Brief Notes- on Various Topics - 67

6 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 67

1.  Julian the Apostate

I read that David Litwa is translating Julian the Apostate’s Against the Galileans.  Julian (331 – 363 CE) was the last Pagan Emperor of the Roman world.  He became Emperor following a number of Christian Emperors.  Julian attempted to reestablish Pagan institutions, temples, and rituals including animal sacrifice, that is to say blood sacrifice, which Julian practiced with great enthusiasm.  Julian’s plan to reestablish Paganism failed for a variety of reasons; personally I think it was simply too late to turn back the Christian tide.  I suspect that even if Julian had lived longer he would not have been successful.

1.1  Litwa’s translation of Against the Galileans is the latest in a series of translations of Pagan critiques of Christianity translated by Litwa.  Litwa previously has translated the fragmentary remains of Celsus and Porphyry who wrote works that were highly critical of Christianity.  The translation of Julian is the third in the series.  I’ve read Litwa’s translations of Celsus and Porphyry and look forward to reading the translation of Julian.

1.2  Platonism at the time of Julian was in a difficult situation.  On the one hand, Pagan Platonism, represented by the Academy in Athens and other teaching centers such as Alexandria, was highly critical of Christianity.  On the other hand, Christian Platonism had taken root and was finding a place in the emerging Christian tradition; it is true that Christian Platonism modified the tradition, producing what I refer to as a kind of hyphenated Platonism.  But even so, Platonism was finding a home among Christian theologians, a place in the emerging new cultural context.

1.2.1  What I think is often overlooked is that the form of Pagan Platonism that was competing with Christianity at the time of Julian was Theurgic Platonism and it is my contention that Theurgic Platonism is just as hyphenated as Christian Platonism and in some ways I would argue that Theurgic Platonism was more altered than Christian Platonism.  I say this because Platonism at that time was governed by the writings of Iamblichus and in particular the critique that Iamblichus wrote of Porphyry’s commitments to refraining from killing animals either for food or for religious ritual sacrifice which Iamblichus presented in what is now called On the Mysteries. 

It is difficult to overemphasize how Iamblichus altered Platonism as a whole in order to advocate for the necessity of blood sacrifice in some theurgic contexts.  For example, it completely changed Platonist ethics and undermined the possibility of the mystical ascent.  It was this kind of hyphenated Platonism that Julian was steeped in and was an advocate for.  It seems that Julian thought of Iamblichus as on an at least equal status as Plato and for that reason I think you could say that Julian was an Iamblichean rather than a Platonist.

1.3  The overall point I want to make is that Christian Platonism, and Christianity in general at that time, did not advocate for the ritual sacrifice of animals; in fact Christian Emperors either restricted such sacrifice or outlawed it altogether.  As I understand it, the reasons for outlawing animal sacrifice in Christianity were theological rather than ethical; I mean that Christianity outlawed animal sacrifice because Jesus was understood to be the final sacrifice and therefore other sacrifices, such as animal sacrifice, were unnecessary, and in a sense blasphemous.

But regardless of the reasons, Christianity brought an end to animal sacrifice.  From an Orthodox Platonist perspective, that is a very good thing.  From the perspective of Orthodox Platonist ethics, that was good for Platonism.

1.4  The way I see it is that Christianity at that time rescued Platonism from Theurgy by putting a stop to a system whose main goal and purpose was the justification of ritual animal slaughter.  I don’t mean to say that Christianity had that purpose in mind; I suspect that Christians outlawed ritual animal slaughter in order to further solidify their power.  But I am saying that rescuing Platonism from a descent into Theurgically sponsored mayhem was an unintended consequence of their program.  I’m looking at this in terms of cause and effect rather than psychological intention.

2.  The God of the Philosophers

Sometimes theologians (I find that this happens mostly among theologians, not so much amongst philosophers) in the West contrast what they call ‘The God of the Philosophers’ as opposed to ‘The God of Scripture’ or ‘The God of Revelation.’  I don’t think it is a major topic in Western Theology, but I find it reappearing now and then.

