Plato on Non-Harming: 2

 15 October 2024

Plato on Non-Harming: 2

“Socrates:  Do we say that one must never in any way do wrong willingly, or must one do wrong in one way and not in another?  Is to do wrong never good or admirable, as we have agreed in the past, or have all these former agreements been washed out during the last few days?  Have we at our age failed to notice for some time that in our serious discussions we were no different from children?  Above all, is the truth such as we used to say it was, whether the majority agree or not, and whether we must still suffer worse things than we do now, or will be treated more gently, that nonetheless, wrongdoing or injustice is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer?  Do we say so or not?

“Crito:  We do.

“Socrates:  So one must never do wrong.

“Crito:  Certainly not.

“Socrates:  Nor must one, when wronged, inflict wrong in return, as the majority believe, since one must never do wrong.

“Crito:  That seems to be the case.

“Socrates:  Come now, should one do harm to anyone or not, Crito?

“Crito:  One must never do so.

“Socrates:  Well then, if one is done harm, is it right, as the majority say, to do harm in return, or is it not?

“Crito:  It is never right.

Socrates:  Doing harm to people is no different from wrongdoing.

“Crito:  That is true.

“Socrates:  One should never do wrong in return, nor do any man harm, no matter what he may have done to you.”

(Plato, Crito, translated by G. M. A. Grube, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 43 - 44, 49b-49d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.  “One should never do wrong in return, nor do any man harm . . . “  Usage like this indicates that ‘harm’ and ‘wrong,’ or ‘wrongdoing,’ are often treated interchangeably in the Dialogues.  In addition, the term ‘injustice’ is also often used as an equivalent for ‘harm’ and ‘wrong.’  It’s like ‘wounded’ and ‘maimed’ and ‘disfigured.’  Or it’s like ‘sophia’ and ‘phronesis’ which are two Greek words that both mean wisdom.

2.  This quote begins with Socrates referring to past discussions that Socrates and his students have had on this subject.  This indicates that the perspective of non-harming was one that was discussed frequently even though that is not reflected in the Dialogues that we have.  Was such discussion confined to a particular group?  I mean were these discussions only for select students and not for the general public?  I don’t mean that these teachings were esoteric but they might not have been the kind of teaching that would be offered to a newcomer or a casual observer.  I’m just speculating, it’s true, but I think it’s worth considering.

3.  The ethical standard that Socrates emphasizes is difficult to maintain or act on because it runs counter to broadly held standards in most societies.  Most societies, and most ethical systems, allow for retaliation; that is to say if someone harms you then that gives you the ‘right’ to harm that person.  

Socrates is arguing for the idea of non-retaliation when one has been harmed.  This runs against our instinctual response to such a situation.  We’ve all been there; when we are harmed, what immediately emerges is a harmful response and if we are unable to harm someone in response to their harming us at that moment, then we plot to enact retribution or vengeance another day.  The teaching of Socrates counters that and at the same time reveals to us how difficult such a commitment is to maintain.  It is difficult because it runs counter to our biological, or body-based, instincts.  It takes dedicated practice to be able to overcome the instinct to counter harm by doing harm.

4.  If we understand refraining from retaliation or retribution as an ethical ideal that Socrates is advocating, this helps us to understand why Socrates argues that it is necessary for the soul to separate itself from the body, to the best of its ability, while still alive.  Because retaliation, the returning of harm for harm received, is so instinctual, so body-based, it can only be overcome when our attention shifts from concern for the body to concern for the soul.  

5.  But what is the basis for this teaching of non-retaliation or non-retribution?  The dialogue does not say, but thinking about it, I suggest that this ethical teaching emerges from the idea of rebirth/reincarnation.  And in the background also is the idea of cyclic existence as a defining feature of the material world.

Rebirth is a consequence of the cyclical nature of the world soul which is then transmitted to, or emanated upon, the beings living in the material world.  In order to ascend to the noetic and the fully transcendental (the One and the Good) it is necessary to step out of cyclic existence, of genesis/samsara.  

Retaliation and retribution are instantiations of the cyclic nature of material existence; this explains why ancient hatreds are so intractable and seem to be never resolved.  This back and forth nature of harming and being harmed is endless because the cyclic nature of existence is endless; this endlessness being a distorted image of eternity (eternity transcends endlessness.)  

