Brief Notes on Various Topics - 89

23 March 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 89

1.  A Few Quotes about Soul

1.1       “The blizzard, the blizzard of the world

             Has crossed the threshold and it has overturned the                    order of the soul.”

                                                         Leonard Cohen - The Future

Leonard Cohen’s songs became darker as he aged.  I wouldn’t say they became nihilistic, but themes involving a pessimistic view of humanity appear.  This is one of those songs. 

The first line of the quoted verse describes the feeling of being buried by the world we currently live in.  Innovations come at us in a fast and furious pace and there is no ability to pause and take in, or get ready for, what is coming at us.

I’ve been in blizzards.  When I was working on the north coast of Alaska I experienced a significant number of them that rose to the level of a ‘white out’.  The wind would howl and the snow would often move horizontally in the driving storm.  And you could only see a very short distance in front of you.  I think that is the kind of experience Cohen is getting at.

The blizzard has ‘crossed the threshold’.  I think Cohen means the threshold that keeps society functioning and somewhat orderly; in other words we have crossed the threshold of chaos. 

And by doing so the blizzard has ‘overturned the order of the soul.’  I listened to one commentary on this song that suggested that Cohen may have been influenced by the traditionalist movement because some of the imagery in the song seems to be strongly connected to traditionalism.  Cohen was influenced by many sources; his Jewish background, his long years of Zen training in Southern California, and he seems to have been exceptionally well read in various spiritual traditions.  So it’s possible, but I can’t say for sure. 

But I wanted to highlight this verse because one of the obstacles the we have in understanding what Platonists have to say about the soul is that the order of the soul has been overturned in modernity and so we are trying to understand what Platonism is saying about the soul, peering through the blizzard that Cohen refers to.  That is not an easy task.  It goes beyond differences of opinion about how the soul works, whether it has parts or is partless, what affections the soul has, and so forth.  It means that we have to wait patiently for a break in the blizzard in order to see what the Classical Platonists were saying about the ‘order of the soul.’

The ‘order of the soul’ refers, I think, in a Platonist context, to the Platonic project of turning away from sensory stimulation and bodily temptations and towards the immaterial soul.  That this is what is important rather than the blizzard of demands that the sensory domain and sensory stimulations that pull us away from that order.

1.2  “The soul must, therefore, be in this way both one and many, and divided and indivisible, and we should not be incredulous as to the possibility of a thing’s being identical and one in many places.  For if we were not prepared to accept this possibility, the nature holding all things together and administering them will not exist.  As it is, it is that which encloses all things in one embrace and directs them with wisdom, constituting on the one hand a multiplicity – since there is a multiplicity of beings – but also one, in order that the coordinating force may be one, and while orchestrating life in all its parts due to its multiple unity, exercising a wise leadership due to its indivisible unity.  In those things which are devoid of wisdom, the controlling unity imitates this. . . The soul, then, is one and many in this way; and the forms in bodies are many and one; bodies, in turn are many only; and that which is highest is one only.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Second Edition, Ennead 4.2.2, On the Substantiality of the Soul 1, Edited by Lloyd P. Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, pages 385-386, ISBN: 9781009604970)

I think Plotinus’s discussions about soul, found in many Enneads, are exceptionally subtle.  Plotinus gives a nod to various interpretations of the soul and how it works now and then that are not, strictly speaking, Platonic (according to footnotes they are often Stoic in origin).  I think what Plotinus is doing in these passages is letting his audience know that Plotinus knows of the numerous theories and interpretations that were circulating in the Classical World.  And perhaps some of his comments were directed at specific students who may have had a Stoic background.

In this quote Plotinus argues that the soul is both ‘one and many’, is both ‘divided and undivided.’  This is not easy to understand.  Plotinus knows this and refers to how incredulous this sounds.  I think what Plotinus is getting at is that how you conceive of the soul will depend on whether you are thinking of soul in the Noetic realm, or if you are thinking of soul in the material realm, as occupying individual bodies.  The forms of bodies are many and one; they are one because of the soul’s connection to the noetic.  But bodies are ‘many only’, that is to say that bodies are divided into parts and differentiated from each other.

