Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 32

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 32

24 June 2024

1.  A repeated item of interest found in many editions of The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius is the nature of, or the significance of, the absence of any Christian references.  Consolation does not mention any distinctively Christian doctrines or any specific Christian persons, including Jesus.  The Consolation does mention God, but does so in a manner that is compatible with the way Platonists, and perhaps other traditions such as Stoicism, use the word ‘God.’ 

This absence is puzzling to people because Boethius wrote works of Catholic theology during his life, including a work on the trinity.  Yet at the end of his life, when facing execution on trumped up charges, it is not to any Christian figure that he turns to for solace; rather, it is to Philosophy personified as a Goddess. 

I think the discussion on this issue centers on the salvific nature of Philosophy as found in the Consolation.  The conflict is that Christianity views itself as salvific, but regards Philosophy as unable to serve a salvific purpose.  Yet the Consolation shows Philosophy as a salvific tradition.  And so the question arises as to how Boethius understood salvation.

My own view is that I suspect that Boethius didn’t feel a need to choose between the two traditions.  This likely strikes people as implausible because we are inheritors of a perspective that requires that we make this kind of either/or choice.  It would strike us as very odd, for example, if someone attended both a Catholic Church and a Presbyterian Church and claimed to be a member in good standing of both.  And it would be more difficult if someone said they were both Christian and Pagan.

To put this in perspective, it does not strike us as odd if someone plays bridge and poker, or someone plays keyboard and guitar.  But when it comes to matters of spirituality there is a strong sense that we should adhere to a single expression of it.

I want to suggest that Boethius didn’t feel that way.  When he turned to Philosophy at the end of his life I don’t think he struggled over that choice.  I don’t think he went through some kind of inner convulsion and left Christianity behind or rejected it.  I think it was easy for Boethius to turn to Philosophy because he had always had a sense of the salvific nature of the tradition of Philosophy and didn’t find that in opposition to what Christianity teaches.  In other words, Boethius wasn’t a Christian Platonist; he was a Platonist who also happened to be a Christian.

2.  I have posted before that in modernity the past is thought of as having no value; instead, the past is considered in almost exclusively negative terms and is thought of as something to overcome.  I don’t normally write about current events, but the recent assault on Stonehenge by activists was such a striking example of this aspect of modernity that I think it is worth highlighting. 

3.  Utopian political thought is unsuccessful because it does not understand the nature of the levels of reality (or hypostases) in general, or the nature of the third and lowest level, that of the material world, in which we live.  Utopian political thought thinks that by rearranging the material factors of this world that we can build a society that eternally embodies justice and other ideas such as equality and so forth. 

But the material world is inherently unstable and is inherently a realm of division and strife.  It is only in the noetic realm that stability is found as well as a derivative eternity.  And it is only with the One that the source of stability, unity, and that which is eternal, is known.  It is only by transcending the material realm that the longed for stability can be attained.

4.  I think it is necessary for the Platonist practitioner to cultivate spiritual indifference, or ‘apatheia’.  Spiritual indifference is not the same as the kind of indifference sometimes found in our, for example, relationship to distant events either positive or negative.  It is more closely related to equanimity.  It is nourished by understanding that we have almost no control over events in the world and that our judgements about how people behave is not going to impact others in any significant way.  Even if you have a social media presence your influence will be very small compared to the number of people on earth and, in addition, your views will be very quickly forgotten.

Spiritual indifference helps the Platonist practitioner to withdraw from the world of strife in which we are embedded.  Spiritual indifference helps us to turn inward, to the world of forms, to the world of silence, as we gradually ascend to the realm of true peace.

5.  In the West’s relationship to Buddhism there is a concern among some scholars and practitioners regarding ‘Original Buddhism’ and what it was like, what it taught, and what its practices were.  There is a feeling, sometimes explicitly stated, that we in the West should return to Original Buddhism.

