Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 94

28 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 94

1.  The Soul of Philosophy

Recently I listened to an interview with Robert Greene.  Robert Greene is an author of popular self-help books.  Unlike most self-help books, Greene’s books are thick.  His best-selling book is The 48 Laws of Power, but other titles are similar in format but focus on other topics.  Greene’s approach is to tell stories, mostly from history, to illustrate the point he is making or the topic he is writing about.  This approach is an engaging format and has been well-received.

The interview was between a British Podcaster and Greene.  At one point the interviewer asks Greene to comment on what happened to philosophy in the 20^th century.  Greene responds by saying that ‘philosophy lost its soul’ starting in the early 20^th century.  I thought that was an interesting answer.  Greene is not a Platonist, as far as I know he is a secular materialist; this means that he is not using ‘soul’ in the way a Platonist would use the word.  But I found it intriguing that Greene chose to use that particular word; this kind of response isn’t typical of the way Greene talks.

Whatever Geene meant by the word ‘soul’ I am comfortable using a Platonic perspective to interpret what was said even if Greene would not sign onto that interpretation.  I have an overall agreement with Greene’s description of what happened to Philosophy.  I also suspect that at least some philosophers would also agree with Greene but would likely celebrate that loss because they think of this situation not as a loss, but as progress; I am thinking of materialist philosophers who are proud of their dismissal of anything transcendental, as well as an ethic that is disconnected to metaphysics and arrived at through the process of purification.  Materialist philosophers, what Plato through Gerson describe as ‘naturalists’, dismiss the idea of a soul, just as they dismiss the idea of Ideas. 

It would be interesting to find out if Greene has unpacked this observation in one of his numerous volumes; if anyone knows where such comments can be found, please indicate in the comments section.  Thanks.

2.  The Beauty of Metaphysics

There is something almost miraculous about the heritage of metaphysics.  When I use the word ‘miraculous’ what I mean is that it is difficult to square how material beings, such as human beings, could move beyond the material, the physical, and dwell enough in the metaphysical to unpack what they found to the best of their abilities after their return to the material domain.  If human beings were merely physical, I suggest that it would be impossible to do so.  The fact that there is metaphysics at all indicates that human beings are not reducible to their physical components.

3.  Ethical Restraints and the Virtues

I have been thinking a lot about the ethical restraints as they are found in Platonism for a long time.  One thing that I have noticed is that there is a lot written about the Platonic Virtues.  Most of the writing on the Virtues has blossomed from the seed of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  It’s not difficult to find books dedicated to the Platonic Virtues.

But the ethical restraints are not written about with the same focus and dedication.  Porphyry writes about them in several of his works, but Porphyry did not receive the approval that Aristotle did and though Porphyry’s influence is profound, it’s not the same as that of Aristotle’s influence.  My point is that Porphyry’s writings on ethical restraint and asceticism did not act as a catalyst for a lot of writing about the place that restraints have in the Dialogues of Plato. 

I would like to see greater attention placed on the ethical restraints, or asceses, that are found in the Platonic corpus as a whole.  One reason I would like to see this is that from my perspective the idea that Platonism is a Way of Life only makes sense if the restraints, or asceses, are looked at as foundational for such a project.

4.  Proclus and Plotinus

I listened to two Platonist philosophers talking about their favorite subject, Platonism, the other day on a long YouTube podcast.  At one point they agreed that they don’t find Proclus of much value. 

This reminded me of how, even today, Platonists tend to divide into two groups with one group finding satisfaction with Plotinus and the other group thinking of Proclus as going beyond what Plotinus had to say.  I fall in the first group; the one that finds satisfaction, and inspiration, in Plotinus but doesn’t find those qualities in Proclus. 

This has led me to think that perhaps this division is, at least in part, a difference in personality types.  Proclus is highly analytical and deductive; Iain McGilchrist would say that Proclus is ‘left brained.’  Plotinus can be analytical; for example I just finished reading Enneads VI.1, 2, and 3 which is Plotinus’s analysis of Aristotle’s categories.  It is very dense and contains discussions about the nature of substance, form, and intellect.  But even here Plotinus’s approach differs from that of Proclus in that Plotinus will often circle around an issue, presenting various possibilities, before settling on what Plotinus offers the reader as his own solution.  In contrast, Proclus often goes straight for a deduction with much less of this kind of circling motion of thought.

