Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 77

15 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 77

1.  Alcinous Defines Philosophy

In this post I’m returning to the definition of Platonic Philosophy as given by Alcinous in Alicnous’s Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon.  I posted this quote before; but here I want to focus solely on the definition.  In the previous post I quoted the whole section in which the definition appears.  Here I am using a narrower focus.

“Philosophy is a striving for wisdom, or the freeing and turning around of the soul from the body, when we turn towards the intelligible and what truly is, and wisdom is the science of things divine and human.”  (Page 3)

I think it is worth noting that Alcinous strongly links Philosophy to wisdom.  This is not surprising as the name of the tradition, Philosophy, means love of wisdom.  I think this definition of Alcinous would not have been controversial, or contested, by the tradition or by anyone affiliated with Platonism for the first 800+ years.  For all that time wisdom stood at the center of the tradition.

I think we need to recover that understanding.  I say this because I think the foundational nature of wisdom has become obscured by a number of sources who place other things at the center that they consider to be more significant.  This kind of replacement makes it difficult to access Platonism on its own terms.

Alcinous goes on to unpack wisdom.  First Alcinous states that wisdom is the ‘freeing and turning around of the soul from the body.’  This is done by distinguishing what is of the body and what is of the soul.  Wisdom is making those distinctions and then acting upon them in one’s life.

This turning has two aspects; the first is turning to the intelligible, what I would call the noetic, and the second is turning to what truly is, what Platonism calls the Good and the One.  What the intelligible and the Good have in common is that they are eternal.  The Good is eternal by its nature, eternal as such, or eternity qua eternity.  The intelligible, or noetic realities, what Whitehead called ‘eternal objects’, are eternal due to their metaphysical closeness to the Good and the One.  I would sum up this turning by saying that Wisdom means to be turning to, or towards, eternity.

The primary distinction of Wisdom, then, is to distinguish what is eternal from what is ephemeral.  What is eternal is the divine.  What is ephemeral is human, or of this world.

2.  Three Levels of Meaning in the Dialogues of Plato

In the Dialogues of Plato the reader is engaging with writing that functions at three primary levels.  These levels are rooted in the three levels, or hypostases, of Platonic metaphysics.  The first level in a Dialogue is the Good and the One.  Sometimes this is brought up explicitly but more often it is pointed to and suggested.  An example of bringing it up explicitly is when Plato refers to the Good in The Republic.  An example of pointing to the Good and the One is found in the opening of Plato’s Dialogue The Laws; I am thinking of the first word of the Dialogue is ‘God’ which is a word for the One in a Platonic context.  This can be more indirect as when Plato writes about recollection and points indirectly to higher realities through this discussion.

The second level is noetic; one might call it archetypal.  The noetic level is where eternal truths are found such as numbers.  When Plato talks about numbers Plato is referring to this second level.  Plato will sometimes personify this level using names of various deities as symbols for eternal noetic realities; this is a kind of indirect pointing.

The third level is the level of cyclic existence.  When Plato refers to human life and its many facets Plato is pointing to the realm of cyclic existence which is present in the human body.  These teachings mostly appear as what I call ‘instruction’, that is to say that Plato is referring to what human beings must do, as embodied beings, to walk a spiritual path in their lives.  In some ways instruction is easy to overlook.  This is because we are often focused on the characters and the plot of a Dialogue and the storyline is what attracts us.  But after some familiarity with the Dialogues we begin to notice that Plato offers us instruction on how to become a Philosopher which means adopting practices conducive to, and defining of, the Philosophical tradition.  You can spot these instructions because they are almost always askeses, meaning they are almost always in the form of ascetic practices that the Philosopher adopts.  This level of instruction is very fruitful and once a reader perceives this level he finds a wealth of such instruction in the Dialogues.

These three levels of meaning are not usually presented in a sequence, but I suspect that they are to be found in all of Plato’s dialogues.

3.  When Friends Give Advice

A friend of mine recently said to me that I should give up philosophy.  He asked me if I knew that he felt that way.  I responded that I have known that for years and that it doesn’t bother me that my friend feels that way.

This is not the first time someone has made this suggestion.  I suspect that this kind of suggestion is made to anyone who has a commitment to a spiritual life of any kind.  I have observed this happening to other people.

Plato talks about this in several dialogues where Plato points out that people will think of Philosophers as inept and kind of buffoonish.  Some devout Catholics have written how casual Catholics often find their devotion to the tradition kind of embarrassing, indicating that what Plato wrote about is not exclusively a problem for practitioners of Philosophy.

