Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 103

3 August 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 103

1.  Lloyd Gerson on Proclus

Lloyd Gerson has published his analysis of Proclus in his latest book, The Platonism of Proclus.  Its release date is not specified, but it looks like it will be some time this year.  It’s interesting to me that, according to the write-up on the book on Amazon, Gerson approaches Proclus through the commentaries that Proclus wrote on various Platonic dialogues.  According to the write-up there are about 3,000 pages of portions of these dialogues that have survived.

The choice Gerson has made to base his study of Proclus on these commentaries, instead of works like The Elements of Theology or Platonic Theology is unusual; at least as far as I have observed there is a tendency to focus on these kinds of works in contemporary scholarship on Proclus, though I might be wrong about that.  This shift in focus will, I think, generate a ‘different’ Proclus than the one who emerges from reading works like the Elements.

I’m not a fan of Proclus, but I am a big fan of Gerson.  I look forward to reading Gerson’s book on Proclus and finding out how Gerson interprets Proclus.

2.  Transcendence

There is a YouTube channel that I listen to now and then.  The presenter has studied the Dialogues of Plato thoroughly and can easily refer to them and often paraphrases key passages.  The presenter is focused on political philosophy and interprets Plato in the tradition of Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, and Alexander Dugan, among others.  His understanding of Plato’s philosophy is that Plato is primarily a political philosopher and he doesn’t really go into other aspects of Platonism.

When listening to one of his recent talks I became aware of how he uses the word ‘transcendence.’  He used the word frequently in this particular talk so I got a good sample of how he understands ‘transcendence.’  When he used the word transcendence what he meant was moving from a limited context to more encompassing context; meaning that when you shift your understanding from a more limited view to a less limited view you are ‘transcending’ the limited view or understanding. 

This is how he maintains his focus on Plato as a political philosopher (and I wonder if others who maintain this idea also use ‘transcendence’ in this way; I’ll have to listen to them to see if it is a general pattern).  So even when Platonist writings speak of the transcendental he interprets that in worldly terms. 

This is not unusual; many people use the word ‘transcendence’ in this way.  Carl Jung uses it that way.  And I once heard a recording of a talk by Roger Scruton in which he used the word in exactly that way which kind of surprised me. 

You might think of this way of understanding transcendence as ‘horizontal’, like shifting focus from a small forest grove to the forest as a whole; something like that.  Or, perhaps, shifting one’s focus from a particular symphony to the symphonic tradition as a whole.  Like I said, it’s a common way of understanding what ‘transcendence’ means.

But in Platonism transcendence is ‘vertical’; to transcend means to leave behind material reality as the focus of one’s attention.  This is done by turning away from sensory stimulation, whether pleasurable, painful, or neither pleasurable nor painful.  It is the practice of the asceses that trains us to engage in such turning away.

Transcendence in Platonism is not aimed at a larger context; it is aimed at the experience of the ineffable (which is prior to all contexts) rather than a more convincing explanation of some aspect of reality or mental formulation.  The Good and the One are ineffable; as Plotinus points out the Good is not good.  We call it the Good, as a kind of stand-in for its actual reality which is beyond affirmation or negation and beyond conceptualization. 

I think this is difficult for people to understand.  The contemplation of the ineffable is simple, but it is, at first, difficult to recognize, and difficult to stabilize.  But that is the reality of transcendence that Platonism asks of us.

3.  Hidden Heritage

I listened the other day to another person who wants to merge Platonism with Buddhist Tantra.  Naturally they think of theurgy as the culmination of Platonism and draw upon the authors who wrote from a theurgic perspective and then attempt to show significant similarities between Theurgy and Tantra (usually Tibetan Buddhist Tantra, but they sometimes make brief references to Shaivism and its Tantric manifestations as well).

