Brief Notes on Various Topics - 104

10 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 104

1.  The Human Condition

As I’ve been rereading the Laws of Plato I have been struck by how little the human condition has changed.  This morning I read a section in Book XI which discusses conflict within the family that law needs to address.  The two specific examples are when a father wants to disown a son and remove the son from the family altogether, and when a son has concluded that a father is no longer of sound mind and needs to be removed from making binding decisions.  In the first case, where the father wants to disown and remove a son from the family, the law that Plato proposes is that the father has to gather a significant number of relatives from both the father’s and mother’s sides to whom the father presents his case.  The son then defends himself from the father’s accusations.  And the gathering of relatives, minus the father, mother, and son, then votes; if more than half of the gathering votes to disown the son then that is what happens.  In the case of a son dealing with a father who is no longer of sound mind, the son is to present his case to some elders who then make the determination.

These are very human situations that people still deal with today.  In fact, as we live longer, it has become fairly common for children to figure out how to take care of their parents as their capacities dwindle. 

The tendency in our culture is to think of ourselves as having advanced beyond previous cultures and their concerns; but passages like this one (and there are many in the Laws) suggest that the human condition is what it was and always will be.

2.  Comparing Buddhism and Platonism

I have often compared Buddhism and Platonism because I spent decades studying and practicing Buddhism, reading many of is key texts, reading Sutras and Commentaries, and having endless conversations with Buddhist friends.  Buddhism was a big part of my life.  I’m not the only one who is making this kind of comparison; there seems to be a steady flow of Westerners who studied and practiced Buddhism and then at some point turned to Platonism as the focus of their spiritual understanding and as the guide to a genuine spiritual path.  How these comparisons are made varies depending on what kind of Buddhism was being practiced.  I have noticed, for example, that hose who practiced Buddhist Tantra, also known as Vajrayana, tend to focus primarily on metaphysics and they tend to compare and contrast Buddhist and Platonist metaphysics and/or cosmology. 

What I have consistently noticed is that comparing the metaphysics of Buddhism and Platonism quickly becomes complicated.  I think it is difficult, or at least a challenge, to meaningfully compare the two spiritual traditions from the perspectives of metaphysics and cosmology.  It can be done, but doing so seems to stretch one or both of the traditions so that one can find points of association or contact.

It is my own opinion that where Buddhism and Platonism really meet is in the cultivation of ethical restraints, that is to say the cultivation of asceses, or asceticism.  There is a remarkable commonality between the two traditions as to what kinds of ethical restraints and prohibitions should be practiced.  I’m not saying the two systems of ethical restraints are identical, but I am saying that there are a surprising number of shared demands on practitioners as to what ethical restraints are essential for purification and spiritual growth. 

3.  Humpty Dumpty

I sometimes humorously think of contemporary Platonism as resembling Humpty Dumpty from the famous children’s rhyme.  For those not familiar, Humpty falls off a brick wall and breaks into pieces, “All the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put Humpty together again.”

I say this because of the great variety of interpretations of Platonism circulating in the world today.  And, furthermore, that these interpretations are at times incompatible. 

I’m aware that Platonism has been extremely fertile in presenting multiple interpretations of central insights and that this happened very early in the history of Platonism.  For example, Aristotle reconfigured the nature of Platonic Forms, and there have been other examples like this.  What I have observed, though, is that in Classical Platonism these kinds of variations didn’t seem to fragment Platonism into rival factions.  In fact, I see in Classical Platonism consistent attempts at reconciliation such as interpreting Aristotle in a way that diminishes, or eliminates, or subordinates, the differences between Aristotle and Classical Platonism as a whole.

Today the situation looks different to me.  Perhaps I am overinterpreting this, but the different streams of Platonism don’t seem to be inclined to interact and I have observed that in at least some cases a particular interpretation is adamant about its greater explanatory range and merit.

I don’t think there is anything that can be done about this; I think it is just a matter of letting this moment of intense differentiation within Platonism run its course.  Patience is, I think, the best response in this situation.

4.  Safe Harbor

Everyone knows that life is difficult; it’s not unusual for people to say exactly that.  Any human life is faced with challenges; happiness is rare and brief while strife is frequent and enduring.

When I read the works of Plato, when I read the works of the Platonic tradition such as the works of Plotinus, I feel like I have found a safe harbor from the inevitable difficulties, the inevitable storms, of life.  Reading even a few pages of one of Plato’s Dialogues, or a few paragraphs from the Enneads of Plotinus is in itself to experience the possibility of peace, serenity and transcendence.  This is a great gift; I would call it a grace.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 103

3 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 103

1.  Lloyd Gerson on Proclus

Lloyd Gerson has published his analysis of Proclus in his latest book, The Platonism of Proclus.  Its release date is not specified, but it looks like it will be some time this year.  It’s interesting to me that, according to the write-up on the book on Amazon, Gerson approaches Proclus through the commentaries that Proclus wrote on various Platonic dialogues.  According to the write-up there are about 3,000 pages of portions of these dialogues that have survived.

