Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 76

8 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 76

1.  Embracing the Past

To be a Platonist means admiring the past; or at least admiring one thing from the past.  It means basing the activities of your life on artefacts from the past in the form of written works such as Plato’s Dialogues. 

This is obvious, but I think it is worth considering how this Platonist relationship with the past runs counter to the spirit of our time which considers the modern world to be the result of overcoming the past.  This is a feature of modernity that is pervasive.

I’m not sure if this difference in attitude towards the past results in intense friction; I tend to think that it results in a kind of low-level but constant disconnect with central features of modernity. 

2.  Cruelty

Human beings are immensely and consistently cruel to each other; I am not thinking of cruelty at this moment in a subtle way.  I mean cruelty in very gross and obvious ways.  Some of this cruelty is widely supported as in the enthusiastic response to war by most people. 

It is also true that human beings are immensely and consistently cruel to other creatures, to animals of various kinds.  There is a lot of confusion about this because there are certain animals, such as pets, for whom we are inclined to act towards with great affection and caring and at the same time other animals that are just as intelligent are treated very poorly by human beings.  There are even laws against cruelty towards certain animals while other animals are, as the saying goes, fair game.

Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation run counter to this habit of cruelty.  In a world, and amongst the human species, where cruelty is approved of, even in very horrific forms, it is difficult to put non-harming into practice.  And being committed to these teachings, and their attendant practices, will separate such practitioners from widespread societal habits and norms.

But it is worthwhile to enter into the way of non-harming; for those who want to walk the spiritual path of Platonism, it is essential.  Commitment to the way of non-harming calms the mind and body, and this calmness is a precondition for turning to the soul, turning to eternity.

3.  Those Who Oppose Transcendence

I’ve been aware for quite a few years that there are those who oppose transcendence.  One such group are materialists; they are widespread but my remarks here will not be about them.  I’m more interested in the group(s) that oppose transcendence for what they regard as spiritual reasons.

From my perspective, I am thinking about groups, or views, that regard something prior to transcendence as ultimate and that therefore transcendence is to be avoided.  Most often the anti-transcendence views come to rest on some kind of unusual sensory experience as the ultimate.  Others, though, regard ritual, often precisely and repetitious done, as the key to attain that which is ultimate.

For example, one of the reasons those who opposed the Quietists in the 17^th century was that the interior silence advocated by the Quietists undermined the status of certain key Catholic rituals, including the Eucharist.  This was the ground for regarding Quietism as a heresy.

Another example of the view of ritual that is similar to that which opposed the Quietists is found in theurgy which ejected Wisdom because contemplative Wisdom leads to ineffable transcendence.  In contrast, theurgy is focused on sensory deities, Gods and Goddesses, who have all the characteristics of third things.

Another example is the way Jungian psychology interprets the realm of images in the form of archetypes as the ultimate achievement of human consciousness; that is to say that becoming aware of archetypes and their functions surpasses something like Wisdom that leads to the experience of that which is beyond all images and from which all images emerge.

There are also individuals who talked about an ultimate reality beyond image, beyond affirmation and negation, who had difficulties with authorities who regarded this approach as suspect.  I am thinking of Meister Eckhart as one famous example.

I suspect that there are various reasons for wanting to halt the spiritual journey before stepping into the ineffable.  But one reason for some, I think, is fear.  In a way, an early experience of the transcendent that precedes image can feel like falling off a cliff.  This can be very uncomfortable.  Plato addresses this in the allegory of the cave in terms of feeling blinded by the light upon emerging from the darkness of the cave; it takes time to accustom oneself to this light and one possible reaction is to reject the experience altogether as nothing more than an uncomfortable sensation.  If you have a good spiritual teacher, a good and experienced guide, a practitioner can stick with it and get past those early moments of fear and discomfort.  The Dialogues of Plato are such a spiritual guide.

4.  Phaedo

I tend to think of Phaedo as Plato’s most significant, most important, dialogue.  This means that I take the teachings put forth in Phaedo as definitive and interpret other teachings in accordance with Phaedo’s teachings and perspectives.

I think this accounts for some differences I have with other contemporary Platonists.  I have observed, for example, that Parmenides is sometimes thought of as being the most significant, or highest, teaching that Plato offers us.  I can understand that; there is a great amount of wisdom in Parmenides.  But I tend to read Parmenides as expanding on teachings presented in Phaedo such as how predication works and the implications of living a life based on the experience of transcendence.

