13 April 2026
Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92
1. The First Principle’s Presence
“Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.”
(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, Second Edition, edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 582, ISBN: 978009604970)
“. . . all [things are] imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.”
(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, That Which is after the First, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 143, ISBN: 9780674994898)
“. . . all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.”
“Plotinus, The Enneads, Enneads 5.4.1, The Secondaries and the First, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 461, ISBN: 978943914558)
1.1 There are single sentences in Plotinus that are exquisite, filled with meaning and beauty. This is one of those sentences.
1.2 In the clause closing the sentence before the one quoted Plotinus refers to fire warming things, to snow cooling things. And then he moves into a generalization from this observation to an insight about ‘all things’. That insight is that all things are imitating the nature of the ultimate in accordance with their specific, limited, nature.
How are things imitating ultimate nature? By generation, by productive activity. Fire is hot and the heat of fire produces warmth in objects that are near it. Snow is cold and the coldness of snow cools those things close to it. I take these to be analogies to how The One overflows and creates, emanates, generates, the world. When looked at in this way we can sense the presence of the One even in ordinary material things. This brings the highest metaphysics of Plotinus down to the material realm so that the material realm is not isolated, or separate from, the transcendental. The transcendental and the material are not the same, but they are related in a manner that, once recognized, assists the philosopher in his journey of ascent to the Good and the One.
1.3 I view the phrase ‘eternity and goodness’ as a way of saying the One and the Good. Here I would say that ‘eternity’ is a way of speaking about the One. The One is ultimately ineffable, but there are names for the One that are used to communicate with each other about this transcendental reality.
Frequently in the Enneads ‘eternity’ or ‘the eternal’ is used to refer to the noetic, the second hypostasis, rather than the One. It is not unusual for Plotinus to use terms that subtly change their meaning depending on which level, or hypostasis, Plotinus is referring to. And Plotinus does not always signal a shift of meaning of this kind. As a reader becomes more familiar with how Plotinus makes these shifts the reader becomes more tuned in to when that happens.
1.4 It is possible to interpret ‘eternity and goodness’ as meaning that everything imitates the noetic forms that are the source of particular things, and following that imitates the ultimate through generous creativity, or goodness. I can understand this kind of interpretation because it elegantly encapsulates the three levels of existence, or hypostases, starting with material things, then rising to the noetic, and then rising further to the transcendental Good.
But Armstrong’s translation leans towards seeing this phrase as another way of expressing the One and the Good. Armstrong translates that all things are imitating the First Principle and Armstrong does not distinguish between everlastingness and generosity as to their level, which hypostasis they reside in; suggesting that both are ways of talking about the ineffable, the transcendental.
MacKenna seems to be making the same point when he says that all things are imitating the ‘Source.’ The ultimate source is the ineffable One. I don’t read MacKenna as saying that ‘eternity’ and ‘service’ represent names for different hypostases.
It may be the case that Plotinus is compressing multiple meanings in this sentence and that reading eternity as referring to the noetic is one reading Plotinus had in mind, while reading eternity as another way of talking about the ineffable is another reading. Multiple meanings are not unusual in Plotinus (or Plato) so it would not surprise me if this is the case here.
1.5 Ennead 3.7, Eternity and Time, deals with how Plotinus understands the relationship between these two realities. Plotinus unpacks his understanding of eternity and time in a way that at first seems complex, but after a second or third reading it comes into clearer focus. Here is a quote from Ennead III.7 that I think is relevant to the quote from Ennead 5.4:
“What, then, should we say eternity is? That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the entire heaven, that is, the cosmos? For they [the Pythagoreans – translator’s footnote] say that some hold this latter belief about time. For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them. And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.
“But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ [Timaeus 37D3 – translator’s footnote] – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it. But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity. For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other. And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.”
(Gerson, see above, page 337)
Here is the passage from Timaeus, 37D3, that the translator referenced in a footnote:
“Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten. And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”
(Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper; Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, page 1241, ISBN: 9780872203495)
I see the quote from Ennead 3.7 as indicating that Plotinus does not consider the intelligible, or the noetic, and eternity to be the same. Eternity is present to the intelligible, but I would say that eternity comes before the intelligible. I suggest this because the intelligible, that is to say noetic realities, arise due to differentiation, and the eternal is before differentiation. When the eternal is subject to differentiation, we get the moving image of eternity that is time.
