Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 53

30 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 53

1.  Platonism grows on you.  I mean that when people first encounter Platonism through reading the Dialogues, perhaps in a University class, it can feel confusing and sometimes opaque.  But there are passages, images, and allegories that are attractive, and some of the characters in the Dialogues are interesting.  It’s a bit like learning a new language; at first the comprehension is not great and there is likely to be much that is misunderstood.  But there are words and phrases that cohere and make sense.  Over time the language becomes internalized and can be used as a means of communication.  I think the process of becoming a Platonist is similar; at some point the pieces of the philosophy fit together and the beauty of its insights become inspiring.  Eventually this leads to daily interaction, through reading, through various practices, and through contemplation.  At this point the relationship to Platonism is no longer opaque or confusing; instead, it is nourishing and every morning when we wake up, we look forward to deepening our relationship to the tradition.

2.  Readers might be interested that David Litwa, a scholar dedicated to the Classical world of, roughly, 100 CE to 300 CE, with a special focus on Christian Gnosticism, has decided to translate Porphyry’s Against the Christians.  This book survives, as I understand it, only in quotes from Christian critics.  I don’t know if there have been any recent discoveries regarding this work, but if there have been Litwa would be aware of them.

Last year I read Litwa’s translation of Celsus’s critique of Christianity which Litwa translates as ‘The True Teaching.’  Both Celsus and Porphyry defend traditional Platonic perspectives on various issues.  I’m not sure when Litwa will publish Against the Christians, but I look forward to reading it.

3.  I sometimes toy with the idea of creating a Platonist Canon.  I do this as a thought experiment; if I was in some kind of position to recommend a canon of Platonic works, what would I choose?  I would, naturally, start with the Dialogues of Plato.  The next work would be the Enneads of Plotinus.  These two alone offer a complete and unsurpassed presentation of Platonism.  You really don’t need anything else.

But other works are helpful and worthwhile.  For this second tier I would add Alcinous’s Handbook of Platonism, Maximus of Tyre’s Orations, and Plutarch’s Platonic works.

For post-Plotinian works I would suggest Porphyry’s On Abstinence as well as additional works such as his Letter to Marcella, and so forth.  (I think it would be a good idea to publish an edition of the remaining complete works of Porphyry that would also include the fragments of works that have vanished.  It could be called ‘The Porphyry Project.’)

After Porphyry selection of works becomes more difficult because of the multiplication of influences impacting the Platonic tradition.  Christian Platonism emerges, and there is the earlier Jewish Platonism of Philo of Alexandria as well as the later development of Islamic Platonism.  At the moment, I’m inclined not include them in a Platonist Canon because the projects of these philosophers is to create what I call a hyphenated Platonism that subordinates Platonism to the concerns of their tradition.  This also applies to the theurgic tradition which is more concerned with ritual efficacy than it is with wisdom and Platonic insights and Platonic ethical practices.  I realize this last is a controversial claim, but that is how I see things at this time. 

The last Platonic philosopher of the Classical period I would include in a canon of Platonism would be Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. 

No doubt I have missed some important works which over time will move into my fantasy Platonic Canon.  In conclusion, this is just a fantasy or mental exercise.  I personally find it useful in negotiating the vast sea of Platonic literature, but I don’t actually think that anyone, or any institution, has the authority for making a definitive Platonic canon; that’s not how Platonism has worked in the past, which is a good thing.

4.  I sometimes think of the variations in how Platonists over the centuries have interpreted the noetic realm (what it is and how it works) as similar to variations on music themes or melodies.  The variation form in music is very widespread; you find it in classical music as well as popular music.  Variations can be simple and easily recognizable, or they can be complex and difficult to hear (that is a variation can be obscure to the listener as to the variation’s relationship to the original theme), and many degrees between. 

If we think of the noetic realm as the realm of eternal objects (Whitehead’s phrase) then it makes sense that those of us residing in the material world, meaning those of us who are ephemeral objects, need to use approximations to talk about the noetic realm.  This isn’t quite the same as trying to describe the ineffable, such as the One and the Good.  The ineffable is beyond description, beyond affirmation and negation.  Noetic objects are not beyond affirmation and negation; for example, numbers have specific characteristics which can be affirmed.  But the unchangingness and eternality of noetic realities means that noetic realities are very remote from our everyday experience which makes it difficult to talk about noetic realities without using comparisons that are approximations.  That’s why variations appear, why Aristotle places noetic realities in objects, why some early Platonists explain noetic realities by calling them thoughts in the mind of God, and why some take a mathematical approach and think of noetic realities as approximating an empty set that contains rules for membership inclusion, and so forth. 

