Brief Notes- on Various Topics - 67

6 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 67

1.  Julian the Apostate

I read that David Litwa is translating Julian the Apostate’s Against the Galileans.  Julian (331 – 363 CE) was the last Pagan Emperor of the Roman world.  He became Emperor following a number of Christian Emperors.  Julian attempted to reestablish Pagan institutions, temples, and rituals including animal sacrifice, that is to say blood sacrifice, which Julian practiced with great enthusiasm.  Julian’s plan to reestablish Paganism failed for a variety of reasons; personally I think it was simply too late to turn back the Christian tide.  I suspect that even if Julian had lived longer he would not have been successful.

1.1  Litwa’s translation of Against the Galileans is the latest in a series of translations of Pagan critiques of Christianity translated by Litwa.  Litwa previously has translated the fragmentary remains of Celsus and Porphyry who wrote works that were highly critical of Christianity.  The translation of Julian is the third in the series.  I’ve read Litwa’s translations of Celsus and Porphyry and look forward to reading the translation of Julian.

1.2  Platonism at the time of Julian was in a difficult situation.  On the one hand, Pagan Platonism, represented by the Academy in Athens and other teaching centers such as Alexandria, was highly critical of Christianity.  On the other hand, Christian Platonism had taken root and was finding a place in the emerging Christian tradition; it is true that Christian Platonism modified the tradition, producing what I refer to as a kind of hyphenated Platonism.  But even so, Platonism was finding a home among Christian theologians, a place in the emerging new cultural context.

1.2.1  What I think is often overlooked is that the form of Pagan Platonism that was competing with Christianity at the time of Julian was Theurgic Platonism and it is my contention that Theurgic Platonism is just as hyphenated as Christian Platonism and in some ways I would argue that Theurgic Platonism was more altered than Christian Platonism.  I say this because Platonism at that time was governed by the writings of Iamblichus and in particular the critique that Iamblichus wrote of Porphyry’s commitments to refraining from killing animals either for food or for religious ritual sacrifice which Iamblichus presented in what is now called On the Mysteries. 

It is difficult to overemphasize how Iamblichus altered Platonism as a whole in order to advocate for the necessity of blood sacrifice in some theurgic contexts.  For example, it completely changed Platonist ethics and undermined the possibility of the mystical ascent.  It was this kind of hyphenated Platonism that Julian was steeped in and was an advocate for.  It seems that Julian thought of Iamblichus as on an at least equal status as Plato and for that reason I think you could say that Julian was an Iamblichean rather than a Platonist.

1.3  The overall point I want to make is that Christian Platonism, and Christianity in general at that time, did not advocate for the ritual sacrifice of animals; in fact Christian Emperors either restricted such sacrifice or outlawed it altogether.  As I understand it, the reasons for outlawing animal sacrifice in Christianity were theological rather than ethical; I mean that Christianity outlawed animal sacrifice because Jesus was understood to be the final sacrifice and therefore other sacrifices, such as animal sacrifice, were unnecessary, and in a sense blasphemous.

But regardless of the reasons, Christianity brought an end to animal sacrifice.  From an Orthodox Platonist perspective, that is a very good thing.  From the perspective of Orthodox Platonist ethics, that was good for Platonism.

1.4  The way I see it is that Christianity at that time rescued Platonism from Theurgy by putting a stop to a system whose main goal and purpose was the justification of ritual animal slaughter.  I don’t mean to say that Christianity had that purpose in mind; I suspect that Christians outlawed ritual animal slaughter in order to further solidify their power.  But I am saying that rescuing Platonism from a descent into Theurgically sponsored mayhem was an unintended consequence of their program.  I’m looking at this in terms of cause and effect rather than psychological intention.

2.  The God of the Philosophers

Sometimes theologians (I find that this happens mostly among theologians, not so much amongst philosophers) in the West contrast what they call ‘The God of the Philosophers’ as opposed to ‘The God of Scripture’ or ‘The God of Revelation.’  I don’t think it is a major topic in Western Theology, but I find it reappearing now and then.

The contrast arose because the characteristics of God, such as immutability, eternity, and so forth, that are found in treatises by philosophers are difficult to reconcile with the God of Scripture.  For example, if God is immutable (changeless), then how would it be possible for God to respond to prayers or to enter into history in the way described in the revealed texts of the monotheistic tradition?  There are other conundrums that arise in this context. 

I think the most pressing contrast between the Theology of the Philosophers and the Theology of the Monotheists is that the God of the Philosophers tends to be impersonal.  In contrast, the God of Monotheism is a personal God with whom individuals have a personal relationship that very much resembles the relationships a human being has with other human beings.  Two examples of the impersonal nature of the God of the Philosophers are Plotinus and Spinoza.  For Plotinus, God is encountered by transcending all differentiation which implies leaving personhood behind.  For Spinoza God is encountered as the underlying nature, that is constantly modified into specific appearances, that eternally abides as the source of appearances, including the appearance of human beings. 

For neither Spinoza nor Plotinus does God have any features or characteristics upon which a relationship that resembles a human relationship may be established.  When it comes to the God of the Philosophers, the goal is not to have a relationship with God, but to be absorbed in his presence which transcends all material appearances.  In a sense you could say that being absorbed in the presence of God is a kind of relationship; but even if that is granted the nature of the relationship differs from the personal relationship found in Monotheistic traditions.  The relationship to the God of the Philosophers is more like our relationship to the sun; we have such a relationship, and it is an important one, but it doesn’t feel like a personal relationship.

