Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 68

13 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 68

1.  Moving Beyond a Defensive Posture

If you hold a view that is a minority view in your culture this often puts you on a defensive footing.  I mean that the dominant culture will see criticizing a minority view as natural and unproblematic and often as not something that needs justification or even much thought.  In such a situation those holding a minority view need to spend a lot of time deflecting the criticisms that most people will bring up.  A negative consequence of this is that the minority view can become stuck and unable to find the time and resources to unfold and grow their own understanding.

The steady critique of metaphysics in modernity puts those who view classical metaphysics not only as legitimate, but as the finest philosophical study possible, in such a position.  One way or another, most contemporary philosophers, particularly academic philosophers, reject metaphysics as such and have what they consider to be an articulate critique of the entire enterprise.

There is only so much one can do in response to those who hold such a critical stance.  I see the position of those who view classical metaphysics as valuable as in a position similar to someone today who writes music who faces constant criticisms for using procedures the critics regard as outdated.  Imagine if, for some strange reason, academics had decided that the minor scale was outdated and passe.  Furthermore, their view was that anyone who wrote music using the minor scale was a throwback to an earlier time that did not understand that the minor scale was unacceptable in our enlightened times.  It would be difficult for a composer who was using the minor scale to defend himself; at some point the composer would simply have to let the music speak for itself, and for himself. 

2.  War and the Causes of War

There have been several books published recently that investigate if war happens because of human nature.  Those who think of war as the result of human nature view war as inevitable.  In contrast, those who regard war as conditional, as the result of specific circumstances, don’t regard war as inevitable.

This discussion has been going on for a long time.  Plato touches on this topic in Phaedo, but most extensively in Book I of Laws.  Plato doesn’t explicitly land on one side or the other of the debate as it is currently framed, but Plato does argue that war is not the purpose of the State and this interpretation runs against those who think of war as an inevitable consequence of human nature.

My own thinking about this is that war is a manifestation of differentiation and differentiation is pervasive in the material realm.  War is the most explicit mode of differentiation.

3.  Me and Christianity

I thought I would take a moment and share my own views regarding Christianity.  I think this is a good time because I have noted in several posts the translation of Pagan anti-Christian works translated by David Litwa and this might be interpreted as reflecting my own view.  Here are a few observations:

3.1  I don’t consider myself to be anti-Christian.  I was raised in a secular household where religion in general, and Christianity specifically, were not a topic of conversation or interest.  Of course I picked up some of the basics of Christianity from the culture at large, but there was no encouragement towards Christianity, or any other religion, in the home. 

3.2  When I first became interested in religion I turned to Buddhism.  This was in the 70’s and there were a lot of Buddhist teachers coming to the U.S. at that time.  But my interest in Buddhism was not motivated by a hostility to Christianity.  While studying and practicing Buddhism I noticed that many young people of my own age were strongly motivated to study Buddhism by a more or less strong hostility to either Christianity or Judaism.  At the same time I didn’t really understand where that came from, but I simply noted that this was the case.  I can remember early in my period of study of Buddhism telling others involved in the same studies that I didn’t have negative feelings about Christianity; and this set me a bit apart though I wouldn’t say it became a significant issue.

3.3  It was only after studying Buddhism for decades that I became interested in Christianity which I approached in the same spirit that I had approached Buddhism when I began studying it.  For the most part, Christianity was new to me.

3.4  I found Christianity to be a mixed bag; there were some things that I found uplifting, and, at the same time, other things that I found problematic.  I didn’t mind this; I had come to the same conclusion about Buddhism and over time I found this mix to be true of every religion. 

3.5  One of the movements in Christianity that I studied a lot, because I found it nourishing, was the 17^th century teachings known as Quietism.  I eagerly read Madame Guyon, Miguel Molinos, Bishop Fenelon, Francois Malaval, and other, less well known, advocates of this teaching.  Quietism as a movement was eventually crushed and officially labelled a heresy, which is still true today.  Yet I found myself nourished by its teachings; even today I am still very impressed by Quietism which has influenced how I view and understand mysticism and spirituality in general.

3.6  When I eventually found a home in Platonism I picked up that some significant Platonists were strongly anti-Christian and/or anti-Monotheist.  The influence of some of these Platonists, like Thomas Taylor, is considerable.

I see the anti-Christian Platonists of today as of basically two types; first are those that think of themselves as Pagans or Neo-Pagans.  They tend to think of themselves as in some sense returning to a kind of original Platonism, a Platonism before it was appropriated by Christianity.  They tend to align themselves with such Platonists as Iamblichus and Julian.

The second group of anti-Christian Platonists tend to be secular and they want to present a secular version of Platonism to the world.  This involves removing Christian influences on Platonism.  But this project also involves editing out aspects of Platonism found in the Dialogues.