In current Platonist scholarship there is a similar concern, though I haven’t run across the phrase ‘Original Platonism.’  What I am referring to is the way scholars will configure what Plato was trying to do and from that analysis there follows an evaluation of subsequent Platonist history.  For example, some modernists consider Plato to be a rationalist and a proto-analytic philosopher and therefore they find a basic continuity between Plato and modern analytic philosophy.  Those who take such an approach sideline the mystical elements of Plato, regarding them as backward and in some sense deficient.

Others, like myself, regard Plato as a spiritual teacher whose teaching closely matches the structure of Indian Dharmic traditions.  From this perspective the mystical elements of Plato’s philosophy are the point and the ultimate goal of his tradition and practice.

The modernist interpretation leads to endless subdivisions of the Platonic tradition.  The mystical, or Dharmic, interpretation leads to a sense of unity and transcendence that unites Platonist Philosophers and practitioners across the centuries.

 

 

Wine and its Confusions in Plato's Dialogue "Laws"

21 June 2024

Wine and its Confusions in Plato’s Dialogue Laws

In the first two books of Laws, which scholars widely regard as Plato’s last dialogue, there is an extensive discussion about wine; the circumstances under which it should be drunk, age restrictions, its effect on health, wine’s effect on cognition, the way different cultures use wine (highly restricted to frequent indulgence), ceremonial usage, the effect wine has on the cultivation of the virtues, and more.  I find the discussion a bit on wandering, but perhaps that is my own lack of comprehension as to the overall direction of the discussion.  When I say ‘wandering’ I mean that at times the discussion seems to be reaching a certain conclusion and then it veers away with an additional consideration.  But at the end of Book 2 there is a summation of the points raised which I found very helpful:

“Athenian:  If a city treats the practice that has now been discussed as a serious matter, and uses it along with laws and order as a means to the practice of temperance, and, in accord with the same argument, will in the same way not avoid the other pleasures, but will contrive to have them for the sake of controlling them, then in this way it must make use of all these things.  But if it treats the practice [of drinking wine – my addition] as a sort of play, allowing anyone who wishes to drink whenever and with whoever he wishes, combining it with any other practices whatsoever, then mine is one vote that would not be cast for the use of strong drink at any time by this city or this man.  Indeed, I would go even beyond the Cretan and Spartan usage and cast it for the Carthaginian law requiring that no one ever taste this drink while on campaign, but for all this time drink water at their gatherings.  Even in the city, it requires that no slave, male or female, should ever taste it, nor any of the officials during their year in office; nor should ship captains or jurors taste any wine at all when on active duty, nor anyone who is about to give advice at an important council meeting, nor anyone at all during the day (except on account of bodily training or disease), nor even at night when anyone, a man or a woman, is intending to beget children.  And there are many other circumstances one could mention in which those who possess understanding and correct law think that one must not drink wine.  The result, according to this argument, is that no city would need many vineyards, and that while the other agricultural products and all dietary matters would be regulated, those having to do with wine would turn out to be pretty much the most properly measured and restricted to the smallest quantity.

“Let this, Strangers, if you agree, put the finishing touch to our argument about wine.

“Cleinias:  Good.  We agree.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2022, page 68, 673e-674c, ISBN: 9781647920463)

“Ath.  First, though, if it’s all right with you two, let’s put the capstone on our discussion of the use of drunkenness.

“Kl.  What capstone and what sort do you mean?

“Ath.  If a city will consider the practice that has now been discussed as something serious, and will make use of it, in conformity with laws and order, for the sake of moderation, and will not refrain from other pleasures but will arrange them with a view to mastering them according to the same argument, then all these things should be employed, in this manner.

