Brief Notes on Various Topics - 88

16 March 2022

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 88

1.  Trappists

It was recently announced that the monks of the founding house of the Trappists, which is in France, is considering moving from its historic location.  Some posts on the internet are saying that the monks are ‘closing’ the Abbey, but that’s not correct.  I would put it that they are considering ‘downsizing’.  I think the tentative plan is to find a new location by 2028.  The main reason appears to be that the Abbey has only 20 monks now with very few new vocations and it is just not enough to maintain the very large Abbey they have inherited (this may also indicate a lack of donations, though the posts I have read don’t mention that).

The Abbey was founded in 1122 and has a continuous monastic presence since that time.  The monastic reform that transformed the Abbey into the Mother House for the Trappists goes back to the 17^th century.

I see this as another indication of the diminishing presence of what I refer to as the Ascetic Ideal.  I see this as another indication as to why it is difficult to approach Platonism as a spiritual tradition grounded in the Ascetic Ideal; because the Ascetic Ideal is simply not understood in our culture at this time.  The Ascetic Ideal is countercultural.

2.  The Critique of Gnosticism by Plotinus

A friend of mine, in response to my post last week that refers to Plotinus’s ‘Against the Gnostics’, pointed out that the critique of Gnosticism would apply equally to Theurgy.  What my friend was getting at is that one of the main criticisms of Gnosticism from Plotinus is that the Gnostics multiplied hypostases, level of reality, and other cosmological categories, for no apparent reason; they also multiplied types of living entities.  This unnecessary complexity is something that Plotinus rejects.  I think the main reason for this rejection is that such multiplication of entities is not based on contemplation; rather it is based on mental conjuration.

The same could be said for Theurgy when it multiplies types of deities and multiplies ritual contexts based on dubious claims.  And the insertion of Henads into the Platonic metaphysical system is exactly the kind of thing that Plotinus was criticizing in ‘Against the Gnostics.’

3.  Lake Wisdom

Reading Plato and Plotinus is like paddling a canoe on a summer lake; not at first.  At first reading Plato and Plotinus is difficult though difficulty varies with specific writings.  For example, a dialogue like “The Symposium” or an Ennead like “On Beauty” are accessible and are good starting points for reading in the Platonic tradition.

But at first there is a need to become familiar with the tradition’s vocabulary and its overall stance on philosophical issues.  This is a challenge because Platonism differs from modern philosophy and so there is a natural friction that arises when someone familiar with modern philosophy begins to study Plato and Plotinus.

But after some time, which can be a few months to a few years, the reading kind of glides, the reading becomes a pleasure.  One begins to look forward to it and such reading often becomes a daily practice that nourishes one’s whole day.

4.  A Comment on Whitehead

As regular readers know, I am fond of Alfred North Whitehead and his Process and Reality.  But I was thinking about ethical restraint in Platonism and it occurred to me that there are no teachings on ethical restraint, or asceses, in Whitehead.  This might indicate that Whitehead approaches Platonism primarily in the way that mathematicians approach Platonism.  I mean that mathematicians seem to be impressed by the explanatory range and power of Platonism as applied to the field of mathematics.  I get it; it is impressive.

But from my perspective that relationship to Platonism hovers around the edges of Platonism rather than getting to the heart of Platonism, which is to adopt a renunciate life in order to turn away from the confusions and seductions of the material world.  This is accomplished by adopting the ethical restraints. 

I see the practice of ethical restraints as presented in Platonism as foundational because ethical restraints shift one’s attention from pursuing pleasure to pursuing wisdom, because living a life of ethical restraint opens the door to living in the world based on the Ascetic Ideal, because ethical restraint aligns one with the Good and the One, because ethical restraint is the means for recognizing the presence of eternity.

5.  Plotinus on the Affections of the Soul

“In general, our theory and intent is not to submit the soul to changes and alterations like the warming and cooling of bodies.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead 3.6: “On the Impassibility of Things without Bodies”, Edited by Lloyd Gerson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 309, ISBN: 9781009604970)

“For how can the part of soul above that which experiences affections and the part above sense-perception and in general any part of soul, be unchangeable when vice, false beliefs, and mindlessness occur in connection with the soul?  In addition, acts of appropriation and alienation occur in the soul when it feels pleasure and pain, when it is angry, jealous, acquisitive, desirous, and in general when it is not at all still but moves and changes in response to each thing that impinges on it.”