Non-retribution cuts through cyclic existence and frees the soul from its embeddedness in material processes and the endless cycle of genesis and suffering.  Looked at from this point of view, the soul is greatly benefitted by adopting non-harming as the foundation of its ethical interaction in the material world.  But it is not just a personal benefit; non-harming paves the way for all those who hope to free themselves from here and ascend to There.

6.  There are a lot of implications that emerge from, or are consequences of, the idea of non-retaliation.  For example, it would seem to lead to an anti-war position, a position that is not, as far as I can recall, referred to in the Dialogues with one possible exception: in the Phaedo Socrates states that war is the result of the body having endless desires, such as the desire for wealth.  War, then, would only cease when these desires are overcome which, in a Platonic context, means separation of the soul from the body.  That’s the basis, in my opinion, for non-harming and non-retaliation.

There are also a lot of questions regarding non-harming such as how to practice non-harming.  I mean beyond the general call for asceticism, what would non-harming practice look like?  

After noticing the teaching of non-harming in Platonism, and after pondering the teaching for some time, it becomes apparent that this teaching ripples out into many fields of practice.  It is, I think, a lifelong exploration.

Plato on Non-Harming: 1

 7 October 2024

Plato on Non-Harming: 1

“Socrates:  Come then, what of statements such as this: Should a man professionally engaged in physical training pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of any man, or to those of one man only, namely a doctor or trainer?

“Crito:  To those of one only.

“Socrates:  He should therefore fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man, and not those of the many?

“Crito:  Obviously.

“Socrates:  He must then act and exercise, eat and drink in the way the one, the trainer and the one who knows, thinks right, not all the others?

“Crito:  That is so.

“Socrates:  Very well.  And if he disobeys the one, disregards his opinion and his praises while valuing those of the many who have no knowledge, will he not suffer harm?

“Crito:  Of course.

“Socrates:  What is that harm, where does it tend, and what part of the man who disobeys does it affect?

“Crito:  Obviously the harm is to his body, which it ruins.

“Socrates:  Well said.  So with other matters, not to enumerate them all, and certainly with actions just and unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating, should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these things and before whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others.  If we do not follow his directions, we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions.  Or is there nothing in this?

“Crito:  I think there certainly is, Socrates.

“Socrates:  Come now, if we ruin that which is improved by health and corrupted by disease by not following the opinions of those who know, is life worth living for us when that is ruined?  And that is the body, is it not?

“Crito:  Yes.

“Socrates:  And is life worth living with a body that is corrupted and in bad condition?

“Crito:  In no way.

“Socrates:  And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits?  Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to that of the body?

“Crito:  Not at all.

“Socrates:  It is more valuable?

“Crito:  Much more.”

(Plato, Crito, translated by G. M. A. Grube, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 41 and 42, 47b-48a, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.  I think I posted before regarding non-harming, but I have been thinking about it a lot in the context of Plato’s Dialogues and feel called to share some of my thoughts.  First, I get the overall impression that non-harming is not given enough attention; at least that seems to be the case in the secondary literature I have read.  I can understand that; the passages in which Plato explicitly discusses non-harming are not numerous when compared to something like the Forms, or the topic of beauty, and so forth.  Yet I have come to regard the teachings on non-harming as foundational for an understanding of Platonic ethics and virtues; I mean that to understand what Plato means by justice, courage, and so forth, it is necessary to understand how Plato understands non-harming.  I think Platonic ethics is built on that foundation.

2.  I would also suggest that purification in Platonism derives from Platonism’s view of non-harming.  An obvious example would be vegetarianism which is undertaken, among other reasons, to refrain from harming living beings and causing animals harm.  I think this kind of reason applies to the other practices of purification as well.

3.  The ascetic teachings found in Platonism are applications of the principle of non-harming to specific situations.  Non-harming is a type of restraint, that is to say refraining from harming one’s self or others.  That idea of restraint is what all ascetic disciplines, the asceses, have in common.  We restrain ourselves from eating animal flesh; we restrain ourselves from indulging in alcohol or recreational drugs; we restrain ourselves from indulging in material goods, sexual indulgence, and so forth.  All of this is grounded in restraining ourselves from harming others.

