Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 61

25 August 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 61

1.  One aspect of ethical restraints, or commitments, in various spiritual traditions that has intrigued me is the place of vegetarianism within their systems of vows, or commitments, or purifications.  What I am getting at is that even in those traditions where vegetarianism occupies an important place, in the sense that members of the tradition are expected to adhere to vegetarianism, this practice seems to be an application of a more fundamental, or foundational, principle or vow or precept.

For example, the five foundational precepts of the Jain tradition, as well as the Classical Yoga tradition, do not contain a specific vow to restrain from eating, or killing, animals.  Instead, the first, and therefore most prominent, vow is non-harming (Ahimsa).  Vegetarianism is understood to be the application of non-harming to this particular aspect of human life; that is to say, what kind of food is acceptable to eat.

For example, in Edwin F. Bryant’s translation and commentary on The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, Bryant writes, “. . . one can be very clear about the fact that eating meat, nourishing one’s body at the expense of the flesh of other living beings, is completely taboo for aspiring yogis.  One should avoid harming even trees, says Hariharananda.” (Page 243)

The same is true for the Jain tradition which imposes on its followers a vegetarian diet that also restricts eating certain root vegetables because someone pulling such vegetables from the soil might harm living beings dwelling there.  The vow that makes this a requirement of the tradition, following a vegetarian diet, is non-harming (Ahimsa).

I think the same applies to Platonism; I mean by this that a vegetarian diet is required by the tradition as a whole, even though there is no specific structure of vows in the Platonic tradition as one finds in Jainism (vratas) or Classical Yoga (yamas).  My reason for viewing vegetarianism within Platonism in this way is first the mythos presented regarding the life of Plato which includes that idea that Plato was raised in a vegetarian family (which may or may not be historically true).  This indicates, I think, the view that vegetarianism is a sign of spiritual inclination and maturity as well as the idea that vegetarianism is a view inherited from the past. 

Second, the ancient antecedents of Platonism (what are called ‘ancient teachings’ in Phaedo) are vegetarian traditions; I am thinking specifically of the teachings of Pythagoras and the Orphics and that Platonism is in many ways aligned with these teachings. 

Third, this view of vegetarianism, which regards vegetarianism as an essential practice, is thoughtfully presented by Porphyry in his treatise On Abstinence from Killing Animals.  The treatise opens as follows:

“I heard from visitors, Firmus, that you had condemned fleshless food and reverted to consuming flesh.  At first I did not believe it, judging by your temperance and by the respect we had shown for those men, at once ancient and godfearing, who pointed out the way.  Then others, following on the first, gave the same information and confirmed the report.  It seems crude, and remote from rational persuasion, to scold you because you have not, as the saying is, ‘found the better by flight from the bad’, or, as Empedocles put it, lamented your former life and turned to a better.  Instead, I thought it a proper return for our friendship with each other, and suitable for those who order their lives in accordance with truth, to reveal through reason the refutation of your errors, and to declare from what and to what you have descended.”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 31, ISBN: 9781780938899)

I read this as Porphyry saying that Firmus has fallen away from the way of Philosophy by ‘descending’ and returning, or reverting, to eating animal flesh.  I think this shows that for Porphyry, and the tradition that Porphyry inherited, being a vegetarian was essential for being a Philosopher; just as Bryant notes that being a vegetarian was essential for being a Yogi.

I believe that the centrality of vegetarianism in Platonism is, as in Jainism and Classical Yoga, an application of the principle of non-harming.  Porphyry will elaborate on this in the rest of his treatise.

2.  Every morning the sun rises and brings light to the world.  And every time I reconnect with the Platonic tradition, through reading, through contemplation, and so forth, I reconnect with the light of eternity.

3.  One aspect I had difficulty with in the Platonic tradition was the view that evil is a deprivation of, or metaphysical distance from, the Good.  My tendency was to think of evil as an active presence and force.  Many spiritual traditions view evil that way and it seemed to make sense to me.

Lately, though I have become more comfortable with the idea of evil as an absence of the Good rather than the presence of some kind of entity.  Metaphorical thinking is helpful in this context; cold is the deprivation of heat, darkness is the absence of light, starvation is the absence of food, and so forth.  Looked at through the lens of these kinds of comparisons evil as the absence of the Good makes sense.

But for me what really shifted my understanding was to comprehend ugliness as the absence of the beautiful. 

