Brief Notes on Various Topics - 108

28 September 2026: Brief Notes on Various Topics - 108

1.  Across the Great Divide

The finest hour I have seen

Is the one that comes between

The edge of night and the break of day

When the darkness rolls away. 

            Kate Wolf – Across the Great Divide

Kate Wolf (1942-1986) was a folk singer and songwriter.  Perhaps her most influential song is ‘Across the Great Divide’ which has been covered by singers like Emmy Lou Harris and others.  The verse I quoted above is the final verse of the song which is followed by the repeated chorus.  The song consists of a series of images that speak to the passing of time in the manner of crossing a barrier.  The uniting metaphor, which appears in the repeated chorus, is the Great Continental Divide which separates North America into the regions where rivers flow to the west and regions where rivers flow to the east into the Mississippi.  The chorus repeats the image of standing on a mountainside ‘where the rivers change direction across the Great Divide.’

I’m very fond of the song and the closing verse is my favorite section of it.  It brings to my mind the symbolism of the sun in the Platonic tradition and why that symbolism is so fitting. 

2.  The Restaurant at the Intersection of Eternity and Time

Reading Plato’s Dialogues resembles going to a fine restaurant with a menu where each of the selections provides an excellent dining experience.  But instead of nourishing the body, the selections on the restaurant’s menu nourish the soul.  And by nourishing the soul we discover the end of becoming and begoning, the cessation of time, and the presence of eternity.

3.  Becoming More Selective about Reading

This year I told my friends when my birthday was coming round to refrain from buying me books.  It’s not that I spend less time on reading.  It’s more that what I read has become more and more selective.  I still do some ‘recreational’ reading, but that has become increasingly rare.

The biggest difference in my reading habits is that these days I want to reread the classics of Platonism rather than branch out to new authors and/or topics (new to me).  I prefer to spend my reading time rereading the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus; I always find such rereading to be very rewarding.  In contrast, many books are not nourishing for my spiritual journey.  I like to think that rereading Plato and Plotinus increases depth of understanding whereas continue to branch out and read many different authors and topics seems to preclude this kind of depth experience.  Perhaps I am just congratulating myself; I’m not sure.  But rereading Plato and Plotinus is something I always find rewarding.

4.  Festivals

I have often thought that it would be beneficial to Platonism to have community festivals to create a kind of Platonic culture.  I’m not thinking of anything grand; these festivals should be simple, inexpensive, and accessible.  The model I think of is found in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus where Porphyry describes how the community headed by Plotinus would celebrate the birth of Socrates and Plato on the same day by sharing a vegetarian meal, giving orations, and discussing philosophical themes.  This structure is a ritual, but it is the kind of ritual that is completely non-esoteric and nourishing to the cultivation of philosophy.

I am thinking of three such festivals.  The first would be the feast of Plato and Socrates as found in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus.  It provides a sense of continuity with what was happening in Rome at the time of the community of Plotinus (presumably Plotinus received this kind of celebration from others; perhaps this was done at the community of Ammonius Saccas).  This would take place in the month of May; the ancient Greek calendar does not map onto our Gregorian calendar very well, but I am told that May would be close enough.  (May 5^th might be a good day as that is the mid-point between the March Equinox and the June Solstice.  But those who are interested in this kind of festival will figure out timing; in our current culture it is often necessary to adjust the specific date of a festival so that it will fall on a weekend when more people can participate, and for other mundane reasons.)

The second festival would be the festival of the Academy.  It is a bit similar to honoring the Sangha in Buddhism.  The Academy seems to be the primary means whereby Platonism has been preserved and passed on.  This is true of the actual Platonic Academy in Athens founded by Plato, but it is also true down to the present day where I observe small groups of Platonists working with each other to study and practice the Platonic tradition.  The festival would be similar to the first one (the one Porphyry describes) but I might suggest a focus on education and friendship as they are presented in the Platonic tradition.  (As an aside, there is a Buddhist Sutta from the Theravada tradition where the Buddha is asked about the importance of the Sangha and the Buddha responds by saying that the Sangha is the whole of the Dhamma.  And traditionally, Buddhism doesn’t consider itself to have planted roots in another country or culture until a self-sustaining Monastic Sangha is functioning.)

I would suggest the June Solstice for this festival.  I think it’s a nice progression from the May mid-point festival to a June Solstice festival.  But again, mundane considerations will likely intervene for groups.

