Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 79

5 January 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 79

1.  Happy New Year Everyone!

Wishing you a prosperous and contemplative 2026!

2.  Grace, Again

I think one reason why some contemporary Platonists dislike the idea of grace, and in some cases reject the idea that grace is a significant aspect of Platonism, is that in the West grace is thought of as a kind of personal gift.  What I mean is that if the source of grace is God then the way grace is configured in the West implies that the God who grants grace is a person who has a personal relationship with the one receiving the grace.  This kind of understanding of grace is consistent with monotheism so it doesn’t cause any friction in a monotheistic context.

But in other philosophical and spiritual contexts it does cause friction and in these other contexts grace is understood differently; grace is still a gift, but it is not a gift given to us as individual persons.

In a Pure Land Buddhist context, I once heard impersonal grace explained as follows:  Suppose a man is very hungry.  This man recently lost his job and is alienated from his family.  He moved to the city just a few months before and doesn’t really know anyone.  He is sitting on a bench at a bus stop when he notices that someone forgot to take a bag of food with them onto the bus.  The bag is sitting against the bench.  The man waits for several hours but no one shows up.  The man decides to take the bag of food with him and this tides him over for the better part of a week.

The story was offered as a metaphor for grace.  The hungry man didn’t deserve the food and therefore what happened was not an exchange of goods.  But reality, or causation, unfolded in such a way as to prevent the man from going hungry. 

Switching back to a Platonist perspective, the presence of the Good and the One is a gift that people can receive and the gift nourishes the return to the One.  But it isn’t because we deserve the gift of this presence, and it isn’t because the One decides that I, as an individual will receive this gift of presence.  Rather it is that reality is structured that way; and by reality I mean the structure of metaphysical reality.  The gift of grace is a consequence of the everywhere nature of the Good and the One.  The gift of grace is a consequence of the everywhen nature of the Transcendental.  The gift of grace is a consequence of the everything nature of the Presence of Eternity.

The man sitting on the bench at the bus stop might not have noticed the bag of food.  Or he might have decided not to take it even after waiting hours for someone to claim it.  The working of grace is not mechanical, it does not follow material sequences of causation.  But without grace I don’t think the spiritual ascent would be possible.

3.  Modern Stoicism

For about 15 to 20 years there has been a popular interest in Stoicism.  Before I retired, about three years ago, I worked at a spiritual bookstore and I can remember when books on Stoicism started becoming popular.  They became so popular that I created a subsection within the philosophy shelf just for Stoicism.  And the books sold well.  It appears to me that books on Stoicism are still selling well.

I have observed that there is some pushback about these books on Stoicism on the grounds that they are very selective about the teachings of Stoicism that they bring forth and talk about.  This criticism comes almost entirely from academics, particularly those who have a specialty in the Classical Period or Roman Philosophy.  I have read and listened to a number of these critiques and I have noticed that many of them note that popular Stoicism rarely mentions Stoic Cosmology, to pick one example.  Almost all popular Stoicism today is focused on ethics and/or self-help.

The point critics make about popular Stoicism not teaching about cosmology is, I think, misguided.  For example, contemporary Aristotelians drop Aristotle’s cosmology, I mean his material cosmology, because the cosmos that science has uncovered has displaced it.  The same could be said for Stoicism.  I suspect that the focus modern Stoics have on ethics is there because in our society there is little offered in terms of ethical guidance; nihilism is rampant and a completely subjective, hyperindividualistic approach to ethics dominates.  Stoic ethical teachings offer people a different perspective on ethics, one that is practical, one that people can actually access and use.  (As an aside, I should mention that some academics, like Pierre Hadot, had a very positive view of the ethics of Stoicism and I suspect this group is not critical of popular Stoicism.)

I wonder if Platonists today can learn from the success of popular Stoicism?  If contemporary Platonists used popular Stoicism as a model it would generate, for example, books on the ethical teachings of Platonism as opposed to an emphasis on metaphysical cosmology.  This would be a way of introducing Platonism to people by emphasizing the way of life aspects of Platonism.

A few posts back I suggested that the first step in living a Platonist life was to become a vegetarian.  A second step might be to simplify one’s life, that is to say to reduce possessions to essentials.  These kinds of teachings do have a metaphysical foundation in the Platonist tradition, but they also can function as a mode of access to Platonism that is not overly intellectual or overly analytical. 

4.  Afterlife Histories

There is an interesting process whereby the negative reputation of someone gets transformed after they have passed away; and this transformation almost always happens in a shift towards a positive assessment.  This has been observed by historians and sociologists for a long time.  An historical figure might have been enormously destructive and received a lot of condemnation during their lifetime; yet, as time passes, the assessment changes and people start thinking of them as, to pick one example, a ‘great military leader’ and the specifics of the negative assessment fade from social awareness; the negative assessment becomes something that only dedicated historians, and a few people who might be interested in the topic for random reasons, even know about.  An example of this is Alexander the Great; but there are many others.  If you are attentive you can watch this process happen in real time to figures of political and military importance who die during one’s lifetime. 

