Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 47

19 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 47

1.  I’ve been spending time rereading Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals and I think it is a very fine example of a Platonic treatise.  Porphyry integrates many aspects of Platonic philosophy in his extended apology for vegetarianism.  He does this by placing the practice of vegetarianism in the context of both Platonic ethics and Platonic metaphysics.

What impresses me this time around is how Porphyry understands the necessity of ethical ascetic practice for purification to take place and for the divine ascent to the One to happen.  This differs from many spiritual groups I have observed over the decades.  There is a strong tendency in some groups to minimize ethical practice.  By ‘ethical practice’ I mean the commitment to ethical guidelines and regulations such as those found in traditional Dharmic traditions.  In Dharmic traditions these are usually encoded in precepts that outline these ethical commitments such as non-harming, non-stealing, refraining from alcohol, and so forth.  In Platonism the ethical regulations are scattered among different dialogues but the two dialogues that stand out in this regard are Phaedo and The Republic. 

The way I look at this is that the ethical precepts, which are all restraints on types of behavior, function as a kind of vessel, or bowl, or goblet, for holding the practice of contemplation, or creating the context for contemplation.  Many Westerners, it seems, have the view that contemplation by itself is sufficient for realization and that adherence to a set of ethical restraints are not causally related to the insights and realizations that the practice of contemplation offers.  But Porphyry makes a direct connection between the practice of ethical restraints, such as vegetarianism, and effecacious contemplation; a point Porphyry makes several times in his work On Abstinence.

What happens when contemplation is done outside of the context of ethical restraints?  What happens is that the insights, energy, and realizations that contemplation brings in such a context become value free experiences; and being value free they can be used for any purpose.  This resembles learning how to swing a baseball bat.  Someone who has learned how to swing a bat in the context of the rules of the baseball game will bring his fellow teammates much pleasure and fans will also be happy about such skill.  But someone who has no interest in the rules of baseball can use the bat to break a window, or even to break some bones.  The skill of swinging a baseball bat is a value free skill and how it is used depends on the context in which that skill is used.

I am suggesting that contemplation outside of the context of ethical restraints and asceticism is similarly problematic.  If looked at in this way, it helps us to understand why some individuals who have meditated for many years, and can guide others in the practice of meditation or contemplation, are sometimes examples of ethically challenged lives; they break the window of their lives and leave behind them much suffering.  In extreme cases this can result in a practitioner of contemplation or meditation encouraging mayhem.  Unfortunately, this has been observed more than once.

There is a feeling that this kind of analysis has to be wrong because contemplation is innately transformative.  The conclusion would follow, then, that someone who behaves badly could not be an actual contemplative, that they must not really understand what contemplation means.  Beyond the fact that this is a classic ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy, I think this kind of analysis, or view, of contemplation underestimates the ability of insight and spiritual experiences to be used in a value-free way.  There are, for example, corporations who want their employees to meditate because their employees are more focused and therefore more productive when they meditate; this is a good example of value free spiritual practice. 

My overall point about Porphyry is that his understanding of Platonism is wholistic; I mean that Porphyry views the practices of purification and ethical restraint as foundational for Platonic practice and it is upon this foundation that contemplation takes place and blossoms.  Or to return to the previous metaphor, the practices of ethical restraint are the vessel which allows the practitioner to drink from the nectar of contemplation; without that vessel the realizations of contemplative practice will spill onto the ground and disappear from sight.

2.  Plato returns to his hermitage after a long morning walk.  The hermitage is located in the hills between two valleys.  There are a lot of oak trees and the foliage is mostly grass.  There is a creek running through the landscape that flows out of the valley at one end.

Plato sits at a table where the notebook he is writing in lies open.  After getting comfortable Plato continues his writing.  He is writing another dialogue which, he thinks, he might finish in another thousand years, perhaps two thousand.

3.  I have for a long time had difficulty with the idea of ‘matter’ in Platonic philosophy.  As I have said in a previous post, perhaps more than one, I’m not convinced that matter is a necessary concept in Platonism; by that I mean I think it might be possible to present Platonism without having to resort to the idea of matter.  I’m not confident about this, though.

These thoughts returned to my mind because I was reading John Dillon’s essay “Ennead III.5: Plotinus’ Exegesis of the Symposium Myth”.  In this essay (which I found complex and not always easy to follow) comments about matter on pages 76-77 (the book is Perspectives on Plotinus).  Dillon quotes Plotinus at III 5.9.49-53, and comments on the quote, “And so we have it – without qualification, it seems – Penia is Matter."  Looking up ‘penia’ I found it means lack or deficiency.  So matter is a kind of deficiency or a lack.  Later Dillon suggests that matter is in some way associated, or ‘stands for’, the ‘irrational element in Soul’. 

