Monday, January 30, 2023

Metaphysical Sestina

 Metaphysical Sestina

It is difficult to know what is real.
You can't rely on what you think or feel;
Our likes, dislikes, and views change over time.
Ev'rything you touch, taste, see, smell, or hear,
Ev'rything you love, ev'rything you fear,
Evrything that exists will disappear.

One day I won't be here, I'll disappear.
Perhaps then I'll come to know what is real,
What lies beyond anxiety and fear.
In the presence of beauty I can feel,
Like a whisper that I can almost hear,
A river flowing where there is no time.

We measure the forward progress of time
And watch as friends, one by one, disappear,
Though sometimes, in daydreams, we can still hear
Them.  Those voices from the past seem more real
Than the daily things that we touch and feel
Or the passing news that gives rise to fear.

Our lives are laced with dukkha, laced with fear;
We're running from the avalanche of time --
(The therapist says, "How's that make you feel?")
But there's one thing which does not disappear,
One thing which cannot be sensed, yet is real,
Beyond our sight, beyond what we can hear.

In deepest silence what is it you hear?
In total stillness what is there to fear?
Dwelling in the grotto of what is real,
Dwelling in the grotto prior to time,
What could arrive and what could disappear?
What could be known and what is there to feel?

Ten thousand years to a mountain will feel
Like a melody that you briefly hear;
Though all things vanish, all things disappear
In the grotto of eternity there is nothing to fear.
Beyond the passing of years, beyond the seething stream of time,
There is the sublime and formless presence of what is real.

Turn to what is real, beyond what we feel,
Prior to all time, a song we cannot hear,
A luminous land where all fears disappear.

Saturday, January 28, 2023

The Great Conversation

28 January 2023

The Great Conversation

“Plotinus’ student Porphyry . . . developed an elaborate account of the virtues’ role in the process of unification (for which see his Letter to Marcella and Launching Points to the Intelligibles).  Iamblichus, Porphyry’s student, applies the term henosis to his own version of unification.  Iamblichus’ practice of theurgy, a type of ritual magic intended to invoke the presence of divine beings, deviates from the purely meditative and contemplative practices Plotinus advocated.  Nevertheless, his goal – to become one with the divine, hence henosis – is clearly inspired by Plotinus’ teachings regarding purification and its telos. . .

“Given the long history of the Platonic tradition and the breadth of its influence, we should not expect universal agreement regarding the details of purification and unification.  Philosophers have struggled, with themselves and with one another, to arrive at precise formulations: does unification occur only after death or is it available to the living?  Does unification mean likeness to god through a life of virtue, participation in the divine energies, or a merging of our soul with the divine essence?  Must we actually become one with the divine or are we by nature already united with the source of our being and have only to realize and live in the awareness of this intimate bond?  Such questions illuminate the layers of interpretative tensions and the substantive concerns that this tradition must continually address.  But beneath the inevitable differences and disagreements there is a consensus, maintained for more than two thousand years, that the human being is in some way bound up with the divine source of all being, that his fullest life consists in contemplating and actively participating in the outpouring energy of this divinity, and that this life can be achieved only through the disciplined practice of purification.”

(Mark Anderson, Pure: Modernity, Philosophy, and the One, Sophia Perennis, San Rafael, CA, 2009, pages 82-84, ISBN: 9781597310949)

 

1.  I think of the Platonic tradition as a great conversation, a timeless conversation, that has continued for over 2,500 years.  When I say that the Platonic conversation is a ‘timeless’ conversation I mean in part that it is a conversation about that which transcends time, and is therefore eternal, and partly each speaker in the conversation is an instantiation into the temporal world of that which is timeless; each speaker is the timeless embodied.

2.  Think of it this way:  Each performance of a piece of music is an instantiation of music that is written down and passed along.  The written music is silent, yet at the same time the written music is the source for countless musical, sonic, presentations.  In a similar way, the great Platonic Sages present to people the reality of the transcendent and eternal through means that are ephemeral.