It's not a big deal once you realize that people have different destinies. 

4.  A First Glance at the Chaldean Oracles

4.1 I have noticed that the Chaldean Oracles make an appearance in a lot of Platonist writings that were written after Plotinus.  I thought it might be a good idea to find out about the Oracles so I decided to read the translation by Ruth Majercik. 

The Chaldean Oracles were composed during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, 161 – 180 C.E.  The authors are Julian the Theurgist and his father Julian the Chaldean.  How, exactly, it was written is speculative but it may have been written, or received, in a trance state while Julian the Theurgist was practicing theurgy. 

The Chaldean Oracles are currently in a fragmentary state; the complete text has been lost but there are a significant number of quotes found in various sources.  Majercik catalogs these quotes, dividing them into two types; quotes that are regarded as securely part of the Chaldean Oracles, and dubious quotes.

The Chaldean Oracles remind me of Gnostic writing in general.  They are visionary and dogmatic; by dogmatic I mean that the Chaldean Oracles state their view as a revelation rather than as a discovery that others can share.  If you compare the Timaeus with the Chaldean Oracles I think you will understand what I am referring to.

Plato writes myths and allegories, but the tone of oracular writing is, I think, different.  In Plato’s devices the reader is being invited to unpack what is written; in contrast, in oracular writing the reader is being told to accept them as they are, even when they are very opaque and mysterious. 

To the extent that the Chaldean Oracles had an influence on Iamblichus and Proclus, I think it may have influenced them to lean toward a stance of talking down to the reader who, presumably, needs to follow their instruction.  Compare, for example, the tone of The Mysteries by Iamblichus to the tone Plato uses when he has Socrates offer instruction in philosophy; to be honest they feel like two different worlds.  Plato uses dialectic, oracular writing uses dogmatics.  I suspect the Chaldean Oracles also influenced the two of them to write in a very complex and opaque style which seems to be well-suited to oracular literature.

This is just a first impression; I have often changed my mind about spiritual works after rereading them. 

4.2  Both Iamblichus and Proclus wrote commentaries on the Chaldean Oracles; both of these are now lost.  The work is focused on theurgy and one can regard the Chaldean Oracles as the source, or a significant source, of what would become Platonic theurgy.  At times I have considered referring to Post-Porphyrian Platonism as “Chaldean Platonism” meaning Platonism that is shaped in significant ways by the Chaldean Oracles; I modeled the name after “Christian Platonism”.  The Chaldean Oracles view theurgy as the necessary practice and means for spiritual ascent, just as Iamblichus did and it may be that Iamblichus either got this idea from the Chaldean Oracles or the Oracles supported the view of Iamblichus in significant ways.  I think it is noteworthy that a primary source for theurgy in Platonism was a non-Platonist text.  Both the Chaldean Oracles and Iamblichus through Proclus view wisdom as insufficient for spiritual ascent which represents a major shift in understanding from the Platonic heritage.

4.3  I referred to the Chaldean Oracles as a non-Platonist text in 4.2 above.  But I think it is noteworthy that in contemporary discussions about Post-Porphyrian Platonism some authors will refer to the Chaldean Oracles as a ‘Neoplatonic’ work, or ‘Neoplatonic’ text.  The reason for this is that it was the Post-Porphyrian Platonists, such as Iamblichus and Proclus, who seem to have been most fascinated by this work, for this reason the association has become an historical one.  I don’t think that the Julians who wrote the Oracles had this specifically in mind, but that is what happened.  I use the term ‘non-Platonist’ for the Chaldean Oracles because the work displaces central understandings of the Platonic tradition such as the transformative nature of wisdom as well as wisdom’s soteriological function and after rejecting the sufficiency of wisdom creates a supersession based structure that places ritual above wisdom.

4.4  In some ways I find the interest in these kinds of works in Post-Porphyrian Platonism to be a bit embarrassing.  At another level, I think the Chaldean Oracles were what I might refer to as a ‘fad’ or a passing fancy.  I’m reminded of certain channeled works that were very popular for a few years and have now vanished; in particular, I am thinking of those channeled works that were produced in the 1960’s and 70’s.  The Chaldean Oracles have that kind of feeling for me.