4.  Continuing with the Sentences of Porphyry; here is Sentence 7:

The soul is bound to the body by a conversion to the corporeal passions; and again liberated by becoming impassive to the body.  (Thomas Taylor)

The soul is bound down to the body by adverting to the passions arising from it, and it is loosed again by impassivity to it.  (Thomas Davidson)

The soul binds herself to the body by a conversion toward the affections experienced by the body.  She detaches herself from the body by “apathy” [turning away from the body’s affections – translator’s emendation].  (Kenneth Guthrie)

The soul is attached to the body through giving in to the passions that arise from it, and is freed from it through the renunciation of these passions.  (Isaak Samarskyi)

4.1  A few notes on English usage: When Taylor uses ‘conversion’ he means a turning to the passions, becoming attached to the passions.  I don’t think Taylor is using ‘conversion’ in a religious sense. 

When Davidson uses the word ‘adverting’ he means something like ‘paying attention to’.  I think what Davidson means is that the soul becomes attentive to and fixated on the passions; this contrasts with ‘impassivity’ which is a kind of indifference to the passions.

4.2  This is a refreshingly straightforward sentence. 

4.3  What this sentence is referring to is the cultivation of apatheia as one of the means whereby a spiritual practitioner frees himself from bondage to the senses.  The Greek word ‘apatheia’ means spiritual freedom and equanimity.  The freedom here is freedom from the constant need to stimulate the bodily senses.

We can all see how easy it is for human beings to be imprisoned by the need to stimulate the senses.  Attachments to food, alcohol, to excitement, and so forth, often lead to negative consequences for individuals who find it impossible to free themselves from these attachments.  The cultivation of ‘apatheia’ is the antidote to this kind of attachment.

4.4  It is because we think that material reality is the only reality that we find attachment to sensory stimulation so seductive.  This casts a spell that keeps us from accessing our ensorcelled soul, not even knowing that there is such a thing as soul.

4.5  But it is possible to break the spell.  I think that breaking the spell cast by the senses happens when we recognize that the senses do not actually bring any relief from the difficulties of the material realm.  Out of this realization apatheia can arise.  And it is possible to cultivate apatheia, once we realize that apatheia opens the gate to more stable and more nourishing realities.

4.6  I know that the Greek word ‘apatheia’ differs in meaning from the English world ‘apathy’, but I would like to suggest that there is some overlap in meaning.  If by apathy we mean indifference, then I think we can acknowledge how indifference towards sensory stimulation is a way of finding the more subtle teachings of apatheia.

5.  The body falls away.  The mind falls away.  The Gods fall away.  Eternity does not fall away.

6.  Long ago I was studying how different Dharma traditions understand karma.  It’s complicated, and the following may be oversimplified, but roughly speaking, I see traditional Hinduism, meaning Vedic Hinduism, as understanding karma as ritual efficacy.  I mean by ‘ritual efficacy’ that by performing certain rituals correctly, using the correct materials, using the correct timing, using correct gestures and verbal formula, and so forth, one’s spiritual goal will be reached.  Usually that goal was depicted as getting to some kind of celestial realm, or heaven.

The Jain tradition equates karma with matter, which is understood as clinging to, or covering, the soul.  Asceses are understood to burn away matter from the immaterial soul, resulting in spiritual liberation.

For Buddhists, I think that karma is primarily the result of intention; that is to say, that if an activity or action was done for good reasons, such as compassion or out of love, then the result will be a good rebirth.

In Platonist traditions I think in the contemplative tradition karma is understood to be determined by wisdom.  Wisdom in this context means distinguishing between what is ephemeral from what is eternal, and then acting on that wisdom.

In a theurgic context, we return to the view of Vedic Hinduism; I mean that theurgy is centered on ritual efficacy.  If a theurgic ritual is done correctly the result is good karma and possibly a celestial rebirth as an (ephemeral) God (see Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book 3).

7.  There has been some rain, not very much, here in the desert the last few days.  It is predicted this will continue for a few more days.  Even a little bit of rain is precious in the desert and an occasion for appreciation.

Reading and studying and contemplating the writings of Platonism, primarily the Dialogues and the Enneads, resembles being nourished by a gentle rain.  It is a rain of wisdom nourishing the garden of the soul which has become parched due to neglect.  Even a few drops of wisdom from these sources can transform a parched garden into a garden of blossoming wisdom.

 

  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 60

18 August 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 60

1.  Recently I have been thinking that analytic philosophy is autistic philosophy.  Autistics are able to engage in what some people call ‘vertical’ learning.  As I understand it, vertical learning means to drill down into a single topic and also to comprehend all other topics, or subjects, or areas of learning, based on the one thing that has attracted the autistic’s attention.

What autistic personalities are incapable of is what is sometimes called ‘horizontal’ learning.  By horizontal is meant to think about how one subject relates to another subject; this kind of learning usually involves metaphorical or analogical thinking, something which autistic personalities find difficult to engage in.

Analytic philosophy can be understood as fitting into this pattern in that it drills down into analysis, and what they think of as logic, while ignoring, or dogmatically rejecting, other philosophical subjects.  This rejection is particularly strong when autistic analytic philosophers discuss metaphysics. 