5.  Egypt plays a significant role in the development of the Greek philosophical tradition and of Platonism in particular.  It appears to be the case that Plato had a high view of Egyptian spirituality.  I find that intriguing because on the surface Egyptian and Greek spirituality appear to be very different; I’m referring to, for example, the way images such as statues are divergent in the two traditions.  Greek statues of Gods and Goddesses are highly idealized human beings, often of striking attractiveness.  In contrast, Egyptian deities, for the most part, merge animal and human forms.  Such combinations do appear in Greek spirituality; a good example is the minotaur.  But such creatures are often threatening and I’m not sure that they would qualify as deities.

In Egyptian spirituality deities often have an animal head and a human body, or a human head and an animal body.  This is strikingly different from Greek presentations of the gods and, in addition, differs from the Abrahamic tradition and how God is represented in that tradition.  (I believe that Philo criticized Egyptian religion for using the kinds of images it used.) 

Nevertheless, Plato shows admiration for Egypt and what he thinks of as the country’s stability.  And Plato seems inclined to trust Egyptian sources for ancient history; this is seen, for example, in Plato’s comments on Atlantis. 

Porphyry picks up on this positive view of Egypt in Book 4 of his treatise On Abstinence.  Beginning with paragraph 6, there is a long presentation of how Egyptian philosophers lived in Egypt.  It is a portrait of a highly regulated and disciplined approach to spirituality.  Porphyry states that Egyptian philosophers lived in the Temples and only rarely, during some ceremonies, interacted with non-initiated, ordinary people.  They spent their time in study and contemplation.

It intrigues me that the picture painted here is explicitly that of the philosopher as a religious figure; I’m using the word ‘religious’ because, according to Porphyry’s description, their philosophers were part of a religious institution of great antiquity, as opposed to finding an individual path on their own, or setting up some kind of alternative organization like Plato’s Academy.  When I read Porphyry’s account, it’s not clear to me if philosophers in Egypt were a type of Priest, or whether these two categories of Philosopher and Priest were separate and distinct.  Perhaps a philosopher at that time resembles something like what we sometimes hear about in today’s religious traditions where someone is both a Priest and a learned Scholar, but not all Priests are Scholars and not all Scholars are Priests.

The Egyptian philosophers followed what I infer to be a strict rule that regulated their lives.  I don’t know if that rule survives in some form among ancient Egyptian documents today (I haven’t heard anything about such a document) and I know almost nothing about the specifics of Egyptian spirituality, so I can only speculate beyond this general observation.  But for us Platonists, I think it is worth noting that such a life was viewed by Porphyry, and perhaps Plato as well, as admirable and perhaps something of an ideal.

6.  According to scholars there are many passages in The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius that are paraphrases of various Platonic Dialogues.  These are not direct quotes, and the dialogues, with one exception, are not explicitly named.  This is likely due to the circumstances under which the Consolation was written, which was in a prison cell.

The one exception about naming a dialogue is found in Book III where Boethius explicitly mentions the Timaeus.  The mention of Timaeus is made by Lady Philosophy:

“’But since,’ said she, ‘as is my Plato’s opinion in the Timaeus, we ought to implore God’s help in even the least of matters, what do you think we should do now, that we may be worthy to discover the abode of that highest good?’”

(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by S. H. Tester, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, page 271, ISBN: 0674990838)

The passage in the Timaeus reads:

“Timaeus: Nay, as to that, Socrates, all men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great . . . “

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1929, page 49, 27C, ISBN: 9780674992573)

There are further references to Timaeus later in Book III but the dialogue itself is not explicitly named as it is here.  In addition, according to a footnote in the Loeb edition, some of the references are to a commentary on Timaeus written by Proclus.  I am not familiar with this commentary, but this shows that Boethius had a strong interest in that dialogue.

In contrast, there do not appear to be any clear, or explicit, references to Christian writings.  My take on this is that Boethius had absorbed a view of Philosophy that Platonism advocates for, but which is completely absent from modernity’s understanding of what the task of Philosophy is.  The view I am referring to is that the purpose of Philosophy is salvific; I mean that Platonic Philosophy viewed its purpose as that of freeing human beings from being trapped in materiality through an ascent that concludes in the experience of the Good and the One, the transcendental and the eternal.  That is what Lady Philosophy is referring to when she refers to the ‘abode of the highest Good.’  That is why Boethius turns to philosophy for consolation in his hour of desperate need.  And that is why we should turn to philosophy today.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 52

23 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 52

1.  I’ve been thinking about a friend who died about four years ago.  He went by the name Gregory Wonderwheel.  Gregory was a very dedicated Zen student and also a serious student of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.  Gregory’s favorite Sutra was The Lion’s Roar of Queen Srimala which he translated (from the Chinese, if I recall correctly). 