What came to mind after listening to the presentation is the idea that Platonism is, in a sense, a hidden heritage.  By that I mean that for over one thousand years, Platonism was embedded in other spiritual traditions who interpreted Platonism as insufficient on its own terms and needed something additional in order to be complete; this additional something was supplied by the non-Platonist tradition.  Christianity was the most successful among those traditions that took this approach.

When I say that Platonism is a ‘hidden heritage’ I mean that Platonism as a sufficient spiritual tradition that does not need supersessionist assistance.  What I am intuiting is that contemporary theurgy is replicating this context by arguing that wisdom is insufficient for the divine ascent and that therefore carefully crafted rituals (some of which can violate, or at least undermine, basic Platonist ethics) is essential.  It’s like the centuries long habit of having Platonism embedded in other spiritual contexts is internalized, but instead of using Christianity, they use theurgy.

This is just an intuition, but it arises out of my reading of theurgic works both ancient and modern and being impressed by how casually ceremonial efficacy is substituted for wisdom. 

3.1  Rereading this, it came to me that perhaps I mean something more like a ‘hidden hermitage’ than ‘hidden heritage’.  The two aren’t contradictory, but I think the image of Platonism as a hidden hermitage leads in nourishing directions.  Platonism is about turning away from, or turning around (periogoge, apostrophe).  It is a turning away from basing one’s life on sensory gratification and fulfilling pleasures.  It is a turning towards soul and its presence and following its guidance to the One.  It is a turning away from the unsatisfactory nature of material existence to the serenity of the hermitage of the transcendental.

3.2  Rereading this again, I think what I posted could be construed as asserting that Platonism, or Orthodox Platonism, to use Gerson’s phrase, is in some way sealed off from interacting with other traditions.  That isn’t what I am getting at.  What I am getting at is that a tradition like Buddhism does not normally think of its tradition as needing ‘completion’ by following, say for example, Confucianism.  Imagine if East Asian Buddhism elevated the teachings of Confucius above, or over, those of the Buddhist tradition itself.  I’m not saying that East Asian Buddhism was not influenced by Confucianism, I’m pointing out that the relationship between East Asian Buddhism and Confucianism was not one of supersessionism.  In contrast, the Platonic tradition has been in a relationship with other spiritual traditions in exactly that way, primarily through the way traditions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have placed Platonism in a ‘handmaid’ role.  It is my view that Theurgy does exactly the same thing to Platonism and that the move that Theurgy makes vis a vis Platonism is structurally the same as other spiritual traditions; that is to say the Theurgic tradition's relationship to traditional, or Orthodox Platonism, is that of supersessionism.

What I think is needed is for Platonism to become confident of itself in the sense that Platonism is a complete spiritual tradition with the insights and resources to function as a guide for spiritual understanding, transcendence, and awakening to the presence of eternity. 

4.  Natural

There is a section in Laws, Book X, beginning about 891c, where Plato discusses first principles.  Plato contrasts those who think of first principles as found in nature with those who think of first principles as transcendental.  Plato begins by referring to those who consider fire, water, earth, and air are the first principles.

This reminded me of the discussion in Phaedo where Socrates talks about how he was, as a young man, initially attracted to Anaxagoras, but was disappointed by Anaxagoras’s material explanations of causation (even though Anaxagoras seemed, when Socrates first encountered him, to place Mind as a first principle).  In Laws Plato points out that those who think of the elementals as first principles argue that soul is derivative of the elementals.  The Platonist view is that soul precedes elementals and material realities, that the immaterial precedes the material, and is the foundation for that which is material.  You can read modern philosophers such as Bernardo Kastrup arguing the same thing (I’m not saying that Kastrup is a Platonist). 

The more I read and reread Plato I find these kinds of connections between dialogues.  I sometimes like to say that Plato’s Dialogues are actually a single book with each dialogue being a chapter; one reason I say this is because of the way insights and themes are revisited, expanded, sometimes amended.  This offers the sense that the reader is sharing in the unfolding thoughts of Plato over time, even when Plato is talking about the timeless.  I find that feeling very inviting.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

13 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

1.  The First Principle’s Presence

“Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, Second Edition, edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 582, ISBN: 978009604970)

“. . . all [things are] imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, That Which is after the First, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 143, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“. . . all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.”