3.7  I’m not a Pagan (I’m not anti-Pagan either).  Because of this the presentation of Platonism by contemporary Pagans doesn’t have a strong pull on me.  As I have mentioned before, I tend to see Platonism as monist and idealist.

3.7.1  When I say I’m not a Pagan I mean that I’m not a Pagan in the way that contemporary Pagan Platonists depict Paganism.  I believe in the existence of living beings like nature spirits and forces that seem abstract but I think have consciousness and life.  Where I diverge is that I think of these kinds of living beings as sharing the same world, or realm, or hypostasis, as human beings, animals, and plants.  I don’t think of them as part of, for example, nous.  And I am very much ill at ease with the idea of henads because I think that even the gods of the Greek pantheon are creatures of this realm.  From a certain point of view believing in things like nature spirits would cause some people to think of me as a Pagan.  But from another point of view, my conception of nature spirits, and so forth, differs from how most Pagans seem to think of them.  The closest any spiritual tradition has come to the way I think of these matters is the Shinto tradition with its understanding of ‘Kami’.  Perhaps I will expand on this in a future post.

3.8  What I find attractive in Christianity are certain Christian mystics.  I have a strong liking for Dionysius the Areopagite and it was reading his Mystical Theology which lead me to Platonism; because of the strongly Platonic nature of that work, as well as the other works of Dionysius such as The Divine Names.  And, as I said above, the mysticism of the Quietists has had an enduring influence on me.

3.8.1  The fact that Quietism is an official heresy in the Catholic tradition, and that Quietism is explicitly rejected by most Protestant traditions, has made me cautious about Christianity as a whole. 

3.9  I think that the intense anti-Christian views held by some modern Platonists has, at times, cramped modern Platonism.  An important example for me is the rejection of grace as a significant factor in Platonism by some (most?) modern Platonists outside of Catholic Platonists.  I think this is unfortunate and is due, I think, to the role that grace plays in Christianity.  My own understanding of grace was formed during my period of Buddhist studies; in particular the way that Pure Land Buddhism thinks about grace, which I see as compatible with the way grace works in Platonism.  But it has been my observation that this Buddhist resource for understanding grace is not known or appreciated among modern Platonists who are strongly anti-Christian.

3.9.1  Another example along the lines of grace is asceticism.  Again, it has been my observation that strongly anti-Christian modern Platonists tend to ignore Platonist asceticism because they associate asceticism with Christianity.  I don’t see it that way.  Instead, I see Christian asceticism as rooted in Platonic teachings on asceticism and as an essential part of the Platonic tradition.

3.10  Christianity is a huge, complex, tradition.  Because of this it is difficult to make generalizations that cover the whole range of Christian traditions.  In my own case, I value Christian mysticism, particularly that of Dionysius and the Quietists, and the teachings on grace which I think is only fully understandable in the context of mysticism. 

But most Christians are not mystics.  So in the end, my appreciation of Christianity is rather limited or selective.  This is similar to my relationship to Buddhism; there are aspects of Buddhism that remain from my period of Buddhist studies.  But there are also aspects, such as Buddhist teachings on emptiness, that I no longer align with. 

 

Brief Notes- on Various Topics - 67

6 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 67

1.  Julian the Apostate

I read that David Litwa is translating Julian the Apostate’s Against the Galileans.  Julian (331 – 363 CE) was the last Pagan Emperor of the Roman world.  He became Emperor following a number of Christian Emperors.  Julian attempted to reestablish Pagan institutions, temples, and rituals including animal sacrifice, that is to say blood sacrifice, which Julian practiced with great enthusiasm.  Julian’s plan to reestablish Paganism failed for a variety of reasons; personally I think it was simply too late to turn back the Christian tide.  I suspect that even if Julian had lived longer he would not have been successful.

1.1  Litwa’s translation of Against the Galileans is the latest in a series of translations of Pagan critiques of Christianity translated by Litwa.  Litwa previously has translated the fragmentary remains of Celsus and Porphyry who wrote works that were highly critical of Christianity.  The translation of Julian is the third in the series.  I’ve read Litwa’s translations of Celsus and Porphyry and look forward to reading the translation of Julian.

1.2  Platonism at the time of Julian was in a difficult situation.  On the one hand, Pagan Platonism, represented by the Academy in Athens and other teaching centers such as Alexandria, was highly critical of Christianity.  On the other hand, Christian Platonism had taken root and was finding a place in the emerging Christian tradition; it is true that Christian Platonism modified the tradition, producing what I refer to as a kind of hyphenated Platonism.  But even so, Platonism was finding a home among Christian theologians, a place in the emerging new cultural context.

