Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 21

28 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 21

1.  The importance of friendship is emphasized by Aristotle in books VIII and IX of Nicomachean Ethics.  And the Buddha was once asked by his disciple, Ananda, about the Buddhist Monastic Sangha and what importance should be placed on it.  The Buddha responded that the Sangha was the whole of the Dharma (the Buddhist teachings.)  These observations emphasize how significant friendship is for a well lived life.

There appears to be about 30 people who followed Socrates around.  From the Dialogues I get the impression that most of them knew each other and the parameters of each other’s lives.  They could joke with each other, dispute with each other, walk here and there with each other while listening to Socrates.  In many ways it looks like an ideal philosophical community.

It is not easy for a Platonist today to find a spiritual friend.  Perhaps it has never been easy, but I’m inclined to think that it is more difficult today than it was in the past, though I can’t prove it.  A spiritual friend is someone who encourages us in our spiritual quest.  A spiritual friend is someone who refrains from distracting us with worldly activities and concerns.  A spiritual friend is someone who understands the direction of asceticism and the path entailed by an ascetic commitment.  A spiritual friend is a reciprocal relationship; I mean that a spiritual friendship mutually encourages both parties to retain a spiritual focus in life.

It is possible to make progress without a spiritual friend, but I think it is much more difficult to do it that way. 

2.  For some reason I’ve become more aware of the problem, often mentioned by translators, of how it is often difficult to know which noun a pronoun refers to in the writings of Plotinus.  In Ennead V there seem to be a number of essays where the pronoun ‘it’ is used very frequently; I find I need to slow down at times to check that I still have the thread of the sentence in mind, meaning that I’m getting the antecedent reference of ‘it’ correct.  It’s not a huge problem, but at times it’s a bit awkward.  I wonder if a translator might substitute the referent for the pronoun in cases where the abundant usage of pronouns might make it difficult to get clarity?  Just to test the idea I rewrote some of the sentences I was wrestling with, replacing the antecedent noun for the pronoun (usually this was either The Good or Intellect/Nous).  Then I reread the sentence and I found it more agreeable from a reader’s perspective. 

I am told that it is not always clear what the antecedent noun is and, in those cases, it is better to simply leave the pronoun as is.  That makes sense.  But in at least some cases it might make the writing more accessible to supply the antecedent noun.  A translator could compromise by using a device like ‘it/intellect’ or ‘it/the Good.’  There are various ways of going about it. 

Keep in mind that I don’t know Greek and I’m not a translator, so these remarks are made from a reader who likely is missing important aspects of this situation.

3.  I’m not convinced that Plato was a Pagan.  I don’t think Plato was a monotheist either.  There are more alternatives than Pagan or Monotheist. 

I’m not saying that Plato was anti-Pagan, and I am aware of the strident conflict that late Classical Platonists had with triumphalist Christianity.  But I think one of the sad things about that Late Classical period is that the non-Pagan and non-Monotheist perspectives were banished from the discussion as the conflict between the Monotheists and Pagans intensified. 

My own feeling at this time is that Plato was what I would call a monist of an idealist leaning.  The use of the term ‘idealist’ is a bit anachronistic, but I think it fits.  I say Plato was an idealist because of the centrality of contemplation in Platonic practice; as Plotinus will say, all things are engaged in contemplation, at least to some degree. 

4.  As I become more familiar with the history of Platonism I observe that there seem to be certain perspectives that are used to interpret Platonism; they rise like a wave and then recede back into the sea.  The earliest one I observe is the adoption of a militant skepticism at the Academy after the first four or five heads of the Academy had passed.  A contemporary example of one that I see emerging is a kind of secular, self-consciously atheist, interpretation (I don’t think this will last very long.) 

I see this as the dominant culture impressing itself on Platonism.  But Platonism is about that which is eternal.  These cultural impressions come and go, but the Platonist tradition, which sees things from the perspective of eternity, outlasts these cultural intrusions.

5.  It is quiet in the desert this afternoon.  Some sparrows are chirping in the bougainvillea.  The sky is cloudless; clear like space. 

Plotinus on The Good

26 April 2024

Plotinus on The Good

“But do not, I beg you, look at it (the Good) through other things: otherwise you might see a trace of it, not itself (the Good itself); but consider what this might be which it is possible to grasp as existing by itself, pure, mixed with nothing, in which all things have a share, though nothing has it (the Good): for there is nothing else like this (the Good), but there must be something like this.  Who, then, could capture its power all together as a whole?  For if one did capture it all together as a whole, why would one be different from it (the Good)?  Does one then grasp it (the Good) partially?  But when you concentrate on it (the Good), you will do so totally, but you will not declare the whole: otherwise, you will be [only – translator’s addition] Intellect thinking, and, even if you attain, he (the Good) will escape you, or rather you will escape him (the Good).  But when you see him, look at him as a whole; but when you think him, think whatever you remember about him, that he is the Good – for he is the productive power of thoughtful, intelligent life, from whom come life and intelligence and whatever there is of substance and being – that he (the Good) is One – for he is simple and first – that he is the Principle – for all things come from him (the Good) . . . “

(Plotinus, Ennead V.5.10, That the Inetelligibles not Outside the Intellect, and on the Good, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, pages 185-187, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“Still, do not, I urge you, look for The Good through any of these other things; if you do, you will see not itself but its trace: you must form the idea of that which is to be grasped, cleanly standing to itself, not in any combination, the unheld in which all have hold: for no other is such, yet one such there must be.

