Theory and Practice in the Platonic Heritage

18 April 2023

Theory and Practice in the Platonic Heritage

I’ve been influenced by Pierre Hadot for a long time.  His books What is Ancient Philosophy and Philosophy as a Way of Life were eye-opening for me.  Hadot’s view, as I understand it, is that Western Philosophy during the Classical period was primarily defined by the spiritual exercises that the various philosophical traditions used to guide students on the path to understanding.  This ‘understanding’ was of a spiritual nature.  In other words, Philosophical Schools in the Classical period more closely resemble Dharmic spiritual traditions in India such as Saivism, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, etc., than what philosophy has come to mean today.  What philosophy has come to mean today is a method, or group of methods, of analysis that has no transcendental goal or understanding.

I continue to find Hadot inspirational and have referenced him several times on this blog.  Here is a quote from The Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot that focuses on the distinction that Hadot makes between what he calls ‘philosophical discourse’ and ‘philosophical exercises’:

“Theoretical philosophical discourse is, indeed, different from these lived philosophical exercises by which the soul purifies itself of its passions and spiritually separates itself from the body.

“In fact, we find these lived and concrete spiritual exercises throughout the entire course of the Platonic tradition, notably in Philo of Alexandria, but above all in Plotinus.  There is, in the latter, a complete lucidity concerning the distinction which separates philosophical discourse from philosophy itself at each level of the soul’s ascent towards the beautiful and the good.  First, the soul can only become aware of its own immateriality if it undertakes an ethical purification which frees it from everything which is not itself: that is to say, which liberates it from the passions.  Then, if the soul wants to be elevatd to the level of the Intellect [nous], it must renounce discourse and try to raise itself to an immediate and indivisible intuition of thought itself, an idea that is part of the heritage of Aristotelian thought.  When Plotinus wants to describe the ascension of the soul towards the Good, he insists, on the one hand, that there is the discourse, which abstractly instructs us about the Good, that is to say, the abstract discourse of rational theology, with its methods of analogy or negation, for example.  On the other hand, there is that which effectively leads us to the Good, that is, as Plotinus says, purifications, virtues and inner discipline: in a word, spiritual exercises effectively practiced.

“Above all, the Plotinian mystical experience prolongs and develops all that the Platonic experience of love represents.  The latter gave to the soul the feeling of the presence of beauty.  The Plotinian mystical experience gives to the soul the experience of the presence of the Good itself, and it is itself lived as an initiation to the mysteries.  There is in this presence a lived dimension which entirely escapes discursive rationality.”

(Pierre Hadot, The Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot: Philosophy as Practice, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2020, pages 74-75, ISBN: 9781474272995)

1.  I don’t know enough about Philo of Alexandria to know what specifically Hadot is referring to in Philo’s writings verses Philo’s practice.  I’m confident that Hadot is referring to something specific, but I’ll put it aside for now.

2.  Hadot’s view about Plotinus is that Plotinus separates theoretical discourse from ‘philosophy itself’; and by ‘philosophy itself’ Hadot means spiritual practices or spiritual exercises. 

I think analogies might be helpful at this point.  For example, there is music theory and there are musical exercises.  If you are learning an instrument (piano, guitar, oboe, koto, etc.) you will be given musical exercises, such as scales, to practice.  Depending on the pedagogy the teacher uses, and the teacher’s own knowledge, you may be given music theory at the same time, preceding being given an exercise or exercises, or the theory might come after (sometimes long after) the exercise.  But for musicians in training the difference between the two, music theory and music exercises, is fairly clear. 

Another example is martial arts.  Martial arts practices typically consist of learning moves through repetition.  The theory behind these moves, once again, may be offered to the student before, during, or after learning any particular move; this depends on the manner of instruction that the martial arts tradition adheres to.

The goal of musical exercises is not to be an expert in playing scales; it is to become a trained musician able to play a variety of musical expressions.  The goal of learning martial arts moves is not to become adept at using a specific block or punch, but to be able to react spontaneously and effectively in a situation requiring physical fighting.

The goal of philosophical, or spiritual, exercises is not the exercise itself, but to ascend to that which is beyond any name, beyond any predication, beyond affirmation or negation.  Purifications ‘effectively lead’ the philosophical practitioner to this goal, just as learning scales effectively leads a student to musicianship. 