“On the other hand, if this is treated as something playful, if anyone who wishes will be allowed to drink whenever he wishes, with whomever he wishes, along with all sorts of similar practices, I would not vote for the use of drunkenness at any time by this city or this man.  Indeed, I would go beyond Cretan and the Lacedaimonian usage, and advocate the Carthaginian law which forbids anyone to taste this drink while out on campaign and requires that only water be drunk for all that time.  I would add to that law, and forbid drinking within the city too, among female and male slaves, and among magistrates during the year in which they serve; pilots and judges would not be allowed to taste wine at all while they were performing their services, and the same would apply to anyone who was about to give advice in an important council meeting.  Moreover, no one would be allowed to drink at all during the day except for purposes of physical training or illness, nor at night would any man or woman who was intending to create children.  And someone might list many other circumstances in which those who possess intelligence and a correct law should not drink wine.

“So according to this argument no city would need many vines, and while the other farm products and the diet as a whole would be regulated, the wine production would be almost the most measured and modest of all.  Let this, strangers, if you agree, be our capstone to the argument about wine.

“Kl.  Beautifully spoken, and we agree.”

(Plato, The Laws of Plato, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1980, pages 56-57, 673e- 674c, ISBN: 0226671100)

1.  It is clear that drinking is to be severely circumscribed; for example a prohibition against drinking wine during the day, with a tiny number of exceptions, sets the general tone.  And there are all sorts of additional restrictions having to do with one’s job and station in life. 

This is similar to the laws that circumscribe the use of alcohol in the U.S. today.  Limits are placed on how much someone can drink and drive, for example.  And it is expected that people engaged in their duties at work will not have those duties compromised by the influence of alcohol.  Depending on the job, if it is discovered that someone has acted under the influence of alcohol this can lead to their dismissal.  In addition there are age restrictions regarding the sale and consumption of alcohol.

In other words, alcohol is seen both by Plato and by our contemporary society in the U.S. and many other countries, as potentially very harmful to society as a whole and this justifies placing the use of alcohol into a class of highly restricted usage; the violation of these legal restrictions is punishable by the law.

2.  I think it is worth noting that Plato is not referring to distilled alcohol such as whisky, bourbon, vodka, and so forth.  Distilled beverages appear on the scene much later and, in general, they have a higher percentage of alcohol and are more destructive to the body and mind.

3.  I find myself thinking of Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals which opens with Porphyry’s suggestion that the philosopher should refrain from eating animal flesh, or participating in animal sacrifices, because of the specific vocation of the philosopher.  The overall view is that eating animals, and sacrificing animals, coarsens the soul and is an obstacle to a life of contemplation.  Porphyry refers to abstinence from eating animals is an ‘ancestral law’ of philosophy and that this teaching is ‘ancient and dear to the gods.’

I think the same kind of analysis can be used to prohibit the drinking of alcohol for philosophers; I mean that the drinking of alcohol is a hindrance for the philosophical vocation; and just as a Doctor should not drink before engaged in surgery, so also a philosopher should not drink before being engaged in contemplation, or even simple study.

This is not a rare opinion.  Traditionally in Buddhism alcohol consumption is prohibited because such usage ‘clouds the mind and leads to heedlessness.’  Although this prohibition is widely disregarded today, nevertheless it is upheld by a number of Buddhist teachers.  Most often these teachers are monastics, but there are even lay teachers, such as Christopher Titmuss and Robert Aitken, who lived up to this basic precept.

And there are many other spiritual traditions that prohibit the use of alcohol for tradition specific reasons.

4.  Porphyry’s On Abstinence also, to my mind, helps to clarify why the Laws would grant limited use of wine among specific, age-restricted, groups on certain occasions.  If Laws is at least in part a general depiction of society, and not solely a guide for those with a philosophical vocation, then that fits in with Porphyry’s view that these kinds of restraints are for the philosopher in particular.  In other words, refraining from animal flesh and wine would both be regulations that a philosopher would live by as part of an overall commitment to philosophy.  

5.  Perhaps the Athenian is telling us his true feelings when he says that if the drinking of wine is unregulated he would cast a vote against any kind of wine drinking at all.  At any rate, it seems clear to me that the Athenian’s preference is to distance himself from wine as much as possible.

