Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 1

13 January 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 1

Sometimes I have thoughts about Platonism that can range from an aphorism to a short paragraph.  These thoughts often do not lead to a lengthy post or to an essay.  I thought I would share some of them and see how posting this kind of material works.  If these look worthwhile I might make these brief notes a regular feature of the blog.

1.  Ultimately Platonism is about becoming apophatic, about merging with that which is beyond name and form. 

2.  Youtube Platonism seems, with a few exceptions, to accept the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ uncritically.  My feeling is that this places Youtube Platonism at least fifty years behind academic Platonism where significant scholars are clear that the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ is a very recent invention that has no foundation.

3.  I was listening to a talk on Late Classical Platonism when the speaker said that Plotinus presented a highly ‘rational’ version of Platonism, whereas, in contrast, Proclus was more mystical.  I thought that was weird.  I have the exact opposite view; that Plotinus is a mystic and Proclus was the rationalist (I almost said ‘hyper-rationalist’).  For example, see The Elements of Theology by Proclus.  The Elements of Proclus in many ways resembles the Ethics of Spinoza as there is the same kind of systematic structure derived from geometry.  And often Spinoza is thought of as a rationalist because Spinoza considered ultimate nature to be accessible by reason.  I believe Proclus also grants access to ultimate nature to reason; Proclus does this by substituting henads for the Good and the One.

4.  Is Platonism complicated?  I think it is more accurate to say that Platonism isn’t complicated, but at least some of its insights are counterintuitive and that makes it seem complicated when we first encounter it.  And for many this feeling can last for an extended period of time.

5.  This world is full of troubles, strife, conflict, suffering, and difficulties.  Peace and serenity are very rare and do not seem to be able to establish themselves in the material world in which we dwell.  Ennead 1.4, On Well-Being is a wonderful tonic for this situation in which we find ourselves.  Just reading it recently allowed me to, once again, see past the riotous conflagrations of genesis to the realm of true peace found in the Good and the One. 

6.  Asceticism is the method for the Platonic ascent to the Good and the One.

 

  

Third Things

10 January 2024

Third Things

“’Adeimantus,’ I replied, ‘you and I are not poets at the present moment, but founders of a state.  It’s the founders’ job to know the forms in which the poets must tell their stories, from which, if they compose, they must not deviate; but it is not the job of the founders themselves to write stories.’

“’And rightly so,’ he said. ‘But on this specific point, what would be the model for a story about matters divine?’

“’Something like this, I suppose,’ I said: ‘I think you should always present a god as he really is, whether you are writing about him in epic, lyric or tragedy.’

“’That must be the case.’

“’A god is, of course, good in reality and must be spoken of as such?’

“’What do you mean?’

“’Well no good quality is harmful, is it?’

“’I don’t think so.’

“’Can what is not harmful cause any harm?’

“’Of course not.’

“’Can what causes no harm do anything bad?’

“’Again, no.’

“’Therefore, whatever can do nothing bad cannot be responsible for anything bad?’

“’How can it?’

“’Now, what about this: a good thing is a beneficial thing, isn’t it?’

“’Yes.’

“’And so responsible for our well-being?’

“’Yes.’

“’Good is not responsible for everything, only for those things which are good, not those which are bad?’

“’Entirely.’

“’Then since he is good,’ I said, ‘the god cannot be responsible for all things, as most people say.  But he is responsible for only a few things for us men, but not for many of them.  For we have fewer good things than bad.  No one else is to be held responsible for the good things, but for the bad things we must look for any other cause but the god.’

“’I think what you’re saying is very true.’

“’Then we must not accept the following blunder from Homer, or any other poet, who makes a foolish mistake about the gods when he says that 

 “two pitchers stand at Zeus’ door

Filled with fates, some good, some evil

and the person to whom he gives a mixture of both: 

            Sometimes he happens upon an evil one, sometimes upon a good one

But whoever he doesn’t, but gives an unmixed portion of evil: 

            Grinding poverty drives him across the rich earth. (Il. 24.527-32)

Nor is Zeus for us the distributor, who 

            Has wrought both good and evil.”

