Showing posts with label Plotinus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Plotinus. Show all posts

Monday, June 22, 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 99

22 June 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 99

1.  Contemplative vs. Theurgic Platonism

I’ve noticed for a number of years that Theurgic Platonism, what might be called Ceremonial Platonism, seems to have a more forward facing, or public facing, contemporary presence than Contemplative Platonism.  I say this because there seems to be more books on Theurgic perspectives than on the Contemplative perspectives.  It’s not that there are no books published on Contemplative Platonism: there is Eric Fallick’s Platonist Contemplative Asceticism: Practice and Principle and there is Mark Anderson’s Pure and I suspect there are others I’m forgetting or are not aware of.

In contrast there seems to be numerous books devoted to Theurgic Platonism from Academic sources as well as from non-academics interested in the subject.  Some authors, like Gregory Shaw and Edward P. Butler regularly publish from the Theurgic perspective.  And there are also highly scholarly books regularly published from the Theurgic perspective, sometimes sponsored by academic organizations or associations (as an aside, I have not observed an academic association or organization publishing on Contemplative Platonism, but I might have missed it.) 

In short, it seems to me that there is a greater emphasis on Theurgic Platonism than there is on Contemplative Platonism.  I think there are several reasons for this:

1.1--The first is that for some reason Theurgic Platonists have been successful at characterizing what I call Contemplative Platonism as a type of philosophical rationalism.  I have mentioned this before in posts dealing with other topics, but here I want to highlight the way this type of classification casts Contemplative Platonism into a shadow region which is difficult for people to access.  This is because Theurgic Platonists tend to present a dichotomy between the Ceremonial and the Rational.  This turns Contemplative Platonism into something people think they are familiar with because it fits in with classifications widely used in modernity.  I find it frequently stated, for example, that Plotinus is a ‘rationalist’ which, to my mind, completely misrepresents what Plotinus was doing.

1.2—Another reason for the sidelining of Contemplative Platonism is that the contemplative dimensions, or the contemplative presence, in traditional Platonist sources (such as the Dialogues, The Orations of Maximus of Tyre, The Enneads of Plotinus, and so forth) have been, for the most part absorbed into Christianity through the heritage of writers like Dionysius the Areopagite, and, to a lesser extent, Boethius, and others.  I think it is still difficult for Platonists to absorb the teachings on contemplation found in many Platonist sources without viewing them through a Christian lens and kind of accepting that contemplation is what Christian Platonists might do.

1.2.1  An example of the point I am making is that there are many volumes published about Christian, Catholic and Orthodox, Mysticism.  Some authors have devoted much of their lives to publishing series on this topic; a good example is the series of books published by Bernard McGinn on Christian Mysticism that covers this topic from very early examples to fairly recent manifestations.  In contrast, locating works on Platonic Mysticism, which do exist, requires dedication and persistence since such works tend to be marginal to how the Platonist tradition is understood.   

1.3  One of the intriguing things about Theurgic Platonism is that it seems to have recently found a place in the University.  I mean that some prominent contemporary Platonists who have a positive view of Theurgy are academics themselves and some are involved in various Platonist academic organizations.

1.4  I’m not complaining about this situation.  It is what it is.  But I think it is helpful for those of us who comprehend Platonism as a contemplative ascetic spiritual tradition to know where we stand in relation to other views of what Platonism is.

2.  Farewell, Angelina

The machine guns are roaring and the puppets heave rocks

And fiends nail timebombs to the hands of the clocks
Call me any name you like I will never deny it
Farewell, Angelina, the sky is erupting
I must go where it’s quiet.

Bob Dylan, Farewell Angelina

My favorite Bob Dylan song is Farewell Angelina.  It has a very simple melody and chord progression in 3-4 time.  In contrast, the images of Farewell Angelina can, at first, feel obscure and at times difficult to access.  After some time with the song, though, the listener can sense how the images gradually build up.  The images start with fairly benign examples like triangles ringing and an empty table by the sea; things like that.  As the verses progress the images become more stark including undertakers, shotgun blasts, and so forth.  I quoted the closing verse above which opens with images of violence in the first two lines.  In line 3 there is a shift and I see in this shift a kind of turning away and an arising of indifference as the verse says ‘Call me any name you like . . . ‘  This is a shift in mood in the song and introduces what I think of as the resolution of the last three lines.  The phrase ‘Farewell, Angelina’ is used at least once in each verse; in the opening verse it is used twice.  So the turning away found in line 3 emerges from this turning away from some kind of relationship.  (As an aside, the ending of relationships is a common theme in early Dylan; think of ‘It Ain’t Me Babe’ and ‘Don’t Think Twice’.  To be fair, such songs are found frequently in popular music, particularly in Country Western so Dylan writing songs where this theme appears fits in with the popular music of his time.)  In line 4 the violence that has appeared in various verses, culminating in lines 1 & 2 of the closing verse, returns with the phrase ‘the sky is erupting’. 