6.  Another aspect of this part of Laws may be focussing on dealing with those of different cultures who have different cultural habits.  Those who adopt the Platonic ascetic practices often run into difficulties with the culture around them because the ascetic practices run counter to cultural norms.  This is a complex problem, especially for practitioners who are not part of an institution that supports these ascetic practices, such as solitary practitioners.  In the case of wine and alcohol, there may be pressure to join with other workers at a bar after work, or to take ‘just a sip’ on some special gathering of friends and/or relatives.  This kind of clash is persistent for those who have even a slight ascetic inclination; for those who adopt a more dedicated ascetic practice outside of an institutional context it can be an almost daily negotiation.  I think Laws has the purpose of bringing that difficulty into the foreground without explicitly stating that purpose.

7.  It’s interesting to me that Plato remarks on the agricultural impact of wine production.  Plato notes that “no city would have many vineyards.”  Instead, that land would be used to grow food to nourish the general population, including the philosophers.

8.  “And there are many other circumstances one could mention in which those who possess understanding (nous – translator’s note) and correct law think that one must not drink wine.”  My intuition here is that the Athenian, speaking for Plato and the tradition he embodied, is suggesting that as one’s practice grows it becomes more and more apparent that the philosopher should refrain from wine.  This naturally arises from circumstances that demonstrate alcohol’s negative effects.  These are not unusual circumstances.  Rather they are ordinary occasions, such as parties and interactions with people under the influence of alcohol that bring to the foreground how damaging alcohol is both at the mundane and contemplative levels.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 31

17 June 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 31

1.  I watched a few videos on youtube recently about the ruins of Plato’s Academy.  I think some of them have been stimulated by the recent reading of a scroll from Herculaneum that tells us exactly where on the grounds of the Academy Plato was buried.

There is very little remaining.  Sulla’s destruction of the Academy, which was outside the walls of Athens and therefore vulnerable, was thorough.  And it doesn’t appear that the re-establishment of the Academy in later centuries was at the same place; at least no one suggested that.

One video maker spoke about how disappointed he was that there wasn’t more done in a public way to indicate what went on there since it was so significant for Western culture; he sounded a bit melancholy.

This started me thinking about how Platonism doesn’t seem to be interested in monumental architecture.  Many spiritual traditions such as Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Greek and Roman Paganism, and so forth, are.  But I’m not aware of Platonism putting its energies into building a Platonic equivalent of some of the massive temple complexes of Buddhism or the famous Cathedrals of Christianity.

I think this reflects the emphasis on contemplation as an interior journey rather than an exterior presentation.  With such an emphasis it is the Dialogues and Enneads which are the equivalents of the exterior monuments of other spiritual traditions.

The teaching locations for Platonism seem to be ephemeral; the Academy at Athens, the house where Plotinus taught, Hypatia’s garden, and so forth.  I think this reflects the Platonist understanding that the material realm, and all things in that realm, are inherently unstable and that the foundation of Platonism is not to be found there.

2.  I finished my reading of the Enneads for this year this morning.  It felt very satisfying.  The last Ennead, Ennead VI.9, feels like the last chord of a great symphony followed by an awesome silence.

3.  The continuity of the Platonic tradition is the continuity of eternity. 

4.  I have toyed with the idea of writing an ‘Answer to Iamblichus’.  The idea is to imagine how Porphyry might have responded to Iamblichus’s critique of Porphyry’s ‘Letter to Anebo.’  Porphyry didn’t pen such a response; I suspect that Porphyry felt that his ‘Letter to Anebo’ was clear enough and he didn’t feel a need to add anything.  A second reason, I feel, is that the tone of Iamblichus’s critique is very sharp, dismissive, and at times agitated.  That’s not a good ground for further discussion.

Vegetarianism was of great importance to Porphyry; he considered this practice as foundational for a philosophical life, as did the Platonic tradition as a whole.  But Iamblichus vehemently opposed this perspective on the grounds that some theurgic practices require blood sacrifices, meaning the sacrifice of animals, in order for the theurgic ritual to be effective.  It is this kind of focus that I would like to deal with in an imagined response to Iamblichus.