(As above, page 309)

“But perhaps in most cases what is termed the vice of this part of the soul is a bad state of the body and virtue the opposite, so that in neither case is there any addition to the soul.”

(As above, page 312)

5.1  I have come to view the soul as partless even though Platonists have routinely talked about various parts of the soul and how these parts have affections, afflictions, and tendencies.  It was helpful to find that Plotinus raises some of the questions about the idea that the soul has parts and affections; no doubt I was partly moved to take on the view that the soul is partless due to these questions that Plotinus raised.  I’m not saying that Plotinus had the view of a partless soul; I am suggesting that some of the questions Plotinus raises about the soul can, when considered and followed out in a direction that Plotinus himself did not take, lead to the view that the soul has no parts.

5.2  I take the view that the unchangeable nature of the soul that Plotinus refers to is due to the soul being the presence of the One in each individual.  The One is unity as such and the presence of the One in material individuals is what makes, or causes, the individual to be a particular thing.  Without the presence of the One in each individual there would be no individuals, no things because there would be no underlying unity.

5.2.1  Plotinus, and other Platonists, view the soul as emerging in the third hypostasis; but I see the soul as always connected to the first hypostasis.  In a way you could say that the soul is the first hypostasis.

It is time that emerges in the third hypostasis, time and cyclic existence.  The presence of time in the individual connects the individual with the third hypostasis.

And it is differentiation that gives rise to all the affections and tendencies of the individual.  Differentiation comes from mind; mind and differentiation have their origin in the second hypostasis.  The presence of differentiation and mind in the individual is the presence of the Noetic.

From this perspective, each individual is a microcosmos of the Platonic metaphysical cosmology:

The One                                 Soul/Unity

Nous/Differentiation         Mind/Differentiation

Time                                       Body/Becoming and Begoning

All of the affections are manifestations of differentiation and therefore found in mind.  Mind and body need to be purified, but soul does not because the soul is never impure, because the One is never impure.  This view is briefly mentioned in the third quote where Plotinus suggests (using ‘perhaps’) that vice in a part of the soul is actually a bad state of the body.  I would add, ‘or the mind.’  Again, I am not suggesting that Plotinus adopted this view, but Plotinus drops some hints regarding this view and its implications.  If these hints are seeds, it seems I have been watering those seeds and I’m beginning to see them sprout.

6.  Becoming a Platonist

It’s a bit of a paradox, becoming a Platonist.  I mean that Platonism is primarily focused on the Good and the One, the transcendental which is beyond time, beyond change, beyond becoming and begoning.  But as human beings who have taken birth in material existence we are embedded in becoming and begoning.  The trick here is to use becoming and begoning as means for transcendental understanding. 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 69

20 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 69

1.  Plato and Newton

Chapter III of Whitehead’s Process and Reality is titled ‘The Order of Nature.’  This Chapter is Whitehead’s analysis of cosmology and in this presentation Whitehead contrasts Newton’s views, as presented in Newton’s Scholium, with Plato’s views as presented in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus.  I suspect that there are very few people who would be able to offer this kind of analysis because to do so requires a working knowledge of both Plato and Newton.

Whitehead views both cosmologies as having virtues, both as having strengths and weaknesses, though it seems to me that Whitehead slightly tilts towards the Timaeus in spite of what Whitehead sees as that dialogue’s shortcomings.  Certainly a lot has changed in cosmology since Plato, and a lot has changed since Newton.  But I find the presentation of these two, the way Whitehead contrasts both of them, to be insightful.

At the bottom of page 93 Whitehead brings the cosmological discussion to ultimate matters.  Whitehead quotes Newton, “When I wrote my treatise about our system [his cosmology] I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity, . . . “ (ellipsis by Whitehead).  Whitehead points out that “The concept in Newton’s mind is that of a fully articulated system requiring a definite supernatural origin . . . “  This is how Whitehead connects the Timaeus, with its Demiurge, with Newton and Newton’s drive to use his cosmology as a kind of elaborate argument for a supreme Deity. 