Naturally, I am using ‘autistic’ to describe analytic philosophy as a metaphor; I’m not saying that analytic philosophers are diagnostically autistic.  Rather I am suggesting that the pattern of analytic philosophy, its modes of study, communication, and relationship, seem to me to resemble what is described as autistic, or has features that seem to be illuminated by the metaphor of autism.

2.  It’s interesting to me that I don’t find a lot written about Platonist asceticism.  When I asked Chatgpt if there are books on this subject, it came up with only three, and only one of those was specifically focused on that topic (Platonist Contemplative Asceticism: Practice and Principle by Eric Fallick).  This contrasts with very numerous books about various issues in Platonic interpretation such as how to interpret The Republic or the relationship between Platonic mysticism and other types of mysticism, or commentaries on various works such as The Symposium or an Ennead by Plotinus.  All of these are valuable and insightful; I’m not objecting to writing about these other aspects of Platonism.  What I’m suggesting is that contemporary writing on Platonism is unable to think of asceticism as foundational for Platonist practice, for how to do, or embody, Platonist practice.  I can understand this; the role of asceticism in early Christianity is often overlooked, and Western Buddhism actively rejects the idea of renunciation as an inherent part of the Buddhist tradition.  This means, I think, that asceticism as a way of life, and Platonism as a way of asceticism, is on the fringes of contemporary thought.

3.  There are two contemporary Western philosophical approaches that are anti-metaphysical and therefore anti-Platonist.  One is the analytic tradition which has its roots in philosophers such as David Hume.  Analytic philosophy had its high point in the first half of the 20^th century and still has many adherents. 

The second anti-metaphysical tradition is what I tend to call the ‘Heideggerian’ tradition.  Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is, from one point of view, subtle and difficult; and from another point of view his critique is obscure and, some would say, incoherent and largely emotive.  Be that as it may, Heidegger views Western philosophy as having ‘abandoned’ metaphysics by which he means, at least I think he means, that being as such has been put aside for the study of beings.  Heidegger even accuses philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle of making this move.  Heidegger then interprets subsequent Western metaphysical investigations as in some way the fruit of this poisonous tree, by which I mean that he seems to think of all subsequent metaphysics as emerging from this displacement of being as such for the study of particular beings.

Analytic philosophy attacked the heritage of metaphysics by constructing a theory of meaning that eliminated metaphysics because metaphysics does not adhere to the analytic theory of meaning.  The Heideggerian tradition attacks the heritage of metaphysics by suggesting that the Western tradition of metaphysics has actually in some way ‘covered’ or distorted what metaphysics is about and therefore made access to being more difficult.  But what I think is really interesting is that both traditions reject the efforts of previous philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, on the subject of metaphysics.  This is where I see a common purpose that is shared by both contemporary traditions, though they come to this shared approach by taking different routes.

To be a Platonist at this time in Western philosophical history, means to be distanced from both streams of anti-metaphysical thinking.  I look at it this way; Western metaphysical thought did not, and has not, abandoned being as such.  Instead I see Western philosophy as offering a variety of interpretations as to the nature of being, as well as to the transcendence of being, as well of the relationship between being as such and individual beings. 

Personally, I regard this rejection of the Western metaphysical tradition by both analytic philosophy and the Heideggerian tradition, as having an obsessively critical and narrow view of how to do philosophy.  My view is that both traditions do not understand, for example, how words work, or the status of metaphysical thought and investigation.  This rejection, again, in my opinion, is aligned with, and nourished by, the pervasive view that treats the past in a completely negative way in the sense that the past is understood to be deficient and the present is superior both in understanding and in science and technology.  From this perspective the past has nothing to offer; in terms of philosophy this results in a dismissal of metaphysics in particular because metaphysics had a high status in the past and is therefore a target of those who adhere to the idea that the present is superior in every way to the past.

I know that analytic and continental philosophy are often configured as antagonistic to each other.  But when looked at from the perspective of metaphysics I understand both traditions to share a common goal, a common purpose.  The shared goal and purpose is to clear the field and practice of philosophy of metaphysics, shrinking the range of human thought.  It is true that analytic philosophy and Heideggerianism offer different reasons for rejecting traditional, Platonic, metaphysics; but in a sense, that is a minor issue.  It is the rejection of metaphysics itself by both approaches that, I think, is significant and deeply misguided.