The choice Gerson has made to base his study of Proclus on these commentaries, instead of works like The Elements of Theology or Platonic Theology is unusual; at least as far as I have observed there is a tendency to focus on these kinds of works in contemporary scholarship on Proclus, though I might be wrong about that.  This shift in focus will, I think, generate a ‘different’ Proclus than the one who emerges from reading works like the Elements.

I’m not a fan of Proclus, but I am a big fan of Gerson.  I look forward to reading Gerson’s book on Proclus and finding out how Gerson interprets Proclus.

2.  Transcendence

There is a YouTube channel that I listen to now and then.  The presenter has studied the Dialogues of Plato thoroughly and can easily refer to them and often paraphrases key passages.  The presenter is focused on political philosophy and interprets Plato in the tradition of Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, and Alexander Dugan, among others.  His understanding Plato’s philosophy is that Plato is primarily a political philosopher and he doesn’t really go into other aspects of Platonism.

When listening to one of his recent talks I became aware of how he uses the word ‘transcendence.’  He used the word frequently in this particular talk so I got a good sample of how he understands ‘transcendence.’  When he used the word transcendence what he meant was moving from a limited context to more encompassing context; meaning that when you shift your understanding from a more limited view to a less limited view you are ‘transcending’ the limited view or understanding. 

This is how he maintains his focus on Plato as a political philosopher (and I wonder if others who maintain this idea also use ‘transcendence’ in this way; I’ll have to listen to them to see if it is a general pattern).  So even when Platonist writings speak of the transcendental he interprets that in worldly terms. 

This is not unusual; many people use the word ‘transcendence’ in this way.  Carl Jung uses it that way.  And I once heard a recording of a talk by Roger Scruton in which he used the word in exactly that way which kind of surprised me. 

You might think of this way of understanding transcendence as ‘horizontal’, like shifting focus from a small forest grove to the forest as a whole; something like that.  Or, perhaps, shifting one’s focus from a particular symphony to the symphonic tradition as a whole.  Like I said, it’s a common way of understanding what ‘transcendence’ means.

But in Platonism transcendence is ‘vertical’; to transcend means to leave behind material reality as the focus of one’s attention.  This is done by turning away from sensory stimulation, whether pleasurable, painful, or neither pleasurable nor painful.  It is the practice of the asceses that trains us to engage in such turning away.

Transcendence in Platonism is not aimed at a larger context; it is aimed at the experience of the ineffable (which is prior to all contexts) rather than a more convincing explanation of some aspect of reality or mental formulation.  The Good and the One are ineffable; as Plotinus points out the Good is not good.  We call it the Good, as a kind of stand-in for its actual reality which is beyond affirmation or negation and beyond conceptualization. 

I think this is difficult for people to understand.  The contemplation of the ineffable is simple, but it is, at first, difficult to recognize, and difficult to stabilize.  But that is the reality of transcendence that Platonism asks of us.

3.  Hidden Heritage

I listened the other day to another person who wants to merge Platonism with Buddhist Tantra.  Naturally they think of theurgy as the culmination of Platonism and draw upon the authors who wrote from a theurgic perspective and then attempt to show significant similarities between Theurgy and Tantra (usually Tibetan Buddhist Tantra, but they sometimes make brief references to Shaivism and its Tantric manifestations as well).

What came to mind after listening to the presentation is the idea that Platonism is, in a sense, a hidden heritage.  By that I mean that for over one thousand years, Platonism was embedded in other spiritual traditions who interpreted Platonism as insufficient on its own terms and needed something additional in order to be complete; this additional something was supplied by the non-Platonist tradition.  Christianity was the most successful among those traditions that took this approach.

When I say that Platonism is a ‘hidden heritage’ I mean that Platonism as a sufficient spiritual tradition that does not need supersessionist assistance.  What I am intuiting is that contemporary theurgy is replicating this context by arguing that wisdom is insufficient for the divine ascent and that therefore carefully crafted rituals (some of which can violate, or at least undermine, basic Platonist ethics) is essential.  It’s like the centuries long habit of having Platonism embedded in other spiritual contexts is internalized, but instead of using Christianity, they use theurgy.

This is just an intuition, but it arises out of my reading of theurgic works both ancient and modern and being impressed by how casually ceremonial efficacy is substituted for wisdom. 

3.1  Rereading this, it came to me that perhaps I mean something more like a ‘hidden hermitage’ than ‘hidden heritage’.  The two aren’t contradictory, but I think the image of Platonism as a hidden hermitage leads in nourishing directions.  Platonism is about turning away from, or turning around (periogoge, apostrophe).  It is a turning away from basing one’s life on sensory gratification and fulfilling pleasures.  It is a turning towards soul and its presence and following its guidance to the One.  It is a turning away from the unsatisfactory nature of material existence to the serenity of the hermitage of the transcendental.

