Transcending Being in Plato's Dialogue Parmenides

23 December 2024

Transcending Being in Plato’s Dialogue Parmenides 

[Note: The dialogue begins with a number of participants, including Parmenides and Zeno, as well as a very young Socrates and other young philosophers including Glaucon, Adeimantus, Cephalus, Antiphon, and one whose name is Aristotle. This is not the Aristotle who was Plato's student at Plato's Academy, but another Aristotle. The dialogue shifts between Parmenides and various young men, including a passage where Socrates and Parmenides discuss the theory of forms. Soon after this the discussion shifts to focus on various 'hypotheses' about the One. Parmenides accepts the request to investigate these and requests that the youngest of those present respond to his questions; the youngest is Aristotle. The portion of the dialogue quoted below is between Parmenides and this young man Aristotle.]

Parmenides: “Now, don’t you think that ‘was’ and ‘has come to be’ and ‘was coming to be’ signify partaking of time past?”

Aristotle: “By all means.”

Parmenides: “And again that ‘will be’ and ‘will come to be’ and ‘will be coming to be’ signify partaking of time hereafter?”

Aristotle: “Yes.”

Parmenides: “And that ‘is’ and ‘comes to be’ signify partaking of time now present?”

Aristotle: “Of course.”

Parmenides: “Therefore, if the one partakes of no time at all, it is not the case that it has at one time come to be, was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, comes to be, or is; or will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be.”

Aristotle: “Very true.”

Parmenides: “Could something partake of being except in one of those ways?”

Aristotle: “It couldn’t.”

Parmenides: “Therefore the one in no way partakes of being.”

Aristotle: “It seems not.”

Parmenides: “Therefore the one in no way is.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Therefore neither is it in such a way as to be one, because it would then, by being and partaking of being, be.  But, as it seems, the one neither is one nor is, if we are obliged to trust this argument.”

Aristotle: “It looks that way.”

Parmenides: “If something is not, could anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it?”

Aristotle: “How could it?”

Parmenides: Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account of any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it.”

Aristotle: “It seems not.”

Parmenides: “Is it possible that these things are so for the one?”

Aristotle: “I certainly don’t think so.”

(Plato, Parmenides, translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 375-376, 141d-142b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

Parmenides: “Well, and do not the words ‘was,’ ‘has become,’ and ‘was becoming’ appear to denote participation in past time?”

Aristotle: Certainly.”

Parmenides: “And ‘will be,’ ‘will become,’ and ‘will be made to become,’ in future time?”

Aristotle: “Yes.”

Parmenides: “And ‘is’ and ‘is becoming’ in the present?”

Aristotle: “Certainly.”

Parmenides: “Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.”

Aristotle: “Very true.”

Parmenides: “Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?”

Aristotle: “It cannot.”

Parmenides: “Then the one has no share in being at all.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Then the one is not at all.”

Aristotle: “Evidently not.”

Parmenides: “Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if that argument is to be trusted.”

Aristotle: “That seems to be true.”

Parmenides: “But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?”

Aristotle: “Of course not.”

Parmenides: “Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

Aristotle: “Evidently not.”

Parmenides: “And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.”

Aristotle: “Apparently not.”

Parmenides: “Is it possible that all this is true about the one?”

Aristotle: “I do not think so.”

(Plato, Parmenides, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1939, page 251, 141D-142B, ISBN: 9780674991859)

The dialogue Parmenides is Plato’s most analytical dialogue.  Rigorous, meticulous, dense, and meaningful it unpacks the meaning of the transcendental, of the One, in Platonic philosophy and contemplation.  I have recently reread this dialogue and this reading was an uplifting experience; I was able to follow the ebb and flow of the analysis and to glimpse the overall point that was being made and the source from which it emerges.  