But I remain puzzled.  It’s not clear to me why we need the idea of matter to explain the irrational element in Soul, or why a lack or a deficiency requires the presence of matter.  For example, a fire generates heat.  The heat diminishes with distance.  If someone sits close to a fire they will feel comfortably warm, even in winter.  If someone sits across the room, the heat from the fire will have diminished; that is to say there is a lack of heat for those sitting across the room from the fire.  And if someone is outside, the lack of heat from the fire at the hearth is so great they will likely not notice the presence of the heat from the fire.  It does not seem to me that anything additional is needed to explain the heat diminishing with distance; this kind of observation indicates that such diminishment is part of what ‘distance’ means.

Metaphysically, the greater the metaphysical distance from the One, the less unity a thing has.  But it is distance that is determinative here.

It is likely that I am missing something but as a thought experiment, what would Platonism look like without matter?

4.  When does a sunrise begin?  When does a flower start to bloom?  It is not a simple thing to make these kinds of determinations.

Similarly, spiritual insights grow in us in ways that, for the most part, are undramatic and not recognized when they first appear in our minds and hearts. 

5.  There is a book on Porphyry by Aaron P. Johnson called Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre, Cambridge University Press.  I purchased it over a year ago, maybe two years ago.  Because my interest in Porphyry has been rekindled I took it down from the shelf and have started to read it.  The book is academic, but still accessible for those with some background in Late Classical Platonism.  There are some technical issues, such as variations in the taxonomy of the divine and how the different taxonomies are related to different views on Platonist practice, which it is not always clear as to why the topic is significant.  But I find the if I slow my reading pace and take in what the author has to offer, the topics and their relationships come into focus.

But what I found very helpful is a translation of the fragments of Porphyry.  These fragments are collected in the closing section of the book.  Many of Porphyry’s books survive only in quotations from other classical authors who commented on Porphyry’s views.  These quotations are the sources for the fragments.  They are listed by topic and author.  For example, there are a lot of quotes from Porphyry that are found in various works by Saint Augustine, many more than I was aware of.  I find these quotes illuminating and even though I know they are fragments, there is enough of Porphyry in his surviving books to get a sense of where these quoted fragments might fit into Porphyry’s overall thought.

Recently I came across a paper at academia (dot) edu on what were the sources for Augustine’s understanding of Platonism.  The paper is titled “Augustine between Plotinus and Porphyry: A Possible Answer to the Problem of the Identity of the Platonicorum Libri” by Paolo Di Leo.  The paper discusses different views as to what Augustine read and studied when he was involved with Platonism; the author says that some scholars advocate for the primary source being Plotinus, others argue for Porphyry, and others for both.  It’s an interesting paper.

From the listing of fragments where Augustine is quoting Porphyry, I can see why some scholars would side with Porphyry as the primary source.  But I don’t know enough about Augustine to make an intelligent evaluation of this discussion.

It is somewhat surprising, pleasantly surprising, how influential Porphyry has been in the history of Platonism.  While I wouldn’t say that Porphyry is as influential as Plotinus, I’m gradually seeing that Porphyry’s writings have had a big impact on Platonism over the centuries.  For example, Porphyry’s On Abstinence had a significant impact on the Renaissance understanding of Platonism (see Renaissance Vegetarianism: The Philosophical Afterlives of Porphyry’s On Abstinence by Cecilia Muratori which I previously reviewed on this blog). 

It's paradoxical that Porphyry, the author of Against the Christians, seems to have had an impact on Augustine and how Augustine understood Platonism.  But perhaps the anti-Christian work of Porphyry was something Augustine may have felt a need to deal with, and from there Augustine became more familiar with what Porphyry had to say on other topics.  For example, both Porphyry and Augustine were ascetics and valued what I call the Ascetic Ideal; this would be a strong connection.

If you are interested in Porphyry, I recommend Religion and Identity.  I think you will find the thought of the author, as well as the translations of the fragments, to be helpful in studying this significant Platonist writer and practitioner.