The contrast arose because the characteristics of God, such as immutability, eternity, and so forth, that are found in treatises by philosophers are difficult to reconcile with the God of Scripture.  For example, if God is immutable (changeless), then how would it be possible for God to respond to prayers or to enter into history in the way described in the revealed texts of the monotheistic tradition?  There are other conundrums that arise in this context. 

I think the most pressing contrast between the Theology of the Philosophers and the Theology of the Monotheists is that the God of the Philosophers tends to be impersonal.  In contrast, the God of Monotheism is a personal God with whom individuals have a personal relationship that very much resembles the relationships a human being has with other human beings.  Two examples of the impersonal nature of the God of the Philosophers are Plotinus and Spinoza.  For Plotinus, God is encountered by transcending all differentiation which implies leaving personhood behind.  For Spinoza God is encountered as the underlying nature, that is constantly modified into specific appearances, that eternally abides as the source of appearances, including the appearance of human beings. 

For neither Spinoza nor Plotinus does God have any features or characteristics upon which a relationship that resembles a human relationship may be established.  When it comes to the God of the Philosophers, the goal is not to have a relationship with God, but to be absorbed in his presence which transcends all material appearances.  In a sense you could say that being absorbed in the presence of God is a kind of relationship; but even if that is granted the nature of the relationship differs from the personal relationship found in Monotheistic traditions.  The relationship to the God of the Philosophers is more like our relationship to the sun; we have such a relationship, and it is an important one, but it doesn’t feel like a personal relationship.

One of the things I have noticed about the literature of this issue is that non-Western understandings of God are not brought into the discussion.  I mean that the Hindu understanding of Brahman and Brahman’s relationship to Atman is not part of the discussion.  Neither is the relationship of the Tao to material appearances part of the discussion.  I find this frustrating because I suspect that bringing in non-Western analyses of an issue like this could be quite fruitful.

3.  Are the Laws in Laws Harsh?

In reading Plato’s Dialogue Laws I sometimes run into sections where the punishment for breaking a law was, it seemed to me, harsh; at least that was my initial response.  I am thinking of, for example, the use of the death penalty for theft when the theft is of items from a temple; there are other examples, but that is the one I tend to recall most often.  I come from a society where the death penalty is rarely used and when it is used it is because of some extraordinary aspect of the crime.  My society tends to congratulate itself on this; I mean that it tends to think of itself as better than other societies that used the death penalty much more frequently and for a variety of crimes in a routine way.  Many people in my society would like to see the death penalty eliminated altogether.

If Laws is read as a treatise for how to organize a community at the political level, these kinds of questions will naturally arise.  I mean that a reader will naturally compare the laws of his own community, along with their punishments for a guilty verdict, to those found in the Laws.  This kind of engagement can become complicated as there are a lot of laws and punishments to compare.  A plus with this kind of engagement with Laws is that it provides an opportunity for questioning one’s own uncritical views because of the contrast of those views with that offered in the Laws. 

A careful reading of a dialogue like Laws, with its wealth of detail and with the meticulous way it investigates certain matters of public life (for example, the long discussion about consuming alcohol), is that it provides an opportunity for understanding how various aspects of Platonism fit together.  For example, how would the use of the death penalty in Laws fit with Plato’s teachings on non-harming found in Crito? 

Finally, I think these kinds of teachings found in Laws can be unpacked as allegorical teachings for the dedicated practitioner on the spiritual path.  When Plato writes that a certain activity requires the application of the death penalty when the perpetrator of that activity is found guilty, it is an indication of how seriously Plato takes this situation and I think what Plato is communicating to those on the spiritual path is that the tendency to indulge in that activity must be slain, avoided at all costs, if they want to complete the spiritual journey.  For example, the theft of items from a temple is allegorically the ‘theft’ of the spiritual impulse for the purposes of material goals and indulgences.  If this continues, it will severely damage the spiritual prospects of the student.  Therefore, the impulse must be slain.