What I find in Phaedo that leads me to place Phaedo in the center of the Platonic Canon, so to speak, is that Phaedo offers the reader specific instruction on how to live a philosophical life.  This happens specifically in the famous passage where Socrates lists various activities that a philosopher will refrain from participating in such as being concerned about beautiful clothing and jewelry, or involvement in sexual pursuits and pleasures.  What I have found is that most readers don’t look at these kinds of passages as instruction; I can understand this because for many years I had the same response.  I mean that I didn’t read this passage as Socrates giving me, the reader, instruction in how to live a Philosophical life.  Instead I read it as Socrates, and/or Plato, giving their opinion, or reporting on their own lives.  These passages of ascetic instruction are embedded in a moving narrative and perhaps the presence of the narrative hides the teaching function of these ascetic passages.  I mean that by becoming wrapped up in, and attentive to, the unfolding story of the last hours of the life of Socrates, and his interactions with various people, we may react to Phaedo on a strictly literary level, concluding that Phaedo is a very well written story.  The shift to understanding Phaedo as a kind of guidebook for living a Philosophical life happens, I think, by repeatedly reading Phaedo.  What I mean here is that by rereading Phaedo we can approach the dialogue with the story of the last hours of Socrates already a known feature and so the story drops a little bit into the background and the teachings of Phaedo move into the foreground.  I don’t mean that the story found in Phaedo disappears; I mean that the presentations of guidance for a philosophical life are finally noticed as actually having that function.  When that happens it is very satisfying and one realizes that all of Plato’s dialogues are written in multiple layers, and one of those layers is the layer of instruction.

5.  Middle Platonism

I have a fondness for what scholars today refer to as Middle Platonism.  Middle Platonism covers a significant period of time.  The Academy founded by Plato went through a period of extreme skepticism but following a kind of restoration, a kind of return to what Plato actually wrote we enter into this period of Middle Platonism.  Generally speaking this period lasts into the second or third centuries of our era. 

These periods of Platonism are a tool that contemporary philosophers and historians use to designate periods in the long history of Platonism.  Middle Platonists didn’t think of themselves as Middle Platonists, of course.  But the term is a convenient way to designate a certain time period in the history of Platonism.

Specific Platonists from the Middle period that I am fond of are Maximus of Tyre, Alcinous, and Plutarch.  Plutarch is the most complex because Plutarch had many interests beside philosophy including history and literature.  He spent a great deal of time on these other interests and the majority of his writing is about historical or literary topics.  This doesn’t bother me because I am also interested in literature and I enjoy reading ancient views on this topic.  But Plutarch does discuss Platonism fairly frequently and he was clearly well versed in Platonism.  As I have mentioned in a number of posts, Plutarch wrote three essays on refraining from harming animals and vegetarianism which documents the existence of vegetarianism in the Middle period of Platonism.  But Plutarch discusses other Platonist topics as well such as the nature of forms and Platonist ethics in general.

In contrast to Plutarch’s wide ranging interests, Maximus’s writings are narrowly focused on Philosophy, specifically Platonism.  Often when he writes about a topic in Philosophy he will directly quote, or paraphrase, a dialogue; so Maximus is rooted in study of the dialogues.  I particularly appreciate that Maximus wrote about the practice of contemplation in a Platonic context in one of his most beautiful Orations.

As far as I know there is only one work on Platonism by Alcinous, the Handbook of Platonism.  Some scholars suggest that the handbook was written for those who were teaching Platonism.  Others think it had a wider circulation.  Of these three writers Alcinous is the most systematic which is in line with the purpose of a Handbook.  Alcinous writes with clarity as he covers various topics in Platonism and because of this we have a good idea of how Middle Platonists understood their own tradition.

One Middle Platonist I have not read, but hope to get to in 2026, is Apuleius.  I have wanted to read the philosophical works of Apuleius for a long time and I’m hoping I will be able to read what he has to say soon.  Apuleius is most famous for his work The Golden Ass which is a very early example of a novel, according to scholars.  But I am more interested, again, in his philosophical works.

One thing I have observed about Middle Platonists is that as a group they seem to have an interest in literature; their works demonstrate literary skill and that they have spent a lot of time reading and studying literature.  I think this is in keeping with the Platonist tradition as a whole because Plato was a very skillful writer so it is only natural that those interested in literature would find Plato’s works attractive.