“Plotinus, The Enneads, Enneads 5.4.1, The Secondaries and the First, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 461, ISBN: 978943914558)

1.1  There are single sentences in Plotinus that are exquisite, filled with meaning and beauty.  This is one of those sentences.

1.2  In the clause closing the sentence before the one quoted Plotinus refers to fire warming things, to snow cooling things.  And then he moves into a generalization from this observation to an insight about ‘all things’.  That insight is that all things are imitating the nature of the ultimate in accordance with their specific, limited, nature. 

How are things imitating ultimate nature?  By generation, by productive activity.  Fire is hot and the heat of fire produces warmth in objects that are near it.  Snow is cold and the coldness of snow cools those things close to it.  I take these to be analogies to how The One overflows and creates, emanates, generates, the world.  When looked at in this way we can sense the presence of the One even in ordinary material things.  This brings the highest metaphysics of Plotinus down to the material realm so that the material realm is not isolated, or separate from, the transcendental.  The transcendental and the material are not the same, but they are related in a manner that, once recognized, assists the philosopher in his journey of ascent to the Good and the One.

1.3  I view the phrase ‘eternity and goodness’ as a way of saying the One and the Good.  Here I would say that ‘eternity’ is a way of speaking about the One.  The One is ultimately ineffable, but there are names for the One that are used to communicate with each other about this transcendental reality.

Frequently in the Enneads ‘eternity’ or ‘the eternal’ is used to refer to the noetic, the second hypostasis, rather than the One.  It is not unusual for Plotinus to use terms that subtly change their meaning depending on which level, or hypostasis, Plotinus is referring to.  And Plotinus does not always signal a shift of meaning of this kind.  As a reader becomes more familiar with how Plotinus makes these shifts the reader becomes more tuned in to when that happens.

1.4  It is possible to interpret ‘eternity and goodness’ as meaning that everything imitates the noetic forms that are the source of particular things, and following that imitates the ultimate through generous creativity, or goodness.  I can understand this kind of interpretation because it elegantly encapsulates the three levels of existence, or hypostases, starting with material things, then rising to the noetic, and then rising further to the transcendental Good. 

But Armstrong’s translation leans towards seeing this phrase as another way of expressing the One and the Good.  Armstrong translates that all things are imitating the First Principle and Armstrong does not distinguish between everlastingness and generosity as to their level, which hypostasis they reside in; suggesting that both are ways of talking about the ineffable, the transcendental.

MacKenna seems to be making the same point when he says that all things are imitating the ‘Source.’  The ultimate source is the ineffable One.  I don’t read MacKenna as saying that ‘eternity’ and ‘service’ represent names for different hypostases.

It may be the case that Plotinus is compressing multiple meanings in this sentence and that reading eternity as referring to the noetic is one reading Plotinus had in mind, while reading eternity as another way of talking about the ineffable is another reading.  Multiple meanings are not unusual in Plotinus (or Plato) so it would not surprise me if this is the case here.

1.5  Ennead 3.7, Eternity and Time, deals with how Plotinus understands the relationship between these two realities.  Plotinus unpacks his understanding of eternity and time in a way that at first seems complex, but after a second or third reading it comes into clearer focus.  Here is a quote from Ennead III.7 that I think is relevant to the quote from Ennead 5.4:

“What, then, should we say eternity is?  That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the entire heaven, that is, the cosmos?  For they [the Pythagoreans – translator’s footnote] say that some hold this latter belief about time.  For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them.  And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.

“But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ [Timaeus 37D3 – translator’s footnote] – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it.  But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity.  For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other.  And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.”