My sense is that some people very much like, and are attracted by, structures of deduction.  And when I say ‘deduction’ I mean reasoned inference in a manner consistent with the logical works of Aristotle and subsequent logicians.  In contrast, there are others, like myself, who enjoy the way Plotinus ‘circles around’, some would even say ‘drifts here and there within the range of the topic he’s discussing.’  I think people who admire this about Plotinus are often, not always, people who enjoy, and learn from, things like metaphor, myth, and allegory.

The Dialogues of Plato contain examples of both approaches; but Plato is exceptional in having the ability to write in many philosophical modes with equal skill (like a composer who can write equally well in major, minor, and modes like the pentatonic scales).  Most philosophers tend to lean in one direction or another.

5.  Haiku

Wandering mountains

Sing hymns to the end of time –

Dry creek, empty sky.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 93

20 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 93

1.  Cicero, Alcinous, and Plato on Wisdom

“For Cicero, philosophy is the love of ‘wisdom’ (sapientia), and is ancient in fact if not in name.  Wisdom on the other hand is ancient in fact and in name, and can be defined as ‘the knowledge of divine and human things and of the beginnings and causes of each thing.’”

(Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1986, page 74, ISBN: 9780268014384)

Plato doesn’t talk about wisdom in this specific way as ‘knowledge of divine and human things.’  According to what I have found in some sources, this definition was widely used in Stoicism.  The merging of Stoicism and Platonism was not unusual.

We can see how widespread this way of understanding wisdom was by referencing the first section of The Handbook of Platonism by Alcinous:

“Philosophy is a striving for wisdom, or the freeing and turning around of the soul from the body, when we turn towards the intelligible and what truly is, and wisdom is the science of things divine and human.”

(Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, page 3, ISBN: 0198236077)

Dillon connects the definition above by Cicero and Alcinous to Stoicism in Dillon’s endnote on this section of the Handbook, “The definition of wisdom given here is Stoic in its inspiration, cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2.  35: ‘Wisdom is the science of the divine and the human . . . “ (as above, page 52)

Earlier in Dillon’s endnote he connects the definition of Alcinous to the work Definitions which is found in the Platonic corpus; however Definitions is not a dialogue.  It is simply a list of definitions of key terms in Platonic philosophy.  Most scholars doubt that it was written by Plato, but it seems to have circulated fairly early.  Dillon writes, “The initial definition of philosophy [by Alcinous], as orexis Sophias, ‘striving’ or ‘desire for wisdom’, seems to be just a watered-down version of that in the Platonic Definitions, where philosophy is defined as ‘the striving for knowledge of the eternally existent’ (tes ton onton aei epistemes orexis), but ultimately derives from Republic 5. 475B . . . “ (as above, page 51.)

The reference to Book V of The Republic is as follows:

“Then do you agree to this or not?  When we say that someone desires something, do we mean that he desires everything of that kind or that he desires one part of it but not another?

“We mean he desires everything.

“Then won’t we also say that the philosopher doesn’t desire one part of wisdom rather than another, but desires the whole thing?

“Yes, that’s true.”

(Plato, The Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, Plato, Complete Worbks, edited by John M. Cooper, Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis1997, Indiana, 1997, pages 1101 and 1102, 475b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.1  I enjoy seeing how these Platonic and Stoic views of wisdom merged and spread.  It’s an interesting episode in spiritual, and intellectual, history.  And it also demonstrates how porous the various Philosophies were to each other in the Classical period.

1.2  The strictly Platonic definition is highlighted in Alcinous when Alcinous highlights the ‘turning around the soul from the body’ and is, I think, based on Phaedo.  This separation of body and soul does not seem to be a focus in Stoic definitions of wisdom. 