“’There is the violation of oaths and truce carried out by Pandarus (Il. 4.69ff).  If someone says this came about through the agency of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve nor will we if they say the dispute and quarrel of the gods came about through Themis and Zeus; nor must we ever allow the young to hear that, in Aeschylus’ words:

            

            For mortals god implants guilt

            Whenever he wishes to ruin a house utterly. (Fr. 160 from Niobe)’

“’But if anyone writes anything in verse in which these lines occur, for example the sufferings of Niobe, or those of the house of Pelops, or the Trojan Wars, or anything else of this sort, then either we must not let them say that these are the work of god, or if they are, then they must search out the reason that we are pretty much looking for now and say that god carried out good, just deeds, and the people responsible have profited by being punished.  We must not allow the poet to say that those paying the penalty were wretched and the one who brought this about was god.  But if they were to say that evil men are wretched because they need punishment, and that they are benefitted by god in being punished, we must allow that.  We must resist at all costs anyone in his own state saying that god is the cause of anyone’s evils, if it is to be well governed; or anyone, young or old, hearing it related either in verse or prose, on the grounds that such things given utterance are impious, and neither beneficial to us, nor harmonious within themselves.’”

(Plato, Republic Book II, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, pages 201-207, 379a-380c, ISBN: 9780674996502)

1.  I think this passage is a good one to illustrate the nature of the tension in the Platonic tradition regarding the gods and their nature.  The tension is between the view that popular Greek culture at that time, embodied in plays, songs, poetry, stories, and legends, and philosophical or spiritual culture that viewed the gods as sublime and in some sense transcendental.  These are two starkly different presentations of the gods and they seem irreconcilable. 

2.  In popular culture the gods are depicted as fickle, malicious, untrustworthy, and heartless.  In philosophical culture the gods are depicted as the source of that which is good, or, perhaps more accurately, the gods are transmitters of the Good to the third dimension, or hypostasis, of materiality.

3.  The question is where do we place the gods in the metaphysical map of the Platonic hypostases?  If we consider the gods as necessarily good then they would be placed possibly in the noetic realm, along with realities like being; or they might be placed even higher and viewed as transcending being and residing between the first and second hypostases.  This is what Proclus did, as I understand his project, by placing his henads as super-essential realities beyond being but not the One.

If we consider the gods to be highly differentiated and subject to the full range of emotions, desires, and flaws that other living things exhibit, then the gods are understood to be what I call ‘third things.’  By ‘third things’ I mean that the gods are found in the third hypostasis which is where human beings and plants and animals and mountains and rivers and stars and clouds, and so forth, reside. 

According to popular Classical Greek literary culture the Gods are third things.  According to philosophical culture, the gods are either second things, or very close to being first things.

4.  I find it difficult to understand why the gods would bother with human beings if they are second things, or even higher.  On the other hand, if the gods are third things it makes sense that they would be interested in the material world and that explains why popular culture depicts them as incessantly interfering in the material domain in accordance with their own desires and whims.

5.  If the gods are second things, or nearly first things, henads, then the practice of theurgy makes some sense (although there are other ethical issues that can be discussed.)  If the gods are third things then the practice of theurgy does not, and cannot, lead to transcendence.  Instead theurgy would only, at best, make the practitioner aware of dimensions of the material world, the third hypostasis, that they were previously unaware of.  This might be a good thing, but it’s not transcendence.

6.  In a way, you can think of this discussion as the problem of Pagan theodicy.  If the gods are good, good essentially, then why is there so much that is not good, so much that is evil, in the material world.  In the above passage Plato argues that poets should not be allowed to attribute anything bad or evil to the gods because the gods are essentially good.  But if you view the gods as third things, that resolves the problem of theodicy in this context because the gods are behaving just like the way other living creatures in the third hypostasis behave.

7.  I think there is a way to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory versions of the nature of the gods.  I would like to suggest that both are right; but we need to apply wisdom to distinguish between the gods as third things and the gods as Divine Names.  (I’m using the term Divine Names instead of the term ‘henads’ for reasons that, I hope, will become apparent.)

8.  If we accept the gods as residents of the third, material, hypostasis, and therefore third things, then it follows:

That the gods, though they may have long lives, are born and they die.

That the gods are impermanent.

That the gods are driven by bodily passions.

That the gods are not wise by nature.

That the gods are subject to rebirth.

That the gods can, if they practice philosophy and its purifications and virtues, enter into the noetic realm, and from there, unite with the Good and the One.

But we can also accept the gods’ presence as transcendental realities if we look at them as Divine Names.  In ordinary life we sometimes use a person’s name as shorthand for a quality that humans have instead of naming the quality itself.  Instead of saying someone is a genius we might say they are an ‘Einstein.’  Or we might refer to a particularly beautiful woman as a Goddess, or a very wise woman as like Athena, or a very handsome man as ‘a Greek God’ or ‘like Apollo.’  This is a common poetic device, a type of personification.  Personification is frequently used in extended allegories like Pilgrim’s Progress. 

