Diogenes Laertius

25 November 2024

Diogenes Laertius

I recently reread the chapter on Plato from Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius.  Scholars say that Diogenes was a third century writer; his dates are never explicitly stated in his book, but the inference for a third century attribution seems fairly solid.  This would make Diogenes a contemporary of Plotinus, though Plotinus does not appear in his work.  Diogenes was mostly concerned with ancient philosophy, its beginning and the most influential philosophers who still, at the time Diogenes was writing, had significant influence.

Scholars suggest that Diogenes himself was an Epicurean; this is based primarily on the very lengthy treatment of Epicurus which appears in Book X and includes long quotations from primary sources.  

Diogenes over the centuries has had an up and down reputation.  His book is often the only source we have for some philosophers so Diogenes can’t be overlooked.  But critics sometimes suggest that Diogenes lacked discrimination as to what was important and what was not when he wrote about certain philosophers.  The chief objection seems to be that Diogenes will report unverified stories that may be nothing more than gossip.

In reading the chapter on Plato I had a kind of realization about Diogenes that I’d like to share.  It came to me that the chapters on various philosophers found in his work remind me of portraits of people that I used to read in ‘The New Yorker’ magazine.  I haven’t looked at The New Yorker in a long time, so I’m not sure that it still publishes this type of writing; but I’m referring to long, say as long as sixty pages, portraits of famous and/or influential people.  Usually these people were involved with the arts in some way; as musicians or composers, writers, poets, critics, and so forth.  The New Yorker would interview the person, but they would also contact people close to the person and sometimes report stories from such sources.  I wouldn’t call this gossip, though at times it could drift in that direction.

I don’t think Diogenes had what today we would call an academic audience in mind.  And it doesn’t seem that Diogenes was concerned with the kind of demands that historians today place on themselves in terms of including scholarly apparatus such as footnotes, endnotes, bibliography, and other types of references.  This is not entirely absent; often Diogenes will name his source and then quote from it.  And at other times Diogenes will list the works that a particular philosopher wrote which gives us a good idea of the scope of the philosopher’s work (see, for example, his portrait of Xenocrates.)  But at other times he doesn’t and perhaps the story he is telling us at that time was just a widely known, or believed, story about that particular philosopher with no secure source.

I think the audience Diogenes had in mind would be an educated literary person who wanted a quick, but knowledgeable, overview of their culture’s philosophical heritage without going into too great detail about difficult and complex topics.  Looked at in this way I think Lives is successful and remains a valuable source of information today.

I think that reading Diogenes’s portrait of Plato gives us a good idea of what Middle Platonists understood to be Platonic doctrine.  Sometimes Diogenes offers surprising insights.  For example, in his section on the creation of the material world, which is based on frequent quotes from Timaeus, Diogenes writes,

“In order that time might exist, the sun, moon, and planets were created.  . . . And in order that the universe, which had been created in the likeness of the intelligible being, might be complete, the nature of all other animals was created.  Since its pattern contains them, the universe must also contain them.  And thus it has gods, which are primarily fiery in nature, and three other kinds of creatures: the winged, the aquatic, and the terrestrial.”

(Diogenes Leartius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, translated by Pamela Mensch, edited by James Miller, Oxford University Press, 2018, pages 164-165, ISBN: 97801908621760)

What I find interesting in this passage is that Diogenes places the gods with ‘other kinds of creatures’ of the material world.  This implies that the gods are what I refer to as ‘third things.’  By ‘third things’ I mean things of the third level, or hypostasis, of the Platonic cosmology, the material world.  Here is a quote from Timaeus that Diogenes bases his own writing on:

“Prior to the coming to be of time, the universe had already been made to resemble in various respects the model in whose likeness the god was making it, but the resemblance still fell short in that it didn’t yet contain all the living things that were to have come to be within it.  This remaining task he went on to perform, casting the world into the nature of its model.  And so he determined that the living things as those which, according to the discernment of Intellect, are contained within the real Living Thing.  Now there are four of these kinds: first, the heavenly race of gods; next, the kind that has wings and travels through the air; third, the kind that lives in water; and fourth, the kind that has feet and lives on land.”

(Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 1243, 39e, ISBN: 9780872203495)

I see this as Diogenes correctly teaching that the gods, as opposed to the god, are created (by the Demiurge) as one of the four types of living beings in the material world.  This is fascinating to me.  Again, I think this teaches that the gods are third things rather than the later interpretation that the gods are henads.  And there are other equally insightful passages in Diogenes’s presentation of Plato’s thought.

