Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 23.1

12 August 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 23.1

The Visible and The Invisible

This is an addition to the post I did on August 9^th.  I wanted to have a section on the discussion Socrates has about the visible and the invisible, but it got too long and I decided to make it a separate post.

“’Now,’ said he (Socrates – my addition), ‘shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?’

“’Let us assume them,’ said Cebes.

“’And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?’

1.  Socrates divides existence into that which is ‘visible’ and constantly changing, and the ‘invisible’ which is always the same.  I understand what Socrates means and how is using these categories at this point in the discussion; but I think it is more complex than how it has been presented here.

2.  For the purposes of this discussion I am interpreting ‘visible’ as ‘sensory’; that is to say that the division Socrates proposes is by suggestion a division between that which is sensory and that which is non-sensory.  I mean that the logic of this division would apply equally to sonic objects, as one example, as it does to visual objects.

3.  There are many invisible things that constantly change in the same way that visual and sonic objects constantly change.  The first level of such objects are sensory objects that are beyond the range of the physiology of a particular species’ senses.  For example, some animals see colors beyond the range that humans can perceive.  And some animals hear sounds beyond the range that humans can perceive.  This is well known and studied.  These sights and sounds are ‘invisible’ to human sense perception, but they are not ‘always the same.’  This is because they are physical objects, or physical occasions, that do not register on the sensory apparatuses of human beings.  But because they are still physical objects; that is to say that they are material objects and dependent upon material causes and conditions, and that they belong to the same class as the sensory objects human beings are physiologically equipped to perceive.

4.  A second level of invisible objects that constantly change are objects that take form in the material world, but lie altogether outside the structure of human senses.  I mean that unlike the first level, these material objects are not, for example, visual but in a region of the spectrum of light outside of human perception.  Rather these material objects dwell in completely other sensory realms, or regions.  For example, a sensory object manifesting as a magnetic field would not be perceptible to human beings because human beings do not have the capacity to detect magnetic fields; magnetic fields themselves are the kind of object that is invisible but constantly changing.

5.  A third level would be sentient beings who live their lives in realms outside of, or beyond, that of human perception.  My view is that this is where the gods reside; they are sentient beings and material realities and in that sense they are like the living beings that we are and that we can perceive through our sensory apparatuses.  We don’t perceive the gods because they are like magnetic fields; we simply do not have the sensory equipment to perceive them.

This means that the gods are born and die (as is explicitly stated in popular literature about the gods), that they are a part of becoming and begoning.  This is the result of the gods dwelling in the third hypostasis, just as we do.  The gods are not higher realities, or transcendental realities.  I think humans have tended to view them that way because they are mysterious and feel remote, just like magnetic fields and other similar things. 

The gods are non-sensory invisible realities and that are constantly changing.

6.  From this perspective the third hypostasis consists of both visible and invisible realities, but whether or not they are visible or invisible, all things, or occasions, that reside in the third hypostasis, in material reality, are subject to generation and decay.

7.  Above the things or occasions of the material realm are the realities of the noetic realm consisting of forms, numbers, and the primary noetic realities of Being, Life, and Intellect (or intelligence).  It is here that we encounter that which is invisible and always the same.  The noetic realities are always the same because they are metaphysically next to the unity of the One.  This unity of noetic realities distinguishes them from material realities, whether they are visible or invisible. 

Noetic realities are invisible because they have no features that could stimulate a sensory apparatus.  They do not have color, they make no sound, etc.  How, then, do we experience them?  From the Platonic perspective this happens when we separate our soul from our body, a process that requires the practice of contemplation.  As Plotinus says, ‘Take away everything.’  I take that to mean, remove yourself from sensory stimulation and when that is done the soul, due to its kinship with noetic realities, will show us these noetic truths.  Socrates refers to this as ‘wisdom’ and in a sense you can analogically think of wisdom as a kind of sensory organ designed to perceive noetic objects; but don’t take this literally.  As I said, it’s an analogy.

8.  Beyond the noetic there is the One (there is nothing between the noetic and the One).  The One is the ultimate source of all things.  Because it is the source of all things, it is invisible to all created things both material and noetic.  It is like a piece from an anonymous author. 

The One is invisible because it is beyond predication of any kind, both affirmation and negation.  Since the One is beyond all predication, it is beyond all concepts.  Since it is beyond all concepts it is beyond analysis.  It is neither light nor darkness.  It is both light and darkness.  It is the realm of true peace.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 23

9 August 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 23

This post is a continuation of my series on Phaedo.  I am using the Harold North Fowler translation from the Loeb Classical Library.