My view is that when the gods’ names are used to indicate transcendental realities they are being used to personify facets of the One that our understanding can access.  But since the One is ineffable, beyond name and form, if we want to talk about the One we need to use a device like personification to do so.  We can’t talk directly about the One because it has no name, but we can talk about the One indirectly by referring to realities that are ‘next to’ or ‘adjacent’ to the One. 

9.  I think the proper attitude towards the gods of third things is respectful appreciation and veneration.  Just as many people venerate and honor their ancestors, and some spiritual traditions venerate mountains, rivers, trees, seasons, and so forth, it makes sense to venerate the gods of third things.  I don’t view this as a type of theurgy; rather I see it as an expression of appreciation and respect.

10.  I think the proper attitude towards the gods as Divine Names is contemplative consideration of these names and a willingness to unpack their meaning and interact with them and use them as a stepping stone to the One itself.  This can be done through poetry or silent contemplation of the transcendental nature of the Names when their material associations are left behind.

11.  Distinguishing between the gods of third things and the gods as Divine Names requires wisdom because it is wisdom that can make these kinds of distinctions.  It also requires the dialectic because making the distinction between these gods and their realities is a contemplation on “what is the eternal and what not eternal.” 

(Plotinus, Ennead I.3, On Dialectic, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, page 159, ISBN: 9780674994843)

12.  We already use Divine Names to talk about the One; these are names like ‘the One’, ‘the Good’, ‘the Beautiful’, ‘God’, the Eternal, and so forth.  These are abstractions rather than personifications, but in the context of the Divine Names, they are metaphors and are, therefore, related to personifications.  Because we already use Divine Names it is not a difficult step to think of the gods in this context as aspects, or perspectives, of the One.  Just as the One is not the One, and the Good is not the Good, and the beautiful is not the beautiful, Aphrodite and Apollo as Divine Names are not the One, but they can help us talk about the One that is not the One. 

13.  Many terms in Platonic philosophy are used in multiple ways depending on which hypostasis the term is focused on.  There is earthly justice and there is noetic justice.  There is earthly beauty and there is noetic beauty.  There is the soul here and the soul There. 

Similarly, the meaning of the names of the gods changes in accordance with which hypostasis the name is referring to.  There are the gods here and the gods There.  They have different meanings, different functions; wisdom can guide us as to which meaning is relevant in any particular context.

14.  In modernity there is the tendency to reject the gods altogether because modernity is materialist and reductionistic.  In theurgy there is the tendency to reject the depiction of the gods found in popular Classical Greek culture because they view the gods as an exalted reality that transcends being and that therefore the depiction of the gods as subject to negative emotions is seen as misguided.  I think both views are limited and partial, and I offer an interpretation that can, I hope, reconcile both views.  It is up to each reader to see if this approach is useful in their own practice and study as they walk the path of the Return to the One.

 

 

 

 

Likeness and Virtue in Plotinus

7 January 2024

Likeness and Virtue in Plotinus

“The perceptible house is not the same thing as the intelligible house [the noetic house – my comment], though it is made in its likeness; the perceptible house participates in arrangement and order, but There, in its formative principle, there is no arrangement of order or proportion.  So then, if we participate in order and arrangement and harmony which come from There, and these constitute virtue here, and if the principles There have no need of harmony or order or arrangement, they will have no need of virtue either, and we shall all the same be made like them [noetic realities] by the presence of virtue.  This is enough to show that it is not necessary for virtue to exist There because we are made like the principles There by virtue.  But we must make our argument persuasive, and not be content to force agreement.

“First then we must consider the virtues by which we assert that we are made like, in order that we may discover this one and the same reality which when we possess it as an imitation is virtue, but There, where it exists as an archetype, is not virtue.  We should note that there are two kinds of likeness; one requires that there should be something the same in things which are alike; this applies to things which derive their likeness equally from the same principle.  But in the case of two things of which one is like the other, but the other is primary, not reciprocally related to the thing in its likeness and not said to be like it, likeness must be understood in a different sense; we must not require the same form in both, but rather a different one, since likeness has come about in this different way.”