From my perspective, the differentiation of bodies from each other is a result of bodies living under the reign of time.  It is time that shapes the material world as first this, then that.  The unity of the soul in the noetic is beyond time, transcends time.  (I think this is one of the primary reasons that Plotinus argues against the idea of the fully descended soul; because if the soul were fully descended it would be cut off from it source of unity and would not be able to function as that which gives unity to living beings.) 

This is a really beautiful passage that manages to reconcile many divergent views of the soul into an overall coherent presentation.

1.3  “There has been much controversy within the Platonic School itself [regarding the soul], one group bringing together into one system and form the various types and parts of life and its activities, as for example Plotinus and Porphyry; another, exemplified by Numenius, setting them up in conflict with each other; and another again reconciling them from a postulated original strife, as for instance Atticus and Plutarch.  These last maintain that there supervene on pre-existing disorderly and irregular motions other later ones which organize and arrange them, and from both of them they thus weave together a web of harmony.”

(Iamblichus, De Anima (On the Sou), translated by John F. Finamore and John M. Dillon, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2002, page 49, ISBN: 9781589834682)

“Some posit that the essence of the soul is numerically one but then multiply it (as Amelius thinks by its relations and assignments or as the Orphics say by breaths from the Whole Soul), then rise from the multiplicity of the whole to the one soul that has laid aside these relations and locations relative to others, and free it from its division into the things that partake of it.  These thinkers, inasmuch as they reject its subdivision into its participating parts, preserve it completely whole and the same, and grant to it a single essence that is given limitation through individuation.”

(As above, page 51)

These quotes give the reader a good idea of how the topic of the soul occupied many philosophical minds who came up with a variety of analyses.  It’s interesting that Iamblichus specifically mentions the Platonic school as having controversies about the soul.  Iamblichus would know since he was a major source of the controversy over whether or not the soul is fully descended (which was Iamblichus’s view) or only partially descended (the view of Plotinus and Porphyry), retaining a presence in the higher hypostases.  But leaving Iamblichus’s own view aside, the quotes are a good example of how varied views of the soul were in the Classical Period.

I think this makes sense because the soul is a kind of mystery.  I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the soul is ‘ineffable’ (although you could make a case for that).  I would use the analogy of music to explain what I mean by the mystery of the soul.  When we listen to some music that moves us and speaks to us, it is difficult to explain exactly what is going on.  There are theories about this; some are psychological, some are evolutionary, some are structural (I mean the structure of music and how music shapes sound), and so forth.  These theories are not necessarily contradictory, and they have some explanatory value, but they don’t seem to go to the heart of the matter.  In a similar way, there are many theories of the soul, but there always seems to be a certain feeling of incompleteness about them.  I don’t mean that these theories are futile; I mean that there is always something left over after an explanation is given and that what is left over feels like it is significant, perhaps the most significant aspect of the soul.

2.  The Geometrical Method

I’ve been thinking about the geometrical method in a philosophical context, as opposed to a mathematical context.  There are not a lot of examples of philosophers who used the geometrical method.  The most prominent that I know of are Proclus and Spinoza.  I have been thinking mostly about the geometrical method in the context of Platonism and I have been wondering if the geometrical method is an appropriate usage, or method, for a Platonic context?

My thinking is that a method shapes what it is possible to say about the topic that the method is applied to.  If you use the geometrical method you are, by using that method, excluding approaches that lack the strict inferential structures demanded by geometry.  But I’m not convinced that this is legitimate.

For example, Plato expresses many of his ideas, some of which are core ideas of his philosophy, using myth, allegory, metaphor, and other similar structures.  At these key points in his dialogues he does not use the geometrical method (does Plato ever use the geometrical method?  I suppose you could say that a dialogue like Parmenides is rigorous, but I think the arguments found therein elude geometrical formulation.) 

I other words, by using the geometrical method, a philosopher like Proclus, especially in a work like The Elements of Theology, is excluding insights and wisdom generated by non-geometrical means.  This is an unnecessary limitation, and I think it shrinks the vastness of Platonic philosophy, and Platonic wisdom, rather than illuminating it.