The reason he has come to mind recently is that Gregory was a strong advocate for the centrality of Buddhist ethics for the Buddhist tradition and he was seriously committed to the Precepts of his Zen tradition that consisted of the five core precepts of Buddhism, plus five additional precepts that elaborate a bit on the five core precepts; this is a standard Japanese Buddhist structure.  Gregory’s strong commitment to the necessity of taking the precepts seriously and applying them to your life is rare in Western Zen.  Gregory realized this, yet he nevertheless continued with his perspective.  For example, I can remember Gregory stating that if you are a Buddhist, and you have taken the precepts, then you cannot vote for a war monger.  This generated more than a little pushback and I can remember some intense exchanges on Facebook centered on this topic.

I’m sure that at this time of assassinations, riots, and multiple simultaneous wars, Gregory would be adamant about how the Buddhist precepts restrain and require Buddhists to disengage from that kind of activity and return to meditation.

I have been thinking how this also applies to Platonism and its ethical teachings, not so much the Virtues, but the Platonic tradition’s teachings on ethical restraint found in Dialogues such as Phaedo and The Republic.  It is rare that I run across someone who takes these restraints seriously (such as to refrain from harming others, refrain from eating meat or sacrificing animals, refrain from luxurious living, and so forth) and think of them as a necessary facet of what it means to be a Platonist.  Such people are not completely non-existent, but they are rare.  Partly that is because the word ‘Platonism’ tends to refer to discussions about the nature of the noetic and how it relates to material reality; that is to say, that people consider themselves to be Platonists if they align with certain views about eternal objects that reside in the noetic realm.  Ethical restraint is not part of this discussion.

And partly this has to do with the ethical teachings of Platonism being displaced many centuries ago.  In the case of Christian Platonism, for example, its ethical teachings are biblically derived and its relationship to Platonism is more concerned with metaphysics.  And in the case of theurgy, the teachings of ethical restraint were displaced by a commitment to ritual efficacy and have become, at best, secondary issues.

At this time Platonism has the opportunity to recover its ethical teachings on restraint and renunciation as a foundational part of what it means to be a Platonist.  Though I often criticize modernity, I think modernity has opened a space where Platonism can reconnect with these teachings and cultivate them and live in accordance with them.

2.  There is a branch of contemporary philosophy called ‘Philosophical Quietism.’  This type of Quietism is not related to the Quietist movement of the 1600’s; from what I have read philosophical Quietists are not even aware of the existence of that movement.  Instead, Philosophical Quietism grew out of linguistic philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein and an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and analytic philosophy in a watered down way.  (As an aside, I’m not saying Wittgenstein was a Philosophical Quietist but Philosophical Quietists are interpreting his philosophy in a particular way.)

The basic view of Philosophical Quietists is that it is not possible for human beings to adequately answer, or talk about (it varies a bit), things like metaphysics (as an aside, metaphysics seems to be their main target though they also, at times, argue that ethical issues are beyond human capacity to clarify).  Personally, I see in the Philosophical Quietists the same hostility to metaphysics as is found in analytic philosophy, but the tone is different.  Whereas analytic philosophy if often militant, aggressive, and ill-informed regarding metaphysics (and also how language works), the Philosophical Quietists seem to be more in the mood of resignation and possess more than a touch of humility.

One of the main ideas of Philosophical Quietism is that there is no ‘progress’ (their word) in metaphysics like there is in science and technology.  I think this is true, but I don’t think that is a bad thing.  (I’m leaving aside the critique of scientific and technological progress that exists on the fringes of society; though it is well thought out, for the purposes of this post, I’ll accept the idea that there is progress in science and technology.)

The comparison I use to explain why I’m not bothered by the apparent lack of progress in metaphysics is to that of the symphony and similar realities.  19^th century symphonies are not superior to 18^th century symphonies; there is no progress from composer to composer.  There is change in how the symphony is presented, but there is no progress.  The same could be said for many other activities.

I think metaphysics is a similar activity.  Each metaphysician resembles a composer; and just as a symphony has certain parameters that a composer explores, metaphysics has certain topics that are explored, and methods that are used, in its presentations. 

My intuition is that metaphysics does not progress because metaphysics deals with eternal realities and eternal realities do not change.  But different metaphysicians highlight different facets of reality as understood by human consciousness.  And I think that is a great service to humanity.