(Plotinus, Ennead I.3, On Virtue, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus: Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead I, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pages 131-133, ISBN: 9780674994843)

1.  The theory of virtue in Platonism is that the practice of the virtues such as courage and temperance and so forth, will make us like the higher realities found in nous, or the noetic realm.  Through the practice of the virtues we become more like the noetic.

The concern of Plotinus is that people will see this relationship of  ‘likeness’ in material terms.  I’ve often heard this expressed in talk among friends about what a Platonic form or idea is.  For example, I’ve heard musicians offer that there is a Platonic ‘perfect performance’ of a concerto to which musicians strive to embody; and this is understood, as I said, in material terms.  This is supported by metaphors for material reality that suggests that material reality is a bad copy of the noetic reality from which the material reality is derived.

Plotinus is suggesting that the relationship between noetic realities and material realities differs from this kind of understanding.  Material likeness arises due to the material content of the comparison.  For example, we might say that two houses are like each other, but one is smaller than the other.  In other words, material likeness depends on the functioning of sameness and difference. 

The likeness of a material reality to a noetic reality is not based on sameness and difference.  It is based, instead, on causation.  Noetic realities are the generative force from which material realities arise.  Returning to the musical example I just mentioned, the noetic reality of music is not a sound, has no rhythm, and has no parts.  Yet it is the source from which music in the material realm emerges and upon which all music depends.

This can be difficult to grasp, but consider that even in the material domain itself, causal origins do not have to resemble the material realities that they nourish.  For example, printed music is silent, and it has no rhythm, nor does it possess the tone colors of various instruments.  Yet printed music functions as the source for a performance of the sonic reality known as music.

2.  The perceptible house is like the noetic house in that the perceptible house depends on the noetic house for its existence, but the reverse is not true.  In contrast, material likeness is reciprocal.

3.  Plotinus is steeped in the tripartite scheme of Platonic emanation and is concerned with preserving the distinct features of each hypostasis, while at the same time showing how likeness functions between the hypostases, in this case between the noetic and the material.  Plotinus does this by distinguishing likeness between material objects, which are derived from the same principle; like two houses based on the same blueprint, or two performances of a song based on the same music.  In contrast, the likeness between noetic realities and material realities differs because the relationship has a different foundation. 

4.  One way I look at this is that material realities are instantiations of noetic realities that do not have any material content (this lack of material content in noetic realities is the primary reason why noetic realities differ from material realities.)  The easiest example of this, I think, are numbers.  Even in material reality numbers lack content and that is why they can be used in multiple material contexts.  Consider that the noetic reality of number has no numbers; rather it is the uninstantiated possibility of differentiation as such that gives rise to numbers when that possibility enters into the material domain.

5.  As an aside, the way Plotinus distinguishes two types of likeness is a very good example of the virtue of wisdom.  I like to say that wisdom functions by making distinctions guided by reason (reason understood in the broad Platonic usage of that term.)  This is exactly what Plotinus does in this passage; it is a wonderful demonstration of the virtue of wisdom and how it functions.

6.  It may seem odd to say that ‘There’, in the noetic, there is no virtue.  If we think of virtues as purifications our tendency would be to see the process of becoming more virtuous as, at the same time, becoming more noetic.  But Plotinus suggests otherwise.

Cultivating virtues aligns us with noetic realities because virtues are causally connected with noetic ‘archetypes’.  It is the alignment which is the likeness in this case.  Think of how all life on earth is aligned with the sun; aligned in the sense of relying on the sun for life, growth, and nourishment.  But living things on earth are not stars and they do not become stars through this process of alignment.  They are like the sun in that they also can nourish and generate life, but their capacity to do so is derived, not a shared principle.

7.  The clarity of the wisdom of Plotinus is inspiring.  Coming across passages like this helps me to understand the Platonist vision of reality and deepens my own understanding of the journey that Platonism illuminates.

 

 

Alcinous on Virtue

5 January 2024

Alcinous on Virtue

Alcinous wrote The Handbook of Platonism.  Scholars say that Alcinous lived in the second century CE.  The Handbook is written in topic-focused sections that succinctly explain the Platonism of that time.  The topic of Virtue is the 29^th topic in the Handbook.

“1.  Virtue is a divine thing, being the perfect and most excellent state of the soul, which makes a man, both in speech and in action, graceful, harmonious, and firm, both in relation to himself and others.  ?There are two species of it, the rational(?), and those (virtues) which are concerned with the irrational part of the soul, to wit, courage and self-control, courage being concerned with the spirited part, self-control with the appetitive; for since the rational, and the spirited, and the appetitive are distinct, the perfection of each should be different.  The perfection of the rational part, then, is wisdom; of the spirited part, courage; and of the appetitive, self-control.