“Now it is clear that we cannot possess ourselves of the power of this principle in its concentrated fullness: so to do one must be identical with it: but some partial attainment is within our reach. 

“You who make the venture will throw forward all your being but you will never tell it entire – for that, you must yourself be the divine Intellect in Act – and at your utmost success it will still pass from you or, rather, you from it.  When you see The Good, see it entire: later you may think of it and identify with The Good whatever you can remember.

“It is The Good since, being a power (being effective outwardly), it is the cause of the intelligent and intellective life as of life and intellect: for these grow from it as from the source of essence and of existence, the Source as being One (where all else has duality), simplex and first because before it was nothing.  All derives from this . . . “

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead V.5.10, That the Intellectual Beings are not outside the Intellectual-Principle: and on The Nature of the Good, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, 1992, pages 472-473, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  Plotinus opens this part of the Ennead with the request that we refrain from looking for the Good “through other things.”  I see this as connected with the ending of Ennead V.3 where Plotinus writes “Take away everything!”  The point I think Plotinus is emphasizing is that the Good, or the One, is found through this process of removing all sensory objects, including Noetic objects.  Noetic objects are non-sensory objects, but they are, nevertheless, differentiated objects in the realm of Mind.  If they were not differentiated objects they would either be nonexistent, or they would be the One, and undifferentiated. 

Looking at something ‘through other things’ means to relate to that something in a manner that subsumes that something to a previously experienced thing.  It is natural to do this; it is how our understanding works.  But in the case of the Good, it does not work because the Good is not a thing, the Good is not differentiated (it is pure Unity), and it is beyond both sensory and mental, or mind-based, experience.

2.  The Good is ‘mixed with nothing [else]’ yet ‘all things have a share’ in it.  How is that possible?  Analogies assist: all living things on earth have a share of the sun though things on earth are not the sun and are unable to grasp the sun.  The moon is reflected in countless bodies of water and in this sense all these bodies of water have a share in the moon; but the moon remains undiminished by that sharing and ungrasped by those bodies of water. 

3.  It’s interesting that Plotinus talks about the difficulty of grasping the Good in its entirety or as a whole, and seems to suggest that ‘partial’ experience of the Good is possible; as MacKenna writes, ‘partial attainment is within our reach.’  I think this is a recognition of how the experience of the One comes and goes; there is a description of this process in another Ennead where Plotinus talks about how he returns to the body and sensory experience after entering into the domain of the One. 

This way of viewing the experience of the One, or what we might call ultimate enlightenment, differs from what many spiritual teachers describe today.  The tendency today is to think of the enlightenment experience as all or nothing and that such experience completely transforms an individual who then never falls back into more ordinary modes of experience.  I think the Platonic presentation, both in Plato and Plotinus, is both more accurate and more realistic.  As I understand it, and as it is talked about in, for example, Phaedo, as long as we have a body our experience of the ultimate will be ‘partial’ or limited.  This isn’t surprising because actually all of our experiences are partial, including ordinary sensory experiences.  For example, the range of light we can experience is limited, and the range of sounds we can experience is limited, and so forth.  In addition, the range of our intellectual insights is limited by our own inherited capacities and by our cultural inclinations.  That doesn’t mean that the spiritual ascent is unavailable, but it does mean that the spiritual ascent is, in part, shaped by our bodily lives. 

The One is beyond bodily and mental formations, but it is approached through the means of our bodily existence.  The One is attained by putting aside bodily and mental capacities aside (take away everything) and when we do so, the Good and the One appear like a sunrise.  This putting aside bodily and mental capacities and realms, or transcending bodily and mental capacities and realms, is accomplished through renunciation and the practice of asceticism as presented in Platonic literature.

But our ability to experience the One is like looking at a vast landscape through a window (our body and mind being the window.)  The view is stunning.  And the view is partial.  But the partial view of the One is enough to set our soul on the path that will lead to full and complete realization of the One when body and mind finally fall away.

4.  The Good and the One is the First Principle and the source for existence and such and for all existing things.  Knowing this, it is possible to trace back the light that is present in things by their participation in the One, to its source which is the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, that which is eternal. 

