Plato's View Regarding the Philosopher's Involvement in Worldly Affairs

31 March 2025

Plato’s View Regarding the Philosopher’s Involvement in Worldly Affairs

“Socrates:  No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people.  Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in rational order, he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can.  Or do you think that someone can consort with things he admires without imitating them?

“Adeimantus:  I do not.  It’s impossible.

“Socrates:  Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can.

“Adeimantus:  That’s absolutely true.”

(Plato, The Republic VI, translated by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, pages 1121 and 1122, 500b-500d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

“Socrates: The law says, doesn’t it, that it is best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes and not get excited about them?  First, it isn’t clear whether such things will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, it doesn’t make the future any better to take them hard; third, human affairs aren’t worth taking very seriously; and finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need in such circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible.

“Glaucon:  What are you referring to?

“Socrates:  Deliberation.  We must accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best.  We mustn’t hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when they trip.  Instead, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure.”

(Plato, The Republic X, as above, page 1209)

1.  In the first quote, Plato writes that the philosopher does not have the time to look down on human affairs.  In the second quote, Plato writes that human affairs aren’t worth taking very seriously.  

I understand this as a result of looking at things from the perspective of eternity.  From the perspective of eternity, the manifestations in the human realm are but a brief spark and when measured against the everlasting cosmic tides of time, and when measured against that which transcends time altogether, it is almost as if they never existed.

2.  In some ways Plato’s point is not difficult to understand.  At a more mundane level, anyone who is devoted to a field of human life will find that the time they have for other fields of human life is necessarily limited.  For example, if someone is a highly trained musician, this training takes a huge amount of time.  If the musician earns their living traveling and giving concerts this makes it almost impossible to spend time on the ups and downs of worldly affairs.  Similarly, if one pursues an athletic endeavor, this also requires a great deal of training and commitment.  Such training and commitment consumes almost all the time of one’s life outside of basic human relations such as to one’s parents and family.  There is a limited amount that one can do in a life and Plato is saying, in part, that this is also true for philosophers. 

The difference is that the philosopher is pursuing ‘things that are’, which is to say that which is beyond becoming and begonning.  The musician, the athlete, and so forth, are pursuing tasks that are recognizable to the senses of observers whereas the pursuit of philosophy is not recognizable, or perceivable, by the senses.  This is what gives rise to people thinking that philosophy is foolish or not worthwhile.  But once a student of the Way of Philosophy has had even a small glimpse of the transcendent it will seem to such a student that nothing is more worthwhile than this pursuit.

3.  It’s helpful to think about the passage in the first quote where Plato writes that the philosopher ‘imitates’ the things that are and tries to become like them as much as is humanly possible.  When reading this I also thought of the word ‘alignment’ as appropriate; I mean that imitating the noetic realities, and the reality of the Good and the One, is a way of aligning with those realities.  

Humans are highly imitative; it is one of the ways that humans learn.  Imitation is a kind of learning by doing.  In the quote Plato points specifically to the philosopher neither committing injustice nor suffering injustice.  Justice is a major theme in The Republic and this is pointing to the source of justice in the noetic.  In various dialogues, injustice is connected to harming others; for this reason I think that the philosopher must align himself with the reality of non-harming in the noetic realm, to the best of his ability in this human birth and in this material reality.

3.1  In the Loeb translation, by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, the phrase ‘do no wrong’ is used instead of ‘injustice’ (page 63).  I think this brings the discussion into a larger ethical context and would connect this to other issues such as vegetarianism.

3.2  In Jowett’s translation Jowett uses the word ‘injured’ rather than injustice or ‘do no wrong’; “he [the philosopher] sees neither injuring nor injured by one another.”  By the context I would assume this means injuring the soul rather than bodily injuries since a primary purpose of philosophy is to transcend concern with the body.

3.3  The point is that the philosopher imitates, or aligns with, this noetic reality of what I might call ‘not engaging in strife’ with others.  In the noetic realm strife is not a reality because noetic realities are transparent to each other and interpenetrate each other.  In such a context strife would instantly rebound upon the maker of strife; one cannot get away without those consequences in the noetic realm.  But since strife and division do not even arise in the noetic, this is not even an issue.

3.4  The philosopher imitates this noetic reality and thereby gets closer to the ultimate reality of the Good.  But in the material world it is only possible to do this to a degree; this is because the material world is inherently a realm of strife and division.  This is one reason why the path of philosophy is challenging and requires great dedication.

