Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 50

9 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 50

1.  It is very difficult to pursue a life of renunciation at this time, in this culture.  I watched a video on youtube the other day that was an announcement by a Buddhist monastic that he was no longer going to practice as a monk as he had decided to continue practicing and teaching Buddhism as a layman.  I have seen this before.  And not just among Buddhist monastics.  I have also seen young Christian monastics announce a similar change in their life on youtube (and this kind of thing also likely appears on other social media platforms).

There are common themes in these stories.  One is a sense of isolation, which is often mentioned by Buddhist monastics in the West.  Often they are trying to live a monastic life on their own which is very difficult.  At a another level, those going through this change often mention that the culture as a whole, and the spirit of the time, finds a life of renunciation baffling; more than a few configure such a life as a life for losers.

For those who think of Platonism as a path of renunciation and asceticism these stories are cautionary tales.  Platonism never developed (as far as I know) an institutional monasticism.  Platonism encourages asceticism but the tradition seems to leave the application of its ascetic principles up to the individual practitioner.  This is a challenge that can, at times, be difficult to apply in one’s life.

One way of accepting this challenge is to think of other activities that are done primarily by individuals; I mean things like gardening, baking, and so forth.  There are many people who devote a lot of time to cultivating their garden without having any kind of institutional support or membership requirements.  For such people gardening is its own reward.

In a similar way, a life lived in accordance with the principles of asceticism is its own reward; that reward being transcendence and the understanding of eternity.  It is the garden of the soul that is cultivated by the Platonist ascetic.

2.  I think one of the differences between what I call contemplative Platonism and theurgic Platonism is the range of ethical concern.  Contemplative Platonists tend to include animals in the embrace of their ethical concern.  In contrast, theurgic Platonists tend to ignore the inclusion of animals in an ethical embrace.

I started thinking along these lines when I came across the curriculum for studying Plato’s Dialogues that Iamblichus developed.  The Republic is not included; neither is Crito.  Both of those dialogues offer teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation.  And I wonder if they were excluded for that reason.

In the writings of Plutarch on vegetarianism there is an emphasis on the mistreatment of animals when they are slaughtered.  This is considered ethically wrong by Plutarch, as it is by Porphyry.  Such concern is simply absent from those advocating for a theurgic approach to Platonism.  Perhaps this is a consequence of displacing wisdom for ceremonial efficacy.

The consequences of this lack of ethical concern for animals resulted in huge quantities of animals being sacrificed under Julian; I’m not aware of any objections to this consequence coming from those with a theurgic orientation.

And this lack of ethical concern for animals by theurgists continues into the present time.  Two books on theurgy I recently read do not bring up this perspective even in sections where they discuss blood sacrifice.  I find this absence striking.

It may be the case that I am overly concerned with this or unduly sensitive; after all most Platonists do not comment on it.  Perhaps my perspective on this issue arises because I do not think of human beings as particularly suited to a spiritual life or to making advances on the spiritual path.  I tend to think that other lifeforms also have this capacity and maybe even have a greater capacity than humans do.  This is eccentric, I know, and I’m not aware of a Platonist source that speaks from this perspective.  Perhaps this is because I am more pessimistic about humans and their spiritual capacities than most people.  But if you do have this perspective (I mean the perspective that considers at least some animals as having spiritual potential as great as, or greater than, that of human beings) then this creates a tendency to see these animals as worthy of ethical concern.

3.  For a long time I have been interested in how the word ‘Neoplatonism’ took hold.  I know it is a modern word, of recent origin, but I have not been able to track down the actual person and the actual book in which ‘Neoplatonism’ first appears.

I had been told by several people that ‘Neoplatonism’ had emerged in Germany during the 1700’s, or around that time.  Some told me that it had been used in a German history of philosophy by Brucher, or Brucker, called Historia Critica Philosophiae.  This was published from 1742 to 1744 in Leipzig; it was five volumes.  I found a copy of the book at Internet Archive where I discovered that the book was written in Latin.  It appears to have been a great success and very influential (for example, Schopenhauer liked it and recommended it).

An English translation by William Enfield appeared in 1766 to 1767 in six volumes.  Enfield also published a condensation of the work in one volume.  I was able to get a copy of this condensation (a little under 700 pages) from a reprint house at a very reasonable price.  I don’t find the word ‘Neoplatonism’ in it; but it is interesting that the section on Plotinus is relentlessly hostile.  I will probably post about this at some time in the future.

Frustrated at not being able to find the specifics on the first usage of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ I finally decided to ask ChatGPT; friends of mine had made me aware of how to use it and how to frame questions so that you get a useful answer.  I asked ChatGPT who first used the word ‘Neoplatonism’ and in what book it first appears.  ChatGPT came up with Schleiermacher and that the word appears in Schleiermacher’s translation of the works of Plato.  The first volume of these translations was released in 1804 and continued his whole life (he was born in 1768 and died in 1834).  In addition to the translations,  Schleiermacher wrote introductory essays to the dialogues and the word ‘Neoplatonism’, according to ChatGPT, first appears in one of these essays.  This seems plausible to me.  Fortunately, some reprint houses have collected Schleiermacher’s introductory essays on the dialogues of Plato, translated into English, at a cheap price so I will be able to see for myself how it is used in that context.  (As an aside, I’m aware that ChatGPT isn’t always accurate in its responses to questions and for that reason I regard the Schleiermacher attribution tentative.)

