Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 66

29 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 66

1.  Wisdom, Negation, and the Ineffable

Last week I posted about the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite.  I wrote a little about its impact on Christianity, particularly Christian Mysticism.

When I first encountered Mystical Theology it was shortly after I decided to leave Buddhism behind.  I had been practicing Buddhism for about thirty years, but, for various reasons, the well of Buddhism had gone dry.  This didn’t mean that I rejected Buddhism as a whole; in particular I retained a great fondness for the Perfection of Wisdom discourses such as the Heart Sutra and the Diamond Sutra.

What immediately struck me when I read Mystical Theology was the manner in which the negations of the mystical ascent outlined in Mystical Theology resembled the negations found in the Heart Sutra.  In particular what I am getting at is how both of these works, about midway through their text, negate the primary collection of ideas that define their respective traditions.

For example, in Chapter 5 of the Mystical Theology the author writes, “It [the ultimate] is not kingship.  It is not wisdom.  It is neither one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness.  Nor is it a spirit, in the sense in which we understand that term.  It is not sonship or fatherhood and it is nothing known to us or to any other being.”

(Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, translated by Colm Luidheid, Paulist Press, New York, 1987, Page 141, ISBN: 9780809128389)

Notice that in this quote there is embedded a negation of the trinity: Nor is it spirit, it is not sonship or fatherhood.  This means that the three persons of the trinity, father, son, and spirit, are transcended in the divine ascent that the author describes.

Many other significant philosophical and theological categories are similarly negated such as: number, soul, mind, power, light, and so forth.  The author deftly places these realities beneath the ineffable which is reached at the end of this mystical ascent.

In The Heart Sutra the reader encounters a similar rejection of foundational categories of the Buddhist tradition.  For example, the five aggregates, the foundation of Buddhist psychology is dismissed as follows: “Therefore in emptiness no form, no feelings, perception, impulses, consciousness.”  Later the Heart Sutra rejects the Four Noble Truths as follows: “. . . no suffering, no origination, no stopping (cessation), and no path.”  As in the Mystical Theology many other basic categories of the Buddhist tradition are also similarly dismissed (not dismissed as in arguing for their non-existence, dismissed in the sense that in the opening to ultimacy, which in a Buddhist context is emptiness, these categories need to be left behind).

There is even a striking similarity in the closing statements of both documents.  In both documents there is an emphasis on the idea that the practitioner must move “beyond” the kind of analysis that these categories lead to.  For example, the conclusion of Mystical Theology says, “It is beyond assertion and denial.  We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfection and unique cause of all things, and, by virtue of its preeminently simply and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial.”

(Ibid)

In the Heart Sutra the closing says, “Gone, gone, gone beyond, gone beyond beyond, Bodhi Savaha.”  This is a mantra which is as follows: “Gate, gate, paragate, parasamgate, Bodhi Svaha!”  (‘Gate’ is pronounced ‘gah-tay’). 

This closing emphasis on going beyond all the foundational categories of the respective spiritual systems of their respective tradition is what I recognized as, to my mind, intimately connecting the two documents even though there is no evidence of any historical connection.  I don’t think there is an historical connection; but I think there is a spiritual connection. 

For a Platonist it is gratifying to find the use of negations, as are found in the dialogue Parmenides, in these two documents.  And what I came to understand is that this kind of teaching is a signal that I am dealing with a Wisdom Tradition when I find this kind of teaching. 

I often say that Wisdom is discrimination that is done in the service of transcendence; it is not just analysis for the sake of analysis.  When Wisdom serves transcendence it leads us to that which is beyond any affirmation or negation, it transcends time and space, it is neither that which is changeless nor that which is in process.  It is eternal peace.

2.  This last week was exceptionally busy and complicated.  For that reason, my post today is short.  I hope to return to a normal pace of living this week.

