is singling out’, as Porphyry says in his interpretation of traditional purity rules.  Augustine said that Porphyry’s rallying cry was ‘avoid all body’, and that seems particularly apt for On Abstinence.  Porphyry takes for granted the Platonist account of human life.  The human soul is rational, incorporeal and immortal.  It is connected with the divine intellect, but the experiences of the corruptible mortal body in the impermanent material world are at the furthest remove from the divine.  The soul has fallen away from God because of its attraction to the body.  In this life, it [the soul] can be tied down by bodily desires and demands, or it can be liberated by detachment to ascend in thought towards God as it waits for release from the body.”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 15, ISBN: 9781780938899)

3.2  Porphyry’s purpose in writing On Abstinence is to demonstrate that vegetarianism is a required practice for philosophers.  On Abstinence is in the form of a long letter written to a friend, Firmus Castricius, who was a fellow student of Plotinus along with Porphyry.  It turns out that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has given up the practice of vegetarianism, of refraining from eating animals, and Porphyry is writing Firmus in the hope of convincing Firmus to return to a vegetarian diet.  One of Porphyry’s main points in this work is that refraining from eating or sacrificing animals is essential for the life of a ‘true philosopher.’  That is what Gillian Clark is referring to in the opening sentence. 

3.3  The true philosopher is engaged with and committed to the practices of purification, one of the most important of which is refraining from eating or sacrificing animals.  In other words, Porphyry’s view is that vegetarianism as a type of ascesis, assists in the ‘rise towards God.’  Indeed, Porphyry regards not eating or sacrificing animals as essential for this kind of spiritual ascent.

3.4  Clark emphasizes the ascetic nature of Platonism in the rest of this paragraph by noting the how the human soul is connected to the higher hypostases and to the ‘impermanent material world.’  The point Clark is making is that Platonism regards asceses as absolutely necessary for the practice of purification and for actualizing the divine ascent to the Good and the One, to God.

"It was Plato who characterised the philosophic life as 'practising for death' (Phaedo 67E), and his Phaedo supplies Porphyry with guidelines and images for what the philosopher should in the meantime.  The body, according to Plato’s Socrates, is extremely distracting.  We have to feed it, it gets ill, it fills us with appetites and fears and fantasies, and we have to get possessions (the origin of conflict) to supply its needs.  So we must have as little as possible to do with it, and ‘we must purify ourselves from it until God himself releases us’ (Phaedo 67A).  Purification, katharsis, is (67C) ‘the separation, so far as possible, of soul from body [. . . ] released as if from chains’.  ‘So far as possible’ is a constant refrain of On Abstinence.  Porphyry is always aware of the limitations imposed by a mortal body, especially if its chains are made heavier by preoccupation with sensation and passion.”

(Ibid, pages 15 and 16)

3.5  Clark highlights the phrase ‘as far as possible’ as a teaching that moderates the strict ascetic teachings of Porphyry.  And I think that is right.  One of the things I admire about the Platonist tradition is the tradition’s recognition of the complexity of human existence and how living up to an unmoderated ideal of the philosophical life is often not possible.  I think that phrase ‘as far as possible’ has its origins in the experience of the Platonic forms.  The Platonic forms are naturally pure, but when these forms are instantiated into the material realm, under the reign of time, the reality of the Platonic forms is diminished; it’s like looking at something through a dusty window, or through glasses that have the wrong prescription for your eyes.  This contrast, I think, is what allows Porphyry to simultaneously perceive the ideal state and also recognize the limitations on achieving that ideal state as long as one is embodied and living under the reign of time.

But that limitation does not mean we should abandon the ascetic practices of purification.  It means that we should do the best we can.  This is similar to many of our activities in daily life; we cook meals the best we can, we play a musical instrument the best we can, we play tennis and other sports the best we can, and so forth.  When seen in this way Porphyry’s teaching to do the best we can with our ascetic disciplines makes sense.