I realized that if it was in Germany that the usage of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ first appeared, then perhaps I should ask AI questions using the German word.  When I did this two additional candidates for first usage came up (the German word is ‘Neuplatonismus’).  The first was Karl Friedrich Hermann who wrote ‘History und System der Platonischen Philosophie’ (History and System of Platonic Philosophy) in 1839.  The second was Heinrich von Stein who wrote ‘Sieben Bucher zur Geschichte des Platonismus’ (Seven Books on the History of Platonism) in 1864.  Laid out chronologically:

1804    Schleiermacher

1839    Karl Friedrich Hermann

1864    Heinrich von Stein

The conclusion seems to be that the use of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ appeared in Germany in the early 19^th century and likely spread from there.  German philosophy was very influential at that time, even in England where the British Idealists were emerging.  I find it remarkable to see how rapidly this reconfiguration of the history of Platonism spread.

Perhaps I’m being a bit obsessive regarding the history of the word ‘Neoplatonism.’  My feeling about the word is that it distorts both the history of Platonism and makes it more difficult to understand the continuities of Platonism over the centuries.  I often hear (on Youtube, for example) that “Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism.”  The statement is a great distortion of the Platonic tradition as a whole, and of Plotinus in particular.  There is probably nothing that can be done to undermine its usage at this time; on the other hand, there are examples of well-known Platonists who have rejected the use of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ so I’m not the only one who finds the word problematic. 

4.  I have tended to think of Platonism as outside of the non-dual versus dual discussions; my feeling has been that Platonism could be interpreted from a non-dual perspective because the One is the only thing that is truly real (keeping in mind that the One is not actually a thing).  On the other hand, Platonism could be thought of as dualistic because the One is understood in Platonism as transcendental to, and beyond, any material manifestations.  My feeling has been that the non-dual versus dual debate arose in an Indian context and because of this the distinction doesn’t really apply to Platonism.

But I’m beginning to think of Platonism as a dualistic system along the lines of classical Yoga.  As readers of this blog know, I have the view that Platonism is closer to the Dharma teachings of India than it is to contemporary Western philosophy.  Because I have a decades long background in Buddhism my tendency has been to compare Platonism to Buddhism; I do this almost automatically because of my long-term studies of Buddhism; that is to say, I have a tendency to interpret Platonism through a Buddhist lens.

But lately I have been thinking that Platonism is closer to Classical Yoga than it is to Buddhism.  First, Platonism does not have the view of emptiness that is so important a part of the Buddhadharma.  In Platonism, things are not viewed as empty, rather things are understood to be emanations from the transcendental source, and because of this, things can function as a door to higher realities such as the noetic and the One.  I’m not sure if this aligns with classical Yoga; my sense is that in some ways it does and in other ways it doesn’t.  The two traditions align in that they don’t see things as empty in the way Buddhism does, but I’m not sure how Yoga would view the Platonic view that things are emanated from a primal source.  More study is needed on my part to clarify this.

Second; closely related to the above mentioned view of emptiness is that both Classical Yoga and Platonism accept the reality of the soul.  In contrast, Buddhism has the view of no-soul (anatman/anatta).  For me personally, my awakening to the reality of soul was pivotal in moving away from a Buddhist analysis.  How Classical Yoga and Buddhism interpret the soul does seem to differ on a number of points.  Platonism seems to include a large number of what moderns might consider mental functions, such as reason, as part of soul, whereas Classical Yoga tends to separate those functions from soul and place them in mind.  This is a complex subject, one that is worth investigating, but it remains the case that both Platonism and Classical Yoga are very concerned with the nature of soul.

Third, both classical Yoga and classical (ancient) Platonism are ascetic traditions and both of these traditions see asceticism as causally necessary for walking their respective spiritual paths.  This is a significant commonality between the two traditions.  I also think that both traditions do not view asceticism as merely instrumental; rather asceticism aligns the soul of the practitioner with the nature of the transcendental.

Another perspective shared by Platonism and Yoga is that they both regard the transcendental, or the ultimate, as beyond, or prior to, mental formations such as thoughts, feelings, emotions, memories, dreams, tendencies, hopes, habits, fears, and so forth.  This contrasts with modern Western Philosophical traditions which tend to understand their task as clarifying thoughts as to their meaning and their implications (this is especially strong in the analytic tradition). 

A difference between Classical Yoga and Platonism is that Classical Yoga doesn’t talk about a noetic dimension which in Platonism plays a significant role.  The noetic reality is why numbers, which reside in the noetic hypostasis, or level of reality, are a meaningful presence, and in Platonism have spiritual implications.  I don’t get the impression that numbers, and other noetic realities, are of concern to Classical Yoga.