6.  I think that one thing that links Dharmic traditions with Platonism is the way both Dharmic traditions and Platonism have a commitment to ethical teachings whose foundations are shared.  I am referring to the teachings on non-harming found in Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, and Platonism.  In Dharmic traditions non-harming, or Ahimsa, is often the first ethical Precept or Vow.  All other vows can be understood to be the application of Ahimsa to specific contexts of human life.

While in Dharmic traditions, as mentioned above, the principle of Ahimsa, or non-harming, is found in its placement at the head of lists of ethical precepts, commitments, or vows.  Platonism, as far as I know, did not generate that kind of document; that is to say, there is no listing of precepts in Platonism in the way one finds in Buddhism, Jainism, and Yoga.  This means that the teachings on non-harming are scattered in various works of Platonism from the Dialogues (see, for example, Crito) to Porphyry’s treatise On Abstinence.  There are also references to non-harming as being an ancient teaching that Platonism has inherited, though sources are not specifically mentioned (I think it is likely that they are Pythagorean and Orphic).

But the foundational nature of non-harming for Platonism and for Dharmic traditions is, I think, recognizably similar.  I say ‘similar’ rather than ‘the same’ because exactly how non-harming, or Ahimsa, works has its differences among Dharmic traditions (for example, the role that intention plays in an act of harming differs among Dharmic traditions).  It is, therefore, to be expected that there will be some differences in how Platonism applies non-harming/Ahimsa.  One thing I have noticed, which I offer as a tentative observation, is that Platonism seems to place a strong emphasis on non-retaliation as a necessary effect of non-harming; at least that is how I read Crito.  Another emphasis in Platonism is how non-harming is linked to the virtue of justice, and from there to the Platonic virtues overall.

But though there are differences, the emphasis on non-harming as such is shared.  And I think that sharing is a good reason for considering Platonism to be more closely allied to Dharmic traditions than it is to what modern philosophy has become.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 46

12 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 46

1.  In my recent reading of Timaeus my feeling was that Timaeus is an extended allegory with the Demiurge and the projects of the Demiurge being a personification of noetic realities.  I say this because it is noetic realities that bequeath the world system, or material realm, in which we live.  Looked at in this way nous is the Demiurge, or more accurately, the Demiurge is the personification of nous and the noetic realm.  Timaeus is about the nature of and order of the manifestations of becoming and begoning.  Becoming and begoning are not noetic realities, but nous is the foundation of becoming and begoning.

2.  “Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1241, 37d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

A distinguishing feature of this material realm is that it is ‘impossible to bestow eternity upon anything’ in the material world; that is because all things in the material realm are created and anything that is created will come to an end.  The closest we can come to eternity is a moving image of eternity.  The moving image of eternity with its sunrises and sunsets, with its waxing and waning moons, with its seasonal displays, is beautiful because eternity is beautiful (in a sense, the beautiful and eternity are the same).  But the beauty of the moving image of eternity means that the things of this image are temporary, whereas the beauty of eternity as such is beauty as such.

3.  Platonism has been around for over 2,000 years.  I sometimes wonder what Platonism might look like after another 2,000 years; that’s assuming that it will be around after another 2,000 years.  It’s impossible to be sure, of course, but I don’t think it is irrational or fanciful to imagine things along this line. 

Will there still be the original Greek texts of Plato and Plotinus?, or will people rely on some later translation in another language?  Platonism is one of the reasons that people are actively interested in ancient Greek and because of this the Greek texts might still be actively circulating.

Platonism has gone through many changes in its interpretation of itself; for example, there are changes on how noetic realities are understood.  In 2,000 years I think it is likely that Platonism will be interpreted through categories that we cannot imagine.

And what will the role of artificial intelligence be for Platonism?  Will we be able to download the Dialogues and the Enneads directly into our minds and ponder them through some kind of technological means?  Perhaps; but perhaps those innovations will have been cast aside.  It’s hard to say.

After 2,000 years it is likely that most of the nations here on earth will only be found in history.  But I suspect that the primary documents of Platonism will still be found and read and discussed at that time.

4.  Beauty is a central understanding of the Platonic tradition.  Some things are strikingly beautiful; for example, a sunset, or a forest path in autumn, or the desert under the full moon, and so forth.  Other things have a more hidden beauty.  When I was young, I lived for a few years on the north coast of Alaska.  The winter is severe, very cold, with snow as far as one can see in any direction.  The Brooks Range is to the south of the north coast and on clear days (which in winter only last a few hours) it can be seen, rising from the endless snow.  This is a different kind of beauty; it is glacial and stark, even threatening, but beautiful nevertheless.