3.  It has been my observation that Western philosophers are not, with some exceptions, at all acquainted with Eastern philosophy, such as that found in the Indian and Chinese cultural spheres.  This contrasts with Eastern philosophers who are, for the most part, very familiar with Western philosophy and have often given Western philosophy serious attention.  It’s not a reciprocal relationship.

This observation has been made by many; it’s not an original insight of mine.  I bring it up because of my view that Platonism is better understood as a Dharmic tradition along the lines of Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, and Hinduism.  One of the difficulties with having this view is that, for the most part, Western philosophers, academic or non-academic, will likely not understand what I mean when I make that assertion because of their not being familiar with Dharmic traditions.  This means that I have to unpack what it is about Dharmic traditions that I find Platonism also has, but that contemporary Western philosophy does not have, in order to bring clarity to what I am suggesting.  That’s not a burden; in fact it helps me to better understand what Platonism is.

If I had to pick one thing that I think qualifies Platonism as a Dharmic tradition it is that Platonism is a salvific tradition; I mean that the ultimate goal of Platonism is liberation, or awakening, or enlightenment concerning ultimate nature, or ultimate reality, or that which is eternal, and so forth.  Contemporary Western philosophy is not concerned with salvation and, in addition, contemporary Western philosophy often dismisses the idea of salvation and liberation from material reality as ‘metaphysical’ and therefore not meaningful, or at least not philosophical.  Western philosophy did not start out that way, but it has become that way.

If I had to pick two things, the second thing I would pick is the place that ethics holds in Platonism maps very closely to how ethics is understood in Dharmic traditions.  In both approaches ethics is a type of purification and assists practitioners on the spiritual path.  Platonism understands ethical commitments as ways of separating the soul from the body; not all Dharma systems use this kind of language, but some do.  For example, in the Classical Yoga tradition the ethical restraints are purifications that help to distance the practitioner from material reality, from mind (citta), and awaken to the soul or purusha. 

Just as there are differences among Dharmic systems, so also there are differences between Platonism and Buddhism, Platonism and Jainism, Platonism and Classical Yoga, Platonism and Hinduism, and so forth.  But I have found it remarkable that in spite of these differences, there is significant overlap among these traditions as to what philosophy is and what is the purpose of philosophy.

4.  Impermanence is sweet.  It is the antidote to sorrow.

There was a period in my life where I “studied impermanence.”  That was how I put it, I studied impermanence.  The reason I decided to study impermanence and really focus on impermanence and its implications is that I had noticed that many people are unable to grasp impermanence and its range.  Ultimately I developed a series of impermanence contemplations, about thirty in number.  Some of these were simply variations, but I still considered them to be their own meditation.

This period of study, lasting about five years, has benefitted me; but I have noticed that even now I sometimes have to remind myself of impermanence and its implications.  As human beings in general, it is easy to forget spiritual lessons even when those lessons come from intuitive and experiential sources.

The meditation on impermanence I chose to engage with was on the sound of a bell.  It goes like this:

I sit or stand in a comfortable posture.  I have in front of me a bell bowl.  Don’t worry about the size of the bell bowl.  I use a small bell bowl, maybe two inches across.  But I have also used much larger bell bowls as well and I find different sizes to be equally effective.

I strike the bell and listen to the sound of the bell until it has completely faded.  When the sound of the bell has faded into silence I pause for a few moments.  Then I strike the bell again, repeating this process.  Sometimes I strike the bell only three times.  Sometimes I strike the bell many more times; reaching 108 times that the bell is struck. 

Alternatively, I sometimes strike the bell for a given amount of time, like ten minutes or half an hour.  You can experiment with different possibilities.

When the last striking of the bell has happened I recite the following:

All things resemble the sound of a bell.

Like the sound of a bell, things appear due to causes.

Like the sound of a bell, things constantly change.

Like the sound of a bell, all things fade.

I will remember that all things resemble the sound of a bell.

Following the recitation I slip into silent contemplation.  The amount of time for silent contemplation varies depending on circumstances.

I find this contemplation to be helpful when I get stuck by the negative circumstances of human life.   I find this to be a soothing meditation and contemplation.  It is based on what I call ‘metaphorical inference.’  The inference is from an appearance that is obvious to our senses (such as the sound of a bell), to things where this is not obvious.  This happens by meditating on how ‘all things resemble the sound of a bell.’  By using metaphorical inference I universalize the experience of the sound of the bell so that the mind shifts to a larger, more universal context, placing the sound of the bell into vastness from which it emerges and to which it returns.