“’Well then,’ said Socrates, ‘must we not ask ourselves some such question as this?  What kind of thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it?  And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and lose our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?’

“’You are quite right,’ he replied.

“’Now is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded?  And if anything is uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?’

“’I think,’ said Cebes, ‘that is true.’

“’Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?’

“’Yes, I think so.’

“’Let us then, ‘ said he, ‘turn to what we were discussing before.  Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change?  Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being – do they ever admit of any change whatsoever?  Or does each absolute essence, since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?’

“’It must,’ said Cebes, ‘necessarily remain the same, Socrates.’

“’But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like?  Are they always the same?  Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?’

“’The latter,’ said Cebes; ‘they are never the same.’

“’And you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?’

“’Certainly,’ said he, ‘that is true.’

“’Now,’ said he, ‘shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?’

“’Let us assume them,’ said Cebes.

“’And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?’

“’Let us assume that also,’ said he.

“’Well then,’ said Socrates, ‘are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?’

“’Yes,’ he replied.

“”Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?’

“’To the visible,’ said he; ‘that is clear to everyone.’

“’And the soul?  Is it visible or invisible?’

“’Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates.’

“’But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?’

“’Yes, we do.’

“’Then what do we say about the soul?  Can it be seen or not?’

“’It cannot be seen.’

“’Then it is invisible?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible.’

“’Necessarily, Socrates.’

“’Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses – for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses – then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?’

“’Certainly.’

“’But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith.  And this state of the soul is called wisdom.  Is it not so?’

“’Socrates,' said he, ‘what you say is perfectly right and true.’

“’And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship?’

“’I think, Socrates,’ said he, ‘that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not.’

“’And the body?’

“’Is more like the other.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 273 – 279, 78B – 79E)

1.  The dialogue continues after the brief, and somewhat humorous, bridge.  This section contains a lot of deep philosophy and could be used for contemplating metaphysical issues.  A lot is brought up at this point in the dialogue.

2.  I feel that behind this discussion we can find the presence of the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus.  Heraclitus lived in the Greek city-state of Ephesus, now in Turkey, in the 6^th century B.C.  He was at least a century before Plato.  The connection to Heraclitus is through the philosopher Cratylus who identified as a Heraclitean and with whom Plato studied briefly.  Plato would write a dialogue, called Cratylus. 

In Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of the Philosophers the author writes:

“Plato studied philosophy at first in the Academy, (Footnote: The name can refer to the grove sacred to the hero Academus, as it does here, or to the school Plato later founded there.) then in the garden at Colonus . . . , where he read the works of Heraclitus.  Later, when he was about to compete for a prize in tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theater of Dionysus, after which he burned his poems, saying, ‘Come hither, Hephaestus: Plato needs you now.’

“From then on, they say, having reached the age of twenty, he became a disciple of Socrates.”

(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, translated by Pamela Mensch, Oxford University Press, New York, 2018, page 136, ISBN: 9780190862176)

2.  I see Heraclitus in the background of this conversation because Heraclitus is the philosopher who depicted the world as in constant flux (‘flux’ being a superlative way of saying ‘change’).  The discussion taking place at this point in the dialogue is about dispersion, about what kinds of things are subject to dispersion, or flux, and what kinds of things, if any, are not subject to dispersion/change/flux.  This was the focus of the inquiries of Heraclitus.

3.  I also see the presence of Heraclitus in the previous discussions about opposites and how opposites interact with each other.  This is another focus of the writings of Heraclitus.  And finally, in some of the fragments that remain of his work, Heraclitus depicts a cyclic cosmos where elementals transform into each other in endless cycles of becoming and begoning.  All of these themes are dealt with in Phaedo.

4.  We have only fragments of the book Heraclitus wrote (it seems that he wrote only one book called ‘On Nature’).  Presumably Plato would have had access to the whole book.  (Scholars disagree as to how much of the book we have in the surviving fragments.) 

Even at the time of Plato the teachings of Heraclitus were thought of as ‘obscure’ and ‘dark.’  But they are also the kind of sayings that draw one’s attention and some of them have become very widespread.  For example, one of his simplest sayings is ‘panta rhei’; everything flows.  Another states that ‘you cannot step twice into the same river for other waters are moving on.’  There are many attractive aphorisms like this.