1.2.1  What I think is often overlooked is that the form of Pagan Platonism that was competing with Christianity at the time of Julian was Theurgic Platonism and it is my contention that Theurgic Platonism is just as hyphenated as Christian Platonism and in some ways I would argue that Theurgic Platonism was more altered than Christian Platonism.  I say this because Platonism at that time was governed by the writings of Iamblichus and in particular the critique that Iamblichus wrote of Porphyry’s commitments to refraining from killing animals either for food or for religious ritual sacrifice which Iamblichus presented in what is now called On the Mysteries. 

It is difficult to overemphasize how Iamblichus altered Platonism as a whole in order to advocate for the necessity of blood sacrifice in some theurgic contexts.  For example, it completely changed Platonist ethics and undermined the possibility of the mystical ascent.  It was this kind of hyphenated Platonism that Julian was steeped in and was an advocate for.  It seems that Julian thought of Iamblichus as on an at least equal status as Plato and for that reason I think you could say that Julian was an Iamblichean rather than a Platonist.

1.3  The overall point I want to make is that Christian Platonism, and Christianity in general at that time, did not advocate for the ritual sacrifice of animals; in fact Christian Emperors either restricted such sacrifice or outlawed it altogether.  As I understand it, the reasons for outlawing animal sacrifice in Christianity were theological rather than ethical; I mean that Christianity outlawed animal sacrifice because Jesus was understood to be the final sacrifice and therefore other sacrifices, such as animal sacrifice, were unnecessary, and in a sense blasphemous.

But regardless of the reasons, Christianity brought an end to animal sacrifice.  From an Orthodox Platonist perspective, that is a very good thing.  From the perspective of Orthodox Platonist ethics, that was good for Platonism.

1.4  The way I see it is that Christianity at that time rescued Platonism from Theurgy by putting a stop to a system whose main goal and purpose was the justification of ritual animal slaughter.  I don’t mean to say that Christianity had that purpose in mind; I suspect that Christians outlawed ritual animal slaughter in order to further solidify their power.  But I am saying that rescuing Platonism from a descent into Theurgically sponsored mayhem was an unintended consequence of their program.  I’m looking at this in terms of cause and effect rather than psychological intention.

2.  The God of the Philosophers

Sometimes theologians (I find that this happens mostly among theologians, not so much amongst philosophers) in the West contrast what they call ‘The God of the Philosophers’ as opposed to ‘The God of Scripture’ or ‘The God of Revelation.’  I don’t think it is a major topic in Western Theology, but I find it reappearing now and then.

The contrast arose because the characteristics of God, such as immutability, eternity, and so forth, that are found in treatises by philosophers are difficult to reconcile with the God of Scripture.  For example, if God is immutable (changeless), then how would it be possible for God to respond to prayers or to enter into history in the way described in the revealed texts of the monotheistic tradition?  There are other conundrums that arise in this context. 

I think the most pressing contrast between the Theology of the Philosophers and the Theology of the Monotheists is that the God of the Philosophers tends to be impersonal.  In contrast, the God of Monotheism is a personal God with whom individuals have a personal relationship that very much resembles the relationships a human being has with other human beings.  Two examples of the impersonal nature of the God of the Philosophers are Plotinus and Spinoza.  For Plotinus, God is encountered by transcending all differentiation which implies leaving personhood behind.  For Spinoza God is encountered as the underlying nature, that is constantly modified into specific appearances, that eternally abides as the source of appearances, including the appearance of human beings. 

For neither Spinoza nor Plotinus does God have any features or characteristics upon which a relationship that resembles a human relationship may be established.  When it comes to the God of the Philosophers, the goal is not to have a relationship with God, but to be absorbed in his presence which transcends all material appearances.  In a sense you could say that being absorbed in the presence of God is a kind of relationship; but even if that is granted the nature of the relationship differs from the personal relationship found in Monotheistic traditions.  The relationship to the God of the Philosophers is more like our relationship to the sun; we have such a relationship, and it is an important one, but it doesn’t feel like a personal relationship.

One of the things I have noticed about the literature of this issue is that non-Western understandings of God are not brought into the discussion.  I mean that the Hindu understanding of Brahman and Brahman’s relationship to Atman is not part of the discussion.  Neither is the relationship of the Tao to material appearances part of the discussion.  I find this frustrating because I suspect that bringing in non-Western analyses of an issue like this could be quite fruitful.

3.  Are the Laws in Laws Harsh?

In reading Plato’s Dialogue Laws I sometimes run into sections where the punishment for breaking a law was, it seemed to me, harsh; at least that was my initial response.  I am thinking of, for example, the use of the death penalty for theft when the theft is of items from a temple; there are other examples, but that is the one I tend to recall most often.  I come from a society where the death penalty is rarely used and when it is used it is because of some extraordinary aspect of the crime.  My society tends to congratulate itself on this; I mean that it tends to think of itself as better than other societies that used the death penalty much more frequently and for a variety of crimes in a routine way.  Many people in my society would like to see the death penalty eliminated altogether.