3.  Platonic Sages instantiate The One through the practices of purification.  That is why, as Anderson writes, purification is foundational for Platonism.  It is also why Platonism is a way of life and not only a way of thinking or believing.  In this context, “way of life” refers to practices such as vegetarianism/veganism, refraining from alcohol and drugs, and sexual restraint, as well as other ascetic practices.  When a Platonist practices these modes of ascetic purification the Platonist embodies the ‘Dharma’ of Platonism in a way that is easy for others to perceive.  It is an indication that this Platonist is walking the Way that they are talking about.

4.  There are many issues, some apparent, some subtle, that generate disagreement among Platonic Sages.  It would be strange if that were not the case.  Given that we dwell in the realm that is the most differentiated, the farthest from Unity, it makes sense in the Platonic scheme of things that this would be the case.  But the theme of purification is foundational for all of them, just as a blueprint can be the source of numerous houses, or an oak tree be the source of numerous subsequent oak trees.

5.  In modernity purification is not considered necessary for a philosopher.  I have had conversations with contemporary philosophers who have never heard of purification in a philosophical context.  This is because they have been guided by analytic views of what philosophy is, as well as by the materialist biases of the culture at large. 

(As an aside, I sometimes imagine that the practices of  purification might at some time in the future, be considered prerequisites for studying philosophy.  I mean that if someone applied to study philosophy they would be asked if they are, for example, vegetarians; and if they are not, the applicant would be told that this is a prerequisite for philosophical study.  This is, of course, just a fantasy; but in some ways I think it makes sense.  Such a prerequisite operates in studies such as calculus where trigonometry is a prerequisite, or in music where certain pieces are learned before moving on to more difficult and sophisticated pieces, in sports where a certain weight, height, and musculature are prerequisites for participation, etc.  Seen from this perspective, vegetarianism, abstinence from alcohol and drugs, and sexual restraint make sense as prerequisites for the study of philosophy.)

Platonism, in spite of its numerous, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations, is a deeply resilient tradition.  By ‘resilient’ I mean that the Platonic tradition has managed to remain a significant presence in spite of the ups and downs of history.  I think Platonism has accomplished this because of its foundation in its purifications which is the first step on the ascent to The One whose voice is the Platonic tradition itself.

Wednesday, January 25, 2023

Politics and Platonism

25 January 202

Politics and Platonism

1. A lot of people think of Plato as a political philosopher.  I can understand why; there are three dialogues that appear to have an explicitly political focus.  I am thinking of The Republic, The Statesman, and Laws.  I am not convinced that these actually have a political focus.  For example, The Republic is primarily an allegory of the soul and the process whereby the soul makes the spiritual, and mystic, ascent.  But this allegorical understanding of The Republic is not widely shared.

2. Philosophy has significant examples of philosophers who decided to enter into politics.  The results have not been good.  Confucius engaged in attempting to reform some of the warring states of his time, but ultimately his efforts did not bear fruit.  Confucius then decided to set up a school as a vehicle for expounding his teaching. 

2.1 Pythagoras seems to have actively pursued political leadership; reports of his success or lack thereof, vary.  But there seems to have been a popular rebellion against what may have been an authoritarian Pythagorean regime; according to some sources Pythagoras was killed during this rebellion.

2.2 Boethius rose to political prominence in the Ostrogothic Kingdom in what today is Italy around 500 A.D.  His two sons rose to power at the same time.  But this political power did not last long as Boethius was falsely accused of working against the ruler.  Boethius was imprisoned, where he wrote The Consolation of Philosophy, and was executed shortly thereafter.

2.3 In Socrates we get a different view of political involvement.  In the Apology, Socrates says:

“Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people’s affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state.  But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very things which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment.  I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward.  This it is which opposes my engaging in politics.  And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself.  And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state.  A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.”

(Plato, The Apology, 31D&E, Plato 1: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1924, page 115, ISBN: 0674990404)

2.4  Plato is said to have engaged in political activity at one point in his life.  Plato was invited to do so and got involved in the power plays of factions in Sicily.  It didn’t go well.  The ruler eventually got tired of Plato’s advice and sold Plato as a slave.  Plato was purchased by a follower and Plato returned to teaching.  If there is any truth to this story it seems that Plato did not heed the advice of Socrates on this topic.  The lesson, I think, is that political power is very tempting. 

