Reason's Range

Reason’s Range

The process of reading through Phaedo in small sections, thinking about those sections, and then posting my own observations about them, has brought to mind a number of observations about Platonism as a spiritual system, and about how different the philosophical world of Platonism is from that of modern philosophy.  One of the topics that I noticed in this reading of Phaedo is the topic of ‘reason,’ and what reason means in Platonism in contrast to what reason means today, particularly in a philosophical context.  Here are a few remarks:

1.  What I noticed in particular was that Socrates uses numerous types of inference structures to make his points in Phaedo.  On at least one occasion Socrates uses a well known rule of inference, modus ponens, which every first year logic student learns.  But much more often Socrates uses structures of argument and persuasion (logoi) that some today would consider deficient (particularly analytic philosophers.)  For example, Socrates will argue that A and B are like each other because they share characteristic X, and then infer from that they are also alike in characteristic Y.  And on other occasions Socrates uses devices such as metaphor and simile to link two appearances together, as opposed to syllogistic. 

2.  It would be interesting, and perhaps revealing, to classify the arguments presented in Phaedo in accordance with their underlying structure.  I have read some modern commentaries on Phaedo that sort of do that, but because they see the arguments presented by Socrates through the lens of analytic philosophy, their approach falls short.  I mean by that they simply reject arguments that analytic philosophy would be unhappy about, thus losing an opportunity to challenge the basic assumptions of analytic philosophy.

3.  What I began to gradually see while reading Phaedo this time around is that reason has a greater range of application in Platonism than it does today.  For example, it would seem from Phaedo that metaphor and simile are a type of structured reasoning in Platonism; and, of course, allegory is also a means whereby one presents one’s arguments in a reasonable way. 

In contrast, the range of reason in modern philosophy has contracted to structures of formal inference that, because of the influence of early analytic philosophy, hover around the border of mathematics.  Other aspects of reason, found in the Dialogues are not considered to be logical, and because they are not logical they are not really reason by today’s standards.

4.  There is a type of person today who think of themselves as rational because they claim that their views are logical in the formal way of contemporary philosophy.  Contemporary atheists often present themselves that way, which I find humorous.  You can find many examples on youtube. But this is not confined to youtubers; widely admired authors like Steven Pinker and Richard Dawkins are examples, and there are many others.  This claim has historical precedents; one of the more significant ones is the French Revolution.  The leaders of the French Revolution thought of themselves as completely rational and reasonable.  And step by logical step the logic of the revolution led to a very active guillotine. 

I refer to this view of reason as ‘the nightmare of reason.’  You could say that modernity is the nightmare of reason.

5.  You can spot people who have this modernist view of reason, that reason is self-sufficient and confined to formal inferential structures, by asking whether or not they think that two completely rational people will necessarily reach the same conclusion in every given situation, dispute, or argument.  If someone says ‘yes’, I would say they live in the nightmare of reason.  If they say no, then I suggest that they are probably free from that nightmare.

6.  Platonism is the way those who dwell in modernity can wake up from the nightmare of reason; not because Platonism rejects reason, but because Platonism expands the range of reason, and this expanded range is like the sun at dawn that clarifies an unknown landscape.

7.  It has been pointed out by many that reason does not give us our starting points.  That is why Euclid starts with Axioms.  Axioms are intuitions, that are not accessed through inference.  Structures like metaphor, simile, allegory, and other types of ‘comparisons’ (as Plotinus says) are ways of cultivating that intuition.  They can be unpacked in multiple ways which keeps them alive and interesting (as an aside, this is why two equally reasonable people might not reach the same conclusion in an argument, because these intuitive approaches are an inherent part of human consciousness and intellect and will always affect the process of reasoning no matter how ‘formal’ someone thinks they are being.) 

8.  Phaedo is a kind of guide to the full range of reason, to the vastness of mind, to the many facets of mind found in human consciousness.  In nous all of these facets are a unity, they are not in opposition.  In the realm of differentiation in which we live, these facets are comprehended as distinct from each other and this can give rise to disputes about their relative efficacy.  In Phaedo Socrates shows how all of these can be used to serve the purpose of spiritual awakening.  This can be done because they are all emanations of Mind as such, which is a facet of nous.  And when we understand Mind as such, from there we can ascend to the Good and the One.