If Laws is read as a treatise for how to organize a community at the political level, these kinds of questions will naturally arise.  I mean that a reader will naturally compare the laws of his own community, along with their punishments for a guilty verdict, to those found in the Laws.  This kind of engagement can become complicated as there are a lot of laws and punishments to compare.  A plus with this kind of engagement with Laws is that it provides an opportunity for questioning one’s own uncritical views because of the contrast of those views with that offered in the Laws. 

A careful reading of a dialogue like Laws, with its wealth of detail and with the meticulous way it investigates certain matters of public life (for example, the long discussion about consuming alcohol), is that it provides an opportunity for understanding how various aspects of Platonism fit together.  For example, how would the use of the death penalty in Laws fit with Plato’s teachings on non-harming found in Crito? 

Finally, I think these kinds of teachings found in Laws can be unpacked as allegorical teachings for the dedicated practitioner on the spiritual path.  When Plato writes that a certain activity requires the application of the death penalty when the perpetrator of that activity is found guilty, it is an indication of how seriously Plato takes this situation and I think what Plato is communicating to those on the spiritual path is that the tendency to indulge in that activity must be slain, avoided at all costs, if they want to complete the spiritual journey.  For example, the theft of items from a temple is allegorically the ‘theft’ of the spiritual impulse for the purposes of material goals and indulgences.  If this continues, it will severely damage the spiritual prospects of the student.  Therefore, the impulse must be slain.

Using such strong allegorical language is not unusual in spiritual literature.  In Chapter 5 of the Tao Te Ching it says that the Sage treats human beings like straw dogs; straw dogs where ritually sacrificed by throwing them into a sacrificial fire.  In verses 294 and 295 of the Dhammapada the Buddha talks about slaying your mother and father.  This is traditionally understood as slaying one’s attachments; in addition, monastics in Buddhism are commonly referred to as ‘home-leavers’.  And the Bhagavad Gita is one long allegorical battle between desire and liberation (at least some interpret it that way).  There are many examples of this kind of usage in spiritual literature.  The Laws can be read this way as well.

One way of examining whether or not it makes sense to read Laws allegorically is to see if an allegorical reading makes Laws more consistent with the rest of the Dialogues of Plato.  For example, when Plato asks for capital punishment for breaking a law in Laws that would seem to clash, or be inconsistent with, Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation in a dialogue like Crito.  But if we read Laws allegorically and read the dialogue as a guide to spiritual practice, then the clash in this particular case, and other cases, is resolved, or at least lessened. 

Is it justifiable to read Laws allegorically?  I think so; but to be open to this possibility it is necessary to see how allegorical readings operate in other dialogues where an allegorical interpretation is more commonly accepted.  I think the best comparison to the Laws would be the Republic.  Personally, I think the deep meaning of the Republic is only accessible through an allegorical reading.  And I suspect the same is true for Laws as well.

If the reader approaches Laws allegorically that will shift the meaning of what is being read; I don’t think it necessarily eliminates a literal reading, but it adds another dimension of meaning.  For example, Laws is a conversation between three old men on the island of Crete.  One is Athenian, the Athenian Stranger, one is Spartan, and one is from Crete.  I think together they symbolize the three principal aspects of a human being.  The Athenian represents the soul.  The Spartan represents the body.  The Cretan represents the mind as the function of differentiation.  That is why, in Book 1, when they discuss what the purpose of laws is, the Spartan and the Cretan put forth the view that the purpose of laws is to be effective in war and that war is the overriding purpose of government and laws.  This is consistent with them being symbols of the mind of differentiation (without the presence of wisdom) and the body as the engine of desire.  It is the Athenian Stranger who counters with the view that the purpose of laws is peace and that peace supersedes, or is prior to, the demands of war; because the Athenian Stranger symbolizes the presence of soul which is the presence of eternity which is the realm of true peace.

I think it is also worthy of noting that the first word in Laws is ‘Theos’ or God.  I think this is a significant clue that Laws is primarily about our relationship with the divine and all the discussions about communal relationships and laws governing those relationships are aimed at indicating the rules, or laws, for cultivating a relationship with the divine, with God, with the One.  I think that Plato is telling us this because the three old men in Laws are taking a long walk on a hot day to a cave dedicated to Zeus.  Zeus is an important symbol in Plato’s Dialogues as the source of all life and other key Platonic concepts.  In other words, Zeus is to be understood allegorically in Laws as well as the long walk of the three old men is allegorically a walk to the divine as the ultimate source of all things.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 66

29 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 66

1.  Wisdom, Negation, and the Ineffable

Last week I posted about the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite.  I wrote a little about its impact on Christianity, particularly Christian Mysticism.

