Platonism and Mental Constructions

April 30, 2023

Platonism and Mental Constructions

Recently I’ve been reading a book that is focused on the history and practice of Saivism.  Saivism is a Dharmic tradition and I have posted before about how Platonism, in some aspects, is comparable to Dharmic traditions in ways that help illuminate what Platonism is about.  But that isn’t always the case.

The book, particularly when it focuses on the history of Saivism, notes that there are dual and non-dual interpretations of Saivism.  The author is relentlessly of the view that the non-dual interpretations are superior to the dualistic interpretations.  This is a very widespread belief in the West among those who think of themselves as teaching from a Dharmic tradition’s perspective; for example this is true of Western Vedanta and Western Mahayana Buddhism.  Among Western teachers and adherents of these traditions it is taken for granted that non-dualism is superior to dualism.

(As an aside, I suspect that his elevation of non-dualism above dualism replicates Western supersessionism, also known as ‘replacement theology.’  Supersessionism is the view that one tradition’s teaching is more complete than a previous tradition.  For example, Christianity supersedes, or replaces, Judaism.  Islam supersedes Christianity.  And Bahai supersedes Islam.  The supersessionism of Christianity also applies to Western philosophy wherein Christianity interprets its teachings as ‘completing’ the teachings of philosophy, particularly Platonism.  My view is that non-dualism in the West is a teaching that has some of the features of Western supersessionism in that non-dualism considers itself more complete than dualistic teachings.)

Reading this book on Saivism got me to thinking of how to place Platonism in the dualist/non-dualist debate.  Is Platonism dualistic or is it a non-dualist tradition?  I don’t think it is an easy call to come down on one side or the other.  In a sense Platonism can be understood as dualistic because the One is ultimate otherness and utterly unlike material, sensory, experience and objects.  Looked at from another perspective, you could say that Platonism is a non-dual teaching because the One is the only truly real ‘thing;’ everything else is deficient in unity, in goodness, in manifesting eternity. 

Thinking about this, I tentatively came to the conclusion that Platonism doesn’t really fit into this discussion regarding dual and non-dual teachings.  I think that makes sense because the dual/non-dual divide emerged in India and was a specific concern of Indian spiritual and religious culture.  Outside of India this discussion does not seem to have appeared; for example, in China I don’t see the Taoists and Confucians arguing along lines that can be mapped on to dualism vs. non-dualism.  Similarly, in the West, in the Classical period, I don’t think this issue was of concern and I don’t think it is touched on in a way that we can recognize or map onto Indian systems.  In contrast, the question of free will is of major concern for Western philosophy and religion, but it is not a major focus outside of the West.

I sometimes find Western teachers of non-dualism frustrating.  The presentation of Western non-dualism seems to be merged with Western psychology, taken as a kind of therapy, and lacking in the foundational commitments that were, and are, of great importance to Indian non-dual teachings.  In addition, Western non-dualism often seems to me to be used to support the West’s hyper-individualism; e.g. ‘you are perfect just as you are.’

My own view is that dualism and non-dualism are metaphysical tools.  Dualism has explanatory value in certain contexts as does non-dualism; but I don’t think it is accurate to see one of these as superior to the other; that would be like saying a screw driver is superior to a hammer. 

These kinds of teachings, really methods of analysis, are mental fabrications.  That doesn’t mean they are useless, but it does mean that understanding these systems is not the goal of spiritual practice.  The goal of spiritual practice in Platonism is beyond affirmation or negation; it is the One that is beyond name and form.  It is arrived at through contemplation.

More important than these analytical approaches, like dualism and non-dualism, are the spiritual practices and exercises that constitute the means whereby purification takes place.  An analogy might help:  We can analyze a sonnet taking an historical approach or a grammatical approach.  Neither of these approaches will teach you how to write a sonnet; you need to internalize the rules of the form so that you become a vessel for the writing of a sonnet.  In a similar way, the basic teachings of asceticism in Platonism, found prominently in Phaedo, but scattered throughout the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, and many other Platonist writers, are the means whereby the practitioner internalizes the truth of the Platonic path.  It is the spiritual practices of purification, such as non-harming, sexual restraint, abstaining from alcohol, and abstaining from killing animals either for food or for the purposes of religious sacrifice (and therefore a vegetarian/vegan approach to life), that transform the practitioner of Platonism into a Sage; it is the practices of purification that lead, step by step, to that which transcends the material realm; it is the practices of purification that align the soul of the practitioner with the Good, the One, the Beautiful, and with that which is Eternal.