5.  Partial or not, there is nothing more wonderful than the experience of the One.  Even a very brief and puzzling experience of the One is transformative.  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 20

23 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 20

1.  I wonder what it was like to study with Plato.  There are all sorts of theories ranging from basically an ancient classroom setting to a structured set of initiations that mimicked some mystery traditions.  These are not necessarily exclusive.

From what I have read it seems that the Academy was keen on mathematics.  That makes sense to me because numbers are, I think, the most accessible example of a non-sensory reality; by ‘most accessible’ I mean that people use them everyday and are familiar with them.  For this reason numbers are a good place to start out exploring Forms and other non-sensory realities. 

I tend to think that contemplation was practiced but perhaps only by ‘advanced’ students.  I base this on fragmentary evidence such as remarks attributed to Xenocrates that he practiced silence for one hour every day. (As an aside, I suspect that this ‘one hour’ was two of our hours.) This is found in Diogenes Laertius; perhaps it is in other sources as well.  But the practice of contemplation is well attested in Plato’s Dialogues with episodes depicting Socrates falling into trance states of some kind (for example in Phaedrus and The Symposium.)  It’s hard for me to discern if contemplation was done as a group practice; that is to say I don’t recall that being specifically mentioned. 

All of this is very vague.  But Aristotle reports that Plato gave lectures and it is likely that Plato’s latest Dialogue would be something the Academy during Plato’s lifetime would have eagerly looked forward to and discussed.

I wonder what the criteria were for attendance?  Plato came from a wealthy background and did not need to charge for his instruction and Plato’s teacher, Socrates, opposed charging for philosophical instruction.  This implies that there were no financial barriers.  Perhaps people became ‘members’ simply by hanging out over an extended period of time and offering their own services when such were needed. 

It's unlikely that we will ever know for sure; but if my idea that Plato was a spiritual teacher in the manner of teachers in Dharmic traditions has merit, then perhaps we can use that as a model for what went on at the Academy.  In such a setting the primary activity would be the teachings, in both written and oral forms such as lectures and discussions, as well as including everyday interactions, with their teacher Plato.  Plato was both the holder, or recipient, of an ancient tradition(s) and the communicator of that tradition to the Athenian community and context.  Plato understood what wisdom, transcendent wisdom, is.  And Plato understood how to teach others the path to the attainment of that wisdom.  That would be reason enough for many to attend the Academy for many years.  And it is reason enough for us to read, study, and contemplate the Dialogues today.

2.  The other day I heard, on a recorded lecture, a complaint about analytic philosophy and how analytic philosophers often distort philosophers’ views by reshaping those views in accordance with their own criteria of how a philosophical argument should be presented.  The lecturer was referring to a philosopher who has a significant literary output and how an analytic commenter reconfigured the view from a literary work by turning the view into a syllogism. 

There are a significant number of philosophers who also wrote literary works; Jean Paul Sartre and Iris Murdoch are recent examples.  The insistence that a philosophical argument must take a specific form, such as that of a syllogism, means that arguments that use allegory, metaphor, and other devices that Plotinus refers to as ‘comparisons’ are in some sense inherently deficient.  Turning these views into a syllogism would, from the analytic point of view, only improve them.

Platonism is very far from that way of looking at philosophy because the founding documents of the tradition, the Dialogues of Plato, are packed with allegory and other types of comparisons.  And these allegories are very powerful and fertile in their meanings.  The Allegory of the Cave is powerful because it is an allegory, not in spite of it being an allegory. 

3.  You can look at the divine ascent in Platonism as the gradual shedding of individuation, or differentiation.  I mean that as the practitioner ascends to Nous, and then past Nous, to the One, less and less remains of that which differentiates the self from the Universal until the differentiations are completely shed in the act of absorption into the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, absorbed into the Eternal.

4.  I was deeply involved, as a young man, in antiwar activities.  I no longer think it is possible to bring about an end to war, or to even reduce the extent of war.  I came to this conclusion with great reluctance.  Platonism helped me make the transition.  It’s not that Platonism is pro-war; rather it is that Platonism understands that the cause of war is embedded in the material conditions of being a human being.  In Phaedo Socrates says that war comes from greed; but the tendency is to write history as if particular individuals through their actions bring about war.  But the passage in Phaedo suggests that as long as there is greed, there will be war. 

And there is another reason; we live in the realm of differentiation and strife.  That is the nature of this realm.  Therefore, war is inevitable.

But there is a way out; follow the path to transcendence and at the end of the journey, there is the grotto of true peace.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 19

20 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 19

1.  I finished reading Plato of Athens by Robin Waterfield.  It is well written; by that I mean that Waterfield is a good stylist, the sentences are well shaped and are not obscure.  The sentences are well formed; these days that should not be taken for granted.  Like any good biography, this book tells a good story.