Best wishes,

Xenocrates 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 65

22 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 65

1.  Dionysius the Areopagite and Contemplative Platonism

Last week I mentioned Johannes Scotus Eriugena and his work The Periphyseon.  I mentioned in passing that Eriugena had translated into Latin the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, in particular Mystical Theology.  Here I want to post some thoughts about Dionysius and his role in Late Classical Platonism as well as Christian Mysticism, also known as Contemplative Christianity.  I think it is an intriguing history of how Platonic Mysticism was transmitted to Christianity, impacting Christian Theology in general, and Christian Mysticism in particular.

Not much is known about Dionysius beyond the works he wrote (or the works attributed to him).  The traditional view of Dionysius, held by orthodox Christians for many centuries, is that he was the Dionysius who appears briefly in the Book of Acts in the scene where Paul preaches to the Athenians at the Areopagus.  In the Book of Acts it mentions by name several people who converted to Christianity at that time, one of whom was Dionysius.  Since Dionysius is a very common Greek name at that time, he is distinguished from others of the same name by referring to him as Dionysius the Areopagite.  The orthodox tradition has the view that the works attributed to Dionysius (both the ones that we have and a few that have not survived) were written by this Dionysius from the Book of Acts. 

Modern scholars almost universally disagree with this attribution for various reasons such as linguistics, quotations from later sources; things like that.  But pinning down who Dionysius was has proven difficult and there are many theories about who he was and when he wrote.  I’ve read theories that place Dionysius anywhere from the 300’s to the mid 500’s.  And there are many theories as to who Dionysius was and where he was from.  One interesting theory I’ve encountered is that Dionysius was a pen name for Damascius who was the last head of Plato’s Academy when it was closed by Justinian in 529 CE.  The idea is that Damascius, or possibly a Christian member of the Academy at the time of the closing, penned the works attributed to Dionysius as a way of preserving some basic teachings of Platonism in the new context of Christianity which had triumphed over Paganism.  On the other hand, a recently published work that translates a 9^th century biography of Dionysius offers an extensive apology for the traditional, orthodox, view that Dionysius was the Apostle of Paul from the Book of Acts.

For those interested in the orthodox view the latest book presented this perspective is The Life of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, published in January 2024.  For those interested in the idea that Dionysius was actually Damascius, in 2006 Carlo Maria Mazzucchi wrote an article presenting this perspective, though I’m not sure of the journal. 

Mystical Theology is a brief work; something like five to seven pages, depending on the layout.  In five sections it describes the mystical ascent in terms of entering into a luminous darkness, an ineffable presence beyond affirmation and negation.  Those familiar with Plotinus can see the connection to passages in the Enneads where Plotinus talks about turning away from the material realm, then turning away from the noetic, in order to become absorbed in that which is beyond being, the Good and the One. 

The mystical ascent in Platonism, and in Dionysius specifically, is about divesting yourself of differentiation and individuation.  I think that is why Dionysius uses the vocabulary of ascending into darkness; because this realm is beyond the light of reason.

This understanding of mysticism is the root of Christian mysticism and it has a Platonic origin.  Mystical Theology had, and still has, a profound impact on orthodox Christianity; for example, a work like The Cloud of Unknowing is rooted in Mystical Theology as are many other works down to the current day.

2.  The Modern World and Mysticism

I saw a talk online that suggested that mystics are vanishing from society.  I wonder if that is true.  My inclination is to think that it is harder these days for a mystic to find a place or organization that is devoted to pursuing mystic realization and living in accordance with the disciplines and ethical restraints that are foundational for mysticism.  We live in a society that rejects the idea of transcendence, a society that is secular, reductionistic, and materialistic; these are not nourishing to an understanding of mysticism.

The talk I listened to quoted Jung as having this view; the view that mystics are vanishing from society.  Personally, I don’t consider Jung to be a mystic, but putting that aside, he may have spotted this kind of trend decades ago.  I suspect others have as well.

But I have also observed that mystics seem to be up to the challenge of the modern world; I mean that mystics do the best they can given the circumstances, which, I think, has always been the case. 

Today a mystic faces the challenge of figuring out how to walk his path without social approval or support.  There are very few teachers or resources or institutions that will assist someone trying to walk this path.  But that’s OK; it’s a challenge for sure, but the difficulties are not insurmountable. 