Eternity and the noetic are intimately related and because of that noetic objects are eternal; but the eternity of noetic objects (which, tellingly, Whitehead refers to as eternal objects) is due to proximity to the One. Eternity is another way of saying Unity. The unity of noetic objects is also due to their proximity to the One, and to their proximity to the Eternal.
1.6 The place that eternity holds in Platonism is a difficult topic. It is not easy to sift through what Plotinus says about this and because of that difficulty people can come to different conclusions. Some have said that the One is beyond eternity just as the One is beyond being. But the One is also beyond Unity, beyond the One. As Plotinus writes, whatever anyone says about the One falls short of its actuality, for the One is even beyond actuality. In other words, I agree that what is ultimate transcends eternity, but I think there are good reasons to think of ‘eternity’ as a useful name for that which transcends name and form.
And, to be honest, I think that Plotinus does use ‘eternity’ as another name for the One; now and then, not always. Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, Plotinus uses eternity, or the eternal, when referring to noetic realities, the intelligibles. But just as Plotinus will use terms like unity to refer to noetic realities as well as the unity of the One, so also Plotinus will skillfully unpack eternity in ways that depend on the level of reality, or hypostasis, that is being referred to.
1.7 All of the writings of Plotinus are based on his experiences of the noetic and the transcendental (the intelligible and the One). Reaching out across the chasm that separates the material world from that which is incorporeal, Plotinus illuminates that which is eternal by proximity, and that which is eternal remaining in unity.
2. Stages of the Practice of Ethical Restraint
There is not a lot of writing about ethical restraint in the Platonist tradition or in how ethical restraint is presented in the Dialogues of Plato. But restraint is discussed outside of this context, and surprisingly it is usually in a therapeutic context, often centered on addiction. In this kind of literature ‘restraint’ has a practical focus on how someone can actually overcome the sensory, and sensual, thing(s) that seem to control their lives. Often there is a three stage presentation of how restraint works:
The first stage is avoidance. Sometimes the expression ‘just don’t go there’ is used; as in an alcoholic should just not go to a bar, or to a party where alcohol is served. This has application to a large variety of situations where people are trying to overcome the seductions of the senses.
The second stage is sometimes called ‘self-command.’ This is learning how to make initial steps in internalizing effective resistance to sensory seductions. A lot of literature is centered on this second stage and the authors of these works offer simple means for reminding the person on the path of renunciation (in a lay and secular context) is helped because most of these suggestions are internal reminders, sometimes prayers, that serve to deflect the seduction of the senses when it appears. It might be as simple as ‘day after day I will reject alcohol.’ Or it might be simpler, ‘I reject alcohol.’ Or it might be longer such as the much used Serenity Prayer. The Serenity Prayer might be condensed to the person saying ‘courage’ in their mind to remind them to pull away from what is tempting them.
This second stage is a kind of internal civil war where old and powerful habits are being contested by a new perspective. This conflict between the older way of life with the possibility of a new way of life can become intense. These internalized sayings, or prayers, are reminders that the individual wants to move into a new situation and wants to give up on habits that are self-destructive.
The third stage is sometimes called ‘mastery’ but I prefer the term ‘stability’ meaning that the change to a new way of living has stabilized and the internal civil war is basically over. There is a greater sense of calm and also a feeling of accomplishment. Of course it is always possible to slide back into old habits and for that reason the practices of the second stage remain a part of the person’s inner life.
I don’t recall in Platonist literature this kind of analysis where the stages of renunciation are discussed; it might be in the literature somewhere, but I don’t recall running across it. My feeling is that this kind of information would be something that would be discussed between teacher and student rather than being the topic of an essay; or at least it looks that way to me.
In the Platonist literature there is some indication that people did fall away from the practices of ethical restraint. For example, in the opening section of Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry writes to Firmus, a friend of Porphyry’s, that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has fallen away from vegetarianism and returned to eating meat. Porphyry views this as Firmus having given up on the Way of Philosophy and is writing to Firmus to encourage him to return to a philosophical life, a vegetarian life.