Part of it, I think, is a kind of general feeling that ‘one should not speak ill of the dead.’  And this sentiment aligns with the tendency for us to reconfigure the past in general in a more positive direction than may be warranted.  This seems to be a feature of most people’s minds, with the exception of dedicated pessimists.

I was thinking about this because late in 2025 I saw two posts on Youtube that were overviews of the life of Julian the Apostate.  In both cases the presenters lauded Julian as a hero who risked everything to bring back the position of Paganism in the Roman world.  Neither of the presentations mention the huge amounts of animals Julian sacrificed during his brief reign.  Well, I take that back; one of them said that under Julian the Pagan altars once again ‘ran red with blood.’  He said this as if it was a good thing.  And it was just a passing comment.

One of the presentations was by a Pagan Platonist, or Neo-Pagan Platonist, or perhaps a Neo-Pagan Neo-Platonist.  It makes sense that a Neo-Pagan would have a positive feeling about Julian, especially if he has a strong anti-Christian bias.

Still, I find it troubling that the zealous, I would say fanatic, devotion to animal sacrifice, which was a signature feature of Julian’s Paganism, goes unmentioned.  Consider, for example, that many countries have laws against animal cruelty; and this applies to the nations in which these presenters live.  This indicates that as a society we think of animals as lying within our ethical concerns.  It’s true that laws against animal cruelty are rarely enforced, but in principle the existence of such laws indicates a general ethical concern regarding how animals are treated.  But this kind of concern was absent from both presentations on Julian; not that this is unusual.  Books I’ve read about Julian don’t bring it up either.

From a Platonist perspective, any animal sacrifice, let alone the elaborate and relentless sacrifices of Julian, means you have not come to terms with Platonist ethics or, I would argue, the ethics of the community in which the presenters reside.  I say this about Platonism because the foundation of Platonist ethics is non-harming and the application of that foundation is found first in ways of life that include animals in the embrace of non-harming. 

5.  Breaking Free

The material world is a kind of trap because the material world is a region of suffering and sorrow.  Platonism offers us a way of breaking free from the trap of material existence; that is the purpose and the meaning of Platonic Teachings, the Platonic Way, the Platonic Dharma.

6.  Solitude in Platonism

The pursuit of solitude, or understanding solitude as a spiritual practice, is not prominent in Classical Platonist literature like the Dialogues and the Enneads.  But there is a kind of reference to solitude in what I might call the ‘penumbra’ of Platonism.  For example, Plotinus famously refers to the ultimate ascent to the ineffable One as a journey of the ‘alone to the alone.’  In addition, Plato mentions in several Dialogues how the Philosopher will be seen as marginal to the society in which the Philosopher dwells because the Philosopher is focused on the immaterial transcendental while almost all people are focused on the material world.  This implies a kind of solitude; it might not be actual solitude in the sense of a hermitage, but these representations of the Philosopher indicate a psychic and social distance, even a separation from most people.

I’m not aware of the topic of solitude being discussed within a Platonist context.  For example, I don’t find it in the Handbook by Alicnous and I don’t recall solitude being a topic in the Orations of Maximus. 

But there are hints, now and then, of Platonists who have given up material possessions and live a life that is withdrawn from material concerns.  I find these examples inspiring and uplifting.  Perhaps it is time for contemporary Platonists to incorporate an explicit commitment to solitude as part of the ascent to the transcendental.

7.  Does the Soul Have Parts?

I was reading what Alicnous has to say about the soul in his Handbook (discussion of the soul is found on pages 31-34 and consists of three sections; 23, 24, and 25, in Dillon’s translation).  Section 24 is titled ‘The Soul and Its Parts’.  It is a very clear presentation of the idea that the soul has parts (an affective part, a part that reasons, and so forth).  And it is consistent with writings on the soul found in Classical Platonist literature both before Alcinous and after him.

Nevertheless, I lean towards viewing the soul as partless, as having no parts.  First because the soul is immaterial and I don’t see how it is possible for that which is immaterial to have parts.  On what basis would the parts be distinguished?

Second, I think of the soul as the presence of the One (and the Good) in the ephemeral individual.  The One is the source of unity in material things; the One is why a thing is a thing and not nothing.  But it seems to me that unity implies a partless reality.  Without a partless immaterial reality individual material things could not even emerge in the material world.

Third, I think of functions like reason as a part of mind rather than soul.  My interpretation is that the main function of mind is differentiation and reason is a tool of differentiation.  I think of mind as the presence of the noetic in the material individual because it is in nous where differentiation first appears. 

In other words, the soul does not reason, nor is soul irrational.  Because the soul is prior to differentiation it is neither rational nor irrational.

Fourth, I think of the affective aspect of the individual to have its origin in the body (and the mind’s relationship to the affective body is to either work to actualize affective desires or to curb them through the cultivation of virtues and other types of purification).  I understand ‘affective’ to mean primarily emotions and desires.  Emotions and desires appear regularly in a manner that is cyclic; the material world is the world of cyclic existence and for this reason the affective aspect originates in the body rather than the soul.