4.  According to the second quote, when harm, injustice, and strife in general occur in our lives we must accept them and then proceed with our lives as best we can.  I often feel that Platonism is mature when discussing these issues.  Platonism doesn’t suggest that we can create a utopia on earth, or that we can transform the material world into a heavenly realm.  This is a result of Platonism differentiating the noetic from the material, and the Good from the noetic.  These three realms are related to each other, but they are also different realities.  It is like differentiating between the ecology of  mountain heights and the ecology of the forest below and the ecology of a river delta.  They are all connected but they support different material realities.  The hypostases of the metaphysical cosmos found in Platonism are similarly differentiated; what is found in one hypostasis differs from what is found in the others.

5.  This realm in which we live is a difficult realm.  It is filled with suffering and strife.  Though there are moments of beauty and peace, those moments are brief.  It is possible for those moments to inspire us to return to the source of those moments; that source being the nous, the second hypostasis, and ultimately the transcendent One.  But that source is hidden.  That source is hidden from our senses because our senses are unable to perceive its existence.  That source is hidden from our mind, particularly in modernity, because we live at a time when the rejection of the transcendental is almost complete; in other words, the structures of our mind that our culture cultivates are a barrier to the mystical ascent to the One.

Still, it is possible to turn away from the distractions of the material world; it’s not easy, but it is possible.  This is done by following the presence of beauty and peace back to their source and there it is possible to rest in true peace.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 40

24 March 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 40

1.  Lloyd Gerson is publishing a second edition of the translation of the Enneads; Gerson was the head of the group that did this translation.  I believe this second edition will become available in late September or early October of this year.  The paperback edition is currently priced at Amazon for $69.99 and the hardback is listed at $175.00.  This second edition contains some revisions as well as additional cross-references.

It is common, though not universal, for translators of Plato and Plotinus to have subsequent revised editions based on feedback they received after the publication of their first edition.  Jowett, I believe, had three editions.  McKenna had several revised editions of his translation of the Enneads (some of these changes are found in footnotes to the Larson Publications’ edition of the MacKenna translation).  Translating the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus is a big job that rests on years of study before even attempting such a project.  It makes sense that the translator might find certain passages lacking after publishing their first edition and then proceed to make corrections.

For those interested, the second edition of the Gerson edition of the Enneads can be pre-ordered from Amazon.

2.  A friend of mine sent me a quote from Iain McGilchrist that I thought readers would find interesting:

“For over two thousand years, in the Platonic, and later the Christian, tradition of Western thought, human life was seen as orientated towards three great values: goodness, beauty, and truth, each of them in turn seen as a manifestation of an aspect of the sacred.  During my lifetime, I have seen each of these important values, along with the sacred, repudiated and reviled.  Less and less attention is given these days to the inner nature of goodness as a disposition of the world.  Too often it seems that goodness has been reduced to rule-following, and good actions determined by a form of bloodless, utilitarian accountancy.  Beauty is dismissed as irrelevant, in an era that respects only one value, namely, power – so that no artist now wishes his or her art to be praised for its beauty, only for being ‘powerful’.  And truth is dismissed, inevitably, as part of the rhetoric of power, supposedly decreed at whim to suit those who hold the power: everyone, it is argued, is entitled to their own truth.  What are we left with?”

I’m not sure of the exact location of this quote; I suspect it comes from a recorded talk (McGilchrist has quite a few talks on Youtube).  My friend put in the topic line of the email he sent that contained this quote, “Plato Gutted”.  

I think McGilchrist sums our current situation very accurately and succinctly here.  In my own journey away from modernity, it was the rejection of beauty that first signaled to me that something was wrong with our current cultural situation.

3.  I’ve been listening to a presentation on Youtube by an academic, a Professor of Philosophy, on Plato.  It is a series of posts.  Overall the presenter seems kindly disposed towards Plato which is why I have continued to watch the series.  At the same time I find the presentation frustrating because it reflects the manner in which academia is unable to comprehend Platonism as a spiritual tradition as opposed to a philosophy in the way that contemporary philosophies are types of philosophy.  For example, there has so far been no mention of rebirth, or purification, or asceticism, among other topics that I focus on when reading Plato.  The basic problem, as I see it, is that academia as an institution is committed to modernity in ways that make it difficult to present Platonism as a spiritual tradition that has the purpose of transcending the world and offering a path to salvation.