3.6  “Porphyry’s ascetic motivation is clearest in the image he borrows from Plotinus (1.30.2): we are in exile from our homeland, and must try to remember its language and customs in preparation for our return.”  (Ibid page 18)

4.  Modesty

I think as one’s practice of Platonism grows over time a sense of modesty, or humility, emerges.  I think this emerges naturally, not because one sets out to become modest (which is not a bad thing to do, by the way).  In my practice this has arisen primarily due to daily contact with Plotinus and Plato through their writings.  As the years have passed, I have become aware of the vastness of their learning, the clarity of their writing both at the level of prose and at the level of thought, or mind.  Their accomplishments are vast, and yet there is no bragging about their accomplishments found in their writings; they simply communicate to the following centuries what they understand what they have experienced.

When I contrast my own understanding with the understanding of Plato and Plotinus it is like I am a candle and they are the sun.  I don’t mind.  In fact, I find it inspiring.  And this realization is one reason why every morning I take time to study what they have written.  Perhaps after a thousand lifetimes of such study the candle of my understanding may evolve into another sun, likely a dimmer sun, but still. 

5.  Aphorisms:

Platonism is the antidote to nihilism.

Though it is difficult to understand, in some ways modernity is very spacious.

Platonism begins with non-harming and concludes with non-harming.

The fragility of time.

Some teachings of Platonism impact the world like a slow-moving glacier.

Aurora.

A man does not have to be in perfect shape to climb a mountain.

The faithful companion on the journey of return to the Good and the One is the dog of eternity.

The return to the Good and the One comes about through a shift in awareness from the ephemeral to that which is eternal.

I think the teachings on ethical restraint have greater importance than the teachings on the virtues because it is ethical restraint that brings about purification.

I sometimes think it would be a good thing to translate Plato’s Dialogues into Sanskrit.

The Platonist tradition doesn’t get better over time because eternity does not get better over time.

Generally speaking, I think that Porphyry is underappreciated.

It’s true that the Path of Platonism is difficult but that is also true for many things.

 

 


Monday, November 9, 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 113

2026 November 9

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 113

1.  Thinking about a Plotinus Society

There are a number of Societies and Associations in the U.S. and the anglosphere that are dedicated to a particular philosopher or philosophical moement.  There is one for William James, one for Immanuel Kant, and so forth.  As I mentioned last week, I’ve been thinking of myself as a ‘Plotinian’ and following up on that I tentatively thought it would be a good idea to have a Plotinus Society, or the American Plotinus Society, or something like that.  It would be devoted to the study and practice of Plotinus’s philosophy and way of life. 

I would like to see a Plotinus society because I think Plotinus deserves that kind of focus.  There is at this time an International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, but, leaving aside their troublesome use of the word ‘Neoplatonic’, the Society covers too wide a range of topics to have the understanding of Plotinus take center stage.  I’d like to see Plotinus taken on his own terms rather than as part of a group that advocates for very different understandings of metaphysics, ethics, purification, and the nature of the philosophical ascent to the Good and the One.

A Plotinus Society would have the space to focus on what Plotinus means by contemplation, his understanding of purification, his view of the soul, and his view of mystical union with the Good and the One.  Personally, I think the Enneads of Plotinus are unsurpassed as spiritual literature and deserve their own home.

2.  Aetius

I recently became aware of a work of philosophy by the author Aetius.  He wrote a book called ‘Placita’ which refers to a collection of views held by various philosophers at the time Aetius was writing. Placita was a genre of writing at that time.  Nothing is known about Aetius.  The collection is dated to the late first or early second century C.E., based on internal evidence such as the philosophers that are referred to.

The original work has been lost.  But scholars have reconstructed more than 80% of the work; they base this 80% estimate on the structure of the book which has numbered sections and items.  Long quotes from Aetius appear in several late classical writers and scholars and there are some Arabic sources as well.  Scholars have pieced together these quotations and come up with a nearly complete collection.  (As an aside, this is the kind of thing that leads me to admire the scholarly community.  Such work requires a great deal of study and training and a very focused mind.  I find it admirable and I am very grateful for the scholars who have done this kind of work.)

There are five sections: First Principles, Cosmology, Meteorology and the Earth, Psychology, and Physiology.  Each of these five sections is then divided into multiple topics.  Under each topic are pithy summaries of various philosophers.  Most of these summaries are brief, but a few run to a full page or more.  Here is an example from Section 4, Psychology, Topic 4, On the parts of the soul:

"4.4 On the Parts of the soul

1.     Pythagoras and Plato according to their most general definition say that the soul is        bipartite, for it has a rational part on the one hand and an irrational on the other.  But            according to what is proximate and precise it is tripartite, for they divide the irrational            into the spirited and the concupiscible

2.     Xenocrates says that one part of the soul is perceiving, and the other rational.

3.     Aristotle said there are five activities of soul, the appetitive, the nurturing, the perceiving, the locomotive, the cogitating.