I realize that viewing the soul as a partless unity is different from the standard presentation of the soul as having higher and lower parts and functions.  Nevertheless, these are my current thoughts on the nature of the soul which I offer for your consideration.

  

Porphyry's Task

29 December 2025

Porphyry’s Task

“During his (Plotinus’s) lifetime, Christianity attracted a diverse popular following, as did movements which drew on ancient philosophy . . . They deceived many people indeed, they were themselves deluded.  As if Plato had not come to grips with the profundity of intelligible substance!  Plotinus himself refuted them on many points in the course of our seminars, and he wrote a book which we called ‘Against the Gnostics’ [Ennead 2.9]; but he left it to us (meaning Porphyry and other students of Plotinus) to judge the rest.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by a committee of scholars, edited by Lloyd P. Gerson, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2025, page 30, paragraph 16, ISBN: 9781009604970)

1.  Plotinus lived in the third century of our era, from 204 or 205 to 270.  Christianity at that time had not achieved complete dominance but was emerging as a pervasive cultural force.  (It was in the fourth century that Christianity’s political power would become overwhelming.) 

2.  The above quote is an interesting look at how a non-Christian philosopher dealt with the increasing Christian presence both in its Orthodox forms and in its Gnostic branches.  It seems that Plotinus dealt with these representatives of various Christian groups by engaging with them in the usual question and answer format of Plotinus’s gatherings.  But Plotinus also took the time to particularly focus on the Gnostics by writing an essay which is now called ‘Against the Gnostics.’  The reason for such a focus is that from the perspective of Plotinus (and Porphyry) the Gnostics misrepresented Plato and Plotinus wanted to correct these misrepresentations.

3.  This is speculative, but I think this kind of engagement might be what led Porphyry to write his work ‘Against the Christians.’  I mean that Porphyry may have been directly inspired to do so by the precedent of Plotinus’s ‘Against the Gnostics’ and the instructions of Plotinus to his students to ‘judge the rest.’ 

4.  Evidently Porphyry’s book, ‘Against the Christians’, was very offensive and irritating to Christianity and it was condemned by name by three emperors as well as some councils.  This led to its destruction so that we have only quotes from various sources as surviving fragments.  (The latest translation of these fragments is by David Litwa in his book A Reconstruction of Against the Christians by Porphyry of Tyre which was published this year, 2025.)  The essay by Plotinus, ‘Against the Gnostics’ had a better fate because Orthodox Christianity opposed the Gnostics, though for different reasons.

5.  Thinking about this, I began to consider Porphyry’s ‘Letter to Anebo’ as in the same vein as ‘Against the Christians.’  What I mean is that in many ways the ‘Letter to Anebo’ is a critique of theurgy and shares, I think, a similar purpose as ‘Against the Christians.’  I started to think of the ‘Letter to Anebo’ as a kind of ‘Against the Theurgists.’ 

6.  In the quote above Porphyry expresses irritation with the Christians, particularly Gnostics, who misrepresent Plato as being deficient because they suggested that Plato did not understand the intelligibles and the noetic realm.  Porphyry thought of Plato’s insights into this dimension of existence as sufficient and based on contemplative experience; they did not need to be reworked into elaborations that were complex and opaque. 

7.  But it appears to me that Porphyry had similar views about theurgy and its interpretation of Platonism.  Theurgy also unnecessarily complicated Plato’s insights by multiplying noetic entities and creating additional hypostases.  Because of this he wrote his ‘Letter to Anebo’ in order to counter the growing tendency to dilute Plato’s teachings by adding unnecessary theurgic complexities and practices.  From the perspective of Porphyry theurgy did not solve any alleged problem in Platonism; instead theurgy created problems and obstacles that made it more difficult to understand Platonism.

8.  I think a reader can also see this kind of task in Porphyry’s On Abstinence which was Porphyry’s extensive apology for vegetarianism in a Platonic context.  Porphyry observed that his friend Firmus had abandoned a vegetarian diet and had returned to eating meat.  I suspect, though Porphyry does not say so, that this was not the first time Porphyry had observed this kind of return to meat eating, or the sacrificing of animals; I mean that Firmus may have been a symbol for Porphyry of this kind of loss of commitment. 

In ‘On Abstinence’ Porphyry takes on the same task as he did with ‘Against the Christians’ and ‘Letter to Anebo’ which is to put forth the view of the Platonic tradition as it had been presented since Plato’s time (and one could argue even before Plato this was the view of Philosophy as the fount of wisdom and as a way of life.)