On the other hand, if Platonism was presented to an audience of college students in the way I would prefer, it is likely that college students would simply dismiss it as superstitious, outdated, unscientific, and deficient.  In a college context a tradition like Platonism needs to be presented in a manner that can actually connect with a young modern audience.  My first contact with Platonism was in such a context and it planted the seed for a later blossoming of a fuller, more traditional, approach to Platonism.

4.  “Animal sacrifice was not the most common ritual in the ancient world.”  This is the opening sentence from the book Animal Sacrifice in the Ancient Greek World, edited by Sarah Hitch and Ian Rutherford, published by Cambridge University Press.  I have enjoyed the collection of essays.  And the opening sentence highlighted for me one of the reasons why I find theurgy to be questionable as a Platonic practice.  What I’m getting at is that the emphasis on theurgy has obscured the many other ways that ceremony functions and presents meaning.  A widespread use of ceremony is to generate cultural memory so that certain events, views, or persons are not forgotten.  The repetition of a ritual on, for example, a yearly basis that is designed to bring to the minds of the participants something that happened in the past is a way of focusing the culture as a whole towards certain realities from the past and keeping them alive for the future by re-presenting them in the present, usually in a symbolic way.  A simple form of this is having a celebratory meal in honor of an event or person.  I see this as a more fruitful use of ritual than theurgy, as well as more powerful.

5.  If I think of the One as pure light, which is consistent with Platonic symbols and metaphors, I see the names of the One, Divine Names, as emerging from the pure light of the One streaming through the prism of Mind as found in the Noetic realm or sphere.  Mind is a prism for the light of the One, the Good, and the Beautiful.

These names are of two types.  The first type of name, or color that emerges when the mind differentiates the pure light of the One, consists of abstract nouns such as the Good, the One, the Beautiful, the Eternal, and so forth.  The second type of name consists of personifications such as Apollo, Athena, Aphrodite, Hermes, Zeus, Hera, and so forth.  

The colors that emerge from the pure light of the transcendental are the result of the mind’s differentiating the unity of the One into distinct aspects.  As a crystal produces colors when the light of the sun flows through the crystal, the mind produces differentiated names when the energy of the One flows through mind.  This is the process of differentiation that is the essence of emanation.

6. I have self-published in book form my blog posts. I have published two volumes. They are available at Amazon. If you put in the key words "Blogging Platonism" both of them will come up.

Sight and Sunlight and the Form of the Good

17 March 2025

Sight and Sunlight and the Form of the Good

“Socrates: Sight may be present in the eyes, and the one who has it may try to use it, and colors may be present in things, but unless a third kind of thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this very purpose, you know that sight will see nothing, and the colors will remain unseen.

“Glaucon: What kind of thing do you mean?

“Socrates: I mean what you call light.

“Glaucon: You’re right.

“Socrates: Then it isn’t an insignificant kind of link that connects the sense of sight and the power to be seen – it is a more valuable link than any other linked things have got, if indeed light is something valuable.

“Glaucon: And, of course, it’s very valuable.

“Socrates: Which of the gods in heaven would you name as the cause and controller of this, the one whose light causes our sight to see in the best way and the visible things to be seen?

“Glaucon: The same one you and others would name.  Obviously, the answer to your question is the sun.

“Socrates: And isn’t sight by nature related to that god in this way?

“Glaucon: Which way?

“Socrates: Sight isn’t the sun, neither sight itself nor that in which it comes to be, namely, the eye.

“Glaucon: No, it certainly isn’t.

“Socrates: But I think it is the most sunlike of the senses.

“Glaucon: Very much so.

“Socrates: And it [the sense of sight] receives from the sun the power it has, just like an influx from an overflowing treasury.

“Glaucon: Certainly.

“Socrates: The sun is not sight, but isn’t it the cause of sight itself and seen by it?

“Glaucon: That’s right.

“Socrates: Let’s say then, that this is what I called the offspring of the good, which the good begot as its analogue.  What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things.

“Glaucon: How?  Explain a bit more.

“Socrates: You know that, when we turn our eyes to things whose colors are no longer illuminated by the light of day but by night lights, the eyes are dimmed and seem nearly blind, as if clear vision were no longer in them.

“Glaucon: Of course.

“Socrates: Yet whenever one turns them on things illuminated by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears in those very same eyes?

 “Glaucon: Indeed.

“Socrates: Well, understand the soul in the same way: When it [the soul] focuses on something illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possess understanding, but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions in this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.

“Glaucon: It does seem that way.