5.  I understand emanation as a process of differentiation.  The One is pure unity and is, therefore, undifferentiated; that is why it lacks any sensory characteristics.  The task of the Platonist practitioner is to ‘return to the One’.  I understand this process of return as a process of de-differentiation, or the steady stepping beyond the differentiations of our material existence.  (This eventually also extends to going beyond the differentiations found in the noetic.)

De-differentiation is done through practices of equanimity, ataraxia, and most importantly, asceticism.  All the practices of de-differentiation are purifications that allow for the soul’s ascent. 

Returning to the One means becoming less and less differentiated which means less and less individuated, more and more like the One.

6.  “I [Porphyry] have shown in the previous two books [chapters], Firmus Castricius, that the eating of animal creatures contributes neither to temperance and simplicity nor to piety, which especially lead to the contemplative life, but rather opposes them.  Justice in its finest aspect is piety towards the gods, and piety is achieved especially by abstinence, so there is no need to fear that we may somehow infringe justice towards people by maintaining holiness towards the gods.  Socrates, in reply to those who argue that our end is pleasure, said that even if all hogs and he-goats agreed with this, he would not be convinced that our happiness lies in experiencing pleasure, so long as intellect rules over all. [See Philebus 67b] And we, even if all wolves and vultures approve of meat-eating, will not agree that what they say is just, so long as humans are naturally harmless and inclined to refrain from acquiring pleasures for themselves by harming others.”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 80, ISBN: 9781780938899)

6.1  This is part of the opening paragraph for Book 3 of Porphyry’s series of letters to Firmus Castricius on refraining from killing animals either for food or for ritual sacrifice.  This paragraph consolidates a number of points that Porphyry uses to support the practice of vegetarianism; for example, that eating animals undermines the virtues such as temperance, piety, and living a simple life (which I take as meaning a life with few possessions).  Porphyry particularly emphasizes how eating meat ‘opposes’ contemplation, which is a point Porphyry makes in the opening of the first Book, or letter, to Firmus.  Notice also how Porphyry states that eating meat undermines justice and holiness towards the gods. 

This is followed by Porphyry arguing against the idea that the pleasure of eating meat somehow justifies such a practice, reminding the reader that Socrates argued against such an approach to ethics. 

Porphyry also integrates the Platonic teachings on non-harming into his overall critique of killing animals.  This passage is dense with reasonings on why eating and killing animals should be avoided with the primary message being that such a practice is contrary to what it means to live a philosophical life.

6.2  Later in Book 3, at paragraphs 26 Porphyry expands on the theme of harmlessness:  “When the passions have been abased and appetite and anger have withered, and the rational part exercises the rule which is appropriate for it, assimilation to the Greater follows at once.  The Greater in the universe is altogether harmless, and itself by its power safeguards all, does good to all, and lacks nothing . . . “ (As above, page 98)

6.3 And in paragraph 27 Porphyry writes: “A man who is led by passions and is harmless only to his children and his wife, but contemptuous and aggressive towards others, is aroused and dazzled by mortal things because the irrational dominates in him.  In the same way, the man who is led by reason maintains harmlessness towards fellow-citizens too, and further still towards strangers and all human beings; he keeps irrationality subjected, and is more rational than those others and thereby also more godlike.  Thus someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other animals is more like the god . . . “ (Ibid, pages 98-99)

7.  On a Summer evening, the evening of the Summer Solstice, Plato walks through a northern Wisconsin forest on a broad path that most people do not see.  Beside Plato is a brown bear; they are walking together.  Now and then Plato scratches the bear behind the bear’s ears.  The slope of the path begins to descend to a small lake where there is a dock with Plato’s canoe tied to a post.  Sunset approaches.  Plato and the brown bear arrive at the shore of the placid lake.  They pause to look at the sunset.  The bear is glowing in the sunset light and with an inner glow as well.  The glow slowly becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes the sparks of starlight swirling in a disc like a galaxy.  The swirling light slowly fades.  Plato, standing on the shore, smiles.  The sun has disappeared but the night sky is clear.  Plato walks down the wooden dock to his canoe.  He unties it and steps into the canoe.  Plato takes a paddle and steers the canoe to the middle of the lake, turns the canoe to the right, and paddles down the middle of the lake.  The Milky Way is reflected in the water so that Plato is paddling on a path of stars.  The lake disappears.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 45

5 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 45

1.  I recently saw two youtube presentations by contemporary British philosophers.  One of them was young, about 30 years old, the other was about 60 years old.  I am not familiar with either of them.

