Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

13 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

1.  The First Principle’s Presence

“Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, Second Edition, edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 582, ISBN: 978009604970)

“. . . all [things are] imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, That Which is after the First, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 143, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“. . . all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.”

“Plotinus, The Enneads, Enneads 5.4.1, The Secondaries and the First, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 461, ISBN: 978943914558)

1.1  There are single sentences in Plotinus that are exquisite, filled with meaning and beauty.  This is one of those sentences.

1.2  In the clause closing the sentence before the one quoted Plotinus refers to fire warming things, to snow cooling things.  And then he moves into a generalization from this observation to an insight about ‘all things’.  That insight is that all things are imitating the nature of the ultimate in accordance with their specific, limited, nature. 

How are things imitating ultimate nature?  By generation, by productive activity.  Fire is hot and the heat of fire produces warmth in objects that are near it.  Snow is cold and the coldness of snow cools those things close to it.  I take these to be analogies to how The One overflows and creates, emanates, generates, the world.  When looked at in this way we can sense the presence of the One even in ordinary material things.  This brings the highest metaphysics of Plotinus down to the material realm so that the material realm is not isolated, or separate from, the transcendental.  The transcendental and the material are not the same, but they are related in a manner that, once recognized, assists the philosopher in his journey of ascent to the Good and the One.

1.3  I view the phrase ‘eternity and goodness’ as a way of saying the One and the Good.  Here I would say that ‘eternity’ is a way of speaking about the One.  The One is ultimately ineffable, but there are names for the One that are used to communicate with each other about this transcendental reality.

Frequently in the Enneads ‘eternity’ or ‘the eternal’ is used to refer to the noetic, the second hypostasis, rather than the One.  It is not unusual for Plotinus to use terms that subtly change their meaning depending on which level, or hypostasis, Plotinus is referring to.  And Plotinus does not always signal a shift of meaning of this kind.  As a reader becomes more familiar with how Plotinus makes these shifts the reader becomes more tuned in to when that happens.

1.4  It is possible to interpret ‘eternity and goodness’ as meaning that everything imitates the noetic forms that are the source of particular things, and following that imitates the ultimate through generous creativity, or goodness.  I can understand this kind of interpretation because it elegantly encapsulates the three levels of existence, or hypostases, starting with material things, then rising to the noetic, and then rising further to the transcendental Good. 

But Armstrong’s translation leans towards seeing this phrase as another way of expressing the One and the Good.  Armstrong translates that all things are imitating the First Principle and Armstrong does not distinguish between everlastingness and generosity as to their level, which hypostasis they reside in; suggesting that both are ways of talking about the ineffable, the transcendental.

MacKenna seems to be making the same point when he says that all things are imitating the ‘Source.’  The ultimate source is the ineffable One.  I don’t read MacKenna as saying that ‘eternity’ and ‘service’ represent names for different hypostases.

It may be the case that Plotinus is compressing multiple meanings in this sentence and that reading eternity as referring to the noetic is one reading Plotinus had in mind, while reading eternity as another way of talking about the ineffable is another reading.  Multiple meanings are not unusual in Plotinus (or Plato) so it would not surprise me if this is the case here.

1.5  Ennead 3.7, Eternity and Time, deals with how Plotinus understands the relationship between these two realities.  Plotinus unpacks his understanding of eternity and time in a way that at first seems complex, but after a second or third reading it comes into clearer focus.  Here is a quote from Ennead III.7 that I think is relevant to the quote from Ennead 5.4:

“What, then, should we say eternity is?  That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the entire heaven, that is, the cosmos?  For they [the Pythagoreans – translator’s footnote] say that some hold this latter belief about time.  For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them.  And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.

“But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ [Timaeus 37D3 – translator’s footnote] – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it.  But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity.  For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other.  And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.”

(Gerson, see above, page 337)

Here is the passage from Timaeus, 37D3, that the translator referenced in a footnote:

“Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper; Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, page 1241, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see the quote from Ennead 3.7 as indicating that Plotinus does not consider the intelligible, or the noetic, and eternity to be the same.  Eternity is present to the intelligible, but I would say that eternity comes before the intelligible.  I suggest this because the intelligible, that is to say noetic realities, arise due to differentiation, and the eternal is before differentiation.  When the eternal is subject to differentiation, we get the moving image of eternity that is time.

Eternity and the noetic are intimately related and because of that noetic objects are eternal; but the eternity of noetic objects (which, tellingly, Whitehead refers to as eternal objects) is due to proximity to the One.  Eternity is another way of saying Unity.  The unity of noetic objects is also due to their proximity to the One, and to their proximity to the Eternal. 