The concluding line, ‘I must go where it’s quiet’ is an explanation of what the singer is doing in the face of all the previous moments that are captured by the various images in the verses of the song.  The ‘quiet’ that the singer must go to is, to my way of thinking, an interior quiet.  This implies, I think, that one can only overcome the violence and cacophony of the previous images by finding the quiet, the peace, that is within.  This may be a stretch, but I think of this line as pointing to the antidote that is contemplation.  The sky is erupting, machine guns are firing, timebombs are ready to explode; even so there is a place of quiet and peace that we can always turn to because it is always present within.  From a Platonist perspective the ultimate source of the peace within is the presence of eternity which is the Good, the One, and the Beautiful.

You can listen to Farewell Angelina on YouTube.  It’s interesting to me that Bob Dylan himself did very few recordings of this song.  But there are excellent covers of this song by various artists, and there is a French version that I find really excellent as well called ‘Adieu Angelina’ which is also available on YouTube, sung by Nana Mouskouri who seemed to make the song a staple of her career, often singing it as a duet with others.  Probably the most famous cover of the song in the English-speaking world is the one by Joan Baez.  I think it’s helpful to listen to more than one version of the song as different singers highlight different aspects.

3.  Addendum to Last Week’s Post on Plato’s Laws

Last week I quoted an early section of Plato’s Laws, making the point that this section can be interpreted as Plato speaking to the reader about the multiple layers of meaning in that dialogue.  I think there is a similar passage in The Republic as follows:

“So Glaucon and the others begged me to help in every way; not abandon the discussion, but on the contrary track down the nature of each of our subjects (justice and injustice) and how the truth of each stood regarding the benefit they each provided.  So I said how it seemed to me, that: ‘The search we are undertaking is no mean task, but as I see it, it’s one that needs a sharp eye, not a weak one.  Since therefore,’ I said, ‘we are not good at making an inquiry of such a kind, I think we should employ the kind of investigation suitable for people who are not very keen-sighted, if someone had ordered them to read small letters from a distance, but then someone noticed that the same letters existed somewhere else written larger and on a larger background.  I think it would seem a godsend to read these first and then examine the smaller ones to see if they were the same.’

‘I’m all for that,’ said Adeimantus, ‘but what relevance here do you perceive in our search for ‘the just’?’

‘I’ll tell you,’ I said, ‘Do we talk sometimes of a justice of an individual person, and sometimes perhaps of a whole city-state too?’

‘Certainly,’ he said.

‘And of course a state is something larger than one person?’

‘Yes it is,’ he said.

‘In which case justice may be of a greater scale in the larger context and be easier to understand.  If you wish then, let’s firstly try to find out what kind of a ting it is in states, then let’s examine it in this way in each individual too by looking closely at the resemblance of the greater in the form of the lesser.’”

(Plato, The Republic, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, pages 159-161, 368c-369a, ISBN: 9780674996502)

3.1  I understand this quote, and the quote from the Laws that I posted last week, as Plato explaining to readers how to read his Dialogue, that the Republic has a layered structure with both individual and societal implications and meanings.  This is also what the passage from the Laws is telling us to do.

3.2  It would be helpful to look at the Dialogues and see where Plato offers this kind of instruction on how to read the Dialogues.  I think it shows Plato as being concerned that readers may not understand the layered approach Plato takes and for that reason Plato makes it clear in passages like the one from the Laws and from the Republic.  This shows Plato being transparent about his writing technique and his purposes.

3.3  One of the consequences that these quotes leads us to is that Plato is writing in such a way so as to point to a sense of unity in disparate aspects of our lives that we tend to overlook.  In a sense, Plato is pointing to unity so that we can get a ‘taste’ of unity as a prelude to our ascending to the Unity of the One.

3.4  In both quoted passages Plato points to different levels of the human experience, individual experience and larger social contexts, and then links them by pointing to a fundamental unity that we have failed to perceive or understand.  This approach is helpful to keep in mind when we read the Dialogues and other Platonic works, and also as a technique that can be applied to our own lives and interactions.

4.  The Solstice Sun

I and a few friends went out into the desert, not very far, to watch the June Solstice Sun rise over the eastern mountain range yesterday morning (21 June 2026).  This is something I have been doing for a few years and I find it an enriching meditation. 

On this June Solstice Morning the conditions could not have been more perfect.  There were no clouds and there was a modest breeze that kept the summer insects away.  The desert fauna spread out before us.  In the distance was a row of Palm Trees that line a road going to a desert trailer park.  Further in the distance is the eastern mountain range.  Behind us is the western mountain range which is much higher and steeper than the range to the east.  Because the western range is so high, it catches the morning light before the sun rises over the eastern mountains; that’s the first sign that sunrise is near.  The light on the western range slowly descends, sliding down the mountains, until the whole western range is in morning light before the sun ascends over the top of the eastern range for those of us standing on the valley floor.

When the sun appeared over the eastern mountains it felt like a symphony of recognition.  We bowed and offered silent thanks.

I was inspired to engage in this kind of practice by Plotinus, particularly the passage found at Ennead V.5.8.  You might want to spend some time with this passage; I always find it inspiring. 