I have to confess that I prefer these Middle Platonists to the Platonists who wrote in the Late Classical period.  For my purposes I think of these writers as ‘Post-Porphyry’ and beginning with Iamblichus.  There are a number of contrasts, I think, between these two groups (Middle Platonists vs. Post-Porphyry Platonists).  The first is that the writing about Platonism found in Middle Platonism is direct and far more accessible than that of Post-Porphyry authors.  Middle Platonists seem to think of their task as to transmit what Plato wrote, what Plato’s views were, instead of elaborating on Platonism based on their own eccentricities.  Middle Platonists refrain from complicating the Platonic system and presentation which became an obsession with Post-Porphyry Platonists.

The other aspect of Middle Platonist writing that I appreciate is that they seem to me to have a strong interest in ethics and virtue.  This is likely controversial, but it seems to me that this focus on ethics and virtue declines in Post-Porphyry Platonism as elaborate cosmology assumes center stage.  I’m not saying it is completely absent from Post-Porphyry Platonism but it seems to me the unnecessary complexity of the cosmology which they present takes a lot of energy away from other aspects of Platonism such as ethics and virtue.

For these reasons, if I were teaching a group of students an ongoing course in Platonism my recommendation for further reading beyond the Dialogues and the Enneads would be the writings left to us from the Middle Platonists rather than the writings of the Post-Porphyry Platonists.  I think the Middle Platonists are more grounded in actual Platonism (what I sometimes call Orthodox Platonism), less prone to elaborately complex and difficult to understand mental speculations, and write in a manner that is helpful to the daily practice of Platonism.  Contemporary Platonists are very fortunate to have the resources left to us by these Middle Platonists.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 59

11 August 2025 

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 59

1.  I’ve had an interest in Plutarch for a long time.  His Platonist views are interesting for a number of reasons.  First, Plutarch’s views are non-academic; I mean that Plutarch was not a part of the Academy in Athens, so Plutarch has a certain degree of independence.  This allows him to consider some Platonic views and consider them in a way that, from my perspective, is like having a dialogue with the tradition.  Plutarch wasn’t the only Platonist in this position.  Both Maximus of Tyre and Plotinus were similarly situated. 

I also like the ability of Plutarch to refer to a vast amount of literature in his discussions.  As someone who enjoys reading and who has some familiarity with English literature, I find myself feeling a kind of kinship with Plutarch.

I am currently reading a book called The Platonism of Plutarch by Roger Miller Jones.  This book is a doctoral thesis Jones wrote to receive his doctorate.  It was first published as a book in 1916; I was able to get a copy through the University of Michigan reprint services at a reasonable price (which is very unusual for Universities). 

Jones knows Plutarch very well and has a knowledge of several European languages, as well as Greek and Latin.  This allowed him to access commentarial material from a large range of sources.  (As was the custom at that time, many quotes in the thesis are in the original language and are not translated; this includes Greek, Latin, German, and others.  But even if you lack reading knowledge of these languages Jones makes his point either in the paragraphs leading up to the quotes, or in the paragraphs immediately following and this allows an English-only reader to follow the thread of thought.)

Jones’s approach is to bring to the reader’s attention a number of views on an issue; that is to say how other scholars have understood, for example, Plutarch’s view of demons (daemons).  After doing this Jones will critique some of these views and then offer his own interpretation.  I like this kind of approach because it shows how Jones’s view does not exist in isolation.  Rather his view arises in dialectical relationship to what others have said about the same topic.

There is a vast literature about Platonism from previous centuries that tends to be overlooked.  I think this is because when we read works about Platonism from previous times we discover that the issues that concerned them are often not of concern to us.  The issues that take center stage change over time.  This is natural.  But I find it kind of refreshing and illuminating to see what the focus was when approaching Plato for scholars of the past.  It helps me to put the focus of contemporary Platonic scholarship in its temporal contingency.

An example of how this effected Platonic scholarship in the past is found in the 17^th century when European scholars, particularly German scholars, sought to construct a Platonism that was rational, reasonable, and void of any mystical aspects.  This lead to a dismissal of Plotinus, because Plotinus is obviously a mystic.  This legacy is fading, but it still has its adherents.

But to return to the thesis of Jones, for those interested in Plutarch as a Platonist (as opposed to his biographical output) I think this short work is worth reading.