9.   A counter to this way of interpreting the writings of Porphyry would be Porphyry’s engagement with the ‘Chaldean Oracles.’  Last week I posted about the Chaldean Oracles and mentioned that both Iamblichus and Proclus wrote commentaries on them; both of which are now lost.  But Porphyry also wrote a commentary on the Chaldean Oracles and he did so before Iamblichus (and, obviously Proclus).  This work is also lost.  The question is, does the fact that Porphyry spent time with the Chaldean Oracles negate, or undermine, the idea that Porphyry’s ‘Letter to Anebo’ was, in a sense, an overall rejection of theurgy and had the same function in a theurgic context as ‘Against the Christians’ had in a Christian context?  It’s a good question.  Here are a few observations:

9.1  I tend to see Porphyry’s involvement with the Chaldean Oracles as resembling the way Chinese philosophers and sages were involved with the Book of Changes, also known as the I Ching.  There are countless commentaries on the Book of Changes written over many centuries.  Most of these commentaries are Confucian, meaning that they use their commentaries to affirm Confucian spirituality.  (The Book of Changes was, after all, a Confucian Classic.)  Some of the commentaries are Daoist, some are Buddhist, and some are more practical in that they are focused on the art of war, or martial arts, or even business and governing.  My point here is that the Book of Changes was flexible enough to allow for a variety of interpretations and uses.

I think Porphyry’s use of the Chaldean Oracles follows a similar pattern in that Porphyry seems to have put forth a traditional Platonic interpretation of its cryptic sayings.  In contrast, it seems to be the case that Iamblichus would use the Chaldean Oracles to justify a complete reinterpretation of Platonism.  Thus their purposes greatly differed and the results also differed.  (This is speculative since all of the commentaries are lost.)

9.1.1  I think it is possible for us today to connect with how Porphyry related to Oracles and other such practices by connecting with how we in the West use the Book of Changes.  We are not Chinese Sages and we have not inherited a long tradition regarding this work.  We tend to approach the Changes in an open way, but not in a way that would treat the Changes as infallible.  There is a certain respect a Westerner has when using the Changes, but it is not what one might call submission. 

9.1.2  Relating to the Changes, or the Oracles, resembles the way we relate to poetry.  I say this because poetry is obscure, the language is often difficult to understand, yet there is a sense of meaning that speaks to us in the way that music speaks to us.  As philosophers, we subject such works to dialectic even when, as Plato wrote in Phaedrus, we know that written works can’t defend themselves.  But is that true?  If we enter into dialectic then these works can ‘speak’ and we can enter into a dialectical relationship with them.  This is how I think Porphyry treated poetry, Oracles, and how he would have treated the Book of Changes.

9.2  Porphyry spent time studying philosophical and spiritual traditions other than Platonism, even those contrary to Platonism.  I don’t think that was unusual in the culture of that time.  For example, in ‘Against the Christians’ Porphyry demonstrates familiarity with Christian scriptures.  (And as an aside, Porphyry was very familiar with Aristotle and other significant philosophers.)  I bring this up because Porphyry’s writings on the Chaldean Oracles may have been more ‘comments on’ rather than a genuine commentary; what I’m getting at is that writing about the Chaldean Oracles does not, by itself, constitute commitment to them as a source of spiritual nourishment.  Porphyry’s studies of Christianity did not eventuate in a commitment to Christianity, and Porphyry’s studies of Aristotle did not lead Porphyry to become a Peripatetic.  Porphyry interpreted all of these approaches through a Platonic lens, preserving the view that Platonism was sufficient and a complete spiritual system.  In contrast, Iamblichus used the Chaldean Oracles to undermine the position of Platonism by insisting that additions needed to be made, of a theurgic kind, because wisdom was insufficient to bring practitioners to the salvific goal of Platonism which is union with the Good and the One. 

9.3  I’m not saying that Porphyry was disinterested in oracles; it seems that Porphyry used oracles found at temples in the same way that today many people use the Book of Changes.  And sometimes Porphyry would write about the oracles he received.  I think Porphyry was interested in the questions surrounding how to interpret such utterances, what status we should give them, and how we should respond to them.  These are the same kinds of questions that people today ask about the Book of Changes or the Tarot.  These strike me as legitimate philosophical questions that would arise naturally in a Platonic context that is rooted in Plato’s Dialogues wherein one finds lots of allegorical, mythic, and metaphorical writing.  I say that these questions would arise naturally in this context because an oracle’s pronouncements might use some of these devices and Platonists would be familiar with them and know how to unpack them.  The point is that Porphyry treated the Oracles as opportunities for dialectic whereas Iamblichus used the Oracles as opportunities for commanding subversion of traditional Platonism.

9.4  I don’t see any evidence that Porphyry signed on to theurgy under the influence of the Chaldean Oracles.  As far as I can tell, Porphyry never suggests that theurgic ritual is higher than wisdom, or that theurgic ritual is necessary for the philosophical ascent to bear fruit.  That would happen with Iamblichus and it is a striking difference between the two.

10.  I’m not saying that this task of passing on the inherited tradition of Platonism by critiquing deviations from it, such as theurgy and meat eating, was the only thing Porphyry did during his productive life as a philosopher.  For example, Porphyry also wrote works that were addressed to beginners, such as Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella and works such as his Sentences which is a subtle presentation on the finer aspects of Platonism. 

Nevertheless, I think much of what Porphyry did was to write what might be called apologetic treatises for Orthodox, or traditional, Platonism at an historical moment when multiple attempts were being made to subvert that inheritance. 