1.6  The place that eternity holds in Platonism is a difficult topic.  It is not easy to sift through what Plotinus says about this and because of that difficulty people can come to different conclusions.  Some have said that the One is beyond eternity just as the One is beyond being.  But the One is also beyond Unity, beyond the One.  As Plotinus writes, whatever anyone says about the One falls short of its actuality, for the One is even beyond actuality.  In other words, I agree that what is ultimate transcends eternity, but I think there are good reasons to think of ‘eternity’ as a useful name for that which transcends name and form.

And, to be honest, I think that Plotinus does use ‘eternity’ as another name for the One; now and then, not always.  Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, Plotinus uses eternity, or the eternal, when referring to noetic realities, the intelligibles.  But just as Plotinus will use terms like unity to refer to noetic realities as well as the unity of the One, so also Plotinus will skillfully unpack eternity in ways that depend on the level of reality, or hypostasis, that is being referred to.

1.7  All of the writings of Plotinus are based on his experiences of the noetic and the transcendental (the intelligible and the One).  Reaching out across the chasm that separates the material world from that which is incorporeal, Plotinus illuminates that which is eternal by proximity, and that which is eternal remaining in unity.

2.  Stages of the Practice of Ethical Restraint

There is not a lot of writing about ethical restraint in the Platonist tradition or in how ethical restraint is presented in the Dialogues of Plato.  But restraint is discussed outside of this context, and surprisingly it is usually in a therapeutic context, often centered on addiction.  In this kind of literature ‘restraint’ has a practical focus on how someone can actually overcome the sensory, and sensual, thing(s) that seem to control their lives.  Often there is a three stage presentation of how restraint works:

The first stage is avoidance.  Sometimes the expression ‘just don’t go there’ is used; as in an alcoholic should just not go to a bar, or to a party where alcohol is served.  This has application to a large variety of situations where people are trying to overcome the seductions of the senses.

The second stage is sometimes called ‘self-command.’  This is learning how to make initial steps in internalizing effective resistance to sensory seductions.  A lot of literature is centered on this second stage and the authors of these works offer simple means for reminding the person on the path of renunciation (in a lay and secular context) is helped because most of these suggestions are internal reminders, sometimes prayers, that serve to deflect the seduction of the senses when it appears.  It might be as simple as ‘day after day I will reject alcohol.’  Or it might be simpler, ‘I reject alcohol.’  Or it might be longer such as the much used Serenity Prayer.  The Serenity Prayer might be condensed to the person saying ‘courage’ in their mind to remind them to pull away from what is tempting them.

This second stage is a kind of internal civil war where old and powerful habits are being contested by a new perspective.  This conflict between the older way of life with the possibility of a new way of life can become intense.  These internalized sayings, or prayers, are reminders that the individual wants to move into a new situation and wants to give up on habits that are self-destructive.

The third stage is sometimes called ‘mastery’ but I prefer the term ‘stability’ meaning that the change to a new way of living has stabilized and the internal civil war is basically over.  There is a greater sense of calm and also a feeling of accomplishment.  Of course it is always possible to slide back into old habits and for that reason the practices of the second stage remain a part of the person’s inner life.

I don’t recall in Platonist literature this kind of analysis where the stages of renunciation are discussed; it might be in the literature somewhere, but I don’t recall running across it.  My feeling is that this kind of information would be something that would be discussed between teacher and student rather than being the topic of an essay; or at least it looks that way to me. 

In the Platonist literature there is some indication that people did fall away from the practices of ethical restraint.  For example, in the opening section of Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry writes to Firmus, a friend of Porphyry’s, that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has fallen away from vegetarianism and returned to eating meat.  Porphyry views this as Firmus having given up on the Way of Philosophy and is writing to Firmus to encourage him to return to a philosophical life, a vegetarian life. 

This kind of falling away is common; it happens to many people.  Overcoming sensual seductions, even when a person knows that succumbing to them is unhealthy and damaging to themselves and others, is not easy.  Knowing this, one can be sympathetic.  The important thing is to encourage the individual who has fallen away from their renunciation practice to try again.  It may take many tries.  But that’s OK.  Just keep trying and eventually the new way of life will establish itself, stabilize itself.

3.  William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is a Protestant Christian Apologist.  Craig has a large following.  Craig has studied philosophy extensively and is familiar with contemporary approaches to philosophy.  Craig is familiar with logic and modern modes of analysis from the analytic tradition (a surprising number of Christian apologists use tools from the analytic tradition in their work).  Craig is an effective apologist for his tradition.

Craig has written one book (“God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism”), and posted several videos, where he criticizes adopting Platonist metaphysics in the Christian tradition (this is more common in the Protestant tradition than it is in Catholicism or Orthodoxy).  Craig is aware of the influence that Platonism has had on Christianity, but Craig thinks that the Platonic influence undermines Christianity in significant ways.