Using such strong allegorical language is not unusual in spiritual literature.  In Chapter 5 of the Tao Te Ching it says that the Sage treats human beings like straw dogs; straw dogs where ritually sacrificed by throwing them into a sacrificial fire.  In verses 294 and 295 of the Dhammapada the Buddha talks about slaying your mother and father.  This is traditionally understood as slaying one’s attachments; in addition, monastics in Buddhism are commonly referred to as ‘home-leavers’.  And the Bhagavad Gita is one long allegorical battle between desire and liberation (at least some interpret it that way).  There are many examples of this kind of usage in spiritual literature.  The Laws can be read this way as well.

One way of examining whether or not it makes sense to read Laws allegorically is to see if an allegorical reading makes Laws more consistent with the rest of the Dialogues of Plato.  For example, when Plato asks for capital punishment for breaking a law in Laws that would seem to clash, or be inconsistent with, Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation in a dialogue like Crito.  But if we read Laws allegorically and read the dialogue as a guide to spiritual practice, then the clash in this particular case, and other cases, is resolved, or at least lessened. 

Is it justifiable to read Laws allegorically?  I think so; but to be open to this possibility it is necessary to see how allegorical readings operate in other dialogues where an allegorical interpretation is more commonly accepted.  I think the best comparison to the Laws would be the Republic.  Personally, I think the deep meaning of the Republic is only accessible through an allegorical reading.  And I suspect the same is true for Laws as well.

If the reader approaches Laws allegorically that will shift the meaning of what is being read; I don’t think it necessarily eliminates a literal reading, but it adds another dimension of meaning.  For example, Laws is a conversation between three old men on the island of Crete.  One is Athenian, the Athenian Stranger, one is Spartan, and one is from Crete.  I think together they symbolize the three principal aspects of a human being.  The Athenian represents the soul.  The Spartan represents the body.  The Cretan represents the mind as the function of differentiation.  That is why, in Book 1, when they discuss what the purpose of laws is, the Spartan and the Cretan put forth the view that the purpose of laws is to be effective in war and that war is the overriding purpose of government and laws.  This is consistent with them being symbols of the mind of differentiation (without the presence of wisdom) and the body as the engine of desire.  It is the Athenian Stranger who counters with the view that the purpose of laws is peace and that peace supersedes, or is prior to, the demands of war; because the Athenian Stranger symbolizes the presence of soul which is the presence of eternity which is the realm of true peace.

I think it is also worthy of noting that the first word in Laws is ‘Theos’ or God.  I think this is a significant clue that Laws is primarily about our relationship with the divine and all the discussions about communal relationships and laws governing those relationships are aimed at indicating the rules, or laws, for cultivating a relationship with the divine, with God, with the One.  I think that Plato is telling us this because the three old men in Laws are taking a long walk on a hot day to a cave dedicated to Zeus.  Zeus is an important symbol in Plato’s Dialogues as the source of all life and other key Platonic concepts.  In other words, Zeus is to be understood allegorically in Laws as well as the long walk of the three old men is allegorically a walk to the divine as the ultimate source of all things.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 53

30 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 53

1.  Platonism grows on you.  I mean that when people first encounter Platonism through reading the Dialogues, perhaps in a University class, it can feel confusing and sometimes opaque.  But there are passages, images, and allegories that are attractive, and some of the characters in the Dialogues are interesting.  It’s a bit like learning a new language; at first the comprehension is not great and there is likely to be much that is misunderstood.  But there are words and phrases that cohere and make sense.  Over time the language becomes internalized and can be used as a means of communication.  I think the process of becoming a Platonist is similar; at some point the pieces of the philosophy fit together and the beauty of its insights become inspiring.  Eventually this leads to daily interaction, through reading, through various practices, and through contemplation.  At this point the relationship to Platonism is no longer opaque or confusing; instead, it is nourishing and every morning when we wake up, we look forward to deepening our relationship to the tradition.

2.  Readers might be interested that David Litwa, a scholar dedicated to the Classical world of, roughly, 100 CE to 300 CE, with a special focus on Christian Gnosticism, has decided to translate Porphyry’s Against the Christians.  This book survives, as I understand it, only in quotes from Christian critics.  I don’t know if there have been any recent discoveries regarding this work, but if there have been Litwa would be aware of them.