This kind of practice, and its use of metaphorical inference, teaches the mind how to shift contexts in order to have insight into broader meanings.  This is what happens in Platonism when we shift from observation of material things to their noetic source.  The example of this kind of contemplation that I have referred to before is the contemplation on beauty that begins by observing three beautiful objects such as a house, a stone, and a melody.  Having fixed the mind on the beauty of each object, we then shift our attention to beauty as such, which is noetic beauty.  Although this is not the same as metaphorical inference I think there is a kind of overlap.  The point is to teach the mind that it has access to, and can observe, higher realities that are broader and more pervasive than the realities that material objects have.  In addition, these kinds of meditations offer the contemplator the experience of abstract objects and their relationship to material objects; in the case of the sound of a bell contemplation, it is impermanence.  In the case of beauty it is beauty as such.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 51

16 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 51

1.  I’m in the process of distinguishing between mind and soul.  I have felt a need to do this because in Platonist works soul seems, at times, to have many functions such as reasoning, feeling, planning, relating, and so forth.  I think all of those functions are aspects of mind.  In contrast, I understand the soul to be the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.

The functions of mind are like the functions of other bodily organs.  In a sense, soul does not have a function; soul is simply a presence which can be noticed or ignored by mind.

Mind in the world of materiality is an emanation of noetic mind.  However, noetic mind has no content, just as noetic numbers have no content.  Material mind has content; that content being the functions of the mind such as reasoning, feeling, hopes and fears, and so forth.

Soul is an intimate emanation from the One and the Good itself.  It is the presence of the transcendental, transformed into immanence in material circumstances.  When I say ‘transformed into immanence’ I mean that the transcendental becomes immanent when it emanates into materiality; I think this is particularly true of the Good, the One, and the presence of eternity.

2.  The ineffability of the ultimate, of the Good and the One, is an obstacle that many find insurmountable.  I think it is difficult to accept the idea that the world of appearances arises from a non-material reality that is metaphysically prior to sensory appearances.  ‘Prior’ in this context has to do with causal dependency.  Everything in existence depends upon the Good and the One; but the Good and the One does not depend upon materially existing things, or on noetic realities.  There is only one single reality that is not causally dependent upon other factors.

For me it was helpful, when thinking about this, to look at how appearances arise within the material realm.  For example, the sound of a bell arises from non-sonic material realities such as the bell itself, the clapper that strikes the bell, the intention of someone wanting to strike the bell, and so forth.  But the point is that the sonic object, the sound of the bell, arises from non-sonic causes.

From there, one can understand how appearances as such arise from a realm beyond appearances.  The realm of physical objects is ‘beyond’ the realm of sonic object, yet it is the physical (and mental, if you include intention) objects that give rise to sonic objects. 

The ineffable, the Good and the One, ring the bell of fluctuating appearances without the ineffable being an appearance.

2.1  It occurs to me that part of the difficulty regarding the ineffable is that the ineffable transcends concepts, is metaphysically before concepts, yet we have no other means than concepts whereby we can discuss the ineffable.  This can lead to confusion.

3.  There is a difference between noetic mind and material mind.  Material mind consists of fluctuations, becomings and begonings, that are the nature of mental events.  Mental events share this nature of becoming and begoning with material things.  Noetic mind is an eternal object but even though it is mind, it does not consist of fluctuations; noetic realities are eternal objects.  Noetic mind resembles an empty vessel in which the fluctuations of material mind can occur.  Whitehead referred to this as a potential for ingression.

I’m not sure, but it might be helpful to develop a vocabulary that distinguishes when we are talking about noetic mind from when we are talking about material mind. 

4.  One of the interesting things about the history of spiritual traditions, looked at over long periods of time, is that those organizations dedicated to asceticism are very stable in comparison to those organizations that lack an ascetic commitment.  For example, in Buddhism it is the monastic community that has remained a constant in Buddhist history whereas sects of Buddhism come and go with rapidity in comparison.  In Christianity monastic communities such as the Benedictines, or the Augustinians, are similarly stable. 

Does this observation have anything to do with Platonism?  I tend to see the ascetic teachings in Platonism to be a kind of constant reference point for Platonism; in a way I’m suggesting that the rest of Platonism emerges from these ascetic commitments.  In contrast, theories of how, for example, noetic realities work, their location, their implications, changes throughout the history of Platonism in significant ways.  But the ascetic teachings remain the same even though through most of Platonist history they have been in the background.