2.5  As far as I can tell, Plotinus did not write about politics; I can’t think of an Ennead that has a political focus.  Plotinus considered himself to be an heir of the Platonic tradition and that he was simply commenting on, and unpacking, Plato’s philosophy.  I take that to mean that Plotinus did not think of Plato as a political philosopher; I think this is important evidence that Plato’s thought was only marginally focused on politics.

3.  Today people tend to interpret things ideologically.  By ‘ideology’ I mean a systematic and philosophically based approach to political theory.  Examples such as Leo Strauss and Alexander Dugin come to mind as contemporary philosophers who embody this ideological perspective. 

This tendency is so widespread that having an ideological view of philosophy is, I think, felt as natural and suggesting that philosophers avoid politics would be almost incomprehensible. 

4.  I see Platonism as a contemplative tradition.  From the perspective of ideology contemplation is a waste of time.  Ideologues tend to see contemplation as an indulgence and self-centered.  This is because ideologues are activists whereas contemplatives are more concerned with turning inward.  Ideologues tend to think of contemplatives as not doing anything to alleviate the problems of the world.  This is a false dichotomy; contemplatives are doing something.  They are doing contemplation.  Contemplation is not doing nothing; it is the activity of stillness.

5.  In Phaedo Socrates says:

“The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body.  We are slaves to its service.”

(Phaedo, 66C, Plato I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1924, page 231, ISBN: 0674990404)

This suggests that the ascetic contemplative is the one (perhaps the only one) who creates the conditions for not only the interior peace of the individual ascetic, but also for society as a whole.

6.  The ideologue and the contemplative have differing analyses of cause and effect.  For example, Woodrow Wilson believed that it was possible to have a ‘war to end all wars’, which is why he pushed the U.S. to join the European conflict of World War I.  In contrast, the contemplative implies that peace is possible only by living a life of peace, embodied through the ascetic ideal and embodied in contemplation.

7.  I tend to see the Platonic tradition as a type of Quietism.  I realize this way of looking at Platonism may irritate other Platonists, but that is not my intention.  By Quietism I mean a view that prioritizes the cultivation of virtue and interior states of wisdom, silence, stillness, and a life lived in accord with the ascetic ideal. 

There have been periods where Quietism has flourished, such as the 17th century among the Catholic Quietists and Quakers.  But this didn’t last long and there was a very strong reaction against the presence of Quietism. 

8.  As I mentioned at the start of this post, many people today tend to interpret Plato as a political philosopher (think of Karl Popper).  Or they think of Plato as an early example of what today we think of as philosophical analysis.  The ascetic and contemplative foundations of his philosophy are missed.  But for the attentive reader they are not difficult to find.  And having found them, and put them into practice even a little bit, the attentive practitioner of Platonism discovers a vast realm of eternal peace and eternal light.

 

 

Monday, January 23, 2023

To Whom Plotinus Wanted to Speak

23 January 2023

To Whom Plotinus Wanted to Speak

“Whoever thinks that reality is governed by chance and accident and held together by bodily causes is far removed from God and from the idea of the One, and our discourse is not directed to these people but to those who posit another nature besides bodies and have gone up as far as soul.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.9.5, Plotinus: Ennead VI.6-9, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 319, ISBN: 9780674995154)

 

“Those to whom existence comes about by chance and automatic action and is held together by material forces have drifted far from God and from the concept of unity; we are not here addressing them but only such as accept another nature than body and have some conception of soul.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.9.5, translated by Steven MacKenna and B. S. Page, various editions 1917 to 1935, quoted from online edition at sacred-texts.com)

 

Here Plotinus tells us something about to whom he is speaking, how he understands his audience.  I find that helpful to know.  Here are a few comments:

1.  Plotinus is not speaking to everyone.  He is speaking to those who already have a sense of the reality of soul. 

2.  This passage has a modern feeling to me.  I am thinking of contemporary atheists and materialists.  It has often been remarked that it is almost impossible to have a conversation with contemporary atheists; the gap is simply too great.  It is difficult to find common ground or a place to start.  In reading this I think that Plotinus felt the same way about the materialists of his own day. 