1.3  The definitions above speak of knowledge of the human and the divine.  But the definition found in Definitions specifies what the divine is when it says that it is striving for the knowledge of ‘the eternally existent.’ 

What I see here is that wisdom is the use of the capacity for differentiation found in the human mind to distinguish, have knowledge of, that which is ephemeral from that which is eternal.  Human things, and their causes that are found in the material realm, are ephemeral.  Eternal things are noetic, or by analogy, that which is eternal is found in the Good and the One.

1.4  The separation of the soul from the body is the separation of that which is eternal (the soul) from that which is ephemeral (the body).  This will happen naturally when we pass away, but the philosopher enters into a discipline to enact that separation prior to nature’s processes because that separation is necessary in order to enter into the noetic and the realm of the One. 

1.4.1  The primary means for such separation are the ascetic practices as found in Phaedo and other Dialogues.

1.5  The mind differentiates things, places them into categories; that is what the mind does.  The human mind is the presence of the Noetic in the individual.  It is in Nous where differentiation first manifests and this capacity for differentiation is passed down by emanation to the human mind.  In a sense you could say that the mind is a fragment of the Noetic or a pale representation of the Noetic.

1.6  Normally when the mind differentiates the mind does so in service to the body.  The body is the presence of time and of cyclic existence in the individual.  But if the mind starts to have a dim awareness of that which is eternal, the mind can then use the capacity for differentiation in service to that which is eternal.  This happens, if it does happen, gradually, step by step; like a flower blossoming in a glen.

1.7  The mind can sense the presence of eternity because of the silence and stillness of the soul.  The soul is the presence of the Good and the One in the individual.  Because of that presence there is a unity in the individual; it is the unity of the One, and its presence as soul, that makes an individual an individual rather than just a random collection of parts. 

Because the soul is silent, still, and partless, it is difficult for the mind to notice it.  When the mind serves the body the needs of the body are noticeable sensory things.  But the Good and the One are ineffable, and the soul shares in that ineffability.  Nevertheless, its presence, the presence of eternity, is detected by its stillness and silence which contrast with the noise and agitation of the body. 

1.8  The turning to eternity is something the mind can do, but it is not easy.  It requires studying the works of Plato and Plotinus, meditation and contemplation, and a love of the wisdom that leads to that which is eternal.

1.9  Alcinous talks about ‘striving’ and the word ‘philosophy’ refers to love.  I think this is why we find erotic imagery in the Dialogues; these images are symbols of the love for wisdom that blossoms in the heart of the philosopher.

2.  Immanence and Transcendence

I have given some thought recently to the question of whether or not the Good and the One are transcendent or immanent.  In many ways the Platonic tradition offers us a transcendental view of the ultimate.  The allegory of the cave supports a transcendent view.  And Plotinus will use words like ‘here’ for the sensory/material world and there, or There, for the noetic or ineffable ultimate.  These ways of talking about the Good and the One, as well as the Noetic, support a transcendental view of the spiritual journey where you abandon the material domain and ‘move’ to the transcendental domain.

The one exception to this way of speaking that I can think of is when writers in the Platonist tradition refer to higher realities, such as the Noetic and the Ineffable, as ‘everywhere’ and ‘everywhen’ (eternal).  I think this suggests (‘implies’ might be too strong a word) an interpretation of ultimate nature that is immanent; that is to say that the ultimate is, in some way, not separate from that which is not ultimate.

One solution to these different modes of speaking is to think of them as tools for talking about spiritual practice.  The transcendental way of speaking is very helpful in creating a sense of dedication to practice that resembles the way a musician will dedicate his time to mastering an instrument, or a carpenter dedicating his life to his craft, and so forth.  I have personally found this manner of speaking very helpful for my own spiritual journey.

The immanent way of speaking is a kind of antidote to thinking that the Good and the One are so far away, that it is impossible for an ordinary person like myself to rise to the level of experiencing the Good and the One.  It’s like a person with a badly broken leg trying to become a ballet dancer. 

