Whitehead on Platonic Forms as Eternal Objects

 30 September 2024

Whitehead on Platonic Forms as Eternal Objects

There is a section, early in Process and Reality, where Whitehead discusses Platonic forms.  Whitehead writes:

“. . . the total multiplicity of Platonic forms is not ‘given.’  But in respect of each actual entity, there is givenness of such forms.  The determinate definiteness of each actuality is an expression of a selection from these forms.  It grades them in a diversity of relevance.”  

(Whitehead, Alfred North, Process and Reality, The Free Press, New York, 1978, Section III, page 43, ISBN: 9780029345602)

A little later Whitehead says:

“The term ‘Platonic form’ has here been used as the briefest way of indicating the entities in question. . . Also the term ‘idea’ has a subjective suggestion in modern philosophy which is very misleading for my present purposes; and in any case it has been used in many senses and has become ambiguous.  The term ‘essence,’ as used by the Critical Realists, also suggests their use of it which diverges from what I intend.  Accordingly, by way of employing a term devoid of misleading suggestions, I use the phrase ‘eternal object’ for what in the preceding paragraph of this section I have termed a ‘Platonic form.’  Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object.’ . . .

“Any eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world.”

(as above, page 44)

The nature of Platonic forms has been an ongoing subject of discussion throughout the history of Platonism.  Famously, Aristotle had a different interpretation than that of Plato regarding Platonic forms, where they are located, and how we gain knowledge of them.  It should also be noted that there is variation in the nature of the relationship between Platonic forms and the One.  Some Middle Platonists regarded Platonic forms as thoughts in the mind of God; others saw Platonic forms as emanations from the One.

And there has been a lot of variety of terminology used for this understanding; Whitehead mentions in passing terms like ‘idea’ and ‘essence’ as two examples.  Given this background, it makes sense to me that Whitehead would want to come up with his own term for this central understanding.  I think coming up with his own term and definition is also part of his way of looking at how to go about philosophizing which is related to his background as a mathematician.  I find this way of speaking (the term ‘eternal object’) helpful because it points to a primary quality, or aspect, or function of this reality; namely, that they are eternal.  Terms like ‘Platonic form,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘idea’ do not do so, or do not do so explicitly.  For this reason the term ‘eternal object’ feels insightful and illuminating.  Here are a few comments:

1.  These variations in the meaning of Platonic forms, what Whitehead calls ‘eternal objects,’ is a good example of what I refer to as ‘definitional drift.’  (I believe I posted about definitional drift in a previous post but in another context.)  Words are material objects and because words are material objects they are subject to becoming and begoning.  The more subtle and difficult to access an idea is, the more that idea is subject to definitional drift.  

2.  Mathematicians are used to structuring their arguments by first presenting clear definitions and that has influenced Whitehead here.  It is not the only place in Process and Reality where he uses this approach.  And it is not the only example of this approach in philosophy; Spinoza’s Ethics is a good example, as well as Proclus’s Elements of Theology.  But it is an uncommon approach and among those I’ve read who use it Whitehead seems the most clear.

3. “Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object.’”

I think an example can help in understanding what Whitehead is saying.  Consider the phrase ‘seven apples.’  The word ‘apples’ refers to actual entities in the temporal, and material, world.  Contemplating ‘apples’ leads to other material realities such as orchards, plants, apple pie, apple blossoms, and so forth.  In contrast the word ‘seven’ does not lead to material realities when ‘seven’ as such is being contemplated.  This is because noetic, non-material, realities have no content.  Seven as such does not infer apples or chairs or geraniums.  Contemplating ‘seven’ leads to other eternal objects such as other numbers, and numbers as such.  The union of the two words ‘seven apples’ is the instantiation of an eternal object, seven, with an object from the temporal world, apples.  This is how emanation works.

There is also a form of apples and a philosopher who has practiced contemplation can ascend from a material manifestation to the form of that manifestation; but it takes practice.  When looked at in this way, seven apples is an appearance in which two eternal objects, seven and apple, have merged with each other.  This is rather like yellow and red light merging to produce the color orange.

The distinction between seven and apples is that seven does not involve a necessary referent to an actual material entity whereas apples does.

4.  Whitehead understands eternal objects as potentialities.  But Whitehead qualifies this with the comment that eternal objects are ‘neutral’ (indifferent?) as to their actual appearance (ingression) in the material world.  I think this implies that emanation from eternal objects to the material world is not willed, or not self-willed.  Instead I think this way of looking at emanation suggests a spontaneous process (I almost wrote ‘natural process’ but I want to avoid the naturalistic implications of that term.)  Emanation is a kind of overflowing like the way light emerges from the Sun as an overflowing of the sun’s activity, a metaphor that both Plato and Plotinus use for emanation. 

5.  One of the ways that I study Platonism is to take passages like this and then unpack them by allowing them to lead me where they will.  I compare it to musical improvisation; the musician is given a subject, usually a melody, sometimes a chord progression, sometimes a structure, and then allows the musical elements to, in a way, speak for themselves by allowing them to take the lead.  This differs from fully notated music, though even in fully notated music there are many choices the musician has to make in order to bring the music to a full performance.  

I find this approach works with Platonism because the richness of the Platonic themes, or melodies, gives me a lot to work with in my philosophical improvisation.