 

 

 

The Way Within

25 March 2023

The Way Within

“A man has not failed if he fails to win beauty of colours or bodies, or power or office or kingship even, but if he fails to win this and only this.  For this he should give up the attainment of kingship and of rule over all earth and sea and sky, if only by leaving and overlooking them he can turn to That and see.

“But how shall we find the way?  What method can we devise?  How can one see the ‘inconceivable beauty’ which stays within the holy sanctuary and does not come out where the profane may see it?  Let him who can, follow and come within, and leave outside the sight of his eyes and not turn back to the bodily splendours which he saw before.  When he sees the beauty in bodies he must not run after them; we must know that they are images, traces, shadows, and hurry away to that which they image.  For if a man runs to the image and wants to seize it as if it was the reality (like a beautiful reflection playing on the water, which some story somewhere, I think, said riddlingly a man wanted to catch and sank down into the stream and disappeared) then this man who clings to beautiful bodies and will not let them go, will, like the man in the story, but in soul, not in body, sink down into the dark depths where intellect has no delight and stay blind in Hades, consorting with shadows there and here.”

(Plotinus, Ennead I.6, On Beauty, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead I, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, page 255-257, 7.30-8.15, ISBN: 9780674994843)

“For not he that has failed of the joy that is in colour or in visible forms, not he that has failed of power or of honours or of kingdom has failed, but only he that has failed of only This, for Whose winning he should renounce kingdoms and command over earth and ocean and sky, if only, spurning the world of sense from beneath his feet, and straining to This, he may see.

“But what must we do?  How lies the path?  How come to vision of the inaccessible Beauty, dwelling as if in consecrated precincts, apart from the common ways where all may see, even the profane?

“He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy.  When he perceives those shapes of grace that show in body, let him not pursue: he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of.  For if anyone follow what is like a beautiful shape playing over water – is there not a myth telling in symbol of such a dupe, how he sank into the depths of the current and was swept away to nothingness?  So too, one that is held by material beauty and will not break free shall be precipitated, not in body but in Soul, down to the dark depths loathed of the Intellective-Being, where, blind even in the Lower-World, he shall have commerce only with shades, there as here.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Plotinus: The Enneads, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, pages 70-71, I.6.7-I.6.8, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  The path of Platonic contemplation is found by turning away from sensory phenomena and instead turning within to the source of those phenomena.  In this Ennead on Beauty, the path is described as turning away from sensory beauty to the source of beauty that is found within.

2.  It is natural that human beings, when seeing, or otherwise sensing, something beautiful tend to reach out in an attempt to grasp, own, or control, that which is beautiful.  It seems obvious that this impulse to reach out makes sense.  The problem is that beauty in the sensory/material world is unstable; such beauty will soon vanish.  Even if someone is in a position to purchase a thing of beauty, that thing of beauty is changing in every moment, losing its unity, headed to the harbor of impermanence where it will vanish under the tides of becoming and begoning. 

3.  But the experience of Beauty as such, of noetic Beauty, surpasses, according to this quote, all worldly accomplishments, even kingship over earth, sea, and sky.  This is because the experience of Beauty as such means experiencing the transcendental, that which participates in eternity.

4.  This turning away is part of what I mean by the ‘ascetic ideal’.  There is a connection between the asceticism that Plato and Plotinus refer to and speak about, and the way to access Beauty as such.  

5.  One of the difficulties in understanding Plotinus is how Plotinus will use a word, such as ‘beautiful’, but the meaning changes depending on the context; in particular what hypostasis is being referred to.  Sensory beauty is found in the third hypostasis, the realm of the senses, materiality, and becoming and begoning.  Noetic beauty is found in the second hypostasis, the realm of nous.  Noetic beauty and material beauty are connected in the sense that all material beauty participates in noetic beauty and depends upon noetic beauty for its existence.  