5.  I saw a commercial online (I think it was for coffee) that used the slogan ‘Pleasure Makes Us Human.’  Intriguing. 

Plato talks a lot about pleasure in various places in his Dialogues.  The main take away I get from Plato’s remarks is that pleasure is not a good guide for a human life and that following pleasure, or using pleasure as the basis for our activities leads to a lot of trouble, many difficulties.

I don’t think it is difficult to understand Plato’s point.  We all know people who are driven by pleasure that leads to negative results even when looked at only from a material level.  Various widespread addictions afflict countless individuals who pursue these addictions because they give the user pleasure which is felt to be a justification for indulgence.

On another level, the discussion around ethics in modernity, particularly in the anglosphere, has been centered around utilitarianism (not exclusively, but significantly).  And utilitarianism (negative or positive) uses pleasure as its standard for its ethical calculus.  Many ethicists today in the anglosphere, but also outside of the anglosphere such as in Europe or Asia, make their arguments from a utilitarian perspective even if they don’t consciously adhere to that branch of ethics because utilitarian ideas have become very widespread.

Plato is the great antidote to this way of thinking.  His Dialogues, and particularly his analyses of pleasure, not only undermine utilitarian views, but they also offer a different perspective of what a life should be dedicated to. 

6.  I think it is a natural consequence of studying Platonism and living the life of a philosopher as outlined in the works of Plato, that one becomes less interested in other things, things that most people find significant.  The focus on the transcendental means reducing one’s concerns with the material; the realms of everyday social engagement, both at a personal and societal levels, seem to lack appeal when looked at from the perspective of eternity.  This can, at times, not very often, but sometimes, lead people to think of Platonist practitioners as a bit distant or even a bit uncaring.  But I don’t think that is actually the case.

The solution to the difficulties of this world is not found in this world; that makes sense if you think of the material world as derived from the transcendental.  And it is that transcendental reality that is the salvific presence that leads to the end of sorrow.

7.  It is a summer night in a quiet, small, rural town.  There is no traffic at the main intersection.  An angel and a raccoon cross the intersection.  A young man sees them and runs to catch up with them.  The young man asks them where they are going?  The angel responds, “We are looking for a bridge of light.  We were told it is in your town.”  The young man says he hasn’t seen a bridge of light, though there is a bridge over the small river that runs through the town.  “That might be it,” says the raccoon.

The three of them reach the bridge and pause.  The angel suggests that they cross it.  As the three of them cross the river the bridge turns into a stone staircase.  The staircase reaches very far, farther than they can see.  After some discussion they decide to keep climbing.  At one point, after a long time climbing, there is a kind of patio with chairs and backpacks.  In the backpacks is food though the raccoon’s backpack is quite small and has only a bit of food.  The angel and the young man agree to share some of their food with the raccoon.

After they eat, they continue their climb with their backpacks.  After what seems like a very long time they reach the top of the stairs.  It is a cliff and they can see far below them the river that runs through the town.  At the cliff’s top there is a bridge that crosses the chasm to a cliff on the other side.  The three of them step onto the bridge and after going about a third of the way on the bridge they realize that it is a bridge of light.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 50

9 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 50

1.  It is very difficult to pursue a life of renunciation at this time, in this culture.  I watched a video on youtube the other day that was an announcement by a Buddhist monastic that he was no longer going to practice as a monk as he had decided to continue practicing and teaching Buddhism as a layman.  I have seen this before.  And not just among Buddhist monastics.  I have also seen young Christian monastics announce a similar change in their life on youtube (and this kind of thing also likely appears on other social media platforms).

There are common themes in these stories.  One is a sense of isolation, which is often mentioned by Buddhist monastics in the West.  Often they are trying to live a monastic life on their own which is very difficult.  At another level, those going through this change often mention that the culture as a whole, and the spirit of the time, finds a life of renunciation baffling; more than a few configure such a life as a life for losers.

For those who think of Platonism as a path of renunciation and asceticism these stories are cautionary tales.  Platonism never developed (as far as I know) an institutional monasticism.  Platonism encourages asceticism but the tradition seems to leave the application of its ascetic principles up to the individual practitioner.  This is a challenge that can, at times, be difficult to apply in one’s life.

One way of accepting this challenge is to think of other activities that are done primarily by individuals; I mean things like gardening, baking, and so forth.  There are many people who devote a lot of time to cultivating their garden without having any kind of institutional support or membership requirements.  For such people gardening is its own reward.

In a similar way, a life lived in accordance with the principles of asceticism is its own reward; that reward being transcendence and the understanding of eternity.  It is the garden of the soul that is cultivated by the Platonist ascetic.