“Socrates: So what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good.  And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge.  Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they [knowledge and truth].  In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as goodlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good – for the good is yet more prized.

“Glaucon: This is an inconceivably beautiful thing you’re talking about, if it provides both knowledge and truth and is superior to them in beauty.  You surely don’t think that a thing like that could be pleasure.

“Socrates: Hush! Let’s examine its image in more detail as follows.

“Glaucon: How?

“Socrates: You’ll be willing to say, I think, that the sun not only provides visible things with the power to be seen but also with coming to be, growth, and nourishment, although it is not itself coming to be.

“Glaucon: How could it be?

“Socrates:  Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.”

(Plato, The Republic, Book VI, translated by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 1128-1130, 507d-509b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.  The sun is a central symbol and metaphor for Platonism.   Understanding the significance of the sun and its symbolic power and meaning assists the reader in understanding the Dialogues at a deeper level; as opposed to reading the Dialogues without taking into account symbolic, metaphorical, and allegorical dimensions.

2.  This passage reinforces my previous post that highlights an occasion where Socrates answers a question by using a comparison, variously translated as simile, allegory, and so forth.  As I mentioned in that post, the use of these kinds of comparisons is necessitated by the ineffable nature of the ultimate which is called The Good and The One, but cannot actually be described through either affirmation or negation.  For this reason, inferences about the One take the approach of what the One resembles, or what approximates the One, or what approximates an aspect, or facet, of the One.

Definitional inferences, which are a very significant part of Platonism, are not efficacious in this fully transcendental context.  As we move from the noetic to the fully transcendental a shift in our method of communicating about these realities happens.

3.  I also think that the symbol of the sun arises out of an approach to contemplation in which the practitioner waits for the sun to rise; I mean that the practitioner, or student, would literally wait in silence and stillness for the sun to appear.  This is mentioned in Plotinus and I have posted about it before, but I think it is worth repeating here.  I think there is a connection between contemplative practice and the use of the sun as a symbol of the One.  To be clear, many scholars regard the passage in Plotinus where Plotinus talks about ‘waiting for the sun’ as a metaphor; and that is possible.  But others, including non-scholars like myself, think that the passage relates to an actual practice rather than being ‘just’ a metaphor.  

I don’t know enough about Greek Pagan practices regarding Apollo and the Sun; but I wonder if waiting for the sun to rise might have been a practice used in the context of temples dedicated to Apollo.  I know that waiting for the sun, and also practices at sunset, were used in a number of cultures.  And I suggest that this was also the case in Ancient Greece.

4.  You can give the practice a try yourself.  It’s very simple.  You rise before the sun and then face East.  If there is an outdoor location you can go to that’s a good idea.  And if you can do it with friends that is also helpful.

You simply stand facing East and wait for the moment of sunrise.  When the sun has risen a simple bow to the sun concludes the practice.  Like I said, it’s very simple.  

Keep in mind not to look directly at the sun; always glance a bit off, or at a distance away from the sun; using sunglasses is a good idea as well.  Looking directly at the sunrise will strain, and possibly damage the eyes.  

5.  Solar contemplations are widespread in many cultures.  Paul Brunton (1898 - 1981) wrote about his use of a solar contemplation done at sunset (waiting for the sun to set).  It is in Volume 3 of his Notebooks.  Chapter 7 outlines his instructions for a sunset solar contemplation and it starts on page 125.  As was Brunton’s style, Brunton’s presentation contains aphorisms about the meaning of solar contemplation which, if you are interested in this approach, you might find valuable.

I believe Brunton learned this solar contemplation in India when he journeyed to India around 1930.  Solar contemplation is a significant practice in Brunton’s teaching.

6.  Engaging in a solar contemplation deepens the understanding of the symbolic nature of the sun in Platonism and, in addition, related symbols of the sun, such as swans because swans, in Greek Paganism, were thought of as related to Apollo.  I have found that this kind of practice helped me to spot passages in the Dialogues that refer to the sun; most of these explicitly mention the sun, but some are indirect.  I think this is an aspect of Plato’s thought that needs to be highlighted more.

7.  I have used the word ‘contemplation’ in the context of ‘waiting for the sun’ because I think it falls in that category, as opposed to meditation or concentration.  In Platonism contemplation is the lifting of the soul from material realities to transcendental realities, from time bound realities to timeless realities.  Contemplating the sun lifts the soul from the material solar manifestation to the Good.  This can happen because the two are so intimately related.  In other words, the sun becomes a kind of platform whereby the practitioner can step into the transcendental.