3.  Precepts of Platonism

If I were to mimic Dharmic traditions by generating a list of core precepts that I think capture the heart of the Dharma of Platonism, I think it would look something like this:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

3.1  These are based on the five precepts, or vows, found in Dharmic traditions such as Classical Yoga and Jainism, as well as Buddhism.  I believe I have posted these previously, but I’m going to put them here to make it easy to compare them:

Classical Yoga and Jainism

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

Here is the Buddhist version:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

3.2  I have used a formulaic approach to the language of these precepts; books readers might consult may use a different kind of language structure, but I do not think these lists are misleading.  I am taking the view that the ethical injunctions are all ethical restraints and the formula I am using emphasizes that perspective.

3.3  Classical Yoga and Jainism share a common fifth precept; to refrain from acquiring unnecessary possessions.  Buddhism has a different fifth precept; to refrain from intoxicants.  I decided to include both of them since both of these restraints are found in Platonic writings.

3.4  I have an inclination to include a precept that emphasizes vegetarianism.  It might look something like this: I will refrain from harming animals by eating them, by wearing their skin or fur, or by sacrificing them for ritual or other purposes.  Both Classical Yoga and Jainism are vegetarian traditions, but they do not have a separate vow for vegetarianism; rather vegetarianism is considered to be the application of the first vow, the vow of non-harming, to the animal-human relationship.  I decided to go along with that; but I do feel a bit ambivalent about that.  My ambivalence is that by emphasizing vegetarianism with a separate vow a structure would be created that would point directly to the important place it has held in the Platonist tradition.  For those new to Platonism I think this could be very helpful.  I don’t think such pointing is necessary for Classical Yoga and Jainism because in their cultural context the practice of vegetarianism in these traditions is so widely known.

3.4.1  It’s worth noting that in East Asia there is a more complex series of ethical commitments referred to as the Bodhisattva Vows.  These vows are available to lay people who want to deepen their Buddhist commitments and practice.  In the East Asian Bodhisattva vows vegetarianism is explicitly required in the third of the 48 minor precepts (there are 10 major precepts) which has had an impact on East Asian culture in general.  I’m not going to list the Bodhisattva Vows here because they are too complex in comparison to the five vows of the Jains, Classical Yoga, and Buddhism.  But perhaps in a possible commentary I might bring them into the discussion.

3.5  My tentative plan is to expand on each of the Platonic Precepts of Philosophy by quoting passages from the Dialogues, the Enneads, and other Platonist sources so that the source from which the Precepts of Philosophy emerge can be made clear.  I have already done this with the First Precept of Non-Harming and posted them to this blog (to find these quotes click on ‘Non-harming’ on the list of topics to the right).  In some ways this is a big project, but I am willing to go at a slow pace to bring it to a conclusion.

3.6  An objection to this kind of project is that Platonism has not, in fact, generated such a list of Ethical Restraints or Precepts and therefore the list is misleading. 

3.6.1  My first response is that there are many ideas and interpretations in the history of Platonism that are not explicitly found in the Dialogues; and, in addition, this is true for all spiritual traditions. 

3.6.2  My second response is that such a list is a kind of a teaching device, a distillation, of Platonist Ethics and the practice of those ethics.  There have been many such distillations such as essays describing the different hypostases and how they interact. 

3.6.3  My third response is that the Platonic tradition seems to have lost sight of the ethical restraints found in Platonism.  When I say we have ‘lost sight’ of these practices, I mean that even though we may read about them, they don’t register as actual practices, actual things we can do to practice the Dharma of Platonism.  I feel that many people don’t know what to do to practice Platonism.  This structure opens the door to doing Platonism.

3.7  I like the idea of following how Jainism interprets their precepts, or vows (vrata), in several ways, depending on the life situation of the practitioner.  For monastics, their vows are interpreted very strictly.  For laypeople, much less so.  I think the same could be done successfully with these Precepts of Philosophy.