Heraclitus’s teaching of the fluid nature of the world seems to undermine any basis for truth or enduring realities.  This was both disturbing and a stimulus to deeper thought about the nature of the cosmos in which we dwell.

5.  A personal aside: as a young man, when I first went to college, I picked up the translation of the fragments of Heraclitus by Philip Wheelwright, which was new at that time.  I was fascinated.  I carried around the small paperback with me for years, diving into it and grappling with its teachings (I no longer have the copy).  This was my introduction to Western philosophy. 

6.  The influence of Heraclitus continues to have a significant impact.  In the 20^th century his teachings influenced such philosophers as Bergson and Whitehead.  Though Heraclitus never became dominant in Western culture in the way that Plato or Aristotle did, nevertheless his aphoristic insights remain a creative force in Western philosophy and thought.

My own understanding of Heraclitus at this time is that Heraclitus offers us fundamental insights as to the nature of the third hypostasis; the realm of soul.  But he does not seem to have entered into the higher hypostases such as the noetic and the One.  His insights remain valuable in the sense that they depict aspects of the third hypostasis accurately, such as that it is a realm of constant flux.  This is valuable information because people are often misguided as to the nature of the material realm.  But we must look elsewhere for understanding higher hypostatic realities.

7.  Socrates points out that it is compounded things that are subject to dispersion, while uncompounded things are not subject to dispersion.  Compounded things are ‘never the same’ (like the river of Heraclitus), while uncompounded things remain the same; they are unchanging.

Compounded things are like the body.  Uncompounded things are like the soul, or the soul is an uncompounded ‘thing.’  Therefore the soul is not subject to change – that is, ultimately, the answer to the question that Cebes raises about the soul’s possible dispersion at death.  As I understand it, Socrates is saying that the soul cannot suffer dispersion because it is uncompounded.

8.  Socrates also reflects on the situation the soul finds itself in by the soul’s association with the body.  Socrates states that when the soul makes an inquiry that is guided by, or stimulated by, the senses then it is ‘dragged’ into the realm where nothing ever remains the same; that is to say, into the material realm.

On the other hand, when the soul remains ‘alone’ with itself (which I take to refer to a turning within during contemplation), “it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal, and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith.  And this state of the soul is called "wisdom.”

I find this passage one of the most beautiful in the dialogue, and possibly in the whole Platonic corpus.  I say this because it unpacks the meaning of wisdom, as in ‘love of wisdom,’ with elegance and precision.  Wisdom means communion with the immortal and the changeless.  Communion means having experiential knowledge of the subject; in other words, experiential knowledge of the transcendental.

9.  Notice how Socrates points out that in this state the soul ‘rests from its wanderings’.  I think this points to the transcendence of rebirth, that Socrates is referring here to union with the Good and the One that is beyond becoming and begoning, beyond samsara, beyond genesis.

10.  Although this was not an issue at the time Plato was writing, later Platonists split over the issue of whether the soul remained ‘in communion’ with higher hypostases; some, like Plotinus and Porphyry, argued that the soul did remain in communion, or at least in contact, with the noetic and the One.  Others, such as Iamblichus and Proclus argued that the soul was what they referred to as ‘fully descended’ into the material realm and was disconnected from higher hypostases.  This passage from Phaedo seems to me to strongly support the view of Platonists like Plotinus; that the soul always remains in communion with higher hypostases.

11.  I want to point out that the way in which Socrates proceeds with his argument in this passage is through what Plotinus refers to as ‘comparisons’.  Socrates is not using syllogistic, or at least not primarily using syllogistic.  Notice how Socrates asks “. . . to which class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship.”  This is an argument from simile, a type of comparison. 

Those who are raised in contemporary types of analytic philosophy will not grant an argument from simile much power, or consider it to be ‘valid’ in a deductive sense.  But the Platonic tradition uses arguments by comparisons (which I call ‘metaphorical inference’) in a way that suggests that classical Platonists considered these arguments to be efficacious. 

I think that this is derived from their understanding of the relationship between forms and material things.  Material things are related to forms by ‘likeness’; that is how the process of emanation and of instantiation proceeds.  So when Socrates suggests that Cebes consider a likeness he is pointing to the great unfolding of the One by differentiation into the material realm and that material things retain contact with their forms through likeness.  From this perspective, arguments based on simile, metaphor, and allegory not only make sense, but they are also a necessary tool for comprehending the metaphysical source of the ever changing, always in flux, material things.