When I first encountered Mystical Theology it was shortly after I decided to leave Buddhism behind.  I had been practicing Buddhism for about thirty years, but, for various reasons, the well of Buddhism had gone dry.  This didn’t mean that I rejected Buddhism as a whole; in particular I retained a great fondness for the Perfection of Wisdom discourses such as the Heart Sutra and the Diamond Sutra.

What immediately struck me when I read Mystical Theology was the manner in which the negations of the mystical ascent outlined in Mystical Theology resembled the negations found in the Heart Sutra.  In particular what I am getting at is how both of these works, about midway through their text, negate the primary collection of ideas that define their respective traditions.

For example, in Chapter 5 of the Mystical Theology the author writes, “It [the ultimate] is not kingship.  It is not wisdom.  It is neither one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness.  Nor is it a spirit, in the sense in which we understand that term.  It is not sonship or fatherhood and it is nothing known to us or to any other being.”

(Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, translated by Colm Luidheid, Paulist Press, New York, 1987, Page 141, ISBN: 9780809128389)

Notice that in this quote there is embedded a negation of the trinity: Nor is it spirit, it is not sonship or fatherhood.  This means that the three persons of the trinity, father, son, and spirit, are transcended in the divine ascent that the author describes.

Many other significant philosophical and theological categories are similarly negated such as: number, soul, mind, power, light, and so forth.  The author deftly places these realities beneath the ineffable which is reached at the end of this mystical ascent.

In The Heart Sutra the reader encounters a similar rejection of foundational categories of the Buddhist tradition.  For example, the five aggregates, the foundation of Buddhist psychology is dismissed as follows: “Therefore in emptiness no form, no feelings, perception, impulses, consciousness.”  Later the Heart Sutra rejects the Four Noble Truths as follows: “. . . no suffering, no origination, no stopping (cessation), and no path.”  As in the Mystical Theology many other basic categories of the Buddhist tradition are also similarly dismissed (not dismissed as in arguing for their non-existence, dismissed in the sense that in the opening to ultimacy, which in a Buddhist context is emptiness, these categories need to be left behind).

There is even a striking similarity in the closing statements of both documents.  In both documents there is an emphasis on the idea that the practitioner must move “beyond” the kind of analysis that these categories lead to.  For example, the conclusion of Mystical Theology says, “It is beyond assertion and denial.  We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfection and unique cause of all things, and, by virtue of its preeminently simply and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial.”

(Ibid)

In the Heart Sutra the closing says, “Gone, gone, gone beyond, gone beyond beyond, Bodhi Savaha.”  This is a mantra which is as follows: “Gate, gate, paragate, parasamgate, Bodhi Svaha!”  (‘Gate’ is pronounced ‘gah-tay’). 

This closing emphasis on going beyond all the foundational categories of the respective spiritual systems of their respective tradition is what I recognized as, to my mind, intimately connecting the two documents even though there is no evidence of any historical connection.  I don’t think there is an historical connection; but I think there is a spiritual connection. 

For a Platonist it is gratifying to find the use of negations, as are found in the dialogue Parmenides, in these two documents.  And what I came to understand is that this kind of teaching is a signal that I am dealing with a Wisdom Tradition when I find this kind of teaching. 

I often say that Wisdom is discrimination that is done in the service of transcendence; it is not just analysis for the sake of analysis.  When Wisdom serves transcendence it leads us to that which is beyond any affirmation or negation, it transcends time and space, it is neither that which is changeless nor that which is in process.  It is eternal peace.

2.  This last week was exceptionally busy and complicated.  For that reason, my post today is short.  I hope to return to a normal pace of living this week.

Best wishes,

Xenocrates 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 65

22 September 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 65

1.  Dionysius the Areopagite and Contemplative Platonism

Last week I mentioned Johannes Scotus Eriugena and his work The Periphyseon.  I mentioned in passing that Eriugena had translated into Latin the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, in particular Mystical Theology.  Here I want to post some thoughts about Dionysius and his role in Late Classical Platonism as well as Christian Mysticism, also known as Contemplative Christianity.  I think it is an intriguing history of how Platonic Mysticism was transmitted to Christianity, impacting Christian Theology in general, and Christian Mysticism in particular.