There is a third, and higher, manifestation of beauty that is mentioned only rarely; I call it ‘transcendental beauty’ and in this instance it is the beauty of the One, it is the beauty of that which is beyond mind and being.  While noetic beauty is beauty as such, transcendental beauty is beauty that transcends itself in its unity with the One, the Good, and the Eternal.

Transcendental beauty is the beauty of eternity.

6.  I learned recently that it was this Ennead that Stephen MacKenna first translated and published.  MacKenna was kind of testing the waters to see if there was any interest.  A man of means read it and offered to finance a full translation of the Enneads, but MacKenna balked at being dependent upon this individual.  So the man of means brought the idea to the attention of a publisher who gave MacKenna a stipend in order to work on the translation; and that’s how the MacKenna translation emerged.  I think this story points to the power of this Ennead; it has always been one of my favorites.  It is clear, direct, and offers the reader instruction on the metaphysical ascent that is accessible.  At the same time the Ennead is uncompromising in its commitment to a spiritual life and the value Plotinus sees in such a life.  I always find reading it inspiring.

Getting Directions to the House of Beauty

22 April 2023

Getting Directions to the House of Beauty

On Youtube there are, now and then, posts that attack modern art.  These posts seem to appear once or twice a year; at least the ones that get a large viewership.  Some of these posts are very witty and get millions of views.

The other day I came across a post that was a defense of modern art; it was a response to one of those Youtube posts lambasting modern art that had received a very large number of views.  I’m not familiar with the individual who posted the defense but from the way he spoke he sounded like a young academic, though I could be wrong about that. 

During the defense of modern art he presented a series of famous, canonical, paintings from the Western canon ranging from medieval icons to French Impressionism.  He noted that these were considered to be beautiful and he agreed.  Then he added, “I don’t care.  So what if they are beautiful.”  He explained that he had no interest in beauty and that one of the things that he liked about modern art is that it had put aside beauty.  What replaced beauty among the modern artists he admired?  He said he was looking for art that generated ‘engagement’, that worked to lead to a conversation. 

The example he gave of a good modern painting was a distorted rendering of the Madonna that was smeared with feces.  He liked this painting because it was controversial which means that people are engaged with it and he considered this engagement to be deeper than the experience of beauty.

(As an aside I want to mention that there is a lot of modern art that I like and that I think is beautiful; it was the Youtube presenter who argued that the lack of beauty in modern art is a good thing.  In addition, I don’t know how widespread this view is, though I have heard it before.  Perhaps it is a fringe view, but I tend to think that is not the case.)

This reminded me of my own experience with poets inspired by Japanese forms and writing in the English language.  I am specifically focusing on English language haiku.  English language poets who write haiku are divided into two camps; I refer to the first as ‘free verse haiku’ and the second as ‘formal haiku.’  The formal haiku poets write a three-line verse with 5-7-5 syllables.  The free verse haiku poets do not use counting as a means for determining line length; consequently, their haiku look a lot like free verse poetry.  Japanese haiku came to the English-speaking world in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, right at the time when free verse was taking a stance against traditional English poetry.  Because of these circumstances I think it is natural that English language haiku reflects the larger context of the formal/free verse divide in contemporary English language poetry.

While reading older issues of English language haiku journals I came across essays that argued for the idea that English language haiku was not concerned with beauty, that other ideals, such as disjunction, or obscurity, have displaced the ideal of beauty.  I found these essays baffling since the great haiku poets of Japan were strongly interested in beauty.  To my surprise, at least one essay linked the idea of beauty in haiku to an ‘outdated’ Platonism which modern poets had left behind.  At the time that I read these essays I thought of myself as a Buddhist, but even so I found the essays very strange.  I still do, though now I am more inclined to think that the conscious rejection of Platonism for an unexamined empiricism has something to do with the ejection of beauty as a, or the, central concern of a poet.