3.2  Rereading this again, I think what I posted could be construed as asserting that Platonism, or Orthodox Platonism, to use Gerson’s phrase, is in some way sealed off from interacting with other traditions.  That isn’t what I am getting at.  What I am getting at is that a tradition like Buddhism does not normally think of its tradition as needing ‘completion’ by following, say for example, Confucianism.  Imagine if East Asian Buddhism elevated the teachings of Confucius above, or over, those of the Buddhist tradition itself.  I’m not saying that East Asian Buddhism was not influenced by Confucianism, I’m pointing out that the relationship between East Asian Buddhism and Confucianism was not one of supersessionism.  In contrast, the Platonic tradition has been in a relationship with other spiritual traditions in exactly that way, primarily through the way traditions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have placed Platonism in a ‘handmaid’ role.  It is my view that Theurgy does exactly the same thing to Platonism and that the move that Theurgy makes vis a vis Platonism is structurally the same as other spiritual traditions; that is to say the Theurgic tradition's relationship to traditional, or Orthodox Platonism, is that of supersessionism.

What I think is needed is for Platonism to become confident of itself in the sense that Platonism is a complete spiritual tradition with the insights and resources to function as a guide for spiritual understanding, transcendence, and awakening to the presence of eternity. 

4.  Natural

There is a section in Laws, Book X, beginning about 891c, where Plato discusses first principles.  Plato contrasts those who think of first principles as found in nature with those who think of first principles as transcendental.  Plato begins by referring to those who consider fire, water, earth, and air are the first principles.

This reminded me of the discussion in Phaedo where Socrates talks about how he was, as a young man, initially attracted to Anaxagoras, but was disappointed by Anaxagoras’s material explanations of causation (even though Anaxagoras seemed, when Socrates first encountered him, to place Mind as a first principle).  In Laws Plato points out that those who think of the elementals as first principles argue that soul is derivative of the elementals.  The Platonist view is that soul precedes elementals and material realities, that the immaterial precedes the material, and is the foundation for that which is material.  You can read modern philosophers such as Bernardo Kastrup arguing the same thing (I’m not saying that Kastrup is a Platonist). 

The more I read and reread Plato I find these kinds of connections between dialogues.  I sometimes like to say that Plato’s Dialogues are actually a single book with each dialogue being a chapter; one reason I say this is because of the way insights and themes are revisited, expanded, sometimes amended.  This offers the sense that the reader is sharing in the unfolding thoughts of Plato over time, even when Plato is talking about the timeless.  I find that feeling very inviting.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 102

27 July 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 102

1.  The Tradition of Orpheus

The Orphic tradition is mentioned a few times in Plato’s Dialogues.  I get the impression that Orphism had a significant place in Plato’s thought, just as the Pythagorean tradition did.  But it is difficult to get a clear picture of what the Orphic tradition taught, the nature of its rituals, and how its members’ lives embodied the tradition.

The Loeb Classical Library has just released a new book on the Orphic tradition titled Orphic Collection.  The scholar who brought the Orphic material together is Alberto Bernabe (the translator is Michael Chase).  The collection includes recent material the was found by archeologists in buried mausoleums.  The collection does not include the  Hymns of Orpheus which have been translated several times.  In the ‘Introduction’ the author explains his reasons for not including them such as their very late provenance and other criticisms.  I’m not qualified to have an opinion about this.  But however one thinks about these issues, the Orphic Collection is a significant contribution to our understand because it brings together a great deal of early material from the tradition of Orpheus that has only existed scattered in academic journals or in monographs on specific documents as opposed to having an overview of the tradition. 

The collection also includes citations from varied sources where the source quotes older material.  These citations are wide ranging and include quotes from philosophers such as Proclus, historians such as Herodotus, and early Christian writers.  This is another example of how this Collection brings together scattered references, making access to them more available.

For those interested in the pre-history of Platonism I think they will find this work to be helpful.

1.1    Here is an example of Plato referencing the Orphic tradition from his Dialogue Laws:

The Athenian Stranger:  “In fact, we see that even now the practice of human beings sacrificing one another still persists among many people.  And we hear just the opposite about other peoples: how there was once a time when we did not dare to taste cattle, and sacrificed to the gods no animals, but instead gruel and fruits soaked in honey and other such hallowed sacrifices.  They abstained from flesh on the grounds that it wasn’t pious to eat it or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood.  Those of us who existed then had ways of life that were what is called ‘Orphic’: we partook of everything that lacked soul but abstained from the opposite, from everything that possessed soul.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VI, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press Chicago, 1980, page 171, 782c-782d, ISBN: 0226671100)

1.1.1  It’s interesting to me that Plato, in this passage, links cannibalism and meat eating.  Centuries later Porphyry would make the same linkage in his On Abstinence.  This connection found in Porphyry then became a topic of discussion in Renaissance Europe after On Abstinence was translated into a number of European languages. 

1.1.2  Plato mentions how Orphism rejected sacrificing animals on their altars to the Gods because to do so was a kind of pollution.  This view would apply to any contemporary tradition that sacrifices animals, including theurgy.