2.  I think one of the differences between what I call contemplative Platonism and theurgic Platonism is the range of ethical concern.  Contemplative Platonists tend to include animals in the embrace of their ethical concern.  In contrast, theurgic Platonists tend to ignore the inclusion of animals in an ethical embrace.

I started thinking along these lines when I came across the curriculum for studying Plato’s Dialogues that Iamblichus developed.  The Republic is not included; neither is Crito.  Both of those dialogues offer teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation.  And I wonder if they were excluded for that reason.

In the writings of Plutarch on vegetarianism there is an emphasis on the mistreatment of animals when they are slaughtered.  This is considered ethically wrong by Plutarch, as it is by Porphyry.  Such concern is simply absent from those advocating for a theurgic approach to Platonism.  Perhaps this is a consequence of displacing wisdom for ceremonial efficacy.

The consequences of this lack of ethical concern for animals resulted in huge quantities of animals being sacrificed under Julian; I’m not aware of any objections to this consequence coming from those with a theurgic orientation.

And this lack of ethical concern for animals by theurgists continues into the present time.  Two books on theurgy I recently read do not bring up this perspective even in sections where they discuss blood sacrifice.  I find this absence striking.

It may be the case that I am overly concerned with this or unduly sensitive; after all most Platonists do not comment on it.  Perhaps my perspective on this issue arises because I do not think of human beings as particularly suited to a spiritual life or to making advances on the spiritual path.  I tend to think that other lifeforms also have this capacity and maybe even have a greater capacity than humans do.  This is eccentric, I know, and I’m not aware of a Platonist source that speaks from this perspective.  Perhaps this is because I am more pessimistic about humans and their spiritual capacities than most people.  But if you do have this perspective (I mean the perspective that considers at least some animals as having spiritual potential as great as, or greater than, that of human beings) then this creates a tendency to see these animals as worthy of ethical concern.

3.  For a long time I have been interested in how the word ‘Neoplatonism’ took hold.  I know it is a modern word, of recent origin, but I have not been able to track down the actual person and the actual book in which ‘Neoplatonism’ first appears.

I had been told by several people that ‘Neoplatonism’ had emerged in Germany during the 1700’s, or around that time.  Some told me that it had been used in a German history of philosophy by Brucher, or Brucker, called Historia Critica Philosophiae.  This was published from 1742 to 1744 in Leipzig; it was five volumes.  I found a copy of the book at Internet Archive where I discovered that the book was written in Latin.  It appears to have been a great success and very influential (for example, Schopenhauer liked it and recommended it).

An English translation by William Enfield appeared in 1766 to 1767 in six volumes.  Enfield also published a condensation of the work in one volume.  I was able to get a copy of this condensation (a little under 700 pages) from a reprint house at a very reasonable price.  I don’t find the word ‘Neoplatonism’ in it; but it is interesting that the section on Plotinus is relentlessly hostile.  I will probably post about this at some time in the future.

Frustrated at not being able to find the specifics on the first usage of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ I finally decided to ask ChatGPT; friends of mine had made me aware of how to use it and how to frame questions so that you get a useful answer.  I asked ChatGPT who first used the word ‘Neoplatonism’ and in what book it first appears.  ChatGPT came up with Schleiermacher and that the word appears in Schleiermacher’s translation of the works of Plato.  The first volume of these translations was released in 1804 and continued his whole life (he was born in 1768 and died in 1834).  In addition to the translations,  Schleiermacher wrote introductory essays to the dialogues and the word ‘Neoplatonism’, according to ChatGPT, first appears in one of these essays.  This seems plausible to me.  Fortunately, some reprint houses have collected Schleiermacher’s introductory essays on the dialogues of Plato, translated into English, at a cheap price so I will be able to see for myself how it is used in that context.  (As an aside, I’m aware that ChatGPT isn’t always accurate in its responses to questions and for that reason I regard the Schleiermacher attribution tentative.)

I realized that if it was in Germany that the usage of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ first appeared, then perhaps I should ask AI questions using the German word.  When I did this two additional candidates for first usage came up (the German word is ‘Neuplatonismus’).  The first was Karl Friedrich Hermann who wrote ‘History und System der Platonischen Philosophie’ (History and System of Platonic Philosophy) in 1839.  The second was Heinrich von Stein who wrote ‘Sieben Bucher zur Geschichte des Platonismus’ (Seven Books on the History of Platonism) in 1864.  Laid out chronologically:

1804    Schleiermacher

1839    Karl Friedrich Hermann

1864    Heinrich von Stein

The conclusion seems to be that the use of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ appeared in Germany in the early 19^th century and likely spread from there.  German philosophy was very influential at that time, even in England where the British Idealists were emerging.  I find it remarkable to see how rapidly this reconfiguration of the history of Platonism spread.