3.  Precepts Defined Tradition

There are different ways of distinguishing one spiritual tradition from another.  Within the Buddhist tradition different levels of practice and types of commitments are defined by the ethical precepts that a person agrees to incorporate into their lives.  For example, lay people take some basic precepts that describe certain ethical restraints; there are five or ten of these precepts, or vows, depending on the Buddhist tradition.  There are also a longer set of precepts or vows known as the Bodhisattva Precepts; in East Asia the Bodhisattva Precepts consist of 10 major and 48 minor precepts.  There are also two versions of the Bodhisattva Precepts used in different Tibetan traditions.  For those who wish to practice Buddhist Tantra there are a set of what are called Samaya Vows that govern a student of tantra’s relationship to the tantric tradition.  And there are also the Monastic Precepts that consist of hundreds of regulations.  Each collection of precepts defines the specific Buddhist tradition and they, the precepts or vows, act as the gate into that specific Buddhist tradition.

Platonism is not a precepts defined tradition.  I mean by this that people tend to define being a Platonist as accepting metaphysical ideas, such as Nous, rather than accepting specific ethical disciplines that are defined by precepts or vows.  I think this is why most people when they read in the dialogues explicit ethical teachings tend to skip past them; because they don’t think of these ethical teachings as central to Platonism.  An example of this would be mathematicians who consider themselves to be Platonists because Plato offers philosophical support for certain theories about the ontological status of numbers; that numbers and their relationships are not human inventions but are discovered by human inquiry.  This view does not require any ethical training or commitments.

Personally, I would like to see the ethical teachings, particularly the teachings regarding ethical restraints, become more prominent and assume a more central role for defining what it means to be a Platonist.  The teachings of ethical restraint do not cover everything about Platonism, but they play a critical role in the process of purification that makes the divine ascent possible.

4.  The Space Between Religion and Philosophy

I read somewhere that Platonism ‘sits between what we today would call religion and philosophy.’  I hadn’t thought about that perspective for a long time; for some reason it returned to my mind recently; probably because I’ve been thinking a lot about Platonism as a religion and if that makes sense. 

I think it can be said that Platonism is a religion if by religion you mean human activity that is focused on that which transcends the material world.  It is true that not all religions focus on transcending the material world; but if an human activity does focus on transcending the material world, I would call that activity religious in nature.

On the other hand, if I look at religions more as social institutions and the center of cultural continuity that is often ritually expressed, then Platonism doesn’t really seem to fit what would be described in this kind of analysis.

And as I have often said, contemporary philosophy has concerns and methods that are very far removed from what Platonism uses or focuses on.  Contemporary philosophy rejects the idea of the transcendental and is often ideologically captured.  There is an historical relationship between Platonism and contemporary philosophy, but the activities of Classical Philosophy and Contemporary Philosophy are so different that it is not an exaggeration to say that they are estranged.

If I were to express this ‘between’ condition of Platonism (between religion and philosophy) I think I would say that Platonism is a Wisdom tradition; meaning that Platonism is focused on Wisdom, its cultivation and its application.  I think you can connect the Wisdom approach of Platonism with something like the Perfection of Wisdom tradition in Mahayana Buddhism because both are textual traditions, both are concerned with transcendence or with ‘going beyond’, and both are focused on study and contemplation as the primary means for achieving what each tradition means by ‘going beyond’.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 88

16 March 2022

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 88

1.  Trappists

It was recently announced that the monks of the founding house of the Trappists, which is in France, is considering moving from its historic location.  Some posts on the internet are saying that the monks are ‘closing’ the Abbey, but that’s not correct.  I would put it that they are considering ‘downsizing’.  I think the tentative plan is to find a new location by 2028.  The main reason appears to be that the Abbey has only 20 monks now with very few new vocations and it is just not enough to maintain the very large Abbey they have inherited (this may also indicate a lack of donations, though the posts I have read don’t mention that).

The Abbey was founded in 1122 and has a continuous monastic presence since that time.  The monastic reform that transformed the Abbey into the Mother House for the Trappists goes back to the 17^th century.

I see this as another indication of the diminishing presence of what I refer to as the Ascetic Ideal.  I see this as another indication as to why it is difficult to approach Platonism as a spiritual tradition grounded in the Ascetic Ideal; because the Ascetic Ideal is simply not understood in our culture at this time.  The Ascetic Ideal is countercultural.

2.  The Critique of Gnosticism by Plotinus

A friend of mine, in response to my post last week that refers to Plotinus’s ‘Against the Gnostics’, pointed out that the critique of Gnosticism would apply equally to Theurgy.  What my friend was getting at is that one of the main criticisms of Gnosticism from Plotinus is that the Gnostics multiplied hypostases, level of reality, and other cosmological categories, for no apparent reason; they also multiplied types of living entities.  This unnecessary complexity is something that Plotinus rejects.  I think the main reason for this rejection is that such multiplication of entities is not based on contemplation; rather it is based on mental conjuration.