1.1.3  I’ve mentioned in comments on some quotes from Plato’s Laws that there are times when Plato seems to withdraw from the focus on constructing laws, and lifts his view to a more ethical, or even metaphysical, domain.  I see these as reminders that Laws is primarily focused on metaphysics and only secondarily on the political dimension of constructing laws.

1.1.4  Plato uses the construction of those things with soul verses those things that lack soul.  It is OK to eat those things lacking soul but one should refrain from eating those things that do have soul.  This is an interesting way of looking at the issue of vegetarianism (Plato doesn’t use the word ‘vegetarian’ in this quote, though some translators do) but it does raise some difficulties.  For example, I’m not convinced that plants don’t have souls.  Plato, in Timaeus, states that plants have a ‘third kind of soul . . . which shares not at all in opinion and reasoning and mind but in sensation, pleasant and painful, together with desires.’  (Timaeus, 77a-77b, R. G. Bury translation, Loeb Classical Library)  This means there is a bit of contrast between Plato’s description of plants in an Orphic context and the description in the context of Timaeus.  It’s possible that in the Orphic tradition when they say that plants ‘lack soul’ it means that they lack the soul that reasons and has opinions and this would be consistent with Plato saying that plants have a ‘third kind of soul’.  At times these three kinds of soul are laid out as, first, the rational soul which is primarily found in humans, second is the spirited soul that is often associated with emotions and inclinations such as courage and anger and is found in humans and animals, and third is the appetitive soul that is concerned with nutrition, growth, and responses to the environment such as when it gets cold or hot. 

It is interesting that the Jains also have a system of classification of different types of souls, though I don’t recall exactly its details; but in both the Jain and Platonic context the difference in types of soul is one of the reasons for refraining from eating or sacrificing animals but allowing for the consumption of plants.

1.1.5  There may be a reference to rebirth in this quote where Plato writes, ‘those of us who existed then’, meaning during the ancient times when people refrained from eating or sacrificing animals.  I think this could be read as implying a previous birth on the part of Plato and maybe the other two participants in the dialogue as well.  The quote could also be interpreted as saying something like an archaeologist today saying ‘we humans who existed 40,000 years ago’, referring to prehistoric human history.

But I incline to a reference to rebirth because I suspect that one of the reasons for refraining from harming animals by eating or sacrificing them is that to do so has consequences for rebirth, and the consequences are negative.  My view is that the rebirth interpretation of the quote fits will with the overall context.

1.1.6  This quote is a good example of Plato’s awareness of his predecessors' impact on his own teachings.  The predecessors I am thinking of are Orphism, Pythagoreanism, and possibly some mystery traditions that may be hinted at in a dialogue like Phaedo.  This suggests that the foundations of Western philosophy are broader, and more complex, than is often presented when Western philosophy is said to begin with Thales and other presocratic philosophers.  Perhaps the beginning of Western philosophy is more rooted in traditions like Orphism.

2.  Counterculture

For a long period of time Platonism was at the center of the culture.  This was true during the classical period from Plato through Proclus and Boethius.  And because Platonism was at the center its influence over other traditions and branches of philosophy was extensive. 

Times change.  Today I think it is the case that Platonism is a counterculture.  By counterculture I mean that Platonism is on the fringe rather than the center.  I mean that the major philosophical commitments that are offered today are either non-Platonic or anti-Platonic: these include materialism, reductionism, scientism, anti-transcendentalism, nihilism, and so forth. 

I think it is helpful for those studying Platonism and those who self-identify as Platonists today to consider their countercultural place.  For example, if you are part of a counterculture, you are in a position where you are frequently asked to justify your assumptions, whereas if you are part of the cultural center this happens rarely.  And if you are part of a countercultural presence, it is sometimes the case that your views will be casually dismissed by the role of someone’s eyes, or other dismissive gestures.

I don’t think this is a bad thing.  Such a situation means that contemporary Platonists need to really think about, and contemplate, what the Platonist tradition consists of, what its virtues are, and if there is anything that might be better stated or needs clarification.  That’s an opportunity.

3.  Sunset

The setting summer sun casts long shadows on the desert sand.  As the sun slowly falls behind the western mountain range the sky puts on a beautiful display of colors; like a painful goodbye ending in a sigh.  The shadows merge and unite in darkness as the stars speak to each other in a language inaccessible to mere mortals. 

A peacock shrieks and flies into the branches of a desert pine where it will spend the night.  Soon people are preparing for their journey to the land of dreams.

I turn the pages of a Dialogue by Plato and suddenly my room is filled with light.

4.  AI Philosophy Books

There seems to be a lot of AI generated books on philosophy these days.  Often these books are published in a series with all the books being issued in a short amount of time.  One series includes Pythagoras, Plato,. Plotinus, and many others.  I spent some time trying to track down the author but was unable to find any indication of an actual person.  The books themselves all follow the same format, which AI does well, but completely lack any information about the author, with no footnotes or bibliography, and no references, even passing references to source material or recommendations for further study.