Waterfield has an amazing grasp of the relevant literature and is capable of making his own decisions regarding reliability and inclusion.  It was nice to see that kind of independence.

The one drawback for me is that Waterfield seems to think of Plato as primarily a political philosopher; to be fair that is a view shared by a lot of scholars.  But it differs from how I understand and approach Plato and I don’t think that Classical Philosophers viewed Plato that way either.  It’s intriguing that three or four times Waterfield mentions Plato’s ‘religious’ inclinations, meaning that there are religious elements in his philosophy.  But this is mentioned only in passing; it almost sounds like an afterthought.  My perspective is that Plato was a spiritual teacher and that Platonism is a spiritual tradition in the manner of Dharmic traditions from India.  Waterfield skirts this, I think, by leaving out antecedent spiritual influences on Plato such as Orphism; with Pythagoreanism he mentions them, but mostly in a political context rather than in the context of numbers as forms and primary realities.

I enjoyed reading the book and the range of reading and study Waterfield has done is impressive.  But from my perspective Waterfield sees Platonism through a modernist lens and because of this misses what are for me the heart of Plato’s teachings.

2.  When Porphyry edited Plotinus’s writings he would sometimes take a longer work and divide it up into the different Enneads that Porphyry was using to arrange the writings topically.  Some of Plotinus’s essays covered more than one topic and this allowed the kind of division that Porphyry used.  Fortunately Porphyry carefully tells us all about this in his Life of Plotinus.

This came back to me because I am reading Ennead V.5, That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect, and on the Good.  Ennead V.5 is part of a long essay that was divided into four different essays among three Enneads: III.8, V.8, V.5, and II.9; I believe German scholars refer to this as the Great Treatise.  I wonder if it might be helpful to read these four as a single work and that this might be facilitated by including the four of them as a single work in an appendix?  The translator, A. H. Armstrong, in his ‘Introductory Note’ to Ennead V.5, suggests that “It is best read after V.8 which is completely continuous: the last sentence of V.8 directly introduces the argument which occupies the first three chapters of V.5.”  I’ll give it a try and see how it feels.

3.  Recently I have read several works by contemporary philosophers in the anglo-sphere that retain a strong influence from the analytic tradition.  I don’t know whether these philosophers identify with the analytic tradition, but they show that the influence is still quite strong.  What I am referring to is the tendency to put forth their insights in abstract presentations, in this case through the use of graphs and other types of scientific looking symbolic means, even though the graphs are not data based or data driven.  I have thought for a long time that this way of presenting philosophy obscures what the author is saying rather than clarifying.  I keep thinking of how Whitehead wrote Process and Reality without using any of those kinds of tools, though he was very well versed in them.  In almost all cases when I have rethought the abstract, graphic, presentation into discursive statements, the ordinary discursive statements have been clearer.

4.  Ennead V.3, On the Knowing Hypostases is one of the great works of spiritual literature; it is difficult for me to think of anything that surpasses it; though some of Plato’s Dialogues are at the same level.  The work steadily builds, point by point, step by step, to the last paragraph, and to the last sentence, “Take away everything” (ephele panta).  It is like listening to a steady rhythm that carries you along as it grows steadily stronger, until it reaches its final cadence and closing.

5.  Sometimes there is remarkable wisdom to be found in popular culture.  There is a song by the rock group Kansas called ‘Dust in the Wind.’  It is well-written with a minor melody and well-crafted supporting harmonies.  The refrain changes through the song beginning with “All they are is dust in the wind,” referring to the singer’s dreams and plans.  In the second verse the refrain says “All we are is dust in the wind.”  And the third verse says “Everything is dust in the wind.”

What is surprising is how popular this song is; it has been covered by other groups and solo singers countless times; it is performed very frequently.  I see this as a contemplation on impermanence, obviously.  I think appearances like this song show that certain core spiritual truths are just below the surface of our busy ordinary lives and every now and then they manage to emerge and have their say or, as in this case, sing their song.

 

Plotinus on the Ineffable and the Transcendent

17 April 2024

Plotinus on the Ineffable and the Transcendent

I’m posting three quotes from Ennead V.3, “On the Knowing Hypostases” that are found in different parts of this Ennead.  After each quote I will give the page number and the translator; at the conclusion of these quotes I will give the full bibliographic reference.

First Quote

“It (the One) must not be one of the things before which it is, and you are not to call it Intellect (Nous, Mind): not even the Good, then: no, not even this if ‘the Good’ means one of all things; but if it means that which is before all things, let the name stand.  If, then, Intellect (Nous) is Intellect because it is multiple, and thinking itself, even if it derives from Intellect, is a kind of internal occurrence which makes it many, that which is absolutely simple and first of all things must be beyond Intellect.  And certainly if it is going to think, it will not be beyond Intellect, but will be Intellect; but if it is Intellect, it (the One) itself will be multiplicity.” (Armstrong, page 111)

“Thus we come, once more, to a Being above the Intellectual-Principle and, since the sequent amounts to no less than the All, we recognize, again, a Being above the All.  This assuredly cannot be one of the things to which it is prior.  We may not call it Intellect; therefore, too, we may not call it the Good, if the Good is to be taken in the sense of some one member of the universe; if we mean that which precedes the universe of things, the name may be allowed.