If I understand Craig correctly, Craig is disturbed by the way Plato talks about intelligibles, or noetic objects, also known as eternal objects.  Craig refers to these as ‘forms’ which is a standard usage.  Craig’s understanding of Platonic forms is that they are eternal and unchanging; that’s true, I mean that the forms are understood to be that way in Platonism.  But Craig argues that this undermines the uniqueness of God because being eternal and unchanging are characteristics of God that are considered by Craig in the exegetical tradition he grows out of, to be unique characteristics of God.  It follows that this undermines the independence and uniqueness of God because there are other things in the cosmos that share at least some of the attributes of God.

Craig offers that a way of resolving this, which Craig argues is something that at least some Christian Platonists took, is to reconfigure the forms as ‘ideas in the mind of God.’  I think Craig is right that this is a way that Christians can retain a sense of the noetic while at the same time arguing for the uniqueness, the divine aseity, of God.  However, according to some histories of Platonism I have read, the view that Platonic forms are ideas in the mind of God was put forward in a Platonist context among the Middle Platonists and was likely absorbed into Christianity from those resources.

Personally, I prefer a more traditional way of viewing the forms; that the forms are emanations of the One, of the fully transcendental, of God.  The difference between the forms and the One is that the forms are differentiated from each other whereas the One is undifferentiated unity that is beyond differentiation, before differentiation.  If you want to understand the presence of differentiation in the forms, consider that the eternity of the forms differentiates them from all that is ephemeral.  In addition, forms are differentiated from each other, but at the same time fully transparent to each other. 

The view that forms are ideas in the mind of God collapses the noetic realm into the realm of that which is ultimate; in this case God.  From this perspective, the three hypostases now become two and the noetic realm of forms disappears. 

I think that Craig thinks of God as having characteristics which is standard Christian theology; with the exception of some Christian mysticism.  In contrast the One is beyond characteristics and beyond being.  The One is beyond affirmation and negation, whereas the forms do have characteristics and traits.

The discussion between Christianity and Platonism has been going on for two thousand years.  The discussion has a dialectical feel to it in the sense that both sides are committed to uncovering metaphysical truth.  I think the differences between the two traditions is a kind of creative, fire producing, light giving, presence that has led participants to focus on certain issues intensely.  I think that is a good thing. 

(As an aside, when I say these kinds of discussions have a long history, a good example of this centered on a treatise written by Proclus called On the Eternity of the World.  It contains eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.  It is my personal favorite of the works of Proclus.  This work was disliked by Christians because Christians have the view that the world was created by God and will end at some point in the future as part of God’s plan.  From this perspective the world is not eternal.  In response to this treatise of Proclus, a Christian writer, Philoponus, wrote a critique of this work by Proclus titled Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.  I think I have mentioned this before on this blog, but it has been a while and I think it fits in with the discussion about William Lane Craig.  The dispute between Proclus and Philoponus is not exactly the same point of divine aseity, but both of them are engaged in distinguishing Christianity from Platonism; and I think the points they raise are related.)

4.  Haiku

The sound of spring wind

Isn’t the same as the sound

Of eternity.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 91

6 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 91

1.  The Sensations of War

The Ascetic Ideal is living in a manner such that we are not guided by sensory stimulation; that is to say, that we do not live a life that is centered on finding ways to stimulate the senses.  The stimulation of the senses that people seek is usually some kind of seeking after pleasure.  But this is not always the case; often people seek the painful sensory stimulation either for its own sake or for the sake of some goal.  This is where the common phrase, “no pain, no gain”, comes from. 

I have been thinking about this in the context of war because, obviously, the current war is in the news and is being talked about a lot.  What I have noticed is that war stimulates the senses in dramatic ways; by ‘dramatic’ I mean that the sensory stimulation that comes from war, even when someone is just watching war on social media, is strong, intense.

The sensation of war is a kind of spectacle.  The blowing up of various structures is visually very stimulating and has a strange attractiveness; I mean that people seem to be drawn to it.  The sound of incoming ordinance, the sound of guns of various types, and the dramatic and sudden deaths of many people stimulate feelings of both fear and triumph.  It’s better than a movie.

The way to peace is through the Ascetic Ideal.  Peace is found by withdrawing from sensory stimulation which in Platonism is expressed as separating body and soul to the extent that is possible while living with a body.  The Ascetic Ideal aligns those who practice this ideal, to the extent it is possible given the circumstances of their lives, with the transcendental because the transcendental is not a spectacle or a movie.  It is the changeless and eternal.  It is peace everlasting.

2.  Latin Platonism

I have started reading Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition.  It is a two-volume work by Stephen Gersh.  Gersh has gathered various sources, like Cicero, Boethius, Seneca, and others, into a kind of anthology of Platonism that centers on Platonists who wrote in Latin.  It is my understanding that this is the first anthology of its kind in English (it was published in 1986).  It looks like a well done collection and I am looking forward to reading it.