4.     The Stoics say the soul consists of eight parts: five perceiving parts, viz. seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching; as sixth the speaking part; as seventh the seminal part; as eighth the regent part itself, from which all these other parts are extended through their own organs, similarly to the tentacles of an octopus.

5.     Apollophanes (says that the soul consists of nine parts).

6.     The successors of Pythagoras, positing that the body is a blend of five elements – for to the four they added the ethereal element – said the powers of the soul too are in respect of this division equal in number, and these they called intelligence and understanding and knowledge and opinion and sensation."

(Aetius, Placita, translated by Jaap Mansfeld and David T. Runia, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2023, pages 329-331, ISBN: 9780674997592)

Some topics have more items; for example, the previous item, Whether the soul is a body and what its substance is, has eleven summaries and some of those summaries contain multiple, maybe three to five, philosophers who share a common view.  And some topics have fewer items and summaries.

What I like about Placita is that it offers the reader a summary overview of the various views on various topics that is easy to access and the collection benefits from being closer to the sources by many centuries than we are today.  I quoted the topic about the parts of the soul because I have become very interested and focused on the complexity of the soul in the Platonic tradition and how that complexity carries through many centuries.  What I find interesting in the above quote is that it seems that the complexity of the soul was a very widespread understanding, though the degree of the complexity varies.  This allows me to understand that the complexity of the soul in Platonism wasn’t an outlier or something unique to the Platonic tradition.

I don’t exactly know how the book was used.  But I can imagine it being something a teacher might use to track down a reference when asked a question about a specific topic.  It has the feeling of a catalog or an appendix. 

Plato is frequently presented on the various topics and because of this it is possible to learn what some people in the late first or early second century understood to be Platonic views; and at the same time the reader can contrast those with those of others.  There are also references to early Platonists such as Xenocrates, as in the quote above.  Because of the structure of the book, you can look up specific topics, turn to that topic, and then find out what people considered to be the Platonic interpretation, along with the interpretations of others.  I find the organization of the book to be remarkably well constructed.  For those interested in Platonism at that time I think this is very helpful.

3. Starting Points

One way of looking at Platonism, or any spiritual or philosophical tradition is by determining the starting point of that tradition.  By ‘starting point’ I mean something like a First Principle, a basic statement that functions like the foundation of a building.  Sometimes that is easy to determine because a tradition might be explicit about stating their starting point, or their first principle.  ‘Jesus is Lord’ is a good example from the Christian tradition.  In Buddhism the First Noble Truth is that life is suffering which functions as the starting point out of which other insights and practices grow.  In Platonism there is the view that the first principle is the Good and the One.  Starting Points don’t necessarily make things simple because different members of the tradition may interpret the starting point, or first principle, differently.  But having such a starting point simplifies discussions about the tradition by clearly articulating its foundation and by distinguishing a tradition from another tradition that has a different starting point.

It seems to me that starting points, or first principles, are most often metaphysical in nature.  But they can also be ethical in nature.  For example, in the Jain tradition non-harming, or Ahimsa, is the starting point.  Non-harming is an ethical commitment rather than a metaphysical statement regarding the nature of existence.  In Jainism all the other insights and practices flow from the ethical principle of non-harming/Ahimsa.

And here I’d like to raise the question regarding Platonism whether its first principle, or starting point, is metaphysical or ethical.  (I recognize that the separation of ethics and metaphysics has its own problems; but for the purposes of this post, I’m going to treat them as different in that an ethical starting point does not, in itself, determine a metaphysical position, and vice versa.  I mean that individuals can be committed to non-harming and at the same time adhere to different metaphysical commitments.  For example, both Jainism and Classical Yoga are committed to Non-harming/Ahimsa, but they have different metaphysical views.)