“The Intellectual-Principle is established in multiplicity; its intellection, self-sprung thought it be, is in the nature of something added to it (some accidental dualism) and makes it multiple: the utterly simplex, and therefore first of all beings, must, then transcend the Intellectual-Principle; and, obviously, if this had intellection it would no longer transcend the Intellectual-Principle but be it, and at once be a multiple.” (McKenna, page 451)

Second Quote

“It is, therefore, truly ineffable; for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a ‘something’.  But ‘beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect’ is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and ‘has no name’, because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it.”  (Armstrong, page 117)

“Thus The One is in truth beyond all statement: any affirmation is of a thing; but ‘all-transcending, resting above even the most august divine Mind’ – this is the only true description, since it does not make it a thing among things, nor name it where no name could identify it: we can but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something concerning it.”  (MacKenna, page 452)

Third Quote

“How then do we ourselves speak about it (the One)?  We do indeed say something about it, but we certainly do not speak it, and we have neither knowledge or thought of it.  But if we do not have it in knowledge, do we not have it at all?  But we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it.  For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it.  But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it.”  (Armstrong, page 121)

“How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking of it?

“No doubt we deal with it, but we do not state it; we have neither knowledge nor intellection of it.

“But in what sense do we even deal with it when we have no hold upon it?

“We do not, it is true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as to be able to speak about it.  And we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, speaking of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we may still possess it.”  (MacKenna, pages 453 and 454)

(Plotinus, Ennead V.3, On the Knowing Hypostases, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1984, page numbers follow the quotations above, ISBN: 9780674994898)

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead V.3, The Knowing Hypostases, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page numbers follow the quotations above, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  In footnotes, Armstrong refers readers to the first hypothesis of Plato’s Dialogue, Parmenides as a source for Plotinus’s thoughts about the transcendence of the One beyond Intellect, or Nous.  Armstrong also writes in a footnote on page 110, “Intellect only constitutes itself as Intellect because it eternally falls short in its endeavour to reach the one and there is perpetually in need of and perpetually desires the One.”

I understand this footnote, and the quotes, to mean that the One is a complete, or full, unity, whereas Intellect, or Nous, is not.  This is because Nous is differentiated into aspects; the three primal aspects are Being, Life, and Mind (also Nous, or Intellect).  From these three primal differentiations all further Noetic differentiations flow.

2.  The ascent to Nous is done through purification and the practices of asceticism; that is to say the turning away from sensory experience, including mental experience.  Noetic realities lack specific, that is to say differentiated, content; Noetic realities are the empty vessel in which material content can arise.

The ascent to the One is done through turning away from Noetic differentiation to the unified source from which Noetic differentiations arise.  The turning away is the same in both instances: turning away from sensory experience and turning away from Noetic realities.  But the results differ.  The result of ascending to the Noetic is clarity regarding realities of the cosmos, such as Being and so forth.  The result of ascending to the One is beyond clarity; it is beyond light and darkness, it is both light and dark.

We can speak about Noetic realities, but we can only analogize that which is fully unified and fully transcendent.

3.  “. . . but if it means that which is before all things, let the name stand.”  Here Plotinus is referring to the name ‘The Good.’  But this principle would apply to any of the terms we commonly use when talking about the ultimate, such as: the Good, the One, the Beautiful, the Eternal, and so forth. 

This is not easy to do.  Our mind (small ‘m’) has the habit, a very strong habit, of taking a name in a non-transcendental way.  If I say ‘the store’ I am communicating a material reality.  If I say ‘I feel happy’ I am communicating a psychological reality.  But if I say ‘The One’ I am talking about a reality that has no sensory or mental mark.  I think that without having some experience in contemplation this is hard to understand.

4.  A couple of decades ago I became aware of just how difficult it is for people to understand what is being asked for in contemplation.  I have attended various meditation groups for many years.  I was involved with a group that practiced ‘interior silence.’  After an hour of silence people would share insights.  Often I would hear someone say, “Today I was thinking about . . . “ as a description of their contemplation.  Even though the literature of the tradition explicitly says that contemplation is not time for thinking, the kind of response I quoted was the most frequent report of what was happening.

It took some time, but I began to realize that people are so busy with activities, commitments, and obligations that many do not have even ten minutes in their lives to just think about their lives, their situation.  For such people, and I think they are the vast majority, the opportunity to sit in silence and discursively think about their lives and their situation was highly unusual, so unusual that it felt like a kind of divine blessing, or even a divine intervention.