4.  In a sense I would say that non-harming is another name for wisdom and that what wisdom means, among other things, is understanding the necessity of a life based on non-harming.  When I say non-harming is another name for wisdom, I mean that one of the tasks of wisdom is to make clear distinctions between things; in this case it would be distinguishing causing harm and not causing harm.  Another aspect of wisdom is to see the underlying unity of disparate things which leads to empathy and compassion.  We do not want to be harmed and others also feel the same way.

5.  And I would also add that contemplation has as its basis non-harming because it is during contemplation that the practitioner is refraining from harming himself and others as well.  No other activity instantiates non-harming more purely than contemplation.

6.  For these reasons I hope to post a series on non-harming, highlighting where non-harming is explicitly mentioned and seeing how these passages work, and what they imply for Platonic practice.

7.  The quoted passage opens with a discussion about whom we should trust when inquiring about what non-harming means.  Should we trust popular opinion?  Or should we trust a single, knowledgeable, person?  

In the case of non-harming this is a significant question.  First because, for the most part, people do not know what it means, or what non-harming refers to.  Second, opinions that are offered about non-harming, in ordinary conversation, are often offered as if they are obvious when they are not; but people resist investigation.  Third, because the idea of non-harming, especially if taken as foundational for an ethical life, is very remote from the considerations that most people think of when trying to form their own ethical norms; thus the idea of non-harming will feel intrusive.

8.  Socrates uses physical training as his analogy to non-harming.  I think that is constructive.  It implies that non-harming is a practice that grows in strength over time.  Just as lifting weights will slowly result in muscular development, so also the practice of non-harming strengthens a person’s soul and their ability to ascend to higher levels of reality (hypostases.)  

Physical training has its equipment and its programs.  But it is not clear what kind of equipment someone who is training in non-harming should use, or which equipment should be used.  That’s because in the case of non-harming we are talking about spiritual training rather than physical training and we are not used to thinking of spirituality as a type of training or exercise.

I think the answer, or part of the answer, is to internalize the understanding of non-harming and to examine non-harming dialectically.  This is done by application to various situations (actual or hypothetical) and bringing non-harming into more and more aspects of one’s life.

For example, non-harming would reject the idea of randomly killing every single person on a city block or in a designated area.  I got this idea from a Discourse of the Buddha (I don’t remember which one) where he refers to someone so far removed from non-harming that they go up one bank of a river, and then down the opposite bank, killing everyone they see.  Restraining such an impulse would be acting on the basis of non-harming.  (As an aside, if the reader thinks this example is too extreme, I think history shows, including contemporary history, that this kind of inclination is common; which in turn shows how remote non-harming is from motivating many people’s ethical behavior.)

The procedure is to apply non-harming to more and more areas of one’s life; this spreads the reality of non-harming into even very simple interactions.

9.  Crito is a very close friend of Socrates.  In Phaedo, it is Crito who takes on the task of caring for Socrates’s family at the request of Socrates.  And the last words of Socrates are spoken to Crito.  This means that there is an intimacy and trust in this dialogue; this sense of trust isn’t always present in the dialogues, but it is strong here.

Crito wants to rescue his friend from his execution which Crito regards as harming Socrates.  But Socrates does not see it that way.  Socrates sees the situation from the perspective of the soul, whereas Crito sees the situation from the perspective of the body.  Socrates thinks that not going through with the execution would harm his soul on several levels.  First, it would show that he lacked courage, one of the primary virtues.  Second, it would undermine Socrates’s teachings on Civics and the Ethics associated with Civic Duty.  Socrates sees that if he were to escape from jail and avoid the death penalty, this would harm the teachings he has given his students; it would suggest that Socrates didn’t really believe in soul, in Civic Duty, and that he lacked the courage to face what the world had handed to him.  This, in turn, could easily lead to his students abandoning philosophy altogether which, from the perspective of Socrates, would be a great harm.