4.  Continuing with the Sentences of Porphyry, here is Sentence 6:

Not everything which acts on another, effects that which it does effect by approximation and contact; but those natures which effect any thing by approximation and contact, use approximation accidentally.  (Thomas Taylor)

The things that act upon others do not act by approximation and by contact.  It is only accidentally when this occurs [that they act by proximity and contact – emendation by the translator].  (Kenneth Guthrie)

That which acts upon something else, does not do what it does by approach or contact; but even those things which do perform an action by approach and contact, employ approach by accident.  (Thomas Davidson)

Not every active being that influences another by approaching or touching the object of influence does so through direct touch and interaction, and some beings that interact in this way use approaching only as a side element of their activity.  (Isaac Samarskyi)

4.1  I have incorporated the translation of the Sentences of Porphyry by Thomas Davidson.  Davidson’s translation was published in a scholarly journal in 1869.  I’m not aware of it being published in book form. 

4.2  This is another of the Sentences that is mostly opaque to me in the sense that I am not sure what the purpose of the Sentence is.  I mean it’s not clear to me how this Sentence fits in with the other Sentences.

4.3  The word ‘approximation’ used by Taylor and Guthrie has, I think, changed meaning since those translators used it.  I think it more accurately means ‘approach’ which is used by Davidson and Samarskyi.

4.4  One way of unpacking a sentence like this one is to try and understand the words it uses and how the words fit together.  Sentence 6 is about how some things influence or impact other things, when they do impact or influence other things.  It seems to me that Sentence 6 is closely related to Sentence 3 which is also about things interacting. 

4.5  I think one concern of this sentence is how incorporeal beings influence other beings when, by definition, incorporeal beings do not touch, approach, or otherwise contact material beings (though Porphyry does not explicitly mention incorporeal beings in this sentence).  This would be an item of discussion in Platonism because noetic realities are incorporeal, yet it is noetic realities which house the incorporeal forms, from which are emanated material realities.  The specific means by which emanation happens cannot be material in nature.

4.6  The use of the word ‘accident’ is interesting.  In most Platonic works I have read the idea that things arise accidentally or randomly is rejected.  But here Porphyry suggests that some things influence other things in a random manner.

The idea that things happen in a random manner was very widespread in Greek popular culture; for example the Gods were viewed as capricious and incomprehensible.  The Goddess Tyche, Fortuna in Latin, was prominent and people often felt that fate governed their lives.

This attitude was present not only in popular culture, but also in some philosophers such as Heraclitus.  There is a famous fragment where Heraclitus compares the activity of an eon to a child playing a game with dice.  Notice that games have rules, implying some order in the cosmos.  But the toss of the dice and the results that appear seem arbitrary and unrelated to the individual who tossed the dice.

Still, it is unusual for a Platonist, at least Platonists I have read, to suggest that things happen accidentally or randomly and I wonder how this fits in with Porphyry’s philosophy as a whole?

5.  I have been thinking about how the Classical World viewed Plato as communicated in comments and biographies/hagiographies.  Primarily the Classical World thought of Plato as ‘divine’ and as extraordinary and as blessed by the Gods.  One aspect of this is found in the belief that Plato was born from a union between a God, Apollo, and Plato’s mother.  His father had approached Plato’s mother for intimate relations, but withdrew when he saw the presence of Apollo.

This story, or mythos, lasted for a long time.  According to some scholars it was Plato’s nephew, Speussippus, who was also the second head of the Academy, who first presented this mythos.  I tend to think that Speusippus may have been the first to write about it, but I suspect that the mythos preceded that writing.  In any case, the mythos seems to have an early origin.  And the mythos was repeated and passed on throughout the classical period.  For example, Plutarch, who lived about 40 to 120 AD, writes about it.  So does Olympiodorus who died in 565 AD. 

It’s interesting that I have not found in my reading any mention of Plato being thought of as a God, though he may be depicted as having God-like qualities.  And I don’t find any mention of a cult of Plato in the sense of temples of worship being constructed for such activity.  Perhaps the Academies in Athens and Alexandria served that purpose.

I do find mention of a yearly celebration of the birth of Plato, and sometimes Socrates at the same time.  This seems to have consisted of a meal (probably vegetarian) and the reading of people’s philosophical essays.  This was a way of expressing their appreciation for, and reverence of, Plato.

I think it is an intriguing picture where Plato is admired, given a kind of divine birth, but is not himself transformed into a God for the purposes of cultic worship.  My reading of this is that it expresses that Plato is beyond the Gods in the sense of transcending the realms that the Gods inhabit.

According to Diogenes Laertius there were a number of epitaphs inscribed at Plato’s tomb, which was at the Academy.  Here is one of them:

Excelling among mortals for temperance and justice,

Here lies divine Aristocles.

If anyone ever won great praise for wisdom,

He won the greatest, without arousing envy.

(Plato’s given name was Aristocles, which was his grandfather’s name – translator’s footnote.)