I sympathize.  On the other hand, Plotinus and the mystical tradition that flows from the Platonic tradition, are suggesting something else.

5.  It is a rare gift to have the path to ultimacy, the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, laid out so clearly, to encounter writing that is rooted in that experience.  I think of that gift as a grace, though I know some people don’t like the use of the term ‘grace.’  But I am comfortable with it.  Understanding The Enneads as a gift and a grace helps me to rededicate myself to the ascetic practices that allow for reaching the source of that gift and that grace.  

6.  Addendum: After reading these passages as translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie I have decided to include them, for the purpose of comparison.  I am aware of the criticisms of Guthrie's translation which was the first complete translation of Plotinus into English; I understand it was published about 1917.  To be fair to Guthrie, most criticisms of his translation point out that there did not exist at that time the kind of critical text that later translators, such as MacKenna, Armstrong, and Gerson et al, had available.  Other criticisms suggest that Guthrie relied on Latin, or French, translations of some of Plotinus's terms so that, in effect, at times the Latin, or French, overpowers the Greek (that's my interpretation of the criticism; not being a scholar myself I may have misunderstood).  

On the other hand, Guthrie was a mystic who practiced contemplation.  (I used to own a manual of contemplation that he wrote but gave it away when I moved and I can't remember the title at this time.)  Guthrie had a wide ranging interest in other mystical writings of that time including Apollonius of Tyana and Porphyry, among others.  I think this, and his practice of contemplation, may give his translation a perspective, or an emphasis, on this experiential dimension that may be absent from other translations.  And over time I have found myself more at ease with his approach to Plotinus.  So here are the three passages as translated by Guthrie for your consideration:

6.1.  ". . . as Unity thus is anterior to universal things, it cannot be any one of them.  Therefore, it should not be called either intelligence or good, if by 'good' you mean any object comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if it indicate that it is anterior to everything.  If Intelligence be intelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found within Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the Principle that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if He think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would be manifold." (page 575)

6.2.  "This Principle, therefore, is really indescribable.  We are individualizing it in any statement about it.  That which is above everything, even above the venerable Intelligence, really has no name, and all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything.  Nor can He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him.  We refer to Him only as best we can." (page 576)

6.3.  "How then do we speak of Him?  Because we can assert something about Him, though we cannot express Him by speech.  We could not know Him, nor grasp Him by thought.  How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp Him?  Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us completely.  We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without expressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He is; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to designate only lower things." (page 577)

(Plotinus, Complete Works in Chronological Order, Ennead V.3, The Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, 1918, reprinted by Kshetra Books, 2017, ISBN: 9781974518968)

Haiku

 Haiku

An April desert

Becomes a contemplation

On eternity.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 18

12 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 18

1.  “Plato came to hold the startling view that philosophy itself had a religious purpose, assimilation to God.”  (Robin Waterfield, Plato of Athens, page 31)  I like that Waterfield understands that Platonism has a “religious purpose” or “spiritual purpose” if you prefer.  This is often ignored in modern presentations of Platonism so it is good to see this explicitly stated. 

But I’m not sure that this is a “startling view”; it depends on how one interprets the history of Ancient Greek philosophy.  If you see philosophy as rooted in traditions such as Pythagoreanism and Orphism, and possibly other mystery traditions, then this view isn’t startling; it is simply the natural unfolding of the dominant view towards philosophy in the Ancient Greek world.  In contrast, if you view Ancient Greek philosophy as a kind of proto-materialist, or proto-scientific, effort and evaluate this tradition on how closely it aligns with contemporary science then you would find Plato’s view to be startling.  (As an aside, I think Pierre Hadot’s work on Ancient Philosophy supports the idea that Plato’s view should not be startling.)

2.  I think that the primary thing that continues to irritate me about analytic philosophy is that the tradition does not understand how words work, or perhaps we could put it that analytic philosophy doesn’t understand the nature of words.  Ambiguity is built into the nature of words; it’s not a sign of weak thinking that needs to be ‘cleared up’ through analysis.  Things like metaphor, simile, allegory, and so forth, are just as powerful tools of reason as are syllogistic and analysis.

3.  Platonism is a shelter in the storm of modernity. 

4.  It appears to me that there is growing interest in Plotinus in the world today.  This is impressionistic; I don’t have data to back this up.  It’s based on things like the widespread availability of translations of the Enneads (not just translations into English, but also many languages, including non-European languages), conferences on Plotinus and various aspects of his heritage, and the overall observation that his work seems to be taken seriously by many contemporary philosophers and classicists.  And I have observed that the ideas of Plotinus seem to be a regular topic on social media like Youtube.  I wonder if this will result in something similar to when the thought of Plotinus was introduced to the European Renaissance through the translation by Ficino? 