My third observation is one that, I understand, comes from Silicon Valley.  I don’t remember where or when I first heard this possibly apocryphal anecdote, but the situation is that a conservationist was having no luck getting contributions for their organization from hi-tech firms.  He checked in with a friend who worked for one of these firms.  The friend told him that, from a hi-tech perspective, “Nature is boring.”  Since first hearing this, I have heard several different versions of it.

The link between the first two stories and the third one is that many people experience beauty when engaging with nature.  It is common for people to comment about the beauty of a sunset, or of a full moon, or to react positively to a walk in the forest.  Many people find spiritual significance in these kinds of experiences, just as many people find spiritual significance when standing in front of a beautiful painting or reading a beautiful poem.

I often think that modernity has created barriers to understanding Platonism that are peculiar to modernity; meaning that these barriers did not exist in previous history.  Thinking about the above examples, I have started thinking that modernity marginalizes, or tries to marginalize, beauty and that I do not know of any previous culture that even attempted to do so.

From a Platonist perspective beauty is a symbol of the transcendental, which is immaterial, nevertheless shining forth in the material realm.  Platonism comprehends beauty as the presence of eternity within the realm of the ephemeral.

From a Platonist perspective beauty is a signal to those who perceive it to go beyond the perception of the beautiful object to beauty itself.  Both Plato and Plotinus wrote a lot about the significance of beauty which is a central theme of the tradition.

From a Platonist perspective perceiving beauty resembles getting directions to the transcendental, nous, and even beyond the transcendental to the source of all things, the One and the Good.

From a Platonist perspective the presence of beauty is a kind of grace.  I mean by ‘grace’ that beauty is freely offered, that beauty is not part of a transaction, that beauty is not a commodity.

From a Platonist perspective beauty is the voice of God.

I do not think it is possible to change someone’s mind about the status of beauty if they conceive of beauty in negative terms, or view it as trivial (comparing beauty to, for example, decoration).  Dismissing the significance of beauty means that they have rejected symbol, analogy, metaphor, and similar means, as sources of knowledge and wisdom.  Instead, only analytic and/or ideological approaches are deemed to be meaningful.  The story of how this happened is long and complex and beyond the scope of this post; though I will say that I think the emergence of analytic philosophy in the early 20^th century was a major contributing factor.

But once someone has had the experience of beauty, and especially if they have had the experience of the beautiful as such, it is impossible to regard beauty as insignificant.  It would be like denying that water is wet.

Fortunately, there are many examples of beauty in this world both in natural settings and in human made things.  Even simple things like a well-crafted muffin, or an excellently shaped coffee mug can be an occasion for the experience of the beautiful to unfold.  And this unfolding experience of the beautiful leads to the experience of the beautiful as such.  And the experience of the beautiful as such leads to the experience of the Good, the One, and the Presence of Eternity.

Theory and Practice in the Platonic Heritage

18 April 2023

Theory and Practice in the Platonic Heritage

I’ve been influenced by Pierre Hadot for a long time.  His books What is Ancient Philosophy and Philosophy as a Way of Life were eye-opening for me.  Hadot’s view, as I understand it, is that Western Philosophy during the Classical period was primarily defined by the spiritual exercises that the various philosophical traditions used to guide students on the path to understanding.  This ‘understanding’ was of a spiritual nature.  In other words, Philosophical Schools in the Classical period more closely resemble Dharmic spiritual traditions in India such as Saivism, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, etc., than what philosophy has come to mean today.  What philosophy has come to mean today is a method, or group of methods, of analysis that has no transcendental goal or understanding.

I continue to find Hadot inspirational and have referenced him several times on this blog.  Here is a quote from The Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot that focuses on the distinction that Hadot makes between what he calls ‘philosophical discourse’ and ‘philosophical exercises’:

“Theoretical philosophical discourse is, indeed, different from these lived philosophical exercises by which the soul purifies itself of its passions and spiritually separates itself from the body.