Whitehead sums up his own view, “The notion of God, . . . , is that of an actual entity immanent in the actual world, but transcending any future cosmic epoch – a being at once actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent.”  There is a lot in this brief statement, a lot to ponder.  But I think it points to the ultimate, the Good and the One, as occupying a both/and cosmological position; the both/and is that the ultimate in Platonism is both immanent and transcendent.  The ultimate is transcendent because it is beyond being.  The ultimate is immanent because the process of emanation means that the ultimate is present everywhere and everywhen. 

A question that remains for me is what Whitehead means by an ‘actual entity’ as it is not clear to me how the term actual entity would apply to that which is transcendent.  In addition, it’s not clear to me how the term ‘actual entity’ would apply to that which is ineffable, which is the view that Platonism has about the ultimate.  The ineffability of the Good and the One is foundational for Plato, Plotinus, for Dionysius the Areopagite, and so forth. 

Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Whitehead means by ‘actual entity.’  On the other hand, perhaps Whitehead is more of a rationalist than I had previously considered.  By ‘rationalist’ I mean that Whitehead seems to be indicating that the ultimate, God, is accessible through mental and conceptual analysis.  This is the position that both Descartes and Spinoza take and Whitehead was very familiar with these two thinkers.  Again, I may be misunderstanding Whitehead on this point.  Either way, I found the discussion about these contrasting cosmologies of Newton and Plato to be fruitful.

2.  Martyrs of Philosophy

I think it would be useful to bring the idea of martyrdom into a philosophical context.  I think this particularly applies to those of us who view Philosophy as a Dharma, a spiritual system and path, whose ultimate purpose is salvation.

I think taking such a view also places philosophers who have died for philosophy in a context that is more meaningful than the context(s) we use today to understand such a sacrifice.  The two greatest examples of martyrdom for philosophy are Socrates and Boethius.  Their deaths have many similarities that I find meaningful and both of them died for the sake of philosophy.

Here is a brief list of Martyrs of Philosophy:

 Socrates: 399 BCE

Rubellius Plautus: 62 CE

Seneca: 65 CE

Barea Soranus: 65 or 66 CE

Thrasea Paetus: 66 CE

Hypatia of Alexandria: 415 CE

Boethius: 524 CE

Thomas More: 1535 CE

Giordano Bruno: 1600 CE

Jan Patocka: 1977 CE

Philosophers such as Spinoza, Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and Karl Jaspers are examples of ‘near misses’, meaning that they were threatened by the State but narrowly missed being actually martyred.  Some modern philosophers such as Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have written about the inherent suffering that comes with a philosophical commitment to truth.  I think that is likely, but I would want to explore the specific nature of philosophical suffering, how it is similar and how it differs from suffering in general.

The cluster of Martyrs in the mid 60’s CE reflects Emperor Nero’s growing paranoia and hostility to Philosophy as such and Stoicism in particular.  Stoics of that time faced a great deal of hostility due to their commitments to ethical principles and their willingness to criticize Roman Emperors for failing to live ethical lives.  Following Nero there were several episodes where Philosophers as a class were exiled from Rome.  Stoics often took Socrates as a model for their own tradition and this allowed a philosopher like Seneca to accept Nero’s order for Seneca to kill himself.

Thomas More is on the list because many people understand his death as being a martyr for freedom of conscience and, in addition, More was also a philosopher along with his religious commitments.

I think it is likely that there are others; there are big gaps in time between the ones who are listed.  If any readers have suggestions please let me know in the comments below.

I think the positive effect of honoring Martyrs for Philosophy is that it focuses our attention on the inherently spiritual and salvific nature of philosophy which is an understanding that is missing from contemporary presentations.  I don’t think that Pierre Hadot talked about this kind of martyrdom, but Hadot does talk about Philosophy as a way of life grounded in ethical commitments and demands that ancient philosophers took seriously.  In some cases this was taken seriously enough so that it led to martyrdom.

3.  Plato and Technology

It’s interesting to recognize that Plato does not talk much about technology.  I think this is a result of his viewing existence from the perspective of eternity rather than from the perspective of progress.

4.  The Second Edition of the Gerson Translation of the Enneads

I recently purchased the new edition of the Enneads of Plotinus; the second edition of the Gerson led translation; Gerson was the head of the group that translated the Enneads.  I’m looking forward to reading it, but I don’t think I’ll get to it until 2026.  2026 isn’t very far away.