5.  Plato walks into a bar and orders a non-alcoholic beer.  He sits down at a table.  An ancient woman of youthful beauty joins Plato and also orders a non-alcoholic beer.  Plato greets Athena and asks her what she’s been doing the last thousand years.  Athena laughs and says she has been in contemplation.  “I’ve had plenty of time for contemplation since the great vanishing of the temples.”  Plato laughed.

The bar turns into the portico of an Academy dedicated to teaching those who love wisdom.  “Shall we join them?” Plato asks.  “Why not?  Let’s find out what the youngsters are saying these days.”

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 49

2 June 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 49

1. “Sophia, wisdom: non-hypothetical knowledge; knowledge of what always exists; knowledge which contemplates the cause of beings.”

(Plato, Definitions, translated by D. S. Hutchinson, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1682, 414b, ISBN: 0872203492)

This is the definition given in a work called Definitions.  Most collections of Plato’s works do not include it.  According to Wikipedia the only English translation currently available is by Hutchinson in the Complete Works published by Hackett.  Definitions was previously translated by George Burgess in his multi-volume Works of Plato which might be available through reprint houses.  I have not found any commentaries on this work, though there might be one tucked away somewhere in some library

Definitions purports to contain the definitions used by Plato in his Academy, as well as by subsequent generations.  There is a view that was held by Ficino and others that Definitions was written, or collected, by Speusipus who was Plato’s nephew and the second head of the Academy.    I just recently read it and found it interesting.

I particularly like the ‘knowledge of what always exists’ definition, though the word ‘exists’ might give rise to misunderstanding if we take ‘exist’ to mean the same thing as when we say a table exists.  I don’t think it is wrong to say that the transcendental exists if that is meant in the sense of causation; meaning that the transcendental is constantly generating, or emanating, material things.

A good definition resembles an axiom in mathematics; I mean that a good definition can lead to further knowledge.  For this reason, I can understand why Plato’s Academy would want to put energy into a list of definitions.

2.  Plato walks into a university class.  It is a graduate level seminar on transfinite numbers.  At a crucial moment in the class Plato makes a comment that resonates with everyone and leads them into new directions of thought.  After the class is over several students want to talk to Plato, but he is nowhere to be found.

3.  One of the ongoing puzzles in life is how to evaluate people who have done something negative, something morally reprehensible.  In the arts this question appears in contexts where some artist, poet, composer, and so forth, produces attractive aesthetic objects, but their life includes examples of negative and harmful behavior.  There is a feeling among many people involved in the arts that in some way the arts reform persons involved in the arts, that such involvement leads to, or springs from, a personality more advanced than the average; but that does not seem to be the case.  Someone might compose beautiful music, or write beautiful poetry, yet at the same lead an unadmirable life.

We can apply this kind of discrepancy to many different fields, including philosophy.  There are famous examples of 20^th century philosophers who were involved in damaging political movements, yet at the same time many people think that they wrote insightful works.  How is it possible that someone could have insight in one area of philosophy and yet be completely blind to a nefarious political context?

In my opinion, it is asceticism that creates a context so that this kind of discrepancy is less likely to arise.  I wouldn’t say it is impossible that this kind of discrepancy would arise in the context of ascetic practice, but I do think it is less likely.  I say this because asceticism is a withdrawal from involvement in the world and a movement towards the transcendental.  The transcendental is the source of great peace.  Great peace soothes the mind and cools desires.  And it is this that creates a context where such discrepancies are more unlikely to materialize.

4.  “Chaerephon:  You (Socrates) are right; today does seem to be a halcyon day, and yesterday was much like it.  But by the gods, Socrates!  How can we actually believe those ancient tales, that once upon a time birds turned into women or women into birds?  All that sort of thing seems utterly impossible.

“Socrates: Ah, my dear Chaerephon, we seem to be utterly short-sighted judges of what is possible or impossible – we make our assessment according to the best of our human ability, which is unknowing, unreliable, and blind.  Many things which are feasible seem, to us, not feasible, and many things which are attainable seem unattainable – often because of our inexperience, and often because of the childish folly in our minds.  For in fact all human beings, even very old men, really do seem to be as foolish as children, since the span of our lives is small indeed, no longer than childhood when compared with all eternity.  My good friend, how could people who know nothing about the powers of the gods and divinities, or of nature as a whole, possibly tell whether something like this is possible or impossible?”

(Plato, Halcyon, translated by Brad Inwood, Plato: Complete Works, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1715, (no Stephanus Numbers), ISBN: 9780872203495)

Ancient sources attribute Halcyon to Plato, but others say the attribution is incorrect.  Some sources attribute Halcyon to Lucian, but that might not fit in with other attributions and it seems the connection to Lucian has been abandoned by most scholars though it is also sometimes included in collections of the works of Lucian.  It seems that Halcyon was not included with the works that Stephanus used to number and organize the dialogues and for this reason Halcyon lacks such numbers.

