Platonism as a Type of Monotheism

31 January 2024

Platonism as a Type of Monotheism

I have been reading Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology, by John Peter Kenney.  Kenney’s purpose is to illuminate the development of monotheism within the Platonic tradition and to see that this development has shaped how the West understands monotheism.  I think the book is very well written, though it is definitely an academic book.  By ‘academic’ I mean that the audience the author was writing for was other academics; I can tell this by the kind of vocabulary he uses and certain ways that academics shape their sentences.  That’s not a criticism; I enjoy academic writing.  But it helps in understanding a book to know who the book was written for.

Here are a few remarks about Mystical Monotheism:

1.  This book is a good counterbalance to the books that view Platonism as an essentially Pagan tradition; there are quite a few of these at this time.  Kenney did not write his book in order to argue against a Pagan interpretation of Platonism; but if you are familiar with contemporary Pagan thought, and its interactions with Platonism, the book will automatically challenge that point of view.

2.  Kenney writes in his Preface, “This is an essay in philosophical theology and its history.  It is the initial study in a broader inquiry into the foundations of Western monotheism and represents an effort to reflect anew upon our theistic patrimony. . . The proximate focus of this study is the development of philosophical monotheism from the late Hellenistic period through the death of Plotinus in 270 A.D., the period of its initial coalescence.”  (Page IX)

It is Kenney’s view that the development of monotheism in the context of the history of Platonism has informed, guided, and shaped Western monotheism overall.  However, Kenney has the view that this formative influence has been ‘neglected.’  Partly this is because scholars of religion tend to start their investigations with the Reformation; this makes sense because almost all the topics of concern to Western religion at this time were either definitively shaped by the Reformation, or got their start in the Reformation.  The consequence of this is that the foundational insights and understanding of Ancient monotheism, such as that found in Platonism, are no longer examined and their contributions are, with some exceptions, not understood.  Kenney hopes to broaden the historical scope of monotheism so that it will include ancient Platonism and its historical unfolding in the Classical world.

3.  It strikes me when reading this work that Kenney is broadening the meaning of monotheism beyond what is usually the case.  I think most people think of ‘monotheism’ to refer to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (with occasional nods to Mormons and Bahai and so forth.)  Philosophical monotheism, the term Kenney uses, is not often brought into the picture (though I seem to recall that Karen Armstrong talks a little bit about it in her A History of God.)  There are Christian philosophers but philosophical monotheism that is prior to Jewish and Christian influences is not usually part of the picture.  Kenney is, I think, attempting to reinstate this kind of monotheism and bring it into the discussion about monotheism overall.

4.  Kenney writes that monotheism “is defined simply as the thesis that there is an ultimate divine principle transcendent to the physical universe.” (Page xxiv)  Looked at in this way, Platonism would qualify as a type of monotheism because of the principle of The One which is the source of all things and is, at the same time, transcendentally Good. 

I suspect that many contemporary Platonists would not consider this to be sufficient for viewing Platonism as a monotheistic tradition.  The definition might be considered too abstract in that it ignores many metaphysical assumptions (such as that of creation) as well as communal, ethical, and ritual commitments.  Looked at in this way Platonism might be seen as very different from, or even opposed to, the three dominant forms of monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  On the other hand, Platonism and these three monotheistic traditions have had a very long history of interacting with each other and finding nourishment for their own theologies in Platonic contexts.

I guess it would depend on where you want to draw lines of distinction and difference.

5.  For me one of the most helpful aspects of Mystical Monotheism has been the way Kenney presents the history of Platonic thought by focusing on the development of ways of interpreting the structure of the levels (hypostases) of existence.  Some early Platonists have viewed Platonic forms as ideas in the mind of God who is the first and highest level.  This means that The One would have conceptual content as opposed to the later development of a mystical understanding of The One as beyond intellect, analysis, affirmation and negation. 

Kenney also focuses on varying views of the nature and function of the Demiurge which I found fascinating.  Kenney’s view is that eventually the Platonic tradition would ‘displace’ the Demiurge; for example, it doesn’t seem that Plotinus has very much to say about this idea.

These shifting interpretations of the nature of the levels of reality (hypostases), of the historical unfolding of Platonic philosophy, was like reading about a great Symposium that has lasted for many centuries.  I had a kind of vision of a gathering of Platonic Sages, people like Xenocrates, Plutarch, Alcinous, Plotinus, Porphyry, Boethius, Ficino, the Cambridge Platonists, and so forth to the present, taking their turn giving speeches about the Platonic Way.  There they are, all of them, sitting on couches, relaxed with each other, discussing the best way to communicate the actuality of the cosmos and the presence of eternity to others.  I find this vision inspiring.

6.  Kenney concludes his book with a chapter on Plotinus.  Kenney refers to the Enneads as a ‘charter for later Hellenic monotheism.’  (Page 151)  Kenney notes that Plotinian monotheism was ‘arrived at through a different conceptual strategy than in the Abrahamic tradition.’ (Page 152) 

Kenney also writes that ‘Despite its temporary success in late antiquity, the Hellenic monotheism of the Neoplatonists was a tradition lost but for its subsequent absorption into the Abrahamic theological world.’  (Page 156)  I think this is true.  It is only very recently that the thought of Plotinus has been viewed as sufficient and complete unto itself.  In my own case, this is because I was able to view Platonism as a whole, and Plotinus specifically, through what I think of as a ‘Dharmic’ lens.  This happened due to my decades long study of Buddhism in particular, and other Dharmic traditions as they interacted with Buddhism.  It isn’t that I think of Platonism as a Buddhist Sect; it has more to do with relating to Platonism as more closely resembling what is expected from Dharmic traditions.  Kenney doesn’t mention this kind of relationship as that is not the purpose of his book (and it seems to me that he has no interest in Dharmic traditions.)  But viewing Platonism as a type of Dharma allows for the possibility of understanding Platonism as a complete spiritual path and I think that is something we can look forward to.