The Third Festival would be the Festival of the Good and the One.  It would be a celebration of Platonism’s soteriological nature and the nature of that ultimate reality.  I suggest late December or early January; I lean somewhat to early January because I like the symbolism of the newness of the New Year and the constant unfolding and emanation of the One.  Also, on a practical level, early January doesn’t compete as much with the numerous holidays and festivals of late December.  But groups can find a time that works for them.

I have seen some calendars by contemporary Platonist groups that list Platonist Sages and indicating that a brief ritual of veneration should be offered for these Sages on their particular day.  This is actually a fairly big demand for people.  The list of names I’ve seen is fairly long and often consists of the heads of the Athenian Academy.  I have nothing against this, but I think such an approach is a kind of calling.  Naturally, if someone has the leisure and the inclination, I think it would be a worthwhile practice; veneration is a kind of method for purification. 

I don’t see these three festivals as onerous.  I see them as a means for cultivating a Platonist community and a sense of shared participation.

P.S.  While rereading this post I noticed that I was focusing on group participation.  I think that is because I based these festivals on Porphyry’s description of how Plotinus celebrated the birth of Socrates and Plato at his school in Rome, which was a group activity.  But in today’s culture many of us who walk the path of Platonism are not connected with any particular group, and others are connected only online. 

I think it is possible, though, to enact these three celebrations as an individual, or solitary practitioner.  It would take some adjustments.  For example, in the description of Plotinus’s celebration people offer orations on various Platonic topics.  In the case of a solitary practitioner this might be refocused to reading Platonic works that are relevant to the particular celebration, or perhaps, for those who are inclined, writing your own observations on some Platonic theme in a kind of journal. 

The Plotinian celebration involved sharing a meal.  If you are a solitary practitioner, it is still possible to celebrate with food, to dedicate a meal to Platonic practice, to express gratitude to the Good and the One from which is the ultimate source of the food one is eating. 

It will take some adjustments, but if a solitary practitioner is interested, and is generous to himself, I think it can be done.

5.  Alcinous on Injustice

“Injustice is such an evil that one should strive even more to avoid committing it than suffering it; for the former is the act of a wicked man, while being wronged is (merely) the misfortune of a weak man.  Both are shameful, but committing injustice is worse, in proportion as it is the more shameful.  It is advantageous for the wrongdoer to undergo punishment, even as it is for a sick man to submit his body to a doctor for treatment; for all punishment is a kind of cure for the soul that has sinned.”

(Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, page 42, ISBN: 0198236077)

I think this section of The Handbook is based primarily on Crito and Gorgias with possible influence from Laws regarding the use of punishment and what punishment should accomplish.  Plato links Injustice to Non-Harming which gives the Platonist view on Non-Harming a unique presentation compared to other traditions such as Classical Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and some branches of Hinduism. 

The radical point that is made in Plato’s Dialogues, such as Crito, and which is emphasized here, is that it is preferable to receive an injustice, or to be harmed than it is to commit an injustice; and Plato adds that this is true even if the person you are harming has committed that harm, or that injustice, against you.  In other words, Platonism teaches non-retaliation.

I see Plato’s teachings on non-harming, on refraining from committing injustice, as the wellspring of Platonic ethics.  This teaching is the ground from which all other Platonist ethical teachings, both ethical restraints and the cultivation of virtues, grow.

6.  Aphorisms

Beauty is another country.

Platonist spirituality isn’t about individuation which is a type of differentiation.

Platonism isn’t about voting for the right candidate.

Grace is the downward flow of the ineffable Good and the mysterious One.

Some people may view Platonism as harsh but that’s because they don’t see the world from the perspective of eternity.

The gods are creatures just like animals, plants, and human beings.

Venerating one’s ancestors has the virtue of helping one to understand the fragility of one’s own existence.

Rebirth is a reality in cyclic existence and the processes of rebirth are under the reign of time; rebirth is left behind with the ascent to the Noetic and the One because these realms are timeless.

I am more reticent to enter into public discussions about philosophical issues than Socrates was.

If I read only a few pages from the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus, that’s enough for me to call it a good day.

 

 

Pierre Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life

21 September 2026 – Pierre Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life 

Pierre Hadot (1922 to 2010) wrote a lot about Ancient Philosophy and what I call Late Classical Philosophy as well as early Christianity.  Some of his books have been translated into English from the original French.  One of them is called Philosophy as a Way of Life which contains a collection of essays that Hadot wrote on the theme that Ancient and Classical Philosophy were transformative and involved commitments to particular ways of life.  One of the essays is also titled ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ and it begins with a quote from Philo (about 20 BCE to 50 CE).