I don’t know if I will have the time to bring such a project to fruition, but it’s been fun thinking about it.

5.  Haiku

Summer days – The way

The sun sets behind the hill

Is like a blessing.

 

 

 Beyond Space and Place

15 June 2024

 “But what is this which did not come to existence?  We must go away in silence and enquire no longer, aware in our minds that there is no way out.  For why should one even enquire when one has nothing to go on to, since every enquiry goes to a principle and stands still in it?  And besides, one must consider that every enquiry is about either what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is or if it is.  Now being, in the sense in which we say that that is, [is known – translator’s addition] from what comes after it.  And the question ‘why?’ seeks another principle; but there is no principle of the universal principle.  And to enquire into what kind of thing it is is to enquire what attributes it has, which has no attributes.  And the question ‘what is it?’ rather makes clear that we must make no enquiry about it, grasping it, if possible, in our minds by learning that it is not right to add anything to it.  But in general we probably think of this difficulty, those of us who think about this nature at all, because we first assume a space and place, a kind of vast emptiness, and then, when the space is already there, we bring this nature into the place which come to be or is in our imagination, and bringing it into this kind of place we enquire in this way as if into whence and how it came here, and as if it was a stranger we have asked about its presence and, in a way, its substance, really just as if we thought that it had been thrown up from some depth or down from some height.  Therefore one must remove the cause of the difficulty by excluding from our concentrated gaze upon it all place, and not put it in any place either as resting and settled in it or as having come to it, but [think of it – translator’s addition] as being what it is (this said by the necessity of speech), but that place, like everything else, is afterwards, and last of all afterwards.  When therefore we think, as we do think, of this being out of place, and put nothing round it in a kind of circle, and are unable to encompass its extent, we shall not attribute extension to it; and certainly not quality either; for there could not be any shape about it, even intelligible; and not relation to something else; for it existed by itself before there was anything else.  What then could the ‘it happened to be like this’ still mean?  And how shall we be able to say this, because everything else about it is said negatively?  So that not ‘it happened to be like this’ but ‘not even like this did it happen to be’ is truer, where it is true that it did not happen to be at all.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.8.11, Free Will and the Will of the One, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, pages 261-265, ISBN: 9780674995154)

“But this Unoriginating, what is it?

“We can but withdraw, silent, hopeless, and search no further.  What can we look for when we have reached the furthest?  Every inquiry aims at a first and, that attained, rests.

“Besides, we must remember that all questioning deals with the nature of a thing, its quality, it cause or its essential being.  In this case the being – in so far as we can use the word – is knowable only by its sequents: the question as to cause asks for a principle beyond, but the principle of all has no principle; the question as to quality would be looking for an attribute in that which has none: the question as to nature shows only that we must ask nothing about it but merely take it into the mind if we may, with the knowledge gained that nothing can be permissibly connected with it.

“The difficulty this Principle presents to our mind in so far as we can approach to conception of it may be exhibited thus:

“We begin by posing space, a place, a Chaos; into this container, whether conceived in our imagination as created or pre-existent, we introduce God and proceed to inquire: we ask, for example, whence and how He comes to be there: we investigate the presence and quality of this new-comer projected into the midst of things here from some height or depth.  But the difficulty disappears if we eliminate all space before we attempt to conceive of God: He must not be set in anything either as enthroned in eternal immanence or as having made some entry into things: He is to be conceived as existing alone, in that existence which the necessity of discussion forces us to attribute to Him, with space and all the rest as later than Him – space latest of all.  Thus we conceive, as far as we may, the spaceless; we abolish the notion of any environment: we circumscribe Him within no limit; we attribute no extension to Him; He has no quality since no shape, even shape Intellectual; He holds no relationship but exists in and for Himself before anything is.