Nevertheless, the Hackett edition of Plato’s complete works includes it with this background information; I believe that decision is based on early inclusions of Halcyon in lists of Plato’s Dialogues, but I’m not completely sure of that.

Personally, I’m glad it was included.  It is a very short dialogues; a little over two pages.  For such a short dialogue it has excellent literary qualities that make it attractive.  And it covers, from a different perspective, a question raised in other dialogues, such as how can we take seriously fantastic tales and myths; that is to say how are we to read them?  (See, for example, Phaedrus.) 

I see Halcyon as a kind of meditation, or reminder, of the limits of human knowledge.  The dialogue argues for a sense of humility and that many things we think of as fantastic might be true, or partially true.

5.  I love having discussions.  I dislike having debates; I avoid debates.  The primary difficulty with debates is that they are structured in such a way that the winner is simply the person who is better at debating.  But this has no relationship to whether or not they are pursuing truth or the truth or falsity of what they have affirmed.

When I say I love having discussions I mean that I am just as fond of having a discussion with someone who disagrees with me as I am with someone who agrees with me.  What is the difference between a discussion and a debate?  One difference, I think, is that in a discussion the two, or more, parties have regard for each other and, in a sense, no one is trying to win; instead it is more like making an attempt to inform.  People may change their minds in a discussion, but whether they do or don’t is really beside the point; the point is about cultivating a relationship of openness and trust.

I don’t think it is possible to have a philosophical debate because the structure of a debate excludes dialectic.  But it is possible to have a discussion that is based on dialectic.

6.  Every day we interact with non-sensory realities.  They are very common.  For example, every day we interact with numbers.  And many days we encounter beauty. 

I think of these encounters with non-sensory realities as encounters with the Messengers of the Divine, or Messengers whose job it is to give ordinary people, and living beings, an opportunity to experience, or intuit, the transcendental. 

Thales is famous for saying, as quoted in Aristotle, that ‘all things are full of gods.’  I think the Messengers, meaning numbers, the presence of beauty, and other embodiments of transcendence, are an example of Platonic Grace.  They come to us from the One not as a planned act of benevolence, but because it is the nature of the One to offer all living beings a way of accessing the Good, the One, and the Beautiful; to access that which is eternal. 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 48

26 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 48

1.  Most people who align with a spiritual tradition do not live in accordance with the ethical demands, embodied in precepts or vows or commandments for that tradition.  This is well known, an often-observed truth.  And this applies equally to Platonism.  The ethical restraints that are brought up in dialogues like Phaedo and the Republic are not taken to heart, and it is rare to find someone who strives to embody them.  I think that part of the reason this is true for Platonism is that the idea of ethical commitments, or ethical restraints, being a part of a philosophical tradition is, in a modern context, strange.  In today’s conception of philosophy the emphasis is almost entirely mental and analytical.  It is religions that have these kinds of ethical commitments, not philosophies.  Even if an academic philosopher sees that Classical Platonism contains ethical commitments, such as non-harming or sexual restraint, and so forth, those restraints would not be taken seriously; I mean they would not be considered part of Platonist philosophy.

2.  “ . . . from the start the terms of life are harsh for every living thing.”

(Plato, Epinomis, translated by Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1618, 973d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

The above quote is just a passing comment in the dialogue (whose authorship is disputed).  From my perspective that makes it more, rather than less, significant.  It indicates that the harshness of life is a widely understood reality of the tradition, an observation that does not need spending a lot of time on because it is so widely known and its implications understood.

3.  Plato leaves his hermitage in the late morning light of early summer.  He likes to stretch his legs and get in a bit of exercise as part of his morning routine and a morning walk is a good way to do this.  Plato is headed for an oak tree that he likes to sit under and lean against during his morning contemplations.  Plato and the oak tree have been companions over many lifetimes and have learned a great deal from each other.  As Plato settles into interior silence he follows the lead of the oak tree, finding there the path of silence, stillness, and transcendence.

4.  In some ways Platonism is simple; at the same time, in some ways Platonism is complex.  The simplicity of Platonism emerges from grasping a few basic principles.  One of these is the principle of Asceticism and its applications in daily life.  As a guiding principle, Asceticism, once understood, is not difficult to understand, though putting it into practice does have its challenges. 

The difficult aspect of Platonism is found in its metaphysical cosmology, what it consists of (for example, the hypostases or levels of existence), how its different parts are related to each other, how soul and body are related to each other, and so forth.  There is a tendency among some Platonists to make this part of Platonism very complex indeed and when that happens it becomes difficult to access.  Plotinus has, I think, struck just the right balance in his presentations of these complexities.  Plotinus seems to be aware of how the tendency to add unnecessary complexities to the metaphysical cosmology of Platonism is a temptation that would be good to resist (I am thinking in particular of “Against the Gnostics”).  This is one reason, among many, why I prefer Plotinus over some of his successors. 

5.  Every morning I read from Platonic literature.  In my case this is either the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus.  There is something soothing, restful, and spacious about this practice.  Doing it in the morning sets the tone for the day which I think has to do with being reminded of the transcendental early in the morning keeps the demands of daily life in perspective. 