“Every person – whether Greek or Barbarian – who is in training for wisdom, leading a blameless, irreproachable life, chooses neither to commit injustice nor return it unto others, but to avoid the company of busybodies, and hold in contempt the places where they spend their time – courts, councils, marketplaces, assemblies – in short, every kind of meeting or reunion of thoughtless people.  As their goal is a life of peace and serenity, they contemplate nature and everything found within her: they attentively explore the earth, the sea, the air, the sky, and every nature found therein.  In thought, they accompany the moon, the sun, and the rotations of the other stars, whether fixed or wandering.  Their bodies remain on earth, but they give wings to their souls, so that, rising into the ether, they may observe the powers which dwell there, as is fitting for those who have truly become citizens of the world.  Such people consider the whole world as their city, and its citizens are the companions of wisdom; they have received their civic rights from virtue, which has been entrusted with presiding over the universal commonwealth.  Thus, filled with every excellence, they are accustomed no longer to take account of physical discomforts or exterior evils and they train themselves to be indifferent to indifferent things; they are armed against both pleasures and desires, and, in short, they always strive to keep themselves above passions . . . they do not give in under the blows of fate, because they have calculated its attacks in advance (for foresight makes easier to bear even the most difficult of the things that happen against our will; since then the mind no longer supposes what happens to be strange and novel, but its perception of them is dulled, as if it had to do with old and worn-out things).  It is obvious that people such as these, who find their joy in virtue, celebrate a festival their whole life long.  To be sure, there is only a small number of such people; they are like embers of wisdom kept smouldering in our cities, so that virtue may not be altogether snuffed out and disappear from our race.  But if only people everywhere felt the same way as this small number, and became as nature meant for them to be: blameless, irreproachable, and lovers of wisdom, rejoicing in the beautiful just because it is beautiful, and considering that there is no other good besides it . . . then our cities would be brimful of happiness.  They would know nothing of the things that cause grief and fear, but would be so filled with the causes of joy and well-being that there would be no single moment in which they could not lead a life full of joyful laughter; indeed, the whole cycle of the year would be a festival for them.”

(Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life¸ translation of Philo by Hadot, translation from the French by Michael Chase, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 1995, pages 265-266, ISBN: 9780631180333)

1.  Hadot views this passage as primarily Stoic, but I tend to see it as a weaving of both Platonic and Stoic themes, which was not unusual at that time.  The emphasis on wisdom is shared by both Stoicism and Platonism, though I would say that Platonism is more oriented towards the transcendental than Stoicism, or this particular passage.  There may also be an Epicurean seasoning in the quote; I’m thinking of the emphasis on withdrawing from courts, councils, assemblies and marketplaces, which was a distinctive theme of the Epicurean tradition.

2.  The idea of never committing an injustice, nor returning an injustice, is a specifically Platonic theme found in dialogues such as Crito, The Republic, and Gorgias.  Injustice in this context is also often translated as ‘harm’, meaning that a Platonist should never harm another, even if that person has harmed him, the Platonist. 

3.  Being armed against both pleasures and desires is an important theme in Platonism; a lot of time is spent on this in Laws, to pick one example.  In Laws there is a discussion about how Spartan society trained young men to resist, or be indifferent to, pain, but the Athenian Stranger then argues that it is equally important, perhaps more important, to resist, or be indifferent to, pleasures.  The ascetic nature of Platonism is found in this indifference to pleasure.  Indifference to pleasure means not thinking of pleasure as a guiding principle in one’s life, not ordering one’s life and its activities by using pleasure as a standard.  This transforms the philosophical way of life into something that is clearly distinguishable from the life of most people.

4.  Philo considers this kind of life rare and compares such people to embers that have not been snuffed out.  They are embers of wisdom.

5.  Following the quote from Philo, Hadot writes, “In this passage from Philo of Alexandria, inspired by Stoicism, one of the fundamental aspects of philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman eras comes clearly to the forefront.  During this period, philosophy was a way of life.  This is not only to say that it was a specific type of moral conduct; we can easily see the role played in the passage from Philo by the contemplation of nature.  Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s life.” (Ibid, page 265)

5.1  I think this transformation has two aspects.  The first is the transformation of the understanding, or mind.  This consists of an increased understanding of the material realm in which we live (which Philo mentions) as well as a shift of the mind from the material to the non-material and the transcendental (which is what Platonism specializes in).  I like to say that it is a shift of attention from the ephemeral to the eternal. 