One of the things I have noticed about the literature of this issue is that non-Western understandings of God are not brought into the discussion.  I mean that the Hindu understanding of Brahman and Brahman’s relationship to Atman is not part of the discussion.  Neither is the relationship of the Tao to material appearances part of the discussion.  I find this frustrating because I suspect that bringing in non-Western analyses of an issue like this could be quite fruitful.

3.  Are the Laws in Laws Harsh?

In reading Plato’s Dialogue Laws I sometimes run into sections where the punishment for breaking a law was, it seemed to me, harsh; at least that was my initial response.  I am thinking of, for example, the use of the death penalty for theft when the theft is of items from a temple; there are other examples, but that is the one I tend to recall most often.  I come from a society where the death penalty is rarely used and when it is used it is because of some extraordinary aspect of the crime.  My society tends to congratulate itself on this; I mean that it tends to think of itself as better than other societies that used the death penalty much more frequently and for a variety of crimes in a routine way.  Many people in my society would like to see the death penalty eliminated altogether.

If Laws is read as a treatise for how to organize a community at the political level, these kinds of questions will naturally arise.  I mean that a reader will naturally compare the laws of his own community, along with their punishments for a guilty verdict, to those found in the Laws.  This kind of engagement can become complicated as there are a lot of laws and punishments to compare.  A plus with this kind of engagement with Laws is that it provides an opportunity for questioning one’s own uncritical views because of the contrast of those views with that offered in the Laws. 

A careful reading of a dialogue like Laws, with its wealth of detail and with the meticulous way it investigates certain matters of public life (for example, the long discussion about consuming alcohol), is that it provides an opportunity for understanding how various aspects of Platonism fit together.  For example, how would the use of the death penalty in Laws fit with Plato’s teachings on non-harming found in Crito? 

Finally, I think these kinds of teachings found in Laws can be unpacked as allegorical teachings for the dedicated practitioner on the spiritual path.  When Plato writes that a certain activity requires the application of the death penalty when the perpetrator of that activity is found guilty, it is an indication of how seriously Plato takes this situation and I think what Plato is communicating to those on the spiritual path is that the tendency to indulge in that activity must be slain, avoided at all costs, if they want to complete the spiritual journey.  For example, the theft of items from a temple is allegorically the ‘theft’ of the spiritual impulse for the purposes of material goals and indulgences.  If this continues, it will severely damage the spiritual prospects of the student.  Therefore, the impulse must be slain.

Using such strong allegorical language is not unusual in spiritual literature.  In Chapter 5 of the Tao Te Ching it says that the Sage treats human beings like straw dogs; straw dogs where ritually sacrificed by throwing them into a sacrificial fire.  In verses 294 and 295 of the Dhammapada the Buddha talks about slaying your mother and father.  This is traditionally understood as slaying one’s attachments; in addition, monastics in Buddhism are commonly referred to as ‘home-leavers’.  And the Bhagavad Gita is one long allegorical battle between desire and liberation (at least some interpret it that way).  There are many examples of this kind of usage in spiritual literature.  The Laws can be read this way as well.

One way of examining whether or not it makes sense to read Laws allegorically is to see if an allegorical reading makes Laws more consistent with the rest of the Dialogues of Plato.  For example, when Plato asks for capital punishment for breaking a law in Laws that would seem to clash, or be inconsistent with, Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation in a dialogue like Crito.  But if we read Laws allegorically and read the dialogue as a guide to spiritual practice, then the clash in this particular case, and other cases, is resolved, or at least lessened. 

Is it justifiable to read Laws allegorically?  I think so; but to be open to this possibility it is necessary to see how allegorical readings operate in other dialogues where an allegorical interpretation is more commonly accepted.  I think the best comparison to the Laws would be the Republic.  Personally, I think the deep meaning of the Republic is only accessible through an allegorical reading.  And I suspect the same is true for Laws as well.

If the reader approaches Laws allegorically that will shift the meaning of what is being read; I don’t think it necessarily eliminates a literal reading, but it adds another dimension of meaning.  For example, Laws is a conversation between three old men on the island of Crete.  One is Athenian, the Athenian Stranger, one is Spartan, and one is from Crete.  I think together they symbolize the three principal aspects of a human being.  The Athenian represents the soul.  The Spartan represents the body.  The Cretan represents the mind as the function of differentiation.  That is why, in Book 1, when they discuss what the purpose of laws is, the Spartan and the Cretan put forth the view that the purpose of laws is to be effective in war and that war is the overriding purpose of government and laws.  This is consistent with them being symbols of the mind of differentiation (without the presence of wisdom) and the body as the engine of desire.  It is the Athenian Stranger who counters with the view that the purpose of laws is peace and that peace supersedes, or is prior to, the demands of war; because the Athenian Stranger symbolizes the presence of soul which is the presence of eternity which is the realm of true peace.

I think it is also worthy of noting that the first word in Laws is ‘Theos’ or God.  I think this is a significant clue that Laws is primarily about our relationship with the divine and all the discussions about communal relationships and laws governing those relationships are aimed at indicating the rules, or laws, for cultivating a relationship with the divine, with God, with the One.  I think that Plato is telling us this because the three old men in Laws are taking a long walk on a hot day to a cave dedicated to Zeus.  Zeus is an important symbol in Plato’s Dialogues as the source of all life and other key Platonic concepts.  In other words, Zeus is to be understood allegorically in Laws as well as the long walk of the three old men is allegorically a walk to the divine as the ultimate source of all things.