5.  Wisdom

I’ve been thinking a lot about wisdom and wisdom traditions.  This has happened, I think, because of the growing realization of how wisdom was ejected from Platonism by the Post-Porphyrian Platonists.  Here are a few thoughts about wisdom:

5.1  Wisdom is a kind of knowing.  Wisdom can be divided into two broad types.  The first is practical wisdom and the second is transcendent wisdom which, in a Platonic context, refers to Philosophical Wisdom.  Platonist literature talks about this basic division in episodes where someone possesses skill in a practical field of learning.  An example would be someone who is a skilled physician, or a skilled in music, or in steering a ship, and so forth.  Someone who is skilled in steering a ship is wise in the ways of the sea.  Someone who is a skilled physician is wise in the ways of the human body.

Transcendent wisdom is also a kind of knowing, but it is knowing about that which applies to all existing things; that is to say it is metaphysical wisdom.  For example, insight into impermanence is a kind of wisdom because it applies to all material things.

5.2  Wisdom is knowing the truth, which is often hidden, about material things, but it is also knowing the truth about non-material realities.  Wisdom does not stop at the material metaphysics; that is just a first step on the path of wisdom.

5.3  Wisdom is a turning toward that which is non-material and therefore that which is eternal.  Wisdom does this by making distinctions and following up on those distinctions.  The basic distinction is to separate that which is ephemeral from that which is eternal. 

5.4  Wisdom is a function of mind; I don’t consider it to be a function of soul.  I say this because it is mind, due to its connection to the noetic, that makes distinctions.  The soul is the silent presence of eternity which the path of Wisdom leads us to.

5.5  Transcendent Wisdom refers to knowledge about the eternal; how to recognize it, how to approach it, how to dwell There.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 76

8 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 76

1.  Embracing the Past

To be a Platonist means admiring the past; or at least admiring one thing from the past.  It means basing the activities of your life on artefacts from the past in the form of written works such as Plato’s Dialogues. 

This is obvious, but I think it is worth considering how this Platonist relationship with the past runs counter to the spirit of our time which considers the modern world to be the result of overcoming the past.  This is a feature of modernity that is pervasive.

I’m not sure if this difference in attitude towards the past results in intense friction; I tend to think that it results in a kind of low-level but constant disconnect with central features of modernity. 

2.  Cruelty

Human beings are immensely and consistently cruel to each other; I am not thinking of cruelty at this moment in a subtle way.  I mean cruelty in very gross and obvious ways.  Some of this cruelty is widely supported as in the enthusiastic response to war by most people. 

It is also true that human beings are immensely and consistently cruel to other creatures, to animals of various kinds.  There is a lot of confusion about this because there are certain animals, such as pets, for whom we are inclined to act towards with great affection and caring and at the same time other animals that are just as intelligent are treated very poorly by human beings.  There are even laws against cruelty towards certain animals while other animals are, as the saying goes, fair game.

Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation run counter to this habit of cruelty.  In a world, and amongst the human species, where cruelty is approved of, even in very horrific forms, it is difficult to put non-harming into practice.  And being committed to these teachings, and their attendant practices, will separate such practitioners from widespread societal habits and norms.

But it is worthwhile to enter into the way of non-harming; for those who want to walk the spiritual path of Platonism, it is essential.  Commitment to the way of non-harming calms the mind and body, and this calmness is a precondition for turning to the soul, turning to eternity.

3.  Those Who Oppose Transcendence

I’ve been aware for quite a few years that there are those who oppose transcendence.  One such group are materialists; they are widespread but my remarks here will not be about them.  I’m more interested in the group(s) that oppose transcendence for what they regard as spiritual reasons.

From my perspective, I am thinking about groups, or views, that regard something prior to transcendence as ultimate and that therefore transcendence is to be avoided.  Most often the anti-transcendence views come to rest on some kind of unusual sensory experience as the ultimate.  Others, though, regard ritual, often precisely and repetitious done, as the key to attain that which is ultimate.

For example, one of the reasons those who opposed the Quietists in the 17^th century was that the interior silence advocated by the Quietists undermined the status of certain key Catholic rituals, including the Eucharist.  This was the ground for regarding Quietism as a heresy.

Another example of the view of ritual that is similar to that which opposed the Quietists is found in theurgy which ejected Wisdom because contemplative Wisdom leads to ineffable transcendence.  In contrast, theurgy is focused on sensory deities, Gods and Goddesses, who have all the characteristics of third things.

Another example is the way Jungian psychology interprets the realm of images in the form of archetypes as the ultimate achievement of human consciousness; that is to say that becoming aware of archetypes and their functions surpasses something like Wisdom that leads to the experience of that which is beyond all images and from which all images emerge.

There are also individuals who talked about an ultimate reality beyond image, beyond affirmation and negation, who had difficulties with authorities who regarded this approach as suspect.  I am thinking of Meister Eckhart as one famous example.