10.  This is a fairly subtle discussion of harm and the avoidance of harm.  I don’t think it is the kind of discussion that a beginner would be able to grasp.  It is good to begin the practice of non-harming with simpler things and situations.  But the understanding of non-harming deepens over time and its application becomes easier to see.  This nourishes our soul and allows us to access noetic reality.  This practice allows us to access noetic reality because in the noetic realm there is no harm.  The realities of the noetic realm are transparent to each other, at ease with each other.  Non-harming is the soul’s connection to the transcendent.

Whitehead on Platonic Forms as Eternal Objects

 30 September 2024

Whitehead on Platonic Forms as Eternal Objects

There is a section, early in Process and Reality, where Whitehead discusses Platonic forms.  Whitehead writes:

“. . . the total multiplicity of Platonic forms is not ‘given.’  But in respect of each actual entity, there is givenness of such forms.  The determinate definiteness of each actuality is an expression of a selection from these forms.  It grades them in a diversity of relevance.”  

(Whitehead, Alfred North, Process and Reality, The Free Press, New York, 1978, Section III, page 43, ISBN: 9780029345602)

A little later Whitehead says:

“The term ‘Platonic form’ has here been used as the briefest way of indicating the entities in question. . . Also the term ‘idea’ has a subjective suggestion in modern philosophy which is very misleading for my present purposes; and in any case it has been used in many senses and has become ambiguous.  The term ‘essence,’ as used by the Critical Realists, also suggests their use of it which diverges from what I intend.  Accordingly, by way of employing a term devoid of misleading suggestions, I use the phrase ‘eternal object’ for what in the preceding paragraph of this section I have termed a ‘Platonic form.’  Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object.’ . . .

“Any eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world.”

(as above, page 44)

The nature of Platonic forms has been an ongoing subject of discussion throughout the history of Platonism.  Famously, Aristotle had a different interpretation than that of Plato regarding Platonic forms, where they are located, and how we gain knowledge of them.  It should also be noted that there is variation in the nature of the relationship between Platonic forms and the One.  Some Middle Platonists regarded Platonic forms as thoughts in the mind of God; others saw Platonic forms as emanations from the One.

And there has been a lot of variety of terminology used for this understanding; Whitehead mentions in passing terms like ‘idea’ and ‘essence’ as two examples.  Given this background, it makes sense to me that Whitehead would want to come up with his own term for this central understanding.  I think coming up with his own term and definition is also part of his way of looking at how to go about philosophizing which is related to his background as a mathematician.  I find this way of speaking (the term ‘eternal object’) helpful because it points to a primary quality, or aspect, or function of this reality; namely, that they are eternal.  Terms like ‘Platonic form,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘idea’ do not do so, or do not do so explicitly.  For this reason the term ‘eternal object’ feels insightful and illuminating.  Here are a few comments:

1.  These variations in the meaning of Platonic forms, what Whitehead calls ‘eternal objects,’ is a good example of what I refer to as ‘definitional drift.’  (I believe I posted about definitional drift in a previous post but in another context.)  Words are material objects and because words are material objects they are subject to becoming and begoning.  The more subtle and difficult to access an idea is, the more that idea is subject to definitional drift.  

2.  Mathematicians are used to structuring their arguments by first presenting clear definitions and that has influenced Whitehead here.  It is not the only place in Process and Reality where he uses this approach.  And it is not the only example of this approach in philosophy; Spinoza’s Ethics is a good example, as well as Proclus’s Elements of Theology.  But it is an uncommon approach and among those I’ve read who use it Whitehead seems the most clear.

3. “Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object.’”

I think an example can help in understanding what Whitehead is saying.  Consider the phrase ‘seven apples.’  The word ‘apples’ refers to actual entities in the temporal, and material, world.  Contemplating ‘apples’ leads to other material realities such as orchards, plants, apple pie, apple blossoms, and so forth.  In contrast the word ‘seven’ does not lead to material realities when ‘seven’ as such is being contemplated.  This is because noetic, non-material, realities have no content.  Seven as such does not infer apples or chairs or geraniums.  Contemplating ‘seven’ leads to other eternal objects such as other numbers, and numbers as such.  The union of the two words ‘seven apples’ is the instantiation of an eternal object, seven, with an object from the temporal world, apples.  This is how emanation works.