(Gerson, see above, page 337)

Here is the passage from Timaeus, 37D3, that the translator referenced in a footnote:

“Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper; Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, page 1241, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see the quote from Ennead 3.7 as indicating that Plotinus does not consider the intelligible, or the noetic, and eternity to be the same.  Eternity is present to the intelligible, but I would say that eternity comes before the intelligible.  I suggest this because the intelligible, that is to say noetic realities, arise due to differentiation, and the eternal is before differentiation.  When the eternal is subject to differentiation, we get the moving image of eternity that is time.

Eternity and the noetic are intimately related and because of that noetic objects are eternal; but the eternity of noetic objects (which, tellingly, Whitehead refers to as eternal objects) is due to proximity to the One.  Eternity is another way of saying Unity.  The unity of noetic objects is also due to their proximity to the One, and to their proximity to the Eternal. 

1.6  The place that eternity holds in Platonism is a difficult topic.  It is not easy to sift through what Plotinus says about this and because of that difficulty people can come to different conclusions.  Some have said that the One is beyond eternity just as the One is beyond being.  But the One is also beyond Unity, beyond the One.  As Plotinus writes, whatever anyone says about the One falls short of its actuality, for the One is even beyond actuality.  In other words, I agree that what is ultimate transcends eternity, but I think there are good reasons to think of ‘eternity’ as a useful name for that which transcends name and form.

And, to be honest, I think that Plotinus does use ‘eternity’ as another name for the One; now and then, not always.  Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, Plotinus uses eternity, or the eternal, when referring to noetic realities, the intelligibles.  But just as Plotinus will use terms like unity to refer to noetic realities as well as the unity of the One, so also Plotinus will skillfully unpack eternity in ways that depend on the level of reality, or hypostasis, that is being referred to.

1.7  All of the writings of Plotinus are based on his experiences of the noetic and the transcendental (the intelligible and the One).  Reaching out across the chasm that separates the material world from that which is incorporeal, Plotinus illuminates that which is eternal by proximity, and that which is eternal remaining in unity.

2.  Stages of the Practice of Ethical Restraint

There is not a lot of writing about ethical restraint in the Platonist tradition or in how ethical restraint is presented in the Dialogues of Plato.  But restraint is discussed outside of this context, and surprisingly it is usually in a therapeutic context, often centered on addiction.  In this kind of literature ‘restraint’ has a practical focus on how someone can actually overcome the sensory, and sensual, thing(s) that seem to control their lives.  Often there is a three stage presentation of how restraint works:

The first stage is avoidance.  Sometimes the expression ‘just don’t go there’ is used; as in an alcoholic should just not go to a bar, or to a party where alcohol is served.  This has application to a large variety of situations where people are trying to overcome the seductions of the senses.

The second stage is sometimes called ‘self-command.’  This is learning how to make initial steps in internalizing effective resistance to sensory seductions.  A lot of literature is centered on this second stage and the authors of these works offer simple means for reminding the person on the path of renunciation (in a lay and secular context) is helped because most of these suggestions are internal reminders, sometimes prayers, that serve to deflect the seduction of the senses when it appears.  It might be as simple as ‘day after day I will reject alcohol.’  Or it might be simpler, ‘I reject alcohol.’  Or it might be longer such as the much used Serenity Prayer.  The Serenity Prayer might be condensed to the person saying ‘courage’ in their mind to remind them to pull away from what is tempting them.

This second stage is a kind of internal civil war where old and powerful habits are being contested by a new perspective.  This conflict between the older way of life with the possibility of a new way of life can become intense.  These internalized sayings, or prayers, are reminders that the individual wants to move into a new situation and wants to give up on habits that are self-destructive.

The third stage is sometimes called ‘mastery’ but I prefer the term ‘stability’ meaning that the change to a new way of living has stabilized and the internal civil war is basically over.  There is a greater sense of calm and also a feeling of accomplishment.  Of course it is always possible to slide back into old habits and for that reason the practices of the second stage remain a part of the person’s inner life.