I suspect that there are various reasons for wanting to halt the spiritual journey before stepping into the ineffable.  But one reason for some, I think, is fear.  In a way, an early experience of the transcendent that precedes image can feel like falling off a cliff.  This can be very uncomfortable.  Plato addresses this in the allegory of the cave in terms of feeling blinded by the light upon emerging from the darkness of the cave; it takes time to accustom oneself to this light and one possible reaction is to reject the experience altogether as nothing more than an uncomfortable sensation.  If you have a good spiritual teacher, a good and experienced guide, a practitioner can stick with it and get past those early moments of fear and discomfort.  The Dialogues of Plato are such a spiritual guide.

4.  Phaedo

I tend to think of Phaedo as Plato’s most significant, most important, dialogue.  This means that I take the teachings put forth in Phaedo as definitive and interpret other teachings in accordance with Phaedo’s teachings and perspectives.

I think this accounts for some differences I have with other contemporary Platonists.  I have observed, for example, that Parmenides is sometimes thought of as being the most significant, or highest, teaching that Plato offers us.  I can understand that; there is a great amount of wisdom in Parmenides.  But I tend to read Parmenides as expanding on teachings presented in Phaedo such as how predication works and the implications of living a life based on the experience of transcendence.

What I find in Phaedo that leads me to place Phaedo in the center of the Platonic Canon, so to speak, is that Phaedo offers the reader specific instruction on how to live a philosophical life.  This happens specifically in the famous passage where Socrates lists various activities that a philosopher will refrain from participating in such as being concerned about beautiful clothing and jewelry, or involvement in sexual pursuits and pleasures.  What I have found is that most readers don’t look at these kinds of passages as instruction; I can understand this because for many years I had the same response.  I mean that I didn’t read this passage as Socrates giving me, the reader, instruction in how to live a Philosophical life.  Instead I read it as Socrates, and/or Plato, giving their opinion, or reporting on their own lives.  These passages of ascetic instruction are embedded in a moving narrative and perhaps the presence of the narrative hides the teaching function of these ascetic passages.  I mean that by becoming wrapped up in, and attentive to, the unfolding story of the last hours of the life of Socrates, and his interactions with various people, we may react to Phaedo on a strictly literary level, concluding that Phaedo is a very well written story.  The shift to understanding Phaedo as a kind of guidebook for living a Philosophical life happens, I think, by repeatedly reading Phaedo.  What I mean here is that by rereading Phaedo we can approach the dialogue with the story of the last hours of Socrates already a known feature and so the story drops a little bit into the background and the teachings of Phaedo move into the foreground.  I don’t mean that the story found in Phaedo disappears; I mean that the presentations of guidance for a philosophical life are finally noticed as actually having that function.  When that happens it is very satisfying and one realizes that all of Plato’s dialogues are written in multiple layers, and one of those layers is the layer of instruction.

5.  Middle Platonism

I have a fondness for what scholars today refer to as Middle Platonism.  Middle Platonism covers a significant period of time.  The Academy founded by Plato went through a period of extreme skepticism but following a kind of restoration, a kind of return to what Plato actually wrote we enter into this period of Middle Platonism.  Generally speaking this period lasts into the second or third centuries of our era. 

These periods of Platonism are a tool that contemporary philosophers and historians use to designate periods in the long history of Platonism.  Middle Platonists didn’t think of themselves as Middle Platonists, of course.  But the term is a convenient way to designate a certain time period in the history of Platonism.

Specific Platonists from the Middle period that I am fond of are Maximus of Tyre, Alcinous, and Plutarch.  Plutarch is the most complex because Plutarch had many interests beside philosophy including history and literature.  He spent a great deal of time on these other interests and the majority of his writing is about historical or literary topics.  This doesn’t bother me because I am also interested in literature and I enjoy reading ancient views on this topic.  But Plutarch does discuss Platonism fairly frequently and he was clearly well versed in Platonism.  As I have mentioned in a number of posts, Plutarch wrote three essays on refraining from harming animals and vegetarianism which documents the existence of vegetarianism in the Middle period of Platonism.  But Plutarch discusses other Platonist topics as well such as the nature of forms and Platonist ethics in general.

In contrast to Plutarch’s wide ranging interests, Maximus’s writings are narrowly focused on Philosophy, specifically Platonism.  Often when he writes about a topic in Philosophy he will directly quote, or paraphrase, a dialogue; so Maximus is rooted in study of the dialogues.  I particularly appreciate that Maximus wrote about the practice of contemplation in a Platonic context in one of his most beautiful Orations.