There is also a form of apples and a philosopher who has practiced contemplation can ascend from a material manifestation to the form of that manifestation; but it takes practice.  When looked at in this way, seven apples is an appearance in which two eternal objects, seven and apple, have merged with each other.  This is rather like yellow and red light merging to produce the color orange.

The distinction between seven and apples is that seven does not involve a necessary referent to an actual material entity whereas apples does.

4.  Whitehead understands eternal objects as potentialities.  But Whitehead qualifies this with the comment that eternal objects are ‘neutral’ (indifferent?) as to their actual appearance (ingression) in the material world.  I think this implies that emanation from eternal objects to the material world is not willed, or not self-willed.  Instead I think this way of looking at emanation suggests a spontaneous process (I almost wrote ‘natural process’ but I want to avoid the naturalistic implications of that term.)  Emanation is a kind of overflowing like the way light emerges from the Sun as an overflowing of the sun’s activity, a metaphor that both Plato and Plotinus use for emanation. 

5.  One of the ways that I study Platonism is to take passages like this and then unpack them by allowing them to lead me where they will.  I compare it to musical improvisation; the musician is given a subject, usually a melody, sometimes a chord progression, sometimes a structure, and then allows the musical elements to, in a way, speak for themselves by allowing them to take the lead.  This differs from fully notated music, though even in fully notated music there are many choices the musician has to make in order to bring the music to a full performance.  

I find this approach works with Platonism because the richness of the Platonic themes, or melodies, gives me a lot to work with in my philosophical improvisation.  

Disappearing into Vastness

 24 September 2023 

Disappearing into Vastness

I’ve been thinking about the path of Platonism and its realization.  When I say I’ve been ‘thinking’ about this, I mean that I wonder how I might explain the path and its realization to someone new to Platonism.  ‘Path and realization’ are a kind of broad perspective, or overview, of Platonism; this contrasts with focusing on specific practices, or particular writings, or specific issues in the history of Platonism.  Here are a few thoughts derived from thinking about this:

1.  Overall, the journey as understood in Platonism is a letting go of differentiation and distinctiveness and a movement toward the less differentiated and the less distinctive.  It is a movement from that which is separated from other things and stands apart from other things, to that which unifies things, in other words a journey to unity itelf, or the One; it is a Return to the One.

2.  On a personal level, this Platonic journey is a letting go of one’s own distinctiveness and uniqueness and moving instead to comprehending oneself as a human being as such rather than as a unique individual.  This is not the final goal, but it is a step on the path of Platonism.  

This is a shift in awareness rather than a shift in material qualities or circumstances.

3.  On a social level, this Platonic journey is a letting go of attachments to social distinctions as defining one’s nature.  Again, this is a shift of awareness rather than a shift in material circumstances or qualities.  I mean that the practitioner remains someone with a particular status in society, with a particular job, who is biologically related to particular people, and so forth.  But these distinctions are no longer compelling or thought of as guiding the life journey.  

4.  This shift resembles how concerns we had when we were young no longer have importance for us when we reach a certain age.  Most of us have the experience of collecting some kind of objects when we were young, often competing with others in this regard.  When I was young many kids in my age cohort collected baseball cards.  A more recent generation often collected cards for a game called ‘Magic: the Gathering.’  Almost everyone can recall something along these lines such as collecting materials about some singer or actor who is famous for your generation.

At some point in life we lose interest in these collections.  Often this happens when we go away to college; we return home for a semester break or some holiday, and we find the collection still on our desk, or in a drawer, or in a box in the closet.  But it no longer interests us.  We can remember how passionate we were about acquiring the collection, but that is just a memory now.

This is the kind of shift I am referring to, but it is also focused on our interior states of mind, not only on exterior things.

5.  This journey, this Return to the One, continues as we step by step drop our identifications with differentiation and individuation.  This can be difficult, sometimes very difficult.  But as we practice contemplation, purification, and renunciation we slowly cultivate a habit of doing so.  

6.  It is like a cloud deciding to rest in the awareness of the sky.  The sky precedes the cloud.  The cloud changes, but the sky is eternal.