What interested me is that both of them expressed adherence to analytic philosophy of the type that reigned in the early 20^th century in Britain.  It sounded as if nothing had changed in the century since analytic philosophy emerged.  The young philosopher praised A. J. Ayer which really surprised me.  I haven’t heard Ayer’s name even mentioned in many decades, let alone praised.  And the older philosopher when asked about how metaphysical statements can be handled if, for example, one disagrees with a metaphysical assertion, offered that “We don’t do that anymore.  We (meaning philosophers) are no longer engaged in grand metaphysical visions; rather, our mission is to clarify and narrow the discussion.”  Or something like that.

It was a strange feeling for me.  This way of talking about philosophy was widespread when I was an undergraduate many decades ago.  To see it presented unchanged after all that time was frustrating.  I’m not the only one who feels that way; I’ve heard, and read, similar observations from quite a few other people.

If I were forced to pick one single part of analytic philosophy for criticism it would be that analytic philosophy does not understand how words work, it does not understand that words are inherently ‘analogical.’  That would be my starting point.

2.  I’ve recently become aware of the writings of Hippocrates and how they emphasize non-harming.  Here are two quotes taken from the Harvard University Medical School webpage; the first one is from the Hippocratic Oath:

“I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous.”

And this second quote is from Hippocrates’s treatises on Epidemics:

“The physician must be able to tell the antecedents, know the present, and foretell the future – must meditate these things, and have two special objects in view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm.”

Hippocrates was born about 460 BCE and died about 370 BCE (about 90 years).  Various dates are given for Plato with birth ranging between 428 and 423 BCE and death at 348/347 BCE.  Hippocrates was born on the island of Cos and he is mentioned in Plato’s dialogues Protagoras and Phaedrus.

In the Protagoras there is a character named Hippocrates who is not the famous Hippocrates of Cos, the physician.  Socrates uses their common name to question the Hippocrates who is with him as they gather around the courtyard waiting to see Protagoras:

“Tell me, Hippocrates,” I said, “in your present design of going to Protagoras and paying him money as a fee for his services to yourself, to whom do you consider you are resorting, and what is it that you are to become?  Suppose, for example, you had taken it into your head to call on your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and pay him money as your personal fee, and suppose someone asked you – Tell me, Hippocrates, in purposing to pay a fee to Hippocrates [of Cos], what do you consider him to be?  How would you answer that?”

“A doctor, I would say.”

(Plato, Protagoras, translated by W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1924, page 99, 311b-c, ISBN: 9780674991835)

This indicates that Hippocrates of Cos, the physician, was well known, likely famous for his skill as a physician.  It may also indicate that Socrates had some familiarity with some of the broader teachings of Hippocrates.  I find it intriguing to think about the famous teachings on non-harming found in both Hippocrates and in dialogues such as Crito where Socrates expounds on the meaning of non-harming, and I wonder if there is some cross-fertilization.  Or perhaps this teaching on non-harming comes from a common, more ancient, source that nourished both Socrates and Hippocrates.

In Phaedrus Socrates says the following about Hippocrates:

Socrates: “Well, isn’t the method of medicine in a way the same as the method of rhetoric?”

Phaedrus:  “How so?”

Socrates: In both cases we need to determine the nature of something – of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric.  Otherwise, all we’ll have will be an empirical and artless practice.  We won’t be able to supply, on the basis of an art, a body with the medicines and diet that will make it healthy and strong, or a soul with the reasons and customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues we want.”

Phaedrus: “That is most likely, Socrates.”

Socrates: “Do you think, then, that it is possible to reach a serious understanding of the nature of the soul without understanding the nature of the world as a whole?”

Phaedrus: “Well, if we’re to listen to Hippocrates, Asclepius’ descendant, we won’t even understand the body if we don’t follow that method.”

(Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 546-547, 270b-c, ISBN: 9780872203495)

This passage does not contain a reference to non-harming.  Instead it emphasizes ethical training in ‘convictions’ and ‘virtues’.  There are several analogies operating in this passage.  One is the comparison between rhetoric and medicine, and the other is between body and soul, and that the curing of the body resembles the curing of the soul through rhetoric when rhetoric is correctly understood and taught.  The passage concludes that in order to understand the nature of the soul one needs to understand the world as a whole, which I read as meaning that which governs the whole world, specifically the world soul.