5.  I think reincarnation is a more complicated process than is often presented.  The idea that a human rebirth is better than an animal birth which is better than a plant rebirth for the unfolding of the soul and accessing wisdom is a view I no longer take on face value.  I first started having this perspective when I encountered Buddhist critiques of rebirth in heavenly realms as some kind of god or deity.  The Buddhist view is that because deities live so long they do not feel the presence of impermanence which gives an impetus to spiritual practice among beings who have shorter lives.  Gods and deities think they are immortal, but this is a delusion, a delusion that makes it difficult for them to practice spiritual cultivation and purification.  From this perspective, a human rebirth is superior to a birth as a god or deity.

This started me thinking of rebirth in other realms and the opportunities for spiritual development that these other, non-human, non-deity, realms might offer.  This is pure speculation, of course, but, on the other hand, I find it worth considering.  I like to think, for example, that life as an oak tree might be a particularly advantageous birth in terms of spiritual development.  And even consider that it might be more advantageous a birth than that of a human being. 

 

  

Plotinus on the Relationships between the Three Hypostases

10 April 2024

Plotinus on the Relationships between the Three Hypostases

“And all things when they come to perfection produce; The One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and its product is less than itself.  What then must we say about the most perfect?  Nothing can come from it except that which is next greatest after it.  Intellect is next to it in greatness and second to it: for Intellect sees it and needs it alone; but it has no need of Intellect; and that which derives from something greater than Intellect is intellect, which is greater than all things, because the other things come after it: as Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One.  But soul’s expression is obscure – for it is a ghost of Intellect – and for this reason it has to look to Intellect; but Intellect in the same way has to look to that god, in order to be Intellect.  But it sees him, not as separated from him, but because it comes next after him, and there is nothing between, as also there is not anything between soul and Intellect.  Everything longs for its parent and loves it, especially when parent and offspring are alone; but when the parent is the highest good, the offspring is necessarily with him and separate from him only in otherness.”

(Plotinus: Ennead V.1, On the Three Primary Hypostases, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 33, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“Again, all that is fully achieved engenders: therefore the eternally achieved engenders eternally an eternal being.  At the same time, the offspring is always minor: what then are we to think of the All-Perfect but that it can produce nothing less than the very greatest that is later than itself?  This greatest, later than the divine unity, must be the Divine Mind, and it must be the second of all existence, for it is that which sees The One on which alone it leans while the First has no need whatever of it.  The offspring of the prior to Divine Mind can be no other than that Mind itself and is the loftiest being in the universe, all else following upon it – the Soul, for example, being an utterance and act of the Intellectual-Principle as that is an utterance and act of The One.  But in soul the utterance is obscured, for soul is an image and must look to its own original: that Principle, on the contrary, looks to the First with meditation – thus becoming what it is – and has that vision not from a distance but as the immediate next with nothing intervening, close to the One as soul to it.

“The offspring must seek and love the begetter; and especially so when begetter and begotten are alone in their sphere; when, in addition, the begetter is the highest Good, the offspring (inevitably seeking its good) is attached by a bond of sheer necessity, separated only in being distinct.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, V.1 The Three Initial Hypostases, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, pages 428-429, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  This quote is a summary of the relationship between the three hypostases as understood and experienced in Plotinus’s contemplations.  As with a lot of philosophical Greek, the antecedents of pronouns isn’t always clear and I have found it is worthwhile to mentally substitute the antecedent for the pronoun; we don’t always have to do that, but it is helpful at some point in our studies to make that effort.  After some time with this way of writing you get used to it.

2.  Plotinus writes that all things in their perfection ‘produce’, MacKenna uses the word ‘engender.’  This is an explanation for why the One begins the process of emanation, instead of remaining enclosed in itself.  To produce is a sign of perfection and since the One is the most perfect, the One is ceaselessly producing.

3.  You might say that ‘producing’ or ‘engendering’ is another divine name for the One, like the Good and the Beautiful; you could add the Engendering, or the Creative.

4.  It is kind of an axiom in Platonism that those things which are produced are in some sense lesser than that which produces those things.  This is not always clear because if we compare this view with our experiences in the material world it doesn’t always seem to match our experience.  For example, a fine human being can be born from two parents who have serious flaws.  And it is difficult to see how an acorn is lesser than the oak from which it was produced or how a house built by following a blueprint is lesser than the blueprint.

What is being referred to, I think, is ‘lesser’ (or as MacKenna says ‘minor’) in a metaphysical sense which means something like ‘derivative’ or ‘dependent upon.’  And this relationship is only one way.  Intellect (the Noetic, or Mind) is dependent on the One,  but the One is not dependent upon the Noetic.  Looked at in this way, you can also see how this works in the material realm; the house is dependent upon the blueprints, but not the other way around.  Children are dependent for their existence upon their parents, but the parents would exist, though not as parents, if they did not have children.  It is this kind of inherently hierarchical relationship that is being highlighted.