7.  This shift from cloud to sky is what happens when we no longer look at our thoughts, feelings, emotions, and tendencies as secure objects.  In contemplation we enter into a spaciousness where the thoughts, feelings, emotions, and tendencies are clouds in the spaciousness of Mind.  This feels similar to the way we let go of our accumulated collections from when we were young.  But in this case we release the collections of our opinions, our feelings, our emotions, and our tendencies, to the best of our ability.

8.  This process resembles what happens when we hear the last chord of a piece of music.  What follows is silence into which the music has disappeared.  The silence was there all along.

9.  This Return to the One means connecting to the source of all things.  The source of all things precedes individuality and its concerns.

10.  A drop of water finds its home in a cloud.  The cloud cools and the drop of water becomes rain.  The drop of rainwater falls into the ocean.

11.  Plato offers several descriptions of the philosopher in his Dialogues, notably in Phaedo and Theatetus.  In these passages, Plato refers to the ineptness of the philosopher in ordinary social situations.  This makes sense; if my attention is focused on the One, on the journey of Return, this diminishes the concerns we have with the activities of the material world and their importance.

12.  It’s like a ray of light that goes through a prism and separates into a multitude of colors.  The rays of colored light then flow out of a window and return to the original light.

13.  It is like incense smoke dispersing in the wind.

14.  Returning to the One means returning to that which is beyond affirmation and negation, beyond understanding.  It is a kind of disappearance, a disappearing into vastness.

Analysis and Its Function in the Platonic Tradition

16 September 2024

Analysis and Its Function in the Platonic Tradition

I have been reading Plotinus the Platonist by David J. Yount.  In the past I have used Yount’s books as reference books, meaning that I dove into them here and there, depending on the particular subject I was interested in.  This time I intend to read his books from cover to cover.  The second book is Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics.  They aren’t huge volumes, but they contain a huge amount of information.

I just finished Chapter 1 of Plotinus the Platonist which Yount refers to as containing his most ‘controversial claims.’  Yount’s approach is to state his understanding of a particular matter of interpretation and then briefly quote scholars who oppose his perspective.  Yount then attempts to counter the scholars who disagree with him.  This makes for a complex texture though I didn’t find it forbidding; partly, I think, this is because Yount doesn’t go off on tangents, which is sometimes a temptation in philosophical writing.

This approach also introduces the reader to the multitude of contemporary interpretations regarding Plato, Plotinus, and the relationship between them.  There is a wide range of such interpretations.  I was aware of this from reading a lot of commentaries on Phaedo when I was posting here about that Dialogue.  But Yount covers a lot more views and topics.

This got me thinking about the (inherent?) instability of these kinds of analyses.  I mean that there never seems to be a conclusion that is reached or a kind of settling down to a general agreement.  Primarily this is due to our living in the third level, or hypostasis, that is to say the material world, which is distinctively marked by differentiation and an inability to achieve unity.  Secondarily, this is due to the way modern philosophy views itself as part of the heritage of analytic philosophy which emerged in the early 20th century.  Analytic philosophy is all about splitting concepts, winning arguments by redefining concepts, creating sub-categories, simply for the sake of doing so.  In this way the analytic tradition sometimes resembles the Gnosticism that Plotinus critiqued because both traditions very much enjoy multiplying concepts beyond necessity.  

This situation, the multitude of interpretations on many issues of Platonic Philosophy that are all vying for acceptance, also got me thinking about what is the function of analysis in Platonic philosophy.  Platonism is a highly intellectual tradition and it has generated some of the greatest intellects of history from Aristotle to Whitehead.  But there is analysis, and then there is ‘analysis.’  Here are a few comments about this:

1.  I think one way of looking at this kind of analysis is to compare it to music theory.  Music theory looks at a piece of music and seeks to point out the underlying structures that are below the surface and hold the music together.  But different analyses will highlight different aspects of the same music.  In a similar way, different analyses of Platonic thought will highlight different aspects of the Platonic tradition.