“2.  Wisdom is the science of what is good and evil, and what is neither, while self-control is a sense of order in relation to desires and impulses and their submission to the ruling element, which is the reason.  When we speak of self-control being a kind of order and submission what we mean to convey is that it is a faculty in virtue of which the impulses are brought to order and submission in relation to that element which is their natural master, that is, the reason.

“3.  Courage is the maintenance of a law-abiding opinion as to what is and what is not to be feared, that is to say, the capacity to maintain a law-abiding doctrine.

“As for justice, it is a kind of harmonization of these three with one another, being a capacity in virtue of which the three parts of the soul agree and harmonize with one another, while each of them fulfils the function which is proper to it and falls to it as its due, in such a way, as to constitute the supreme perfection of the three other virtues, wisdom, courage, and self-control.  Since, then, the rational element exercises rule, while the other two parts of the soul are brought into submission by the reason according to their respective characteristics, and yield obedience to it, on these terms one may accept the doctrine of the mutual implication of the virtues.

“4.  Courage, then, being the ‘maintaining of law-abiding opinion’, is thereby also the maintaining of right reason; for law-abiding opinion is a sort of right reason, and right reason arises from wisdom.  But wisdom in turn is involved with courage; for it is knowledge of what is good, but no one can see the good if his view is obscured by cowardice and the feelings that follow upon cowardice.  Likewise, no one can be wise if he is possessed of intemperance, and in general if someone does something contrary to right reason through being overcome by passion, Plato says that he does this by reason of ignorance and folly.  So one cannot possess wisdom if one is intemperate and cowardly.  The virtues, therefore, in their perfect forms, are inseparable from one another.”

(Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, pages 38 and 39, ISBN: 0198236077.  Note: The question marks are the translator’s way of offering an emendation of a lacuna.)

1.  Alcinous uses a three-part division of the soul to explain how virtue works.  This is a standard Platonic division.  As I have mentioned before, the traditional Greek view of the soul is much more complex, and includes many more functions, than modern conceptions of the soul.  For example, in these brief paragraphs Alcinous includes opinion, wisdom, self-control, and courage as aspects of the soul that can be cultivated.  Our tendency is to see things like opinion is a function of the brain, and things like self-control as an aspect of psychology, and courage as likely a hereditary capacity. 

2.  It’s always of interest to me when I read Platonists emphasizing ‘law-abiding’ as a virtue.  It interests me because it is so different from the way our modern culture views obeying the law.  The root of this emphasis on being law-abiding, and seeing this as an important civic virtue, lies in the Apology of Socrates as well as Crito.  Socrates had the option of escaping prison and thereby escaping the consequences of an unjust decision by the Athenian jury.  But Socrates chose to remain and accept the consequences that his life had brought to him, which meant accepting the death sentence handed down to him.  My observation is that this way of understanding being law-abiding is rejected by most modern ethical discussion of the topic. In its place is the view that one should at the very least challenge unjust laws and decision.  And this often leads to stronger statements and movements of discontent with the law.  I have read on more than one occasion and ethicist argue that ‘you do not have to obey an unjust law.’  And some argue that ethically you are required to disobey an unjust law.

But that isn’t how Socrates understood this issue.  And it seems that this left its mark on how Platonists viewed their relationship to law and civic injustice.  This is a complex issue and I find myself having a lot of sympathy with the modern view.  On the other hand, I think there is something to be said for being a good ‘law-biding’ citizen of the community in which one lives, a perspective that is often overlooked these days.

2.1  This is an addendum.  It has been pointed out to me that this section on Virtue, Section 39, is a summary of what Plato has to say about virtue in The Republic.  My comment failed to make that connection; but it certainly is true that Alcinous is presenting a condensed version of what is found in The Republic.

The translator, John Dillon, in his extensive endnotes, refers to many sources, but The Republic, Book 4 and notes that Alcinous is focused in deriving his presentation explicitly from Plato.  An example from Book 4 that Dillon notes is as follows:

”’Then again, that each man doing his own business and not dabbling in a large number is justice, and we have heard many others and have said so ourselves many times.’

“’We have indeed.’

“’Then, my friend,’ I said, ‘somehow it turns out that this is in a sense what justice is: doing your own business.  You know where I get my proof of this from don’t you?’

“’No, but do tell me,’ he said.