“How can we think any longer of that ‘Thus He happened to be’?  How make this one assertion of Him of whom all other assertion can be no more than negation?  It is on the contrary nearer the truth to say ‘Thus He has happened not to be’: that contains at least the utter denial of his happening.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.8.11, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, pages 686-687, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  In this passage Plotinus is approaching the One through the understanding of that which never came into existence, what MacKenna calls the ‘unoriginated.’  This is a way of approaching ultimacy that one can find in a number of spiritual teachers; I am reminded, for example, of passages in the Buddhist Suttas that read, ‘there is that which is uncaused, unconditioned, deathless, unborn, . . . ‘ 

I tend to use the term ‘the eternal’ in this kind of context because that which is eternal does not have an origin and will never enter into cessation; the eternal is beyond becoming and begoning.

2.  I sometimes refer to the experience that Plotinus points to in this passage as ‘spacious awareness.’  There are a number of traditions that teach a practice that either leads to spacious awareness or is rooted in spacious awareness.  In a way ‘spacious awareness’ has its own problems because when we use the word ‘awareness’ we think of it as meaning awareness of something.  And spacious awareness does not have an object of focus. 

Meditation practices are numerous.  But I tend to think of them as divided into two major types: concentration practices and spacious awareness.  Concentration practices cultivate attention and focused awareness.  A common example is focusing on the breath, but there are other numerous practices.  In Christianity concentrating on the life of Jesus is another example.  But spacious awareness has no object of concentration so that the awareness of spacious awareness is not focused.  In a Platonist context it is the experience of the One which, as this passage points out, has no quality or quantity or distinguishing features.  It is before distinguishing features arise.

3.  In the ascent to the One we put aside mind (small ‘m’ mind), meaning all categorization and analysis.  As Plotinus says in another Ennead, “Take away everything.”  In this Ennead Plotinus says we must go away in silence and inquire no longer.  This silence is an internal silence; it is the practice of interior silence.  The practice of interior silence is the same as the practice of exterior silence.  Practicing exterior silence means not being distracted when sounds appear in space.  Practicing interior silence means not being distracted when thoughts, feelings, emotions, and other mental things appear in interior space.  That is why Plotinus speaks about removing all sense of place because place as such is something that arises after the One.  To return to the One we must transcend place as such, including the place that is Noetic.

4.  “. . . it is not right to add anything to it.  But in general we probably think of this difficulty, those of us who think about this nature at all, because we first assume a space and place . . . “  That is to say our tendency, or habit of mind, is to construe the One as a location, or more accurately, as inhabiting a location.  But the One is experienced by transcending place and space (and also time).

5.  “Therefore one must remove the cause of the difficulty by excluding from our concentrated gaze upon it all place . . . “ (Armstrong)  “But the difficulty disappears if we eliminate all space before we attempt to conceive of God.” (MacKenna) 

How do we do this?  We can do this because we have been practicing smaller, more ordinary, versions of this practice from the beginning of our engagement with the Platonic Path.  When we cultivate virtues and put aside things like deceit we are starting to cultivate a mind that puts things aside.  When we practice the Platonic asceses, as outlined in places like Phaedo, we cultivate a mind that overcomes attractions to different kinds of desires, leaving them behind.  When we practice dietary restrictions leading to vegetarian or vegan lifestyle, we learn to overcome the attractions of stimulating food, and so forth.

It seems that Plotinus is asking a lot of us in passages like this; and in a sense he is.  But because Platonism is a gradual path, the skill that allows for leaving behind place and space as such, has already been honed over years, and probably lifetimes, of practice.  Because of this, when we have reached a certain point where the light of the One is shining forth, we can take the step that leads to becoming that light itself.

6.  The closing sentences tie this paragraph back to earlier paragraphs in the Ennead where Plotinus frames the discussion of free will as the question about whether things ‘happen to be this way’ or ‘happen to be like this’ but could have been otherwise.  Plotinus is saying that the One is not like things that have a causal basis, the One does not become or emerge into existence.  The One is eternity as such; not the eternity of Noetic realities which is a derived eternity that comes from Noetic realities being metaphysically close to the One.  But the One is eternity as such; as I like to say it is beyond becoming and begoning.