5.  Three Views of Platonism

I think that these days there are three primary views about Platonism.  I’m using the word ‘views’ to designate a broad understanding upon which other understandings are built.  The first view is what I call ‘academic’; you could call it analytical or intellectual (here ‘intellectual’ does not refer to the intellect of nous).  I use the term academic because it is the dominant view in academic culture.  The academic view is that Platonism is a philosophy in the way that contemporary philosophies are philosophies and should be treated with the same methods and approaches.  Aspects of Platonism, such as rebirth, noetic eternal objects, and the transcendent, that clash with the dominant philosophical view and academic culture in general are often simply not mentioned, or if they are it is only briefly and they tend to be treated as archaic superstitions that modern philosophy has left behind.

The second view is what I call ‘ritual efficacy.’  This view, known in Platonism as theurgy, argues that rituals done in a meticulous way are the means whereby the goals of Platonism can be attained.  This is a late classical deviation from Platonism, but it still has its adherents.

The third view is what I call ‘contemplative.’  The contemplative view of Platonism is that it is through contemplation that the student of Platonism arrives at the noetic, and following that, the transcendent.  It is the practice of contemplation which is at the center of the contemplative view.  The contemplative view has many secondary practices, such as purifications, including vegetarianism, sexual restraint, and other asceses.  The practice of wisdom is also a supporting practice for the contemplative in the sense that making clear distinctions supports the practice of contemplation (such as making the distinction between that which is ephemeral and that which is eternal).

The first two, the academic and the ritual views, are widespread, with the academic view dominant.  The contemplative view is, in contrast, a bit sidelined.  I wouldn’t say it is completely ignored, but I think it is, for the most part, not given the attention that the other two views receive.

I say this because in discussing Plotinus I often run into the framing of Plotinus as a ‘rationalist’ (I’ve mentioned this before).  It seems that the choices that people think about when considering Plotinus are that either Plotinus would be a ritualist or a rationalist.  But Plotinus is neither of these two; Plotinus was a contemplative as is, in my opinion, the Platonic tradition as a whole.

My feeling is that the contemplative view is difficult for people to access unless they practice contemplation and have some familiarity with the experiences that emerge from such practice.  In addition it is difficult to communicate to people what contemplation is.  The instructions for contemplation are not difficult, but it takes time for those practicing contemplation to get a feeling for what contemplation is.  For example, I have observed many beginners who think that contemplation means ‘thinking about’ as opposed to transcending the conceptual mind altogether. 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 65

22 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 65

1.  Dionysius the Areopagite and Contemplative Platonism

Last week I mentioned Johannes Scotus Eriugena and his work The Periphyseon.  I mentioned in passing that Eriugena had translated into Latin the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, in particular Mystical Theology.  Here I want to post some thoughts about Dionysius and his role in Late Classical Platonism as well as Christian Mysticism, also known as Contemplative Christianity.  I think it is an intriguing history of how Platonic Mysticism was transmitted to Christianity, impacting Christian Theology in general, and Christian Mysticism in particular.

Not much is known about Dionysius beyond the works he wrote (or the works attributed to him).  The traditional view of Dionysius, held by orthodox Christians for many centuries, is that he was the Dionysius who appears briefly in the Book of Acts in the scene where Paul preaches to the Athenians at the Areopagus.  In the Book of Acts it mentions by name several people who converted to Christianity at that time, one of whom was Dionysius.  Since Dionysius is a very common Greek name at that time, he is distinguished from others of the same name by referring to him as Dionysius the Areopagite.  The orthodox tradition has the view that the works attributed to Dionysius (both the ones that we have and a few that have not survived) were written by this Dionysius from the Book of Acts. 

Modern scholars almost universally disagree with this attribution for various reasons such as linguistics, quotations from later sources; things like that.  But pinning down who Dionysius was has proven difficult and there are many theories about who he was and when he wrote.  I’ve read theories that place Dionysius anywhere from the 300’s to the mid 500’s.  And there are many theories as to who Dionysius was and where he was from.  One interesting theory I’ve encountered is that Dionysius was a pen name for Damascius who was the last head of Plato’s Academy when it was closed by Justinian in 529 CE.  The idea is that Damascius, or possibly a Christian member of the Academy at the time of the closing, penned the works attributed to Dionysius as a way of preserving some basic teachings of Platonism in the new context of Christianity which had triumphed over Paganism.  On the other hand, a recently published work that translates a 9^th century biography of Dionysius offers an extensive apology for the traditional, orthodox, view that Dionysius was the Apostle of Paul from the Book of Acts.