“’It seems to me,’ I said, ‘that of the qualities we’ve looked at in our state, temperance, courage and prudence, the one remaining is the one that gives them all the ability to come into existence and gives security to those that come into existence for as long as it is there.  And indeed we said justice would be the one remaining of them if we were to discover the other three.’

“’Yes, that has to be so,’ he said.

“’But on the other hand,’ I said, ‘if it were necessary to determine which of these could make our state especially good if it was present in it, it would be difficult to decide whether it is the unanimity of our rulers and their subjects, or the security of lawful belief which has been inculcated in our troops with regard t danger, or the lack of it, whatever it is, or the prudence and guardianship in our rulers, or the fact that what especially makes our state good is to be found in children, women, slaves, freemen, artisans, rulers and their subjects: namely that each one being an individual would carry out one job and not involve himself in any number of them.’

“’It is difficult to decide, of course,’ he said.

“’Then it seems that the ability of each individual to do his own job in the state is an equal match for the virtue of the state in wisdom, temperance, and courage.’”

(Plato, The Republic, Book 4, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, pages 393-395, 433b-433d, ISBN: 9780674996502)

Given this connection to The Republic readers need to recall that The Republic is an allegory for the soul and the soul’s journey to the transcendent.  This places terms like ‘law-abiding’ or ‘lawful belief’ in their deeper context, that of spiritual growth.  In this context virtues are tools for freeing the soul and the laws referred to are, in a sense, the laws of cause and effect that result in spiritual realization. 

I suspect that this kind of deep background context would have been obvious to the audience Alcinous was addressing.  According to the ‘Introduction’, some scholars think that this work was intended for teachers of Platonism.  This implies that they already had more than a passing acquaintance with the Dialogues.

In any case, it is easy for us to neglect these kinds of connections, but that can be overcome through regular reading and study of the Dialogues and the Enneads.

3.  “Wisdom is the science of what is good and evil, and what is neither.”  Wisdom is the craft of making clear distinctions; here Alcinous is focusing on making the distinction between good and evil.  It’s not clear to me exactly what Alcinous means by good and evil, but tentatively, given the context of this section of the Handbook, that which is good is that which cultivates the virtues because such cultivation leads us to becoming ‘divine.’  Evil is what takes us farther and farther away from that which is ‘divine.’  The practice of the virtues, such as courage and self-control, leads us to the divine.  Neglecting such practice leads us farther away from the divine.

4.  Alcinous sees self-control as the means whereby we diminish the power that desires by placing them under the control of reason.  This is not easy to do.  My observation is that people often suffer setbacks and have to start over when attempting to place their desires under the control of reason.  But a setback is not the same as a defeat.  If one is persistent it is possible to overcome even strong desires by cultivating the reasoning part of the soul, remembering that reason is a much broader concept in Platonism than simply our analytic power of mind.

5.  Wisdom perfects the rational part of the soul.

Courage perfects the ‘spirited’ part of the soul.

Self-control perfects the appetitive, or desiring, part of the soul.

Justice perfects all three of these aspect by harmonizing them so that they work together.

“The virtues, therefore, in their perfect forms, are inseparable from one another.”

An analogy of how this works might be becoming a musician.  Learning various rhythms, learning how to play certain successions of intervals smoothly, learning scales, and many other skills, all mutually re-enforce each other, even though one studies them and practices them one at a time.  This can also apply to becoming a Doctor or Healer; there are many things to learn, many subjects to internalize, but they all serve the single purpose of health and healing.

6..  Alcinous begins by saying virtue is a ‘divine thing.’  I think the virtues are divine in three ways.  First, they are divine because they are purifications (Porphyry associates the virtues with Purification.)  Second, they are divine because their source is the Good and the One.  And third, they are divine because they transform us by aligning our life and our soul to the divine, by which I mean that Good, the One, and the Beautiful.  Seen in this way, the virtues are not only instrumental, they are also of the nature of the divine.

 

  

Haiku

January night --

In my dream I cross a stream

To the land of light.

Triptolemus, Xenocrates, Jerome, and Porphyry and Philosophical Vegetarianism

2 January 2024

Triptolemus, Xenocrates, Jerome, and Porphyry

A friend of mine sent me a brief quote from Saint Jerome that he found in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers collection.  Saint Jerome writes, “Xenocrates the philosopher writes that at Athens out of all the laws of Triptolemus only three precepts remain in the Temple of Ceres: respect for parents, reverence for the gods, and abstinence from flesh.”