“In fact, we find these lived and concrete spiritual exercises throughout the entire course of the Platonic tradition, notably in Philo of Alexandria, but above all in Plotinus.  There is, in the latter, a complete lucidity concerning the distinction which separates philosophical discourse from philosophy itself at each level of the soul’s ascent towards the beautiful and the good.  First, the soul can only become aware of its own immateriality if it undertakes an ethical purification which frees it from everything which is not itself: that is to say, which liberates it from the passions.  Then, if the soul wants to be elevatd to the level of the Intellect [nous], it must renounce discourse and try to raise itself to an immediate and indivisible intuition of thought itself, an idea that is part of the heritage of Aristotelian thought.  When Plotinus wants to describe the ascension of the soul towards the Good, he insists, on the one hand, that there is the discourse, which abstractly instructs us about the Good, that is to say, the abstract discourse of rational theology, with its methods of analogy or negation, for example.  On the other hand, there is that which effectively leads us to the Good, that is, as Plotinus says, purifications, virtues and inner discipline: in a word, spiritual exercises effectively practiced.

“Above all, the Plotinian mystical experience prolongs and develops all that the Platonic experience of love represents.  The latter gave to the soul the feeling of the presence of beauty.  The Plotinian mystical experience gives to the soul the experience of the presence of the Good itself, and it is itself lived as an initiation to the mysteries.  There is in this presence a lived dimension which entirely escapes discursive rationality.”

(Pierre Hadot, The Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot: Philosophy as Practice, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2020, pages 74-75, ISBN: 9781474272995)

1.  I don’t know enough about Philo of Alexandria to know what specifically Hadot is referring to in Philo’s writings verses Philo’s practice.  I’m confident that Hadot is referring to something specific, but I’ll put it aside for now.

2.  Hadot’s view about Plotinus is that Plotinus separates theoretical discourse from ‘philosophy itself’; and by ‘philosophy itself’ Hadot means spiritual practices or spiritual exercises. 

I think analogies might be helpful at this point.  For example, there is music theory and there are musical exercises.  If you are learning an instrument (piano, guitar, oboe, koto, etc.) you will be given musical exercises, such as scales, to practice.  Depending on the pedagogy the teacher uses, and the teacher’s own knowledge, you may be given music theory at the same time, preceding being given an exercise or exercises, or the theory might come after (sometimes long after) the exercise.  But for musicians in training the difference between the two, music theory and music exercises, is fairly clear. 

Another example is martial arts.  Martial arts practices typically consist of learning moves through repetition.  The theory behind these moves, once again, may be offered to the student before, during, or after learning any particular move; this depends on the manner of instruction that the martial arts tradition adheres to.

The goal of musical exercises is not to be an expert in playing scales; it is to become a trained musician able to play a variety of musical expressions.  The goal of learning martial arts moves is not to become adept at using a specific block or punch, but to be able to react spontaneously and effectively in a situation requiring physical fighting.

The goal of philosophical, or spiritual, exercises is not the exercise itself, but to ascend to that which is beyond any name, beyond any predication, beyond affirmation or negation.  Purifications ‘effectively lead’ the philosophical practitioner to this goal, just as learning scales effectively leads a student to musicianship. 

2.1  As an aside, this way of looking at the spiritual path leads some to think of purifications and ascetic practices as a kind of tool used on the path, but which is abandoned upon attaining the goal.  There are lots of expressions that take this approach; we might say, for example, that a hiker no longer carries his backpack once he has reached his camping site.  Or we might point out that a highly trained musician might no longer need to use beginner practices, such as simple scales.  When I was a Buddhist I often heard it put this way: that the Dharma is a raft to get to the other shore, but once you have reached the other shore you no longer need the raft.

I don’t think Platonism looks at purifications that way.  Ascetic practices are, primarily, alignments with the nature of the One, the Good, and the Beautiful.  In other words, from the Platonic tradition’s perspective, asceses will steadily deepen, become more and more a part of the practitioner’s life (lives) as the experience of higher hypostases becomes more secure.  It’s not like abandoning a raft; it’s like building a home in eternity.

3.  It is helpful to me that Hadot refers to the abstract discourse of philosophy (what in music would be called music theory) as containing methods of ‘analogy or negation’.  This is what Plotinus writes about this kind of discourse, although in Armstrong’s translation he says that Plotinus refers to ‘comparisons’. 