Last year I read Litwa’s translation of Celsus’s critique of Christianity which Litwa translates as ‘The True Teaching.’  Both Celsus and Porphyry defend traditional Platonic perspectives on various issues.  I’m not sure when Litwa will publish Against the Christians, but I look forward to reading it.

3.  I sometimes toy with the idea of creating a Platonist Canon.  I do this as a thought experiment; if I was in some kind of position to recommend a canon of Platonic works, what would I choose?  I would, naturally, start with the Dialogues of Plato.  The next work would be the Enneads of Plotinus.  These two alone offer a complete and unsurpassed presentation of Platonism.  You really don’t need anything else.

But other works are helpful and worthwhile.  For this second tier I would add Alcinous’s Handbook of Platonism, Maximus of Tyre’s Orations, and Plutarch’s Platonic works.

For post-Plotinian works I would suggest Porphyry’s On Abstinence as well as additional works such as his Letter to Marcella, and so forth.  (I think it would be a good idea to publish an edition of the remaining complete works of Porphyry that would also include the fragments of works that have vanished.  It could be called ‘The Porphyry Project.’)

After Porphyry selection of works becomes more difficult because of the multiplication of influences impacting the Platonic tradition.  Christian Platonism emerges, and there is the earlier Jewish Platonism of Philo of Alexandria as well as the later development of Islamic Platonism.  At the moment, I’m inclined not include them in a Platonist Canon because the projects of these philosophers is to create what I call a hyphenated Platonism that subordinates Platonism to the concerns of their tradition.  This also applies to the theurgic tradition which is more concerned with ritual efficacy than it is with wisdom and Platonic insights and Platonic ethical practices.  I realize this last is a controversial claim, but that is how I see things at this time. 

The last Platonic philosopher of the Classical period I would include in a canon of Platonism would be Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. 

No doubt I have missed some important works which over time will move into my fantasy Platonic Canon.  In conclusion, this is just a fantasy or mental exercise.  I personally find it useful in negotiating the vast sea of Platonic literature, but I don’t actually think that anyone, or any institution, has the authority for making a definitive Platonic canon; that’s not how Platonism has worked in the past, which is a good thing.

4.  I sometimes think of the variations in how Platonists over the centuries have interpreted the noetic realm (what it is and how it works) as similar to variations on music themes or melodies.  The variation form in music is very widespread; you find it in classical music as well as popular music.  Variations can be simple and easily recognizable, or they can be complex and difficult to hear (that is a variation can be obscure to the listener as to the variation’s relationship to the original theme), and many degrees between. 

If we think of the noetic realm as the realm of eternal objects (Whitehead’s phrase) then it makes sense that those of us residing in the material world, meaning those of us who are ephemeral objects, need to use approximations to talk about the noetic realm.  This isn’t quite the same as trying to describe the ineffable, such as the One and the Good.  The ineffable is beyond description, beyond affirmation and negation.  Noetic objects are not beyond affirmation and negation; for example, numbers have specific characteristics which can be affirmed.  But the unchangingness and eternality of noetic realities means that noetic realities are very remote from our everyday experience which makes it difficult to talk about noetic realities without using comparisons that are approximations.  That’s why variations appear, why Aristotle places noetic realities in objects, why some early Platonists explain noetic realities by calling them thoughts in the mind of God, and why some take a mathematical approach and think of noetic realities as approximating an empty set that contains rules for membership inclusion, and so forth. 

5.  Egypt plays a significant role in the development of the Greek philosophical tradition and of Platonism in particular.  It appears to be the case that Plato had a high view of Egyptian spirituality.  I find that intriguing because on the surface Egyptian and Greek spirituality appear to be very different; I’m referring to, for example, the way images such as statues are divergent in the two traditions.  Greek statues of Gods and Goddesses are highly idealized human beings, often of striking attractiveness.  In contrast, Egyptian deities, for the most part, merge animal and human forms.  Such combinations do appear in Greek spirituality; a good example is the minotaur.  But such creatures are often threatening and I’m not sure that they would qualify as deities.