Not much is known about Dionysius beyond the works he wrote (or the works attributed to him).  The traditional view of Dionysius, held by orthodox Christians for many centuries, is that he was the Dionysius who appears briefly in the Book of Acts in the scene where Paul preaches to the Athenians at the Areopagus.  In the Book of Acts it mentions by name several people who converted to Christianity at that time, one of whom was Dionysius.  Since Dionysius is a very common Greek name at that time, he is distinguished from others of the same name by referring to him as Dionysius the Areopagite.  The orthodox tradition has the view that the works attributed to Dionysius (both the ones that we have and a few that have not survived) were written by this Dionysius from the Book of Acts. 

Modern scholars almost universally disagree with this attribution for various reasons such as linguistics, quotations from later sources; things like that.  But pinning down who Dionysius was has proven difficult and there are many theories about who he was and when he wrote.  I’ve read theories that place Dionysius anywhere from the 300’s to the mid 500’s.  And there are many theories as to who Dionysius was and where he was from.  One interesting theory I’ve encountered is that Dionysius was a pen name for Damascius who was the last head of Plato’s Academy when it was closed by Justinian in 529 CE.  The idea is that Damascius, or possibly a Christian member of the Academy at the time of the closing, penned the works attributed to Dionysius as a way of preserving some basic teachings of Platonism in the new context of Christianity which had triumphed over Paganism.  On the other hand, a recently published work that translates a 9^th century biography of Dionysius offers an extensive apology for the traditional, orthodox, view that Dionysius was the Apostle of Paul from the Book of Acts.

For those interested in the orthodox view the latest book presented this perspective is The Life of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, published in January 2024.  For those interested in the idea that Dionysius was actually Damascius, in 2006 Carlo Maria Mazzucchi wrote an article presenting this perspective, though I’m not sure of the journal. 

Mystical Theology is a brief work; something like five to seven pages, depending on the layout.  In five sections it describes the mystical ascent in terms of entering into a luminous darkness, an ineffable presence beyond affirmation and negation.  Those familiar with Plotinus can see the connection to passages in the Enneads where Plotinus talks about turning away from the material realm, then turning away from the noetic, in order to become absorbed in that which is beyond being, the Good and the One. 

The mystical ascent in Platonism, and in Dionysius specifically, is about divesting yourself of differentiation and individuation.  I think that is why Dionysius uses the vocabulary of ascending into darkness; because this realm is beyond the light of reason.

This understanding of mysticism is the root of Christian mysticism and it has a Platonic origin.  Mystical Theology had, and still has, a profound impact on orthodox Christianity; for example, a work like The Cloud of Unknowing is rooted in Mystical Theology as are many other works down to the current day.

2.  The Modern World and Mysticism

I saw a talk online that suggested that mystics are vanishing from society.  I wonder if that is true.  My inclination is to think that it is harder these days for a mystic to find a place or organization that is devoted to pursuing mystic realization and living in accordance with the disciplines and ethical restraints that are foundational for mysticism.  We live in a society that rejects the idea of transcendence, a society that is secular, reductionistic, and materialistic; these are not nourishing to an understanding of mysticism.

The talk I listened to quoted Jung as having this view; the view that mystics are vanishing from society.  Personally, I don’t consider Jung to be a mystic, but putting that aside, he may have spotted this kind of trend decades ago.  I suspect others have as well.

But I have also observed that mystics seem to be up to the challenge of the modern world; I mean that mystics do the best they can given the circumstances, which, I think, has always been the case. 

Today a mystic faces the challenge of figuring out how to walk his path without social approval or support.  There are very few teachers or resources or institutions that will assist someone trying to walk this path.  But that’s OK; it’s a challenge for sure, but the difficulties are not insurmountable. 

3.  Precepts of Platonism

If I were to mimic Dharmic traditions by generating a list of core precepts that I think capture the heart of the Dharma of Platonism, I think it would look something like this:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

3.1  These are based on the five precepts, or vows, found in Dharmic traditions such as Classical Yoga and Jainism, as well as Buddhism.  I believe I have posted these previously, but I’m going to put them here to make it easy to compare them:

Classical Yoga and Jainism

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from acquiring possessions unnecessarily.

Here is the Buddhist version:

I will refrain from harming living beings.

I will refrain from taking what is not given.

I will refrain from sexual misconduct.

I will refrain from harmful or deceptive speech.

I will refrain from intoxicants that cloud the mind and lead to heedlessness.

3.2  I have used a formulaic approach to the language of these precepts; books readers might consult may use a different kind of language structure, but I do not think these lists are misleading.  I am taking the view that the ethical injunctions are all ethical restraints and the formula I am using emphasizes that perspective.

3.3  Classical Yoga and Jainism share a common fifth precept; to refrain from acquiring unnecessary possessions.  Buddhism has a different fifth precept; to refrain from intoxicants.  I decided to include both of them since both of these restraints are found in Platonic writings.