11.  Was Porphyry successful in these apologetic efforts?  In the immediate historical context I think we would have to say ‘no’, he wasn’t.  I mean that Christian Platonism found a place and created a way of interpreting Platonism that presented Platonism as incomplete and deficient.  In addition, theurgy undermined Platonist ethics, its metaphysics, and shifted the tradition from Philosophy, love of wisdom, to Theurgy, love of ritual, and to a focus on theology rather than philosophy.  (Those who follow Theurgy today retain these anti-Platonist views to some extent which varies from person to person and group to group.) 

On the other hand, when looked at from a longer historical view, Porphyry passed on to the future the tradition that he loved and made it available and accessible to many people.  This reconnection to Orthodox Platonism via Porphyry’s writings began in the Renaissance; one example is a reconnection to vegetarianism with the discovery, and then the wide distribution, of his On Abstinence in Europe.  In some ways, I think the full significance of Porphyry’s writings, and the full impact of those writings, has not yet emerged but is likely to blossom in the future; that is, of course, speculation.  But I think it is informed speculation.  I say this because I sense that some people, more with the passing of time, seem to be interested in learning Platonism on its own terms instead of through the distorting lenses of Christianity and Theurgy.  And Porphyry’s writings are an excellent way to access the tradition as it existed before it was subject to these distortions; that is my hope and perhaps the hope of others as well.

12.  What about today, our contemporary situation?  I think that Porphyry offers us a model of how a Platonist can interact with other philosophical and spiritual systems without succumbing to those traditions and at the same time retaining a sense of one’s own place and wisdom.  I mean that in our contemporary situation we have many people wanting to adjust, reinterpret, or in some way undermine Orthodox Platonism so that it will serve some other system’s purposes.  For example, the practice of Theurgy is advocated for by a number of non-academic Platonist groups who configure the practice of Theurgy as in some way a significant Platonic practice.  I think Porphyry shows us how to relate to these kinds of claims. 

We also have those who want to subsume Platonism under their own political agenda.  Some examples of this have had significant influence such as the teachings of Leo Straus.  Porphyry does not write specifically about politics, but he offers a sense of stability when faced with misinterpretations of Platonism that can be applied to a political context.

In contemporary Universities there is a strongly held view that Platonism is best understood through the analytic tools of contemporary philosophy thus transforming Plato into a proto-analytic philosopher and relegating mystics like Plotinus to the fringes.  Porphyry shows us that misinterpretations of Platonism can be subjected to dialectical investigation and that this leads to understanding Platonism on its own terms rather than interpreting Platonism through a different, in this case secular, lens.

I also think that Porphyry informs us how to retain our equanimity in the thick of the confusion of competing claims and critiques.  As mentioned above, in the short term, Porphyry’s apologias for traditional Platonism did not win out.  But if one looks at this kind of situation from the perspective of wisdom, from the perspective of eternity, that is not disturbing. 

In short, I think Porphyry is the ancient Platonist who is best equipped to show us moderns how to move forward in a world that feels just as chaotic as the world in which Porphyry lived; a world in which, if we take the long view, he thrived.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 78

22 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 78

1.   Usury

“Serapion of Alexandria was with him (Plotinus), too – originally an orator, but afterwards also interested in philosophical argument.  But he (Serapion) did not stay the course.  He found himself unable to renounce his possessions and give up usury.”

(Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, translated by Lloyd P. Gerson et al, Plotinus: The Enneads, Second Edition, 2025, pages 26 and 27, ISBN: 9781009604970)

There is a section in the Life of Plotinus by Porphyry where Porphyry presents a representative sampling of the students of Plotinus.  Porphyry offers brief sketches of a few sentences at most.  But I think they are very interesting because they show the reader the standards that were in effect among these students of Plotinus.  I’m not aware of any written document that lists these standards.  I suspect they were more like commonly understood standards that were broadly used in various philosophical traditions and because of this no written list, or summary, of them was needed.

Porphyry writes that Serapion was ‘originally an orator.’  Orators gave prepared speeches, often at public venues, on various topics.  An example in the Platonic tradition of an Orator is Maximus of Tyre whose works are called ‘Orations.’  An Orator could make a living and become well-known if they were eloquent and spoke on topics of broad interest.  I don’t think we have any Orations of Serapion at this time, but to be an Orator you had to have a good education in writing and literature; and it is likely that an Orator would study rhetoric.  It appears that Serapion had dropped being an Orator because Porphyry uses the word ‘afterwards’ he became interested in philosophy, indicating, I think, after concluding his efforts at being an Orator.

Porphyry assesses Serapion as someone unable to ‘stay the course’ in his studies of Philosophy because he could not renounce his possessions or give up usury.  The inability to give up possessions seems to have been an important disqualifier in the community of Plotinus but it’s not easy to see exactly how that functioned.  I mean were there discussions about this between Plotinus and his students, or between a senior student and a newcomer?  I am thinking about how in Christian monasticism that in some monastic traditions it is required that you give away all your possessions to the poor before becoming a member of the monastic community.  Was something like this going on?  Or was it more a matter of a group consensus that was communicated to newcomers through conversation and the behavior of senior students?