2.  I have noticed for many years, that those who follow an ascetic path, an ascetic form of spirituality, feel a kind of kinship across traditions with others who are similarly committed to asceticism and renunciation.  I first noticed this in the writings of Thomas Merton who would sometimes complain that lay Catholics in the U.S. have no understanding of monasticism, particularly the more ascetically inclined traditions such as the Trappists which was the tradition that Merton was affiliated with.  On the other hand, when he communicated with, for example, Buddhist monastics he immediately felt in tune with their calling.

I feel refreshed when I learn about ascetics who have managed to live a life based on ascetic principles whether they are following some ancient tradition or following new manifestations of similar impulses such as minimalism.  I recognize what they are doing and feel that they would recognize what I am doing.

3.  Continuing with our discussion of Porphyry’s Sentences, here is Sentence 5:

“Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an impartible essence, and an essence which is divisible about bodies.  But intellect is an impartible essence alone.  And qualities and material forms are divisible about bodies.”  (Thomas Taylor)

“The soul has a nature intermediary between the ‘being’ that is indivisible, and the ‘being’ that is divisible by its union with bodies.  Intelligence is a being absolutely indivisible, bodies alone are divisible; but the qualities and the forms engaged in matter are divisible by their union with the bodies.”  (Kenneth Guthrie)

“The soul lies somewhere in between the wholeness and divisibility of the material world and is a kind of mediator, while the mind is completely whole and the body is completely divisible, and the qualities and embodied forms surrounding the bodies are divisible.”  (Isaak Samarskyi)

3.1  Porphyry has the view, which I think is based on certain passages in Plotinus, such as when Plotinus refers to an ‘amphibious soul’, that regards soul as occupying a place that is not completely the same as incorporeal or non-material things found in the noetic, and is not completely material, which is to say divisible, either.  I think for Porphyry this way of understanding soul helps him to understand why the soul can be distracted by material things and desires, but that soul also has the capacity to turn away from material things and desires and turn towards the noetic and transcendental. 

3.2  I have often noted while reading Platonism that ancient Platonists seem to think of the soul as much more complex, and having many more functions, than contemporary depictions of the soul.  For example, ancient Platonist think of the soul as having reason, which in modern terms would be part of intellect or mind (small ‘m’ mind).  There are also emotional appearances that are attributed to the soul, or which the soul participates in, in some way, that today we would think of as part of psychology rather than a function of the soul.

I think that Porphyry’s depiction in this sentence of soul as between the noetic and the material makes sense of the soul having all these functions.

3.3  To be honest, though, I find this way of looking at soul unsatisfactory; I have a different way of understanding soul.  As I have often said on this blog, I think of the soul as the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  By ‘presence of eternity’ I mean that which is eternal as such, which is the ineffable One and the ineffable Good that transcends all graspable understanding.  It is because of the presence of eternity, the soul, in the ephemeral individual, that it is possible for human beings, and other living beings, to make the spiritual ascent, to Return to the One.  It is because the soul is not fully descended, or fully separated, from the One that it is possible for us to, step by step, Return to the One. 

I think of mind as the presence of the noetic in the individual.  The noetic is the first appearance of differentiation and it is the mind, our mind, that has the function of differentiation; this ability to differentiate is descended from the noetic.  This is why I think of mind as the presence of the noetic in each individual.

Mind makes differentiations; when mind differentiates between what is eternal and what is not, that is wisdom.  All other differentiations are worldly.

And the body is the presence of cyclical existence in the individual which is what makes the individual a person with a history.  When mind differentiates what is cyclical from what is not, we ascend to the noetic because noetic realities are not cyclical.  Noetic realities are eternal but it is a derived eternity; they are not eternal as such.

When the mind distinguishes derived eternities, such as numbers, from the ineffable source of noetic realities, that wisdom allows for the Return to the One. 

I include contemplation as a mode of differentiation that allows the mind to separate from the body, and to separate from the noetic, and Return to the One.

3.4  Understood in this way, I can think of human life as a microcosmos containing ineffable realities as the soul, noetic realities as the mind, and cyclic realities as the body.  Thus human life is a weaving together of the three levels, or hypostases, of the Platonic metaphysical cosmology. 

3.5  The above is only an outline which I felt hesitant to include in the comments on this Sentence of Porphyry.  Perhaps I am being arrogant; I’m not sure. 

On the other hand, I am encouraged to offer a different account of the place of, and the nature of, soul because I know this has been an ongoing topic of discussion in the history of Platonism.  It is in the spirit of dialectical discussion that I offer the above alternative understanding of soul.