In contrast, there are the spiritual exercises themselves which consist of purifications, virtues, and inner discipline.  Purifications are practices such as vegetarianism and/or veganism, sexual restraint, and refraining from alcohol.  Virtues are usually presented in the Platonic tradition as of several types such as civic virtues, et al.  In a lot of Platonic literature I have read, such as Porphyry, purifications are subsumed into the virtues by thinking of purification as one type of virtue.  For example, a Platonic writer might talk about civic virtues, purificatory virtues, and contemplative virtues.  On the other hand, it seems that at times all the virtues are considered to be purifications of various types.  The approaches to categorization are varied, but they are all what Hadot refers to as spiritual exercises.

4.  As an aside, I’m not convinced that Platonism is primarily a path of negation.  In mysticism the negative path seems to be favored.  I understand why many, including Hadot, see negation as primary.  For example, when Plotinus writes, “Take away everything” that is very much in the negative, or apophatic, mode.

But I think there is a positive element in Platonic philosophy that may have been overlooked.  This appears on those rare occasions where the Platonic Sage is depicted in positive terms.  They are people who are calm, serene, centered, present to the transcendental.  The behavior of Socrates in his last hours, as shown in Phaedo, is a good example.

I think there is also a positive element in the usage of specific terms to designate the One.  These designations are the One, the Good, the Beautiful, God, the Eternal, and a few others now and then.  And the positive approach is also present in the analogies that the Platonic tradition uses as stand-ins for the One; such as the sun, light, and others that only appear rarely.

It is true that the ultimate is beyond affirmation or negation; but that implies that negation is not favored over affirmation since both affirmation and negation are inadequate. 

5.  It is intriguing to me that Hadot suddenly refers to ‘love’ as the culmination of the Plotinian mystical experience.  I think this is true in the sense that the One is inherently attractive to the soul, our souls.  This attractiveness of the One, and the Good, and the Beautiful draws the practitioner forward on the path.  Once the practitioner has had an experience of a higher hypostasis, the presence of the One, what I like to call the presence of eternity, the philosopher is pulled forward on the path.  At this point ascesis becomes easier (it can still be a challenge) because the bliss of the higher hypostases has been felt and understood.

Hadot links the mystical experience to beauty.  In a way you can think of any experience of beauty as potentially mystical because in the Platonic understanding all beauty comes from a higher source and when we respond to beauty we are responding to that higher source.  However, most people who experience beauty do not turn to that higher source and the experience quickly fades.  That is why purifications and ascetic practices are necessary; to stabilize those kinds of experiences so that they can be cultivated and nourish our understanding of the higher source from which they originate.

6.  I like the way Hadot ends this section with the use of the analogy of an initiation into the mysteries.  I suspect there is an historical linkage that Hadot is implying to the Greek mystery traditions; perhaps Hadot is suggesting that Platonism is linked to these mystery traditions in important ways.  The experience of the One is a mystery because it is beyond affirmation or negation, beyond ‘discursive rationality', in a way it is beyond experience itself.  Yet, at the same time it is the source of all that we experience and of all that exists, has existed, or ever will exist.

 

 

 

Ancient Traditions

15 April 2023

Ancient Traditions

Socrates: “There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they [people in general] go there [to the afterlife] from here and come back here again and are born from the dead.”

(Plato, Phaedo, Translated by Harold North Fowler, Plato I, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, page 243, 70C, ISBN: 0674990404)

Socrates: “. . . I have heard from wise men and women who told of things divine –”

Meno: “What was it they said?”

Socrates: “Something true, as I thought, and admirable.”

Meno: “What was it?  And who were the speakers?”

Socrates: “They were certain priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry; and Pindar also and many another poet of heavenly gifts.  As to their words, they are these: mark now, if you judge them to be true.  They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes.  Consequently one ought to live all one’s life in the utmost holiness.”

(Plato, Meno, Translated by W. R. M. Lamb, Plato: Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1924, page 301, 81A-B, ISBN: 9780674991835)

1.  The quote from Phaedo is part of a response given by Socrates to Cebes, one of Socrates’s students, who has just said that he, Cebes, would like more discussion and more proof regarding rebirth than Socrates has offered up to that point in the dialogue.  Socrates makes this statement in passing, but does not dwell on what ‘ancient’ tradition is being referenced.