This is speculative, but it seems that Socrates was familiar with the teachings of Hippocrates.  It seems that Plato had a positive view of Hippocrates and perhaps that is attributable to the teachings on non-harming found in both of their writings.

2.1  Here is another translation of the passage from Phaedrus which I’m including because of its different emphases:

Socrates: “The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.”

Phaedrus: “How so?”

Socrates: “In both cases you must analyze a nature, in one that of the body and in the other than of the soul, if you are to proceed in a scientific manner, not merely by practice and routine, to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue.”

Phaedrus: “That, Socrates, is probably true.”

Socrates: “Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?”

Phaedrus: “If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way.”

(Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, pages 547-549, ISBN: 0674990404)

Notice that in the Fowler translation it says that to know the soul one has to know the nature of the ‘whole man’, whereas in the Nehamas and Woodruff translation it says you need to know the ‘world as a whole’.  I think this is a striking difference. 

3.  Plato doesn’t start with doubt; I mean the kind of systematic doubt that is distinctive of modern philosophy.  Plato, it seems to me, is much more accepting of the world.  That might sound odd for an ascetically inclined philosopher who often has negative things to say about the pursuit of pleasure and whose philosophy is ultimately about transcending the world.  But there is also a luminous quality about the world that Plato lives in and reveals to us.  The world is an expression of the transcendental and as such the world is, when comprehended through contemplation, the means for finding our home in eternity.

4.  If the world is all you have then the world does not have much to offer.  If the world is understood as a gate to noetic and transcendental realities, then that is the gift the world has for those who can accept such a gift.

5.  I keep running into various people making the assertion that Plotinus was a ‘rationalist’ whereas other Late Classical Platonists were not.  My understanding of ‘rationalism’ is that it is the view that reason is the final authority; when applied to religion it means that reason surpasses revelation, intuition, and so forth, as the source for religious understanding.  And I think that same understanding applies in a philosophical context.

Spinoza would be an example of a rationalist; his use of the geometric method signals this.  The same would apply to Proclus in The Elements of Theology.  But Plotinus does not use that kind of approach or method (neither does Plato).  The writing of Plotinus ebbs and flows, focuses on a point, then moves on to another point that is connected, usually, by some kind of similarity to the preceding point, or refers back to the main topic of the Ennead.  The style of Plotinus is more free form than that of Spinoza or Proclus (this is consistent with Porphyry’s description of how Plotinus wrote in The Life of Plotinus). 

Perhaps the people using this term to describe Plotinus mean something different by the term ‘rationalist’ or ‘rationalism’, but I suspect that this usage reflects a basic misunderstanding of the philosophy of Plotinus.  I say this because Plotinus uses intuition, suggestion, and most of all, contemplation as foundations for his philosophy.  I think Plotinus makes this very clear. 

5.1 It just occurred to me that those who think of Plotinus as a rationalist may do so because they do not understand what ‘contemplation’ means.  They may think of the word ‘contemplation’ as meaning something like ‘thinking about’ some topic.  But this is not what Plotinus means by contemplation; by contemplation Plotinus means going beyond reason, designation, and affirmation and negation.  This is explained in Enneads V and VI.

6.  A friend of mine recently asked me what attracted me to Platonism.  We have been friends for a very long time and my friend wondered why I dropped my affiliation to Buddhism, after decades of study and practice; and in particular why I started to identify as a Platonist which is an obscure tradition.  By ‘obscure’ my friend meant that Platonism is not normally understood to be a spiritual path, that Platonic teachings are not presented in this way in all but a few contexts.

I had not considered this question and at first I was stumped.  After a while, though, I realized that the change was primarily based on my experience of soul.  Buddhism, famously, has the doctrine of ‘no soul, anatman/anatta’.  I had learned a lot about this perspective and was skilled in communicating it to others.  But there came a time when I could no longer deny an underlying sense of continuity and unity that makes a person a person.  And at some point I could no longer deny that this underlying unity was what is meant by soul.

I didn’t immediately become a Platonist during this process of change in my basic view.  In fact, I spent a number of years wandering through various traditions trying to find a spiritual home.  Looking back, I think it was Phaedo in particular that opened the door to Platonism for me.  Over the years I had recommended Phaedo to people who wanted to understand the idea of rebirth because I think it is a clearer presentation than those found in other spiritual traditions.  So Phaedo was familiar to me.  But this time I read Phaedo focusing primarily on the arguments for the existence of soul and for the nature of soul.  That was enormously helpful and led me to want to know more about Platonism; this also indicated to me that Platonism is a spiritual tradition, or should be comprehended from a spiritual/religious perspective.