8.  Notice that in this quoted passage, the sun is considered to be a God.  For some moderns this might be a barrier to understanding this passage, as well as the idea of waiting for sunrise as a kind of contemplation.  We have been taught that the sun is simply a ball of fire at roughly the center of our solar system.  Our reductionist tendencies lead some to conclude that the sun is nothing but a ball of fire.  

If, however, we think of the sun as the source of all life on earth, and of the earth as a whole, this can lead us to a more expansive sense of the sun in our lives.  From there it is possible to think of the sun as more like a living presence that directly impacts my life; and from there gratitude for the sun can arise naturally.

The sun is a ball of fire AND the sun is the source of all life on earth.  It is both of these.

And I think it is possible, even for a modern person, to think of the sun as a living being with a soul, a life, and as part of the great web of becoming and begonning in which we dwell.

9.  “What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things.”

The Good, the fully transcendental, is the light by which the soul can ‘see’ or comprehend intelligible, or noetic, realities.  These realities are accessible to us only through the light of the Good because they are non-sensory realities.  The sun is a symbol of the Good because the sun reveals visual things to our sense of sight as the Good reveals noetic things to the soul.  

The Sun is, therefore, an emanation of the Good; it is the presence of the meaning of the Good in the material world.

10.  “. . . the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.”

The Good transcends being.  The Good is the source of being and the full range of noetic realities.  This is one of the things that signals to us that Platonism is, at its heart, a mystical path.  Non-mystical paths tend to configure being as the conclusion of the spiritual journey.  This means that the ultimate can be approached through the mind (small ‘m’ mind) which is a primary noetic reality along with being and life.  In Platonism the trio of being, mind, and life are noetic realities where one does not come before the others; the three of them are the first differentiation that appears from the Good.

In Platonism, however, the Good transcends being, gives birth to being, but the Good itself is not being (and the Good is also not non-being or nothingness).  This can be experienced in contemplation to a greater or lesser degree.

11.  There is much to ponder in this passage and much to learn at many levels; particularly the symbolic level and how that level is foundational for Platonism and the Way of Philosophy.

Image, Simile, Allegory, Parable

10 March 2025

Image, Simile, Allegory, Parable

1.  There is an interesting section of The Republic, Book VI where Socrates answers a question by using a simile.  Socrates prefaces the response by explicitly stating that he is going to use simile to respond to the question:

“Adeimantus:  . . . someone might well say now that he’s unable to oppose you [Socrates] as you ask each of your questions, yet he sees that of all those who take up philosophy – not those who merely dabble in it while still young in order to complete their upbringing and then drop it, but those who continue in its for a longer time – the greatest number become cranks, not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend.

“Socrates:  When I heard him out, I said: Do you think that what these people say is false?

“Adeimantus:  I don’t know, but I’d be glad to hear what you think.

“Socrates: You’d hear that they seem to me to speak the truth.

“Adeimantus:  How, then, can it be true to say that there will be no end to evils in our cities until philosophers – people we agree to be useless – rule them?

“Socrates:  The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image or simile.”

(Plato, The Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeven, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 1110-1111, 487c-487e, ISBN:9780872203495)

Socrates then goes on to use a ship, the ship’s captain, and the ship's crew, as a simile for the city of The Republic, which is itself a simile, or more accurately an allegory, for the human soul and the soul’s relationship to justice.  In other words, the simile of the ship is embedded in the allegory of the city, giving The Republic a very complex pattern of relationships between several levels of discussion.

2.  This is a good example of how devices like simile, image, and allegory are part of what the Platonic tradition means by reason.  In other words, the ancient view of reason is more expansive, and more varied, than what the word reason tends to indicate at this time.

3.  We have lost the idea that comparisons such as simile are tools for philosophical discussion and dialectic.  When modern philosophy students study reason and inference, they study logic, and by logic this usually means symbolic logic.  Studying the structure and the nature of implication in something like a simile isn’t often a part of the curriculum of logic and reason at this time.  But for Socrates, simile was a tool in his toolbox of dialectic and Socrates clearly regards simile as a valid way of investigating a question in a dialectical discussion.

3.1  I think part of the reason for the shrinking of what constitutes reason in modern philosophy is that the modern understanding of how words work and function is, in my opinion, misguided.  In modern philosophy there was the idea that the logic of words could be improved by incorporating mathematical procedures when analyzing words and word-dependent structures.  But words are not numbers.  Words are much more fluid and subject to shifts in emphasis and meaning.  If that is understood, then using an approach like simile, and related approaches, makes sense.