The author’s name may not be the name of an individual; rather it might be the name used for all the books in the series and in the format being used.  It might be the name of an organization dedicated to generating these kind of books.  It’s not clear.  What I would like is clarity; if the author’s name is a stand-in for the name of an organization then it should say so on the copyright page, and possibly on the back cover. 

Another series uses the 366 Days a Year format.  This format is very popular.  When I worked at a spiritual bookstore we had a separate section devoted to this kind of book.  Some of these books were recovery related, some were devoted to quotations from famous people, some were more topical, like 366 thoughts on nature featuring famous quotes from well-known people, some were about relationship, and so forth.  This series has a 366 quotes from Plato as one example of its series.

I don’t have any problem with people using AI to assist in writing a book.  But what I would like is transparency; I mean that somewhere in the book, like on an acknowledgements page, the usage of AI, and the extent of that usage, should be explicitly stated. 

There is a teaching in economics, attributed to Thomas Gresham, that says, ‘bad money drives out good money.’  Perhaps we should apply this to the sale of books in the context I’m referring to.  A good book on Pythagoras will likely be priced higher than the book on Pythagoras from the first series I talked about.  But the very cheap price of the AI generated book on Pythagoras will naturally attract people, thus decreasing the sales of the book written by a qualified author or authors.  That’s why I think it is helpful to have the role that AI played in producing the book clearly stated; it’s kind of like labels on food products letting you know how much sugar is in the product you are buying.

Again, I’m not inherently against using AI in book production.  I just think we should be able to make an informed decision about such usage rather than having to do independent research on it; it should be right there for any reader to see.

4.1  Upon rereading this, it occurs to me that it won’t be long before we have AI generated translations.  And this will happen in the field of philosophy.  Think of a translation of Plato’s Dialogues or Plotinus’s Enneads done by AI.  Such a translation process will be less expensive than having a translator, or team of translators, getting paid for their time and their valuable expertise.  Just to repeat, I don’t think this is inherently a bad thing; it depends on the nature of the AI program being used; as many have noted AI today makes significant mistakes on a regular basis and one would expect translation mistakes in such a context.  On the other hand, potentially AI would have access to broad range of usages for a word, a phrase, or a sentence that AI could use to generate its own version.

For me, the biggest problem, and I’m speaking from a contemplative perspective, is that I don’t think that AI could read these Classical Platonist works from am experiential basis of contemplation, or from the experience of ascetic practices.  I think this would be a serious barrier to how deeply AI could mine for meanings in these works.  And even the way Plato, for example, uses allegory and metaphor might be difficult for AI to recognize. 

 

The Voyage of Existence

20 July 2026

The Voyage of Existence

The Athenian Stanger:  “It is evident to me that what I’m doing here myself is much the same as what a shipwright does in beginning to build ships, when he sketches the shape of ships in outline by laying down the keels.  I’m trying to distinguish the outline of ways of life as they accord with characteristics of soul, and thus really ‘laying down their keels’ – investigating, in the correct way, what device we should use and what characteristics we should at any time incorporate if we are going to be carried through this voyage of existence on the best way of life.  Of course, the affairs of human beings are not worthy of great seriousness; yet it is necessary to be serious about them.  And this is not a fortunate thing.  But since we’re here, if somehow we would carry out the business in some appropriate way it would perhaps be a well-measured thing for us to do.  But whatever am I saying?  Someone would perhaps be correct to take me up in this very way.

Kleinias:  “Indeed!

The Athenian Stranger:  “I assert that what is serious should be treated seriously, and what is not serious should not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete, blessed seriousness, but that what is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything of god, and that this is really the best thing about it.  Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing the noblest possible games, and thinking about them in a way that is the opposite of the way they’re now thought about.

Kleinias:  “How’s that?

The Athenian Stranger:  “Nowadays, presumably, they suppose the serious things are for the sake of the playful things: for it is held that the affairs pertaining to war, being serious matters, should be run well for the sake of peace.  But the fact is that in war there is not and will not be by nature either play or, again, an education that is at any time worthy of our discussion; yet this is what we assert is for us, at least, the most serious thing.  Each person should spend the greatest and best part of his life in peace.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VII, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, pages 192-193, 803a-803d, ISBN: 022667110)

The Athenian Stranger:  “Just as a shipwright at the commencement of his building outlines the shape of his vessel by laying down her keel, so I appear to myself to be doing just the same – trying to frame, that is, the shapes of lives according to the modes of their souls, and thus literally laying down their keels, by rightly considering by what means and by what modes of living we shall best navigate our barque of life through this voyage of existence.  And notwithstanding that human affairs are unworthy of earnest effort, necessity counsels us to be in earnest; and that is our misfortune.  Yet, since we are where we are, it is no doubt becoming that we should show this earnestness in a suitable direction.  But no doubt I may be faced – and rightly faced – with the question, ‘What do I man by this?’

Cleinias: “Certainly. 

