The Meaning of the One in Different Levels, or Realms, or Hypostases According to Plotinus

6 May 2024

The Meaning of the One in Different Levels, or Realms, or Hypostases According to Plotinus

“But we must investigate how the one is in being, and how what we speak of as division [works], and in general the division of the genera, and if it is the same [as the division of being] or different in each of the two cases.  First, then, how in general each and every thing is called one, and then if we mean the same [by ‘one’ when we speak of it] in the one being and as transcendent.  Now the one over all things is not the same; for [we do not mean] the same [by ‘one’] in the case of perceptible and of intelligible things – and certainly being is not [one in the same sense as the others] – [and it does not mean] the same in the case of perceptible things in comparison with each other; for it is not the same in a chorus and an army and a ship and a house, and not the same in these last and in what is continuous.  But nevertheless all try to represent the same [One], but some attain only a remote resemblance, some come nearer, and attain it already more truly in Intellect: for soul is one and Intellect and being are still more one.  So we then in each thing when we say its being also say its ‘one’, and is it with its ‘one’ as it is with its being?  This happens incidentally, but a thing is not therefore one in proportion to its being, but it is possible to have no less real an existence but to be less one.  For an army or a chorus has no less being than a house, but all the same it is less one.  It seems then that the one in each thing looks more to good, and in so far as it attains to good it is also one, and being more or less one lies in this; for each thing, wishes not just for being, but for being together with the good.  For this reason things which are not one strive as far as they can to become one, natural things by their very nature coming together, wishing to be united in identity with themselves; for all individual things do not strive to get away from each other, but towards each other and towards themselves; and all souls would like to come to unity, following their own nature.  And the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which they go; for all things originate from the One and strive towards the One.”

Note: The words in square brackets are additions by the translator.

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.2.11, On the Kinds of Being II, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, pages 147-149, ISBN: 9780674994904)

“We are bound, however, to inquire under what mode unity is contained in Being.  How is what is termed the ‘dividing’ effected?  What is generic division, and does it apply to this unity?  Or is its division different from the division of genera?

“First then: In what sense, precisely, is any given particular called and known to be a unity?  Secondly: Does ‘unity’ as used of the One-Being carry the same connotation as in reference to the Absolute?

“Unity is not identical in all things; it has a different significance according as it is applied to the Sensible and the Intellectual realms – Being too, of course, comports such a difference – and there is a difference in the unity affirmed among sensible things as compared with each other; the unity is not the same in the cases of chorus, camp, ship, house; there is a difference again as between such discrete things and the continuous.  Nevertheless, all are representations of the one exemplar, some quite remote, others more effective: the truer likeness is in the Intellectual; Soul is a unity, and still more is Intellect a unity and Being a unity.

“When we predicate Being of a particular, do we thereby predicate unity, and does the degree of its unity tally with that of its being?  Such correspondence is accidental: unity is not proportionate to Being; less unity need not mean less Being.  An army or a choir has no less being than a house, though less unity.

“It would appear, then, that the unity of a particular is related not so much to Being as to the Good: in so far as the particular attains goodness, so far is it a unity; and the degree of unity depends on this attainment.  The particular aspires not simply to Being, but to a Being combined with Goodness: it is in this strain towards their good that such beings as do not possess unity strive their utmost to achieve it.

“Things of nature tend by their very nature to coalesce with each other and also to unify each within itself; their movement is not away from but towards each other and inwards upon themselves.  Souls, moreover, seem to desire always to pass into a unity appropriate to their substance (or reality).  Unity in fact confronts them on two sides: their origin and their goal alike are unity; from unity they have arisen, and towards unity they strive.  Unity is thus identical with Goodness; for no being ever came into existence without possessing, from that very moment, an irresistible tendency towards unity.”

Note: The words in curved brackets are additions by the translator.

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.2.11, On the Kinds of Being: 2, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 549, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  A major concern of the writing of Plotinus is to present, as clearly as possible, how certain realities differ depending on the level of reality that we are referring to.  Plotinus has done this with Beauty previously in The Enneads, as well as with the idea of contemplation.  Here Plotinus is, I think, unpacking a confusion that clouds understanding how the One, or the Good, manifests in different realms.  Plotinus does this by distinguishing the functioning of the One and the functioning of Being in those different realms.  This is a complex project, but a project that I find helpful in better understanding the Good and the One.

2.  This passage is embedded in a long discussion regarding the categories of Aristotle.  What I think Plotinus is doing is to place such categories in their correct realm, or hypostasis by relating the categories to being and then clarifying that being is not ultimate reality; the Good and the One is.  I suspect Plotinus does this because Aristotle, in his Metaphysics is concerned primarily with Being and does not move beyond Being to that which transcends Being.

3.  The One emanates Being, but being is dependent upon the One.

4.  The unity of “each and every thing” is derived from the One as such, but differs from that which has unity as such.  Here Plotinus is showing how the unfolding of the cosmos means that some things are metaphysically closer to the One, and other things are metaphysically distant.  The closer they are to the One the more unified they are.

Being is very close to the One which may be why there can be confusion as to the nature of Being; I mean confusing Being with the One.

5.  Towards the end of this passage Plotinus introduces the level of Soul into the discussion; this completes the depiction of the three levels, or realms: the One, Intellect, or Nous, (where Being resides), and Soul.  Plotinus states that souls strive for unity, meaning souls strive to return to the One.  This is another example of how Plotinus understands that there is a deep and abiding connection between the Soul and the One.

6.  Plotinus argues that the being that a thing possesses and the unity that a thing possesses differ from each other; that a thing can have more or less of being, as well as more or less of unity.  Plotinus illustrates this point with examples such as a chorus and a house. 

This makes sense if we understand Being as derivative of, and dependent upon, the One.  A difference between the two is that Being is not beyond mind and predication; that is to say we can coherently talk about Being.  In contrast, the One is beyond affirmation and negation, beyond conceptualization.  From this perspective Being derives from non-being.

7.  In a sense Plotinus is saying that things in nature find it insufficient to strive toward Being; they want to go beyond Being to that which is Good, that which is the source of all that is Good. 

8.  Personally, I have found that clarifying the nature of the three metaphysical levels of existence, and their interactions and relationships, clarifies the spiritual journey as a whole.  I can go quite far on the spiritual journey without this kind of clarification; but at some point the specifics of these levels, their nature, and their relationships, is needed in order to go further.

Think of it this way: I may know that the mountain I want to climb is in a mountain range in the West.  Knowing where the mountain range is, I can begin my journey even if I am a continent away.  But as I approach the mountain range, at some point I’m going to need more specific directions; is it that mountain to the north, or should I turn south?  If the mountain itself is very large, and if the mountain has many paths on it, I will need some way of turning to the specific path of my journey. 

Passages like this one by Plotinus offer these kinds of insights and clarifications.