4.  The Sentences of Porphyry – Sentence 11

Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts, and multiplies about individuals with a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power.  (Thomas Taylor)

The incorporeal existences in descending are divided and multiplies into atomic things by a remission of power, whilst in ascending they are unified, and revert to inseparateness by superabundance of power.  (Thomas Davidson)

When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the individual.  When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and their power intensifies.  (Kenneth Guthrie)

When immaterial beings descend, they divide into parts and branch out, multiplying in their individual manifestations of power, but when they ascend, they unite and return to simultaneous existence in unity through increased power.  (Isaak Samarskyi)

4.1  I read this as an elegant summary by Porphyry of the process of descent into the material realm, followed by the process of the return to the noetic, and beyond the noetic to the One.  Porphyry manages to describe these processes concisely and at the same time, with insight.  I think it reflects, or embodies, Porphyry’s own experience of returning to the One.

4.2  Porphyry begins by explaining how the incorporeal, or immaterial, becomes, or descends, into the material realm.  Porphyry describes this as division of noetic, or hypostatic, unities into parts.  Because this is a highly condensed presentation, Porphyry does not go into the specifics of the process of division into parts that noetic unities undergo, though later Platonists, such as Proclus, will focus on this and offer their understanding of how this process unfolds.

I tend to use the concept ‘differentiation’ to describe the movement from unity to noetic realities, and then from noetic realities to material instantiations.  This process of differentiation resembles the way light breaks up into different colors when light flows through a crystal.  Or the way a river will branch out in a delta.  Or the way a song will be performed differently by different singers and musicians. 

4.3  Interestingly, there is the idea in this Sentence that there is a loss of ‘power’ as differentiation increases; the more a material entity is the result of a series of differentiations, the less power it has.  I think the term ‘power’ here means ‘metaphysical power’ and, further, that this is referring to a thing’s potentialities.  For example, the number 7 in the noetic hypostasis has enormous potential, unlimited possibilities.  But because noetic numbers have no content, this power of possibilities remains a potential.  In contrast, 7 apples is a limited manifestation of the noetic reality of 7.  7 apples are differentiated from 7 chairs, 7 days, and 7 stars.  7 chairs have some potential; for example, it could potentially refer to 7 oak chairs, 7 old chairs, 7 rocking chairs, and so forth.  But all of those potentialities are contained in 7 as a noetic reality so the potentiality of 7 chairs is less than, which is to say has less power than, 7 as a noetic presence.

4.4  The Sentence then reverses the process to describe the ascent to the noetic from the material.  When we ascend, we become more unified, less differentiated, but at the same time we have more power in our understanding, vision, and potential.  Finally, there is a return to unity as such, meaning a return to the One.

5.  Whitehead and Heidegger

I found an essay online that is a thoughtful presentation of the differences between Heidegger and Whitehead.  The essay is by Jay McDaniel whom I have not heard of before.  He is a philosopher, evidently a follower of Whitehead, who likes to post essays on various topics at his blog called Open Horizons which is found at openhorizons (dot) org.  The specific essay I’m referring to is titled “Love and Mystery.”  If you are interested in the differences and overlaps between Whitehead and Heidegger I recommend the essay as a good summary.

McDaniel, in one section of the essay, lists the various critiques Heidegger had of metaphysics.  In item 6 McDaniel writes “Heidegger argues that metaphysics has exhausted itself and reached its ‘end.’  This does not mean metaphysics has been resolved or completed, but rather that it has reached a point where it can no longer meaningfully address the question of being.”

This perspective is a primary reason why I ultimately rejected Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of philosophy.  But I want to make one point that McDaniel doesn’t touch on; and that is that this idea of the ‘end of metaphysics’ is, surprisingly, a typical modernist stance regarding the past and what the past has to offer us.  I mean that one of the foundations of modernism is that it regards the past as void of any positive content, void of wisdom or insight, that the past is solely something to overcome and to leave behind. 

It is typical of modernist views that those who offer them want to start over; a kind of Year Zero project.  I think the first manifestation of this was the French Revolution which sought to eliminate all traces of the past; those who were seen as clinging to the past were to be eliminated. 