The same could be said for Theurgy when it multiplies types of deities and multiplies ritual contexts based on dubious claims.  And the insertion of Henads into the Platonic metaphysical system is exactly the kind of thing that Plotinus was criticizing in ‘Against the Gnostics.’

3.  Lake Wisdom

Reading Plato and Plotinus is like paddling a canoe on a summer lake; not at first.  At first reading Plato and Plotinus is difficult though difficulty varies with specific writings.  For example, a dialogue like “The Symposium” or an Ennead like “On Beauty” are accessible and are good starting points for reading in the Platonic tradition.

But at first there is a need to become familiar with the tradition’s vocabulary and its overall stance on philosophical issues.  This is a challenge because Platonism differs from modern philosophy and so there is a natural friction that arises when someone familiar with modern philosophy begins to study Plato and Plotinus.

But after some time, which can be a few months to a few years, the reading kind of glides, the reading becomes a pleasure.  One begins to look forward to it and such reading often becomes a daily practice that nourishes one’s whole day.

4.  A Comment on Whitehead

As regular readers know, I am fond of Alfred North Whitehead and his Process and Reality.  But I was thinking about ethical restraint in Platonism and it occurred to me that there are no teachings on ethical restraint, or asceses, in Whitehead.  This might indicate that Whitehead approaches Platonism primarily in the way that mathematicians approach Platonism.  I mean that mathematicians seem to be impressed by the explanatory range and power of Platonism as applied to the field of mathematics.  I get it; it is impressive.

But from my perspective that relationship to Platonism hovers around the edges of Platonism rather than getting to the heart of Platonism, which is to adopt a renunciate life in order to turn away from the confusions and seductions of the material world.  This is accomplished by adopting the ethical restraints. 

I see the practice of ethical restraints as presented in Platonism as foundational because ethical restraints shift one’s attention from pursuing pleasure to pursuing wisdom, because living a life of ethical restraint opens the door to living in the world based on the Ascetic Ideal, because ethical restraint aligns one with the Good and the One, because ethical restraint is the means for recognizing the presence of eternity.

5.  Plotinus on the Affections of the Soul

“In general, our theory and intent is not to submit the soul to changes and alterations like the warming and cooling of bodies.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 3.6: “On the Impassibility of Things without Bodies”, Edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 309, ISBN: 9781009604970)

“For how can the part of soul above that which experiences affections and the part above sense-perception and in general any part of soul, be unchangeable when vice, false beliefs, and mindlessness occur in connection with the soul?  In addition, acts of appropriation and alienation occur in the soul when it feels pleasure and pain, when it is angry, jealous, acquisitive, desirous, and in general when it is not at all still but moves and changes in response to each thing that impinges on it.”

(As above, page 309)

“But perhaps in most cases what is termed the vice of this part of the soul is a bad state of the body and virtue the opposite, so that in neither case is there any addition to the soul.”

(As above, page 312)

5.1  I have come to view the soul as partless even though Platonists have routinely talked about various parts of the soul and how these parts have affections, afflictions, and tendencies.  It was helpful to find that Plotinus raises some of the questions about the idea that the soul has parts and affections; no doubt I was partly moved to take on the view that the soul is partless due to these questions that Plotinus raised.  I’m not saying that Plotinus had the view of a partless soul; I am suggesting that some of the questions Plotinus raises about the soul can, when considered and followed out in a direction that Plotinus himself did not take, lead to the view that the soul has no parts.

5.2  I take the view that the unchangeable nature of the soul that Plotinus refers to is due to the soul being the presence of the One in each individual.  The One is unity as such and the presence of the One in material individuals is what makes, or causes, the individual to be a particular thing.  Without the presence of the One in each individual there would be no individuals, no things because there would be no underlying unity.

5.2.1  Plotinus, and other Platonists, view the soul as emerging in the third hypostasis; but I see the soul as always connected to the first hypostasis.  In a way you could say that the soul is the first hypostasis.

It is time that emerges in the third hypostasis, time and cyclic existence.  The presence of time in the individual connects the individual with the third hypostasis.