12.  Again, this is a sublime passage.  A passage like this is worth reading and rereading, a guide to the immortal, to the Good and the One.

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 22

7 August 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 22

Continuing with my series on Phaedo using the Harold North Fowler translation from the Loeb Classical Library:

“’But how about Cebes?’ said Socrates.  “For Cebes must be convinced, too.’

“’He is fully convinced, I think,’ said Simmias; ‘and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals.  Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born.  However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains.  For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?’

“’You are right Simmias,’ said Cebes.  “’It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth.  But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect.’

“’It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already,’ said Socrates, ‘if you will combine this conclusion with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead.  For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again?  So the proof you call for has already been given.  However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further.  You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.’

“And Cebes laughed and said, ‘Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears.  Let us try to persuade him and not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin.’

“’Ah,’ said Socrates, ‘you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear.’

“’Where then, Socrates,’ said he, ‘shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?’

“’Hellas, Cebes,’ he replies, ‘is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also.  You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money.  And you must seek among yourselves, too, for perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you.’

“’That,’ said Cebes, ‘shall be done.  But let us return to the point where we left off, if you are willing.’

“’Oh, I am willing, of course.’

“’Good,’ said he.”

1.  I see this passage as a kind of humorous interlude.  Cebes is mocked in a friendly manner by Simmias for being ‘obstinately incredulous.’  And Socrates points out that Cebes’s objection has already been answered; but then accepts that both of them would like to continue the discussion.  Partly, I think, Cebes and Simmias want to continue the discussion because it is going well and the spirit of philosophical friendship is evident, and partly I think there may be the feeling on their part that if the discussion continues then they won’t have to move on to Socrates’s execution.

2.  I think the objection of Cebes, that the discussion has proved that the soul exists before birth, but that the soul continues after death has not been proved, means that Cebes is out of touch with the basic cyclic nature of the World Soul and the material realm which is an instantiation of cyclical time.  In a sense, Cebes has a modern, linear, sense of time and for this reason is unable to comprehend how previous arguments are sufficient to answer his objection.

3.  But Socrates is willing to continue even though he has gone over this before.  I see this as an example of the virtue of patience.  I am particularly attracted to teachers who have this virtue because I am a slow learner; I mean that I need to have multiple explanations of a new idea, or a new practice, in order to get a feel for it.  For this reason I empathize with Cebes and admire the willingness of Socrates to continue with the topic which will be done in the next section.

 

 

 

  

On Sorrow

2 August 2023

On Sorrow

The Platonic tradition depicts the material world as an emanation of higher realities found in the noetic plane of existence, and beyond that, the One and the Good.  We are urged to turn away from sensory experience in order to ascend to the non-material source of material existence.

But there is not a lot of time spent on the reason we should turn away from material existence and sensory experience.  In general, the experience of noetic realities is depicted as very attractive, as is the experience of ultimate nature; the Good and the One.  And these transcendental realities, because of their attractiveness, pull us towards their presence.  But I think more can be said about material, sensory, existence and the more that can be said is that material existence is the realm of sorrow.

1.  For a long time, decades, I was involved with Buddhism.  I studied briefly abroad and for a lengthy time in the U.S.  My observation is that Buddhism places the sorrowful aspect of the material world front and center with the First Noble Truth, known in Pali and Sanskrit as ‘Dukkha.’  Dukkha is usually translated into English as ‘suffering,’ sometimes as ‘unsatisfactory,’ and sometimes other translations are used though the word ‘suffering’ seems to dominate.  I am suggesting that ‘sorrow’ is a helpful way of unpacking the meaning of ‘Dukkha.’

2.  When the Buddha was asked about the meaning of Dukkha, he didn’t define it; instead, he gave examples of Dukkha.  The classical list is: Birth is Dukkha, Old Age is Dukkha, Sickness is Dukkha, Death is Dukkha, the five aggregates (skandhas/sense bases) subject to clinging are Dukkha.  Since every living being will experience birth, old age, sickness, death, and clinging to sensory experience, Dukkha/suffering/sorrow is inevitable.

3.  But sorrow is present even in our ordinary experiences.  For example, two lovers are on a date at an upscale restaurant.  The food is great, the conversation flows with ease, they are enjoying each other’s company.  Then he says, “This evening is perfect. I wish it could last forever.”  That comment is the awareness of sorrow, or dukkha, rising in his consciousness.  It is an awareness that nothing in the material realm lasts forever.  It is an awareness of impermanence.