3.  Style

I have the impression that authors in the Platonic tradition tend to fall into two categories based on their approach.  The first is systematic; the author is focused on system building and metaphysical completeness.  Proclus is the obvious candidate for this way of writing about Platonism.  Oddly enough, I would also include Whitehead in this style; even though Proclus and Whitehead are separated by many centuries they both enjoyed building systems that they hoped would be all encompassing.

The second is what I would say is centered on the occasional essay.  Plutarch is a good example of this kind of approach, as is Plotinus.  Some think of Plotinus as a system builder and I think there is some truth to that.  On the other hand, the flow of Plotinus’s thought is more open to shifts of focus, to returning to the same topic and having another go at it.  I think it was Armstrong who wrote that Plotinus was an unsystematic writer on a systematic philosophy.  And since I am writing here about style in terms of how their thought appears to the reader, I think Plotinus as an essayist is appropriate, though I can understand why some would disagree with that.

Needless to say my own writing is that of occasional essays; often more like a diary than a full blown essay. 

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 90

30 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 90

1.  Complex

I listened to two YouTube presentations that were centered on Proclus.  One of them had a presenter commenting on one of the shorter works of Proclus.  The other one was two people talking about Platonism from various perspectives but once they started talking about Proclus it became fixed on Proclus because one speaker was very dedicated to Proclus and the other speaker had a more skeptical view of Proclus; I would say that the exchange became an argument about the Henads and whether or not they were needed, or even made sense, as a part of Platonic metaphysical cosmology.

What I noticed is that these presentations were complex and used a highly specialized vocabulary.  In the case where there were two speakers, the shift to a complex, specialized vocabulary was noticeable because it contrasted with the previous part of their discussion.  It seems that when Platonists talk about Proclus, or view Platonism through the lens of Proclus, the vocabulary becomes specialized to a degree that surpasses the kind of vocabulary used by Plato himself, by Plotinus, or Platonists like Maximus of Tyre et al. 

My feeling is that Platonism is not as complicated as Proclus makes it out to be.  I understand that there is a specific set of Platonic concepts and usages (especially in terms of the Noetic and how the Noetic functions), but that is true of philosophy and spiritual systems in general.  What I’m getting at is accessibility.  There are difficulties in accessing Plotinus, but the difficulties in accessing Proclus are, I think, greater and of a different kind.  But it’s not clear to me that this complex Proclean manner of speaking is necessary or that it is productive of understanding.

2.  Can We Break Free from Early 20^th Century Philosophy?

One of the stories that contemporary philosophy tells about itself is that there was a split between what would become analytic philosophy and continental philosophy in the early 20^th century.  And this split centered around questions of meaning and the place that metaphysics holds, or can hold, in contemporary philosophy.  It has surprised me how tenacious this description is.  Perhaps it is because I have not inhabited the University that I have the feeling that contemporary philosophy is still stuck in this division and does not seem to know how to get out of that moment.  For example, I have been amazed at how often I have seen young philosophers with degrees from prestigious Universities presenting the arguments against metaphysics that are found in early analytic philosophy because I really thought that these arguments had long ago been dismissed both theoretically and practically, practical in the sense that metaphysics has continued to be written and talked about without feeling any need to respond to the alleged critiques of what it is doing.

But there is a deeper issue here; I am thinking of the alleged contrast between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy (which in a talk I recently listened to was represented by Carnap vs. Heidegger).  The idea is that analytic philosophy rejects metaphysics as meaningless whereas continental philosophy has focused on recovering metaphysics and regaining a foothold from which to uncover what metaphysics is actually about.

What I see is that both sides of this division agree on the idea that the heritage of metaphysics is a failure.  Analytic philosophy regards metaphysics as a failure because its statements are not verifiable and therefore not meaningful.  Continental philosophy regards the heritage of metaphysics as flawed and in some way deficient, that the heritage of metaphysics actually covers over being, that it talks about being as if being were an entity, and other flaws.

What I see, and offer for consideration, is that both analytic and continental approaches reject the heritage of metaphysics and that in this sense they are united in their hostility towards the philosophical past.  And I think that is why contemporary philosophy feels rootless, and why, ultimately, it lacks clarity and focus.

In contrast to this, a Platonist is consciously aware of inheriting a tradition and considers that tradition as a fount of wisdom.  Platonism is not aligned with either analytic philosophy or with continental philosophy.  It is aligned with an heritage of wisdom that aligns with the transcendent.  Platonism is the antidote to both the analytic tradition and the continental tradition because Platonism is both before these and after these because its foundation is eternity.