6.  I received some feedback on my post from last week; specifically regarding 47.1 where I talk about contemplation in a value free context that is void of ethical restraints.  The basic criticism, which I have heard often before, is that contemplation is itself transformative in a way that aligns with ethical teachings.  The implication here is that someone who exhibits anti-ethical behavior, no matter what their claims, cannot have had a genuine experience of contemplation.

I understand this criticism and it intuitively makes sense.  Nevertheless, I don’t think it is accurate, or to put it another way, such a view does not seem to align with what I have observed in the practice of spiritualities that I have observed.

In response I would suggest for consideration that it is not possible for a human being to reach a state of perfection.  I mean that the body always pulls the practitioner in negative directions and that is one reason why ascetic practice is a lifelong commitment.  In the Dialogues Socrates suggests to his students that they should practice the separation of the soul from the body to the best of their ability, which I take as meaning that as long as we have a body the capacity for such a separation will never be perfect.

In a similar vein, Plotinus writes about the feeling he experienced when returning to bodily awareness after residing in the transcendental for a period of time.  Plotinus writes that this was always a difficult transition, this return to the body’s material consciousness.  Again, I think this indicates that perfect realization of the transcendental is not possible for a human being who is embodied. 

These kinds of teachings align with my observations of a large number of spiritual teachers as well as my own experience.  I don’t think this should come as a surprise because such an interpretation of spiritual experience resembles many other experiences.  For example, a baker may want to make a perfect muffin, or a potter might want to make a perfect mug, or a quilter might want to make a perfect quilt, or a physicist might want to find a perfect equation.  Yet in all of these examples there will be flaws and I think that is because ‘having flaws’ is part of what it means to be a material thing and to reside in materiality.

Looking at contemplation, ‘being flawed’ means that the transformative range of contemplation will always be incomplete as long as one has a body.  That is, again, why I think that ascetic practice is necessary as a basis for contemplation.

I realize that this view differs from what a lot (perhaps a majority) of spiritual teachers present today.  And it might be the case that I am simply justifying my own less than perfect practice.  On the other hand, I have found that Platonism offers clear and cogent reasons for why contemplation in the context of a human body will always have its limitations.  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 47

19 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 47

1.  I’ve been spending time rereading Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals and I think it is a very fine example of a Platonic treatise.  Porphyry integrates many aspects of Platonic philosophy in his extended apology for vegetarianism.  He does this by placing the practice of vegetarianism in the context of both Platonic ethics and Platonic metaphysics.

What impresses me this time around is how Porphyry understands the necessity of ethical ascetic practice for purification to take place and for the divine ascent to the One to happen.  This differs from many spiritual groups I have observed over the decades.  There is a strong tendency in some groups to minimize ethical practice.  By ‘ethical practice’ I mean the commitment to ethical guidelines and regulations such as those found in traditional Dharmic traditions.  In Dharmic traditions these are usually encoded in precepts that outline these ethical commitments such as non-harming, non-stealing, refraining from alcohol, and so forth.  In Platonism the ethical regulations are scattered among different dialogues but the two dialogues that stand out in this regard are Phaedo and The Republic. 

The way I look at this is that the ethical precepts, which are all restraints on types of behavior, function as a kind of vessel, or bowl, or goblet, for holding the practice of contemplation, or creating the context for contemplation.  Many Westerners, it seems, have the view that contemplation by itself is sufficient for realization and that adherence to a set of ethical restraints are not causally related to the insights and realizations that the practice of contemplation offers.  But Porphyry makes a direct connection between the practice of ethical restraints, such as vegetarianism, and effecacious contemplation; a point Porphyry makes several times in his work On Abstinence.

What happens when contemplation is done outside of the context of ethical restraints?  What happens is that the insights, energy, and realizations that contemplation brings in such a context become value free experiences; and being value free they can be used for any purpose.  This resembles learning how to swing a baseball bat.  Someone who has learned how to swing a bat in the context of the rules of the baseball game will bring his fellow teammates much pleasure and fans will also be happy about such skill.  But someone who has no interest in the rules of baseball can use the bat to break a window, or even to break some bones.  The skill of swinging a baseball bat is a value free skill and how it is used depends on the context in which that skill is used.

I am suggesting that contemplation outside of the context of ethical restraints and asceticism is similarly problematic.  If looked at in this way, it helps us to understand why some individuals who have meditated for many years, and can guide others in the practice of meditation or contemplation, are sometimes examples of ethically challenged lives; they break the window of their lives and leave behind them much suffering.  In extreme cases this can result in a practitioner of contemplation or meditation encouraging mayhem.  Unfortunately, this has been observed more than once.

There is a feeling that this kind of analysis has to be wrong because contemplation is innately transformative.  The conclusion would follow, then, that someone who behaves badly could not be an actual contemplative, that they must not really understand what contemplation means.  Beyond the fact that this is a classic ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy, I think this kind of analysis, or view, of contemplation underestimates the ability of insight and spiritual experiences to be used in a value-free way.  There are, for example, corporations who want their employees to meditate because their employees are more focused and therefore more productive when they meditate; this is a good example of value free spiritual practice. 