4.  There are times when it seems as if our understanding of Platonism is blossoming; things fall into place that we previously did not understand.  Something in the Dialogues or Enneads that was opaque in the past now makes sense and we comprehend how it fits in with the rest of Platonism.  These times are very refreshing and awesome and they inspire us to further study and contemplation.

At other times our understanding may seem to be stagnant; this can feel frustrating because we know we have not finished the journey and because of this we feel stuck.  I’ve gone through this cycle quite a number of times. 

What I have found is that when we feel like nothing is happening in our Platonist practice, that our practice is not maturing, what is really happening is that our mind is working at, and learning at, a deeper level.  I mean that the mind is maturing at a level that is not primarily at the level of conscious awareness.  Most of what happens in the realm of mind is not consciously available; hence it is not surprising that this is also true of our Platonist practice.

It is difficult to overcome our attachments to materiality.  It is difficult to embody the ethical restraints of Platonic asceses.  It is difficult to gain clarity about the cosmos and the transcendental and how they are related.  It is difficult to transcend time.

But it is possible to do all this.  It happens over a long period of time.  Sometimes we do not recognize how far we have travelled on the spiritual path.  An antidote to this is to look back on what your life was like ten, fifteen, twenty years before.  It can be surprising when you compare yourself of today to yourself from twenty or thirty years ago.  Such a meditation can build a sense of how much has been accomplished without denying how much more there is to do.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 50

9 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 50

1.  It is very difficult to pursue a life of renunciation at this time, in this culture.  I watched a video on youtube the other day that was an announcement by a Buddhist monastic that he was no longer going to practice as a monk as he had decided to continue practicing and teaching Buddhism as a layman.  I have seen this before.  And not just among Buddhist monastics.  I have also seen young Christian monastics announce a similar change in their life on youtube (and this kind of thing also likely appears on other social media platforms).

There are common themes in these stories.  One is a sense of isolation, which is often mentioned by Buddhist monastics in the West.  Often they are trying to live a monastic life on their own which is very difficult.  At another level, those going through this change often mention that the culture as a whole, and the spirit of the time, finds a life of renunciation baffling; more than a few configure such a life as a life for losers.

For those who think of Platonism as a path of renunciation and asceticism these stories are cautionary tales.  Platonism never developed (as far as I know) an institutional monasticism.  Platonism encourages asceticism but the tradition seems to leave the application of its ascetic principles up to the individual practitioner.  This is a challenge that can, at times, be difficult to apply in one’s life.

One way of accepting this challenge is to think of other activities that are done primarily by individuals; I mean things like gardening, baking, and so forth.  There are many people who devote a lot of time to cultivating their garden without having any kind of institutional support or membership requirements.  For such people gardening is its own reward.

In a similar way, a life lived in accordance with the principles of asceticism is its own reward; that reward being transcendence and the understanding of eternity.  It is the garden of the soul that is cultivated by the Platonist ascetic.

2.  I think one of the differences between what I call contemplative Platonism and theurgic Platonism is the range of ethical concern.  Contemplative Platonists tend to include animals in the embrace of their ethical concern.  In contrast, theurgic Platonists tend to ignore the inclusion of animals in an ethical embrace.

I started thinking along these lines when I came across the curriculum for studying Plato’s Dialogues that Iamblichus developed.  The Republic is not included; neither is Crito.  Both of those dialogues offer teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation.  And I wonder if they were excluded for that reason.

In the writings of Plutarch on vegetarianism there is an emphasis on the mistreatment of animals when they are slaughtered.  This is considered ethically wrong by Plutarch, as it is by Porphyry.  Such concern is simply absent from those advocating for a theurgic approach to Platonism.  Perhaps this is a consequence of displacing wisdom for ceremonial efficacy.

The consequences of this lack of ethical concern for animals resulted in huge quantities of animals being sacrificed under Julian; I’m not aware of any objections to this consequence coming from those with a theurgic orientation.

And this lack of ethical concern for animals by theurgists continues into the present time.  Two books on theurgy I recently read do not bring up this perspective even in sections where they discuss blood sacrifice.  I find this absence striking.