3.  Are We Becoming Post-Literate?

3.1  There are two channels on YouTube that I listen to on a regularly irregular (if that makes sense) basis; one is called ‘Religion for Breakfast’ and the other is the presenter’s name, ‘Jared Henderson.’  Henderson is very interested in philosophy and spent many years in the University advancing to the level of a PhD.  Henderson is not a Platonist, but he is a thoughtful individual and, at times, will consider a question in what strikes me as a dialectical manner, if ‘dialectic’ can be applied to an individual talking about a specific topic (I think Plotinus is an example of this).

Both of these presenters are about the same age (perhaps 35ish).  And both of them made the decision to step away from the University environment which now and then they talk about on their channels.  Because of this common background they decided to do a joint discussion which can be found at Religion for Breakfast.  They are both concerned with how technological changes, such as the internet and AI, will impact our culture; that’s why I titled this post focusing on ‘Post-Literate’.  Both of them are very literate, but recognize that the place, and status, of being highly literate is changing in basic ways.

Platonism is a highly literate tradition.  Reading the Dialogues of Plato, the Enneads of Plotinus, and other works from the Platonic tradition, is a significant part of what it means to be a Platonist.  For most of the history of the Platonic tradition I think you could say that literacy was a gatekeeping skill for the tradition.  I mean that you had to be literate in order to access the Platonic tradition and literacy was a skill that only a small percentage of people had.  This could be said of any philosophy or spiritual tradition; it’s not unique to Platonism.

When literacy became widespread access to Platonic writing became available to an increased number of people.  Still, Platonism was, for the most part, confined to elite institutions like elite Universities or centers of theological study.  The move that brought Platonism outside of the University was done in the English speaking world by Thomas Taylor (1758-1835).  (As an aside, I suspect that some of the criticisms levelled against Taylor came from the feeling that Platonism, and philosophy in general, was the ‘property’ of elite Universities and Taylor was undermining that idea by taking advantage of technologies that allowed Taylor to publish his translations on his own.) 

Today we are in a situation where the writings of Platonism can be found easily online, where anyone can post their thoughts about Plato on YouTube, TikTok, or X.  It is interesting to consider how this might impact how Platonism is understood.  For example, the ease of access reduces the idea that Platonism is something only for highly educated people.  This, in turn, may lead some people who do not have a University background to present their understanding of Platonism from a very different perspective than has been done before.  This could be beneficial, or could be harmful, depending on how one sees the situation. 

The availability of Platonism discussions on social media means, I think, that Platonism is moving more into the realm of orality; I’m not suggesting that it is leaving literacy behind, but I see Platonism as being accessed by young people through presentations on social media rather than by reading a book that was assigned in an Introduction to Philosophy class at a University.  In the past I have written that most young people first encounter Platonism through such a class, but now I think that is changing.  I’m not sure how that will impact Platonism (partly because I am old and not at ease with the new technologies that younger people now grow up with).  But Platonism has been through technological shifts before, such as the printing press.  I suspect that Platonism is highly adaptable and will carve out a presence in this new world of technological innovation that is emerging.

3.2  Both Jared Henderson and Religion for Breakfast are concerned about AI and how it will impact human cognition, among other things.  Just this year I began using ChatGPT as a tool for clarifying certain questions, for finding sources of information, and asking about how a philosopher I don’t know much about views a certain issue (to give a specific example, I used ChatGPT to learn more about Schleiermacher and his views of Plato and how the impact of Schleiermacher’s essays on and translations of Plato impacted German culture and the wider Western world.) 

Personally, I have found AI to be useful, but I think users of AI have to be attentive.  It is surprising how often AI gives wrong answers, or contested answers.  I think people are surprised by this because AI has an image of infallibility and that image has been deliberately cultivated by advocates of AI, those who will, first and foremost, financially benefit from AI.  Henderson and Religion for Breakfast suggested that AI has an ‘oracular’ quality to it and compared the way people approach AI to how people went to the Oracle at Delphi. 

My feeling about this is that when new technologies are introduced, they are almost always introduced with very high expectations as to how the technology will uplift humanity.  This happened with the telegraph, the phone, the automobile, and so forth.  Because there is a strong financial incentive to present a new technology as benevolent and helpful, the downside of new technologies is rarely mentioned or considered, and even when it is mentioned the objections are brushed aside.  Over time, though, as people become familiar with the new technology there is a widening realization that the new technology has significant negatives that inherently come with it; for example, automobiles allow us to travel great distances more easily than before, but that comes at the price of vehicular accidents resulting in death or injury. 

I think that regarding AI we are still at the ‘utopian’, introductory stage of this new technology and this is reflected in the tendency to think of AI and its impact in very broad, and mostly positive, strokes.  In time, and I don’t think it will take that long, people will experience the negatives of AI and it will take its place with other technologies.  That’s how I see it.