In Egyptian spirituality deities often have an animal head and a human body, or a human head and an animal body.  This is strikingly different from Greek presentations of the gods and, in addition, differs from the Abrahamic tradition and how God is represented in that tradition.  (I believe that Philo criticized Egyptian religion for using the kinds of images it used.) 

Nevertheless, Plato shows admiration for Egypt and what he thinks of as the country’s stability.  And Plato seems inclined to trust Egyptian sources for ancient history; this is seen, for example, in Plato’s comments on Atlantis. 

Porphyry picks up on this positive view of Egypt in Book 4 of his treatise On Abstinence.  Beginning with paragraph 6, there is a long presentation of how Egyptian philosophers lived in Egypt.  It is a portrait of a highly regulated and disciplined approach to spirituality.  Porphyry states that Egyptian philosophers lived in the Temples and only rarely, during some ceremonies, interacted with non-initiated, ordinary people.  They spent their time in study and contemplation.

It intrigues me that the picture painted here is explicitly that of the philosopher as a religious figure; I’m using the word ‘religious’ because, according to Porphyry’s description, their philosophers were part of a religious institution of great antiquity, as opposed to finding an individual path on their own, or setting up some kind of alternative organization like Plato’s Academy.  When I read Porphyry’s account, it’s not clear to me if philosophers in Egypt were a type of Priest, or whether these two categories of Philosopher and Priest were separate and distinct.  Perhaps a philosopher at that time resembles something like what we sometimes hear about in today’s religious traditions where someone is both a Priest and a learned Scholar, but not all Priests are Scholars and not all Scholars are Priests.

The Egyptian philosophers followed what I infer to be a strict rule that regulated their lives.  I don’t know if that rule survives in some form among ancient Egyptian documents today (I haven’t heard anything about such a document) and I know almost nothing about the specifics of Egyptian spirituality, so I can only speculate beyond this general observation.  But for us Platonists, I think it is worth noting that such a life was viewed by Porphyry, and perhaps Plato as well, as admirable and perhaps something of an ideal.

6.  According to scholars there are many passages in The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius that are paraphrases of various Platonic Dialogues.  These are not direct quotes, and the dialogues, with one exception, are not explicitly named.  This is likely due to the circumstances under which the Consolation was written, which was in a prison cell.

The one exception about naming a dialogue is found in Book III where Boethius explicitly mentions the Timaeus.  The mention of Timaeus is made by Lady Philosophy:

“’But since,’ said she, ‘as is my Plato’s opinion in the Timaeus, we ought to implore God’s help in even the least of matters, what do you think we should do now, that we may be worthy to discover the abode of that highest good?’”

(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by S. H. Tester, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, page 271, ISBN: 0674990838)

The passage in the Timaeus reads:

“Timaeus: Nay, as to that, Socrates, all men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great . . . “

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1929, page 49, 27C, ISBN: 9780674992573)

There are further references to Timaeus later in Book III but the dialogue itself is not explicitly named as it is here.  In addition, according to a footnote in the Loeb edition, some of the references are to a commentary on Timaeus written by Proclus.  I am not familiar with this commentary, but this shows that Boethius had a strong interest in that dialogue.

In contrast, there do not appear to be any clear, or explicit, references to Christian writings.  My take on this is that Boethius had absorbed a view of Philosophy that Platonism advocates for, but which is completely absent from modernity’s understanding of what the task of Philosophy is.  The view I am referring to is that the purpose of Philosophy is salvific; I mean that Platonic Philosophy viewed its purpose as that of freeing human beings from being trapped in materiality through an ascent that concludes in the experience of the Good and the One, the transcendental and the eternal.  That is what Lady Philosophy is referring to when she refers to the ‘abode of the highest Good.’  That is why Boethius turns to philosophy for consolation in his hour of desperate need.  And that is why we should turn to philosophy today.