It may be the case that I am overly concerned with this or unduly sensitive; after all most Platonists do not comment on it.  Perhaps my perspective on this issue arises because I do not think of human beings as particularly suited to a spiritual life or to making advances on the spiritual path.  I tend to think that other lifeforms also have this capacity and maybe even have a greater capacity than humans do.  This is eccentric, I know, and I’m not aware of a Platonist source that speaks from this perspective.  Perhaps this is because I am more pessimistic about humans and their spiritual capacities than most people.  But if you do have this perspective (I mean the perspective that considers at least some animals as having spiritual potential as great as, or greater than, that of human beings) then this creates a tendency to see these animals as worthy of ethical concern.

3.  For a long time I have been interested in how the word ‘Neoplatonism’ took hold.  I know it is a modern word, of recent origin, but I have not been able to track down the actual person and the actual book in which ‘Neoplatonism’ first appears.

I had been told by several people that ‘Neoplatonism’ had emerged in Germany during the 1700’s, or around that time.  Some told me that it had been used in a German history of philosophy by Brucher, or Brucker, called Historia Critica Philosophiae.  This was published from 1742 to 1744 in Leipzig; it was five volumes.  I found a copy of the book at Internet Archive where I discovered that the book was written in Latin.  It appears to have been a great success and very influential (for example, Schopenhauer liked it and recommended it).

An English translation by William Enfield appeared in 1766 to 1767 in six volumes.  Enfield also published a condensation of the work in one volume.  I was able to get a copy of this condensation (a little under 700 pages) from a reprint house at a very reasonable price.  I don’t find the word ‘Neoplatonism’ in it; but it is interesting that the section on Plotinus is relentlessly hostile.  I will probably post about this at some time in the future.

Frustrated at not being able to find the specifics on the first usage of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ I finally decided to ask ChatGPT; friends of mine had made me aware of how to use it and how to frame questions so that you get a useful answer.  I asked ChatGPT who first used the word ‘Neoplatonism’ and in what book it first appears.  ChatGPT came up with Schleiermacher and that the word appears in Schleiermacher’s translation of the works of Plato.  The first volume of these translations was released in 1804 and continued his whole life (he was born in 1768 and died in 1834).  In addition to the translations,  Schleiermacher wrote introductory essays to the dialogues and the word ‘Neoplatonism’, according to ChatGPT, first appears in one of these essays.  This seems plausible to me.  Fortunately, some reprint houses have collected Schleiermacher’s introductory essays on the dialogues of Plato, translated into English, at a cheap price so I will be able to see for myself how it is used in that context.  (As an aside, I’m aware that ChatGPT isn’t always accurate in its responses to questions and for that reason I regard the Schleiermacher attribution tentative.)

I realized that if it was in Germany that the usage of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ first appeared, then perhaps I should ask AI questions using the German word.  When I did this two additional candidates for first usage came up (the German word is ‘Neuplatonismus’).  The first was Karl Friedrich Hermann who wrote ‘History und System der Platonischen Philosophie’ (History and System of Platonic Philosophy) in 1839.  The second was Heinrich von Stein who wrote ‘Sieben Bucher zur Geschichte des Platonismus’ (Seven Books on the History of Platonism) in 1864.  Laid out chronologically:

1804    Schleiermacher

1839    Karl Friedrich Hermann

1864    Heinrich von Stein

The conclusion seems to be that the use of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ appeared in Germany in the early 19^th century and likely spread from there.  German philosophy was very influential at that time, even in England where the British Idealists were emerging.  I find it remarkable to see how rapidly this reconfiguration of the history of Platonism spread.

Perhaps I’m being a bit obsessive regarding the history of the word ‘Neoplatonism.’  My feeling about the word is that it distorts both the history of Platonism and makes it more difficult to understand the continuities of Platonism over the centuries.  I often hear (on Youtube, for example) that “Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism.”  The statement is a great distortion of the Platonic tradition as a whole, and of Plotinus in particular.  There is probably nothing that can be done to undermine its usage at this time; on the other hand, there are examples of well-known Platonists who have rejected the use of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ so I’m not the only one who finds the word problematic. 

4.  I have tended to think of Platonism as outside of the non-dual versus dual discussions; my feeling has been that Platonism could be interpreted from a non-dual perspective because the One is the only thing that is truly real (keeping in mind that the One is not actually a thing).  On the other hand, Platonism could be thought of as dualistic because the One is understood in Platonism as transcendental to, and beyond, any material manifestations.  My feeling has been that the non-dual versus dual debate arose in an Indian context and because of this the distinction doesn’t really apply to Platonism.