The other disqualifier Porphyry mentions for a student of Philosophy is usury.  Usury can mean charging exorbitant interest or, in some contexts, it can mean charging any interest at all.  Charging exorbitant interest is the more common meaning, but in Plato’s dialogues Plato argues against charging interest full stop.  Usury was considered a serious breach of ethical behavior in Western culture and until fairly recently there were laws against it. 

Porphyry is following Platonic tradition in his judgment against usury.  In Laws, for example, usury is prohibited in the sense of charging any interest:

“. . . no one should give money to someone he can’t trust, and no money should be lent at interest.”

(Plato, Laws, Book V, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press, 1980, page 129, 742c, ISBN: 0226671100)

There are additional passages about interest and wealth accumulation that are scattered through dialogues such as The Republic and Theaetetus. 

When Plato writes that ‘no one’ should loan money at interest it appears to be a blanket injunction.  However, later Platonists sometimes interpret these kinds of injunctions as pertaining to those who want to become Philosophers; taking into account this perspective, a gloss on the above quote from The Laws would read “. . . no Philosopher should give money to someone he can’t trust, and no money should be lent at interest.”  Porphyry does this in his book On Abstinence when, early in the work, Porphyry writes that the prohibition against eating or sacrificing animals for ritual purposes applies specifically to Philosophers, but not to people engaged in ordinary activities.  It’s possible that Porphyry unnecessarily narrows that injunction, but that’s how Porphyry seems to been inclined to look at them.

My primary reason for referring to this passage from Life of Plotinus is to give an example of how the works of Platonism are filled with what I refer to as ‘instruction.’  What I mean by ‘instruction’ are passages that inform the reader, and particularly a reader who wants to be a Philosopher, how to incorporate behaviors that are consistent with the overall view of the cosmos that Platonism has.  The most explicit example of this that I can recall is the passage in Phaedo, which I have previously quoted, where Socrates quizzes Simmias on the behavior of Philosophers in everyday contexts such as food, adornments, sex, and so forth. 

It appears that Plotinus and Porphyry followed this way of writing, scattering instructions on how to live a Philosophical life throughout their writings.

2.  The Pleasure of Reading Plotinus

When I first read Plotinus I found it difficult.  I wasn’t used to the vocabulary.  I wasn’t used to the syntax.  And I wasn’t familiar enough with the antecedents of the thought of Plotinus to feel confident about the background out of which these writings emerge; this applied particularly to the Dialogues of Plato which are the fertile ground for the Enneads.  But this also applies to ancillary works such as those of Aristotle that have an impact on the thought of Plotinus.  Over time I slowly became more familiar with this broad context of classical thought and its styles and assumptions that are woven through what Plotinus writes.

At a certain point, after reading the Enneads many times, the difficulties I had at first diminished and some of them vanished altogether.  At that point reading Plotinus became a pleasure, a pleasure that I eagerly look forward to.  I doubt that this process has ended; I suspect that the pleasure of reading Plotinus will only increase over time.

3.  Is Platonism a Religion?

I have often referred to Platonism as a spiritual tradition, and now and then I have even referred to Platonism as a religion.  And I also, as readers here know, like to refer to Platonism as a kind of Dharma, similar to the Dharmas of India such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Yoga. 

But most people do not think of Platonism that way.  Instead they think of Platonism as a philosophy and they find philosophy and religion to be distinct, non-overlapping categories. 

I think the key to accepting that a way of life is a religion is that religions are, at their core, salvific.  I mean that religions have the task of offering their adherents a way of escaping from, or a way of transforming, the difficulties of human life, the difficulties of material existence.  In Buddhist terms, religions offer ‘refuge’ from the struggles that human beings must endure.  I think if you look at it from this perspective, Platonism qualifies as a religion, a spirituality, a salvific path that offers a way out of the pains and sorrows of life in the material realm.

4.  Solstice

The December solstice was on the 21^st of December this year (some years the solstice is on the 22^nd).  I and some friends stepped into the desert and walked a little ways out to greet the solstice sunrise; we’ve been doing this for about three years and there is a spot we always use for the solstices and equinoxes.  The valley I live in is surrounded by mountains which add about ten to fifteen minutes to the time of sunrise listed online. 

At sunrise we bowed to express our gratitude for the sun’s light and warmth. 

It’s a very simple ceremony; no chants, no prayers, no robes.  Just a simple acknowledgement of the gifts we receive from the sun year after year.

There is a steady and quiet beauty in the solar cycle, particular the times of sunrise and sunset.  Many have felt how these times are conducive to contemplation.  I think that is because the beauty of those moments can open the gate to the source from which beauty comes and by following beauty we can ascend to that source.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 77

15 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 77

1.  Alcinous Defines Philosophy

In this post I’m returning to the definition of Platonic Philosophy as given by Alcinous in Alicnous’s Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon.  I posted this quote before; but here I want to focus solely on the definition.  In the previous post I quoted the whole section in which the definition appears.  Here I am using a narrower focus.