The difference for Plotinus and us is that in Plotinus’s lifetime materialists were a small minority.  Today materialists dominate the culture; even if they do not represent the majority of people living today, they are in positions that control what is acceptable and unacceptable in philosophical matters.  Often they accomplish this by declaring what is meaningful and what is not; declaring ideas like soul, and metaphysics in general, to lack meaning.  This is why it is so difficult to have a conversation with people who hold such views.  To offer an analogy, suppose you met someone who told you that music was not meaningful?  It would be difficult to talk to such a person about music.

 

Friday, January 20, 2023

Apatheia

20 January 2023

Apatheia

“The soul binds herself to the body by a conversion toward the affections experienced by the body.  She detaches herself from the body by ‘apathy’ [turning away from the body’s affections – note added by translator].”

(Porphyry, Launching Points to the Realm of Mind, translated by Kenneth Guthrie, Phanes Press, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988, page 36, ISBN: 0933999585)

 

I have a strong appreciation for Porphyry and I think he deserves more credit than he usually receives.  Perhaps this is due to Porphyry living in the shadow of Plotinus.  He was a student of Plotinus and it is Porphyry’s editing and arrangement of Plotinus’s essays, which Porphyry called The Enneads, that we have today.  But Porphyry has a clear grasp of the way virtues and purifications function in the Platonic tradition.  For example, Porphyry wrote a treatise on why vegetarianism is a necessary commitment for the life of a philosopher.  It is true that Porphyry does not have the depth of understanding, or the subtlety that we find in his teacher, Plotinus.  On the other hand, Porphyry doesn’t set about unnecessarily complicating the system of hypostases as later Platonists were inclined to do.  Here are a few comments on the observation that is quoted above:

1.  The soul is a complicated structure in Platonism.  For example, the entire dialogue The Republic is devoted to unpacking the soul in all of its tendencies, strengths, and weaknesses.  In terms of the mystical ascent to The One, the soul seems to have two primary tendencies.  The first is to be fixated on material existence, and the second is to recognize, or recollect, the eternal nature of The One and from that recognition strive to return to it.  Porphyry’s comment is his explanation of how this happens.  The soul is attracted to the ‘affections experienced by the body’, and when it is attracted to these experiences it remains locked in the material realm, or bound in metaphorical chains in the cave of shadows.  But Porphyry suggests that there is a way out; by practicing ‘apathy’ towards bodily experience the soul can detach itself from being driven by the desire for sensory stimulation and begin its long journey back to The One (the non-sensory source of all material existence).

2.  I don’t have the Greek to look at, but I’m going to assume that Guthrie is translating the word ‘apatheia’.  Cultivating apatheia was a primary practice among the Stoics, but according to Porphyry it has its place in Platonism as well.  (I don’t know enough about the history of this practice to know if it was first used by the Platonists or by the Stoics, or perhaps by a third, earlier, tradition). 

3.  Apatheia is related to our word ‘apathy’, but it seems, according to some scholars, to be closer to a word like equanimity.  The point is not to be repulsed by things happening that one dislikes, or seduced by things that one likes.  As the Buddhists would say, “Neither attracted nor repelled.” 

4.  The point is not to be ruled by the body’s constant stream of wants and desires; desires for particular foods, desires for worldly goods of all kinds, desires for bodily pleasures such as sex, desires that other people behave in a certain way and believe certain things, etc.  Through apatheia a space is created in the mind where these desires simply arise and fall away.  In that space it is now possible to recognize the presence of the light of The One, to turn to that light, and over time be guided by that light.

5.  Being ‘guided by the light’ means becoming familiar with the way of life that is conducive to experience the light’s presence, or conducive to occasions for the light’s manifestation.  One begins to realize that indulgence in bodily sensations, such as good food, alcohol and drugs, and erotic experiences, makes it difficult, or even impossible, to find the light or to access it’s guidance.  It’s like looking for a trail on a moonlit night with a group of people who are drinking, talking, and taking drugs; it is likely that you will walk right past the trail, not even noticing that it is there. 

Wednesday, January 18, 2023

The Great Learning

18 January 2023

The Great Learning

“The knowledge or touching of the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato says it is the ‘greatest study’, not calling the looking at it a 'study', but learning about it beforehand.  We are taught about it by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues and adornings and by gaining footholds in the intelligible and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.7.36, Plotinus Ennead VI.6.9, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 199, ISBN: 9780674995154)


“’Certainly, he said [a worthy thought],; however, as to what is the most important study and what you mean by it, do you think anyone could let you off without asking what it is?’