But it is a good idea to be cautious about AI.  As I mentioned above, AI often, not rarely, gives incorrect information in response to a question.  (I asked AI a question about Henry David Thoreau and got a very confusing answer.  I suddenly realized that ChatGPT was mixing up Thoreau with Emerson and kind of merging the two people.  I brought this to Chat’s attention, and it immediately corrected its response.  I have heard many other stories along these lines from many people.)  There is every reason to think that AI may give incorrect information when asked about Platonism.  Just keep that in mind when you visit AI and double check before forwarding what you find out from AI sources.

3.2.1  Religion for Breakfast mentioned in this conversation that the descendants of Confucius in China have created an online AI Confucius personality that people can access and ask questions to.  Because this project is state sanctioned and initiated by the descendants of Confucius it seems to be gaining a lot of traction, but I don’t know how seriously users of this AI Confucius take their interactions.

I have a friend who is steeped in the works of Nisargadatta.  He once asked ChatGPT to answer his questions as Nisargadatta.  He told me that the experience was amazing and that the answers to his questions were very consistent with Nisargadatta’s written work. 

Intrigued by these examples, I asked ChatGPT if there was an AI Plato; had someone generated an online Plato with both visual and verbal aspects, that could answer philosophical questions.  Chat said there have been some experiments along this line, but none of them have gained traction or widespread notice.  Platonism does not have the cultural centrality and status in the West that Confucius does in China, and I doubt that any Western government would support such an effort.  Perhaps it has already been done at some University or AI firm and is not widely known at this time.

What would be the status of an AI Plato?  How seriously would the pronouncements of an AI Plato be taken?  I suspect that the response would be similar to the way people respond to channeled works; mostly books and videos.  In other words, there would be a spectrum of responses.  Some would be dismissive.  Others would consider them as candidates for entering the Platonic Canon.  I think it would be interesting to see what emerges from such experiments.  Notice the plural use of ‘experiments’.  It would be interesting to observe two different AI Platos produced by two different institutions using different AI programs.  And then ask each of them the same question.  I suspect, depending on the question, we would get different answers (and possibly a few, or maybe more than a few, mistakes.)

3.2.2  I think behind a lot of the discussions about AI is the question of consciousness and awareness.  Many have pondered whether or not AI is conscious, or can become conscious.  I don’t have any problem with a self-conscious AI, but I tend to think that consciousness, or awareness, is prior to matter and that consciousness permeates the cosmos.  That is to say, I think a rock is conscious; or to put it another way, a rock has soul.  I suspect that when people talk about consciousness and awareness that this is a way of talking about soul without having to admit that this is their topic. 

In the Enneads Plotinus talks about the world soul and its relationship to individual souls.  I see the world soul as permeating the material realm.  And I see the individual soul as how the world soul is perceived in our realm of time. 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 89

23 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 89

1.  A Few Quotes about Soul

1.1       “The blizzard, the blizzard of the world

             Has crossed the threshold and it has overturned the                    order of the soul.”

                                                         Leonard Cohen - The Future

Leonard Cohen’s songs became darker as he aged.  I wouldn’t say they became nihilistic, but themes involving a pessimistic view of humanity appear.  This is one of those songs. 

The first line of the quoted verse describes the feeling of being buried by the world we currently live in.  Innovations come at us in a fast and furious pace and there is no ability to pause and take in, or get ready for, what is coming at us.

I’ve been in blizzards.  When I was working on the north coast of Alaska I experienced a significant number of them that rose to the level of a ‘white out’.  The wind would howl and the snow would often move horizontally in the driving storm.  And you could only see a very short distance in front of you.  I think that is the kind of experience Cohen is getting at.

The blizzard has ‘crossed the threshold’.  I think Cohen means the threshold that keeps society functioning and somewhat orderly; in other words we have crossed the threshold of chaos. 

And by doing so the blizzard has ‘overturned the order of the soul.’  I listened to one commentary on this song that suggested that Cohen may have been influenced by the traditionalist movement because some of the imagery in the song seems to be strongly connected to traditionalism.  Cohen was influenced by many sources; his Jewish background, his long years of Zen training in Southern California, and he seems to have been exceptionally well read in various spiritual traditions.  So it’s possible, but I can’t say for sure. 

But I wanted to highlight this verse because one of the obstacles the we have in understanding what Platonists have to say about the soul is that the order of the soul has been overturned in modernity and so we are trying to understand what Platonism is saying about the soul, peering through the blizzard that Cohen refers to.  That is not an easy task.  It goes beyond differences of opinion about how the soul works, whether it has parts or is partless, what affections the soul has, and so forth.  It means that we have to wait patiently for a break in the blizzard in order to see what the Classical Platonists were saying about the ‘order of the soul.’