Perhaps I’m being a bit obsessive regarding the history of the word ‘Neoplatonism.’  My feeling about the word is that it distorts both the history of Platonism and makes it more difficult to understand the continuities of Platonism over the centuries.  I often hear (on Youtube, for example) that “Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism.”  The statement is a great distortion of the Platonic tradition as a whole, and of Plotinus in particular.  There is probably nothing that can be done to undermine its usage at this time; on the other hand, there are examples of well-known Platonists who have rejected the use of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ so I’m not the only one who finds the word problematic. 

4.  I have tended to think of Platonism as outside of the non-dual versus dual discussions; my feeling has been that Platonism could be interpreted from a non-dual perspective because the One is the only thing that is truly real (keeping in mind that the One is not actually a thing).  On the other hand, Platonism could be thought of as dualistic because the One is understood in Platonism as transcendental to, and beyond, any material manifestations.  My feeling has been that the non-dual versus dual debate arose in an Indian context and because of this the distinction doesn’t really apply to Platonism.

But I’m beginning to think of Platonism as a dualistic system along the lines of classical Yoga.  As readers of this blog know, I have the view that Platonism is closer to the Dharma teachings of India than it is to contemporary Western philosophy.  Because I have a decades long background in Buddhism my tendency has been to compare Platonism to Buddhism; I do this almost automatically because of my long-term studies of Buddhism; that is to say, I have a tendency to interpret Platonism through a Buddhist lens.

But lately I have been thinking that Platonism is closer to Classical Yoga than it is to Buddhism.  First, Platonism does not have the view of emptiness that is so important a part of the Buddhadharma.  In Platonism, things are not viewed as empty, rather things are understood to be emanations from the transcendental source, and because of this, things can function as a door to higher realities such as the noetic and the One.  I’m not sure if this aligns with classical Yoga; my sense is that in some ways it does and in other ways it doesn’t.  The two traditions align in that they don’t see things as empty in the way Buddhism does, but I’m not sure how Yoga would view the Platonic view that things are emanated from a primal source.  More study is needed on my part to clarify this.

Second; closely related to the above mentioned view of emptiness is that both Classical Yoga and Platonism accept the reality of the soul.  In contrast, Buddhism has the view of no-soul (anatman/anatta).  For me personally, my awakening to the reality of soul was pivotal in moving away from a Buddhist analysis.  How Classical Yoga and Platonism interpret the soul does seem to differ on a number of points.  Platonism seems to include a large number of what moderns might consider mental functions, such as reason, as part of soul, whereas Classical Yoga tends to separate those functions from soul and place them in mind.  This is a complex subject, one that is worth investigating, but it remains the case that both Platonism and Classical Yoga are very concerned with the nature of soul.

Third, both classical Yoga and classical (ancient) Platonism are ascetic traditions and both of these traditions see asceticism as causally necessary for walking their respective spiritual paths.  This is a significant commonality between the two traditions.  I also think that both traditions do not view asceticism as merely instrumental; rather asceticism aligns the soul of the practitioner with the nature of the transcendental.

Another perspective shared by Platonism and Yoga is that they both regard the transcendental, or the ultimate, as beyond, or prior to, mental formations such as thoughts, feelings, emotions, memories, dreams, tendencies, hopes, habits, fears, and so forth.  This contrasts with modern Western Philosophical traditions which tend to understand their task as clarifying thoughts as to their meaning and their implications (this is especially strong in the analytic tradition). 

A difference between Classical Yoga and Platonism is that Classical Yoga doesn’t talk about a noetic dimension which in Platonism plays a significant role.  The noetic reality is why numbers, which reside in the noetic hypostasis, or level of reality, are a meaningful presence, and in Platonism have spiritual implications.  I don’t get the impression that numbers, and other noetic realities, are of concern to Classical Yoga.

5.  Plato walks into a bar and orders a non-alcoholic beer.  He sits down at a table.  An ancient woman of youthful beauty joins Plato and also orders a non-alcoholic beer.  Plato greets Athena and asks her what she’s been doing the last thousand years.  Athena laughs and says she has been in contemplation.  “I’ve had plenty of time for contemplation since the great vanishing of the temples.”  Plato laughed.

The bar turns into the portico of an Academy dedicated to teaching those who love wisdom.  “Shall we join them?” Plato asks.  “Why not?  Let’s find out what the youngsters are saying these days.”