The Athenian Stranger: “What I assert is this, - that a man ought to be in serious earnest about serious things, and not about trifles; and that the object really worthy of all serious and blessed effort is God, while man is contrived, as we said above [before], to be a plaything of God, and the best part of him is really just that; and thus I saw that every man and woman ought to pass through life in accordance with this character, playing at the noblest of pastimes, being otherwise minded than they now are.

Cleinias:  “How so?

The Athenian Stranger:  “Now they imagine that serious work should be done for the sake of play; for they think that it is for the sake of peace that the serious work of war needs to be well conducted.  But as a matter of fact we, it would seem, do not find in war, either as existing or likely to exist, either real play or education worthy of the name, which is what we assert to be in our eyes the most serious thing.  It is the life of peace that everyone should live as much and as well as he can.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VII, translated by R. G. Bury, Aquilla Press (a reprint house that specializes in reprints of Loeb editions), 2021, pages 30-32, ISBN: 9798328186223.  I double checked the Aquilla Press reprint by using the online site archive (dot) org which has the 1926 edition, published by William Heinemann in London)

1.  There is a paradox, or a seeming paradox, in this passage which is that the dialogue Laws is focused on taking human affairs seriously enough so that the three old men of this dialogue are spending their time discussing what would be the best laws for the proposed new city of Magnesia.  But the Athenian Stranger puts forth the idea that human affairs, which would include the making of laws, should not be taken seriously. 

I think a passage like this is Plato’s way of reminding the reader that the human context is embedded in a much grander cosmos than appears when we focus on the human situation.  People have the tendency to inhabit the human situation and context in a way that forgets about the overall cosmos in which humans dwell.  I think this is natural; human beings have to cook meals, go to work, take care of children and the elderly, grow food, build buildings, make laws, and so forth.  The body demands that we pay attention to these kinds of activities, a point that Plato makes in a number of dialogues.  Such activities consume most of our time.  The time remaining for spiritual practice, such as contemplation and spiritual reading, is small; and it is a consistent struggle to carve out time for these kinds of activities.

The contrast that Plato makes is between human affairs and God (as an aside, it’s  interesting to me that the Pangle translation uses the lower case ‘god’, while the Bury translation uses the upper case ‘God’.  It’s a small thing, but I suspect it emerges from a difference in the translators’ understanding of the significance of the word in this context.  Classical Greek does not use upper and lowercase letters, so such usage in a context like this reflects the choices the translators are making.) 

Returning to the contrast Plato makes; God deserves to be taken with utmost seriousness while human affairs are not to be taken seriously.  Why does Plato say that human affairs should not be taken seriously, what is Plato getting at?  I think a good example is how, in contemporary democracies, every election is depicted as of great significance and how the fate of humanity will be decided by the results.  Yet the truth is that this is hardly ever the case (I think you could make a case that, in fact, it is never the case).  Elections come and go.  The issues people were passionate about disappear so that after only a few decades only specialist historians will even know what the issues were.  In a society like ours, where ideological thinking saturates the public sphere, it is difficult to see this.  But I think what Plato is getting at by contrasting human affairs with God is that ‘God’ is an indicator of that which is eternal; the contrast is between the ephemeral nature of human activity and the eternal presence of God, of the Divine.  I like to say that the spiritual path involves a shift of attention from that which is ephemeral to that which is eternal and I think that is what is behind what Plato is saying.

2.  My own view is that gaining perspective on this contrast between human affairs and God happens when we become aware of impermanence and the range of impermanence.  That is why I think it is a good idea to study impermanence, to get an understanding of the impermanence so that it saturates one’s understanding.  Plato does not touch on impermanence in this passage, but that is what came to my mind when reading it.

3.  The Athenian Stranger speaks at the opening of this passage with a metaphor of laying down a keel; the function of a keel is to keep a ship from tipping over as it sails to its destination.  I think Plato is communicating to the reader that Plato’s purpose in writing Laws is to point out what kind of life will lead us to the transcendental.  We have to cross the ocean of obstacles by leaving the harbor of material concerns.  To do this we need to align the ship of our lives to the distant shore of serenity and peace.  The laws of Laws are instructions on how to do that.  At times this dialogue appears to be overly detailed, but I’m beginning to think that the details resemble the detailed regulations that we find in a work like the Buddhist Vinaya or some other monastic rules.  The detail is there so that we can understand how the guidance of the law under consideration functions in different circumstances.  Of course not every circumstance can be covered; there are just too many.  But by offering some details of application we are shown how to apply a regulation to multiple situations.

4.  Did Plato think of the dialogue Laws as something that could actually be applied in real life?  Did Plato think of the dialogue Laws as a blueprint for an actual city-state?  I lean toward the idea that this is not an accurate portrayal of what Plato was trying to communicate to the reader.  I think that what Plato is doing in Laws is communicating how to live a life that is serious, a life that is dedicated to the transcendental, to God. 

I think Plato’s view is that aligning with the transcendental, living a life that is focused on that which is eternal, is not easy; and, furthermore, that such a life requires dedication in both large and small ways.  In the quote above Plato is, I think, revealing his purpose, not just for this particular dialogue, but overall.