But I’m beginning to think of Platonism as a dualistic system along the lines of classical Yoga.  As readers of this blog know, I have the view that Platonism is closer to the Dharma teachings of India than it is to contemporary Western philosophy.  Because I have a decades long background in Buddhism my tendency has been to compare Platonism to Buddhism; I do this almost automatically because of my long-term studies of Buddhism; that is to say, I have a tendency to interpret Platonism through a Buddhist lens.

But lately I have been thinking that Platonism is closer to Classical Yoga than it is to Buddhism.  First, Platonism does not have the view of emptiness that is so important a part of the Buddhadharma.  In Platonism, things are not viewed as empty, rather things are understood to be emanations from the transcendental source, and because of this, things can function as a door to higher realities such as the noetic and the One.  I’m not sure if this aligns with classical Yoga; my sense is that in some ways it does and in other ways it doesn’t.  The two traditions align in that they don’t see things as empty in the way Buddhism does, but I’m not sure how Yoga would view the Platonic view that things are emanated from a primal source.  More study is needed on my part to clarify this.

Second; closely related to the above mentioned view of emptiness is that both Classical Yoga and Platonism accept the reality of the soul.  In contrast, Buddhism has the view of no-soul (anatman/anatta).  For me personally, my awakening to the reality of soul was pivotal in moving away from a Buddhist analysis.  How Classical Yoga and Platonism interpret the soul does seem to differ on a number of points.  Platonism seems to include a large number of what moderns might consider mental functions, such as reason, as part of soul, whereas Classical Yoga tends to separate those functions from soul and place them in mind.  This is a complex subject, one that is worth investigating, but it remains the case that both Platonism and Classical Yoga are very concerned with the nature of soul.

Third, both classical Yoga and classical (ancient) Platonism are ascetic traditions and both of these traditions see asceticism as causally necessary for walking their respective spiritual paths.  This is a significant commonality between the two traditions.  I also think that both traditions do not view asceticism as merely instrumental; rather asceticism aligns the soul of the practitioner with the nature of the transcendental.

Another perspective shared by Platonism and Yoga is that they both regard the transcendental, or the ultimate, as beyond, or prior to, mental formations such as thoughts, feelings, emotions, memories, dreams, tendencies, hopes, habits, fears, and so forth.  This contrasts with modern Western Philosophical traditions which tend to understand their task as clarifying thoughts as to their meaning and their implications (this is especially strong in the analytic tradition). 

A difference between Classical Yoga and Platonism is that Classical Yoga doesn’t talk about a noetic dimension which in Platonism plays a significant role.  The noetic reality is why numbers, which reside in the noetic hypostasis, or level of reality, are a meaningful presence, and in Platonism have spiritual implications.  I don’t get the impression that numbers, and other noetic realities, are of concern to Classical Yoga.

5.  Plato walks into a bar and orders a non-alcoholic beer.  He sits down at a table.  An ancient woman of youthful beauty joins Plato and also orders a non-alcoholic beer.  Plato greets Athena and asks her what she’s been doing the last thousand years.  Athena laughs and says she has been in contemplation.  “I’ve had plenty of time for contemplation since the great vanishing of the temples.”  Plato laughed.

The bar turns into the portico of an Academy dedicated to teaching those who love wisdom.  “Shall we join them?” Plato asks.  “Why not?  Let’s find out what the youngsters are saying these days.”

 

 

A Few Notes on Vegetarianism in the Platonic Tradition after Reading Plutarch

6 April 2024

A Few Notes on Vegetarianism in the Platonic Tradition after Reading Plutarch

1.  I just read The Eating of Flesh I and II in the Loeb Edition, Volume XII, of Plutarch’s Moralia.  I had wanted to read it for a long time because I was interested in what a Middle Platonist might say about vegetarianism and how it compared to Porphyry’s long work On Abstaining from Killing Animals and his Letter to Anebo.  Plutarch lived from 46 to 119 C.E.  Porphyry lived from 234 to 305 C.E.  So they are about two centuries apart. 

2.  The Plutarch essays are in a highly fragmentary condition, which is unfortunate.  It is not possible to ascertain how long they originally were and it is likely that some significant observations are missing.  (I’m not sure if there is recent scholarship on if some missing parts of the essay might have been quoted in other classical sources.)  But it does indicate that a Platonist from Plutarch’s time was also a passionate advocate for philosophical vegetarianism.  (Note: It’s not clear if vegetarians in the Classical period might have been vegans; there is some evidence that Plotinus might have had that commitment.  But it does not seem that a differentiation between the two was operative at that time.  Because of this I will use the term ‘vegetarian’ in talking about the classical tradition.)