As far as I know there is only one work on Platonism by Alcinous, the Handbook of Platonism.  Some scholars suggest that the handbook was written for those who were teaching Platonism.  Others think it had a wider circulation.  Of these three writers Alcinous is the most systematic which is in line with the purpose of a Handbook.  Alcinous writes with clarity as he covers various topics in Platonism and because of this we have a good idea of how Middle Platonists understood their own tradition.

One Middle Platonist I have not read, but hope to get to in 2026, is Apuleius.  I have wanted to read the philosophical works of Apuleius for a long time and I’m hoping I will be able to read what he has to say soon.  Apuleius is most famous for his work The Golden Ass which is a very early example of a novel, according to scholars.  But I am more interested, again, in his philosophical works.

One thing I have observed about Middle Platonists is that as a group they seem to have an interest in literature; their works demonstrate literary skill and that they have spent a lot of time reading and studying literature.  I think this is in keeping with the Platonist tradition as a whole because Plato was a very skillful writer so it is only natural that those interested in literature would find Plato’s works attractive.

I have to confess that I prefer these Middle Platonists to the Platonists who wrote in the Late Classical period.  For my purposes I think of these writers as ‘Post-Porphyry’ and beginning with Iamblichus.  There are a number of contrasts, I think, between these two groups (Middle Platonists vs. Post-Porphyry Platonists).  The first is that the writing about Platonism found in Middle Platonism is direct and far more accessible than that of Post-Porphyry authors.  Middle Platonists seem to think of their task as to transmit what Plato wrote, what Plato’s views were, instead of elaborating on Platonism based on their own eccentricities.  Middle Platonists refrain from complicating the Platonic system and presentation which became an obsession with Post-Porphyry Platonists.

The other aspect of Middle Platonist writing that I appreciate is that they seem to me to have a strong interest in ethics and virtue.  This is likely controversial, but it seems to me that this focus on ethics and virtue declines in Post-Porphyry Platonism as elaborate cosmology assumes center stage.  I’m not saying it is completely absent from Post-Porphyry Platonism but it seems to me the unnecessary complexity of the cosmology which they present takes a lot of energy away from other aspects of Platonism such as ethics and virtue.

For these reasons, if I were teaching a group of students an ongoing course in Platonism my recommendation for further reading beyond the Dialogues and the Enneads would be the writings left to us from the Middle Platonists rather than the writings of the Post-Porphyry Platonists.  I think the Middle Platonists are more grounded in actual Platonism (what I sometimes call Orthodox Platonism), less prone to elaborately complex and difficult to understand mental speculations, and write in a manner that is helpful to the daily practice of Platonism.  Contemporary Platonists are very fortunate to have the resources left to us by these Middle Platonists.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 75

1 December 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 75

1.  This marks the 75^th post in the ‘Brief Notes’ series.  I feel a bit celebratory about it.  When I started this blog most of what I posted were longer posts about specific topics, unpacking my understanding of the Platonist tradition.  Gradually the ‘Brief Notes’ format took over; I think that is because I find it a congenial way of expressing myself.  As I have mentioned before, this blog is more like a diary with a focus on Platonism than it is a technical treatise or analysis.  I find myself satisfied with this approach; I think it is more ‘conversational’ in tone and more open to new discoveries as I pursue the Path of Platonism.

2.  The Council of Florence

From 1438 to 1445 a Council was held in Florence, Italy.  The purpose of the Council was to heal the rift between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.  The Council actually started the year before in Ferrara but was moved to Florence for, I have read, financial reasons.

David Horan, who released his translation of the Dialogues of Plato in 2024 or 2025, gave a talk in which he reviewed the Council and the significant role the Council played in bringing back to Europe the Platonic Corpus.  The works of Plato were brought to Florence by an Orthodox Christian known as Gemistos Plethon.  Plethon was a very controversial Philosopher and theologian who held many Pagan views (as he understood Paganism).  He was Greek and I think he was able to thread his way through opposition to his controversies by appealing to a kind of Hellenism that was rooted in Greek thought and culture.  I’m not sure how, but Plethon was invited to the Council and Plethon showed up with a copy of the Dialogues.  According to Horan, Plethon gave a stunning and impassioned talk about Plato which appears to have had a big impact on his audience.  One person in his audience was Cosimo de Medici.  (I have read alternative versions of this history who have the view that Medici was not in actual attendance but in some manner learned of the talk given by Plethon.)  One of the results of these events is that the copy of the Dialogues that Plethon brought with him to the Council was left in Florence when the Council ended.  Cosimo de Medici used this copy as the basis for setting up a kind of Platonic Academy that would be the home of Ficino who would translate the Dialogues into Latin and from there would spread throughout Europe.