I think that when Platonic literature talks about the importance and significance of beauty it feels like leaning towards a more immanent approach to the divine.  I know that structurally the origin of Beauty is in the Noetic (and at times the ineffable), and that the beauty here is a poor reflection of the Beauty There.  Nevertheless, the way Platonists talk about beauty shields Platonism from becoming filled with Gnostic repulsion for material existence as well as shielding Platonists from the widespread nihilism of our own culture.

A second solution to these different modes of speaking is to remind ourselves that the Good and the One are only names for the ultimacy that Platonism points to.  In this way transcendence and immanence are seen as provisional ways of speaking about the Good and the One; they are tools for shifting our attention from the material world to a way of seeing and comprehending a world, that is both here and There, and that is the end of sorrow.

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

13 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

1.  The First Principle’s Presence

“Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, Second Edition, edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 582, ISBN: 978009604970)

“. . . all [things are] imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, That Which is after the First, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 143, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“. . . all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.”

“Plotinus, The Enneads, Enneads 5.4.1, The Secondaries and the First, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 461, ISBN: 978943914558)

1.1  There are single sentences in Plotinus that are exquisite, filled with meaning and beauty.  This is one of those sentences.

1.2  In the clause closing the sentence before the one quoted Plotinus refers to fire warming things, to snow cooling things.  And then he moves into a generalization from this observation to an insight about ‘all things’.  That insight is that all things are imitating the nature of the ultimate in accordance with their specific, limited, nature. 

How are things imitating ultimate nature?  By generation, by productive activity.  Fire is hot and the heat of fire produces warmth in objects that are near it.  Snow is cold and the coldness of snow cools those things close to it.  I take these to be analogies to how The One overflows and creates, emanates, generates, the world.  When looked at in this way we can sense the presence of the One even in ordinary material things.  This brings the highest metaphysics of Plotinus down to the material realm so that the material realm is not isolated, or separate from, the transcendental.  The transcendental and the material are not the same, but they are related in a manner that, once recognized, assists the philosopher in his journey of ascent to the Good and the One.

1.3  I view the phrase ‘eternity and goodness’ as a way of saying the One and the Good.  Here I would say that ‘eternity’ is a way of speaking about the One.  The One is ultimately ineffable, but there are names for the One that are used to communicate with each other about this transcendental reality.

Frequently in the Enneads ‘eternity’ or ‘the eternal’ is used to refer to the noetic, the second hypostasis, rather than the One.  It is not unusual for Plotinus to use terms that subtly change their meaning depending on which level, or hypostasis, Plotinus is referring to.  And Plotinus does not always signal a shift of meaning of this kind.  As a reader becomes more familiar with how Plotinus makes these shifts the reader becomes more tuned in to when that happens.

1.4  It is possible to interpret ‘eternity and goodness’ as meaning that everything imitates the noetic forms that are the source of particular things, and following that imitates the ultimate through generous creativity, or goodness.  I can understand this kind of interpretation because it elegantly encapsulates the three levels of existence, or hypostases, starting with material things, then rising to the noetic, and then rising further to the transcendental Good. 

But Armstrong’s translation leans towards seeing this phrase as another way of expressing the One and the Good.  Armstrong translates that all things are imitating the First Principle and Armstrong does not distinguish between everlastingness and generosity as to their level, which hypostasis they reside in; suggesting that both are ways of talking about the ineffable, the transcendental.

MacKenna seems to be making the same point when he says that all things are imitating the ‘Source.’  The ultimate source is the ineffable One.  I don’t read MacKenna as saying that ‘eternity’ and ‘service’ represent names for different hypostases.

It may be the case that Plotinus is compressing multiple meanings in this sentence and that reading eternity as referring to the noetic is one reading Plotinus had in mind, while reading eternity as another way of talking about the ineffable is another reading.  Multiple meanings are not unusual in Plotinus (or Plato) so it would not surprise me if this is the case here.