“’Certainly not,” I said, ‘go ahead and ask me yourself.  At any rate you have heard it quite a few times, but now either you don’t understand, or more likely your intention is to cause me problems by your objections!  However, I rather think it’s the latter since in fact you have often heard that the Form of the Good is the most important thing to learn, in relation to which “just” and other such terms become useful and beneficial.  And now you know more or less that this is what I’m going to say, and that, in addition, we don’t know it adequately.  But if we don’t know it, you know that, even if we were to understand everything else as fully as possible, nothing is of any use to us without this notion, any more than we could acquire anything without the Good.  Or do you think there is any advantage in having gained every possession, apart from the Good?  Or to hold everything in high regard without the Good, but have no regard for anything beautiful and good?’

“’By Zeus, I certainly do not!’ he exclaimed.”

(Plato, The Republic, Book VI, 504e and 505a&b, Plato VI, Republic Books 6-10, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, pages 77-79, ISBN: 9780674996519, brackets inserted by translators)

 

1.  This is another example of the clarity of Plotinus’s writing.  (As an aside, I have read a lot of spiritual works in a variety of traditions, and my experience is that there is no writer of greater, or even equal, clarity to Plotinus.  I know some will disagree with this, and it isn’t a view I came to right away, or upon first reading Plotinus.  But over time that is the overall sense I have of The Enneads.)  Plotinus points out that we are taught about the Good through comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees.

‘Comparisons’ means analogies, allegories, metaphors, and those types of communication.  (Some translations, such as MacKenna, use the word ‘analogies’ instead of comparisons.)  This touches on a point I have made previously and that has slowly grown as I become more familiar with, more at home with Platonic sources.  Namely, that allegory, analogy, metaphor, or ‘comparisons’ are a primary means whereby Platonism communicates its view and its understandings to others.  There is a tendency among moderns to pick out the passages that resemble modern analysis and think of these as primary to Platonism.  My view is that these passages are secondary, or even tertiary.  Logical analysis is done for the purpose of unpacking the meaning of an allegory or other comparison; analysis is in the service of the comparisons rather than the comparisons emerging from the analyses.  There is, I think, a reason for this: and that is that the Good, or the One, is beyond concepts, beyond name and form, is deathless and unborn, and because of this, comparisons, and devices such as allegory and metaphor, are the only means human intellect has for referring to, and talking about, the Good.

‘Negations’ refers to the via negativa, or negative way, found in Plato and Plotinus.  In Plato scholars say that this is most specifically laid out in the dialogue Parmenides.  The idea is that the mystical ascent to the Good and the One is accomplished by negating appearances and mental constructs.  This approach strongly influenced Christianity and Christian mysticism through the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite which seems to rely on Plato’s Parmenides.  (The negative way is also found in Dharmic traditions.)

‘Knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees’ refers to the three primary hypostases and how they relate to each other; in other words, the metaphysical structure of the emanated cosmos.

2.  I see these three topics (comparisons, negations, and knowledge of the hypostases and their relationships) as the kind of thing that one would talk about in a class, a kind of Platonism 101.  I think Plotinus is telling us that these are the topics to lecture on, particularly for new students.

After a student gets some clarity about these topics, then we move on to entering the way through a collection of spiritual practices.

3.  Plotinus moves from topics that give a student a sense of overall structure to actual spiritual practices, naming specifically purifications, virtues, adornings, gaining footholds in the intelligible (the nous, or the world of forms), settling, and feasting.

‘Purifications’ refers to the ascetic ideal and its three main practices: vegetarianism (and veganism), refraining from alcohol and, by extension, drugs that cloud the mind, and sexual restraint (including living a chaste, celibate, life).  I believe these are mentioned first by Plotinus because they are foundational.  A good essay on the nature and function of purifications is found in the book Pure by Mark Anderson, in the title essay, the last one in the book.

‘Virtues’ refers to the standard virtue ethics shared by most philosophical traditions in the Classical World.  Porphyry is particularly good at explaining these ethical virtues and their function in a Platonic context.