I have had this kind of experience before.  As I have previously written here, I am a slow learner, but I am willing to read something that interests me multiple times and for me this approach seems to bear fruit.  I first encountered this when I was engaged in reading some difficult Buddhist philosophy.  And I have kept with this method of reading and rereading until what the work is saying makes sense or becomes coherent.  It resembles listening to a piece of music in a style you are not familiar with.  When you first listen only brief moments will make sense, but it is difficult to get an overall feel for the piece.  But after listening multiple times the music’s overall shape and direction starts to register and the music may even become a great pleasure to listen to.  In a similar way, a difficult work like the dialogue Parmenides is the kind of work I need to spend time with in order to gain some clarity about it.  Here are a few comments stimulated by my last reading:

1.  The overall meaning of the passage quoted above is that the One transcends being.  I think that the source for this understanding is contemplation; in other words the quoted passage is an attempt to communicate the nature of the experience of the One to others.

2.  In this reading I connected what was being written in Parmenides to my studies of the Perfection of Wisdom discourses I spent a lot of time studying when I was a Buddhist.  For example, in both traditions all three aspects of time (past, present, and future) are given equal status when looked at from the point of view of the ultimate.  There is no privileging of the present, or the now, as more real than the past or the future.  For example, in the Diamond Sutra it says, “. . . the past mind is not found, the future mind is not found, and the present mind is not found.”  In the quote from Parmenides it states that the One does not partake of time at all and that therefore neither the present, nor the past, nor the future, is something that can be found in the One.

3.  It is fairly common to hear spiritual teachers say that the present, or the now, is privileged in some way.  This can be in the form of something like saying that only the now is real, or that we only have ‘this present moment.’  But in wisdom traditions such as Platonic philosophy, or Buddhist Perfection of Wisdom, the present is not given a higher status than the past or the future.  This kind of teaching points to a reality that is ‘prior’ (metaphorically prior and metaphysically prior) to time as such.  This can only be experienced in mystical union.

4.  It is remarkable to me that Plato as a writer is equally at home writing allegories and weaving stories of gatherings such as the Symposium as well as the mode of meticulous analysis found in Parmenides.  It is extremely rare to find a writer that can encompass so many different modes of writing and be so skilled in all of them.

5.  I don’t think it is possible to understand Parmenides unless the reader has practiced contemplation.  I’m not saying that reading Parmenides has no value unless one is a contemplative.  I read the Diamond Sutra long before I had an experience of transcendence in contemplation and it did help me.  Here is an analogy; it can be helpful to read a recipe if I am interested in cooking something I have heard about and that has attracted my attention.  The recipe will tell me the ingredients I need, the procedures for mixing and cooking, and so forth.  These are useful and meaningful.  But one more step is needed to really understand a specific recipe; that is to put the ingredients together and cook it.  Contemplation is the occasion that ‘puts the ingredients together.’

6.  I think the climax of this section of Parmenides is “Therefore the one in no way partakes of being.”  This is explaining very clearly that the one transcends being, is beyond (and ‘before’) being.  The final portion of this section of the dialogue unpacks some of the implications of the one transcending being, such as the one having no name.

7.  The place of being in Platonism is, for some, difficult to access.  I recently listened to a talk on youtube about Platonism in which the speaker stated that the One is pure being.  That’s not the first time I have heard this way of speaking about the One.  I believe that this view is at least influenced by Aristotle, but more importantly, I think many metaphysicians have difficulty understanding what transcending being would mean.  For example, what does it mean to say that the One has no name; that would imply that the One is not ‘the One,’ which is paradoxical and can be confusing.

The confusion is overcome through contemplative practice; and I don’t know of any other way that the difficulty presented by the idea of the One transcending being can be overcome.  This makes Platonism inherently a mystical philosophy.  If Platonism is looked at as an example of mysticism this creates difficulties for analytic and materialist philosophers, as well as for those who want Plato to be a proto-rationalist.

The confusion is also overcome through ascetic practice because ascetic practice is based on turning away from material manifestations.  To approach that which transcends being requires such a turning away.

8.  I don’t think that contemplation or asceticism can be incorporated into a modern university’s curriculum.  And this is why there will always be a gap between the mysticism of Platonic philosophy and contemporary academic approaches.

The model that is needed for accessing the fullness of Platonism is that of an ashram or a dojo; a place where the works of Platonism are studied, but the practices of contemplation and asceses are considered to be foundational and essential.

9.  The dialogue Parmenides is a jewel of wisdom.