The ‘order of the soul’ refers, I think, in a Platonist context, to the Platonic project of turning away from sensory stimulation and bodily temptations and towards the immaterial soul.  That this is what is important rather than the blizzard of demands that the sensory domain and sensory stimulations that pull us away from that order.

1.2  “The soul must, therefore, be in this way both one and many, and divided and indivisible, and we should not be incredulous as to the possibility of a thing’s being identical and one in many places.  For if we were not prepared to accept this possibility, the nature holding all things together and administering them will not exist.  As it is, it is that which encloses all things in one embrace and directs them with wisdom, constituting on the one hand a multiplicity – since there is a multiplicity of beings – but also one, in order that the coordinating force may be one, and while orchestrating life in all its parts due to its multiple unity, exercising a wise leadership due to its indivisible unity.  In those things which are devoid of wisdom, the controlling unity imitates this. . . The soul, then, is one and many in this way; and the forms in bodies are many and one; bodies, in turn are many only; and that which is highest is one only.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Second Edition, Ennead 4.2.2, On the Substantiality of the Soul 1, Edited by Lloyd P. Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, pages 385-386, ISBN: 9781009604970)

I think Plotinus’s discussions about soul, found in many Enneads, are exceptionally subtle.  Plotinus gives a nod to various interpretations of the soul and how it works now and then that are not, strictly speaking, Platonic (according to footnotes they are often Stoic in origin).  I think what Plotinus is doing in these passages is letting his audience know that Plotinus knows of the numerous theories and interpretations that were circulating in the Classical World.  And perhaps some of his comments were directed at specific students who may have had a Stoic background.

In this quote Plotinus argues that the soul is both ‘one and many’, is both ‘divided and undivided.’  This is not easy to understand.  Plotinus knows this and refers to how incredulous this sounds.  I think what Plotinus is getting at is that how you conceive of the soul will depend on whether you are thinking of soul in the Noetic realm, or if you are thinking of soul in the material realm, as occupying individual bodies.  The forms of bodies are many and one; they are one because of the soul’s connection to the noetic.  But bodies are ‘many only’, that is to say that bodies are divided into parts and differentiated from each other.

From my perspective, the differentiation of bodies from each other is a result of bodies living under the reign of time.  It is time that shapes the material world as first this, then that.  The unity of the soul in the noetic is beyond time, transcends time.  (I think this is one of the primary reasons that Plotinus argues against the idea of the fully descended soul; because if the soul were fully descended it would be cut off from it source of unity and would not be able to function as that which gives unity to living beings.) 

This is a really beautiful passage that manages to reconcile many divergent views of the soul into an overall coherent presentation.

1.3  “There has been much controversy within the Platonic School itself [regarding the soul], one group bringing together into one system and form the various types and parts of life and its activities, as for example Plotinus and Porphyry; another, exemplified by Numenius, setting them up in conflict with each other; and another again reconciling them from a postulated original strife, as for instance Atticus and Plutarch.  These last maintain that there supervene on pre-existing disorderly and irregular motions other later ones which organize and arrange them, and from both of them they thus weave together a web of harmony.”

(Iamblichus, De Anima (On the Sou), translated by John F. Finamore and John M. Dillon, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2002, page 49, ISBN: 9781589834682)

“Some posit that the essence of the soul is numerically one but then multiply it (as Amelius thinks by its relations and assignments or as the Orphics say by breaths from the Whole Soul), then rise from the multiplicity of the whole to the one soul that has laid aside these relations and locations relative to others, and free it from its division into the things that partake of it.  These thinkers, inasmuch as they reject its subdivision into its participating parts, preserve it completely whole and the same, and grant to it a single essence that is given limitation through individuation.”

(As above, page 51)

These quotes give the reader a good idea of how the topic of the soul occupied many philosophical minds who came up with a variety of analyses.  It’s interesting that Iamblichus specifically mentions the Platonic school as having controversies about the soul.  Iamblichus would know since he was a major source of the controversy over whether or not the soul is fully descended (which was Iamblichus’s view) or only partially descended (the view of Plotinus and Porphyry), retaining a presence in the higher hypostases.  But leaving Iamblichus’s own view aside, the quotes are a good example of how varied views of the soul were in the Classical Period.

I think this makes sense because the soul is a kind of mystery.  I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the soul is ‘ineffable’ (although you could make a case for that).  I would use the analogy of music to explain what I mean by the mystery of the soul.  When we listen to some music that moves us and speaks to us, it is difficult to explain exactly what is going on.  There are theories about this; some are psychological, some are evolutionary, some are structural (I mean the structure of music and how music shapes sound), and so forth.  These theories are not necessarily contradictory, and they have some explanatory value, but they don’t seem to go to the heart of the matter.  In a similar way, there are many theories of the soul, but there always seems to be a certain feeling of incompleteness about them.  I don’t mean that these theories are futile; I mean that there is always something left over after an explanation is given and that what is left over feels like it is significant, perhaps the most significant aspect of the soul.