‘Adornings’; to be honest, I’m not clear about what ‘adornings’ refers to.  MacKenna seems to translate this with ‘right ordering’, but that isn’t very clear to me either.  Speculating, I wonder if ‘adornings’ refers to experiences that help students retain their commitment to the Platonic Way.  These experiences can be as simple as a growing sense of clarity where one was previously confused, or they might be more traditionally ‘mystical’, such as experiencing a sense of oneness, or having a direct experience of the noetic realm.  Or they may refer to a growing sense of, for example, bodily health and balance which was referred to in the story of the Senator who abandoned his decadent life for a life of philosophy and through dedication to the ascetic ideal experienced an increase in his health and overall wellbeing.  But I am speculating here; if any reader has insight on this, please post in the comments or contact me directly.

‘Gaining footholds in the intelligible (the nous)’:  It is possible to have an experience of the realm of forms.  This is done through contemplation.  Having such an experience, even if it is very brief, is ‘gaining a foothold’ in nous (the second hypostasis often translated as the Intelligible, sometimes translated as Mind or Spirit).  Contemplation is not mentioned in the list Plotinus has in the quoted passage, but I believe it is inferred in this context.

“Settling”:  I think Plotinus means by “settling” what some Buddhist traditions mean by ‘stabilization’.  The experience of the noetic is stabilized when we routinely begin to perceive the material world as an emanation from the nous. 

“Feasting”:  I believe Plotinus uses the metaphor of feasting (which takes us back to the topic of ‘comparisons’) as a reference to how the experience of the noetic nourishes our spiritual life and, possibly, lives.  It is like participating in a feast for the gods, with nectar, ambrosia, and abundant food for the soul.  And most importantly, such feasting nourishes us for the divine, and final, ascent to The One.

4.  Above I said that the student advances on the ascent ‘after’ the introductory topics.  But in thinking further about it, I suspect that these insights and practices and experiences are often undertaken in a manner that mixes them up.  I think that was true in my own case.  Still, I think there is some virtue in laying them out in a sequential manner.  For example, Anderson in his essay Pure makes a good case for how purification practices are foundational for further journeying on the path.  As long as we don’t put these topics, insights, practices, and experiences in an inflexible series there should be no problem.  (As an aside, I think past lives will have a significant influence in this context.)

5.  The quote from The Republic assists us in understanding the importance of following this Platonic Way and engaging in the rigorous practices that end in the Good and the One.  It is because all things flow from, and participate, in the One.  The return to the One means to return to the source, it means to understand why there are things and not nothing, it means to no longer dwell in a realm of shadows, it means to dwell in the light of the deathless and unborn, in the light of the eternal.

 

 

Monday, January 16, 2023

Why I Don't use the Word 'Neoplatonism'

16 January 2023

Why I Don’t Use the Word ‘Neoplatonism’

Recently, on Youtube, I have seen an increased number of uploads, by a variety of youtubers, on the topic of Platonism.  Most of these are focused on Plotinus and what I call ‘Late Classical’ Platonism.  The posts cover a variety of topics such as Plotinus’s relation to Gnosticism, Mysticism, Kabbalah, Theurgy, and contemporary philosophical concerns such as the coherence of materialism.

Uniformly these posts use the word ‘Neoplatonism’ in their presentations and refer to Plotinus as the ‘founder’ or ‘starting point for’ Neoplatonism.  Some of these posts have been coordinated by groups of youtubers and some of these posts are done by individuals.  A small number of youtubers in this group mention in passing that the designation ‘Neoplatonism’ is a modern one, not one that, for example, Plotinus ever used, but then continue to use this designation throughout the rest of their video.

For some reason, I had the idea that the word ‘Neoplatonism’ was falling out of use.  Perhaps that is simply because I am not in touch with academic usage and I just got that impression by relating with other non-academic Platonists.  I’m not sure.  Personally, and many others agree with me, I think the designation is misleading and should be abandoned.  When I want to refer to Platonists of a particular time I tend to use designations that refer to that time period; for example I will use ‘Late Classical Platonism’ or ‘Late Classical Philosophy’.  Here are my reasons:

1.  Plotinus never thinks of himself as anything but a Platonist and never suggests that he is in some way bringing a new understanding of Platonism to the world.  This is also true of people like Porphyry and Maximus of Tyre, as well as other less well-known Platonists from the Late Classical period.  I think the use of the term ‘Neoplatonism’ misrepresents Plotinus et al, because ‘Neoplatonism’ implies that what these philosophers are doing is something new and, by implication, not found in Plato himself; in other words an innovation.  But even those who use the term admit that they did not conceive of themselves in that way.  I think we should defer to their own understanding of themselves and that it is a kind of hubris to impose upon them, especially Plotinus, a name or designation that they could only regard as a misunderstanding of their own purpose and project.