When I ask this question, I am contrasting in my own mind the idea that the Good and the One are the first principle of Platonism in contrast to asserting that non-harming, or justice (which Plato equates with non-harming) is the first principle.  I think the norm is to assert that the Good and the One is the First Principle and the starting point for Platonism.  This partially explains why the teachings on non-harming found in Platonism are not treated as extensively as the metaphysics of Platonism.

In the history of Platonism, the Platonist who comes closest, it seems to me, to viewing non-harming as the, or a, first principle is Porphyry, particularly in his work On Abstinence.  But one can also see this stance in Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo.  I don’t mean that Porphyry explicitly states that non-harming is the first principle of Platonism.  He doesn’t do that.  But what I am suggesting is that it makes sense to interpret a work like On Abstinence as functionally equivalent to regarding non-harming as the first principle of Platonism, as Platonism’s starting point.  I say this because Porphyry links the focus of that work, vegetarianism, to contemplation, to the nature of soul, to purification, and many other topics which is typical of how a first principle works; kind of like an axiom in geometry.  (For those interested in Porphyry’s perspective I recommend Book III, paragraphs 26 and 27 of On Abstinence which are found on pages 97 and 98 in the translation by Gillian Clark.)

Scholars don’t see On Abstinence in this way, as an elaboration of non-harming as a first principle; on the other hand, scholars tend to have come to the conclusion that the Good and the One is the first principle, so they wouldn’t be looking for another candidate.  (As an aside, I understand why people, many people, regard the Good and the One as the first principle of Platonism; there is a lot of writing that is consistent with that presentation that can be found in early sources such as Plato and Aristotle and so forth over many centuries.  I’m not dismissing that out of hand.  In a way I’m offering the idea that non-harming is the first principle of Platonism as a kind of thought experiment to see where it would lead; perhaps viewing non-harming as the first principle of Platonism will clarify some issues or bring certain insights forward that we have not observed clearly in the past.  That’s my hope, but we shall see.)

If non-harming is the first principle, the ultimate starting point, of Platonism how would that impact the place that the Good and the One hold?  I suspect that if we take non-harming as the first principle then the Good and the One, along with the metaphysical cosmology of Platonism, become inferences (broadly speaking) from the axiom, or starting point, or first principle of non-harming.  In other words, the Good and the One, as understandings, are subsequent to the intuition, the insight, the primal source of non-harming. 

I think there exist good textual reasons for looking at non-harming this way in a Platonist context; particular in the dialogue Crito.  This dialogue depicts Socrates as so committed to non-harming that he is willing to die rather than forgoing its teaching.  And in several dialogues, it is stated that it is better to suffer an injustice/harm than it is to commit an injustice, even in retaliation.  This kind of writing is powerful and can be understood as saying that the ethical commitment of non-harming is the primary teaching, the starting point, of Platonic teachings.

4. Aphorisms --

The geraniums of time.

There is something a bit humorous in writing about eternity using an aphorism.

You cannot use the same word twice.

In the philosophical ascent some things become clearer and at the same time other things become more mysterious.

All nations are unstable.

Grace is the atmospheric condition that allows philosophy to happen.

Philosophical analysis is not an end in itself.

Poetry is a craft like baking bread or sewing quilts.

In my old age I find that I am content and I think that is due to decades of spiritual practice.

The gods are not immortal.

I’m probably in the minority on this point; but I don’t regard a human birth as particularly auspicious in terms of spiritual development, understanding, and realization.

There is a place, or, better, a presence, that I have come to call the ‘grotto of eternity.’

 

 

 

 


Monday, November 2, 2026

2 November 2026

2 November 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 112

1.  Love and Grace in Plotinus: 1

For a long time, I have thought of grace as having a significant place in the Platonic tradition.  Grace is not often mentioned in discussions of Platonism and I think one of the reasons is that it is not overtly mentioned in important Platonic works very often.  A second reason is that I think the strong association of grace with Christianity means that secular scholars tend to interpret Platonic grace in Christian terms and while this makes historical sense, it is, I think, a barrier to accessing how grace functions in the Platonic tradition.

