Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 86

2 March 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 86

1.  Some Remarks on Metaphysics

I’m a fan of metaphysics.  I don’t mean only the metaphysics found in Western Philosophy.  I also mean metaphysical thought found in cultures like India and China; though India and China use different vocabularies than what is in use in the West.  The connection I see is that metaphysics focuses primarily on the transcendental and on immaterial realities (hence ‘after physics’) and one can certainly find profound works with that kind of focus in these non-Western cultures. 

I view Plato as primarily a metaphysician in the sense that Plato’s writing has the overall purpose of guiding people to the Good and the One which is an immaterial reality and the immaterial source for all things; I like to refer to this as ‘the presence of eternity.’  I think this is the focus of the Platonic tradition as a whole.  Many other things are discussed in Platonism, but it is my feeling that these other things that are discussed are discussed because they assist in the journey to the One.  For example, the Platonic tradition’s focus on ethical restraints and the virtues has the function of showing people how to purify themselves, how to become less distracted by sensory experience, and this assists people in turning towards the Good, the One, and the Beautiful. 

Because I have this view I, at times, spend time on uncovering why metaphysics came under such widespread attack in the modern period (beginning approximately with Hume and Descartes) in the West.  It helps me to understand where I am in terms of the culture that I inhabit and why I sometimes feel so estranged from it. 

After a lot of study, I have come to a few conclusions (which are subject to revision).  The most important for me is that metaphysics never really disappeared in the modern period.  The announcement by various modernist philosophers that metaphysics was done was an expression of a wish, or hope, on their part; it was prescriptive.  What they were really saying to young philosophers is that you shouldn’t bother with metaphysics.  But work in metaphysics continued among some philosophers anyway (the most notable case is Alfred North Whitehead). 

It is striking to me that those who continued to engage with metaphysics do not seem to have been interested in responding to those who viewed metaphysics as over and done with; at least I have not found essays that I might consider to be apologias for metaphysics.  Instead, they simply proceeded to engage with the tradition and let those interested find what they had written.  I think this shows some wisdom.  And it shows some patience.  I think the wisdom and patience shown here is a natural result of engaging with the transcendental, of understanding things from the perspective of eternity.

2.  The Individual in Modernity

I’ve become more aware that one of the striking differences between philosophy in the modern period in contrast to philosophy in the classical period is that in the modern period, the period we reside in, it is the individual mind that is the starting point but in the classical period it is what arises in interaction that is the starting point.  For example, Plato’s philosophy emerges from dialogue and dialectic; it would be difficult to think of Socrates as acting like Descartes and thinking of his ego as the starting point of his inquiries.  And this is true throughout the classical period of Platonism; think of Plotinus presenting his essays to his students and getting feedback from them.

This has often been observed; I mean the shift to the individual mind and ego from the ground of interaction and what emerges in a more communal context.  In modern philosophy it is the individual philosopher who critiques and renders judgment.  In Platonic philosophy it is what emerges from interaction, particularly dialectic, that sheds light on the questions being discussed.  These are different processes.  Modern philosophy is critical, classical philosophy is constructive due to its basis in interaction.

It is true that Plato depicts Socrates as withdrawing for the purposes of contemplation in Dialogues such as Phaedrus and The Symposium.  But this kind of contemplative withdrawal is not a withdrawal into the individual mind (small ‘m’ mind), it is an ascent to the noetic and the transcendent which is the ground for the emergence of wisdom.  In other words, it is not the individual mind that is the source of wisdom in classical philosophy, whereas in modernity there really isn’t anything that surpasses the individual mind.

Thinking about this, I wondered if it is possible to replicate the dialectical foundation of Platonism in the culture of today?  It may be that the emergence of dialectical discussion requires particular communal contexts; I’m not sure.  I have observed that it is difficult for contemporary philosophers to step away from the critical stance of modern philosophy.  But it’s not impossible; Whitehead managed to offer a constructive metaphysics in the classical manner.  And perhaps this is the key to reconnecting with a more dialectical philosophical involvement.  Whitehead was deeply involved in the history of philosophy and his attitude towards previous philosophy is what I might call ‘reverence’.  I mean by this that Whitehead often shows his appreciation for his predecessors and, at the same time, he is willing to modify their presentations or Whitehead will spotlight where he thinks they missed something of significance.  This is dialectical rather than critical.  Whitehead does not dismiss previous attempts at metaphysics, he learns from them and having absorbed what they have to say he ventures forth into new territory.  The individualist and hypercritical attitude of modern philosophy is often dismissive of the past and treats the past as if it has nothing of significance to offer.  Whitehead shows us why that attitude is deficient.

So I do think it is possible to replicate the kind of interactive exchange of insight and energy that is foundational for Platonic Philosophy.  Online interaction provides a venue for this, at least potentially.  But I think that most often this interaction happens when we engage deeply with the classic sources of Platonism such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.  It’s a matter of reading them receptively instead of in the modern manner of always having a critical stance.  When reading these works many people have a kind of experience of opening up to dialogue and dialectic.  Dialogue and dialectic take the reader out of their individual ego and their individual concerns and open the way to the larger realms in which our life unfolds.

3.  Plotinus on Renunciation

“Let the human being who lives in the world of corporeal goods be beautiful and tall and wealthy and the sort of ruler over people that one can be here, yet he ought not to be envied for these things, since he was deceived by them. But the wise person would perhaps not even have these to begin with, though if he did, he will lessen their impact, if indeed he cares for himself.  He will lessen their impact and extinguish the advantages of the body by his lack of interest in them, and he will let their power over him die.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads: Second Edition, Ennead 1.4.14, “On Happiness”, translated by Lloyd P. Gerson et al, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2025, page 85, ISBN: 978109604970)

3.1  Plotinus points to a gradual, step by step, renunciation.  The wise person will lessen the impact of ‘corporeal goods’ in his life.  I read this as saying that the wise person takes steps to turn away from ‘corporeal goods’ and these steps might be modest, at least at first.

3.2  It’s interesting, and meaningful, to me that often when Platonism talks about renunciation what we get are broad strokes rather than a meticulously laid out list; the kind of thing one finds, for example, in the Buddhist Vinaya (rule of life for monastics).  Specifics do appear now and then such as in the Phaedo, but even there, if you compare the instructions in renunciation to monastic rules it is pointers rather than a long list of specifics. 

This may indicate that Platonism as an ascetic tradition wants its practitioners to go in a certain direction, but trusts its followers to walk the path as best they can.  It’s kind of like giving advice to a hiker by telling them what kind of equipment they will need for the hike because you have the requisite experience.  But the new hiker will purchase their own equipment and it may contain additions or alternatives to what was suggested.

3.3  I see this kind of relationship in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, in the section where Porphyry writes about various disciples.  The instantiation of the Platonic life varies in accordance with their circumstances, but the general direction of renunciation and asceticism is clear.