Monday, June 1, 2026

Numbers as Noetic Realities

1 June 2026

Numbers as Noetic Realities

Numbers and their relationships have always had a place of importance in the Platonic tradition.  Here are a few thoughts I’d like to share about numbers and the place numbers hold in the Platonist tradition.

1.  Numbers are Noetic realities according to the Platonic metaphysical cosmology.  This means, among other things, that numbers and their relationships are immaterial and eternal.  This is why, in the Platonic tradition, numbers and their relationships are thought to be discovered rather than generated by, or dependent upon, the human mind.

2.  Nous is the second level of reality, or hypostasis, in Platonic Metaphysics.  The first level is the Good and the One, which is ineffable.  Noetic realities are not ineffable; they are coherent and understandable; Noetic realities are why the cosmos has regularities and natural laws.

3.  As I have mentioned before on this blog, the first differentiation of the Good and the One is found in Nous as Being, Mind, and Life.  Numbers follow Being, that is to say Numbers are a differentiation of Being.  Because the presence of Numbers overflows into material reality, the third level, or hypostasis, Numbers are instantiated in material appearances, such as seven apples, through participation in their Noetic reality, Noetic 7.  Here is a diagram of this sequence:

The Good and the One → Nous → Being → Numbers as such → Noetic Number 7 → Seven apples

We start with the Ineffable Good and the Ineffable One that is pure Unity and completely undifferentiated.  This overflows to Nous where differentiation begins; and here the current of unfolding is through Being which is a Noetic reality.  Being overflows and differentiates into various Noetic realities including the Form of Number as such.  Number as such overflows into further differentiation which in this current of unfolding generates the forms, noetic realities, eternal objects, of specific numbers such as 2, 4, 7, and so forth ad infinitum.  The specific noetic numbers’ energies flow into the material domain where these numbers are perceived as 7 apples, 7 stars, 7 hours, and so forth.

4.  Noetic numbers, the forms of specific numbers, have no content.  But the possibility of their instantiating in material reality is dependent upon structural features of the noetic form.  I like to look at it this way: you can think of Noetic Numbers as empty sets that nevertheless have specific rules for inclusion, or membership, in the set. 

4.1  It is generally the case that noetic realities, eternal objects, have no content; that is not peculiar to numbers.  For example, Noetic Being has no content; Noetic Being is not the being of a mountain, or the being of a person, or the being of a relationship or quality.  When Being overflows into material reality Being becomes being, meaning specified material being.  In the material realm being has content.  That is why we can speak of the being of a human being even though Being as such has no content.

4.2  The sequence in item 3 is an outline of sequential hierarchical metaphysical dependence.  Sometimes I think of this as causation, but that probably is not the best way to express this relationship because causation is most often thought of as temporal.  Noetic realities are prior to the emergence of time (you could say that it is the differentiation known as time that generates material reality).  But Being generating Number as such is not a temporal process; it is only temporal by analogy.  Noetic Number as such is dependent upon Being, but Being is not dependent upon Noetic Number; that is the hierarchy part.

4.3  There is another way of looking at the lack of content, or the emptiness, of Noetic Realities.  I mean the way emptiness is presented in Daoism.  For example, the emptiness of a cup is the lack of any content in the cup; it means that the cup has no water, tea, fruit juice, and so forth, in it.  It is this lack of content that allows that cup to have many uses, or instantiations of functions.  Similarly, it is the lack of content in Noetic Realities that allows for the Noetic Reality to have unlimited material instantiations.

4.3.1  The Daoist view is an image of the potentiality of Noetic Realities.  The empty set that has rules for membership, or inclusion, is about the structure of Noetic Realities.

5.  Noetic realities are differentiated but are, nevertheless, transparent to each other; that is to say that Noetic Realities are not barriers to other Noetic Realities.  This is why Noetic Numbers can be added, subtracted, and othewise manipulated without damaging the presence of any specific numbers. 

5.1  Plotinus writes about the transparency of noetic realities in Ennead 6.6, On Numbers:

“One has to think that, generally, all things [in the intelligible (noetic) world] lie within one nature, and that one nature contains them and, in a way, encompasses them, and not that they are each separate, as in the sensible realm, with the sun in one place, another thing somewhere else; rather, everything (in the Noetic realm) is together in one . . . Although all Beings (in the Noetic realm) are together, each of them is also separate.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 6.6, On Numbers, translated by Lloyd P. Gerson et al, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2025, page 785, ISBN: 9781009604987)

I recommend for those interested in the Platonic view of numbers reading Ennead 6.6.  I think you will find it very rewarding.

5.2  Material realities are different; material realities are opaque to each other.  This is partly due to their becoming and begoning nature, and partly to differentiation manifesting as strife under the reign of time and as an inherent feature of the third hypostasis.

There is one partial exception to this; music.  I’ve mentioned this before on this blog, but it’s worth repeating, a piece of music can have many parts and these parts do not interfere with each other, they intermingle and encourage each other’s presence.  This is true even for a simple song.  I suspect that one of the reasons listening to music is pleasing is that this experience of intermingling is a way of experiencing the way Noetic Realities are present to each other and Noetic Realities are inherently attractive.