(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, translated by Pamela Mensch, Oxford University Press, 2018, page 156, ISBN: 9780190862176)

I like this epitaph.  It emphasizes the virtues of temperance and justice, and adds that Plato won great praise for his wisdom.  And Plato managed to do this without arousing envy which speaks to his divine character.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 59

11 August 2025 

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 59

1.  I’ve had an interest in Plutarch for a long time.  His Platonist views are interesting for a number of reasons.  First, Plutarch’s views are non-academic; I mean that Plutarch was not a part of the Academy in Athens, so Plutarch has a certain degree of independence.  This allows him to consider some Platonic views and consider them in a way that, from my perspective, is like having a dialogue with the tradition.  Plutarch wasn’t the only Platonist in this position.  Both Maximus of Tyre and Plotinus were similarly situated. 

I also like the ability of Plutarch to refer to a vast amount of literature in his discussions.  As someone who enjoys reading and who has some familiarity with English literature, I find myself feeling a kind of kinship with Plutarch.

I am currently reading a book called The Platonism of Plutarch by Roger Miller Jones.  This book is a doctoral thesis Jones wrote to receive his doctorate.  It was first published as a book in 1916; I was able to get a copy through the University of Michigan reprint services at a reasonable price (which is very unusual for Universities). 

Jones knows Plutarch very well and has a knowledge of several European languages, as well as Greek and Latin.  This allowed him to access commentarial material from a large range of sources.  (As was the custom at that time, many quotes in the thesis are in the original language and are not translated; this includes Greek, Latin, German, and others.  But even if you lack reading knowledge of these languages Jones makes his point either in the paragraphs leading up to the quotes, or in the paragraphs immediately following and this allows an English-only reader to follow the thread of thought.)

Jones’s approach is to bring to the reader’s attention a number of views on an issue; that is to say how other scholars have understood, for example, Plutarch’s view of demons (daemons).  After doing this Jones will critique some of these views and then offer his own interpretation.  I like this kind of approach because it shows how Jones’s view does not exist in isolation.  Rather his view arises in dialectical relationship to what others have said about the same topic.

There is a vast literature about Platonism from previous centuries that tends to be overlooked.  I think this is because when we read works about Platonism from previous times we discover that the issues that concerned them are often not of concern to us.  The issues that take center stage change over time.  This is natural.  But I find it kind of refreshing and illuminating to see what the focus was when approaching Plato for scholars of the past.  It helps me to put the focus of contemporary Platonic scholarship in its temporal contingency.

An example of how this effected Platonic scholarship in the past is found in the 17^th century when European scholars, particularly German scholars, sought to construct a Platonism that was rational, reasonable, and void of any mystical aspects.  This lead to a dismissal of Plotinus, because Plotinus is obviously a mystic.  This legacy is fading, but it still has its adherents.

But to return to the thesis of Jones, for those interested in Plutarch as a Platonist (as opposed to his biographical output) I think this short work is worth reading.

2.  I have noticed for many years, that those who follow an ascetic path, an ascetic form of spirituality, feel a kind of kinship across traditions with others who are similarly committed to asceticism and renunciation.  I first noticed this in the writings of Thomas Merton who would sometimes complain that lay Catholics in the U.S. have no understanding of monasticism, particularly the more ascetically inclined traditions such as the Trappists which was the tradition that Merton was affiliated with.  On the other hand, when he communicated with, for example, Buddhist monastics he immediately felt in tune with their calling.

I feel refreshed when I learn about ascetics who have managed to live a life based on ascetic principles whether they are following some ancient tradition or following new manifestations of similar impulses such as minimalism.  I recognize what they are doing and feel that they would recognize what I am doing.

3.  Continuing with our discussion of Porphyry’s Sentences, here is Sentence 5:

“Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an impartible essence, and an essence which is divisible about bodies.  But intellect is an impartible essence alone.  And qualities and material forms are divisible about bodies.”  (Thomas Taylor)

“The soul has a nature intermediary between the ‘being’ that is indivisible, and the ‘being’ that is divisible by its union with bodies.  Intelligence is a being absolutely indivisible, bodies alone are divisible; but the qualities and the forms engaged in matter are divisible by their union with the bodies.”  (Kenneth Guthrie)

“The soul lies somewhere in between the wholeness and divisibility of the material world and is a kind of mediator, while the mind is completely whole and the body is completely divisible, and the qualities and embodied forms surrounding the bodies are divisible.”  (Isaak Samarskyi)

3.1  Porphyry has the view, which I think is based on certain passages in Plotinus, such as when Plotinus refers to an ‘amphibious soul’, that regards soul as occupying a place that is not completely the same as incorporeal or non-material things found in the noetic, and is not completely material, which is to say divisible, either.  I think for Porphyry this way of understanding soul helps him to understand why the soul can be distracted by material things and desires, but that soul also has the capacity to turn away from material things and desires and turn towards the noetic and transcendental. 