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 101

13 July 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 101

1.  The Political Perspective

I listened to a brief presentation by a professor of philosophy regarding Plato.  He argued in favor of the interpretation of Leo Strauss; I mean that the professor argues that Strauss is the most insightful recent scholar on Plato.  And the reason given for the importance of Strauss is that Strauss abandoned metaphysical and mystical interpretations of Plato’s Dialogues and brought out the political nature of Plato’s works.  I have read this kind of interpretation before (I am also aware that there are those that disagree that this is how Strauss treats Plato, but that’s another issue.  The view of Strauss presented by this philosophy professor is widespread.) 

As I mentioned, the video was brief, only a few minutes, and I hesitated to respond.  But he invited people to comment, so I asked him, given his views, how would he handle the episodes in the Dialogues where Socrates goes into some kind of trance, or meditative state.  I mentioned specifically the Symposium and Phaedrus.  I suggested that, given these episodes, it is difficult to maintain that Plato was in some sense anti-mystical, that Plato was kind of a proto-analytic philosopher who specialized in political philosophy.  The professor responded by saying that what Strauss had accomplished was a realignment (his word) of what is significant in the Dialogues; that is to say that Strauss foregrounds political thought which earlier Platonists (he specifically mentions Christian Platonism as an example) had neglected.

Needless to say, this is not my point of view.  It isn’t only the episodes depicting trance states that are significant.  A Dialogue like Phaedo which is focused on the nature of the soul, the teachings of rebirth, and the practices of asceticism, is entirely devoted to non-material realities and mystical experiences that are depicted in the penultimate section of mythic unfolding.

The separation of Western Philosophy from its spiritual roots is, to my mind, a kind of cultural tragedy; but that is what has happened.  And that is the what Universities are structured to present as philosophy.  From the perspective of this kind of separation, the history of philosophy is understood to be a kind of freeing itself from superstitions such as mysticism and spirituality. 

For the contemporary Platonist who wants to actually practice the Platonic Way or Path, I think one important step to take is to let the Dialogues speak in their own voice, without bringing to them contemporary assumptions such as materialism, reductionism, and so forth.  When this step is taken the Dialogues of Plato open up a vaster and richer understanding of the cosmos, an understanding that can be pursued and practiced for many lifetimes.

2.  Monism

The term ‘monism’ emerged, I think, in the 18^th or 19^th century.  It appeared as part of an effort, centered in Germany, to approach the history of philosophy through classification systems that in some ways mimicked scientific systems of classification, such as the periodic table of the elements and biological classifications, that have had great success in their respective fields.  ‘Monism’ came with ‘dualism’ and ‘pluralism.’  In general, I think that this specific classification of monism, dualism, pluralism has been successful and has its uses.  But it is good to keep in mind that, for example, Platonists did not refer to themselves as monists; the term has been applied to some Platonist philosophers, such as Plotinus, retroactively.

I think of myself as a monist, and think that monism is a good descriptor of the Platonist tradition, while recognizing at the same time that there is variation among specific Platonist authors; that’s not unusual.  My view is that in Platonism there is one thing, the Good and the One, that is completely real in Platonist term.  But unlike some other examples of monism, Platonism does not consider the material world unreal.  Instead, Platonism views material entities as derivative of the ultimate and unique source, the One.  Material things are real, but they are less real than the One or the Noetic realities such as abstract objects and Platonic Forms.

Sometimes I read in scholarly works that Plato did not really commit himself to a specific metaphysical position.  I think this is mistaken.  I suspect that what is going on with that kind of assertion is that the scholar, or University Platonist, is looking for some kind of clear statement as to affiliation in the way that some philosopher today might say they are an existentialist, or a materialist, or a monist, pluralist, or dualist, and so forth.  What I suggest is that Plato does not seem to normally choose that way of speaking to present his metaphysics.  My observation is that Plato usually uses allegories and myths to express metaphysical truths, especially when Plato is dealing with realities that are difficult to present in terms of affirmations and negations.  I think the primary example of this is the allegory of the cave which, in my reading, culminates in a monist vision of the metaphysical sun.  And the sun is a symbol of what Platonist monism means.  In other words, the allegory of the cave is Plato’s statement on his metaphysical commitments and I think that allegory expresses a metaphysics that is consistent with monism.

Ultimately all things emanate from the transcendental sun of the One and are dependent upon the One.  In addition, the One is ineffable and beyond affirmation and negation.  This means that ultimate reality is unknowable through intellect and reason, but is approachable through intellect and reason.  Terms we use to designate the One are analogies of that which is beyond our grasp, of that which is the source of all that exists.

3.  Plato on Change

The Athenian Stranger: “Change, we shall find, is much the most dangerous thing in everything except what is bad – in all the seasons, in the winds, in bodily habits, and in the characters of souls.  It isn’t the case that change is, so to speak, safe in some things and dangerous in others, except, as I just now said, in bad things.