2.  I think Socrates mentions this ‘ancient tradition’ to suggest to Cebes, and the others who are attending Socrates during his last hours, that the idea of rebirth is not some eccentric teaching that Socrates has come up with, or even conjured, due to the dire situation Socrates finds himself in (as an aside, Socrates does not find it dire, but his students do).  Socrates is quietly reminding Cebes that what Socrates is teaching has a long heritage, that many wise people have held these views in the past.

3.  This appeal to the past that Socrates offers in a casual way is one that would carry weight in most societies, but not in modernity, the society we live in at present.  In traditional societies that past was understood to be source of wisdom, experience, as part of the heritage of the present.  In our current cultural situation, the past is seen as an obstacle to progress that must be overcome.  This means that the past should be disposed of as it has no value to those who think that material perfection will be achieved only in a future that will appear only when the past and its influences are removed. 

4.  Neither the quote from Phaedo, nor the quote from Meno, specifically mention the ‘ancient tradition’ or the affiliation of the priests, priestesses, and poets that is the source of the idea of rebirth.  In a commentary on Phaedo by R. Hackforth, the footnote to this quote argues for an Orphic origin, “Plato often appeals to ‘ancient doctrine’, especially in his latest dialogue, the Laws.  It is not always Orphic doctrine that is so described . .  . But in the present case it probably is; the doctrine of rebirth of the soul has already been referred to at Meno 81A [quoted above] in language plainly suggestive of Orphism, though it is not there called ancient, as it is here [in Phaedo] . . .” (R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedo, page 59)

5.  I don’t know much about Orphism in Greece and the ancient Classical world.  What I have read simply mentions in passing that Orphism is a source for the idea of rebirth in the Classical World, but does not go into details.  I understand that Orphism was a mystery tradition, which means that its adherents took vows to not reveal to outsiders certain teachings, and perhaps ceremonies, that were only granted to initiates.  There were a lot of mystery traditions in the Classical World in general and in ancient Greece in particular.  If Socrates means, when he says that he ‘heard from’ priests and priestesses about these teachings that may imply that Socrates was an initiate of an Orphic, or Orphic-related mystery tradition. 

6.  Another ancient tradition that Socrates may be pointing to is Pythagoreanism.  Phaedo is relating the last hours of Socrates to Echecrates of Phlius, where the dialogue takes place.  Echecrates was a Pythagorean.  It is possible that Echecrates was a student of the well-known Pythagorean Philolaus, if the reference in Diogenes Laertius is to the same person.  The Pythagoreans also held to the idea of rebirth and they connected rebirth to their vegetarianism. 

Echecrates was not present at the death of Socrates, but asks Phaedo for an account because Echecrates has an interest in Socrates and the events that happened in Athens.  Echecrates knows about them, but only in a general way and wants Phaedo to fill in the details.

The quote ‘ancient teaching’ may be a way for Plato to condense what otherwise would be a lengthy sidebar on the sources of this ‘ancient teaching’; a kind of synecdoche.  My feeling is that all of this, and likely more, is embedded in this passing reference.  For us moderns, it is sufficient to remember that the idea of rebirth was already an ancient teaching when Plato received it from his teacher, Socrates.

7.  I think I’ve mentioned before, in another post, that when I was studying Plato in University they never mentioned rebirth with regards to Plato and Platonism.  The quotes above, and other references to rebirth in Plato and subsequent Platonists, were simply passed over.

These days this reminds me of the way that rebirth in western Buddhism is similarly sidelined.  It is kind of startling the ease with which western Buddhists simply ignore the teaching of rebirth, but there it is. 

8.  The idea of rebirth clashes with core assumptions of modernity in ways that no other ancient view that I know of does.  Rebirth implies the existence of the immaterial soul, implies that not all things can be reduced to material factors, suggests that there exist domains that are transcendental to materiality, and further suggests that our actions have ethical consequences for us either in this life or in future lives.  For many people who are trapped in modernity, all of this is a big challenge.