3.  In some ways Plutarch’s writing resembles Porphyry.  For example, both of them present a mythic history of why people started eating meat, alleging that it must have been due to some great disaster.  Both of them are committed to the idea that vegetarianism was the original diet of human beings.

4.  In Porphyry there is an emphasis on the idea that abandoning killing animals for food or sacrifice is necessary for a philosopher.  But Porphyry exempts ordinary non-philosophers from such commitments.  It appears that Plutarch does not make such a distinction.  Plutarch writes, “Note that the eating of flesh is not only physically against nature, but it also makes us spiritually coarse and gross by reason of satiety and surfeit.  For wine and indulgence in meat make the body strong and vigorous, but the soul weak.” (page 555) Platonism cultivates the soul, and places that above cultivating the body; hence Plutarch reaches this conclusion.

Modern vegetarians would not agree that their diet makes the body weak.  I’m not sure, but this idea might be due to the specific vegetarian diet that was eaten in the Classical Period.  I have not run into the specifics of such a diet, meaning I have not run into what classical vegetarians recommended for eating as distinct from what they excluded.  On the other hand, this idea might be just a common prejudice.

4.1  A friend suggested that what Plutarch is getting at is that eating meat makes the body 'unruly' and what we might call 'out of control.'  Eating meat is a kind of drug addiction from this perspective.  In addition, there is evidence in the Dialogues that a vegan diet was known.  That would explain why Plotinus had what we would call 'vegan' commitments.  

5.  Plutarch was very interested in history and refers to Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, as well as Xenocrates and others. 

6.  Plutarch argues that vegetarianism has moral implications that, if widely adopted, will, for example, increase social responsibility.  “But apart from these considerations (of eating meat being ‘against nature’), do you not find here a wonderful training in social responsibility?  Who could wrong a human being when he found himself so gently and humanely disposed toward non-human creatures?” (page 559) 

7.  Plutarch imputes to Empedocles the idea “. . . though he (Empedocles) does not say so directly, that human souls are imprisoned in mortal bodies as a punishment for murder, the eating of animal flesh, and cannibalism.  This doctrine, however, seems to be even older, for the stories told about the sufferings and dismemberment of Dionysus and the outrageous assaults of the Titans upon him, and their punishment and blasting by thunderbolt after they had tasted his blood – all this is a myth which in its inner meaning has to do with rebirth.” (page 559)  In this way Plutarch draws on older sources and myths to support his own vegetarian views.

8.  Plutarch was, I understand, a Priest at Delphi for part of his life.  I would liked to have read about Plutarch’s practice of vegetarianism in that context.  I know very little about practices at Delphi but I am aware that animal sacrifice was standard for Classical Pagan religion.  But perhaps Delphi was different from the norm?  Or perhaps those in charge of Delphi granted Plutarch an exemption?  This is not clear.

9.  In the second part, the surviving fragments emphasize purification.  “. . . nor is it easy to extract the hook of flesh-eating, entangled as it is and embedded in the love of pleasure . . . it would be well for us to excise our own gluttony and lust to kill and become pure for the remainder of our lives . . . “ (page 563)

10.  Plutarch has a deep disgust for the particulars of animal slaughter in a way that reminds me of contemporary critics of ‘factory farming.’ 

11.  There is a strong continuity in the teaching of vegetarianism in both the Platonic and Pre-Platonic traditions, particularly those traditions that Plato refers to as predecessors of what would become Platonism.  I mean, of course, Pythagoreanism and Orphism.  It’s not that every single philosopher was a vegetarian; rather it is that vegetarianism was of central concern to philosophers in general and Platonism in particular.  There were multiple reasons for this, but the primary reason appears to have been that philosophical practice is dulled, and the soul is harmed, by eating meat and sacrificing animals. 

I believe this view is as significant today for Platonism as it was for the tradition during the Classical Period.  It would be useful to bring all the sources that remain from these traditions together as a kind of reference for the student of philosophy so that the student won’t have to go through multiple volumes to find out the particulars of the discussion.

12.  There is one more essay on Vegetarianism by Plutarch, in Volume 15, that I haven’t read yet.  When I have an opportunity to do so, I will write about it here.