I don’t recall in Platonist literature this kind of analysis where the stages of renunciation are discussed; it might be in the literature somewhere, but I don’t recall running across it.  My feeling is that this kind of information would be something that would be discussed between teacher and student rather than being the topic of an essay; or at least it looks that way to me. 

In the Platonist literature there is some indication that people did fall away from the practices of ethical restraint.  For example, in the opening section of Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry writes to Firmus, a friend of Porphyry’s, that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has fallen away from vegetarianism and returned to eating meat.  Porphyry views this as Firmus having given up on the Way of Philosophy and is writing to Firmus to encourage him to return to a philosophical life, a vegetarian life. 

This kind of falling away is common; it happens to many people.  Overcoming sensual seductions, even when a person knows that succumbing to them is unhealthy and damaging to themselves and others, is not easy.  Knowing this, one can be sympathetic.  The important thing is to encourage the individual who has fallen away from their renunciation practice to try again.  It may take many tries.  But that’s OK.  Just keep trying and eventually the new way of life will establish itself, stabilize itself.

3.  William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is a Protestant Christian Apologist.  Craig has a large following.  Craig has studied philosophy extensively and is familiar with contemporary approaches to philosophy.  Craig is familiar with logic and modern modes of analysis from the analytic tradition (a surprising number of Christian apologists use tools from the analytic tradition in their work).  Craig is an effective apologist for his tradition.

Craig has written one book (“God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism”), and posted several videos, where he criticizes adopting Platonist metaphysics in the Christian tradition (this is more common in the Protestant tradition than it is in Catholicism or Orthodoxy).  Craig is aware of the influence that Platonism has had on Christianity, but Craig thinks that the Platonic influence undermines Christianity in significant ways.

If I understand Craig correctly, Craig is disturbed by the way Plato talks about intelligibles, or noetic objects, also known as eternal objects.  Craig refers to these as ‘forms’ which is a standard usage.  Craig’s understanding of Platonic forms is that they are eternal and unchanging; that’s true, I mean that the forms are understood to be that way in Platonism.  But Craig argues that this undermines the uniqueness of God because being eternal and unchanging are characteristics of God that are considered by Craig in the exegetical tradition he grows out of, to be unique characteristics of God.  It follows that this undermines the independence and uniqueness of God because there are other things in the cosmos that share at least some of the attributes of God.

Craig offers that a way of resolving this, which Craig argues is something that at least some Christian Platonists took, is to reconfigure the forms as ‘ideas in the mind of God.’  I think Craig is right that this is a way that Christians can retain a sense of the noetic while at the same time arguing for the uniqueness, the divine aseity, of God.  However, according to some histories of Platonism I have read, the view that Platonic forms are ideas in the mind of God was put forward in a Platonist context among the Middle Platonists and was likely absorbed into Christianity from those resources.

Personally, I prefer a more traditional way of viewing the forms; that the forms are emanations of the One, of the fully transcendental, of God.  The difference between the forms and the One is that the forms are differentiated from each other whereas the One is undifferentiated unity that is beyond differentiation, before differentiation.  If you want to understand the presence of differentiation in the forms, consider that the eternity of the forms differentiates them from all that is ephemeral.  In addition, forms are differentiated from each other, but at the same time fully transparent to each other. 

The view that forms are ideas in the mind of God collapses the noetic realm into the realm of that which is ultimate; in this case God.  From this perspective, the three hypostases now become two and the noetic realm of forms disappears. 

I think that Craig thinks of God as having characteristics which is standard Christian theology; with the exception of some Christian mysticism.  In contrast the One is beyond characteristics and beyond being.  The One is beyond affirmation and negation, whereas the forms do have characteristics and traits.

The discussion between Christianity and Platonism has been going on for two thousand years.  The discussion has a dialectical feel to it in the sense that both sides are committed to uncovering metaphysical truth.  I think the differences between the two traditions is a kind of creative, fire producing, light giving, presence that has led participants to focus on certain issues intensely.  I think that is a good thing. 