“Thus, if one were to look at bodies, one would see how they become accustomed to all foods and all drinks and exercises, even if at first they are upset by them; one would see how, with the passage of time, they grow, out of these very materials, flesh that is akin to these things, and come to like, be accustomed to and familiar with, a whole regimen – thriving on it in the best way from the point of view of both pleasure and health; one would see that if someone is ever compelled to change back to one of the reputable diets, he is at first upset with sickness, but then once again with difficulty recovers, by regaining a habituation in the food.  Now one must hold that this very same thing applies to the thoughts of human beings and the natures of their souls.  If they’re brought up under laws which by some divine good fortune have remained unchanged for a great length of time, if they neither remember nor have heard that these things were ever otherwise than they are at present, then the entire soul reverences and fears changing any of the things that are already laid down.  Somehow or other the lawgiver must think up a device by which this situation will prevail in the city.  The following is what I at least have discovered: as we said before, everyone thinks that very great and serious harm can’t follow from changes in the games of the young, on the grounds that these are really just games.  As a result, they don’t prevent such changes but give in to and follow them, not taking into account the fact that these boys who practice innovations in their games must necessarily grow up to be men who are different from those the earlier children grew into; being different, they seek a different way of life, and in seeking it they desire different practices and laws; from this it follows that none of them fears the arrival of what was now said to be the greatest evil for cities.  There are, indeed, other changes – those affecting outward appearance – that would do less damage; but whatever brings about frequent change in the praise and blame accorded to dispositions is the greatest of all changes, I believe, and would require the most attentive watching.”

(Plato, Laws, Book VII, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, pages 186-187, 797d-798d)

3.1  Plato talks about change and stability in Laws as well as in other Dialogues.  The passage quoted is one of the longer and more thorough on the subject.

3.2  In Laws Plato wants the laws of the proposed new city-state to be written in a manner that aligns the citizens to higher realities.  Higher realities, such as Nous and the One, are stable and unchanging.  Therefore, in order to live in accordance with these higher realities at least the appearance of stability needs to be cultivated and in this dialogue that means laws that are so well written that they do not change over long stretches of time.

3.2.1  I believe ‘long stretches of time’ means thousands of years, even ten thousand years, in Plato’s mind because in Laws the Egyptians are admired because their regulations for painting have not changed for thousands and thousands of years.

3.3  It is somewhat a puzzle for me that Plato argues that the changing seasons and the shifting of the wind are negative changes rather than, say, neutral, or perhaps even positive.  Perhaps these are symbols of instability for Plato as opposed to the sun and its light which is a symbol of stability.  I’m not sure of that, and I’m not aware of another dialogue where Plato unpacks the meaning of the changing seasons and the wind.  Nevertheless it is a puzzle to me because the changing seasons proceed in an orderly manner; yes the seasonal changes are changes, but the manner of the changes is predictable and points to a deeper stability.  It’s just not clear to me why this would be a problem.

3.3.1  But there is an example where Plato has a constructive relationship to a natural phenomenon; I am thinking of the sound of the cicadas in Phaedrus.

3.3.2  Perhaps Plato is thinking along the lines that the changing seasons in some way ‘teach’ young people that change and innovation in a city’s laws might lead to misalignment for the souls of its citizens.  I get the overall impression that Plato is concerned here, and in other places in Laws with the effect of precedent; the idea that if change is permitted, or even admired, in one context then change will be introduced into a context where it is inappropriate. 

3.4  If the reader interprets Laws as teachings that are applicable to one’s own life as a practitioner of the way of philosophy, then a passage like this is directing the person dedicated to philosophy to be very cautious about introducing changes into a traditional spiritual practice.  In today’s culture, which exalts change and alteration simply for the sake of change and alteration, as if they are inherently a good thing, such changes are introduced, even demanded, of spiritual traditions that are many thousands of years old, and they are often introduced thoughtlessly; kind of in the way a cultural fad is introduced.  Plato resists that kind of approach. 

3.4.1  A Daoist teacher once told me that Daoists are people who show up at an open village meeting to discuss the village’s plan for a new bridge and then ask if such a bridge is necessary, pointing out that the city has been in its current location for a long time and is doing just fine.

3.4.2  In my long involvement with Buddhism in the West, I have observed such innovations being introduced frequently and often adopted.  Because I studied overseas in Korea and Japan, I was sometimes aware of how this innovation or change would diminish the tradition; I rarely brought this up because there was no context to do so.  But sometimes in conversations with individuals it could be discussed, with mixed results.

3.4.3  Looking at a passage like this as instruction for practitioners of the way of philosophy helps to cultivate patience and endurance.  The ascetic practices of Platonism bear fruit, but that does not always happen immediately.  Contemplation bears fruit, but that does not always happen right away.  Dialectic bears fruit, but it can take time to learn how dialectic works.

3.5  Plato writes that changes of the negative kind (and negative changes are changes that make it more difficult to align with the transcendent) require ‘attentive watching.’  I think this is a good instruction for life in general; I mean that if you introduce a change into your spiritual practice, it is good to attentively watch how it impacts your spiritual development, whether or not the change is a step forward or a step back.