There are, however, a few places where Plotinus writes about grace, and there are a few scholars who have examined what Plotinus has to say.  Pierre Hadot wrote a short book about Plotinus called Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision and in that book Hadot briefly talks about Plotinus’s understanding of grace and love.  Here is a quote from Hadot’s book:

“For Plotinus, if things were nothing other than what they are, in their nature, essence and structure, they would not be lovable.  In other words, love is always superior to its object, however lofty the latter may be.  Its object can never explain or justify it.  There is in love a ‘something more,’ something unjustified; and that which, in objects, corresponds to this ‘something more’ is grace, or Life in its deepest mystery.  Forms and structures can be justified, but life and grace cannot.  They are ‘something more,’ and this gratuitous surplus is everything.  In it, Plotinus recognizes ‘the trace of the Good’: ‘Each form, taken by itself, is [only] what it is; but it becomes desirable once the Good diffuses the color of its light over it . . . awakening love in those who desire it’ (VI 7, 22, 5-7).

“What Plotinus calls the Good is thus, at the same time, that which, by bestowing grace, gives rise to love, and that which, by awakening love, causes grace to appear.  The Good is what all things desire; it is what is desirable in an absolute sense.  We asserted that love and grace are unjustified; likewise, the Good itself is absolutely unjustified.  It is not random or accidental, but by willing itself and being what it wants to be, it freely creates the love that beings feel for it, as well as the grace they receive from it.  All these formulations are, in any case, unable to translate what the soul knows of the Good when it goes through the experience of love.”

(Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, translated by Michael Chase, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pages 50 and 51, ISBN: 9780226311944)

1.1  Hadot refers to ‘something more’ in the things of this world.  I think that is an excellent way of looking at how Platonism, and Platonist practitioners, stand in the world.  Platonism is focused on this ‘something more.’  This is one of the primary differences between naturalism and Platonism; in naturalism, or materialism, things are thought of as being sufficiently, and completely, depicted by their natural, material features.  In Platonism the natural features of any given thing are the result of the something more of existence, of the Platonic Forms, of the Good and the One. 

I think Plotinus is connecting with the dialogue Phaedo and that wonderful section where Socrates gives a brief intellectual, or philosophical, biography.  I have mentioned this section on several posts before, it is where Socrates explains that he was, at first, attracted to the philosophy of Anaxagoras, but then later saw through its limitations which are that Anaxagoras explains things through reducing them to natural and material causes alone (and it seems that Socrates is suggesting that even mind in Anaxagoras was explained in this way).  Anaxagoras is the naturalist, the reductionist, in this telling, while Socrates is the one who is rooted in the transcendental.

1.2  Hadot links love and grace in what I have quoted.  I read this as grace being the overflowing of the Good and the One, which in turn generates in material beings love for the Good and the One and the desires to return to the One.  The way Hadot puts it is that grace bestows love.

This love is, at times, given an erotic description, particularly in the Symposium where the Diotima’s ladder of beauty begins with the contemplation of attractive bodies.  At first this may appear to conflict with the ascetic teachings of Plato found in Phaedo and other dialogues.  But what Diotima teaches is to ascend to the transcendental by turning away from material beauty to that which is beautiful as such; that is to say to the beauty of the noetic.  In addition, Socrates is praised in the Symposium for not succumbing to the attempted seduction of Alcibiades, an example of someone who has transcended the seduction of material beauty.

1.3  Hadot uses the word ‘unjustified’ to describe love and grace.  I think this is an aspect of grace that disturbs many people.  That someone will receive the grace of the One even if they have not lived an exemplary life runs counter to our sense of fairness; it can even feel arbitrary.

The metaphor I use for Platonic grace has helped me to understand how this works.  I use the metaphor of moonlight shining on a mountain path that branches of the main path.  A hiker notices this path and turns to hike that path to its conclusion.

The moonlight is the symbol of grace.  The moonlight was shining on the path but wasn’t shining specifically for that individual hiker; moonlight simply shines because that is its nature.  I think that in this sense grace is ‘unjustified’ because the path that is being shown in the moonlight is simply being shown; the presence of the path is not noticed due to some kind of transaction.  The presence of the path is a gift in the sense that it comes to the hiker freely, without calculation.