For those interested in the orthodox view the latest book presented this perspective is The Life of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, published in January 2024.  For those interested in the idea that Dionysius was actually Damascius, in 2006 Carlo Maria Mazzucchi wrote an article presenting this perspective, though I’m not sure of the journal. 

Mystical Theology is a brief work; something like five to seven pages, depending on the layout.  In five sections it describes the mystical ascent in terms of entering into a luminous darkness, an ineffable presence beyond affirmation and negation.  Those familiar with Plotinus can see the connection to passages in the Enneads where Plotinus talks about turning away from the material realm, then turning away from the noetic, in order to become absorbed in that which is beyond being, the Good and the One. 

The mystical ascent in Platonism, and in Dionysius specifically, is about divesting yourself of differentiation and individuation.  I think that is why Dionysius uses the vocabulary of ascending into darkness; because this realm is beyond the light of reason.

This understanding of mysticism is the root of Christian mysticism and it has a Platonic origin.  Mystical Theology had, and still has, a profound impact on orthodox Christianity; for example, a work like The Cloud of Unknowing is rooted in Mystical Theology as are many other works down to the current day.

2.  The Modern World and Mysticism

I saw a talk online that suggested that mystics are vanishing from society.  I wonder if that is true.  My inclination is to think that it is harder these days for a mystic to find a place or organization that is devoted to pursuing mystic realization and living in accordance with the disciplines and ethical restraints that are foundational for mysticism.  We live in a society that rejects the idea of transcendence, a society that is secular, reductionistic, and materialistic; these are not nourishing to an understanding of mysticism.

The talk I listened to quoted Jung as having this view; the view that mystics are vanishing from society.  Personally, I don’t consider Jung to be a mystic, but putting that aside, he may have spotted this kind of trend decades ago.  I suspect others have as well.

But I have also observed that mystics seem to be up to the challenge of the modern world; I mean that mystics do the best they can given the circumstances, which, I think, has always been the case. 

Today a mystic faces the challenge of figuring out how to walk his path without social approval or support.  There are very few teachers or resources or institutions that will assist someone trying to walk this path.  But that’s OK; it’s a challenge for sure, but the difficulties are not insurmountable. 

3.  Precepts of Platonism

If I were to mimic Dharmic traditions by generating a list of core precepts that I think capture the heart of the Dharma of Platonism, I think it would look something like this:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

3.1  These are based on the five precepts, or vows, found in Dharmic traditions such as Classical Yoga and Jainism, as well as Buddhism.  I believe I have posted these previously, but I’m going to put them here to make it easy to compare them:

Classical Yoga and Jainism

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

Here is the Buddhist version:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

3.2  I have used a formulaic approach to the language of these precepts; books readers might consult may use a different kind of language structure, but I do not think these lists are misleading.  I am taking the view that the ethical injunctions are all ethical restraints and the formula I am using emphasizes that perspective.

3.3  Classical Yoga and Jainism share a common fifth precept; to refrain from acquiring unnecessary possessions.  Buddhism has a different fifth precept; to refrain from intoxicants.  I decided to include both of them since both of these restraints are found in Platonic writings.

3.4  I have an inclination to include a precept that emphasizes vegetarianism.  It might look something like this: I will refrain from harming animals by eating them, by wearing their skin or fur, or by sacrificing them for ritual or other purposes.  Both Classical Yoga and Jainism are vegetarian traditions, but they do not have a separate vow for vegetarianism; rather vegetarianism is considered to be the application of the first vow, the vow of non-harming, to the animal-human relationship.  I decided to go along with that; but I do feel a bit ambivalent about that.  My ambivalence is that by emphasizing vegetarianism with a separate vow a structure would be created that would point directly to the important place it has held in the Platonist tradition.  For those new to Platonism I think this could be very helpful.  I don’t think such pointing is necessary for Classical Yoga and Jainism because in their cultural context the practice of vegetarianism in these traditions is so widely known.