3.2  I have often noted while reading Platonism that ancient Platonists seem to think of the soul as much more complex, and having many more functions, than contemporary depictions of the soul.  For example, ancient Platonist think of the soul as having reason, which in modern terms would be part of intellect or mind (small ‘m’ mind).  There are also emotional appearances that are attributed to the soul, or which the soul participates in, in some way, that today we would think of as part of psychology rather than a function of the soul.

I think that Porphyry’s depiction in this sentence of soul as between the noetic and the material makes sense of the soul having all these functions.

3.3  To be honest, though, I find this way of looking at soul unsatisfactory; I have a different way of understanding soul.  As I have often said on this blog, I think of the soul as the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  By ‘presence of eternity’ I mean that which is eternal as such, which is the ineffable One and the ineffable Good that transcends all graspable understanding.  It is because of the presence of eternity, the soul, in the ephemeral individual, that it is possible for human beings, and other living beings, to make the spiritual ascent, to Return to the One.  It is because the soul is not fully descended, or fully separated, from the One that it is possible for us to, step by step, Return to the One. 

I think of mind as the presence of the noetic in the individual.  The noetic is the first appearance of differentiation and it is the mind, our mind, that has the function of differentiation; this ability to differentiate is descended from the noetic.  This is why I think of mind as the presence of the noetic in each individual.

Mind makes differentiations; when mind differentiates between what is eternal and what is not, that is wisdom.  All other differentiations are worldly.

And the body is the presence of cyclical existence in the individual which is what makes the individual a person with a history.  When mind differentiates what is cyclical from what is not, we ascend to the noetic because noetic realities are not cyclical.  Noetic realities are eternal but it is a derived eternity; they are not eternal as such.

When the mind distinguishes derived eternities, such as numbers, from the ineffable source of noetic realities, that wisdom allows for the Return to the One. 

I include contemplation as a mode of differentiation that allows the mind to separate from the body, and to separate from the noetic, and Return to the One.

3.4  Understood in this way, I can think of human life as a microcosmos containing ineffable realities as the soul, noetic realities as the mind, and cyclic realities as the body.  Thus human life is a weaving together of the three levels, or hypostases, of the Platonic metaphysical cosmology. 

3.5  The above is only an outline which I felt hesitant to include in the comments on this Sentence of Porphyry.  Perhaps I am being arrogant; I’m not sure. 

On the other hand, I am encouraged to offer a different account of the place of, and the nature of, soul because I know this has been an ongoing topic of discussion in the history of Platonism.  It is in the spirit of dialectical discussion that I offer the above alternative understanding of soul.

4.  There are times when it seems as if our understanding of Platonism is blossoming; things fall into place that we previously did not understand.  Something in the Dialogues or Enneads that was opaque in the past now makes sense and we comprehend how it fits in with the rest of Platonism.  These times are very refreshing and awesome and they inspire us to further study and contemplation.

At other times our understanding may seem to be stagnant; this can feel frustrating because we know we have not finished the journey and because of this we feel stuck.  I’ve gone through this cycle quite a number of times. 

What I have found is that when we feel like nothing is happening in our Platonist practice, that our practice is not maturing, what is really happening is that our mind is working at, and learning at, a deeper level.  I mean that the mind is maturing at a level that is not primarily at the level of conscious awareness.  Most of what happens in the realm of mind is not consciously available; hence it is not surprising that this is also true of our Platonist practice.

It is difficult to overcome our attachments to materiality.  It is difficult to embody the ethical restraints of Platonic asceses.  It is difficult to gain clarity about the cosmos and the transcendental and how they are related.  It is difficult to transcend time.

But it is possible to do all this.  It happens over a long period of time.  Sometimes we do not recognize how far we have travelled on the spiritual path.  An antidote to this is to look back on what your life was like ten, fifteen, twenty years before.  It can be surprising when you compare yourself of today to yourself from twenty or thirty years ago.  Such a meditation can build a sense of how much has been accomplished without denying how much more there is to do.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 58

4 August 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 58

1.  I was working on Blogging Platonism Volume 3, which covers all of 2024 in book form, and I noticed a post I made on 10 January 2024 which is called “Third Things.”  It covers the exact same material that I posted last week on “Brief Notes on Various Topics 57.2.”  The topic is the status of the gods in ancient Greece and the contrast between the way poets like Homer and Hesiod treat the gods and the way Plato and subsequent Platonists treat the gods.  When I say that both posts cover ‘the same topic’, this applies even to the passage I quoted from The Republic: Book II.

I hadn’t remembered posting about this topic in January 2024.  There are some differences between the two posts; the January 2024 post is much longer and brings in material from Proclus and Plotinus.  The post last week is not so thorough.