2.  It isn’t only that they (Plotinus, Porphyry, et al) didn’t think of themselves as anything other than Platonists.  No one else thought of them as anything other than Platonists either.  For example, Augustine thought of Plotinus as a Platonist and representative of the Platonic tradition.  And this was also true of Marsillio Ficino who lived in the 15th century. 

3.  In fact the word ‘Neoplatonism’ is a modern term, coming into usage in the early 19th century.  In the Wikipedia article on Neoplatonism it says, “Neoplatonism is a modern term.  The term Neoplatonism has a double function as a historical category.  On the one hand it differentiates the philosophical doctrines of Plotinus and his successors from those of Plato.  On the other hand, the term makes an assumption about the novelty of Plotinus’s interpretation of Plato. . . The term Neoplatonism implies that Plotinus’s interpretation of Plato was so distinct from those of his predecessors that it should be thought to introduce a new period in the history of Platonism.  Some contemporary scholars have, however, taken issue with this assumption . . . “

4.  I would like to suggest that the issue at hand is mysticism.  Plotinus is known as a mystic, a contemplative.  But modernity does not like to think of Plato as a mystic, or as primarily a mystic.  In modernity Plato is understood as a proto-analytic philosopher in those dialogues where standard meanings of ideas like holiness are subjected to Socratic examination; or Plato is understood to be a political philosopher and looked at from this view The Republic is understood to be a political treatise; or Plato is understood to be an a specialist in ethics, specifically virtue ethics, etc. 

The mystical elements in Plato’s philosophy are either reinterpreted so that they are not seen as mystical, or they are marginalized as backwards relics from a bygone era.  In this way Plato and Plotinus are distinguished from each other.  Plato has in his philosophy elements of what would become modernism, according to this view, but Plotinus does not.

5.  The traditional view is that Plato was a mystic; that is how the Classical World viewed him, as well as many subsequent centuries of commentators.  And that is why the Classical World did not distinguish between Plato and Plotinus as to their affiliation; Plotinus was a disciple, or spokesman for Platonism, rooted in the Platonic tradition and heritage and dedicated to bringing that heritage, in an undistorted manner, to his students. 

6.  ‘Neoplatonism’ brings with it too many distortions of the Platonic tradition to be useful.  It is a distorting lens rather than a clarifying category.  As mentioned before in this blog, Platonism can best be understood as a spiritual tradition rather than a philosophy as modernists understand philosophy.  This understanding of Platonism as a spiritual tradition is gaining some traction, particularly since the works of Pierre Hadot have appeared.  But it seems to be still a minority view. 

I would like to see a return to this view of Platonism as a spiritual, or even a religious, tradition.  One small step in a return to this understanding is to reject the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ and all that it implies.

Saturday, January 14, 2023

Formless Beauty

14 January 2023

Formless Beauty

“. . . [T]he nature of the best and the nature of the most lovable is in the altogether formless.  Therefore, whatever you bring into form and show to the soul, it seeks something else over it which gave it shape.  Our reasoning insists that what has shape, and shape, and form, all this is measured and limited, that is, it is not all or self-sufficient or beautiful of itself, but this too is mixed.  These beautiful things, then, must be measured and limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the super-beautiful; but if this is so, it must not be shaped or be a form.  The primarily beautiful, then, and the first is without form, and beauty is that, the nature of the Good.  The experience of lovers bears witness to this, that, as long as it is in that which has the impression perceived by the senses, the lover is not yet in love; but when from that he himself generates in himself an impression not perceptible by the senses in his partless soul, then love springs up.  But he seeks to see the beloved that he may water him when he is withering.  But if he should come to understand that one must change to that which is more formless, he would desire that; for his experience from the beginning was love of a great light from a dim glimmer.  For the trace of the shapeless is shape; it is this which generates shape, not shape this, and it generates it when matter comes to it.  But matter is necessarily furthest from it, because it does not have of itself any one even of the last and lowest shapes.  If then what is lovable is not the matter, but what is formed by the form, and the form upon the matter comes from soul, and soul is more form and more lovable, and intellect is more form than soul and still more lovable, one must assume that the first nature of beauty is formless.”