Another aspect of Diogenes writing on Plato I like is that Diogenes presents two arrangements of the Dialogues which seem to have been used at the time Diogenes wrote.  One consists of tetralogies which Diogenes lists along with their contents and, often, alternate names of the dialogues that were in use at the time, such as The Statesman which was also called On Monarchy and Phaedo which was also titled On the Soul.  The second consists of groupings into trilogies.  In this section Diogenes also discusses ‘spurious’ dialogues even suggesting in one case the actual author.

Diogenes collects certain brief quotes about Plato, such as, “He advised those who were drunk to look at themselves in the mirror; for they would then abstain from such unseemly conduct.”  And “He spent most of his time in seclusion, according to some writers.”  (These are from page 152 of the Mensch translation.)  This is the only reference I have found that suggests that Plato spent ‘most of his time’ in seclusion.  It is an unattributed comment.  Perhaps this refers to the need for writers to have a lot of alone time, or perhaps it refers to a contemplative life.

(As an aside, the section where Diogenes collects remarks about Plato reminds a little of Plutarch and his collections of sayings.  I wonder if Diogenes was influenced by Plutarch?)

Diogenes closes his chapter on Plato with a summary of Platonic doctrine.  This gives us a good window into how Platonism was understood at that time.  Diogenes does this by having paragraphs about types of friendship, forms of government, kinds of knowledge, kinds of medicine, kinds of law, and so forth.  

I think the chapter on Plato written by Diogenes belongs with the Handbook by Alcinous, the Orations of Maximus, and Plutarch’s writings that are pertinent to Platonism.  It tells us a lot about the life and thought of Plato as understood by Diogenes and, by extension, the people of the time in which Diogenes lived.  I think it is a very good introduction to both Plato and Platonism and it is well worth reading.

The Flaws of Perfection

The Flaws of Perfection

18 November 2024

I just finished rereading Plato’s Phaedo.  What a sublime work!  For me, Phaedo has become the most important dialogue.  Phaedo never fails to inspire me and to reveal new aspects of the Platonic Way that I have previously overlooked or misunderstood.

This time I was particularly struck by how Socrates states that the teaching on the separation of the soul from the body is a teaching that should be followed to the extent it is possible while living in a body.  But the association of the soul with the body limits the extent to which human understanding can reach.  For example, “. . . for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body . . . While we live, we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body and do not join with it more than we must . . . “

(Plato, Phaedo, translated by G. M. A. Grube, Plato Complete Works, edited by John M. Carter, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, page 58, 66e-67a, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.  I find this teaching refreshing.  It places human beings in a context where the natural limitations of being human are taken into account.  And this kind of teaching makes the practices more accessible because, instead of aiming for an imagined perfect instantiation of these practices, we simply do the best we can given our situation.

2.  In some teachings that are offered today there is the idea that the practitioner experiences a sudden transformation that turns them into a different kind of being than what they were before.  They, the teachers, are now on a different level than ordinary humanity.

When the teacher succumbs to ordinary temptations this creates a great deal of tension in the community.  Attempts are made to explain away the fall from the perfect ideal that the tradition claims is the goal.  This causes more tension.  I have observed this in a significant number of spiritual communities and it leads to a lot of confusion, resentment, and bitterness.

The teachings of Platonism differ.  The teachings of Platonism differ because these teachings are grounded in asceticism, which means turning away from sensory stimulation and the desires of the body.  At the same time, asceticism recognizes the power of bodily desires and that because of this it is understandable that, at times, people succumb to desires’ temptations.  

In most cases, this is not a disaster.  You simply pick yourself up, recognize what has happened, and continue with the practices of asceses.  In some ascetic traditions they even have a ceremony of confession so that the practitioner can reaffirm their commitment to the ascetic path by atoning for their backsliding.  It’s kind of like a musician confessing to their teacher that they didn’t practice this week and the teacher encouraging the student to renew commitments to regular practice.  Or it’s like someone abandoning their physical training at the gym for a week and then, after talking this over with friends, renewing their gym schedule.  

3.  Human beings are not perfect; they are flawed.  Platonism recognizes this flawed nature and works with it instead of ignoring it.  It may seem strange to some, but this is why I consider the path of asceticism to be more compassionate, and more understanding, and just plainly more realistic, than those traditions that think human beings are perfect ‘just as they are.’  The idea that human beings are perfectible, or that they are already perfect ‘just as they are,’ creates a great deal of friction in the psyche because at some level each of us is aware of our limitations and our negative tendencies.  Asceticism accepts this and because of this understands that training is necessary; this training manifests as asceses such as limitations on diet, refraining from alcohol, restraining sexual activity, and in general withdrawing from sensory stimulation.  It takes time to internalize these asceses, but over time it is possible to do so.  Over time the temptations of the senses are reduced and almost forgotten.

But it is a long path.  We should be generous with ourselves and towards others.  When someone on the ascetic path backslides we should sympathize rather than condemn and encourage them to pick themselves up and regain their footing on the path that leads to the falling away of body and mind and the return to the Good and the One.