I have repeated things before on this blog, but as far as I can remember it was repeating a general topic such as the nature of the One, or the nature of the noetic.  There is a lot to cover and contemplate when considering realities like these.  I also have a number of posts that share a common ethical focus, such as non-harming.

When I first noticed how closely related the two posts based on the quote from Book II of The Republic were I thought of removing last week’s post.  If I was writing a treatise and getting it published, no doubt an editor would do something like that. 

But this blog is not a treatise, nor is it an academic presentation.  It is more like a diary; the diary of a Platonist and how he relates to the world and how he engages with and applies Platonism in the life he is living.

So I decided to leave both posts as they are and accept that at times I will return to topics and insights that may repeat points previously raised.  It’s like a piece of music where passages get repeated.  And Platonism has many songs.

2.         I’m living in another country,

            I’m bound to cross the line.

            Beauty walks a razor’s edge

            Someday I’ll make it mine.

           Bob Dylan – Shelter from the Storm

Bob Dylan is one of the greatest poets of the post-WWII period.  My own writing has been influenced by his use of syntax, rhyme, parallelisms, and use of images.  Dylan isn’t a Platonist, but at times I find images in his songs that are strikingly relevant to a Platonic world view.  The above is an example.

To be a Platonist is to ‘live in another country’ in the sense that once a Platonist glimpses higher realities a feeling arises that one doesn’t really belong in this material dimension.  One’s true country is ‘there,’ as Plotinus likes to put it.

The Platonist practitioner crosses the line to the ‘there’ of higher realities; there is a kind of barrier between the material realm and the non-material realms.  This line is crossed through the purification of asceses, wisdom, and contemplation. 

My favorite line in this song is the one that says ‘beauty walks a razor’s edge someday I’ll make it mine.’  I think Dylan is in tune with beauty.  Both Plotinus and Plato write a lot about beauty and how following beauty to its source is one of the ways a Platonist practitioner can cross the line to the transcendental.

3.  Continuing with the postings of the Sentences by Porphyry, here is the Fourth Sentence:

Things essentially incorporeal, are not present with bodies, by hypostasis and essence; for they are not mingled with bodies.  But they impart a certain power which is proximate to bodies, through verging towards them.  For tendency constitutes a certain secondary power proximate to bodies.  (Thomas Taylor)

The incorporeal in itself does not become present to the body in “being” nor in hypostatic form of existence.  It does not mingle with the body.  Nevertheless, by its inclination to the body, it begets and communicates to it a potentiality capable of uniting with the body.  Indeed, the inclination of the incorporeal constitutes a second nature [the irrational soul - Guthrie’s addition], which unites with the body.  (Kenneth Guthrie)

Non-material beings are not present and do not mix with material bodies because of their essence, but because of a certain force arising from their interaction, and through this force they can influence the material.

After all, the interaction itself creates a secondary force that can act on material bodies and is closer to them.  (Isaak Samarskyi)

3.1  One of the difficulties with reading Sentences is that Porphyry’s writing in this work remains abstract.  I mean that Porphyry does not illustrate the Sentences with examples, or with stories (myths, legends, things like that), or with comparisons such as metaphors.  Nor is there the kind of conversational context that is found in Plato’s Dialogues.  This differs from some of Porphyry’s writings, such as On Abstinence; but Porphyry was capable of a wide range of philosophical writing and we have to accept the Sentences as they are.

3.2  I think that this sentence would be clearer to me if I understood why it is important for Porphyry to establish that non-material beings do not interact with material beings.  I suspect that he may be contrasting his view with that of other Platonists of his time and Porphyry wants to clarify his own views on this topic; but I’m not sure of that.

3.2.1  It occurs to me that Porphyry may have Aristotle in mind; I mean that Porphyry may be differentiating his own view from that of Aristotle.  Porphyry was very well read in Aristotle’s works; see his work on Aristotle’s Categories.  You could say that Aristotle had the idea that incorporeal things, such as Platonic forms, mingled with material objects, as opposed to Plato’s view that they inhabit distinct hypostases.  Porphyry does not reference Aristotle in Sentences so this is speculative.

3.3  Perhaps Porphyry is alluding to the process of emanation and how it works.  It would seem that Porphyry may be distinguishing between how material things interact with each other from how non-material things impact, or influence in some way, material things. 

Material things influence each other by ‘mingling’ or one might say by ‘bumping into each other’ or otherwise interacting; all of this occurring at the material level.  Porphyry points out the non-material things differ from material things by hypostatic placement, and therefore their ‘being’ or ‘essence’, which Porphyry suggests excludes the kind of mingling that is observed when material things influence, impact, or otherwise connect with other material things. 