My overall point about Porphyry is that his understanding of Platonism is wholistic; I mean that Porphyry views the practices of purification and ethical restraint as foundational for Platonic practice and it is upon this foundation that contemplation takes place and blossoms.  Or to return to the previous metaphor, the practices of ethical restraint are the vessel which allows the practitioner to drink from the nectar of contemplation; without that vessel the realizations of contemplative practice will spill onto the ground and disappear from sight.

2.  Plato returns to his hermitage after a long morning walk.  The hermitage is located in the hills between two valleys.  There are a lot of oak trees and the foliage is mostly grass.  There is a creek running through the landscape that flows out of the valley at one end.

Plato sits at a table where the notebook he is writing in lies open.  After getting comfortable Plato continues his writing.  He is writing another dialogue which, he thinks, he might finish in another thousand years, perhaps two thousand.

3.  I have for a long time had difficulty with the idea of ‘matter’ in Platonic philosophy.  As I have said in a previous post, perhaps more than one, I’m not convinced that matter is a necessary concept in Platonism; by that I mean I think it might be possible to present Platonism without having to resort to the idea of matter.  I’m not confident about this, though.

These thoughts returned to my mind because I was reading John Dillon’s essay “Ennead III.5: Plotinus’ Exegesis of the Symposium Myth”.  In this essay (which I found complex and not always easy to follow) comments about matter on pages 76-77 (the book is Perspectives on Plotinus).  Dillon quotes Plotinus at III 5.9.49-53, and comments on the quote, “And so we have it – without qualification, it seems – Penia is Matter."  Looking up ‘penia’ I found it means lack or deficiency.  So matter is a kind of deficiency or a lack.  Later Dillon suggests that matter is in some way associated, or ‘stands for’, the ‘irrational element in Soul’. 

But I remain puzzled.  It’s not clear to me why we need the idea of matter to explain the irrational element in Soul, or why a lack or a deficiency requires the presence of matter.  For example, a fire generates heat.  The heat diminishes with distance.  If someone sits close to a fire they will feel comfortably warm, even in winter.  If someone sits across the room, the heat from the fire will have diminished; that is to say there is a lack of heat for those sitting across the room from the fire.  And if someone is outside, the lack of heat from the fire at the hearth is so great they will likely not notice the presence of the heat from the fire.  It does not seem to me that anything additional is needed to explain the heat diminishing with distance; this kind of observation indicates that such diminishment is part of what ‘distance’ means.

Metaphysically, the greater the metaphysical distance from the One, the less unity a thing has.  But it is distance that is determinative here.

It is likely that I am missing something but as a thought experiment, what would Platonism look like without matter?

4.  When does a sunrise begin?  When does a flower start to bloom?  It is not a simple thing to make these kinds of determinations.

Similarly, spiritual insights grow in us in ways that, for the most part, are undramatic and not recognized when they first appear in our minds and hearts. 

5.  There is a book on Porphyry by Aaron P. Johnson called Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre, Cambridge University Press.  I purchased it over a year ago, maybe two years ago.  Because my interest in Porphyry has been rekindled I took it down from the shelf and have started to read it.  The book is academic, but still accessible for those with some background in Late Classical Platonism.  There are some technical issues, such as variations in the taxonomy of the divine and how the different taxonomies are related to different views on Platonist practice, which it is not always clear as to why the topic is significant.  But I find the if I slow my reading pace and take in what the author has to offer, the topics and their relationships come into focus.

But what I found very helpful is a translation of the fragments of Porphyry.  These fragments are collected in the closing section of the book.  Many of Porphyry’s books survive only in quotations from other classical authors who commented on Porphyry’s views.  These quotations are the sources for the fragments.  They are listed by topic and author.  For example, there are a lot of quotes from Porphyry that are found in various works by Saint Augustine, many more than I was aware of.  I find these quotes illuminating and even though I know they are fragments, there is enough of Porphyry in his surviving books to get a sense of where these quoted fragments might fit into Porphyry’s overall thought.

Recently I came across a paper at academia (dot) edu on what were the sources for Augustine’s understanding of Platonism.  The paper is titled “Augustine between Plotinus and Porphyry: A Possible Answer to the Problem of the Identity of the Platonicorum Libri” by Paolo Di Leo.  The paper discusses different views as to what Augustine read and studied when he was involved with Platonism; the author says that some scholars advocate for the primary source being Plotinus, others argue for Porphyry, and others for both.  It’s an interesting paper.

From the listing of fragments where Augustine is quoting Porphyry, I can see why some scholars would side with Porphyry as the primary source.  But I don’t know enough about Augustine to make an intelligent evaluation of this discussion.