This change of affiliation wasn’t dramatic, or traumatic, for me.  Looking back, it appears to me more like the slow blossoming of a flower.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 44

28 April 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 44

1.  I’ve been thinking, more like pondering, about the division in Platonism between those who regard the soul as ‘fully descended’ and those who do not regard the soul as fully descended.  ‘Descended’ in this context means ‘descended into the material realm from higher realities; either the noetic or the ineffable transcendental of the Good and the One.  This division emerged in the late Classical Period; it was one part of various disputes between Porphyry and Iamblichus.  The dispute has left a lasting impression on the Platonist tradition.  There are those who regard the soul as always resident in the transcendental, exemplified by Plotinus, and there are those who regard the soul as separated from the transcendental, exemplified by Proclus (see the last section of the Elements of Theology).

1.1  I think my recent focus on this unresolved split within Platonism was stimulated at this time by my reading Theurgy and the Soul by Gregory Shaw; Shaw takes the view of Iamblichus and critiques Plotinus on this issue.  To be fair, Shaw’s criticism of Plotinus is nuanced in the sense that he points out where Iamblichus likely misunderstood Plotinus. Even so, I think overall that Shaw misrepresents Plotinus, but that’s to be expected from someone like myself who is so dedicated to Plotinus as a guide and an embodiment of transcendent wisdom. 

1.2  As I was thinking about this it came to me that the idea of the partial descent of the soul is not an unusual, or eccentric, view within a Platonic context.  I think partial descent is something we have all experienced.  For example, think of attending a lecture that is introducing a complex topic (perhaps in a classroom context, perhaps online, perhaps in person at a venue).  You are interested in the topic but there are parts of the lecture that you don’t understand, while there are other parts that immediately make sense.  This is a very common experience when, for example, learning a new language or beginning a branch of mathematics, and so forth.  What I want to suggest is that this is an example of a ‘partial descent’ of the topic into one’s mind.  When we have this experience, we know that our understanding is partial and that there is more to learn.  In a similar way, the partial descent of the soul into matter leaves the soul with only a partial understanding of its own place in the cosmos; more needs to be studied and understood and this is accomplished through renunciation, study, and contemplation.

1.3  There are other examples of partial descent in our experience of the world.  When the light of the moon appears in a pond, that is the partial descent of the light of the moon into the pond.  In a similar way, the soul can be thought of as analogically the partial descent of the light of the One into the pond of individuated material existence.

1.3.1  Another example, among many that can be chosen, is the material tree as an instantiation of, or emanation from, the form of treeness.  Each tree is descended from treeness but the material tree is only a partial representation of treeness.  All trees are like that; they have a limited reality here, and a transcendent reality there where treeness resides.

1.4  The partial descent of the soul also resembles the descent of higher, abstract, realities into materiality.  The descent of the One, in the sense of Unity, is partial in the material world.  The unity of a material being happens because of material beings’ participation in the One, in Unity itself.  But the unity of material beings is only a partial unity; if it were a full unity, a full descent of the One into material embodiment, then material beings would be the One itself.  The partial unity, or Oneness, of material beings is on display as becoming and begoning.  The One, and Noetic realities, do not participate in becoming and begoning, but material beings do and that is why the Oneness of material beings is only a partial Oneness.

1.5  It is my feeling that the idea of the full descent of the soul came into Platonism from Christianity.  What I am getting at is that the Christian view of fallen humanity is that because of the fall humans need an intermediary to connect with God because human beings are too sinful to make such a connection on their own.  The intermediary for Christians is Jesus who is considered to be fully human and fully Divine, fully God.  Because of this complex nature Jesus can save human beings from their fallen condition.

In a similar way, those Late Classical Platonists who argued for the full descent of the soul also argued for intermediaries, plural, consisting of the Gods of the Greek pantheon.  Through carefully constructed ritual the practitioner could contact one, or more, of these intermediaries who had the ability to lift the separated and fully descended human soul to noetic, and possibly higher, realms.

I understand that usually those who study the history of Platonism view Platonism and Paganism in the Late Classical period as deeply in opposition to Christianity; but I tend to see them as in significant ways engaged in the same project which in this case is based on the idea of the human soul as fully separated from the transcendental.