If you read modernist theory, particularly in the realm of politics and related fields, this idea is a steady drumbeat.  It seems to me that Heidegger is marching to that drum.  In other words, Heidegger’s rejection of the tradition of metaphysics fits right in with modernity’s overall project of starting over with Year Zero.

From this perspective, the perspective of modernity, those who engage in metaphysics are by that very engagement reactionaries.  McDaniel writes, “. . . the Heideggerians I encountered were profoundly suspicious of metaphysics, often rejecting it outright.”  As I mentioned in a previous post, from this perspective analytic philosophy and Heidegger’s philosophy have the same anti-metaphysical impact.

In a way, we can think of a work like Whitehead’s Process and Reality as a refutation of Heidegger’s thesis about the ‘end of metaphysics.’  Process and Reality is consciously rooted in the heritage of metaphysical thought going back to Plato.  Whitehead finds that heritage nourishing and vividly interacts with it to make his own original observations.  (Perhaps this positive view of the heritage of metaphysics was shaped by Whitehead’s interest in mathematics; it would be difficult for a mathematician to reject the history of mathematics in the way modernity rejects so much else.)  I’m not saying that Whitehead wrote Process and Reality in order to refute Heidegger; McDaniel writes that, as far as scholars can tell, the two were almost entirely unaware of each other.  I mean that Process and Reality is a rejection of Heidegger’s views on metaphysics because it is a demonstration that metaphysics has not, for example, reached its ‘end.’

For contemporary Platonists I think it is helpful to get some clarity about what Heidegger says about metaphysics in general and about Plato in particular.  Some of the strange hostility to metaphysics one encounters these days is rooted in Heidegger’s application of modernity’s hostility to the past to metaphysics.  As I mentioned in a previous post about this, the best way to counter these kinds of ideas is simply to continue one’s studies of metaphysics and to apply such studies to how one lives one’s life.  In this way the great garden of metaphysics will continue to blossom.

6.  It is late at night.  There was another brief rain today in the desert where I live.  This cleared the air and when the sun set behind the mountain range in the distance the air was exceptionally clear. 

There are times when I feel a deep sadness at the state of the world and the fate that human beings have made their destiny.  But there are consolations, messages from the noetic, that can soothe the sense of alienation from this world.  An astonishingly beautiful sunset is one such message.  The cooling stillness of contemplation is another.  The writings of the Platonic tradition are yet another.  Experiences like this are like opening a gate to the grotto of eternity.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 64

15 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 64

1.  Gaps in the History of Platonism

Two weeks ago, I posted about how I asked some AI sites for a list of what those sites considered are the most significant books in Metaphysics in Western Philosophy.  (This was Brief Notes on Various Topics – 62, dated 1 September 2025, Item 4.)  I have continued with investigating this focus this past week by downloading a few lists of essential reading in Western Philosophy that were compiled by Youtube Presenters who have channels focused on philosophy; I confined the downloads to people who have academic qualifications.

The reading lists mimicked what I found in AI; mainly, that there is a very long gap after Aristotle who is followed by early modern philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume.  What I would like to do here is to highlight two books from this timegap that I think are significant in the history of Platonism, and for philosophy in general, but do not appear in lists of significant philosophical literature when doing online searches of various types.

The first book to consider is The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius.  Boethius was born about 480 and died in 524.  Boethius lived after the fall of the Western Roman Empire and is often considered to be the last Classical Scholar of the Roman period due to his scholarly commitments and vast knowledge of the Classics. 

The Consolation was written when Boethius was imprisoned, charged with treason in a conspiracy that was hatched against Boethius by powerful forces at the court of the Ostrogothic King Theodoric. While in prison awaiting execution Boethius wrote the Consolation.