1.5  Ennead 3.7, Eternity and Time, deals with how Plotinus understands the relationship between these two realities.  Plotinus unpacks his understanding of eternity and time in a way that at first seems complex, but after a second or third reading it comes into clearer focus.  Here is a quote from Ennead III.7 that I think is relevant to the quote from Ennead 5.4:

“What, then, should we say eternity is?  That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the entire heaven, that is, the cosmos?  For they [the Pythagoreans – translator’s footnote] say that some hold this latter belief about time.  For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them.  And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.

“But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ [Timaeus 37D3 – translator’s footnote] – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it.  But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity.  For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other.  And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.”

(Gerson, see above, page 337)

Here is the passage from Timaeus, 37D3, that the translator referenced in a footnote:

“Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper; Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, page 1241, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see the quote from Ennead 3.7 as indicating that Plotinus does not consider the intelligible, or the noetic, and eternity to be the same.  Eternity is present to the intelligible, but I would say that eternity comes before the intelligible.  I suggest this because the intelligible, that is to say noetic realities, arise due to differentiation, and the eternal is before differentiation.  When the eternal is subject to differentiation, we get the moving image of eternity that is time.

Eternity and the noetic are intimately related and because of that noetic objects are eternal; but the eternity of noetic objects (which, tellingly, Whitehead refers to as eternal objects) is due to proximity to the One.  Eternity is another way of saying Unity.  The unity of noetic objects is also due to their proximity to the One, and to their proximity to the Eternal. 

1.6  The place that eternity holds in Platonism is a difficult topic.  It is not easy to sift through what Plotinus says about this and because of that difficulty people can come to different conclusions.  Some have said that the One is beyond eternity just as the One is beyond being.  But the One is also beyond Unity, beyond the One.  As Plotinus writes, whatever anyone says about the One falls short of its actuality, for the One is even beyond actuality.  In other words, I agree that what is ultimate transcends eternity, but I think there are good reasons to think of ‘eternity’ as a useful name for that which transcends name and form.

And, to be honest, I think that Plotinus does use ‘eternity’ as another name for the One; now and then, not always.  Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, Plotinus uses eternity, or the eternal, when referring to noetic realities, the intelligibles.  But just as Plotinus will use terms like unity to refer to noetic realities as well as the unity of the One, so also Plotinus will skillfully unpack eternity in ways that depend on the level of reality, or hypostasis, that is being referred to.

1.7  All of the writings of Plotinus are based on his experiences of the noetic and the transcendental (the intelligible and the One).  Reaching out across the chasm that separates the material world from that which is incorporeal, Plotinus illuminates that which is eternal by proximity, and that which is eternal remaining in unity.

2.  Stages of the Practice of Ethical Restraint

There is not a lot of writing about ethical restraint in the Platonist tradition or in how ethical restraint is presented in the Dialogues of Plato.  But restraint is discussed outside of this context, and surprisingly it is usually in a therapeutic context, often centered on addiction.  In this kind of literature ‘restraint’ has a practical focus on how someone can actually overcome the sensory, and sensual, thing(s) that seem to control their lives.  Often there is a three stage presentation of how restraint works:

The first stage is avoidance.  Sometimes the expression ‘just don’t go there’ is used; as in an alcoholic should just not go to a bar, or to a party where alcohol is served.  This has application to a large variety of situations where people are trying to overcome the seductions of the senses.

The second stage is sometimes called ‘self-command.’  This is learning how to make initial steps in internalizing effective resistance to sensory seductions.  A lot of literature is centered on this second stage and the authors of these works offer simple means for reminding the person on the path of renunciation (in a lay and secular context) is helped because most of these suggestions are internal reminders, sometimes prayers, that serve to deflect the seduction of the senses when it appears.  It might be as simple as ‘day after day I will reject alcohol.’  Or it might be simpler, ‘I reject alcohol.’  Or it might be longer such as the much used Serenity Prayer.  The Serenity Prayer might be condensed to the person saying ‘courage’ in their mind to remind them to pull away from what is tempting them.

This second stage is a kind of internal civil war where old and powerful habits are being contested by a new perspective.  This conflict between the older way of life with the possibility of a new way of life can become intense.  These internalized sayings, or prayers, are reminders that the individual wants to move into a new situation and wants to give up on habits that are self-destructive.