(As an aside, when I say these kinds of discussions have a long history, a good example of this centered on a treatise written by Proclus called On the Eternity of the World.  It contains eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.  It is my personal favorite of the works of Proclus.  This work was disliked by Christians because Christians have the view that the world was created by God and will end at some point in the future as part of God’s plan.  From this perspective the world is not eternal.  In response to this treatise of Proclus, a Christian writer, Philoponus, wrote a critique of this work by Proclus titled Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.  I think I have mentioned this before on this blog, but it has been a while and I think it fits in with the discussion about William Lane Craig.  The dispute between Proclus and Philoponus is not exactly the same point of divine aseity, but both of them are engaged in distinguishing Christianity from Platonism; and I think the points they raise are related.)

4.  Haiku

The sound of spring wind

Isn’t the same as the sound

Of eternity.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 1

13 January 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 1

Sometimes I have thoughts about Platonism that can range from an aphorism to a short paragraph.  These thoughts often do not lead to a lengthy post or to an essay.  I thought I would share some of them and see how posting this kind of material works.  If these look worthwhile I might make these brief notes a regular feature of the blog.

1.  Ultimately Platonism is about becoming apophatic, about merging with that which is beyond name and form. 

2.  Youtube Platonism seems, with a few exceptions, to accept the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ uncritically.  My feeling is that this places Youtube Platonism at least fifty years behind academic Platonism where significant scholars are clear that the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ is a very recent invention that has no foundation.

3.  I was listening to a talk on Late Classical Platonism when the speaker said that Plotinus presented a highly ‘rational’ version of Platonism, whereas, in contrast, Proclus was more mystical.  I thought that was weird.  I have the exact opposite view; that Plotinus is a mystic and Proclus was the rationalist (I almost said ‘hyper-rationalist’).  For example, see The Elements of Theology by Proclus.  The Elements of Proclus in many ways resembles the Ethics of Spinoza as there is the same kind of systematic structure derived from geometry.  And often Spinoza is thought of as a rationalist because Spinoza considered ultimate nature to be accessible by reason.  I believe Proclus also grants access to ultimate nature to reason; Proclus does this by substituting henads for the Good and the One.

4.  Is Platonism complicated?  I think it is more accurate to say that Platonism isn’t complicated, but at least some of its insights are counterintuitive and that makes it seem complicated when we first encounter it.  And for many this feeling can last for an extended period of time.

5.  This world is full of troubles, strife, conflict, suffering, and difficulties.  Peace and serenity are very rare and do not seem to be able to establish themselves in the material world in which we dwell.  Ennead 1.4, On Well-Being is a wonderful tonic for this situation in which we find ourselves.  Just reading it recently allowed me to, once again, see past the riotous conflagrations of genesis to the realm of true peace found in the Good and the One. 

6.  Asceticism is the method for the Platonic ascent to the Good and the One.

 

  

Me and Proclus

3 December 2022

Me and Proclus

When I look at the Platonic tradition, I see two great Platonic Sages who are my primary resources and guides for walking the Platonic Path; these two are Plato and Plotinus.  What I have observed is that for many contemporary Platonists the two great Platonic Sages seem to be Plato and Proclus.  My relationship to Proclus is ambivalent.  Here are a few comments about me and Proclus:

1.  Years ago I read Proclus: An Introduction by Radek Chlup.  In this book Chlup, at times, differentiates Proclus and Plotinus.  Every time Chlup makes such a differentiation I found myself favoring Plotinus. 

2.  It’s not that I have strongly negative feelings about Proclus or that I don’t find inspiring passages in his work.  It has more to do, I think, with style and method.  Perhaps it’s unfair to compare Proclus’s style to that of Plato because at the level of literary technique Plato is simply unsurpassed.  But if I compare the style of Proclus to that of Plotinus, I find Plotinus more accessible, less analytical, or perhaps less ‘academic’ is closer to what I am getting at. 