Horan pointed out that the goal of the Council of Florence was not met; the Orthodox and Catholic Christian Churches did not overcome their differences and other, less significant issues, were not resolved either.  Although a document was produced by those present who were Orthodox and those who were Catholic which could have formed a basis for reconciliation, it was never taken to heart by those in power on either side and for that reason had no effect.

Horan pointed out that the spread of Platonism into Europe was not on the Council’s agenda.  Nevertheless, that was the significant result.  This means that the stated human aim of the Council was not brought to fruition, but a completely unstated purpose was brought to fruition; that of bringing the Dialogues of Plato back to Western Europe.

Horan does not quite say explicitly that there was a divine hand working at the Council, but what I took away from Horan’s lecture, particularly the part focusing on the Council, is that this is a good example of Providence at work.  It is my view that the Dialogues of Plato are intimately connected with the fully transcendental, with eternity and for this reason it does not surprise me that episodes like the one Horan spoke of happen, now and then, in the history of Platonism.

3.  Translations

There is an often-quoted Italian proverb that goes “traduttore, traditore.”  It means something like “translator, traitor,” indicating that all translations in some way betray the work they are translating.

I have gradually come to a different perspective on this issue.  I see translations as commentaries on the original rather than betrayals of the original. 

4.  Historical Drift

I was reading a book about Julian the Apostate that stated that Julian was not familiar with Plotinus.  I did some online research to see if this was an accurate assessment and what I found is that Julian is not known to have quoted Plotinus, nor does he seem to be aware of distinguishing features of Plotinus as a Platonist.  This means that when Julian refers to himself as a Platonist Julian is making this assertion based on his reading of the works of Iamblichus and, in addition, the Chaldean Oracles (which appear to have occupied a significant place in Julian’s understanding), and other theurgical sources.  This has helped me to understand why Julian places such a strong emphasis on theurgy and why he engaged in animal sacrifices with such gruesome enthusiasm.  It does not appear that Julian had any countervailing sources at hand.

I think this is a good example of how history unfolds in such a way as to alter intellectual and spiritual traditions.  Though there is an historical connection between Orthodox Platonism and Theurgic Platonism, this is a causal connection, not an intellectual connection because the intellectual connection has been severed.  When I say there is a causal connection I mean that we can map out the significant Platonists and their writings and we can understand how there is this kind of causal connection up to Julian.  But by the time Platonism reaches Julian it is a deformed Platonism that was available.

Think of it this way; think of something like a Rose Society.  It starts out with a focus on roses and its members and significant leaders all share that focus.  Over time, though, some members shift the focus of the group to other plants; first to other flowers, then to other types of plants like trees, and so forth.  After a long time passes, someone who connects with this society may have no idea that the original purpose of the group was to further the cultivation of, and our knowledge of, roses and spend all their time studying and cultivating birch trees thinking that this is completely in sync with the rose society that they know.  There is a causal connection between the original rose society and the transformed rose society that focuses on birch trees, but the intellectual (and I’m using intellectual in broad terms, not just in the sense of isolated ideas) link has been broken.  This break doesn’t happen dramatically; in some cases it may be barely noticeable at first.  But over time the transformation is complete.

5.  Regarding the Soul

I’ve become more aware that my thinking about the soul in some ways diverges from what I find in traditional Platonic literature.  I view the soul as the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  And I see this eternity as the presence of the Good and the One in the ephemeral individual.  I see it this way because I regard the Good and the One as eternity as such; in contrast noetic realities are eternal through their closeness, metaphysically, to the Good and the One.

Because of this perspective on the soul, I don’t think of the soul as divisible into parts; in contrast the idea of a tripartite soul is spoken of in traditional Platonism.  I understand the soul as unchanging and also as unmoved by the seductions of sensory existence.

I transfer the divisions of the soul to mind (usually referred to as ‘intellect’).  I think of mind as the presence of the noetic in the ephemeral individual because mind is the capacity for differentiation and it is in the noetic that differentiation first happens (metaphysically ‘happens’).  It is mind that is divided into various functions, pulled in various directions, and this happens because of the mind’s innate capacity for differentiation and categorization.  In other words, it is not the soul that is pulled this way and that, it is the mind.