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.7.33, Plotinus Ennead VI.6-9, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, pages 189 – 191, ISBN: 9780674995154)

 

“. . . This at last is the Authentic term because the Nature best and most to be loved may be found there only where there is no least touch of Form.  Bring something under Form and present it so before the mind; immediately we ask what Beyond imposed that shape; reason answers that while there exists the giver having shape to give – a giver that is shape, idea, an entirely measured things – yet this is not alone, is not adequate in itself, is not beautiful in its own right but is a mingled thing.  Shape and idea and measure will always be beautiful, but the Authentic Beauty and the Beauty Beyond cannot be under measure and therefore cannot have admitted shape or be Idea: the primal existent, The First, must be without Form, the beauty in it must be, simply, the Nature of the Intellectual Good.

“Take an example from love: so long as the attention is on the visible form, love has not entered: when from that outward form the lover elaborates within himself, in his own partless soul, an immaterial image, then it is that love is born, then the lover longs for the sight of the beloved to make the fading image live again.  If he could but learn to look elsewhere, to the more nearly formless, his longing would be for that: his first experience was loving a great luminary by way of some thin gleam from it.

“Shape is an impress from the unshaped; it is the unshaped that produces shape, not shape the unshaped; and Matter is needed for the producing; Matter, in the nature of things, is the furthest away, since of itself it has not even the lowest degree of shape.  This loveableness does not belong to Matter but to that which draws upon form: the Form upon Matter comes by way of soul; soul is more nearly Form and therefore more lovable; Intellectual-Principle [nous], nearer still, is even more to be loved; by these steps we are lead to know that the First Principle, principle of Beauty, must be formless.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page, various editions 1917 to 1930, quoted from the online edition at sacred-texts.com)

 

1.  This is Plotinus’s elaboration of the relationship between sensory beauty and transcendental beauty.  It is a repeated theme in The Enneads that beauty is a sign of the existence of the transcendental, but if we experience beauty as sensory we miss what beauty really is.

2.  In some Enneads Plotinus seems to say that Beauty as such is another name for the transcendental, like The Good and The One. In other Enneads Plotinus seems to place beauty below The Good and the One, in the realm of nous.  I don’t think there is any actual confusion; it is simply that there is a noetic beauty that is received in the noetic realm from the transcendental, The One and The Good; and this noetic beauty is further transmitted to the realm of soul, and ultimately impressed upon the material realm. 

This quotation details how, by following beauty back to its source, ascending to the noetic (Intellectual-Principle/Intellect/Spirit), and then releasing the beauty found there in the noetic, one enters the realm of The Good, where one finds Authentic Beauty, the Beauty Beyond, the Source of all that is beautiful in the material realm.

3.  Plotinus weaves into this discussion the topic of love.  Like beauty, love is a sign of the presence of the transcendent, but as the Armstrong translation says, as long as the lover bases love on the mistaken idea that love grows from the senses, ‘the lover is not yet in love.’  This is a view that is found many times in Platonism such as the dialogues Alcibiades I, Rival Lovers, and The Symposium.  The insight is that sensation-based love is not actually love; but the experience of love can lead one past the material experience and allow one to make the same kind of ascent that beauty offers.

4.  There is an optimism in this kind of analysis; I mean that, in a sense, the cosmos is constantly offering us opportunities to recognize the existence of the transcendental - through the experiences of beauty and love.  This, again, I don’t mind saying, is a kind of Platonic grace. 

Most people do not take advantage of these opportunities; but they are, nevertheless, there. 

5.  This quote also re-enforces the centrality of the Ascetic Ideal for the practice of Platonism.  In both the experience of beauty and the experience of love, the way the practitioner uses these experiences to ascend to The One is by turning away from the sensory experience and tracing back the experience of beauty or love to its source.  It is this turning away from material sensation that is the Ascetic Ideal.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 32

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