Bits and Pieces

11 November 2024

Bits and Pieces

I like to write about Platonism.  That’s why I started this blog.  Since this blog was re-energized, I have followed a once a week schedule for posting; specifically every Monday.  That contrasts with the more spontaneous posting I did for the first year or so with the blog, posting whenever I felt inspired to do so.  Both approaches have their virtues.  

The once a week schedule works well for me; it gives me time to rewrite and reconsider and to sometimes reject what I have written.  But now and then I find myself unable to focus on anything specific.  This is what has happened this week.  Partly I think this is due to external circumstances such as a friend who is in a serious health crisis; and partly I think this is simply the cyclical nature of mental functioning.  I like to say that the mind (small ‘m’ mind) has its seasons and its periods of storm and repose.  

This week I have tried three times to produce something I thought worthy of posting, but upon rereading I found they lacked focus and ran off in confusing directions.  But I really do want to keep with my once a week schedule.  The solution is to post what I refer to as ‘bits and pieces’ of thought; these are incomplete thoughts, more like suggestions.  Here they are:

1.  I have been reading The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, edited by Thomas L. Pangle.  Pangle published a translation of Plato’s Laws.  Pangle studied under Allan Bloom who published a translation of The Republic.  Allan Bloom studied under Leo Strauss who seems to think of Plato as primarily (solely?) a political philosopher.  Both Allan Bloom and Leo Strauss contribute essays and translations to the collection.

The volume is dedicated to reexamining some of Plato’s Dialogues, all of them short, that have been considered to be spurious since, approximately, the 19th century.  The Introduction by Pangle offers a vigorous defense of these works as genuine works written by Plato.  That’s why I got the volume; because I wanted to read a contemporary defense of these often neglected dialogues, and because I am skeptical of some of the academic disciplines as being capable of determining the question of authenticity.  

At the same time I am uncomfortable with the strong influence of Strauss on the volume; the title, The Roots of Political Philosophy, reflect what my discomfort is about.  The discomfort flows from my view that Plato is a mystic and primarily concerned with transcendence and the methodology of achieving that transcendence; that methodology being asceticism.  I am not well read in Strauss’s output, so my discomfort may be misguided.  And I think I understand that Strauss seems to be using ‘political philosophy’ in a way that might be unique and that does not necessarily map onto what is typically called ‘political philosophy.’  On the other hand, I often run into people who only see Plato as having a political focus, whereas I see Plato as only marginally interested in politics.  I’m bolstered in my view by the fact that philosophers and commentators on Plato and Platonism in the Classical Period did not think of Plato as concerned with politics (I’m thinking of Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and people like that.)  Politics impinges on Plato’s thought now and then in the way that bad weather can impinge on our lives; but neither are a central focus of Plato’s thought.

2.  When I have a spare moment I like to pick up Plutarch’s Moralia and read a section or two.  Plutarch’s writing is often nicely divided into small, digestible, sections so that I can read a bit of Plutarch when I have a half-hour of uncommitted time.  In Plutarch’s section “Sayings of the Spartans: Agesilaus the Great,” there are several sayings that I marked in the margin for consideration:

“. . . when someone inquired what advantage the laws of Lycurgus had brought to Sparta, he [Agesilaus] said, ‘Contempt for pleasures.’

“In answer to the man who expressed surprise at the plainness of the clothes and the fare of both himself and of the other Spartans, he said, ‘From this mode of life, my friend, we reap a harvest of liberty.’

“The Thasians, as he [Agesilaus] was marching through their country with his army, sent to him flour, geese, sweetmeats, honey-cakes, and other costly foods and drinks of all kinds.  The flour alone he accepted, but the rest of the things he bade those who had brought them to carry back because these were of no use to the Spartans.  But when the Thasians importuned him and begged him by all means to take all, he gave orders to distribute them among the Helots.  And when the Thasians inquired the reason, he said, ‘It is not in keeping that those who practise manly virtues should indulge in such gormandizing, for things that allure the servile crowd are alien to free men.’”

(Plutarch, Moralia, Volume III, translated by Frank Cole Babbitt, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931, pages 253-255, ISBN: 9780674992702)

2.1  In the last quote, the one about the Thasians, the ‘Helots’ were a subjugated class; sometimes referred to as slaves and sometimes referred to as having a status between slaves and freemen.  The point of the story is that Agesilaus thought such extravagant food was not good for a Spartan, but it was OK to give it to the Helots.

2.2  These quotes have an ascetic slant to them, but this appears in a martial context.  In a lot of ascetic literature, ascetic training is compared to the physical training of a warrior.