3.4  I have an inclination to include a precept that emphasizes vegetarianism.  It might look something like this: I will refrain from harming animals by eating them, by wearing their skin or fur, or by sacrificing them for ritual or other purposes.  Both Classical Yoga and Jainism are vegetarian traditions, but they do not have a separate vow for vegetarianism; rather vegetarianism is considered to be the application of the first vow, the vow of non-harming, to the animal-human relationship.  I decided to go along with that; but I do feel a bit ambivalent about that.  My ambivalence is that by emphasizing vegetarianism with a separate vow a structure would be created that would point directly to the important place it has held in the Platonist tradition.  For those new to Platonism I think this could be very helpful.  I don’t think such pointing is necessary for Classical Yoga and Jainism because in their cultural context the practice of vegetarianism in these traditions is so widely known.

3.4.1  It’s worth noting that in East Asia there is a more complex series of ethical commitments referred to as the Bodhisattva Vows.  These vows are available to lay people who want to deepen their Buddhist commitments and practice.  In the East Asian Bodhisattva vows vegetarianism is explicitly required in the third of the 48 minor precepts (there are 10 major precepts) which has had an impact on East Asian culture in general.  I’m not going to list the Bodhisattva Vows here because they are too complex in comparison to the five vows of the Jains, Classical Yoga, and Buddhism.  But perhaps in a possible commentary I might bring them into the discussion.

3.5  My tentative plan is to expand on each of the Platonic Precepts of Philosophy by quoting passages from the Dialogues, the Enneads, and other Platonist sources so that the source from which the Precepts of Philosophy emerge can be made clear.  I have already done this with the First Precept of Non-Harming and posted them to this blog (to find these quotes click on ‘Non-harming’ on the list of topics to the right).  In some ways this is a big project, but I am willing to go at a slow pace to bring it to a conclusion.

3.6  An objection to this kind of project is that Platonism has not, in fact, generated such a list of Ethical Restraints or Precepts and therefore the list is misleading. 

3.6.1  My first response is that there are many ideas and interpretations in the history of Platonism that are not explicitly found in the Dialogues; and, in addition, this is true for all spiritual traditions. 

3.6.2  My second response is that such a list is a kind of a teaching device, a distillation, of Platonist Ethics and the practice of those ethics.  There have been many such distillations such as essays describing the different hypostases and how they interact. 

3.6.3  My third response is that the Platonic tradition seems to have lost sight of the ethical restraints found in Platonism.  When I say we have ‘lost sight’ of these practices, I mean that even though we may read about them, they don’t register as actual practices, actual things we can do to practice the Dharma of Platonism.  I feel that many people don’t know what to do to practice Platonism.  This structure opens the door to doing Platonism.

3.7  I like the idea of following how Jainism interprets their precepts, or vows (vrata), in several ways, depending on the life situation of the practitioner.  For monastics, their vows are interpreted very strictly.  For laypeople, much less so.  I think the same could be done successfully with these Precepts of Philosophy.

4.  The Sentences of Porphyry – Sentence 11

Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts, and multiplies about individuals with a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power.  (Thomas Taylor)

The incorporeal existences in descending are divided and multiplies into atomic things by a remission of power, whilst in ascending they are unified, and revert to inseparateness by superabundance of power.  (Thomas Davidson)

When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the individual.  When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and their power intensifies.  (Kenneth Guthrie)

When immaterial beings descend, they divide into parts and branch out, multiplying in their individual manifestations of power, but when they ascend, they unite and return to simultaneous existence in unity through increased power.  (Isaak Samarskyi)

4.1  I read this as an elegant summary by Porphyry of the process of descent into the material realm, followed by the process of the return to the noetic, and beyond the noetic to the One.  Porphyry manages to describe these processes concisely and at the same time, with insight.  I think it reflects, or embodies, Porphyry’s own experience of returning to the One.

4.2  Porphyry begins by explaining how the incorporeal, or immaterial, becomes, or descends, into the material realm.  Porphyry describes this as division of noetic, or hypostatic, unities into parts.  Because this is a highly condensed presentation, Porphyry does not go into the specifics of the process of division into parts that noetic unities undergo, though later Platonists, such as Proclus, will focus on this and offer their understanding of how this process unfolds.

I tend to use the concept ‘differentiation’ to describe the movement from unity to noetic realities, and then from noetic realities to material instantiations.  This process of differentiation resembles the way light breaks up into different colors when light flows through a crystal.  Or the way a river will branch out in a delta.  Or the way a song will be performed differently by different singers and musicians. 