Normally the mind is caught up by, and dominated by, material reality.  The shift of the mind to non-material and eternal realities is wisdom.

The second aspect is the training of the body so that it is not so demanding of the mind’s attention; in other words, asceticism.  It is withdrawing from a life in which the demands of the body have first priority.  The first and second aspects of this transformation work together and mutually reenforce each other.

6.  It was Hadot’s contribution to the study of Ancient and Classical Philosophy that these traditions were based on commitments, largely ethical, that were observable and that taking on these commitments was the start of wisdom. 

7.  Later Hadot writes, “In order better to understand in what way ancient philosophy could be a way of life, it is perhaps necessary to have recourse to the distinction proposed by the Stoics, between discourse about philosophy and philosophy itself.” (Ibid, page 266)

Discourse about philosophy serves philosophy itself.  For example, the study of logic serves to make clear distinctions between that which is eternal and that which is ephemeral.  And analysis enlightens us as to the nature of injustice and harm so that we can become philosophers by refraining from injustice and harm.

Hadot clarifies this by quoting Polemon who succeeded Xenocrates as the head of the Platonic Academy, “We should exercise ourselves with realities, not with dialectical speculations, like a man who has devoured some textbook on harmonics, but has never put his knowledge into practice.  Likewise, we must not be like those who, when it comes to their own lives, contradict their own teachings.” (Ibid, page 267)

7.1  Putting one’s knowledge into practice is, to pick one example, applying the understanding of non-harming and non-retaliation to the way we live our lives so that we assume a vegetarian, or vegan, way of life.

7.2  A little later, Hadot, writes, “An Epicurean saying puts it clearly, ‘Vain is the world of that philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man.’  Philosophical theories are in the service of philosophical life.” (Ibid, page 267)

8.  “Does the philosophical life, then, consist only in the application, at every moment, of well-studied theorems, in order to resolve life’s problems?  As a matter of fact, when we reflect on what the philosophical life implies, we realize that there is an abyss between philosophical theory and philosophizing as living action.  To take a similar case: it may seem as though artists, in their creative activity, do nothing but apply rules, yet there is an immeasurable distance between artistic creation and the abstract theory of art.  In philosophy, however, we are not dealing with the mere creation of a work of art: the goal is rather to transform ourselves.  The act of living in a genuinely philosophical way thus corresponds to an order of reality totally different from that of philosophical discourse.”  (Ibid, page 268)

8.1  The activity of musicianship is playing an instrument.  The activity of baking is kneading bread dough.  The activity of philosophy, the way of life of philosophy, is to live in accordance with certain requirements that the tradition upholds.  In Platonism, the Way of Philosophy is determined by the practices of renunciation found in the Platonic tradition, as well as the study of central writings of the tradition such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.

9.  “Thus, as we have seen, philosophy in the Hellenistic and Greek period took on the form of a way of life, an art of living, and a way of being.  This, however, was nothing new; ancient philosophy had had this character at least as far back as Socrates [Pythagoras?].  There was a Socratic style of life (which the Cynics were to imitate), and the Socratic dialogue was an exercise which brought Socrates’ interlocutor to put himself in question, to take care of himself, and to make his soul as beautiful and wise as possible.  Similarly, Plato defined philosophy as a training for death, and the philosopher as the person who does not fear death, because he contemplates the totality of time and of being.”  (Ibid pages 268-269)

10.  “Above all, the conception of philosophy as an art and form of living is not linked to political circumstances, or to a need for escape mechanisms and inner liberty.  Philosophy did not change its essence throughout the entire course of its history in antiquity.”  (Ibid page 269)

10.1  I think what Hadot is getting at in this quote is that philosophy as a way of life did not modify its commitments when political circumstances shifted; for example, the specifics of renunciation, or asceses, remained a constant in the Platonic tradition, and the need for retreating from political contexts remained a constant for Epicureans, and so forth.  It is true that Ancient and Classical Philosophy did have things to say about politics, just as they had things to say about running a household (see, for example, Plutarch).  But those things did not impinge on what it meant to live a philosophical life.

11.  “In general, historians of philosophy pay little attention to the fact that ancient philosophy was, first and foremost, a way of life.  They consider philosophy as, above all, philosophical discourse.”