I am not familiar with Triptolemus, in fact I don’t recall running into that name previously.  Triptolemus is said to have received a winged chariot from Demeter along with seeds of wheat.  Taking the chariot into the sky, Triptolemus sowed wheat throughout the whole world, or perhaps the story refers to the Greek world.  Evidently Triptolemus was a law-giver whose work and insights appear to be connected to the Eleusinian Mysteries.

Saint Jerome lived about 342 to 420.  An earlier reference to Triptolemus is found in Porphry’s work On Abstinence from Killing Animals (Porphyry lived from 234 to 305):

“According to tradition, Triptolemos was the most ancient of the legislators of Athens, and Hermippus writes of him as follows, in book two of On the Legislators.  ‘They say that Triptolemos made laws for the Athenians, and Xenokrates the philosopher says that these three are still in force at Eleusis: respect parents, honour the gods with crops, do not harm animals.  The first two, Xenokrates says, were rightly handed down, for our parents are benefactors and we must return good for good as far as possible, and we must give the gods first-fruits from what they have given us that helps us to live.  But as for the third, he is at a loss to know what Triptolemos had in mind when he instructed people to abstain from animals.  “Did he simply think,” he asks “that it is terrible to kill one’s kin, or did he realize that the animals most useful to us were being killed by people for food?  So, wanting to make life civilized, he tried to preserve those animals which live with humans and those that are the most tame; unless, indeed, having ordained that the gods should be honoured with fruits, he thought this kind of honour would last longer if there were no animal sacrifices to the gods.”’”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 118, ISBN: 9781780938899)

1.  It is interesting to see the discrepancy regarding the second precept.  In Jerome it says, “reverence for the gods,” but in Porphyry it says “honour the gods with crops.”  The second version fits in with Porphyry’s aims for writing On Abstinence.  My feeling is that Porphyry included it because this ancient source supports his overall view. 

2.  The third precept is “abstinence from flesh” in the quote from Jerome, and “do not harm animals” in the quote from Porphyry.  In both instances when applying the precept those that adhere to the precept would refrain either eating or sacrificing animals.

3.  It’s not clear to me why Porphyry felt that the third precept is ambiguous; but I don’t have the Greek and perhaps the Greek is ambiguous grammatically or at some other level.  It seems that Porphyry is concerned with the motivation for abstinence from killing animals.  That makes sense because Porphyry is arguing in On Abstinence that philosophers in particular should refrain from either eating or sacrificing animals; his view is that such activity will inevitably interfere with a life of contemplation and philosophical practice.  I think Porphyry is trying to figure out if Triptolemus had the same kind of motivation.

4.  One of the issues that Porphyry brings up in On Abstinence is how to honor the gods, meaning with what material substances.  In his book Porphyry recommends the use of grains, fruits, leaves, incenses of various kinds, flowers, and other, mostly botanical, substances and refraining from sacrificing animals to the gods.  This topic was of great importance in Pagan culture since animal sacrifice was the central rite for nearly all ceremonial occasions.  Refraining from sacrificing animals would have separated a philosopher from the ordinary habits of the culture, just as refraining from eating animals separates people from the ordinary habits of our culture.

5.  The issue of animal sacrifice would emerge during Porphyry’s life when his student, Iamblichus, argued with great intensity that blood sacrifice, meaning the sacrifice of animals, was necessary for correct theurgic practice centered on some lower deities that required such sacrificial procedures.  Iamblichus wrote about this in On the Mysteries.  It was this issue that separated the theurgists from the contemplatives in the Late Classical Platonic community.  It is noteworthy in this context that no such sacrificial procedures are attributed to Plotinus in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, or from any other source.

6.  When I come across passages like this it makes me aware of how much I do not know about classical culture.  There are so many stories, rituals, insights, myths and allegorical tales that I am not aware of that, when I do find out about them, shed light on the culture in general and on specific philosophical issues, such as the place vegetarianism held in philosophical culture and practice.  It’s a delight when I run across something like this that offers additional insight on the culture of that time.  When the practice of refraining from killing animals is directly linked to ancient law-givers, and to the Mysteries of Eleusis, it uncovers how central such a diet was to the Greek philosophical tradition.

7.  This is another example of how a vegetarian/vegan diet, and a commitment to refrain from killing animals, is a central precept of a philosophical life.  It is not an add-on or a side issue.  It is the application of the precept to refrain from harming others, which appears several times in Plato’s Dialogues, to our relationship to animals. 