2.  In some cases, it seems to me that some of these analyses are mere ‘mental fabrications’ or ‘speculations’ which are a kind of churning of the intellect.  Some of them do not seem to me to lead to clarity or insight; but that might be because I don’t understand what, in these cases, is being advocated.  As I have previously mentioned, I ran into these kinds of mental fabrications when I studied Buddhism.  In some ways they are attractive, but they don’t seem to have any real impact on practice.  That is to say whether or not I agree with one of these ‘tenet systems’ does not change or deepen my meditation or my ability to embody Buddhist ethics.  In that sense, they are disconnected from the life of a Buddhist practitioner.  I think the same can be said of some of the contemporary analyses of Platonism.

3.  This tendency to over-analyze and over-interpret Platonism appears to me to run counter to the purpose of experiencing Nous, or the second hypostasis, or the second level of reality. This level is usually referred to as ‘Intellect,’ sometimes ‘Intellectual Principle’ but I think that what the second level is about differs from the kinds of analyses I am expressing skepticism about.  Nous is a realm of unities and includes such unities as numbers, being, and the forms.  The experience of Nous brings us closer to the One which is pure unity and absence of differentiation.  When Nous is referred to as intellect, in a traditional Platonic context that means using the mind to uncover unity where unity was not previously accessible or known.  This is why devices like allegory, metaphor, simile, and other ‘comparisons’ of this kind are used in Platonism; because these devices are excellent for pointing to hidden unities.  But this way of approaching Platonic analysis is nearly the opposite of analysis that seeks to divide, separate, and is focused on the multiplication of mind-created entities.

4.  What Yount does in his two books is to point out what unites Plato and Plotinus rather than what separates them.  And by implication Yount is pointing to what unites the Platonic tradition as a whole.  This was how Plato and Plotinus were understood for over 1,000 years.  I think it is a good thing to return to that perspective.

Orthodox Platonism

9 September 2024

Orthodox Platonism

“There is no question that Plotinus thought himself to be an orthodox Platonist – whatever that meant exactly in the 3rd century CE . . . “

Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus and Platonism, posted at academia (dot) edu

The use of the phrase “orthodox Platonist”, which shifted in my own mind to “Orthodox Platonism” struck me as efficacious.  It was the phrase I had been looking for to distinguish my own perspective on Platonism.  Here are a few comments on this usage:

1.  Traditions that self-identify as ‘Orthodox’ (such as Orthodox Christianity, Orthodox Judaism, and so forth) mean, I think, that they regard certain founding truths and practices of their tradition to be essential for that tradition.  Orthodox traditions are reluctant to jettison received aspects of their tradition.  

Applying this to Platonism, Orthodox Platonism has the same relationship to the teachings that are found in the ancient sources of Platonism such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus; that is to say Orthodox Platonists are reluctant to jettison teachings found in these documents simply for the sake of aligning themselves with contemporary views.  An example of this would be rebirth; Orthodox Platonists find rebirth to be central to Platonism and not something that should be marginalized for the sake of agreeing with the widespread materialism of our time.

2.  Orthodox Platonism, like other Orthodox traditions, has an attitude of respect towards its past.  Orthodox Platonism regards Sages like Plato and Plotinus as insightful to a degree that makes them almost superhuman.  In such a context it is appropriate to approach their works with deference, to assume that what they are saying is accurate and valuable, and to assume that if I don’t understand a passage that it is likely that is because of my own limitations rather than the limitations of the author.  

This differs from the attitude of suspicion with which people today approach the past.  There is a kind of cynicism towards the past and its Sages, as if because we are modern we automatically know more than they did, as if we have nothing to learn from them except what we need to overcome.  There is also a lack of generosity in the contemporary approach.  For example, if I come across a passage that refers to an outdated cosmology, such as a geocentric view, as a modernist, I tend to regard that as proof that the author has nothing to say, no insights to offer, nothing of value.  Even a very minor remark that clashes in this way will be used to dismiss everything the author has to say.  This is very unfortunate.  If we think about our own lives, and the number of times our own opinions have been wrong, it is likely to be very numerous.  And this is true of many people we know.  But we tend to be generous to ourselves in matters like this and, at the same time, very harsh and judgmental towards authors from the past.

3.  Orthodox traditions tend to emphasize commitments that we might think of as distinctive practices.  Orthodox traditions tend to have distinctive ways of life that are foundational for the tradition.  These regulations may apply to types of food that are acceptable, clothing, manners of speaking, and other everyday activities.  