11.1  I have often referred to Platonism as a type of Dharma; that is to say, that Platonism more closely resembles the way Indian Dharma traditions manifest than the way modern philosophy manifests.  And my reasoning is that the Dharma traditions of India are not just discourses and the clarification of propositions; they are also specific ways of life, identifiable ways of life, shaped by commitments that transform body and mind and shift one’s attention to one’s soul.  This is also true for Stoicism and Epicureanism.

11.2  If you want to grasp what it meant for Platonism and other philosophical traditions to lose the way of life that defined its existence in the Classical world, think of Buddhism having lost all connection with its ethical disciplines from the five basic precepts to the monastic Vinaya.  What remains?  Exactly what we have in modern philosophy; a focus on analytical discourse and not much else.

11.3  Hadot follows the above quote, quote 11, with a long discussion as to how philosophy lost its connection to its Ancient and Classical ways of life.  It’s a complex history involving the way Christianity reconfigured the place that philosophy has in a spiritual context, the rise of Universities in the later Middle Ages, along with the increased specialization of vocabulary and technical tools of analysis. 

11.4  “Ancient philosophy proposed to mankind an art of living.  By contrast, modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for specialists.” (Ibid page 272)

12.  “Such is the lesson of ancient philosophy: an invitation to each human being to transform himself.  Philosophy is a conversion, a transformation of one’s way of being and living, and a quest for wisdom.  This is not an easy matter.  As Spinoza wrote at the end of the Ethics: ‘If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  It must indeed be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be possible, if salvation were easy to find, and could without great labour be found, that it should be neglected by almost everybody?  But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.’”  (Ibid page 275)

 

 

Hesiod on Strife

14 September 2026

Hesiod on Strife

“Muses, from Pieria, glorifying in songs, come here, tell in hymns of your father Zeus, through whom mortal men are unfamed and famed alike, and named and unnamed by the will of great Zeus.  For easily he strengthens, and easily he crushes the strong, easily he diminishes the conspicuous and increases the inconspicuous, and easily he straightens the crooked and withers the proud – high-thundering Zeus, who dwells in the loftiest mansions.  Give ear to me, watching and listening and straighten the verdicts with justice yourself; as for me, I will proclaim truths to Perses.

“So there was not just one birth of Strifes after all, but upon the path there are two Strifes.  One of these a man would praise once he got to know it, but the other is blameworthy; and they have thoroughly opposed spirits.  For the one fosters evil war and conflict – cruel one, no mortal loves that one, but it is by necessity that they honor the oppressive Strife, by the plans of the immortals.  But the other one gloomy Night bore first: and Cronus’ high-throned son, who dwells in the aether, set it in the roots of the earth, and it is much better for men.  It rouses even the helpless man to work.  For a man who is not working but who looks at some other man, a rich one who is hastening to plow and plant and set his house in order, he envies him, one neighbor envying his neighbor who is hastening toward wealth: and this Strife is good for mortals.  And potter is angry with potter, and builder with builder, and beggar begrudges beggar and poet poet.”

(Hesiod, Works and Days, translated by Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2018, pages 87-89, lines 1-25, ISBN: 9780674997202)

1.  This opening passage of Works and Days is famous and well-known.  It has a dramatic feeling to it that draws the reader into the work from the first words.

2.  After Hesiod’s appeal to the Muses the passage opens with a depiction of how Zeus treats human beings; Zeus gives them fame and then removes it, he strengthens and crushes the strong.  This is a description of strife, or one facet of strife, that human beings are intimately acquainted with; that the powers that be may grant favors and then remove them for reasons that we do not know and cannot access.

2.1  This section is similar to the ‘Wheel of Fortune’ depictions in Medieval Europe; in fact the capacity of Zeus to lift people up and then to have them thrown down is very similar to how the Goddess Fortune is depicted.  You can find this kind of thinking in works from The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius in the poems of Carmina Burana, particularly the opening poem, ‘O Fortuna’. 

3.  The opening paragraph ends with the author saying he will give truths to Perses.  Perses was one of the sons of Helios.  Hesiod is addressing his subsequent observations about strife to the son of Helios, the Sun.  This gives a further cosmological dimension to this passage.  The name ‘Perses’ may be related to ‘pertho’ which means to sack or destroy; an appropriate god to address when discussing strife.