But the idea of rebirth in Platonism is also a great opportunity.  For those of us in the West, it is a reminder of how much wisdom has been lost and how much we need to recover. 

Crito and Platonic Ethics

13 April 2023

Crito and Platonic Ethics

Socrates: Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others?  Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong?  Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children?  Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not?  And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer?  Do we believe this or not?

Crito: We do.

Socrates:  Then we ought not to do wrong at all. 

Crito:  Why, no.

Socrates:  And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.

Crito:  Apparently not.

Socrates:  Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?

Crito:  Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates:  Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?

Crito:  Not right, certainly.

Socrates:  For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.

Crito:  That is true.

Socrates:  Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us.

(Plato,  Crito, translated by Harold North Fowler,  Plato I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, pages 171-173, 49A-C, ISBN: 0674990404)

 

1.  This is a teaching found in a number of places in the Dialogues of Plato.  In Crito Socrates uses this teaching to distinguish the way of the world from the way of philosophy.  The way of the world is to retaliate in kind; meaning that if someone wrongs you or does something evil to you, then you retaliate against that person by doing harm and/or evil to that person.  The way of philosophy is to refrain from retaliating in kind; that is to say that those committed to the way of philosophy will refrain from doing wrong to those who have wronged them, and will refrain from doing evil to those who have done evil to them.

2.  I see this kind of analysis as embedded in the Platonic view of rebirth and karma.  At the end of Phaedo Socrates reveals to his students the nature of the afterlife and how people are judged and treated based on the deeds they have done.  It is a vivid description and some of the most vivid scenes are what happens to those who have wronged others, or engaged in evil acts; they suffer for an extended time in an afterlife that includes being trapped in a river from which they cannot emerge no matter how hard they try, until those whom they have harmed assist them.  In other words Socrates has the view that those who do wrong and evil suffer as a consequence of having committed those acts.

3.  This is similar to the way Dharmic traditions often talk about rebirth and the afterlife state between births.  I don’t know if there is an afterlife description that has the specifics of the way Socrates describes it in Phaedo, but the broad features are similar.

4.  Refraining from acts of wrong or evil, even in a situation where you are retaliating against those who have committed wrong or evil against you, is a type of purification.  It is linked to such basic practices as vegetarianism in the sense that vegetarianism, and refraining from participation in animal sacrifices, means to refrain from wronging animals, or doing evil to them.  It is the same principle applied in different contexts.  (See On Abstinence from Killing Animals by Porphyry)

5.  Platonic ethics is, it seems to me, based on principles that are then applied to various specific situations.  When I speak about Platonic ethics I mean the ethical teachings that are specifically Platonic and can be distinguished from the more broadly held ethical views of ancient Greek society as a whole.  For example, virtue ethics is a significant part of the ethical teachings found in Platonism, but virtue ethics are also part of the culture of that period.  In contrast, teachings like vegetarianism, sexual restraint, and abstaining from alcohol, are peculiar to Platonism and the philosophical way of life.  Both Socrates and Porphyry are explicit about this, at times, when referring to specific ethical teachings.  Here, in Crito, Socrates contrasts the way of ordinary people with the way ‘we’ (which I take to mean Socrates and his fellow philosophers) live in the world.  Likewise, Porphyry makes clear several times that it is philosophers in particular who should refrain from killing animals either for food or for the purposes of religious sacrifices. 

6.  I think the principle which is illustrated here is what in Dharmic traditions would be called ‘non-harming’, or ahimsa.  (I suspect it would be helpful to compare and contrast the Dharmic traditions’ teachings on ahimsa with the teachings on refraining from doing wrong or committing evil, even in retaliation for the same.)  Like the Dharmic traditions, non-harming, or ahimsa, is embedded in the teachings of karma and rebirth in the Platonic tradition.  And, further, this practice of non-harming, or non-wrongdoing, is seen as a way of transcending a world in which doing harm and doing evil, especially in a context of retaliation, is not only permitted, but considered highly admirable.

7.  This teaching is a profound one.  As I continue on my journey on the path of Platonism, I continue to find applications I had not previously considered.  As my understanding of this teaching grows I find myself, step by step, advancing on the path that leads to a return to the One.