And it is differentiation that gives rise to all the affections and tendencies of the individual.  Differentiation comes from mind; mind and differentiation have their origin in the second hypostasis.  The presence of differentiation and mind in the individual is the presence of the Noetic.

From this perspective, each individual is a microcosmos of the Platonic metaphysical cosmology:

The One                                 Soul/Unity

Nous/Differentiation         Mind/Differentiation

Time                                       Body/Becoming and Begoning

All of the affections are manifestations of differentiation and therefore found in mind.  Mind and body need to be purified, but soul does not because the soul is never impure, because the One is never impure.  This view is briefly mentioned in the third quote where Plotinus suggests (using ‘perhaps’) that vice in a part of the soul is actually a bad state of the body.  I would add, ‘or the mind.’  Again, I am not suggesting that Plotinus adopted this view, but Plotinus drops some hints regarding this view and its implications.  If these hints are seeds, it seems I have been watering those seeds and I’m beginning to see them sprout.

6.  Becoming a Platonist

It’s a bit of a paradox, becoming a Platonist.  I mean that Platonism is primarily focused on the Good and the One, the transcendental which is beyond time, beyond change, beyond becoming and begoning.  But as human beings who have taken birth in material existence we are embedded in becoming and begoning.  The trick here is to use becoming and begoning as means for transcendental understanding. 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 87

9 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 87

1.  Beauty Redeems the World

1.1-There is a theme that flows through several of the Enneads of Plotinus: ‘Against the Gnostics,’ (Ennead 2.9), ‘On Providence,’ (Enneads 3.2 and 3.3).  I am referring to Plotinus talking about the negatives of embodied, or material, existence and how to comprehend them.  The main thrust of Plotinus’s presentation as I understand it is that people tend to make too much of, or overinterpret, these negativities.  The result is that they misunderstand the nature of embodied existence and all of its manifestations; for example they are unable to comprehend that all of embodied existence flows from a shared principle because they are kind of hypnotized by the presence of negativities and fail to notice, for example, the presence of beauty in embodied existence, and the significance of that presence.

1.2 – Plotinus isn’t shy about giving examples of these negativities such as war, assaults of various kinds, deceitfulness, and so forth (he even uses the example of a snake).  But Plotinus argues that all of these mishaps in life are like what happens on a stage and we are watching the play.  The actors are not actually harmed and the negativities in the action of the play are there for balance and to give a kind of form to the play.

1.2.1  I think many people would have difficulty accepting this kind of analysis.  But in thinking about this, and focusing more on the providential nature of the higher hypostases, I think it is possible to comprehend what Plotinus is referring to.  For example, someone might get fired from a job unjustly; unjust because they have, in fact, done very good work at this job.  At first they may feel angry, or hurt, and they may want to lash out at those responsible for these circumstances.   But a few months later they have found a new job which pays better and offers other rewards.  Their view of what happened to them now changes; they may view getting fired as ‘the best thing that ever happened to me.’

1.3  The primary antidote to getting entangled in worldly negativities, according to Plotinus, is Beauty.  For Plotinus, Beauty is not just decorative; the presence of Beauty is a sign, or symbol, of the higher hypostases (or levels of reality).  And Plotinus’s view on this is drawn from Plato’s Symposium primarily, but also from the Phaedrus.  Particularly in the Symposium beauty is spoken of by Diotima (as quoted by Socrates) as the presence that can lead a student of philosophy to the divine and transcendental.  The idea is to follow beauty back to its source which is non-material.  In a sense, Plato and Plotinus are saying that Beauty is not of this world, that the presence of Beauty in this world is not a result of material conditions; rather it is the result of the Noetic and Transcendental breaking through to material reality.  Both Plato and Plotinus offer contemplative exercises to follow beauty back to its source.

1.4  For Plotinus, the presence of Beauty is what, ultimately, undermines the Gnostic view that the world is evil without any redeeming aspect.  This critique of Gnosticism, and the inability of Gnostics to understand the function of Beauty in the world, is powerful and distinguishes Gnosticism from Platonism in important ways. 

The Enneads on Providence (which was originally a single Ennead which Porphyry separated into two parts) place the function of Beauty into the larger context of Providence; relating these two important realities.  You could say that the presence of beauty is providential in that in spite of the negativities of material existence, Beauty redeems the world.