“Philosophy is a striving for wisdom, or the freeing and turning around of the soul from the body, when we turn towards the intelligible and what truly is, and wisdom is the science of things divine and human.”  (Page 3)

I think it is worth noting that Alcinous strongly links Philosophy to wisdom.  This is not surprising as the name of the tradition, Philosophy, means love of wisdom.  I think this definition of Alcinous would not have been controversial, or contested, by the tradition or by anyone affiliated with Platonism for the first 800+ years.  For all that time wisdom stood at the center of the tradition.

I think we need to recover that understanding.  I say this because I think the foundational nature of wisdom has become obscured by a number of sources who place other things at the center that they consider to be more significant.  This kind of replacement makes it difficult to access Platonism on its own terms.

Alcinous goes on to unpack wisdom.  First Alcinous states that wisdom is the ‘freeing and turning around of the soul from the body.’  This is done by distinguishing what is of the body and what is of the soul.  Wisdom is making those distinctions and then acting upon them in one’s life.

This turning has two aspects; the first is turning to the intelligible, what I would call the noetic, and the second is turning to what truly is, what Platonism calls the Good and the One.  What the intelligible and the Good have in common is that they are eternal.  The Good is eternal by its nature, eternal as such, or eternity qua eternity.  The intelligible, or noetic realities, what Whitehead called ‘eternal objects’, are eternal due to their metaphysical closeness to the Good and the One.  I would sum up this turning by saying that Wisdom means to be turning to, or towards, eternity.

The primary distinction of Wisdom, then, is to distinguish what is eternal from what is ephemeral.  What is eternal is the divine.  What is ephemeral is human, or of this world.

2.  Three Levels of Meaning in the Dialogues of Plato

In the Dialogues of Plato the reader is engaging with writing that functions at three primary levels.  These levels are rooted in the three levels, or hypostases, of Platonic metaphysics.  The first level in a Dialogue is the Good and the One.  Sometimes this is brought up explicitly but more often it is pointed to and suggested.  An example of bringing it up explicitly is when Plato refers to the Good in The Republic.  An example of pointing to the Good and the One is found in the opening of Plato’s Dialogue The Laws; I am thinking of the first word of the Dialogue is ‘God’ which is a word for the One in a Platonic context.  This can be more indirect as when Plato writes about recollection and points indirectly to higher realities through this discussion.

The second level is noetic; one might call it archetypal.  The noetic level is where eternal truths are found such as numbers.  When Plato talks about numbers Plato is referring to this second level.  Plato will sometimes personify this level using names of various deities as symbols for eternal noetic realities; this is a kind of indirect pointing.

The third level is the level of cyclic existence.  When Plato refers to human life and its many facets Plato is pointing to the realm of cyclic existence which is present in the human body.  These teachings mostly appear as what I call ‘instruction’, that is to say that Plato is referring to what human beings must do, as embodied beings, to walk a spiritual path in their lives.  In some ways instruction is easy to overlook.  This is because we are often focused on the characters and the plot of a Dialogue and the storyline is what attracts us.  But after some familiarity with the Dialogues we begin to notice that Plato offers us instruction on how to become a Philosopher which means adopting practices conducive to, and defining of, the Philosophical tradition.  You can spot these instructions because they are almost always askeses, meaning they are almost always in the form of ascetic practices that the Philosopher adopts.  This level of instruction is very fruitful and once a reader perceives this level he finds a wealth of such instruction in the Dialogues.

These three levels of meaning are not usually presented in a sequence, but I suspect that they are to be found in all of Plato’s dialogues.

3.  When Friends Give Advice

A friend of mine recently said to me that I should give up philosophy.  He asked me if I knew that he felt that way.  I responded that I have known that for years and that it doesn’t bother me that my friend feels that way.

This is not the first time someone has made this suggestion.  I suspect that this kind of suggestion is made to anyone who has a commitment to a spiritual life of any kind.  I have observed this happening to other people.

Plato talks about this in several dialogues where Plato points out that people will think of Philosophers as inept and kind of buffoonish.  Some devout Catholics have written how casual Catholics often find their devotion to the tradition kind of embarrassing, indicating that what Plato wrote about is not exclusively a problem for practitioners of Philosophy.

It's not a big deal once you realize that people have different destinies. 

4.  A First Glance at the Chaldean Oracles

4.1 I have noticed that the Chaldean Oracles make an appearance in a lot of Platonist writings that were written after Plotinus.  I thought it might be a good idea to find out about the Oracles so I decided to read the translation by Ruth Majercik. 

The Chaldean Oracles were composed during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, 161 – 180 C.E.  The authors are Julian the Theurgist and his father Julian the Chaldean.  How, exactly, it was written is speculative but it may have been written, or received, in a trance state while Julian the Theurgist was practicing theurgy. 

The Chaldean Oracles are currently in a fragmentary state; the complete text has been lost but there are a significant number of quotes found in various sources.  Majercik catalogs these quotes, dividing them into two types; quotes that are regarded as securely part of the Chaldean Oracles, and dubious quotes.