There is a significant difference, though, between the way musical realities intermingle and the transparency of Noetic Realities and that is that musical intermingling is under the reign of time and therefore musical realities are differentiated from each other in a more definite way (Song A is not Song B).  In addition, music is ephemeral, whereas Noetic Realities are eternal.

6.  Noetic realities are not an idealized example of a class of material realities.  This is clear with numbers because there is no material number 7; there is only the instantiation of Noetic 7.  Noetic realities are the necessary condition, or presence, for a class of material realities.

7.  Numbers permeate material existence in the sense that we use numbers constantly.  We count them in numerous situations.  This helps us to understand that the noetic is not spatially distant from the material; instead the second level, or hypostasis, the Noetic level, and the third level, or hypostasis, the material level are intertwined; it might be even closer than ‘intertwined.’ 

7.1  Because noetic realities, abstract objects, have no content they can manifest anywhere in the material realm in accordance with the rules, or structures, of inclusion. 

8.  The third level of existence, or hypostasis, is time.  Time is cyclic due to its relationship with number; number structures the cycles of time.  Numbers are eternal (like all Noetic realities).  Because of this ‘time is the moving image of eternity’ as it says in the ‘Timaeus.’ 

8.1  Even though time is a moving image, time is shaped by the eternity of the Noetic reality of number.  This becomes the everlastingness of time in the material dimension, or level, or hypostasis, of the Platonic Metaphysical Cosmology.

Eternal unchanging numbers are the condition that, when the Noetic reality of numbers overflows, gives rise to time, just as the overflow of being gives rise to number.

9.  The impact of Platonism on mathematics is considerable.  Just recently I learned that Kurt Godel was a dedicated Platonist and wrote that Platonism was foundational for Godel’s development of his famous theorems.  There are many examples like this.

10.  What does all this have to do with walking the Platonist path?  I think that numbers, and the way numbers manifest, are the clearest example of how immaterial realities impact our material realm.  Numbers teach us, each time we interact with them that there are non-material dimensions of existence of great range, power (or applicability), and beauty. 

I wouldn’t go so far as to say that Platonism requires facility in mathematics, though it seems that some Platonists have thought so.  It is also possible to transcend material existence by following Diotima’s teachings on beauty and following beauty back to its source.

On the other hand, numbers are the presence of the noetic in our everyday life; to see numbers this way requires that we pay attention to numbers and how they work; that is what mathematicians do.  And this refinement of attention is part of how Platonism works.  As I just mentioned, Diotima refines our attention so that we comprehend beauty as the presence, or trace, of a higher reality (‘higher’ not in a spatial sense, rather ‘higher’ in the sense of more primal, closer to the source of all things; again ‘closer’ does not mean spatially closer in this context, but closer in the sense of having a clearer comprehension.)  This refined attention is undistracted attention and is part of what contemplation means.  When this is applied to numbers, which are everywhere around us and within us, we open ourselves up to the metaphysical dimensions of the cosmos that lead us to the source of all things; the Ineffable One and the Good beyond all affirmation and negation.

 


Monday, May 4, 2026

The Good and the One and Their Relationship to the Noetic

4 April 2026

The Good and the One and Their Relationship to the Noetic

“But then, someone will say, why do we not stop at Intellect and postulate this as the Good?  For both soul and life are traces of Intellect, and soul desires it (Intellect).  Soul judges and thereby desires Intellect, judging justice better than injustice, and putting every form of excellence before every form of vice, and it honours the identical things it chooses.  But if it (soul) desires only Intellect, it would presumably need more argument to show that Intellect is not the ultimate thing; and while not everything desires Intellect, everything desires the Good.

“And even among things without intellect, not all try to come to possess it, and those who do have it do not stop there but go on to look for the Good; they look for Intellect on the basis of calculative reasoning, whereas they look for the Good prior to reason as well.

“But if they desire life and eternal existence and activity, then the object desired is not desired as Intellect, but as Good, as deriving from the Good and leading to the Good; for that is the way life is.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 6.7.20, How the Multiplicity of the Ideas Came to Exist, and on the Good, translated by Lloyd Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 2025, pages 831-832, ISBN: 978009604970)

“Why then, someone will say, do we not stop at Intellect and posit this as the Good?  For soul and life are traces of Intellect, and it is this Intellect that soul desires.  And so in its judgements also it desires Intellect, judging righteousness better than unrighteousness, and preferring each form of virtue to the [corresponding] form of vice, and judging more valuable the same things which it chooses.  But if it only desires Intellect, perhaps it might be in need of further reasoning to show that Intellect is not the ultimate and that not all things desire Intellect but all things desire the Good.  And not all of the things which do not have intellect seek to gain possession of it, and the things that have intellect do not stop there, but again seek the Good, and they seek Intellect from their reasoning, but the Good even before reason.  And if they also seek life, and everlasting existence and activity, what they desires is not Intellect in so far as it is Intellect, but in so far as it is good and from the Good and directed to the Good: since this is so also with life.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.7.20, The Forms and the Good, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 153, ISBN: 9780674995154)

“Why not halt, then – it will be asked – at Intellectual-Principle and make that The Good?  Soul and life are traces of Intellectual-Principle; that principle is the Term of Soul which on judgement sets itself towards Intellectual-Principle, pronouncing right preferable to wrong and virtue in every form to vice, and thus ranking by its choosing.