4.  On the spiritual path it is good to spend some time studying impermanence; and by ‘studying’ I mean deeply contemplating and unpacking the meaning of impermanence.  All things that appear in the realm of the senses, including things we see, touch, taste, hear, smell, as well as all mental constructions such as thoughts, feelings, and emotions, will pass away.  And by ‘pass away’ I mean that they will vanish from this realm of becoming and begoning, never to appear again.  But if we shift our attention away from sensory experience, to that which is both the source of material existence and transcends material existence, we can enter into that which is beyond becoming and begoning, that which is beyond the reach of ‘crazy sorrow.’

5.  The realm in which we dwell is a realm where sorrow is dominant and happiness is rare and vanishes quickly.  Wars, other forms of physical violence, injustices beyond counting, deceits, theft, abuse, plots against others, hatred, jealousy, envy, pointless arguments, fatal accidents, revenge, starvation, diseases, and strife of all kinds permeate daily life and occupy most of our newscasts and dominates a lot of our conversations.  In addition, natural calamities of all kinds such as floods, fires, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, plagues, severe heat, severe cold, etc., means that life is fragile and subject to impermanence at any moment.

Knowing this, it is imperative that we turn to the transcendental, turn to that which is eternal, to the Good and the One, and leave the sorrowful realm of becoming and begoning behind.

6.  In the past, in the early period of Christianity, on into the Medieval period, there was a type of book written that often had in the title the phrase ‘De Contemptu Mundi’, which means ‘On Contempt for the World.’  These short books contained detailed lists of the negative aspects of life and urged people to follow an ascetic program in order to follow a path that brought one closer to God.

This kind of literature has no appeal today.  (I recall one youtuber reading a section from a version of ‘De Contemptu Mundi’ and just finding it hugely humorous and proof that Christianity was hopeless.)  The view today is that perfection is possible in the material sphere.  This is a view that, naturally enough, is held by materialists, but it is also held by the majority of religionists in the West today as well.  If you view the material world as perfectible then these kinds of thoughts, and dwelling on them make no sense.  Instead, you should use your energy to overcome the barriers to perfection in the material world rather than moan and groan about its drawbacks. 

But it is my view that there is a devouring shadow that inevitably follows every kind of material progress.  For example, the science of physics has given us many wonderful things, but it has also given us the capacity to destroy an entire city with a single bomb; these two are linked and cannot be separated from each other.

In contrast to modernity, Platonism views the material realm as the home of imperfection due to the material realm’s metaphysical distance from the One.  Because of this, perfection is found in the transcendental which lies beyond the material dimension.  In addition, the material realm is viewed as cyclic, which I call becoming and begoning, and for this reason all improvements in the material realm will pass away.

7.  There is beauty in the material world.  Plotinus writes about this in Ennead 1.6, On Beauty.  And there are scattered comments about beauty, and additional Enneads, throughout his writing.

In a sense the beauty of this world redeems material existence; almost.  I say ‘almost’ because the beauty found in material existence is not of, or from, or part of, material existence.  The beauty in this material realm is an emanation of that which is Beauty as such, of pure beauty, of transcendental beauty which is eternal.  Beauty in the material realm is transient, not because beauty is transient, but because the material realm is the realm of impermanence.

The beauty found in the world is a symbol of the source of beauty that lies beyond.  If we lift ourselves up from beautiful things, to beauty itself (as Plotinus suggests) then we enter noetic beauty, beauty as such.  In this sense, scattered throughout material existence are gates to the beyond, if we are able to take advantage of them.  These gates are a kind of grace that is due to the effulgent nature of the One and its omnipresent nature.

8.  I think Platonism has relied on the appeal that noetic experience brings to practitioners.  I think it is instructive that Socrates in Phaedo spends time leading his students to an awareness of the noetic and of the soul’s connection to the noetic.  Socrates does not spend a lot of time on the drawbacks of material existence and I suspect that is because he was so full of the wonder and bliss of noetic realities that he did not need to dwell on the negativities of material existence.  In addition, the injustice of Socrates’s imprisonment and execution make the negative aspects of the material world readily apparent to his students and do not need to be pointed out.  This makes sense to me.