The soul is quiet, undemanding of attention; that is why the mind often overlooks it.  In addition the soul is not accessible by the senses; I mean that the soul has no color, no observable body that weighs a particular amount, the soul makes no sound, has no scent, and so forth. The soul is quiet because the Good and the One are quiet, silent, and completely uninterested in displays designed to draw attention to it. 

The soul, because it is immaterial, permeates the cosmos but appears to individuals as divided; that is to say that the mind understands, or experiences, the soul as divided and divisible.  How does the soul manifest in this way?  Metaphors are very helpful in responding to this question.  The appearance of the individual soul resembles moonlight glowing in ten thousand different bodies of water; in ponds, lakes, rivers, and bowls.  The source of all these appearances is the moon.  Without the moon these appearances would not happen.  Each appearance looks like an individual, isolated appearance.  Each appearance looks like the light of the moon has fully descended into the pond, or the lake, or the river, or the bowl.  That is a misunderstanding; the light of the moon is present at its source and in each of the lights’ appearances which are fragments of the source of the light.

There are many metaphors that can be used to illuminate the way the soul is simultaneously here, in the material realm, and There, in the transcendental realm of the Good and the One.  For example, the light of the sun appears in countless rooms in this world.  The light of the sun simultaneously comes from the sun and is the sun.

When the mind, attracted by the peace and serenity of the light of the soul, turns to the soul, then the mind can use its capacity for differentiation to begin the spiritual ascent to the Good and the One.  When the mind uses its capacity for differentiation to follow the soul to its source, that is Wisdom; I mean Philosophical Wisdom, or you could say Transcendent Wisdom, meaning Wisdom that guides us to the transcendental Good and the transcendental One.

The mind is for the most part preoccupied with caring for the body and responding to the demands of the body.  In contrast with the soul, the body is loud and wants a lot of attention.  But at times the mind steps back from the body and catches a glimpse of the soul, a glimpse of the presence of eternity.  This can be an occasion for the mind to change its priorities from caring for the body to caring for, and following the soul to its source.

To be honest, I’m not sure at this point how this view of the soul, and the soul’s relationships with mind and body, aligns with the views presented in the Dialogues and the Enneads.  There are some differences.  But there are also similarities, or overlaps.  The most important is that this view supports the Platonist practices of renunciation and spiritual ascent. 

I expect to revise this analysis in the future; but I have personally found it helpful in my own Platonic practice.  Perhaps others will as well.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 74

24 November 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 74

1.  Life and Meaning

Recently I listened to an online talk by a young philosopher who argued that it is not the job of Philosophy to teach people the meaning of life.  The young philosopher put the argument in analytic terms by arguing that asking ‘What is the meaning of life’ isn’t actually a question, that such a question, paradoxically, has no meaning.

It was frustrating to listen to such a talk at this point in the 21^st century.  I would have thought that the analytic tradition’s tropes about what falls into the category of meaningful would have, by now, exhausted themselves.  But, apparently, that is not the case.

If I were speaking directly to someone who has this person’s view my response would be to refer them to Plato’s Phaedo and to The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius.  Both of these are examples of Philosophy taking on the task of guiding the characters in these works, and the reader, to the meaning of life in the face of impermanence and death.  These works are salvific; and it used to be the case that philosophers thought of Philosophy as the means whereby it is possible to be guided to the meaning of life, to the point of existence, to how a human being can transcend the difficulties that life brings and how to transcend those difficulties by going beyond the mundane.

2.  Continuities

In the West those who are interested in Buddhism have access to the full range of Buddhist traditions.  In Buddhist history that is unusual, perhaps unprecedented.  Traditions that were separated for many centuries by geography, culture, and language (such as Theravada and Tibetan Vajrayana) are found rubbing shoulders on bookshelves and they are available at online retail outlets.

Years ago I was thinking about what holds these Buddhist traditions together?  Is there some kind of underlying unity that runs like a common thread among all these traditions?  If you contrast Theravada with Tibetan Buddhism you find that they have different collections of Buddhist texts, that they have different philosophical interpretations of what it means to be a Buddhist, that they have different rituals, and so forth.

What came to mind when thinking about this is that in all of these traditions there is one thing that unites all of them and that is the Monastic Sangha.  It is the institution of monasticism that provides a sense of unity among all of these variant Buddhist traditions. 

When I look at Platonism I see similar kinds of variations among contemporary Platonists.  Some Platonists are theurgists and others eschew a theurgic interpretation of Platonism.  Some consider Platonism to be grounded in mystical experience and others regard Plato as an analytic philosopher, or proto-analytic philosopher. 

Looking at this and thinking about it, I came up with a source of unity among these variations and that is the Dialogues that Plato wrote.  All the various interpretations of Platonism are rooted in that common canon; the Dialogues of Plato.