“The soul aiming only at that Principle would need a further lessoning; it must be taught that Intellectual-Principle is not the ultimate, that not all things look to that while all do look to The Good.  Not all that is outside of Intellectual-Principle seeks to attain it; what has attained it does not halt there but looks still towards good.  Besides, Intellectual-Principle is sought upon motives of reasoning, The Good before all reason.  And in any striving towards life and continuity of existence and activity, the object is aimed at not as Intellectual-Principle but as good, as rising from good and leading to it: life itself is desirable only in view of good.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.7.20, The Multiplicity of Ideal Forms, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 655, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  This quote from the Enneads is one of the clearest, perhaps the clearest, statement from Plotinus why the divine ascent transcends even the Noetic (what the translators refer to as Intellect or Intellectual-Principle.)  I have mentioned this before, but I think it is worth repeating, and that is that I would prefer the use of the word ‘mind’ or ‘Mind’ for nous rather than Intellect.  It’s not that I think ‘Intellect’ is wrong; there is a long tradition of translating nous that way and that is a consideration that carries weight.  But over time I think the word intellect has taken on meanings that are primary that undermine its usage in the context of the Enneads.  That context is that ‘intellect’ is often a synonym for someone who is ‘smart’ as in ‘he’s an intellectual’ and therefore lives primarily through applying his brain to analytical approaches to problems.  In contrast the word ‘mind’ has a broader base of meaning, particularly when comparing its usage to non-Western spiritual literature.  It’s not a big deal, but it is a point I like to bring up when I have an opportunity to do so.

2.  “. . . not everything desires Intellect but everything desires the Good.” (Gerson et al)  That’s an interesting contrast.  You could put it that all things desire the One; all things desire to return to the One. 

2.1  It’s remarkable that the word ‘desire’ is used in this context.  I say this because overcoming desire is the basis for ethical restraints, asceses, in Platonism.  This is explicitly stated in Phaedo and The Republic.  But in the context of the One desire is seen as that which propels the philosopher to that transcendental and ineffable realm.

This suggests that it is not desire as such that is the problem, or that Platonism is advocating for the end of desire (or as Buddhists would say ‘the cessation of desire.’)  Rather, the philosopher needs to distinguish between those desires that need to be overcome (broadly speaking, bodily desires) and those desires that assist the philosopher on the path to awakening to the presence of eternity.

2.1.1  Those kinds of differentiations are a function of the noetic in the sense that it is at the level of nous where differentiation first appears.  Mind is the instantiation of, or the presence of, nous in the human being.  It is Mind that both makes these kinds of differentiations (and differentiating between desires that need to be overcome and desires that assist the philosopher on the path is a subtle process) and guides the philosopher as to the application of those differentiations; that is to say how such differentiations will impact the life of the philosopher.

2.1.2  I have to admit (this is a bit of a personal confession) that the idea that all things desire the Good and the One is a difficult one for me to accept.  It does not seem to me that when I watch and try to understand the activity of living beings, or even just human beings, that their activity is in some sense directed towards the ineffable One.  Alas, that is not what I observe.  Instead, I observe, among many, perhaps among most, a desire to increase fragmentation, a desire to cultivate separation in the sense of acting as if we do not have a common source or a shared life and destiny. 

Perhaps I am a bit of a philosophical pessimist in this regard (I’m thinking of philosophers like Schopenhauer).  Perhaps this inclination of mine is due to my age; I was much more willing when I was younger to think of all human beings as in some sense good and well-intentioned.  But I no longer think this is the case.

How does that impact my reading of this passage?  I tend to read it as suggesting that the ascent to the One, the Good, to the Eternal, is always available to all beings.  But that availability is a choice that only a very small number of living beings will take.  I’ve come to the view that there is nothing wrong with this way of looking at living beings.  For example, every human being (who is not deaf) has musical capacity, but only a small number become composers.  Every human being has mathematical capacities, but only a very small number become mathematicians.  And so forth.  I look at spirituality and living in accordance with the demands of spirituality, in a similar way.

Partly this is a difference between a universal vision of spirituality and a restricted view of spirituality.  There is a strong view that spiritual traditions should be universal in their application.  This is a legacy of traditions like Christianity and Buddhism.  But, ironically, this is not a view that is universally held.  For example, in Jainism it is the view, as I understand it, that only a very small number of people, the number is so small you could easily count them, attain moksha, liberation.  For the vast majority of living beings simply continue cycling through samsara, life after life after life. 