1.6  Returning to the context of Platonism and its internal disputes, I think that there has been a tendency to look at this dispute within Platonism in a way that is too analytical; in addition, there is a tendency to use language that is too technical when discussing this issue (too technical in the sense that the language used obscures rather than clarifies).  If, instead, we look at this issue through the procedures of analogy and metaphor, particular to our own experience, then the assertion that the soul is not fully descended into the material realm makes intuitive, and logical sense (logical in a Platonic sense) with a clear experiential basis.

2.  The history of Platonism gives me the impression of a very malleable tradition.  I say that because it seems that Platonism finds it easy to adapt to changing environments so that Platonism does not resist, or does not resist very much, putting on the robes of various other traditions such as Greek Paganism, Skepticism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mathematics, and so forth.  Some traditions are highly resistant to this kind of display; Jainism is one example. 

I think this is because Platonism regards the material domain as inherently unstable and in constant flux.  Looked at in this way I think it makes sense that one would accept the kind of changes and adaptations that Platonism has gone through.  The focus of Platonism is on the transcendental which is, from one perspective, ultimate otherness.  This ultimate otherness is not to be found here in the material domain; it is there in the transcendental.  From this perspective it is not a matter of first importance what robes the tradition wears.

3.  There is a social movement which is called ‘Minimalism’.  When I say ‘movement’ I don’t mean that Minimalism is very organized or that someone can attain an official certificate of Minimalism.  But there are people who act as what I would call guides to a minimalist life.

The movement is strongly devoted to simplifying one’s life by having as few things as possible, cutting back on extraneous things, or things one no longer actually needs.  Some Minimalists have very few possessions indeed.  Others are more moderate in their minimalism.

The Minimalist movement has a strong aesthetic component to it which some emphasize more than others.  I have noticed that there seems to be a Japanese aesthetic influence, which makes sense; and some of those offering Minimalist insights are Japanese.

But there is also a philosophical component.  And at times it seems some minimalists are almost taking a vow of poverty.  I haven’t run across any explicitly religious content from Minimalists; but there is a kind of sense that many minimalists are turning away from the material world having seen through its false promises.  This is often motivated by wanting to have time to do what is important in the life of a minimalist instead of their life being consumed by and wasted on the accumulation of things. 

I take all of this as a positive sign.  It indicates to me a kind of inchoate spiritual yearning.  Perhaps something profound will emerge from this.

4.  Brief is the life of a mountain.

5.  “. . . and the first requirement for a happy life is to do yourself no injury nor allow any to be done to you by others.  Of course, the first half of the requirement presents no great problem; the difficulty lies in becoming strong enough to be immune to injury – and the one and only thing that brings such immunity is complete virtue.  The same applies to a state: if it adopts the ways of virtue, it can live in peace; but if it is wicked, war and civil war will plague it.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by Travor J. Saunders, Plato: The Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1491, 829a, ISBN: 9780872203495)

“Now those who live happily must first avoid doing injustice to others and suffering injustice themselves at the hands of others.  Of these two, the former is not very difficult, but what is very difficult is acquiring the power that prevents being done injustice – this cannot be completely achieved unless one becomes completely good.  This very same thing applies to a city: if it becomes good it lives a life of peace, but it lives a life of external and internal war if it is evil.”

(Plato, Laws, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, page 219, 829a, ISBN: 0226671100)

5.1  It’s interesting to see that Plato in this passage makes an explicit case for the city and the individual as being kind of mutual analogies for each other (in the passage immediately preceding the one quoted, Plato also asserts this).  I think this suggests that the Laws, as is true of most of Plato’s dialogues, is written at multiple levels simultaneously and that the Laws is at one level a guide for how to live a good life.

It's not easy to see this in the long passages where the Laws discusses setting up various bureaus and committees in great detail; at least I find it difficult to see how this applies to my life as an individual.  But that is probably due to my own limited understanding.

5.2  It is helpful to see how Plato’s teaching on non-harming, or non-injury, makes an appearance here in his last dialogue.  Non-injury, injustice, and non-harming often have the same valence in the dialogues.

5.3  Plato seems to be suggesting that it is possible for a city, which in Plato’s day would mean a city-state which is close to what we mean by a country, can live in peace.  At other times in the Laws Plato expresses frustration that there has to be discussion about laws for acts that the three characters in the dialogue find abhorrent or disgusting; but (and you can almost hear the sigh) they have to do so because human beings have tendencies in those directions and they must be dealt with.  My conclusion is that Plato likely leans to the view that a City living in peace (both internally and externally) is probably a utopian fantasy.