2.1  As an aside, this way of looking at the spiritual path leads some to think of purifications and ascetic practices as a kind of tool used on the path, but which is abandoned upon attaining the goal.  There are lots of expressions that take this approach; we might say, for example, that a hiker no longer carries his backpack once he has reached his camping site.  Or we might point out that a highly trained musician might no longer need to use beginner practices, such as simple scales.  When I was a Buddhist I often heard it put this way: that the Dharma is a raft to get to the other shore, but once you have reached the other shore you no longer need the raft.

I don’t think Platonism looks at purifications that way.  Ascetic practices are, primarily, alignments with the nature of the One, the Good, and the Beautiful.  In other words, from the Platonic tradition’s perspective, asceses will steadily deepen, become more and more a part of the practitioner’s life (lives) as the experience of higher hypostases becomes more secure.  It’s not like abandoning a raft; it’s like building a home in eternity.

3.  It is helpful to me that Hadot refers to the abstract discourse of philosophy (what in music would be called music theory) as containing methods of ‘analogy or negation’.  This is what Plotinus writes about this kind of discourse, although in Armstrong’s translation he says that Plotinus refers to ‘comparisons’. 

In contrast, there are the spiritual exercises themselves which consist of purifications, virtues, and inner discipline.  Purifications are practices such as vegetarianism and/or veganism, sexual restraint, and refraining from alcohol.  Virtues are usually presented in the Platonic tradition as of several types such as civic virtues, et al.  In a lot of Platonic literature I have read, such as Porphyry, purifications are subsumed into the virtues by thinking of purification as one type of virtue.  For example, a Platonic writer might talk about civic virtues, purificatory virtues, and contemplative virtues.  On the other hand, it seems that at times all the virtues are considered to be purifications of various types.  The approaches to categorization are varied, but they are all what Hadot refers to as spiritual exercises.

4.  As an aside, I’m not convinced that Platonism is primarily a path of negation.  In mysticism the negative path seems to be favored.  I understand why many, including Hadot, see negation as primary.  For example, when Plotinus writes, “Take away everything” that is very much in the negative, or apophatic, mode.

But I think there is a positive element in Platonic philosophy that may have been overlooked.  This appears on those rare occasions where the Platonic Sage is depicted in positive terms.  They are people who are calm, serene, centered, present to the transcendental.  The behavior of Socrates in his last hours, as shown in Phaedo, is a good example.

I think there is also a positive element in the usage of specific terms to designate the One.  These designations are the One, the Good, the Beautiful, God, the Eternal, and a few others now and then.  And the positive approach is also present in the analogies that the Platonic tradition uses as stand-ins for the One; such as the sun, light, and others that only appear rarely.

It is true that the ultimate is beyond affirmation or negation; but that implies that negation is not favored over affirmation since both affirmation and negation are inadequate. 

5.  It is intriguing to me that Hadot suddenly refers to ‘love’ as the culmination of the Plotinian mystical experience.  I think this is true in the sense that the One is inherently attractive to the soul, our souls.  This attractiveness of the One, and the Good, and the Beautiful draws the practitioner forward on the path.  Once the practitioner has had an experience of a higher hypostasis, the presence of the One, what I like to call the presence of eternity, the philosopher is pulled forward on the path.  At this point ascesis becomes easier (it can still be a challenge) because the bliss of the higher hypostases has been felt and understood.

Hadot links the mystical experience to beauty.  In a way you can think of any experience of beauty as potentially mystical because in the Platonic understanding all beauty comes from a higher source and when we respond to beauty we are responding to that higher source.  However, most people who experience beauty do not turn to that higher source and the experience quickly fades.  That is why purifications and ascetic practices are necessary; to stabilize those kinds of experiences so that they can be cultivated and nourish our understanding of the higher source from which they originate.

6.  I like the way Hadot ends this section with the use of the analogy of an initiation into the mysteries.  I suspect there is an historical linkage that Hadot is implying to the Greek mystery traditions; perhaps Hadot is suggesting that Platonism is linked to these mystery traditions in important ways.  The experience of the One is a mystery because it is beyond affirmation or negation, beyond ‘discursive rationality', in a way it is beyond experience itself.  Yet, at the same time it is the source of all that we experience and of all that exists, has existed, or ever will exist.