The book became a great success in the medieval period.  There are about 400 manuscript copies of the Consolation that have survived and that we can refer to, indicating the widespread circulation of this work.  It was hugely influential with images found in the book being widely used in art, and poems from the book being set to music.  For these reasons alone I consider the Consolation to be essential reading.  But there is more; the Consolation is a serious work of philosophy in the Platonic tradition.  It grapples with the nature of suffering, fate, and transcendence.  It is a book that has helped countless people down through the centuries right into the present.  The absence of the  Consolation is, to my mind, kind of embarrassing; it would seem to imply that contemporary academic philosophers are unaware of it, or haven’t read it, or both. 

For Platonists in particular who have an interest in how Platonism developed over the centuries, and how Platonism shaped Western culture, the Consolation is essential.  Even today it is widely read and talked about.   

The second book I want to highlight is the Periphyseon by Johannes Scotus Eriugena.  (I don’t think I’ve mentioned this book before on this blog.)  Eriugena lived from about 800 to 877 CE.  He was an Irishman who ended up at the Carolingian Court of Charles the Bald in about 845.  He wrote the Periphyseon in the 860’s. 

The Periphyseon is a work of Platonic Metaphysics and Theology.  But the specific heritage of Platonism that Eriugena connected with differs from that of the Classical Period of Platonist Philosophy.  His inspiration and grounding in Platonism was based on his reading of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite in which one finds such works as Mystical Theology and the Divine Names as well as works on celestial and terrestrial hierarchies.  Eriugena translated these works into Latin and in this way he became a conduit for philosophical mysticism in this period.  In contrast, Eriugena was not acquainted with Plotinus or Iamblichus or other late Classical Platonists (I suspect the availability of Plato and Aristotle was very limited; likely confined to translations by Boethius.)

I first encountered the Periphyseon (also known as The Divisions of Nature) many decades ago in the form of selected passages of the work; that was the only book available in English that I could find.  Later the University of Dublin translated the book, but their edition was very expensive and didn’t stay in print for very long.  Recently, though, a translation by I. P. Sheldon-Williams, edited by John O’Meara, has become available at a reasonable price.  Now those who are interested in the book in the English speaking world will be able to read it from cover to cover.

I have found the selections of this work that I have already read to be very inspiring.  The author frames his examination of nature, by which he means the cosmos as whole, including the transcendental, into four categories or divisions:

1.  That which creates and is not created

2.  That which creates and is created

3.  That which does not creates and is created

4.  That which neither creates nor is created

Spiritually, the idea unfolds of returning to the first category; so the purpose of the work is salvific. 

These are two examples of books that ‘fill in the gap’ that is present in most overviews of Western Philosophy at this time.  There are others, but for me these two are both significant and worthy of a Platonist’s time and attention.  Perhaps becoming aware of this gap in suggested reading material in the context of Western Metaphysics will inspire me to develop a reading list of my own.

2.  The Sentences of Porphyry: Sentence 10

We do not understand similarly in all things, but in a manner adapted to the essence of each.  For intellectual objects we understand intellectually; but those that pertain to soul rationally.  We understand plants spermatically; but bodies idolically (i.e. as images); and that which is above all these, super-intellectually and super-essentially.  (Thomas Taylor)

We do not think in the same manner in all things, but in a manner consonant with the essence of each.  In intellect, for example, we think intellectually; in soul, logically; in plants, seminally; in bodies, phantasmically; and in what transcends these, inconceivably and superessentially.  (Thomas Davidson)

Thought is not the same everywhere; it differs according to the nature of every being.  In intelligence, it is intellectual; in the soul it is rational; in the plant it is seminal; last, it is superior to intelligence and existence in the principle that surpasses all these [that is, the One – note by the translator].  (Kenneth Guthrie)

Everything exists in everything, but in a way that corresponds to the nature of each entity: in the mind - noetically, in the soul – rationally, in plants – through seeds, in bodies – in the form of images, and in the transcendent – unknown and beyond being. (Isaak Samarskyi)

2.1  Here Porphyry is presenting his view of how different types of things differ in their mode of understanding.  Deciphering this sentence feels complex because at times Porphyry seems to be referring to different types of biological things, such as plants as opposed to those biological things that have a mind. 