In Platonism these teachings are found scattered among various documents.  Most notably they are found in passages in the Phaedo.  They include items such as vegetarianism/veganism, sexual restraint up to and including chastity, refraining from harming others, refraining from charging for spiritual teachings, refraining from ostentatious and luxurious clothing, and so forth.  These kinds of practices in a Platonist context have been sidelined for a long time, many centuries.  But from an Orthodox Platonist perspective, they are significant practices and teachings.

4.  When Gerson frames Plotinus as an Orthodox Platonist, I think Gerson means that Plotinus embodies an Orthodox praxis as well as Orthodox views and understandings of the Platonic tradition.  I think it is difficult for us to think of such a thing as Platonist Orthodoxy because we are used to encountering what I refer to as ‘hyphenated Platonism.’  What I mean by ‘hyphenated Platonism’ are interpretations that merge Platonism with other traditions.  The most significant example would be Christian Platonism which has had a big influence on Christianity and the West as a whole.  Orthodox Platonism is Platonism before Platonism was hyphenated.

5.  We are also used to presentations of Platonism that simply ignore Platonic teachings that do not align with contemporary assumptions.  I mentioned rebirth before as one of these, but there are others.  In contemporary materialism, rebirth is considered to be a ‘superstition’ and not worthy of serious consideration.  This is so pervasive in the West that Western Buddhists routinely reject the teachings on rebirth found in Buddhism on the grounds that such a teaching is a backwards superstition.  This kind of an attitude makes it very difficult to even approach some of the teachings found in the Dialogues or the Enneads.  The idea of Orthodox Platonism can function as a kind of shelter for these teachings, a place where such teachings are taken seriously.

6.  A standard view of Orthodoxy is that such traditions are rigid and they are unable to adapt to new insights.  I think many people view Orthodox traditions as lacking in the give and take of debate and not allowing for differences in interpretation.  A closer look offers a different picture.  Orthodox traditions have their disputes, and actively participate in debates on many issues.  I think of these disputes in an Orthodox context as resembling disputes among musicians as to how to interpret a musical phrase; some musicians may place the emphasis on a certain beat, while others on a different beat, or they might dispute with each other as to the pace of a musical phrase, and so forth.  But at the center of the disputes is the music itself and it is all done in the spirit of working out a performance that communicates to others.

In a similar way, Orthodox Platonist Sages may disagree with each other about the nature of the One, about the specifics of dialectic, about how to interpret a particularly difficult passage in Plato or Plotinus.  But like the above mentioned musicians, it is all in the spirit of communicating meaning to others.  

This differs from the kind of dispute often found today where the dispute might be whether or not a piece of music has any value at all.  Or whether or not ancient teachings of any kind have any value.  

7.  Returning to the topic of hyphenated Platonism, I think that Platonism first became hyphenated roughly between the 3rd and 6th centuries CE.  There were two sources: Christian Theurgy and Pagan Theurgy.  Both of these traditions substituted the pursuit of ritual efficacy for wisdom; in Christianity this was the Eucharist, for Pagans such as Iamblichus, Julian, and Proclus, it was the theurgic practices found in various Pagan traditions.  From the perspective of Orthodox Platonism, both the Pagans and Christians of that period were creating a hybrid (I almost wrote ‘heterodox’) interpretation of Platonism.  This resulted in the sidelining of practices such as a vegetarian diet and an altered view of the fully transcendental, an altered view of the soul and its relationship to the transcendental, and an altered view of the path to the transcendental. 

That was a long time ago.  As far as I know, there has been no ‘Orthodox Platonist’ presence since that time; although I think it is possible to detect such a presence in some individuals.  Recovering Orthodox Platonism is not an easy task considering that it runs counter to centuries of accepted interpretations of Platonism (of the hyphenated kind) as well as running counter to widely accepted dogmas of materialism and naturalism.  But I am optimistic.  I think it is possible at this point in history to relate to Platonism on its own terms, to see Platonism as a spiritual tradition that offers a way to free ourselves from the sorrows of material existence.  That is what Orthodox Platonism is about.