But regardless of whether or not all beings desire the Good, if someone is such a being, a being who desires the Good, the guidance of Plotinus is assuredly helpful and nourishing to accomplish the task of returning to the One.

3.  It is stated that people look for Intellect (Nous, Mind) through reason, but the Good is ‘prior to reason.’  My understanding of this is that eternal objects in the Noetic realm are differentiated.  I understand differentiation to be foundational for reason which suggests that the cultivation of reason (broadly speaking) is necessary for experiencing Nous, even if the technique for doing so is contemplation (because it is reason that will guide the philosopher to contemplation). 

The Good is ‘prior to reason’ because the Good is the complete unity of the One.  And in complete unity there is no differentiation and therefore the Good does not reason.  Differentiation flows out of the Good and generates reason in the way that the light of the sun flows out of the sun and illuminates our world.

4.  I’m not sure how to interpret the closing sentence, the one about the desire for life, eternal activity and existence.  At first glance the sentence suggests to my mind something close to what heaven in Christianity might be described.  That doesn’t fit the context of this Ennead.  So we need to shift gears.

4.1  In thinking about this sentence perhaps Plotinus is referring to the eternal overflowing of the Good and the One into the Noetic, and the eternal overflowing of the Noetic into the material world.  This eternal overflowing (a kind of generating process) is a kind of activity, an eternal activity.  Again, it is like the light of the sun understood as an overflowing of the sun’s presence.  Or it is like the way beauty flows from a mountain landscape.  I think what Plotinus is suggesting is that part of the reason we desire to return to the One is to be a part (though ‘part’ is in some ways a problematic word in this context) of this eternal activity found in the Good and the One.  I mentioned that ‘part’ is a problematic word in this context because it might be suggestive of individuated existence in the One, whereas I see the Good and the One, and unifying with the Good and the One, as the dissolution of individuation which is an illusion in itself, and the source of many other illusions and misunderstandings.  But I can’t figure out a clearer why of referring to what I think is being suggested in this closing sentence.

4.1.1  This eternal process that Plotinus seems to refer to contrasts with the view that the Good and the One are unchanging.  I think the resolution to this can be found by thinking of process as an ultimate category so that what is unchanging is the process of eternal overflow of the presence of the Good and the One, the overflow of that which is eternal into the realm of time.  (If I were still a Buddhist I might put it this way: “Change does not differ from eternity, eternity does not differ from change.  Change is eternity, eternity is change.”  But this is a topic for another time.)

5.  Reading Plotinus is endlessly rewarding. 

 

  

Monday, April 13, 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

13 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 92

1.  The First Principle’s Presence

“Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, Second Edition, edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 582, ISBN: 978009604970)

“. . . all [things are] imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 5.4.1, That Which is after the First, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 143, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“. . . all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.”

“Plotinus, The Enneads, Enneads 5.4.1, The Secondaries and the First, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 461, ISBN: 978943914558)

1.1  There are single sentences in Plotinus that are exquisite, filled with meaning and beauty.  This is one of those sentences.

1.2  In the clause closing the sentence before the one quoted Plotinus refers to fire warming things, to snow cooling things.  And then he moves into a generalization from this observation to an insight about ‘all things’.  That insight is that all things are imitating the nature of the ultimate in accordance with their specific, limited, nature. 

How are things imitating ultimate nature?  By generation, by productive activity.  Fire is hot and the heat of fire produces warmth in objects that are near it.  Snow is cold and the coldness of snow cools those things close to it.  I take these to be analogies to how The One overflows and creates, emanates, generates, the world.  When looked at in this way we can sense the presence of the One even in ordinary material things.  This brings the highest metaphysics of Plotinus down to the material realm so that the material realm is not isolated, or separate from, the transcendental.  The transcendental and the material are not the same, but they are related in a manner that, once recognized, assists the philosopher in his journey of ascent to the Good and the One.

1.3  I view the phrase ‘eternity and goodness’ as a way of saying the One and the Good.  Here I would say that ‘eternity’ is a way of speaking about the One.  The One is ultimately ineffable, but there are names for the One that are used to communicate with each other about this transcendental reality.

Frequently in the Enneads ‘eternity’ or ‘the eternal’ is used to refer to the noetic, the second hypostasis, rather than the One.  It is not unusual for Plotinus to use terms that subtly change their meaning depending on which level, or hypostasis, Plotinus is referring to.  And Plotinus does not always signal a shift of meaning of this kind.  As a reader becomes more familiar with how Plotinus makes these shifts the reader becomes more tuned in to when that happens.

1.4  It is possible to interpret ‘eternity and goodness’ as meaning that everything imitates the noetic forms that are the source of particular things, and following that imitates the ultimate through generous creativity, or goodness.  I can understand this kind of interpretation because it elegantly encapsulates the three levels of existence, or hypostases, starting with material things, then rising to the noetic, and then rising further to the transcendental Good. 

But Armstrong’s translation leans towards seeing this phrase as another way of expressing the One and the Good.  Armstrong translates that all things are imitating the First Principle and Armstrong does not distinguish between everlastingness and generosity as to their level, which hypostasis they reside in; suggesting that both are ways of talking about the ineffable, the transcendental.