The third stage is sometimes called ‘mastery’ but I prefer the term ‘stability’ meaning that the change to a new way of living has stabilized and the internal civil war is basically over.  There is a greater sense of calm and also a feeling of accomplishment.  Of course it is always possible to slide back into old habits and for that reason the practices of the second stage remain a part of the person’s inner life.

I don’t recall in Platonist literature this kind of analysis where the stages of renunciation are discussed; it might be in the literature somewhere, but I don’t recall running across it.  My feeling is that this kind of information would be something that would be discussed between teacher and student rather than being the topic of an essay; or at least it looks that way to me. 

In the Platonist literature there is some indication that people did fall away from the practices of ethical restraint.  For example, in the opening section of Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry writes to Firmus, a friend of Porphyry’s, that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has fallen away from vegetarianism and returned to eating meat.  Porphyry views this as Firmus having given up on the Way of Philosophy and is writing to Firmus to encourage him to return to a philosophical life, a vegetarian life. 

This kind of falling away is common; it happens to many people.  Overcoming sensual seductions, even when a person knows that succumbing to them is unhealthy and damaging to themselves and others, is not easy.  Knowing this, one can be sympathetic.  The important thing is to encourage the individual who has fallen away from their renunciation practice to try again.  It may take many tries.  But that’s OK.  Just keep trying and eventually the new way of life will establish itself, stabilize itself.

3.  William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is a Protestant Christian Apologist.  Craig has a large following.  Craig has studied philosophy extensively and is familiar with contemporary approaches to philosophy.  Craig is familiar with logic and modern modes of analysis from the analytic tradition (a surprising number of Christian apologists use tools from the analytic tradition in their work).  Craig is an effective apologist for his tradition.

Craig has written one book (“God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism”), and posted several videos, where he criticizes adopting Platonist metaphysics in the Christian tradition (this is more common in the Protestant tradition than it is in Catholicism or Orthodoxy).  Craig is aware of the influence that Platonism has had on Christianity, but Craig thinks that the Platonic influence undermines Christianity in significant ways.

If I understand Craig correctly, Craig is disturbed by the way Plato talks about intelligibles, or noetic objects, also known as eternal objects.  Craig refers to these as ‘forms’ which is a standard usage.  Craig’s understanding of Platonic forms is that they are eternal and unchanging; that’s true, I mean that the forms are understood to be that way in Platonism.  But Craig argues that this undermines the uniqueness of God because being eternal and unchanging are characteristics of God that are considered by Craig in the exegetical tradition he grows out of, to be unique characteristics of God.  It follows that this undermines the independence and uniqueness of God because there are other things in the cosmos that share at least some of the attributes of God.

Craig offers that a way of resolving this, which Craig argues is something that at least some Christian Platonists took, is to reconfigure the forms as ‘ideas in the mind of God.’  I think Craig is right that this is a way that Christians can retain a sense of the noetic while at the same time arguing for the uniqueness, the divine aseity, of God.  However, according to some histories of Platonism I have read, the view that Platonic forms are ideas in the mind of God was put forward in a Platonist context among the Middle Platonists and was likely absorbed into Christianity from those resources.

Personally, I prefer a more traditional way of viewing the forms; that the forms are emanations of the One, of the fully transcendental, of God.  The difference between the forms and the One is that the forms are differentiated from each other whereas the One is undifferentiated unity that is beyond differentiation, before differentiation.  If you want to understand the presence of differentiation in the forms, consider that the eternity of the forms differentiates them from all that is ephemeral.  In addition, forms are differentiated from each other, but at the same time fully transparent to each other. 

The view that forms are ideas in the mind of God collapses the noetic realm into the realm of that which is ultimate; in this case God.  From this perspective, the three hypostases now become two and the noetic realm of forms disappears. 

I think that Craig thinks of God as having characteristics which is standard Christian theology; with the exception of some Christian mysticism.  In contrast the One is beyond characteristics and beyond being.  The One is beyond affirmation and negation, whereas the forms do have characteristics and traits.

