20 October 2025
Brief Notes on Various Topics – 69
1. Plato and Newton
Chapter III of Whitehead’s Process and Reality is titled ‘The Order of Nature.’ This Chapter is Whitehead’s analysis of cosmology and in this presentation Whitehead contrasts Newton’s views, as presented in Newton’s Scholium, with Plato’s views as presented in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. I suspect that there are very few people who would be able to offer this kind of analysis because to do so requires a working knowledge of both Plato and Newton.
Whitehead views both cosmologies as having virtues, both as having strengths and weaknesses, though it seems to me that Whitehead slightly tilts towards the Timaeus in spite of what Whitehead sees as that dialogue’s shortcomings. Certainly a lot has changed in cosmology since Plato, and a lot has changed since Newton. But I find the presentation of these two, the way Whitehead contrasts both of them, to be insightful.
At the bottom of page 93 Whitehead brings the cosmological discussion to ultimate matters. Whitehead quotes Newton, “When I wrote my treatise about our system [his cosmology] I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity, . . . “ (ellipsis by Whitehead). Whitehead points out that “The concept in Newton’s mind is that of a fully articulated system requiring a definite supernatural origin . . . “ This is how Whitehead connects the Timaeus, with its Demiurge, with Newton and Newton’s drive to use his cosmology as a kind of elaborate argument for a supreme Deity.
Whitehead sums up his own view, “The notion of God, . . . , is that of an actual entity immanent in the actual world, but transcending any future cosmic epoch – a being at once actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent.” There is a lot in this brief statement, a lot to ponder. But I think it points to the ultimate, the Good and the One, as occupying a both/and cosmological position; the both/and is that the ultimate in Platonism is both immanent and transcendent. The ultimate is transcendent because it is beyond being. The ultimate is immanent because the process of emanation means that the ultimate is present everywhere and everywhen.
A question that remains for me is what Whitehead means by an ‘actual entity’ as it is not clear to me how the term actual entity would apply to that which is transcendent. In addition, it’s not clear to me how the term ‘actual entity’ would apply to that which is ineffable, which is the view that Platonism has about the ultimate. The ineffability of the Good and the One is foundational for Plato, Plotinus, for Dionysius the Areopagite, and so forth.
Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Whitehead means by ‘actual entity.’ On the other hand, perhaps Whitehead is more of a rationalist than I had previously considered. By ‘rationalist’ I mean that Whitehead seems to be indicating that the ultimate, God, is accessible through mental and conceptual analysis. This is the position that both Descartes and Spinoza take and Whitehead was very familiar with these two thinkers. Again, I may be misunderstanding Whitehead on this point. Either way, I found the discussion about these contrasting cosmologies of Newton and Plato to be fruitful.
2. Martyrs of Philosophy
I think it would be useful to bring the idea of martyrdom into a philosophical context. I think this particularly applies to those of us who view Philosophy as a Dharma, a spiritual system and path, whose ultimate purpose is salvation.
I think taking such a view also places philosophers who have died for philosophy in a context that is more meaningful than the context(s) we use today to understand such a sacrifice. The two greatest examples of martyrdom for philosophy are Socrates and Boethius. Their deaths have many similarities that I find meaningful and both of them died for the sake of philosophy.
Here is a brief list of Martyrs of Philosophy:
Philosophers such as Spinoza, Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and Karl Jaspers are examples of ‘near misses’, meaning that they were threatened by the State but narrowly missed being actually martyred. Some modern philosophers such as Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have written about the inherent suffering that comes with a philosophical commitment to truth. I think that is likely, but I would want to explore the specific nature of philosophical suffering, how it is similar and how it differs from suffering in general.
The cluster of Martyrs in the mid 60’s CE reflects Emperor Nero’s growing paranoia and hostility to Philosophy as such and Stoicism in particular. Stoics of that time faced a great deal of hostility due to their commitments to ethical principles and their willingness to criticize Roman Emperors for failing to live ethical lives. Following Nero there were several episodes where Philosophers as a class were exiled from Rome. Stoics often took Socrates as a model for their own tradition and this allowed a philosopher like Seneca to accept Nero’s order for Seneca to kill himself.
Thomas More is on the list because many people understand his death as being a martyr for freedom of conscience and, in addition, More was also a philosopher along with his religious commitments.
I think it is likely that there are others; there are big gaps in time between the ones who are listed. If any readers have suggestions please let me know in the comments below.
I think the positive effect of honoring Martyrs for Philosophy is that it focuses our attention on the inherently spiritual and salvific nature of philosophy which is an understanding that is missing from contemporary presentations. I don’t think that Pierre Hadot talked about this kind of martyrdom, but Hadot does talk about Philosophy as a way of life grounded in ethical commitments and demands that ancient philosophers took seriously. In some cases this was taken seriously enough so that it led to martyrdom.
3. Plato and Technology
It’s interesting to recognize that Plato does not talk much about technology. I think this is a result of his viewing existence from the perspective of eternity rather than from the perspective of progress.
4. The Second Edition of the Gerson Translation of the Enneads
I recently purchased the new edition of the Enneads of Plotinus; the second edition of the Gerson led translation; Gerson was the head of the group that translated the Enneads. I’m looking forward to reading it, but I don’t think I’ll get to it until 2026. 2026 isn’t very far away.
5. Three Views of Platonism
I think that these days there are three primary views about Platonism. I’m using the word ‘views’ to designate a broad understanding upon which other understandings are built. The first view is what I call ‘academic’; you could call it analytical or intellectual (here ‘intellectual’ does not refer to the intellect of nous). I use the term academic because it is the dominant view in academic culture. The academic view is that Platonism is a philosophy in the way that contemporary philosophies are philosophies and should be treated with the same methods and approaches. Aspects of Platonism, such as rebirth, noetic eternal objects, and the transcendent, that clash with the dominant philosophical view and academic culture in general are often simply not mentioned, or if they are it is only briefly and they tend to be treated as archaic superstitions that modern philosophy has left behind.
The second view is what I call ‘ritual efficacy.’ This view, known in Platonism as theurgy, argues that rituals done in a meticulous way are the means whereby the goals of Platonism can be attained. This is a late classical deviation from Platonism, but it still has its adherents.
The third view is what I call ‘contemplative.’ The contemplative view of Platonism is that it is through contemplation that the student of Platonism arrives at the noetic, and following that, the transcendent. It is the practice of contemplation which is at the center of the contemplative view. The contemplative view has many secondary practices, such as purifications, including vegetarianism, sexual restraint, and other asceses. The practice of wisdom is also a supporting practice for the contemplative in the sense that making clear distinctions supports the practice of contemplation (such as making the distinction between that which is ephemeral and that which is eternal).
The first two, the academic and the ritual views, are widespread, with the academic view dominant. The contemplative view is, in contrast, a bit sidelined. I wouldn’t say it is completely ignored, but I think it is, for the most part, not given the attention that the other two views receive.
I say this because in discussing Plotinus I often run into the framing of Plotinus as a ‘rationalist’ (I’ve mentioned this before). It seems that the choices that people think about when considering Plotinus are that either Plotinus would be a ritualist or a rationalist. But Plotinus is neither of these two; Plotinus was a contemplative as is, in my opinion, the Platonic tradition as a whole.
My feeling is that the contemplative view is difficult for people to access unless they practice contemplation and have some familiarity with the experiences that emerge from such practice. In addition it is difficult to communicate to people what contemplation is. The instructions for contemplation are not difficult, but it takes time for those practicing contemplation to get a feeling for what contemplation is. For example, I have observed many beginners who think that contemplation means ‘thinking about’ as opposed to transcending the conceptual mind altogether.
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