This kind of falling away is common; it happens to many people. Overcoming sensual seductions, even when a person knows that succumbing to them is unhealthy and damaging to themselves and others, is not easy. Knowing this, one can be sympathetic. The important thing is to encourage the individual who has fallen away from their renunciation practice to try again. It may take many tries. But that’s OK. Just keep trying and eventually the new way of life will establish itself, stabilize itself.
3. William Lane Craig
William Lane Craig is a Protestant Christian Apologist. Craig has a large following. Craig has studied philosophy extensively and is familiar with contemporary approaches to philosophy. Craig is familiar with logic and modern modes of analysis from the analytic tradition (a surprising number of Christian apologists use tools from the analytic tradition in their work). Craig is an effective apologist for his tradition.
Craig has written one book (“God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism”), and posted several videos, where he criticizes adopting Platonist metaphysics in the Christian tradition (this is more common in the Protestant tradition than it is in Catholicism or Orthodoxy). Craig is aware of the influence that Platonism has had on Christianity, but Craig thinks that the Platonic influence undermines Christianity in significant ways.
If I understand Craig correctly, Craig is disturbed by the way Plato talks about intelligibles, or noetic objects, also known as eternal objects. Craig refers to these as ‘forms’ which is a standard usage. Craig’s understanding of Platonic forms is that they are eternal and unchanging; that’s true, I mean that the forms are understood to be that way in Platonism. But Craig argues that this undermines the uniqueness of God because being eternal and unchanging are characteristics of God that are considered by Craig in the exegetical tradition he grows out of, to be unique characteristics of God. It follows that this undermines the independence and uniqueness of God because there are other things in the cosmos that share at least some of the attributes of God.
Craig offers that a way of resolving this, which Craig argues is something that at least some Christian Platonists took, is to reconfigure the forms as ‘ideas in the mind of God.’ I think Craig is right that this is a way that Christians can retain a sense of the noetic while at the same time arguing for the uniqueness, the divine aseity, of God. However, according to some histories of Platonism I have read, the view that Platonic forms are ideas in the mind of God was put forward in a Platonist context among the Middle Platonists and was likely absorbed into Christianity from those resources.
Personally, I prefer a more traditional way of viewing the forms; that the forms are emanations of the One, of the fully transcendental, of God. The difference between the forms and the One is that the forms are differentiated from each other whereas the One is undifferentiated unity that is beyond differentiation, before differentiation. If you want to understand the presence of differentiation in the forms, consider that the eternity of the forms differentiates them from all that is ephemeral. In addition, forms are differentiated from each other, but at the same time fully transparent to each other.
The view that forms are ideas in the mind of God collapses the noetic realm into the realm of that which is ultimate; in this case God. From this perspective, the three hypostases now become two and the noetic realm of forms disappears.
I think that Craig thinks of God as having characteristics which is standard Christian theology; with the exception of some Christian mysticism. In contrast the One is beyond characteristics and beyond being. The One is beyond affirmation and negation, whereas the forms do have characteristics and traits.
The discussion between Christianity and Platonism has been going on for two thousand years. The discussion has a dialectical feel to it in the sense that both sides are committed to uncovering metaphysical truth. I think the differences between the two traditions is a kind of creative, fire producing, light giving, presence that has led participants to focus on certain issues intensely. I think that is a good thing.
(As an aside, when I say these kinds of discussions have a long history, a good example of this centered on a treatise written by Proclus called On the Eternity of the World. It contains eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world. It is my personal favorite of the works of Proclus. This work was disliked by Christians because Christians have the view that the world was created by God and will end at some point in the future as part of God’s plan. From this perspective the world is not eternal. In response to this treatise of Proclus, a Christian writer, Philoponus, wrote a critique of this work by Proclus titled Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World. I think I have mentioned this before on this blog, but it has been a while and I think it fits in with the discussion about William Lane Craig. The dispute between Proclus and Philoponus is not exactly the same point of divine aseity, but both of them are engaged in distinguishing Christianity from Platonism; and I think the points they raise are related.)
4. Haiku
The sound of spring wind