This is why Porphyry’s book On Abstinence is of such importance to Platonism today; because it shows in detail the relationship between philosophy and practices of purification such as vegetarianism and refraining from blood, or animal, sacrifice.  This kind of relationship between philosophical understanding and philosophical practice is not highlighted in most contemporary discussions of Platonism.  It is Porphyry who has kept the light of that connection burning.

 Addendum 1

Athenian: “Well, don’t we think that in every part of the earth and in all sorts of ways there have been cities founded and destroyed, and all sorts of practices, both orderly and disorderly, and a huge variety of appetites for food, both solid and liquid, and all sorts of variations in climatic conditions, in which it is probable that animals underwent vast number of changes?

Cleinias: “Of course.

Athenian: “Well, I suppose we believe, don’t we, that vines made their appearance at a certain point, not having existed before?  Likewise, olives, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore?  Wasn’t a certain Triptolemus the messenger for these sorts of things?  And in the time when these did not exist, don’t we think that animals turned to eating each other, as they do now?

Cleinias:  “Certainly.

Athenian: “Indeed, human sacrifice is something we see persisting even now among many peoples.  And it’s just the opposite, we hear, among others, where there was once a time when they didn’t dare to taste even beef, and sacrificed not animals to the gods, but round cakes, honey-soaked grain, and other ‘pure’ sacrifices of these sorts, and avoided flesh, on the supposition that it wasn’t pious to eat it or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood.  We humans who existed in those days lived what is called an ‘Orphic’ life, keeping entirely to things without souls, and entirely avoiding things with souls.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, pages 197-198, 782a-782b, ISBN: 9781647920463)

1.  The translator has a footnote on Triptolemus, “Demeter was the goddess of corn, grain, harvest, and fertility.  Kore her virgin daughter, and Triptolemus the hero who conveyed the secret of these things to mankind.”

2.  It’s interesting to find vegetarianism connected with the ancient Orphic tradition which seems to be one of the foundations for Platonism. 

3.  I don’t know if this passage influenced Porphyry but I tend to think that it did because Porphyry also has a mythic history of a time when people only offered pure sacrifices to the gods that did not contain any animal products.  And the reason stated, because blood sacrifices pollute the altars of the gods with the blood that is shed, is also mentioned in Porphyry.  This indicates a long continuity in the commitment to refrain from killing animals either for the purpose of eating them or for the purpose of sacrificing them.

4.  Plants are configured here as beings without souls.  I’m not sure I would agree with that.  But it’s interesting that contemporary vegans have a similar distinction that they use to deflect the idea that killing animals and plants is the same, a criticism they often have to deal with.  Contemporary vegans argue that plants are not consciously aware because they do not have the requisite brain and nervous system which is necessary for consciousness.  I find this materialist argument very weak because I don’t believe that consciousness arises from material conditions; that is to say I think consciousness is prior to material reality.  Modern vegans view consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the material body; but that is just asserted, it has never been demonstrated.

The Jain tradition is more sophisticated.  Jains view plants as having souls, but they believe there are different kinds of souls and in their system negative karma is not a result of eating certain kinds of plants.

I don’t recall if Porphyry makes the plant/animal distinction based on the presence or absence of soul.  It would be interesting to see if he remarks on this issue.

Addendum 2

“. . . if death is, as it were, a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be, judges?  For if a man when he reaches the other world, after leaving behind these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would the change of habitation be undesirable?  Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer?  I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment, and compared my experience with theirs.  I think that would not be unpleasant.  And the greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not.”

(Plato, The Apology, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, page 143, 41A-41B, ISBN: 0674990404)

1.  In this passage Triptolemus is referred to as a demigod, meaning someone who in their life was just a man, but because of their exceptionally well-lived life have become a kind of deity.  Triptolemus is one of the people that Socrates hopes to meet in the afterlife because he would like to glean whatever wisdom from these demigods. 

2.  There is no reference to diet in this passage, but I see a connection through the reference to wisdom.  One function of wisdom is to discern how to live a good life, a life that is based on refraining from harming others.  Triptolemus is depicted as having lived such a life, and I think of him as being a ‘messenger’ of this way of life by bringing the secrets of grain to the world. 

3.  The overall portrait of Triptolemus from these quotes is complex.  It is difficult to discern the main features but he seems to have been a law-giver and benefactor of humanity.  I can understand why Socrates would want to meet with him in the realm of the demigods.