4.  The second paragraph begins by suggesting that there are two ‘Strifes’, not just one.  It is interesting to me that this kind of analysis is what we would today call a ‘philosophical move’ by which is meant in this instance, the unpacking of the meaning of a word.  By disclosing two distinct meanings, where previously it was thought that there was one, Hesiod is functioning philosophically.  You can see this kind of approach in Plato and Plotinus when they take a term and point to two or more meanings for that word; for example the word ‘logos’, or the word ‘beauty’, or other key terms.  Hesiod does not present these two Strifes by telling us a myth or allegory about how the gods divided Strife.  This is a kind of shift in reasoning and analysis that is taking place very early in Greek thought.

4.1  Notice that this kind of analysis relies on differentiation which is a noetic function because it is in Nous that differentiation first appears.  Here, Hesiod is using differentiation for the purpose of furthering the reader’s understanding.  When differentiation is used by the mind to further genuine understanding, that is wisdom.  When differentiation is used by the mind to generate anger, bitterness, and battle, that is ignorance.

5.  One Strife is ‘blameworthy’ because it fosters evil war and conflict.  I would put it that this is differentiation serving material ends and what we would call egoic concerns.

5.1  Hesiod states that humans only honor this type of strife out of necessity.  I suspect that this kind of honoring is perhaps making offerings to this kind of Strife, and Strife’s servants, to keep it at bay.  It is kind of like paying off someone who threatens you.  This is a major preoccupation of popular religion; if you don’t make offerings to this kind of Strife, bad things will happen to you.

6.  The second Strife, according to Hesiod, ultimately benefits humans by facilitating, or encouraging, them to work for their livelihood.  The primary motivator that Hesiod offers as an example of the second type of Strife is jealousy; one man has plenty of food and is on his way to becoming rich because he is working very hard.  This propels someone who is lazy to wake up in the morning so that by imitating the guy he resents, he too might become wealthy and productive.

The translator uses the word ‘envy’ rather than jealousy.  So envy is considered to a type of strife that generates competitiveness between people.  However, that competitiveness born of envy has the possibility of a positive outcome. 

I think this is a subtle, and fascinating, analysis.

6.1  It appears that human beings think of both of these Strifes as one thing; that is the psychology at any rate.  It seems to me that we tend to think of both kinds of Strife as the same because both of them generate conflict and that feels the same both at the level of body and mind. 

If we make a simple contrast perhaps we can get closer to what Hesiod is offering.  If we compare war with a competitive game (everything from wrestling to chess) I think it is possible to see the difference.  War is destructive; and in modern times the destructiveness has become amplified to an incredible degree.  Competitive games can, and often do, lead to tensions of various kinds, but they also lead to a kind of camaraderie among competing participants.  In other words, competition isn’t necessarily destructive.  This analysis has its limitations, and perhaps there is a better, or clearer, way of understanding the distinction that Hesiod is making; but for now, this is the best I can do.

7.  Hesiod’s analysis of Strife has had a lasting and profound impact on philosophy, particularly Classical Greek Philosophy.  Scholars suggest that this kind of analysis was picked up by both Heraclitus and Empedocles, both of whom viewed Strife as a cosmological, or elemental, principle.  Looked at in this way, that Strife is a cosmological or elemental principle, means that both kinds of Strife cannot be done away with in this world.  More concretely it suggests that manifestations such as war (for the first kind of Strife), and competitiveness and envy (for the second kind of Strife) are not accidents that appear due to random material, or historical, causation.  Instead, they are part of the nature of material existence itself.

This is difficult to accept.  It can, and often does, feel disheartening.  Feeling disheartened is not an argument against this view, but it is a barrier to looking at it clearly.

8.  Plato was very familiar with these discussions.  Hesiod lived roughly around 750 BCE to 650 BCE; exact dates are not known.  Plato lived roughly 428 BCE to 348 BCE.  This means that the topic of strife and its impacts on humanity had already taken place for about 200 years. 

It’s possible to see Plato integrating understandings of strife in works like the Republic and Laws when Plato talks about types of civil discord and also family discord.  But I am more interested in how these discussions impacted Plato’s metaphysics.

It is helpful, I think, to point out that Hesiod depicts the gods as deeply involved with strife; and not just the competitive kind.  The gods also participate in the first, destructive kind.  I think this is an indication that the gods are simply creatures, a type of living being residing in the material world.  In other words, the gods are not transcendent or even particularly wise.  The are long-lived and powerful, but in psychological terms they are human in every respect.  Therefore we cannot turn to the gods to resolve questions about strife and its place in the cosmos.

8.1  But there are questions and experiences that arise about the status of strife that turn us in a different direction.  There is the experience of beauty which seems to be in some sense beyond the concerns of strife.  Nor does a sunset generate a sense of competition.