7.  It is passages like this that confirm the understanding of Plotinus as a mystic. 

8.  “ . . . every inquiry is about either what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is, or if it is.”  This in itself is an interesting analysis regarding the nature of inquiry and, more broadly, the range of epistemology.  It is used to distinguish the process of inquiry with the process of contemplation that leads to the One.  Inquiry is focused on things; contemplation is for the purpose of transcending things.  Inquiry is focused; contemplation is spacious awareness.  Inquiry is of the world; contemplation transcends the world through experiencing the Good, the One, the Beautiful, that which is Eternal.

9.  Here is the translation by Guthrie:

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRANSCEND THE FIRST

“What then is the Principle which one cannot even say that it is (hypostatically) existent?  This point will have to be conceded without discussion, however, for we cannot prosecute this inquiry.  What indeed would we be seeking, when it is impossible to go beyond, every inquiry leading to some one principle, and ceasing there?  Besides, all questions refer to one of four things: existence, quality, cause, and essence.  From the beings that follow Him, we conclude to the essence of the First, in that sense in which we say He exists.  Seeking the cause of His existence, however, would amount to seeking an (ulterior) principle, and the Principle of all things cannot Himself have a principle.  An effort to determine His quality would amount to seeking what accident inheres in Him in whom is nothing contingent; and there is still more clearly no possible inquiry as to His existence, as we have to grasp it the best we know how, striving not to attribute anything to Him.

THE ORIGIN OF GOD PUZZLES US ONLY BECAUSE WE HABITUALLY START FROM SOME PRE-EXISTENT CHAOS.

“(Habitually) we are led to ask these questions about the nature (of the divinity) chiefly because we conceive of space and location as a chaos, into which space and location, that is either presented to us by your imagination, or that really exists, we later introduce the first Principle.  This introduction amounts to a question whence and how He came.  We then treat Him as a stranger, and we wonder why He is present there, and what is His being; we usually assume He came up out of an abyss, or that He fell from above.  In order to evade these questions, therefore, we shall have to remove from our conception (of the divinity) all notion of locality, and not posit Him within anything, neither conceiving of Him as eternally resting, and founded within Himself, nor as if come from somewhere.  We shall have to content ourselves with thinking that He exists in the sense in which reasoning forces us to admit His existence, or with persuading ourselves that location, like everything else, is posterior to the Divinity, and that it is even posterior to all things.  Thus conceiving (of the Divinity) as outside of all place, so far as we can conceive of Him, we are not surrounding Him as it were within a circle, nor are we undertaking to measure His greatness, nor are we attributing to Him either quantity or quality; for He has no shape, not even an intelligible one; He is not relative to anything, since His hypostatic form of existence is contained within Himself, and before all else.

THE SUPREME, BEING WHAT HE IS, IS NOT PRODUCED BY CHANCE

“Since (the Divinity) is such, we certainly could not say that He is what He is by chance.  Such an assertion about Him is impossible, inasmuch as we can speak of Him only by negations.  We shall therefore have to say, not that He is what He is by chance; but that, being what He is, He is not that by chance, since there is within Him absolutely nothing contingent.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.8, Of the Will of the One, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, Kshetra Books, www (dot) kshetrabooks (dot) com, 2017 reprint of the 1918 edition, pages 414-415, ISBN: 97819745189668)

10.  I think this passage contains aspects that are explanatory in the context of the Ennead as a whole, but it also contains guidance for those of us on the Platonic path today.  In other words, it is not simply theoretical, but also contains information as to how to arrive at the same ‘experience’ that gave rise to Plotinus’s understanding.  In this way we can meet Plotinus where he dwells with the Good and the One.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 30

12. June 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 30

1.  I recently registered at academia (dot) edu.  In the signup you get to select your interests and I naturally selected Platonism.  Since then I have received a huge number of links to papers published on the site.  I’m not complaining, but I am acutely aware that I don’t have the time to read even a fraction of what is being published.  This is a common complaint among academics, I know, but because of my recently registering at the site I have become strongly aware of it.  How does someone sift through all of this material?