2.2  Porphyry seems to be saying that different things have different modes of thought, and I take thought as interacting with the material world.  But again, there is a source of confusion in that mind interacts noetically, which refers to the second level of existence, but the soul interacts rationally and the question that arises for me is if that aspect of reason is also noetic or does it refer to the material world. 

2.3  Maybe if we lay out the items referred to in a different way it might be helpful:

mind                          nous

soul                            reason

plants                         seeds

bodies                        images

transcendent             unknown and beyond being

Looked at in this way Porphyry is describing the path of ascent that goes through several means of understanding, ending in the transcendence of those modes in the One that is beyond being.  Looking at these categories and their interactions, I tend to see their relationships in this way:

plants                         seeds

bodies                        images

mind                          noetic differentiation

soul                             transcendence

2.3.1    I’m not exactly sure what Porphyry means by suggesting that the mode plants use to interact with the world are seeds.  But tentatively, the seeds of plants are responsive to things like temperature, rain, dry spells, and many other conditions.  It is through this interaction that the seed of a plant knows when to sprout.

2.3.2    Bodies interact with existence through images.  (I wonder if this includes dreams for Porphyry?)  In Platonism material images are often thought of as imitations; such as paintings being imitations of actual things.  Perhaps Porphyry is thinking of that kind of relationship.

2.3.3    The previous two types of things and their modes are materially bound.  In this third type of thing, mind, we move to the noetic.  Mind has the function of making differentiations and the source of these differentiations is nous.  (Incorrect differentiations are not found in nous; they are due to the diminished capacity of materially embodied minds to access noetic realities outside of contemplation.)  As an aside, discriminations by the mind that discriminate between that which is eternal from that which is ephemeral is the appearance of wisdom.

2.3.4    I understand the soul to be the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual; this seems to differ from Porphyry’s schema a bit.  Porphyry links the soul with reason, but I tend to see reason as a function of mind, specifically as a tool, or set of tools, for noetic discrimination.  In a sense you could say that reason is noetic discrimination which is why the principles of reason transcend material instantiations.

3.  I listened to a short Youtube where two philosophers were talking about how philosophy should not be taught to young people because young people tend to like arguing too much.  They suggested that philosophy should have a kind of age requirement of about 30 years old. 

Looking back on my own philosophical studies I can understand what they mean.  I think it is easy for younger people to misinterpret arguments or views, to simplify discussions that are inherently complex. 

On the other hand, it seems to be the case that a lot of older philosophers are not exactly free of these tendencies.  Personally, I think what is needed is a good teacher who can show that there is more to philosophy than crafting arguments or unpacking the meaning of a word or phrase.  There are also ethical restraints, purifications that shape one’s life in the world, how that life manifests; and that is just one example.  This embeds philosophy into the life of the practitioner so that insights, as opposed to arguments, are tested in the realm of experience.

4.  A Manner of Speaking

Words are slippery things.  I mean that words are subject to shifting usages, definitional drift, and becoming and begoning as older words vanish and newer words emerge.  This applies to the context of Philosophy as much as any other area of life.

And I have been thinking about how this applies to contemporary Platonism.  Such a focus has started me thinking that contemporary Platonism needs to develop and cultivate its own vocabulary and terms.  I say this because key terms of academic Platonism are recent inventions that have become very widespread and in important ways misrepresent the Platonic tradition.  The obvious example is the word ‘Neoplatonism’ which I have discussed several times on this blog.  But there are others as well.  And there are terms, such as ‘reason’, that have a range of meanings in Classical Platonism that is absent from contemporary usages of that word and I think this leads to misreadings of works from the Classical Platonist period.

As Platonism re-emerges from its eclipse under modernity, I think it will be natural for Platonists to reconnect with key words and phrases from the Platonic tradition with the idea of understanding what these words mean in the context of Classical Platonism without having a thick layer of modernist assumptions making it difficult to access what is being said.  I have already seen a few contemporary Platonists spontaneously move in that direction.

In short, I think Platonism needs to discover a distinctly Platonic manner of speaking, a manner of speaking that is more congenial to its transcendental insights than what we currently have.