4.  It is helpful to compare different translations regarding a passage like this.  Here is the Loeb translation:

“In the present situation someone might say to you [Socrates] that he can’t argue against each individual question theoretically, but that when it comes to facts he can see that whoever eagerly seizes upon philosophy – not those who do it when they are young as a set part of their education and then drop it, but those who spend longer on it – the majority become really strange, not to say utterly depraved, while those who seem the most estimable nevertheless turn out to be useless to their states, because they have been involved in the practice you approve of.

“When I heard this, I said: Do you think then that people who say this are speaking falsely?

“I don’t know,” he [Adeimantus] said, "but I'd love to hear what you think."

"You'd hear that they seem to me to be telling the truth."

“How is it right then," he said, "to say that states will not be rid of evil until philosophers, whom we agree are of no use to them, rule in them?

“The question you’re asking,” I said, “needs an answer in the form of an allegory.”

[Footnote: eikon = “image,” “likeness,” “simile”; “allegory” and “parable” are also translations which have been used, the translation here justified to some extant by the length and exact correspondence of the “image.”]

(Plato, The Republic, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, page 17, 487c-487e, ISBN:9780674996519)

And here is the Jowett translation:

“For any of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

“Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

“I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

“Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

“Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

“You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.”

(The Jowett translation is widely available both online and is offered by various reprint houses.  Some editions use the Stephanus numbers and some do not.  In addition, some of the dialogues were revised by Jowett, so there may be discrepancies between editions.  The translation was originally published in 1871, but the third revised edition of 1888 is also used by reprint houses.)

And finally, here is the newest translation by a single translator, David Horan, which was published this year:

“. . . someone may now say that they cannot oppose you in argument based on each individual question, but that you should look at the facts.  Those who venture into philosophy, not taking it up in their youth for educational purposes and then being free from it, but engaging in it for a long period of time, become for the most part very odd or, we could even say, utterly debased.  There are others who seem completely reasonable, except that they are rendered useless to their cities through their encounters with the very subject that you commend.

Having listened to all this, I replied, “Do you think the people who make these statements are lying?”

“I do not know,” he said, “but I would be glad to hear your opinion.”

“Then I will tell you.  In my opinion, they appear to me anyway to be speaking the truth.”

“In that case,” he said, “how is it appropriate to say that the cities will have no relief from evils until the philosophers rule in them, when we agree that such people are useless to these cities?”

“The question you have asked,” I replied, “needs an answer expressed by means of an image.”

(Found online at platonicfoundation (dot) org.  The online edition does not use pagination, but you can follow the Stephanus numbers to locate the passage.)

5.  Notice the variety of words used to express the use of a literary device in this context: image, simile, allegory, parable.  In the footnote found in the Loeb translation, and quoted above, the word ‘likeness’ is listed as a possible translation.  This variation indicates that we are looking at a term that resembles ‘figurative language’ when used in a literary context.  In one of the Enneads, Plotinus uses the term ‘comparisons’ as a collective noun for these kinds of usages.

6.  The discussion raises a question regarding the view that philosophers should be rulers and that rulers should be philosophers, and that until that comes about justice will not find a place in The Republic.  This is stated in Book V, at 473c-d, “Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize . . . cities will not rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race.” (Hackett Publishing edition, page 1100)  

But Adeimantus states that in his observation those who study philosophy are not exactly stellar examples of humanity, or at least not many of them are.  Surprisingly, Socrates agrees with Adeimantus.  Yet Socrates retains his commitment to the idea of the philosopher king, or philosopher ruler.  It is here that Socrates says that in order to explain to Adeimantus why he still favors this arrangement, Socrates will resort to a “comparison”, meaning an analogy, simile, image, and so forth.

7.  Why does Socrates state his argument in the form of a comparison?  My suggestion is that what makes the philosopher, the true philosopher, unique is that the philosopher is focused on, and immersed in, eternal things, in eternity as such.  And eternity is beyond description; eternity is ineffable.  In this kind of situation, then, we can only offer what the philosopher resembles, or is like, or provide a mythos/allegory, to point to this truth.  I think that is why allegory has such a prominent place in The Republic. 

8.  There is so much to learn in a passage like this.  And this is why reading and rereading The Republic, and other dialogues of Plato, is worthwhile.  You could spend a lifetime studying the words, and contemplating the thoughts of, The Republic, and that would be a very good use of the time given to a life.