2.  Geology

Years ago I was walking with a friend who was a geologist.  We were walking past a cliff.  My friend the geologist began to explain what all the layers were, how they were formed, and what their presence signified, and roughly the timespan involved.  It was a very enjoyable walk for me.

I was thinking about this, and I noticed how this experience of mine resembles how one goes about experiencing the higher hypostases, or realities, that are referred to in the Platonic tradition.  That’s probably not obvious, but bear with me.

Both I and my geologist friend were looking at the same cliff, but our perception and understanding differed depending on our level of training.  My friend had trained in geology for many years and this training shaped his perception of the cliff making facets of meaning and understanding available to him, but which were unavailable to me because I had not undergone the necessary training.

In Platonism it is the training of ethical restraint, the asceses, that refines and reshapes our perception, both inner and outer, so that we can become aware of these other realities which were previously hidden from us due to the unrefined nature of our mind.  This suggests that becoming aware of noetic realities and transcendental reality, is not a matter of a mystical ascent, it’s a matter of refining our awareness, of being able to shift our attention from the ephemeral to the eternal.  It is mysticism, but it is the mysticism of presence rather than the mysticisms of ascent.

I think that the idea that our body and minds need to be purified in order to become a philosopher is today a strange one.  This is due, I think, to the way philosophy has become centered on thinking, differentiation, and mental analysis.  For most philosophers today thinking, differentiation, and mental analysis are philosophy.  Purification through ethical restraint isn’t part of their program; but it was part of the program in Platonism. 

I don’t think it is too difficult to understand why purification is necessary; we can compare purification practices in more mundane activities to understand the place of purification in philosophy.  For example, a coach may instruct athletes in training to refrain from, or at least limit, alcohol and drug use because it makes it more difficult, perhaps impossible, to concentrate on physical development and athletic prowess.  A musician may be told by an instructor to refrain from spending so much time on social media, that the student needs to spend more time on practicing their craft of musicianship.  A carpenter may see that an apprentice is not making progress and suggest that the apprentice limit distractions.  Such advice is common.  And I suggest that ethical restraint in philosophy is similar to this kind of advice.  However, there is a primary difference; the goal in mundane activities is a worldly goal (to become a musician, and athlete, a carpenter, and so forth).  The goal of philosophical purification is awareness of, and experience of, non-material realities.  In this context restraint is not just a tool for worldly accomplishments.  Rather ethical restraint is an alignment with the higher realities by transforming the student in a manner that leads to the student resembling these higher realities; living a life that, as far as possible in a material body, is like that found in the noetic and transcendental realities. 

In a philosophical context, ethical restraint, asceses, brings us closer to the everlasting realities of nous, and to the ineffable reality of the Good and the One.

3.  New Porphyry Translations

New translations of two of Porphyry’s works, Letter to Anebo and Philosophy from Oracles, has just been released on Amazon.  (The copyright states the book was published in 2025, but it wasn’t available until last month on Amazon.)  The author is Fabien Muller.  The publisher is The Center for the Study of World Religions, and the distributor is Harvard University Press.

Both of the translations have facing English and Greek or Latin pages which allows those with knowledge of these languages the opportunity to compare the original with the English.  Both of these works come down to us in a fragmentary state.  Most of the fragments of the Letter to Anebo come to us through Iamblichus’s response to Porphyry’s Letter in On the Mysteries.  Iamblichus’s response is very critical and dismissive of Porphyry which must be kept in mind when reading the quotes from Iamblichus’s work.  But there are additional Latin sources such as Augustine and Eusebius, which are included in this publication.  Again, Augustine and Eusebius have differing levels of hostility to Porphyry (though based on different reasons from that of Iamblichus).  In the case of the Letter we have quite a lot of quotations and what comes through seems to be consistent with Porphyry’s overall views of Platonism.

The second work, Philosophy from Oracles, is more fragmentary and it is more difficult to access what Porphyry may have been saying.  In the Introduction it is pointed out that some scholars regard these two works as in some way contradictory or at least expressing different views.  The idea is that the Letter is highly critical of theurgy (which is true), but the Philosophy from Oracles uses Oracular statements as a source for philosophical insight.  Personally, I don’t think there is a contradiction.  Porphyry’s comments on the oracles are philosophical.  There is a long history in Platonism of writing comments, sometimes full-blown commentaries, on non-philosophical works; for example there are commentaries on Homer from within the Platonic tradition.  In other words, I think Porphyry’s Philosophy from Oracles is part of this Platonic heritage, just as Porphyry’s criticisms of theurgy come from the same heritage. 