It’s interesting, I think, to consider that in Buddhism it is an institution that provides a common basis for the tradition as a whole; the Monastic Sangha.  In Platonism it is not an institution that provides a common basis, it is a book, the Dialogues. 

I think this happens because the Dialogues are attractive at many levels; as literature, as analysis, as dialectic, and as a guide to the transcendental.  The Dialogues are like an eternal spring of crystal clear water that flows forth nourishing everything that it contacts.

3.  Doing Platonism

Most people are introduced to Platonism through the reading of some of Plato’s Dialogues.  Usually this happens in college but it can also happen if someone is interested in becoming familiar with the foundations of Western thought in general, or Western Philosophy in particular.  If interest in Platonism takes root this often manifests as understanding Platonism as primarily a scholarly activity; I mean reading the Dialogues and related material, commenting on them, and exploring how others have understood them.  All of this is wonderful and inspiring and I, and many others, have benefitted greatly from this kind of activity.

At some point some people ask how to embody these teachings in one’s life; I think of this as asking how to do Platonism or what does Platonism indicate, or even demand, of its followers.  This is when an individual becomes interested in wanting to ground the teachings of Platonism in one’s behavior and in comprehending Platonism as not only a way of thought, but also a way of life.  By ‘way of life’ I mean that Platonism manifests in identifiable behaviors.

I have posted previously about what I think of as the Precepts of Platonism that offer a framework for doing Platonism, a doing that goes beyond ‘thinking about.’  I think the question that those interested in taking this step have is where to start.  The reason that is not easy to answer is that Platonism has not generated a guidebook for the basic steps, or practices, or precepts, in the way that, for example, Jainism, or other Dharma traditions, have.

But it is possible to glean from the Dialogues ethical practices and precepts that define a way of life that is consistent with being a Philosopher.  If I were asked by someone interested in what I call doing Platonism, I would make the suggestion that the first step is simply to become a vegetarian.  I say this because it is relatively easy to do; there is a lot of material to support a change to a vegetarian diet and there are a lot of vegetarians to offer support in such a change. 

I also make this suggestion because vegetarianism, in a Platonist context, is directly tied to the teachings of non-harming and non-retaliation found in Dialogues such as Crito and The Republic.  Non-harming is the most important ethical teaching of Platonism and the source for all other ethical teachings and precepts.  But it is often the case that when first encountering non-harming it seems to be too big of a demand when considered in the abstract; and often the mind will raise objections.  Vegetarianism, however, is easy to access, provides an experiential basis for what non-harming means, and deepens one’s understanding of non-harming so that when a reader comes across these teachings in Platonic literature the reader has an experiential basis for understanding what non-harming means.  This is why I consider vegetarianism to be a significant teaching of Platonism rather than something peripheral.

There is a lot of material in the Platonic tradition that supports becoming a vegetarian.  This is helpful for those who want to practice Platonism in their lives.  Porphyry’s On Abstinence is the most significant example of a work on the topic of vegetarianism and it links vegetarianism to non-harming and living a philosophical life.  But there are others such as three essays on this topic by Plutarch.  The combined impact of these kinds of writings is to show the function of vegetarianism for those wanting to walk the Path of Platonism, for those wanting to become Philosophers.

I would also suggest that becoming vegetarian sheds a new light on reading and study of Platonic literature such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.  Once someone embodies Platonism through the practice of vegetarianism they begin to see reading and study of the Platonist tradition as a way of doing Platonism, as another practice that embodies Platonism in the life of a practitioner.  This is a subtle shift in the understanding of what someone is doing when they are reading Platonic literature.  The tendency is to understand such reading, at first, as a means of acquiring information in the same way that someone might read a history or even fiction.  When one begins to embody Platonism by doing Platonism then reading Platonic literature more closely resembles a musician playing music on their instrument, or the daily practice a musician has to maintain their musicianship.  Vegetarianism is similar to this kind of relationship; it is a practice that deepens one's understanding of what it means to be a Platonist and at the same time deepens one's understanding of what it means to read and study Platonic literature; the two practices mutually nourish each other.

So that is my suggestion to someone wanting to embody Platonism, wanting to do Platonism, in their life.  It is a first, or perhaps more accurately, an early step on the path that leads to the Good and the One.

4.  The Unseen Sun

At dusk the sun swiftly sets behind the distant November mountains.  On a moonless night the stars come out above the desert with its cacti and creosote bushes.  The sun has disappeared but its presence remains.