And there is the experience of mathematics that opens our minds to a domain that is free from strife.  I don’t mean that mathematicians are immune from strife, particularly competitive strife.  I mean that numbers themselves, and their relations, are not hounded by strife.

And there is the experience of contemplation which is a turning within to a realm of silence and stillness.  I consider the experience of contemplation to be foundational for Platonism.  Contemplation is depicted in dialogues like The Symposium and Phaedrus.  Personally, I don’t think it is possible to understand Platonism without taking into account the practice of contemplation.

8.2  Plato’s great skill is that he fully acknowledges the presence of strife in the material world, but he also knows from personal experience that there are realms that are free from strife; primarily the noetic realm and the realm of the Good and the One.  It is because these realms are free from strife, both kinds of strife, that we are not trapped in the domain of strife, fated to endure strife’s arbitrary blows.

8.3  What Plato offers us is a roadmap to that which is beyond strife.  Strife is a constant presence in the material world, but the material world is a distorted image of the noetic where strife is absent.  But because the material world is an image, however distorted, of the noetic there are traces in the material world of that which is transcendent and beyond strife, discord, and suffering. 

What Plato has done, with great precision, is to show us (through reason, through myth, through allegory, through analysis) how to turn away from this realm of Strifes and Sorrows, to leave it behind, and return to the ineffable Good and the One.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 107

9 September 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 107

1.  Methods for Reading Platonism

When we are reading the classics of Platonism, such as the Dialogues of Plato, or the Enneads of Plotinus, we tend to read them with what might be called as a primal question in mind that is focusing our reading.  We might hold this question consciously or unconsciously.  And the primal question isn’t necessarily the same each time we read from the classics of Platonism, which is one reason why rereading these classics often uncovers new insights that we didn’t notice before.  Here are a few examples of what I mean:

1.1  We might read Plato and Plotinus with the question in mind “What did Plato or Plotinus actually say?”  This might be thought of as ‘historical Platonism’ because we are  trying to place Plato and Plotinus in the stream of ancient philosophical history.  It’s not always easy, and is often quite difficult, to determine what Plato or Plotinus were actually saying.  It seems to me that this way of reading Platonic classics is the main one found in the Universities today.

1.2  We might read the classics of Platonism with the question in mind “What can we do with Plato’s, or Plotinus’s, ideas?”  At this level we are dealing with the metaphysical structure of Platonic thought and how its teachings, its categories, fit together (or don’t fit together).  Some Platonic philosophers are highly focused, and very concerned, with this question and tend to focus on Dialogues or Enneads that are metaphysical in nature, while at the same time sidelining, to various degrees, those works that are not primarily metaphysical in nature.  It is at this level where we have discussions about the nature of the levels, or hypostases, or about soul and its nature, or about emanation and how it works, and so forth.

1.2.1  Another level of focusing on “What can we do with Platonic ideas?” will look for instruction as to how to live one’s life.  The above entry, 1.2, is about understanding Platonism; but at this level it is about behavior with the main focus being ethics as found in the Virtues and the teachings on Ethical Restraints.  Here the reader is gleaning from the classics of Platonism the teachings on how to live in accordance with Platonist teachings such as non-harming, vegetarianism, refraining from sexual misconduct, refraining from acquiring too many possessions or too much wealth, and so forth. 

1.3 The last approach I offer is “Where might these ideas, the ideas found in the classics of Platonism, lead?” if given a new lease on life under circumstances that differ from those that Plato and Plotinus lived under.  Here we are using the classics of Platonism as a resource for addressing the contemporary world in which we live.  A good example of this is how Plotinus spends time writing about Astrology which Plato barely mentions.  This is because the period in which Plotinus wrote was a high point in Roman and Greek thought regarding Astrology which was very widespread.  Another example is how Plotinus addressed the emerging Gnostic movements; Plato does not talk about Gnosticism because there were no Gnostics during Plato’s lifetime. 

Platonism has been very successful throughout its long history in addressing these new concerns and understandings.  I believe this openness to addressing these new concerns is one of the primary things that keeps Platonism fresh and relevant as the specific circumstances change and create new, and previously unaddressed, ways of comprehending the world in which we live.

2.  Pangle’s ‘Interpretive Essay’

At the conclusion of Thomas Pangle’s translation of the Laws of Plato Pangle has an ‘Interpretive Essay’.  It’s about 125 pages.  It is meticulous and brings up certain aspects of the dialogue that, I suspect, are easy to overlook.