The Introduction’s presentation of the nature of the disagreements between the Letter and Oracles is nuanced and helpful in understanding the particular passages and issues involved.  The Introduction mentions that these disagreements or contradictions ‘extend only to a certain point.’ (page 50)  Ultimately, due to the fragmentary nature of Oracles in particular, a resolution of these issues that is completely satisfactory is unlikely to emerge (unless more complete copies are found, buried in the desert sand, than we have at present).  But I very much appreciate the way the Introduction spells out these issues in a meticulous way.

I have some experience in the kind of commentary that Porphyry undertakes in his book on Oracles.  I like to interpret popular songs from a Platonic perspective.  I have posted several such commentaries on this blog and hope to do more in the future.  I think popular culture can be surprisingly insightful about the human condition and situation in a way that illuminates Platonism or can represent Platonism.  I’m not claiming that these songs were written by Platonists or philosophers.  But I think it is helpful to see the reality that Platonism refers to having a voice in a popular context.  I think accessing oracles seems to have been a popular activity in Greek religion and suggest that Porphyry is linking Platonism to this popular activity without necessarily claiming that the Oracles were spoken by a Platonist Sage.

I have been waiting for this translation for quite some time and I’m glad to finally get a copy.  It’s great to see an emerging interest in Porphyry resulting in such a well-done book on these two works.  For those interested in Porphyry and in the world of Late Classical Platonism, I highly recommend this book.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 86

2 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 86

1.  Some Remarks on Metaphysics

I’m a fan of metaphysics.  I don’t mean only the metaphysics found in Western Philosophy.  I also mean metaphysical thought found in cultures like India and China; though India and China use different vocabularies than what is in use in the West.  The connection I see is that metaphysics focuses primarily on the transcendental and on immaterial realities (hence ‘after physics’) and one can certainly find profound works with that kind of focus in these non-Western cultures. 

I view Plato as primarily a metaphysician in the sense that Plato’s writing has the overall purpose of guiding people to the Good and the One which is an immaterial reality and the immaterial source for all things; I like to refer to this as ‘the presence of eternity.’  I think this is the focus of the Platonic tradition as a whole.  Many other things are discussed in Platonism, but it is my feeling that these other things that are discussed are discussed because they assist in the journey to the One.  For example, the Platonic tradition’s focus on ethical restraints and the virtues has the function of showing people how to purify themselves, how to become less distracted by sensory experience, and this assists people in turning towards the Good, the One, and the Beautiful. 

Because I have this view I, at times, spend time on uncovering why metaphysics came under such widespread attack in the modern period (beginning approximately with Hume and Descartes) in the West.  It helps me to understand where I am in terms of the culture that I inhabit and why I sometimes feel so estranged from it. 

After a lot of study, I have come to a few conclusions (which are subject to revision).  The most important for me is that metaphysics never really disappeared in the modern period.  The announcement by various modernist philosophers that metaphysics was done was an expression of a wish, or hope, on their part; it was prescriptive.  What they were really saying to young philosophers is that you shouldn’t bother with metaphysics.  But work in metaphysics continued among some philosophers anyway (the most notable case is Alfred North Whitehead). 

It is striking to me that those who continued to engage with metaphysics do not seem to have been interested in responding to those who viewed metaphysics as over and done with; at least I have not found essays that I might consider to be apologias for metaphysics.  Instead, they simply proceeded to engage with the tradition and let those interested find what they had written.  I think this shows some wisdom.  And it shows some patience.  I think the wisdom and patience shown here is a natural result of engaging with the transcendental, of understanding things from the perspective of eternity.

2.  The Individual in Modernity

I’ve become more aware that one of the striking differences between philosophy in the modern period in contrast to philosophy in the classical period is that in the modern period, the period we reside in, it is the individual mind that is the starting point but in the classical period it is what arises in interaction that is the starting point.  For example, Plato’s philosophy emerges from dialogue and dialectic; it would be difficult to think of Socrates as acting like Descartes and thinking of his ego as the starting point of his inquiries.  And this is true throughout the classical period of Platonism; think of Plotinus presenting his essays to his students and getting feedback from them.