Personally, I only click on links to papers that indicate they are focused on something I have been interested in for some time.  It is very easy to get distracted by new things and in a way a flood of academic papers can feel like the flood of new entertainment offered online from youtube to tv series at various sites.  You have to become kind of ruthless about what you are going to spend time on or else whole days will vanish as you go from paper to paper.

Old age helps me in this context.  I don’t have a lot of years left.  I want to spend my time as wisely as I can and this helps me be more rigorous in my selections.

Also, in my later years, I tend to want to reread certain things, preferring to do that rather than read something new.  I prefer deepening my knowledge of some work through rereading than taking on an entirely new reading project.  The concrete result is the regular rereading of Plato and Plotinus.

2.  The process of emanation is from the unified to the differentiated.  I think understanding this is the key to comprehending how the cosmos exhibits the reality of the three levels, or hypostases, of existence.

3.  The more something is differentiated the farther it is from the One, the fully unified.  The number 7 is not as differentiated as 7 apples; for this reason, the number 7 is metaphysically closer to Unity, the One, than 7 apples.

It isn’t always easy, given two examples, to know which is more differentiated than the other, but the principle is helpful.  In general, the more content something has, in comparison to something else, the more differentiated it is.  The number 7 has no content but 7 apples does.

4.  I recently posted about how expensive some Platonist books are.  Here is an update: I came across a new book on Platonism that is over $300.  It is about 600 pages; a large book, for sure, but many are larger.  The hardback of Gerson et al’s translation of Plotinus is about $150.00 and is about 1,000 pages; the paper back is about $50.00.

I bring this topic up not solely out of personal frustration, though that is an element.  Although overpriced academic books are a problem in all fields, I think they are particularly problematic in the context of Platonism.  I am referring to the practice of Platonist teachers to not charge for their teachings, which goes back to Socrates.  This act of not charging contrasted with the Sophists and was a serious issue contrasting the two approaches. 

I should point out that there are Platonists who charge very little, as little as possible, for their books; two I can think of right now are Eric Fallick and his insightful volume Platonist Contemplative Asceticism and Edward P. Butler whose books are very reasonably priced.  I’m confident there are others as well.

5.  I like to complain about modernity; perhaps readers have noticed.  But here I am, undoubtedly for karmic reasons.  Perhaps it is possible to see advantages in modernity.  I mean perhaps modernity offers advantages that other times did not. 

One thing I can think of is the widespread availability of the Platonic classics.  I think it is likely that at this time they are more widely available than at any other time in history.  This is a wonderful thing and I have personally benefitted from it.

Another is that I was born at a time, and grew up in a location, where I did not have to be constantly concerned about things like where my next meal is coming from.  I can make this observation because I am an old man.  I am aware that this situation is slipping away; such abundance is very rare in history.  My good fortune on this issue was auspicious and I feel humbled about it, and more than a little undeserving. 

A third benefit of modernity is that at this time old forms of institutions are passing away more or less rapidly.  I observed this early on and came to a realization I could not rely on general institutions that are commonly thought of as stable.  This also applies to religious and spiritual organizations.  During my lifetime I saw many such organizations self-sabotage due to internal frictions of various kinds.  Eventually, with great reluctance, I realized that I would somehow have to find the internal resources that would support my spiritual journey within me.  I could not rely on an institution to create some kind of supporting scaffolding because in modernity these supports are routinely taken away.

A fourth benefit is that modernity has shown me in painful detail what happens when desire and differentiation are dominant in a culture.  This is an important lesson to learn and learning it, I feel, is requisite for a good rebirth.

I’m sure that modernity offers spiritual practitioners other benefits as well, but I think I’ll close here.