Porphyry offers that non-material beings have a ‘secondary power’ and it is through this ‘secondary power’ that they have a presence and, one might say, influence, or impact, on material beings.  When I read ‘secondary power’ it reminded me of the way Orthodox Theology talks about God’s ‘energies.’  It’s also possible to understand ‘secondary power’ as a power that is not central to incorporeal beings, but nevertheless manifests from incorporeal beings; think of the primary power of the sun is to provide light and the secondary power of the sun is to provide warmth.  Or think of the primary power of prayer is to facilitate connection to the transcendental and a secondary power of prayer is to bring a sense of calm to one’s life. 

3.4  Porphyry is clarifying how non-material beings are present to, and interact with, material beings.  This is not easy to understand.  Contemplating this Sentence, and the previous Sentence 3, is a good way to enter into an understanding of how this happens.

4.  There is an aspect of the Platonic practices of ethical restraint, or ascesis, which I would like to see emphasized more often.  And that is that the practices of ethical restraint are a cultivation that grows over time.  I think that people tend to think of asceses as states rather than cultivations.  Take, for example, the teaching on non-harming, or refraining from harming others.  In India this is known as ‘ahimsa’ and is the first ethical restraint in a number of Dharmic traditions such as Classical Yoga, Jainism, and Buddhism.  I also think of it as the first ethical restraint in Platonism.  ‘First’ in this context means that other ethical restraints can be understood as the application of non-harming to specific situations or domains of human activity. 

As a cultivation, ethical restraints can begin with easily accessible applications.  For example, can you refrain from killing every single person in a city?  Almost everyone would say that they could; but there are people for whom this first step in non-harming would be difficult to adhere to.  And there are some people who would consider such an endeavor as a duty and obligation under certain circumstances such as military strife.  It may seem that this application of non-harming is obvious, and for most people it is; even so, it is a first step in cultivating non-harming.

From there the Platonist practitioner can apply non-harming and non-retaliation to less obvious situations.  Things like name-calling, or sabotaging someone else’s plans. 

And non-harming can be expanded to other kinds of living beings such as animals; to the extent that non-harming is a Platonic teaching it is also a teaching that opposes slaughtering animals either for ritual sacrifice or for eating.

Applying non-harming to situations in our life at first might feel a bit awkward because we are not used to it and because it is not a principle of ethics in the larger world that we inhabit.  After some time, though, the cultivation of non-harming becomes a kind of internalized way of living in the world and blossoms in a surprising number of circumstances.

The same applies to other Platonic asceses such as restraining sexual impulses, the rejection of intoxicants, the reduction in the number of possessions and so forth.  Each of these ethical restraints are means for separating the soul from the body; the goal of the philosopher according to the dialogue Phaedo. 

5.  In a way this fifth part of today’s post is a continuation of the fourth part, but I wanted to treat it as a separate item.  What I want to comment on here is that asceticism, the cultivation of ethical restraints, is often experienced as a great joy.  Because in our contemporary world we rarely meet a practicing ascetic we have little to no experience with how ascetics feel about their own lives.  When examining the literature I have found that ascetics are often profoundly happy with their circumstances and their choice to become an ascetic.  This baffles people who are fixated on material acquisitions and other material goals.  But it’s true.  I have read about this even in the lives of what I would call lay renunciants or monastics; people who follow a strict program of asceses but are not affiliated with any specific institutional religious or spiritual group.  For example, in the book Ordinary People as Monks and Mystics, published in 1986, the author, Marsha Sinetar, surveyed a large number of such people and found them to be happy about, and satisfied with, their choices in life.

I’m not saying there are no difficulties in the life of an ascetic.  Perhaps the most often mentioned difficulty is loneliness; but it seems to be the case that ascetics eventually find ways of dealing with this.

A barrier to becoming an ascetic is that it is often referred to as very difficult, particularly in our modern and materialistic world.  But as a friend of mine who is a Platonist Monk said, “So what if it’s difficult?  There are lots of things in life that are difficult, but we do them anyway.”  Learning how to throw a javelin is difficult, learning calculus is difficult, learning how to bake an excellent cake is difficult, and so forth.  The program of Platonist asceticism, of ethical renunciations, can be a challenge, but it is a practice that is profoundly satisfying.

6.  I never tire of reading the Enneads of Plotinus.  I was reading Ennead V.1 the other day, “On the Three Primary Hypostases” and parts of it are among the finest spiritual writing I have ever come across.  The clarity, the way Plotinus will unpack the meaning of a term like ‘soul’ or ‘hypostasis’ is simply unsurpassed.

I have benefitted greatly from the writings of many Platonists, including Plutarch, Alcinous, Maximus of Tyre, Porphyry, Boethius, and so forth.  But my feeling is that Plotinus soars above, and beyond, what they offer. 

The Enneads are an ocean of wisdom and a sure guide to eternity.