MacKenna seems to be making the same point when he says that all things are imitating the ‘Source.’  The ultimate source is the ineffable One.  I don’t read MacKenna as saying that ‘eternity’ and ‘service’ represent names for different hypostases.

It may be the case that Plotinus is compressing multiple meanings in this sentence and that reading eternity as referring to the noetic is one reading Plotinus had in mind, while reading eternity as another way of talking about the ineffable is another reading.  Multiple meanings are not unusual in Plotinus (or Plato) so it would not surprise me if this is the case here.

1.5  Ennead 3.7, Eternity and Time, deals with how Plotinus understands the relationship between these two realities.  Plotinus unpacks his understanding of eternity and time in a way that at first seems complex, but after a second or third reading it comes into clearer focus.  Here is a quote from Ennead III.7 that I think is relevant to the quote from Ennead 5.4:

“What, then, should we say eternity is?  That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the entire heaven, that is, the cosmos?  For they [the Pythagoreans – translator’s footnote] say that some hold this latter belief about time.  For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them.  And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.

“But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ [Timaeus 37D3 – translator’s footnote] – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it.  But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity.  For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other.  And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.”

(Gerson, see above, page 337)

Here is the passage from Timaeus, 37D3, that the translator referenced in a footnote:

“Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper; Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, page 1241, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see the quote from Ennead 3.7 as indicating that Plotinus does not consider the intelligible, or the noetic, and eternity to be the same.  Eternity is present to the intelligible, but I would say that eternity comes before the intelligible.  I suggest this because the intelligible, that is to say noetic realities, arise due to differentiation, and the eternal is before differentiation.  When the eternal is subject to differentiation, we get the moving image of eternity that is time.

Eternity and the noetic are intimately related and because of that noetic objects are eternal; but the eternity of noetic objects (which, tellingly, Whitehead refers to as eternal objects) is due to proximity to the One.  Eternity is another way of saying Unity.  The unity of noetic objects is also due to their proximity to the One, and to their proximity to the Eternal. 

1.6  The place that eternity holds in Platonism is a difficult topic.  It is not easy to sift through what Plotinus says about this and because of that difficulty people can come to different conclusions.  Some have said that the One is beyond eternity just as the One is beyond being.  But the One is also beyond Unity, beyond the One.  As Plotinus writes, whatever anyone says about the One falls short of its actuality, for the One is even beyond actuality.  In other words, I agree that what is ultimate transcends eternity, but I think there are good reasons to think of ‘eternity’ as a useful name for that which transcends name and form.

And, to be honest, I think that Plotinus does use ‘eternity’ as another name for the One; now and then, not always.  Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, Plotinus uses eternity, or the eternal, when referring to noetic realities, the intelligibles.  But just as Plotinus will use terms like unity to refer to noetic realities as well as the unity of the One, so also Plotinus will skillfully unpack eternity in ways that depend on the level of reality, or hypostasis, that is being referred to.

1.7  All of the writings of Plotinus are based on his experiences of the noetic and the transcendental (the intelligible and the One).  Reaching out across the chasm that separates the material world from that which is incorporeal, Plotinus illuminates that which is eternal by proximity, and that which is eternal remaining in unity.

2.  Stages of the Practice of Ethical Restraint

There is not a lot of writing about ethical restraint in the Platonist tradition or in how ethical restraint is presented in the Dialogues of Plato.  But restraint is discussed outside of this context, and surprisingly it is usually in a therapeutic context, often centered on addiction.  In this kind of literature ‘restraint’ has a practical focus on how someone can actually overcome the sensory, and sensual, thing(s) that seem to control their lives.  Often there is a three stage presentation of how restraint works:

The first stage is avoidance.  Sometimes the expression ‘just don’t go there’ is used; as in an alcoholic should just not go to a bar, or to a party where alcohol is served.  This has application to a large variety of situations where people are trying to overcome the seductions of the senses.

The second stage is sometimes called ‘self-command.’  This is learning how to make initial steps in internalizing effective resistance to sensory seductions.  A lot of literature is centered on this second stage and the authors of these works offer simple means for reminding the person on the path of renunciation (in a lay and secular context) is helped because most of these suggestions are internal reminders, sometimes prayers, that serve to deflect the seduction of the senses when it appears.  It might be as simple as ‘day after day I will reject alcohol.’  Or it might be simpler, ‘I reject alcohol.’  Or it might be longer such as the much used Serenity Prayer.  The Serenity Prayer might be condensed to the person saying ‘courage’ in their mind to remind them to pull away from what is tempting them.

This second stage is a kind of internal civil war where old and powerful habits are being contested by a new perspective.  This conflict between the older way of life with the possibility of a new way of life can become intense.  These internalized sayings, or prayers, are reminders that the individual wants to move into a new situation and wants to give up on habits that are self-destructive.