It is somewhat surprising, pleasantly surprising, how influential Porphyry has been in the history of Platonism.  While I wouldn’t say that Porphyry is as influential as Plotinus, I’m gradually seeing that Porphyry’s writings have had a big impact on Platonism over the centuries.  For example, Porphyry’s On Abstinence had a significant impact on the Renaissance understanding of Platonism (see Renaissance Vegetarianism: The Philosophical Afterlives of Porphyry’s On Abstinence by Cecilia Muratori which I previously reviewed on this blog). 

It's paradoxical that Porphyry, the author of Against the Christians, seems to have had an impact on Augustine and how Augustine understood Platonism.  But perhaps the anti-Christian work of Porphyry was something Augustine may have felt a need to deal with, and from there Augustine became more familiar with what Porphyry had to say on other topics.  For example, both Porphyry and Augustine were ascetics and valued what I call the Ascetic Ideal; this would be a strong connection.

If you are interested in Porphyry, I recommend Religion and Identity.  I think you will find the thought of the author, as well as the translations of the fragments, to be helpful in studying this significant Platonist writer and practitioner.

6.  I think that one thing that links Dharmic traditions with Platonism is the way both Dharmic traditions and Platonism have a commitment to ethical teachings whose foundations are shared.  I am referring to the teachings on non-harming found in Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, and Platonism.  In Dharmic traditions non-harming, or Ahimsa, is often the first ethical Precept or Vow.  All other vows can be understood to be the application of Ahimsa to specific contexts of human life.

While in Dharmic traditions, as mentioned above, the principle of Ahimsa, or non-harming, is found in its placement at the head of lists of ethical precepts, commitments, or vows.  Platonism, as far as I know, did not generate that kind of document; that is to say, there is no listing of precepts in Platonism in the way one finds in Buddhism, Jainism, and Yoga.  This means that the teachings on non-harming are scattered in various works of Platonism from the Dialogues (see, for example, Crito) to Porphyry’s treatise On Abstinence.  There are also references to non-harming as being an ancient teaching that Platonism has inherited, though sources are not specifically mentioned (I think it is likely that they are Pythagorean and Orphic).

But the foundational nature of non-harming for Platonism and for Dharmic traditions is, I think, recognizably similar.  I say ‘similar’ rather than ‘the same’ because exactly how non-harming, or Ahimsa, works has its differences among Dharmic traditions (for example, the role that intention plays in an act of harming differs among Dharmic traditions).  It is, therefore, to be expected that there will be some differences in how Platonism applies non-harming/Ahimsa.  One thing I have noticed, which I offer as a tentative observation, is that Platonism seems to place a strong emphasis on non-retaliation as a necessary effect of non-harming; at least that is how I read Crito.  Another emphasis in Platonism is how non-harming is linked to the virtue of justice, and from there to the Platonic virtues overall.

But though there are differences, the emphasis on non-harming as such is shared.  And I think that sharing is a good reason for considering Platonism to be more closely allied to Dharmic traditions than it is to what modern philosophy has become.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 46

12 May 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 46

1.  In my recent reading of Timaeus my feeling was that Timaeus is an extended allegory with the Demiurge and the projects of the Demiurge being a personification of noetic realities.  I say this because it is noetic realities that bequeath the world system, or material realm, in which we live.  Looked at in this way nous is the Demiurge, or more accurately, the Demiurge is the personification of nous and the noetic realm.  Timaeus is about the nature of and order of the manifestations of becoming and begoning.  Becoming and begoning are not noetic realities, but nous is the foundation of becoming and begoning.

2.  “Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten.  And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.  This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1241, 37d, ISBN: 9780872203495)

A distinguishing feature of this material realm is that it is ‘impossible to bestow eternity upon anything’ in the material world; that is because all things in the material realm are created and anything that is created will come to an end.  The closest we can come to eternity is a moving image of eternity.  The moving image of eternity with its sunrises and sunsets, with its waxing and waning moons, with its seasonal displays, is beautiful because eternity is beautiful (in a sense, the beautiful and eternity are the same).  But the beauty of the moving image of eternity means that the things of this image are temporary, whereas the beauty of eternity as such is beauty as such.

3.  Platonism has been around for over 2,000 years.  I sometimes wonder what Platonism might look like after another 2,000 years; that’s assuming that it will be around after another 2,000 years.  It’s impossible to be sure, of course, but I don’t think it is irrational or fanciful to imagine things along this line. 

Will there still be the original Greek texts of Plato and Plotinus?, or will people rely on some later translation in another language?  Platonism is one of the reasons that people are actively interested in ancient Greek and because of this the Greek texts might still be actively circulating.

Platonism has gone through many changes in its interpretation of itself; for example, there are changes on how noetic realities are understood.  In 2,000 years I think it is likely that Platonism will be interpreted through categories that we cannot imagine.

And what will the role of artificial intelligence be for Platonism?  Will we be able to download the Dialogues and the Enneads directly into our minds and ponder them through some kind of technological means?  Perhaps; but perhaps those innovations will have been cast aside.  It’s hard to say.

After 2,000 years it is likely that most of the nations here on earth will only be found in history.  But I suspect that the primary documents of Platonism will still be found and read and discussed at that time.