3.4.1  It’s worth noting that in East Asia there is a more complex series of ethical commitments referred to as the Bodhisattva Vows.  These vows are available to lay people who want to deepen their Buddhist commitments and practice.  In the East Asian Bodhisattva vows vegetarianism is explicitly required in the third of the 48 minor precepts (there are 10 major precepts) which has had an impact on East Asian culture in general.  I’m not going to list the Bodhisattva Vows here because they are too complex in comparison to the five vows of the Jains, Classical Yoga, and Buddhism.  But perhaps in a possible commentary I might bring them into the discussion.

3.5  My tentative plan is to expand on each of the Platonic Precepts of Philosophy by quoting passages from the Dialogues, the Enneads, and other Platonist sources so that the source from which the Precepts of Philosophy emerge can be made clear.  I have already done this with the First Precept of Non-Harming and posted them to this blog (to find these quotes click on ‘Non-harming’ on the list of topics to the right).  In some ways this is a big project, but I am willing to go at a slow pace to bring it to a conclusion.

3.6  An objection to this kind of project is that Platonism has not, in fact, generated such a list of Ethical Restraints or Precepts and therefore the list is misleading. 

3.6.1  My first response is that there are many ideas and interpretations in the history of Platonism that are not explicitly found in the Dialogues; and, in addition, this is true for all spiritual traditions. 

3.6.2  My second response is that such a list is a kind of a teaching device, a distillation, of Platonist Ethics and the practice of those ethics.  There have been many such distillations such as essays describing the different hypostases and how they interact. 

3.6.3  My third response is that the Platonic tradition seems to have lost sight of the ethical restraints found in Platonism.  When I say we have ‘lost sight’ of these practices, I mean that even though we may read about them, they don’t register as actual practices, actual things we can do to practice the Dharma of Platonism.  I feel that many people don’t know what to do to practice Platonism.  This structure opens the door to doing Platonism.

3.7  I like the idea of following how Jainism interprets their precepts, or vows (vrata), in several ways, depending on the life situation of the practitioner.  For monastics, their vows are interpreted very strictly.  For laypeople, much less so.  I think the same could be done successfully with these Precepts of Philosophy.

4.  The Sentences of Porphyry – Sentence 11

Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts, and multiplies about individuals with a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power.  (Thomas Taylor)

The incorporeal existences in descending are divided and multiplies into atomic things by a remission of power, whilst in ascending they are unified, and revert to inseparateness by superabundance of power.  (Thomas Davidson)

When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the individual.  When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and their power intensifies.  (Kenneth Guthrie)

When immaterial beings descend, they divide into parts and branch out, multiplying in their individual manifestations of power, but when they ascend, they unite and return to simultaneous existence in unity through increased power.  (Isaak Samarskyi)

4.1  I read this as an elegant summary by Porphyry of the process of descent into the material realm, followed by the process of the return to the noetic, and beyond the noetic to the One.  Porphyry manages to describe these processes concisely and at the same time, with insight.  I think it reflects, or embodies, Porphyry’s own experience of returning to the One.

4.2  Porphyry begins by explaining how the incorporeal, or immaterial, becomes, or descends, into the material realm.  Porphyry describes this as division of noetic, or hypostatic, unities into parts.  Because this is a highly condensed presentation, Porphyry does not go into the specifics of the process of division into parts that noetic unities undergo, though later Platonists, such as Proclus, will focus on this and offer their understanding of how this process unfolds.

I tend to use the concept ‘differentiation’ to describe the movement from unity to noetic realities, and then from noetic realities to material instantiations.  This process of differentiation resembles the way light breaks up into different colors when light flows through a crystal.  Or the way a river will branch out in a delta.  Or the way a song will be performed differently by different singers and musicians. 

4.3  Interestingly, there is the idea in this Sentence that there is a loss of ‘power’ as differentiation increases; the more a material entity is the result of a series of differentiations, the less power it has.  I think the term ‘power’ here means ‘metaphysical power’ and, further, that this is referring to a thing’s potentialities.  For example, the number 7 in the noetic hypostasis has enormous potential, unlimited possibilities.  But because noetic numbers have no content, this power of possibilities remains a potential.  In contrast, 7 apples is a limited manifestation of the noetic reality of 7.  7 apples are differentiated from 7 chairs, 7 days, and 7 stars.  7 chairs have some potential; for example, it could potentially refer to 7 oak chairs, 7 old chairs, 7 rocking chairs, and so forth.  But all of those potentialities are contained in 7 as a noetic reality so the potentiality of 7 chairs is less than, which is to say has less power than, 7 as a noetic presence.