5.  “Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One.”

The One, through its ‘activity’ of producing emanates the Noetic.  The Noetic through its activity of producing emanates Soul. 

The Noetic looks to the One as its source and its completion.  Soul looks to the Noetic as its source and its completion; but the Soul’s full completion means journeying through the Noetic and returning to the One itself.

6.  Soul is the ‘ghost’ of Intellect, the ghost of the Noetic.  That’s a powerful image.  It indicates how deficient material existence is in comparison to the Noetic.

7.  There is nothing between Soul and the Noetic.  There is nothing between the Noetic and the One.  This indicates that the outpouring from the One, and the subsequent outpouring of the Soul from the Noetic, is seamless.  How does that work?  It is like the seamless effulgence of the sun whose light pours out continuously.  It is like water emerging from a mountain spring that ceaselessly nourishes the plants that receive the spring’s water. 

There is no strict wall of separation between these levels, or hypostases; but it is helpful to think of these levels as metaphysical regions.  Think of how a prairie becomes a desert, or how a forest becomes a prairie.  There is no strict separation line between the two; yet a forest and a prairie differ.  In a similar way, you can think of the Noetic as a kind of region in a metaphysical ecology that becomes Soul, which is another ecological region of Platonic metaphysics.

8.  Plotinus’s statement that there is nothing between these realms or hypostases differs from how subsequent Platonists have treated these levels.  I can think of two examples: the first is how the Theurgists inserted a hypostasis between the One and the Noetic which they called the Henads (which means something like ‘the Ones’).  They argued that this is where the Gods of Olympus and other deities, existed.  From this perspective the Gods transcend Being.  This reconfiguration of the levels of existence was necessary to support their theurgic program; the argument was that soul was completely separate from higher levels and was incapable of transcendence.  Therefore it was necessary to ceremonially approach deities of various kinds to enact such a journey, which is why it was necessary to inject a hypostasis between the One and the Noetic. 

A second example is contemporary; some scholars argue that Nature is a fourth level, or hypostasis, or that you can deduce that Nature functions like a fourth hypostasis that is beyond Soul.  A recent example of this is found in The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (the 2022 edition; there is also The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus published in 1966; both were edited by Gerson so it is easy to confuse them.)  In this collection there is an essay “Nature: Plotinus’ Fourth Hypostasis?” by James Wilberding.  Wilberding writes that this idea of Nature as a fourth hypostasis has been around for a long time, but seems to have been given a boost among contemporaries by no less a person than A. H. Armstrong.  Others have strongly disagreed. Those who are interested in this topic might want to start with this essay.

I have spent a lot of time becoming familiar with Platonic metaphysics and how the levels are presented.  First, it is my view that this way of speaking about metaphysics is based on contemplative experience rather than deductive analysis of some kind.  In other words, Plotinus is reporting on the nature and structure of the cosmos from a contemplative perspective.  I don’t see Plotinus as presenting this structure to justify a particular spiritual or religious inclination, whereas I do think that kind of thing is what motivates the theurgist’s reconfiguration as well as the contemporary idea of Nature as a fourth level, or hypostasis.

From another perspective, you can think of the hypostases as a teaching device, a way of communicating contemplative understanding to those who have not yet had that experience and may not be familiar with contemplation at all.  It both offers the practitioner a map for the spiritual ascent, and, as well, an explanatory tool for recognizing where one is in the spiritual journey.

Personally, I am satisfied with the experiential basis, and the clarity of presentation, found in Plotinus.  I recall reading, or was it a lecture I heard on Youtube, I don’t remember right now, that the very late Classical Platonists had a kind of obsession with creating divisions and categories.  I think that is mimicked in analytic philosophy today, which has had a wide influence even beyond the analytic tradition.  Even if you view the three hypostases as nothing more than a tool of explanation, as opposed to contemplative experience, I think the three levels are sufficient.  When I say the three levels are sufficient I mean that I do not see any problem in Platonic metaphysics that needs to be solved, or can only be solved, by adding additional levels, or hypostases.

8.1  A friend of mine suggested a third example of multiplying hypostases, or levels; the Gnostics.  In Ennead II.9, "Against the Gnostics", Plotinus strongly criticizes the Gnostics for creating unnecessary complications by taking from Plato the Platonic cosmology and then adding levels and aspects and other types of additions.  I think my friend is right about this; in fact, I suspect Plotinus might have been sensitive to this because of the presence and influence of Gnosticism in the Roman world of that time.  (As an aside, I wonder if the Theurgic addition of the Henads is derived from one or more of the Gnostic systems circulating at this time.)  

9.  Ennead V.1 is stunningly beautiful.  Ennead V.1 is like the stars on a clear winter night where each star is an illumination of the transcendental.