3.  To be honest, there are secondary Platonic writers whom I turn to for insight and understanding before I turn to Proclus; I am thinking in particular of Maximus of Tyre, Porphyry, and Boethius.  Maximus wrote orations and his works were written to be understood by a public audience (as opposed to a classroom).  This gives his writing a certain charm and poise.  Regarding Porphyry, in general I think he has been underrated.  His writings have a clear grasp of the nature of virtues and purifications and the centrality of asceticism for the Platonic path that I find refreshing.  And I have written about Boethius before; I think The Consolation of Philosophy is one of the great works of the Platonic tradition, a great treasure.

4.  A long time ago, when I was diligently studying Buddhism, I spent time with Abhidhamma (particularly the Dhammasanghani) and Abhidharma (particularly the Abhidharmakosa by Vasubandhu).  In some ways I think of Proclus as Platonic Abhidharma.  There is the same emphasis on categories and their relationships, the same emphasis on completeness and definitiveness, and a consequent lessening of emphases on contemplative practice.

5.  I don’t get a sense of the centrality of asceticism when I read Proclus like I do when I read Plotinus and Porphyry.  This may be due to the fact that I haven’t read everything by Proclus, but I’m inclined to think that Proclus favored insight over way-of-life commitments and consequent purifications.

6.  My favorite book by Proclus is On the Eternity of the World.  Interestingly, this book is rarely mentioned by contemporaries rooted in a Proclean interpretation of Platonism; I don’t recall it appearing in the book by Chlup.  I found On the Eternity of the World inspiring and its emphasis on the role of love in the eternal cosmos uplifting.

7.  When I read The Elements of Theology I run into difficulties.  First, there are logical difficulties.  For example, Proclus uses an analysis of the infinite regress to refute views that are contrary to his own: That is to say that Proclus treats infinite regresses the same as a contradiction, he regards an infinite regress as a contradiction, and thinks that demonstrating that if a particular view generates an infinite regress then this is sufficient to prove that the view should be rejected.  I disagree with that, I mean that I don’t concur that an infinite regress is automatically a contradiction and is therefore grounds for rejecting a particular argument that results in an infinite regress.  In order to reject an infinite regress, it must also be demonstrated that the argument is vicious; that is to say self-referentially refuting.  That isn’t always easy to recognize or obvious, but the point is that Proclus does not make the effort to show this and I suggest that in at least some cases the infinite regress he analyzes is not vicious.  This is a big topic and I may post more about it in the future.

The second difficulty is that though Platonism uses logic, I wouldn’t say that Platonism is a logical system in the way that Euclid’s Geometry is such a system.  What I’m getting at is that Plato writes in allegories, metaphors, comparisons of all kinds, to present his vision.  It seems to me that things like allegories and metaphors, etc., are actually primary means of communicating Plato’s understanding; I say this because I think the use of logic is in the service of unpacking the allegories rather than propositional logic being explained by metaphors and allegories.  This makes sense to me because the ultimate, The One, in Platonism is beyond predication.

The third difficulty is the emphasis that Proclus places on the henads.  It’s not clear to me that the introduction of the henads into Platonic cosmology is helpful.  I mean that I do not see a lack in the tri-partite depiction of The One, The Intellect/Being, and Soul, and their unfolding and returning such that it requires the henads in order to be coherent.  In some ways the way Proclus uses the henads strikes me as an add-on.  But that may be due to a lack of my own understanding as to what Proclus is trying to accomplish.

8.  I don’t have an ax to grind.  I’m not opposed to people using Proclus as a primary Platonic resource for their own journey back to The One.  But speaking for myself, and for others I have discussed this with, I’ll continue to think of Plato and Plotinus as the two great wings of wisdom in the Platonic tradition.