The discussion between Christianity and Platonism has been going on for two thousand years.  The discussion has a dialectical feel to it in the sense that both sides are committed to uncovering metaphysical truth.  I think the differences between the two traditions is a kind of creative, fire producing, light giving, presence that has led participants to focus on certain issues intensely.  I think that is a good thing. 

(As an aside, when I say these kinds of discussions have a long history, a good example of this centered on a treatise written by Proclus called On the Eternity of the World.  It contains eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.  It is my personal favorite of the works of Proclus.  This work was disliked by Christians because Christians have the view that the world was created by God and will end at some point in the future as part of God’s plan.  From this perspective the world is not eternal.  In response to this treatise of Proclus, a Christian writer, Philoponus, wrote a critique of this work by Proclus titled Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.  I think I have mentioned this before on this blog, but it has been a while and I think it fits in with the discussion about William Lane Craig.  The dispute between Proclus and Philoponus is not exactly the same point of divine aseity, but both of them are engaged in distinguishing Christianity from Platonism; and I think the points they raise are related.)

4.  Haiku

The sound of spring wind

Isn’t the same as the sound

Of eternity.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 91

6 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 91

1.  The Sensations of War

The Ascetic Ideal is living in a manner such that we are not guided by sensory stimulation; that is to say, that we do not live a life that is centered on finding ways to stimulate the senses.  The stimulation of the senses that people seek is usually some kind of seeking after pleasure.  But this is not always the case; often people seek the painful sensory stimulation either for its own sake or for the sake of some goal.  This is where the common phrase, “no pain, no gain”, comes from. 

I have been thinking about this in the context of war because, obviously, the current war is in the news and is being talked about a lot.  What I have noticed is that war stimulates the senses in dramatic ways; by ‘dramatic’ I mean that the sensory stimulation that comes from war, even when someone is just watching war on social media, is strong, intense.

The sensation of war is a kind of spectacle.  The blowing up of various structures is visually very stimulating and has a strange attractiveness; I mean that people seem to be drawn to it.  The sound of incoming ordinance, the sound of guns of various types, and the dramatic and sudden deaths of many people stimulate feelings of both fear and triumph.  It’s better than a movie.

The way to peace is through the Ascetic Ideal.  Peace is found by withdrawing from sensory stimulation which in Platonism is expressed as separating body and soul to the extent that is possible while living with a body.  The Ascetic Ideal aligns those who practice this ideal, to the extent it is possible given the circumstances of their lives, with the transcendental because the transcendental is not a spectacle or a movie.  It is the changeless and eternal.  It is peace everlasting.

2.  Latin Platonism

I have started reading Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition.  It is a two-volume work by Stephen Gersh.  Gersh has gathered various sources, like Cicero, Boethius, Seneca, and others, into a kind of anthology of Platonism that centers on Platonists who wrote in Latin.  It is my understanding that this is the first anthology of its kind in English (it was published in 1986).  It looks like a well done collection and I am looking forward to reading it.

3.  Style

I have the impression that authors in the Platonic tradition tend to fall into two categories based on their approach.  The first is systematic; the author is focused on system building and metaphysical completeness.  Proclus is the obvious candidate for this way of writing about Platonism.  Oddly enough, I would also include Whitehead in this style; even though Proclus and Whitehead are separated by many centuries they both enjoyed building systems that they hoped would be all encompassing.

The second is what I would say is centered on the occasional essay.  Plutarch is a good example of this kind of approach, as is Plotinus.  Some think of Plotinus as a system builder and I think there is some truth to that.  On the other hand, the flow of Plotinus’s thought is more open to shifts of focus, to returning to the same topic and having another go at it.  I think it was Armstrong who wrote that Plotinus was an unsystematic writer on a systematic philosophy.  And since I am writing here about style in terms of how their thought appears to the reader, I think Plotinus as an essayist is appropriate, though I can understand why some would disagree with that.

Needless to say my own writing is that of occasional essays; often more like a diary than a full blown essay.