On the other hand, I was struck by how Pangle’s approach avoids metaphysics and mysticism.  Pangle’s approach is to view Laws as a political treatise; that is common these days. 

Pangle was heavily influenced by Leo Strauss.  Pangle studied under Alan Bloom who studied under Leo Strauss.  I’ve mentioned this linkage before, but I bring it up again here because I think it is a good illustration of Strauss’s influence.  What I am highlighting is how Strauss tended to view Plato’s Philosophy as a whole as a political project.  According to what I have read, Strauss was reluctant to engage in Platonic metaphysics, and seems to have had the idea that Late Classical Platonism (which he refers to as ‘Neoplatonism’) with its emphasis on metaphysics as somehow distorting Plato’s thought.

I suspect that Strauss inherited this view from 19^th century German Historiography; it was widespread in Germany that the Late Classical Platonists had in some sense deformed Platonism due to their interest in elaborating metaphysics as well as their interest in mysticism.  Mysticism was viewed negatively as opposed to a ‘scientific’ approach.  The overall idea is to advocate for a Plato who was a proto-analytic philosopher; looked at from this perspective, the mystical elements in Plato and Platonism can be ignored as backwards and superstitious.

I don’t think Strauss or Pangle were that extreme.  I am not widely read in Strauss, but from what I have read I think Strauss accepted Plato as having metaphysical and mystical interests (meaning that Plato was not a proto-analytical philosopher).  But I do think that Strauss thought it was more significant to sift a view of politics from Plato than to sift a metaphysics from Plato.

I view this as yet another example of the anti-metaphysical bias of modernity.  It is very pervasive.  And I think of this bias as a significant, perhaps the most significant, barrier that a modern reader has to overcome if they really want to access the world that Platonism uncovers.  There is a range of anti-metaphysics; it can be sarcastic and dismissive as in Hume, it can be embedded in progressive thought as in Carnap and Ayer, it can be rooted in historicism and reductionism as in Heidegger, and so forth. 

The anti-metaphysical stance can be observed mostly as critical absences when considering what a modern philosopher or scholar writes about Plato.  If metaphysics is simply absent from their work on Plato, that is a sign that the scholar has absorbed, or actively accepted, the anti-metaphysical bias of our time.  The examples can be general (such as not dealing with the hypostases), or they can be very specific (such as refusing to deal with, touch on, or examine, Plato’s teachings on rebirth even when holding a class on a dialogue where rebirth is extensively discussed).  Absences are harder to spot than presences.  The absence of metaphysics in modernity is not normally noticed because it is the norm.  But as you become more and more familiar with Plato’s views you begin to notice that certain aspects of his philosophy are often neglected and that those aspects are either explicitly metaphysical in nature, or emerge from Plato’s metaphysical commitments.

2.1  The contemporary bias against metaphysics, while directly impacting modern interpretations of Platonism, also impacts other spiritual traditions.  During my period of studying Buddhism I often heard people, sometimes scholars, say that, for example, the Buddha was uninterested in metaphysics.  It took me a long time to realize that this view of the Buddha, and the Buddhist tradition, is a projection of the anti-metaphysical bias of Western modernity onto an ancient Indian tradition.  Once you see this anti-metaphysical bias operating in the West, you can also see it operating in how the West treats non-Western traditions; and this opens up these non-Western traditions, such as Buddhism and Jainism in a surprisingly rich way; by ‘rich’ I mean multifaceted in a way that adds depth and complexity to those traditions that often was previously missed.

2.2  Returning to Western philosophy, once you see the anti-metaphysical bias of modernity you begin to see how contemporary Western philosophy, despite its claims, is just as metaphysical as other metaphysical systems; that modernist philosophy has its own first principles, to pick one important example.  This shifts one’s understanding of modern philosophy significantly as you begin to see it in a larger context.

2.3  One of the results of uncovering the absence of metaphysics in contemporary Western philosophy is that other dimensions of meaning emerge that were not noticed before.  For example, it becomes clear why Plato would present some of his most significant teachings in the form of myths and allegories; because metaphysical truths sometimes need those kinds of structures in order to present and discuss them.

There is a kind of flatness to a lot of modern Western philosophy and I think that is because the metaphysical dimension has been, for the most part, with significant exceptions, lost.  When we read from the Platonic classics we become aware of that metaphysical dimension and the world we live in becomes richer and full of possibilities that we had previously overlooked.