The Chaldean Oracles remind me of Gnostic writing in general.  They are visionary and dogmatic; by dogmatic I mean that the Chaldean Oracles state their view as a revelation rather than as a discovery that others can share.  If you compare the Timaeus with the Chaldean Oracles I think you will understand what I am referring to.

Plato writes myths and allegories, but the tone of oracular writing is, I think, different.  In Plato’s devices the reader is being invited to unpack what is written; in contrast, in oracular writing the reader is being told to accept them as they are, even when they are very opaque and mysterious. 

To the extent that the Chaldean Oracles had an influence on Iamblichus and Proclus, I think it may have influenced them to lean toward a stance of talking down to the reader who, presumably, needs to follow their instruction.  Compare, for example, the tone of The Mysteries by Iamblichus to the tone Plato uses when he has Socrates offer instruction in philosophy; to be honest they feel like two different worlds.  Plato uses dialectic, oracular writing uses dogmatics.  I suspect the Chaldean Oracles also influenced the two of them to write in a very complex and opaque style which seems to be well-suited to oracular literature.

This is just a first impression; I have often changed my mind about spiritual works after rereading them. 

4.2  Both Iamblichus and Proclus wrote commentaries on the Chaldean Oracles; both of these are now lost.  The work is focused on theurgy and one can regard the Chaldean Oracles as the source, or a significant source, of what would become Platonic theurgy.  At times I have considered referring to Post-Porphyrian Platonism as “Chaldean Platonism” meaning Platonism that is shaped in significant ways by the Chaldean Oracles; I modeled the name after “Christian Platonism”.  The Chaldean Oracles view theurgy as the necessary practice and means for spiritual ascent, just as Iamblichus did and it may be that Iamblichus either got this idea from the Chaldean Oracles or the Oracles supported the view of Iamblichus in significant ways.  I think it is noteworthy that a primary source for theurgy in Platonism was a non-Platonist text.  Both the Chaldean Oracles and Iamblichus through Proclus view wisdom as insufficient for spiritual ascent which represents a major shift in understanding from the Platonic heritage.

4.3  I referred to the Chaldean Oracles as a non-Platonist text in 4.2 above.  But I think it is noteworthy that in contemporary discussions about Post-Porphyrian Platonism some authors will refer to the Chaldean Oracles as a ‘Neoplatonic’ work, or ‘Neoplatonic’ text.  The reason for this is that it was the Post-Porphyrian Platonists, such as Iamblichus and Proclus, who seem to have been most fascinated by this work, for this reason the association has become an historical one.  I don’t think that the Julians who wrote the Oracles had this specifically in mind, but that is what happened.  I use the term ‘non-Platonist’ for the Chaldean Oracles because the work displaces central understandings of the Platonic tradition such as the transformative nature of wisdom as well as wisdom’s soteriological function and after rejecting the sufficiency of wisdom creates a supersession based structure that places ritual above wisdom.

4.4  In some ways I find the interest in these kinds of works in Post-Porphyrian Platonism to be a bit embarrassing.  At another level, I think the Chaldean Oracles were what I might refer to as a ‘fad’ or a passing fancy.  I’m reminded of certain channeled works that were very popular for a few years and have now vanished; in particular, I am thinking of those channeled works that were produced in the 1960’s and 70’s.  The Chaldean Oracles have that kind of feeling for me.

5.  Wisdom

I’ve been thinking a lot about wisdom and wisdom traditions.  This has happened, I think, because of the growing realization of how wisdom was ejected from Platonism by the Post-Porphyrian Platonists.  Here are a few thoughts about wisdom:

5.1  Wisdom is a kind of knowing.  Wisdom can be divided into two broad types.  The first is practical wisdom and the second is transcendent wisdom which, in a Platonic context, refers to Philosophical Wisdom.  Platonist literature talks about this basic division in episodes where someone possesses skill in a practical field of learning.  An example would be someone who is a skilled physician, or a skilled in music, or in steering a ship, and so forth.  Someone who is skilled in steering a ship is wise in the ways of the sea.  Someone who is a skilled physician is wise in the ways of the human body.

Transcendent wisdom is also a kind of knowing, but it is knowing about that which applies to all existing things; that is to say it is metaphysical wisdom.  For example, insight into impermanence is a kind of wisdom because it applies to all material things.

5.2  Wisdom is knowing the truth, which is often hidden, about material things, but it is also knowing the truth about non-material realities.  Wisdom does not stop at the material metaphysics; that is just a first step on the path of wisdom.

5.3  Wisdom is a turning toward that which is non-material and therefore that which is eternal.  Wisdom does this by making distinctions and following up on those distinctions.  The basic distinction is to separate that which is ephemeral from that which is eternal. 

5.4  Wisdom is a function of mind; I don’t consider it to be a function of soul.  I say this because it is mind, due to its connection to the noetic, that makes distinctions.  The soul is the silent presence of eternity which the path of Wisdom leads us to.

5.5  Transcendent Wisdom refers to knowledge about the eternal; how to recognize it, how to approach it, how to dwell There.