This has often been observed; I mean the shift to the individual mind and ego from the ground of interaction and what emerges in a more communal context.  In modern philosophy it is the individual philosopher who critiques and renders judgment.  In Platonic philosophy it is what emerges from interaction, particularly dialectic, that sheds light on the questions being discussed.  These are different processes.  Modern philosophy is critical, classical philosophy is constructive due to its basis in interaction.

It is true that Plato depicts Socrates as withdrawing for the purposes of contemplation in Dialogues such as Phaedrus and The Symposium.  But this kind of contemplative withdrawal is not a withdrawal into the individual mind (small ‘m’ mind), it is an ascent to the noetic and the transcendent which is the ground for the emergence of wisdom.  In other words, it is not the individual mind that is the source of wisdom in classical philosophy, whereas in modernity there really isn’t anything that surpasses the individual mind.

Thinking about this, I wondered if it is possible to replicate the dialectical foundation of Platonism in the culture of today?  It may be that the emergence of dialectical discussion requires particular communal contexts; I’m not sure.  I have observed that it is difficult for contemporary philosophers to step away from the critical stance of modern philosophy.  But it’s not impossible; Whitehead managed to offer a constructive metaphysics in the classical manner.  And perhaps this is the key to reconnecting with a more dialectical philosophical involvement.  Whitehead was deeply involved in the history of philosophy and his attitude towards previous philosophy is what I might call ‘reverence’.  I mean by this that Whitehead often shows his appreciation for his predecessors and, at the same time, he is willing to modify their presentations or Whitehead will spotlight where he thinks they missed something of significance.  This is dialectical rather than critical.  Whitehead does not dismiss previous attempts at metaphysics, he learns from them and having absorbed what they have to say he ventures forth into new territory.  The individualist and hypercritical attitude of modern philosophy is often dismissive of the past and treats the past as if it has nothing of significance to offer.  Whitehead shows us why that attitude is deficient.

So I do think it is possible to replicate the kind of interactive exchange of insight and energy that is foundational for Platonic Philosophy.  Online interaction provides a venue for this, at least potentially.  But I think that most often this interaction happens when we engage deeply with the classic sources of Platonism such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.  It’s a matter of reading them receptively instead of in the modern manner of always having a critical stance.  When reading these works many people have a kind of experience of opening up to dialogue and dialectic.  Dialogue and dialectic take the reader out of their individual ego and their individual concerns and open the way to the larger realms in which our life unfolds.

3.  Plotinus on Renunciation

“Let the human being who lives in the world of corporeal goods be beautiful and tall and wealthy and the sort of ruler over people that one can be here, yet he ought not to be envied for these things, since he was deceived by them. But the wise person would perhaps not even have these to begin with, though if he did, he will lessen their impact, if indeed he cares for himself.  He will lessen their impact and extinguish the advantages of the body by his lack of interest in them, and he will let their power over him die.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads: Second Edition, Ennead 1.4.14, “On Happiness”, translated by Lloyd P. Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 85, ISBN: 978109604970)

3.1  Plotinus points to a gradual, step by step, renunciation.  The wise person will lessen the impact of ‘corporeal goods’ in his life.  I read this as saying that the wise person takes steps to turn away from ‘corporeal goods’ and these steps might be modest, at least at first.

3.2  It’s interesting, and meaningful, to me that often when Platonism talks about renunciation what we get are broad strokes rather than a meticulously laid out list; the kind of thing one finds, for example, in the Buddhist Vinaya (rule of life for monastics).  Specifics do appear now and then such as in the Phaedo, but even there, if you compare the instructions in renunciation to monastic rules it is pointers rather than a long list of specifics. 

This may indicate that Platonism as an ascetic tradition wants its practitioners to go in a certain direction, but trusts its followers to walk the path as best they can.  It’s kind of like giving advice to a hiker by telling them what kind of equipment they will need for the hike because you have the requisite experience.  But the new hiker will purchase their own equipment and it may contain additions or alternatives to what was suggested.

3.3  I see this kind of relationship in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, in the section where Porphyry writes about various disciples.  The instantiation of the Platonic life varies in accordance with their circumstances, but the general direction of renunciation and asceticism is clear.