2.  The Geometrical Method

I’ve been thinking about the geometrical method in a philosophical context, as opposed to a mathematical context.  There are not a lot of examples of philosophers who used the geometrical method.  The most prominent that I know of are Proclus and Spinoza.  I have been thinking mostly about the geometrical method in the context of Platonism and I have been wondering if the geometrical method is an appropriate usage, or method, for a Platonic context?

My thinking is that a method shapes what it is possible to say about the topic that the method is applied to.  If you use the geometrical method you are, by using that method, excluding approaches that lack the strict inferential structures demanded by geometry.  But I’m not convinced that this is legitimate.

For example, Plato expresses many of his ideas, some of which are core ideas of his philosophy, using myth, allegory, metaphor, and other similar structures.  At these key points in his dialogues he does not use the geometrical method (does Plato ever use the geometrical method?  I suppose you could say that a dialogue like Parmenides is rigorous, but I think the arguments found therein elude geometrical formulation.) 

In other words, by using the geometrical method, a philosopher like Proclus, especially in a work like The Elements of Theology, is excluding insights and wisdom generated by non-geometrical means.  This is an unnecessary limitation, and I think it shrinks the vastness of Platonic philosophy, and Platonic wisdom, rather than illuminating it.

3.  Precepts Defined Tradition

There are different ways of distinguishing one spiritual tradition from another.  Within the Buddhist tradition different levels of practice and types of commitments are defined by the ethical precepts that a person agrees to incorporate into their lives.  For example, lay people take some basic precepts that describe certain ethical restraints; there are five or ten of these precepts, or vows, depending on the Buddhist tradition.  There are also a longer set of precepts or vows known as the Bodhisattva Precepts; in East Asia the Bodhisattva Precepts consist of 10 major and 48 minor precepts.  There are also two versions of the Bodhisattva Precepts used in different Tibetan traditions.  For those who wish to practice Buddhist Tantra there are a set of what are called Samaya Vows that govern a student of tantra’s relationship to the tantric tradition.  And there are also the Monastic Precepts that consist of hundreds of regulations.  Each collection of precepts defines the specific Buddhist tradition and they, the precepts or vows, act as the gate into that specific Buddhist tradition.

Platonism is not a precepts defined tradition.  I mean by this that people tend to define being a Platonist as accepting metaphysical ideas, such as Nous, rather than accepting specific ethical disciplines that are defined by precepts or vows.  I think this is why most people when they read in the dialogues explicit ethical teachings tend to skip past them; because they don’t think of these ethical teachings as central to Platonism.  An example of this would be mathematicians who consider themselves to be Platonists because Plato offers philosophical support for certain theories about the ontological status of numbers; that numbers and their relationships are not human inventions but are discovered by human inquiry.  This view does not require any ethical training or commitments.

Personally, I would like to see the ethical teachings, particularly the teachings regarding ethical restraints, become more prominent and assume a more central role for defining what it means to be a Platonist.  The teachings of ethical restraint do not cover everything about Platonism, but they play a critical role in the process of purification that makes the divine ascent possible.

4.  The Space Between Religion and Philosophy

I read somewhere that Platonism ‘sits between what we today would call religion and philosophy.’  I hadn’t thought about that perspective for a long time; for some reason it returned to my mind recently; probably because I’ve been thinking a lot about Platonism as a religion and if that makes sense. 

I think it can be said that Platonism is a religion if by religion you mean human activity that is focused on that which transcends the material world.  It is true that not all religions focus on transcending the material world; but if an human activity does focus on transcending the material world, I would call that activity religious in nature.

On the other hand, if I look at religions more as social institutions and the center of cultural continuity that is often ritually expressed, then Platonism doesn’t really seem to fit what would be described in this kind of analysis.

And as I have often said, contemporary philosophy has concerns and methods that are very far removed from what Platonism uses or focuses on.  Contemporary philosophy rejects the idea of the transcendental and is often ideologically captured.  There is an historical relationship between Platonism and contemporary philosophy, but the activities of Classical Philosophy and Contemporary Philosophy are so different that it is not an exaggeration to say that they are estranged.

If I were to express this ‘between’ condition of Platonism (between religion and philosophy) I think I would say that Platonism is a Wisdom tradition; meaning that Platonism is focused on Wisdom, its cultivation and its application.  I think you can connect the Wisdom approach of Platonism with something like the Perfection of Wisdom tradition in Mahayana Buddhism because both are textual traditions, both are concerned with transcendence or with ‘going beyond’, and both are focused on study and contemplation as the primary means for achieving what each tradition means by ‘going beyond’.