1.4  A few paragraphs later, Hadot writes, “The grace he (Plotinus) speaks of reveals to use the gratuitousness of divine initiative.  Let the reader be reassured: this is not an attempt to Christianize Plotinus.  It is too obvious that he is unaware of or opposed to the idea of a new creation in Christ, which constitutes the content of the specifically Christian concept of grace.  The gratuitousness of divine initiative is only ne element of this concept, and not the most characteristic one at that.  If philosophical reflection goes to its own extreme, and still more if it attempts to express the content of the mystical experience, it, too, will be led to this notion of gratuitousness.  It will, moreover, become clear upon reflection that all necessity and all duty presuppose the absolute initiative of an original love and freedom.”  (Ibid, page 51)  And I would add an original grace.

The use of the word ‘gratuitous’ I read as emphasizing that the grace of the Good and the One is beyond affirmation and negation; as I mentioned above, it is not calculated.  I also think the usage of ‘gratuitous’ emphasizes that the Good and the One are beyond being, mind, and life.  I think it is a way of talking about the ineffable that is particularly effective.

1.5  The moonlight on the mountain path is a metaphor I like because it doesn’t negate the need for purification.  The hiker does need to notice the path, does need to turn to the path, and needs to consider the path valuable enough to turn away from, to renounce, other possible paths.  In this way purification and grace can be understood to work together.

1.6  Again, I have not observed much writing on the topics of grace and love in University Platonism.  And I suspect that one of the reasons is that to think of grace and love as significant, even foundational, is to move the Platonic tradition to another dimension of reality that modern philosophy has for the most part rejected. 

1.7  Hadot’s description of love and grace also connects love and grace with beauty.  Beauty is ‘something more’ just as love and grace are something more.  I think this explains why Plotinus, following Plato, spends so much energy referring to beauty and the illuminating presence of Beauty.  Beauty is the presence of grace perceived.

2.  Plotinian

I have started thinking of myself as a ‘Plotinian.’  I think of this as similar to a Christian who refers to himself as an ‘Augustinian.’  In other words, Plotinian refers to a stream of, or tradition of, Platonism.  I feel attracted to this way of speaking because of the vastness of the Platonic tradition and how this vastness facilitates misunderstandings; ‘Plotinian’ narrows the focus.

My only hesitancy about the term ‘Plotinian’ is that it is still common, unfortunately, for people to refer to Plotinus as the ‘father of Neoplatonism.’  I’ve posted before about why I think this is misguided; it’s kind of like referring to Augustine as ‘the father of Neochristianity.’  No one does that because it would be laughable to do so.  In a similar way, I think associating Plotinus with ‘Neoplatonism’ misunderstands what Plotinus was doing and who he was.

But there’s nothing I can do about that, other than to offer my own understanding, along with others who agree and let people decide for themselves as to this usage.  In the meantime, I will try on the Plotinian hat and see if it fits.

3.  The Demise of Postmodernism?

I recently saw a few videos on YouTube that share the theme of the approaching end of postmodernism.  That’s interesting; I think this is the first time I’ve seen young people talk in this way.  I don’t know what the future will bring, but I can kind of see that postmodernism has a faddish quality to it.  And its opaque use of language guaranteed that it would exclude most people from understanding what it was about and that it would remain primarily of interest to academics.

For Platonists, modernism and postmodernism created an intellectual environment that was casually hostile to its primary concerns such as the nature of the transcendental, the manner in which Platonic forms work, asceticism and the cultivation of virtue, and a strong interest in the nature of beauty.  If it is true that postmodernism is reaching a conclusion that doesn’t guarantee that what follows it will be more congenial to Platonism.  On the other hand, its demise might create more space for Platonism to present itself as a way of life that is just as valid today as it was thousands of years ago.

4.  Aphorisms

I consider the Letters of Plato as a warning Plato left for his students so they would not pursue political careers or engagement.

Sometimes I feel profoundly tired of this world.

Reading different translations of Plotinus resembles listening to different conductors conduct the same symphony.

The instantiation of beauty fades but beauty as such does not fade.

Contemplation is the conversion of attention from the dispersions of the material world to the unity of the One which is found within.

A strange thing I have noticed about nihilists is that they seem to find meaning in the meaninglessness of nihilist teachings.

I found a fossil in the desert.

The material world is dominated by the cacophony of differentiation but there are hidden appearances of eternity here and there, now and then.

 


Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 114

16 November 2026 Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 114 1.   The Classics of Platonism I’m working on a list I call ‘The Classics of Plato...