4.  Beauty is a central understanding of the Platonic tradition.  Some things are strikingly beautiful; for example, a sunset, or a forest path in autumn, or the desert under the full moon, and so forth.  Other things have a more hidden beauty.  When I was young, I lived for a few years on the north coast of Alaska.  The winter is severe, very cold, with snow as far as one can see in any direction.  The Brooks Range is to the south of the north coast and on clear days (which in winter only last a few hours) it can be seen, rising from the endless snow.  This is a different kind of beauty; it is glacial and stark, even threatening, but beautiful nevertheless.

5.  I understand emanation as a process of differentiation.  The One is pure unity and is, therefore, undifferentiated; that is why it lacks any sensory characteristics.  The task of the Platonist practitioner is to ‘return to the One’.  I understand this process of return as a process of de-differentiation, or the steady stepping beyond the differentiations of our material existence.  (This eventually also extends to going beyond the differentiations found in the noetic.)

De-differentiation is done through practices of equanimity, ataraxia, and most importantly, asceticism.  All the practices of de-differentiation are purifications that allow for the soul’s ascent. 

Returning to the One means becoming less and less differentiated which means less and less individuated, more and more like the One.

6.  “I [Porphyry] have shown in the previous two books [chapters], Firmus Castricius, that the eating of animal creatures contributes neither to temperance and simplicity nor to piety, which especially lead to the contemplative life, but rather opposes them.  Justice in its finest aspect is piety towards the gods, and piety is achieved especially by abstinence, so there is no need to fear that we may somehow infringe justice towards people by maintaining holiness towards the gods.  Socrates, in reply to those who argue that our end is pleasure, said that even if all hogs and he-goats agreed with this, he would not be convinced that our happiness lies in experiencing pleasure, so long as intellect rules over all. [See Philebus 67b] And we, even if all wolves and vultures approve of meat-eating, will not agree that what they say is just, so long as humans are naturally harmless and inclined to refrain from acquiring pleasures for themselves by harming others.”

(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated by Gillian Clark, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2000, page 80, ISBN: 9781780938899)

6.1  This is part of the opening paragraph for Book 3 of Porphyry’s series of letters to Firmus Castricius on refraining from killing animals either for food or for ritual sacrifice.  This paragraph consolidates a number of points that Porphyry uses to support the practice of vegetarianism; for example, that eating animals undermines the virtues such as temperance, piety, and living a simple life (which I take as meaning a life with few possessions).  Porphyry particularly emphasizes how eating meat ‘opposes’ contemplation, which is a point Porphyry makes in the opening of the first Book, or letter, to Firmus.  Notice also how Porphyry states that eating meat undermines justice and holiness towards the gods. 

This is followed by Porphyry arguing against the idea that the pleasure of eating meat somehow justifies such a practice, reminding the reader that Socrates argued against such an approach to ethics. 

Porphyry also integrates the Platonic teachings on non-harming into his overall critique of killing animals.  This passage is dense with reasonings on why eating and killing animals should be avoided with the primary message being that such a practice is contrary to what it means to live a philosophical life.

6.2  Later in Book 3, at paragraphs 26 Porphyry expands on the theme of harmlessness:  “When the passions have been abased and appetite and anger have withered, and the rational part exercises the rule which is appropriate for it, assimilation to the Greater follows at once.  The Greater in the universe is altogether harmless, and itself by its power safeguards all, does good to all, and lacks nothing . . . “ (As above, page 98)

6.3 And in paragraph 27 Porphyry writes: “A man who is led by passions and is harmless only to his children and his wife, but contemptuous and aggressive towards others, is aroused and dazzled by mortal things because the irrational dominates in him.  In the same way, the man who is led by reason maintains harmlessness towards fellow-citizens too, and further still towards strangers and all human beings; he keeps irrationality subjected, and is more rational than those others and thereby also more godlike.  Thus someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other animals is more like the god . . . “ (Ibid, pages 98-99)

7.  On a Summer evening, the evening of the Summer Solstice, Plato walks through a northern Wisconsin forest on a broad path that most people do not see.  Beside Plato is a brown bear; they are walking together.  Now and then Plato scratches the bear behind the bear’s ears.  The slope of the path begins to descend to a small lake where there is a dock with Plato’s canoe tied to a post.  Sunset approaches.  Plato and the brown bear arrive at the shore of the placid lake.  They pause to look at the sunset.  The bear is glowing in the sunset light and with an inner glow as well.  The glow slowly becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes sparks of starlight.  The bear becomes the sparks of starlight swirling in a disc like a galaxy.  The swirling light slowly fades.  Plato, standing on the shore, smiles.  The sun has disappeared but the night sky is clear.  Plato walks down the wooden dock to his canoe.  He unties it and steps into the canoe.  Plato takes a paddle and steers the canoe to the middle of the lake, turns the canoe to the right, and paddles down the middle of the lake.  The Milky Way is reflected in the water so that Plato is paddling on a path of stars.  The lake disappears.