4.3  Interestingly, there is the idea in this Sentence that there is a loss of ‘power’ as differentiation increases; the more a material entity is the result of a series of differentiations, the less power it has.  I think the term ‘power’ here means ‘metaphysical power’ and, further, that this is referring to a thing’s potentialities.  For example, the number 7 in the noetic hypostasis has enormous potential, unlimited possibilities.  But because noetic numbers have no content, this power of possibilities remains a potential.  In contrast, 7 apples is a limited manifestation of the noetic reality of 7.  7 apples are differentiated from 7 chairs, 7 days, and 7 stars.  7 chairs have some potential; for example, it could potentially refer to 7 oak chairs, 7 old chairs, 7 rocking chairs, and so forth.  But all of those potentialities are contained in 7 as a noetic reality so the potentiality of 7 chairs is less than, which is to say has less power than, 7 as a noetic presence.

4.4  The Sentence then reverses the process to describe the ascent to the noetic from the material.  When we ascend, we become more unified, less differentiated, but at the same time we have more power in our understanding, vision, and potential.  Finally, there is a return to unity as such, meaning a return to the One.

5.  Whitehead and Heidegger

I found an essay online that is a thoughtful presentation of the differences between Heidegger and Whitehead.  The essay is by Jay McDaniel whom I have not heard of before.  He is a philosopher, evidently a follower of Whitehead, who likes to post essays on various topics at his blog called Open Horizons which is found at openhorizons (dot) org.  The specific essay I’m referring to is titled “Love and Mystery.”  If you are interested in the differences and overlaps between Whitehead and Heidegger I recommend the essay as a good summary.

McDaniel, in one section of the essay, lists the various critiques Heidegger had of metaphysics.  In item 6 McDaniel writes “Heidegger argues that metaphysics has exhausted itself and reached its ‘end.’  This does not mean metaphysics has been resolved or completed, but rather that it has reached a point where it can no longer meaningfully address the question of being.”

This perspective is a primary reason why I ultimately rejected Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of philosophy.  But I want to make one point that McDaniel doesn’t touch on; and that is that this idea of the ‘end of metaphysics’ is, surprisingly, a typical modernist stance regarding the past and what the past has to offer us.  I mean that one of the foundations of modernism is that it regards the past as void of any positive content, void of wisdom or insight, that the past is solely something to overcome and to leave behind. 

It is typical of modernist views that those who offer them want to start over; a kind of Year Zero project.  I think the first manifestation of this was the French Revolution which sought to eliminate all traces of the past; those who were seen as clinging to the past were to be eliminated. 

If you read modernist theory, particularly in the realm of politics and related fields, this idea is a steady drumbeat.  It seems to me that Heidegger is marching to that drum.  In other words, Heidegger’s rejection of the tradition of metaphysics fits right in with modernity’s overall project of starting over with Year Zero.

From this perspective, the perspective of modernity, those who engage in metaphysics are by that very engagement reactionaries.  McDaniel writes, “. . . the Heideggerians I encountered were profoundly suspicious of metaphysics, often rejecting it outright.”  As I mentioned in a previous post, from this perspective analytic philosophy and Heidegger’s philosophy have the same anti-metaphysical impact.

In a way, we can think of a work like Whitehead’s Process and Reality as a refutation of Heidegger’s thesis about the ‘end of metaphysics.’  Process and Reality is consciously rooted in the heritage of metaphysical thought going back to Plato.  Whitehead finds that heritage nourishing and vividly interacts with it to make his own original observations.  (Perhaps this positive view of the heritage of metaphysics was shaped by Whitehead’s interest in mathematics; it would be difficult for a mathematician to reject the history of mathematics in the way modernity rejects so much else.)  I’m not saying that Whitehead wrote Process and Reality in order to refute Heidegger; McDaniel writes that, as far as scholars can tell, the two were almost entirely unaware of each other.  I mean that Process and Reality is a rejection of Heidegger’s views on metaphysics because it is a demonstration that metaphysics has not, for example, reached its ‘end.’

For contemporary Platonists I think it is helpful to get some clarity about what Heidegger says about metaphysics in general and about Plato in particular.  Some of the strange hostility to metaphysics one encounters these days is rooted in Heidegger’s application of modernity’s hostility to the past to metaphysics.  As I mentioned in a previous post about this, the best way to counter these kinds of ideas is simply to continue one’s studies of metaphysics and to apply such studies to how one lives one’s life.  In this way the great garden of metaphysics will continue to blossom.

6.  It is late at night.  There was another brief rain today in the desert where I live.  This cleared the air and when the sun set behind the mountain range in the distance the air was exceptionally clear. 

There are times when I feel a deep sadness at the state of the world and the fate that human beings have made their destiny.  But there are consolations, messages from the noetic, that can soothe the sense of alienation from this world.  An astonishingly beautiful sunset is one such message.  The cooling stillness of contemplation is another.  The writings of the Platonic tradition are yet another.  Experiences like this are like opening a gate to the grotto of eternity.