Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 20

24 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 20

Continuing with my series on Phaedo, I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’Now then,’ said he, ‘do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way:  Do they seem to use to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?’

“’They fall very far short of it,’ said he.

“’Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, “This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,” he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?’

“’We must.’

“’Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?’

“’It certainly is.’

“’Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, “All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.’

“’That is true.’

“’And we agree, also that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses?  I consider that all the senses are alike.’

“’Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.’

“’Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it.  Is that our view?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.’

“’That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates.’”

“’And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?’

“’Certainly.’

“’But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.’

“’It does.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 259-263)

1.  This part of the dialogue starts out with Socrates suggesting that things ‘fall short’ of the ideal.  Furthermore things ‘strive’ for this ideal that we have in our understanding.  This, I think, is the source for a lot of conversation about ‘Platonic Ideals’ being perfect examples of experienced things.  I have heard pianists refer to a perfect performance of a concerto as a ‘Platonic Ideal’ of the concerto.  What I think they are saying is that pianists strive for a perfect performance, but always fall short of that perfection.  This kind of observation is made in many contexts. 

It is helpful to contemplate the terms ‘strive’ and ‘fall short’.  ‘Strive’ appears to imply that things, even ‘inanimate’ things like sticks, have a sense of their own perfection and in some way are working to instantiate that perfection; however such perfection is not possible in the world of becoming and begoning.  Because such perfection is not possible in becoming and begoning things ‘fall short’ of what they strive to be.  It is only by returning to their noetic source that things can reach perfection.

2.  In the next step, Socrates suggests that if we are comparing the sensory stick to an ideal stick, then the ideal must have preceded the experience of the sensory stick.  Socrates is leading us, step by step, to the understanding that our soul has had experience of ideal noetic realities before we take on a body in this life.

3.  Socrates next moves on from the perfect stick and the idea of equality which has no referent in the material world.  Socrates is pointing out that equality and its meaning must exist in our soul prior to seeing two ‘equal sticks.’  Because the understanding of equality exists prior to our use of the idea in material experience, and because there are no material examples of two equal things in an ideal sense, the idea of equality does not derive from material observation; instead the idea of equality is something the soul experiences in the noetic realm prior to rebirth in a material body.  This is emphasized by returning to the term ‘fall short’ and applying it to two equal things, such as two sticks.  We may say that two sticks are equal, but the two sticks fall short of the actual idea we have of equality, though they participate in that idea/form so that we can observe their ‘striving’ for equality.

4.  “Then it appears we must have acquired it before we were born.”  The task Socrates has set himself is to carefully lead his students to an understanding of noetic experience and the reality of the noetic realm as the foundation for reincarnation.  Socrates does through various lines of thought, comparisons, arguments, criticisms, and, at the end of the dialogue, mythic expressions.  Socrates is offering his students on his final day the means for understanding the meaning of noetic experience and that noetic experience is the foundation for sensory experience. 

5.  As an aside, I want to conclude with a brief comment about how to relate to these various strategies that Socrates uses to present his case for reincarnation and the immortality of the soul.  In modernity, particularly among philosophers influenced by, or adhering to, the analytic tradition in Anglo-American philosophy, there are particular demands made for an argument to be considered presentable in a philosophical context.  For example, the analytic tradition does not find comparisons such as metaphors and allegories philosophically useful.  And in the 20^th century various criteria were offered for a philosophical, or scientific, argument to be considered ‘meaningful’ such as the verifiability and falsifiability criteria of meaning.  Although there has been a lot of criticism of these criteria of meaning even within the analytic tradition, they still have a lot of influence on the philosophical community today.

I think that adhering to these apparatuses of analysis when reading a dialogue like Phaedo interferes with accessing what Socrates is trying to say.  Though some of the arguments presented by Socrates in Phaedo could be, and have been, formalized, I don’t think unpacking them in that way is helpful.

The way Socrates presents his views has more to do with coherence, both internal and external, than it does with formal logic.  Coherence is a sign of authenticity and that the speaker is speaking from experience.  And a second concern for Socrates is accessibility; that is to say that in Phaedo Socrates is concerned that his students understand what he is saying even if they remain somewhat skeptical of what he has to say.  This is different from analytic philosophy, particular in the more extreme adoptions of notations that only a very few specialists understand. 

So how do we approach all these strategies that Socrates offers us in Phaedo?  First, there is a basic sense that Socrates is a trustworthy man; this is shone by the life he has lived.  Second, it is not necessary to completely comprehend all the ins and outs of each argument in order to appreciate it.  Reincarnation is a subtle subject; it is reasonable to expect that some information about reincarnation will reach us while other information, or explanation, eludes us.  That is why it is a very good idea to read Phaedo many, many times.  I’m suggesting that if a train of thought offered by Socrates does not seem to land or quite make sense, that’s OK; over time, and as one’s contemplative experience deepens, it will make more sense.  The journey to wisdom is a long and twisting road.