On the other hand, we live in a highly materialistic culture and for that reason I think it is helpful to comprehend the negativities of material existence precisely because they tend to be ignored or downplayed.  Our culture tends to see itself as beyond the reach of these negativities, but thinking even a little about them demonstrates that this is not the case.

9.  Platonism offers us a path beyond sorrow.  It is not an easy path.  But it is a rewarding one.  Even a brief glimpse of noetic realities transforms our relationship to the cosmos.  Our life becomes an opportunity for transcending sorrow and dwelling at peace in the grotto of eternity.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 21

1 August 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 21

Continuing with my notes and comments on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions?  For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal “absolute” in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth.’

“’That is true.’

“’And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?’

“’Certainly, Socrates,’ said he.

“’But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own?  And should we be right in calling this recollection?’

“’Assuredly.’

“’For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of the two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember and learning would then be recollection.’

“’This is certainly true, Socrates.’

“’Which then do you choose, Simmias?  Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?’

“’I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates.’

“’How about this question?  You can choose and you have some opinion about it; When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?’

“’Certainly he can, Socrates.’

“’And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matter about which we have just been talking?’

“’I wish they might,’ said Simmias; ‘but on the contrary I fear that tomorrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly.’

“’Then, Simmias, you do not thin all men know these things?’

“’By no means.’

“’Then they recollect the things they once learned?’

“’Necessarily.’

“’When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them?  Surely not after we were born as human beings.’

“’Certainly not.’

“’Then previously.’

“’Yes.’

“’Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously. Before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence.’

“’Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains.’

“’Very well, my friend.  But at what other time do we lose them?  For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed.  Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?’

“’None whatever, Socrates.  I did not notice that I was talking nonsense.’

“’Then, Simmias,’ said he, ‘is this the state of the case?  If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force?  Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?’

“’Socrates, it seems to be that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists.  For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence.  And I think the proof is sufficient.’”

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 263 – 269)

1.  “Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?”

I understand this discussion as an effort by Socrates to present a more precise understanding of the soul’s understanding.  I look at it this way: is the knowledge of things like equality, beauty, etc., an innate structure of the human mind, or is it knowledge that is learned by the soul between lives?  (By inference this knowledge would be learned in the noetic realm.) 

The first option, that this kind of knowledge is part of the innate structure of the human mind, is, to take a modern example, a Kantian view of how this knowledge comes about.  Kantian was an idealist, but I think this way of looking at this kind of knowledge is also agreeable to a materialist interpretation; meaning that knowledge of the good and the beautiful is an epiphenomenon of the structure of the human brain and is therefore, from a reductionist perspective, a material reality. 

Whether idealist or materialist, the view of this kind of transcendental knowledge is contrasted with the Platonist view that his knowledge is acquired by the soul between lives, and then recollected if the soul has the opportunity to recollect such realities, due to good karmic conditions.

2.  “. . . is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions (the good, the beautiful – my addition) exist, so our souls existed before we were born.”

In what sense is this a ‘necessary’ inference?  I think the necessity lies in the view Socrates has of the soul.  First, like abstractions such as the good and the beautiful, the soul is immaterial.  It is only an immaterial reality, or function, like the soul that could apprehend immaterial noetic realities such as the good and the beautiful.  This is similar to the way certain things are perceived by the eye and other things are perceived by the ear.  The soul perceives immaterial realities because it is suited for that kind of perception; it is suited for that kind of perception because the soul itself is immaterial.  The eye can learn about things illuminated by light, the ear can learn about sonic objects, and the soul learns about the noetic; transcendental immaterial realities.

Second, it is ‘necessary’ in the sense that the notes of a well-written piece of music follow each other with a sense of ‘necessity.’  Sometimes people will remark that an exceptional piece of music seems to have a feeling of inevitability about it; meaning that each note seems to be placed in just the right place.  In a similar way, there is a feeling of inevitability, or the necessary, in the argument the Socrates is presenting.

3.  Notice that Socrates consistently uses as examples of abstract noetic realities the good and the beautiful.  I take these references as pointing beyond the noetic to the One itself because the One is also frequently referred to as the Good.  The beautiful is usually considered a noetic reality; and of course it is.  But I suggest that the paring of the Good and the One by Socrates suggests that there is that which is beautiful that transcends the noetic and stands beside the Good and the One.  This is the source of all that is beautiful, including all that is beautiful in the noetic, just as the One is the source of unity in the noetic, and the Good is the source of the benign nature of the noetic.