The third stage is sometimes called ‘mastery’ but I prefer the term ‘stability’ meaning that the change to a new way of living has stabilized and the internal civil war is basically over.  There is a greater sense of calm and also a feeling of accomplishment.  Of course it is always possible to slide back into old habits and for that reason the practices of the second stage remain a part of the person’s inner life.

I don’t recall in Platonist literature this kind of analysis where the stages of renunciation are discussed; it might be in the literature somewhere, but I don’t recall running across it.  My feeling is that this kind of information would be something that would be discussed between teacher and student rather than being the topic of an essay; or at least it looks that way to me. 

In the Platonist literature there is some indication that people did fall away from the practices of ethical restraint.  For example, in the opening section of Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry writes to Firmus, a friend of Porphyry’s, that Porphyry has heard that Firmus has fallen away from vegetarianism and returned to eating meat.  Porphyry views this as Firmus having given up on the Way of Philosophy and is writing to Firmus to encourage him to return to a philosophical life, a vegetarian life. 

This kind of falling away is common; it happens to many people.  Overcoming sensual seductions, even when a person knows that succumbing to them is unhealthy and damaging to themselves and others, is not easy.  Knowing this, one can be sympathetic.  The important thing is to encourage the individual who has fallen away from their renunciation practice to try again.  It may take many tries.  But that’s OK.  Just keep trying and eventually the new way of life will establish itself, stabilize itself.

3.  William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is a Protestant Christian Apologist.  Craig has a large following.  Craig has studied philosophy extensively and is familiar with contemporary approaches to philosophy.  Craig is familiar with logic and modern modes of analysis from the analytic tradition (a surprising number of Christian apologists use tools from the analytic tradition in their work).  Craig is an effective apologist for his tradition.

Craig has written one book (“God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism”), and posted several videos, where he criticizes adopting Platonist metaphysics in the Christian tradition (this is more common in the Protestant tradition than it is in Catholicism or Orthodoxy).  Craig is aware of the influence that Platonism has had on Christianity, but Craig thinks that the Platonic influence undermines Christianity in significant ways.

If I understand Craig correctly, Craig is disturbed by the way Plato talks about intelligibles, or noetic objects, also known as eternal objects.  Craig refers to these as ‘forms’ which is a standard usage.  Craig’s understanding of Platonic forms is that they are eternal and unchanging; that’s true, I mean that the forms are understood to be that way in Platonism.  But Craig argues that this undermines the uniqueness of God because being eternal and unchanging are characteristics of God that are considered by Craig in the exegetical tradition he grows out of, to be unique characteristics of God.  It follows that this undermines the independence and uniqueness of God because there are other things in the cosmos that share at least some of the attributes of God.

Craig offers that a way of resolving this, which Craig argues is something that at least some Christian Platonists took, is to reconfigure the forms as ‘ideas in the mind of God.’  I think Craig is right that this is a way that Christians can retain a sense of the noetic while at the same time arguing for the uniqueness, the divine aseity, of God.  However, according to some histories of Platonism I have read, the view that Platonic forms are ideas in the mind of God was put forward in a Platonist context among the Middle Platonists and was likely absorbed into Christianity from those resources.

Personally, I prefer a more traditional way of viewing the forms; that the forms are emanations of the One, of the fully transcendental, of God.  The difference between the forms and the One is that the forms are differentiated from each other whereas the One is undifferentiated unity that is beyond differentiation, before differentiation.  If you want to understand the presence of differentiation in the forms, consider that the eternity of the forms differentiates them from all that is ephemeral.  In addition, forms are differentiated from each other, but at the same time fully transparent to each other. 

The view that forms are ideas in the mind of God collapses the noetic realm into the realm of that which is ultimate; in this case God.  From this perspective, the three hypostases now become two and the noetic realm of forms disappears. 

I think that Craig thinks of God as having characteristics which is standard Christian theology; with the exception of some Christian mysticism.  In contrast the One is beyond characteristics and beyond being.  The One is beyond affirmation and negation, whereas the forms do have characteristics and traits.

The discussion between Christianity and Platonism has been going on for two thousand years.  The discussion has a dialectical feel to it in the sense that both sides are committed to uncovering metaphysical truth.  I think the differences between the two traditions is a kind of creative, fire producing, light giving, presence that has led participants to focus on certain issues intensely.  I think that is a good thing. 

(As an aside, when I say these kinds of discussions have a long history, a good example of this centered on a treatise written by Proclus called On the Eternity of the World.  It contains eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.  It is my personal favorite of the works of Proclus.  This work was disliked by Christians because Christians have the view that the world was created by God and will end at some point in the future as part of God’s plan.  From this perspective the world is not eternal.  In response to this treatise of Proclus, a Christian writer, Philoponus, wrote a critique of this work by Proclus titled Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.  I think I have mentioned this before on this blog, but it has been a while and I think it fits in with the discussion about William Lane Craig.  The dispute between Proclus and Philoponus is not exactly the same point of divine aseity, but both of them are engaged in distinguishing Christianity from Platonism; and I think the points they raise are related.)

4.  Haiku

The sound of spring wind

Isn’t the same as the sound
Of eternity.

 

 

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