4.4  The Sentence then reverses the process to describe the ascent to the noetic from the material.  When we ascend, we become more unified, less differentiated, but at the same time we have more power in our understanding, vision, and potential.  Finally, there is a return to unity as such, meaning a return to the One.

5.  Whitehead and Heidegger

I found an essay online that is a thoughtful presentation of the differences between Heidegger and Whitehead.  The essay is by Jay McDaniel whom I have not heard of before.  He is a philosopher, evidently a follower of Whitehead, who likes to post essays on various topics at his blog called Open Horizons which is found at openhorizons (dot) org.  The specific essay I’m referring to is titled “Love and Mystery.”  If you are interested in the differences and overlaps between Whitehead and Heidegger I recommend the essay as a good summary.

McDaniel, in one section of the essay, lists the various critiques Heidegger had of metaphysics.  In item 6 McDaniel writes “Heidegger argues that metaphysics has exhausted itself and reached its ‘end.’  This does not mean metaphysics has been resolved or completed, but rather that it has reached a point where it can no longer meaningfully address the question of being.”

This perspective is a primary reason why I ultimately rejected Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of philosophy.  But I want to make one point that McDaniel doesn’t touch on; and that is that this idea of the ‘end of metaphysics’ is, surprisingly, a typical modernist stance regarding the past and what the past has to offer us.  I mean that one of the foundations of modernism is that it regards the past as void of any positive content, void of wisdom or insight, that the past is solely something to overcome and to leave behind. 

It is typical of modernist views that those who offer them want to start over; a kind of Year Zero project.  I think the first manifestation of this was the French Revolution which sought to eliminate all traces of the past; those who were seen as clinging to the past were to be eliminated. 

If you read modernist theory, particularly in the realm of politics and related fields, this idea is a steady drumbeat.  It seems to me that Heidegger is marching to that drum.  In other words, Heidegger’s rejection of the tradition of metaphysics fits right in with modernity’s overall project of starting over with Year Zero.

From this perspective, the perspective of modernity, those who engage in metaphysics are by that very engagement reactionaries.  McDaniel writes, “. . . the Heideggerians I encountered were profoundly suspicious of metaphysics, often rejecting it outright.”  As I mentioned in a previous post, from this perspective analytic philosophy and Heidegger’s philosophy have the same anti-metaphysical impact.

In a way, we can think of a work like Whitehead’s Process and Reality as a refutation of Heidegger’s thesis about the ‘end of metaphysics.’  Process and Reality is consciously rooted in the heritage of metaphysical thought going back to Plato.  Whitehead finds that heritage nourishing and vividly interacts with it to make his own original observations.  (Perhaps this positive view of the heritage of metaphysics was shaped by Whitehead’s interest in mathematics; it would be difficult for a mathematician to reject the history of mathematics in the way modernity rejects so much else.)  I’m not saying that Whitehead wrote Process and Reality in order to refute Heidegger; McDaniel writes that, as far as scholars can tell, the two were almost entirely unaware of each other.  I mean that Process and Reality is a rejection of Heidegger’s views on metaphysics because it is a demonstration that metaphysics has not, for example, reached its ‘end.’

For contemporary Platonists I think it is helpful to get some clarity about what Heidegger says about metaphysics in general and about Plato in particular.  Some of the strange hostility to metaphysics one encounters these days is rooted in Heidegger’s application of modernity’s hostility to the past to metaphysics.  As I mentioned in a previous post about this, the best way to counter these kinds of ideas is simply to continue one’s studies of metaphysics and to apply such studies to how one lives one’s life.  In this way the great garden of metaphysics will continue to blossom.

6.  It is late at night.  There was another brief rain today in the desert where I live.  This cleared the air and when the sun set behind the mountain range in the distance the air was exceptionally clear. 

There are times when I feel a deep sadness at the state of the world and the fate that human beings have made their destiny.  But there are consolations, messages from the noetic, that can soothe the sense of alienation from this world.  An astonishingly beautiful sunset is one such message.  The cooling stillness of contemplation is another.  The writings of the Platonic tradition are yet another.  Experiences like this are like opening a gate to the grotto of eternity.