3.  In Classical and Medieval teachings four ways of interpretation are offered.  This way of reading, particularly scripture, goes back to Augustine.  The four ways of reading are historical or literal, typological or symbolic, tropological or ethical, and anagogical that deal with future events; I’ve also read that the fourth way of reading is allegorical.  I’ve also read that in Kabbalah there are four approaches to reading as follows; literal, allusive, allegorical, and mystical.

Thinking about this I see the following ways of reading a Platonic Dialogue: historical, symbolic, allegorical, and mystical.

3.1  Historical means to read the dialogue as an actual record of an interaction that took place in a particular time and place.

3.2  Symbolic means to look for particular symbols as carriers of meaning for a dialogue.  Examples would be the sun as a symbol of the One, and swan(s) as a symbol of Apollo and also as a symbol of Plato himself.

3.3  I used ‘allegorical’ but I mean all the kinds of comparisons used by Plato including metaphor, simile, allegory, and so forth.

3.4  Mystical means to place the dialogue in the overall context of the ascent to the Good and the One; that is to say to comprehend the dialogue as contributing to that ascent in some manner.  ‘Some manner’ means, for example, wisdom, asceses, metaphors and other comparisons, purifications, and so forth.

4.  I have noticed that different contemporary Platonist groups (or individuals) interpret the history of Platonism differently and that these differences impact their practice of Platonism.  Those who focus on theurgy tend to view Classical Platonism as a single stream of thought, or one might say a single structure that has been added to over the centuries.  They tend to view this history  as a series of insightful Sages who, in spite of their differences, stand in a single line of succession.  For example in Late Classical Platonism you have Plotinus followed by Porphyry, then Iamblichus, then Proclus, then Damascius.  Various intermediary Platonists are sometimes included but each Sage receives the previous insights and then adds their own, passing along the full corpus to some kind of successor.

In contrast, contemplative Platonists tend to see this same period as one of essential division, meaning that Platonism separated into two distinct ways of interpreting and practicing Platonism.  The division referred to takes place after Plotinus who is seen from this perspective as a contemplative.  The separation takes place due to disputes between Porphyry (234 - 305) and Iamblichus (245 - 325).  The disputes centered around the efficacy of theurgy and the place that asceticism, and ascetic practices such as vegetarianism, holds in Platonic practice.  From this perspective a separation occurred which is documented in The Mysteries which is Iamblichus’s critique of a letter that Porphyry wrote to Anebo on the necessity of a vegetarian diet for philosophers.  From this point on there are at least two branches of Platonism with striking differences and this is true down to the present day.

4.1  Rethinking what I wrote, it’s actually more complicated than just two branches.  For example, the emergence of Christian Platonism is a branch of its own.  And the branches keep multiplying in the modern era.  This isn’t a bad thing, this multiplication of interpretations.  But the purpose of noting this is that the idea of a single line of succession seems to lack explanatory power when I look at the manner in which Platonism has grown and developed.  Platonism is more like a tree with many branches.

5.  I often have an experience of spaciousness while reading Plato.  I think this is partly due to the dialogue format.  There is no sense of threat coming from Socrates.  There are sometimes threatening contexts surrounding the dialogue (Crito, Phaedo) but there is none of this from Socrates himself.

This contrasts with the sense of threat that is just below the surface in many conversations that we have.  Some psychologists have suggested that beneath every human verbal interaction is the possibility of physical confrontation.  I don’t think I would say this is universal, but it is very common.  And in ordinary life conversations often degenerate into verbal insults and attacks followed by physical fights.

But in the dialogues this is absent.  I think this arises from Socrates’s commitment to non-harming which leads to a feeling of security in the midst of philosophical debate and dialectic.  And there is also the Platonist commitment to reason which implies putting aside threat so that the truth can be pursued and hopefully uncovered.  In addition, the dialogues are rooted in the experience of the transcendental which is the abode of true peace.  

All of this makes the experience of reading the dialogues a kind of meditative practice.  The dialogues of Plato are an emanation of the Good and the One and very close to those transcendent realities.

 

Brief Observations on Non-Harming in the Platonic Tradition

4 November 2024

Brief Observations on Non-Harming in the Platonic Tradition

1.  From the brief look I have taken of the teachings on non-harming in the Platonic tradition, I get the impression that Plato received these teachings from previous sources.  ‘Previous sources’ means, I think, the usual candidates such as Pythagoreanism, Orphism, and likely some mystery traditions.  These observations on non-harming and non-retaliation are referenced here and there in Plato in a way that leads me to think that they are an accepted part of that inherited tradition.  Perhaps that can be verified by research into earlier philosophers and spiritual traditions.

2.  As regular readers know, I am of the view that Platonism more closely resembles Dharmic traditions found in India than it resembles contemporary philosophy.  The teachings on non-harming reinforce that view for me because non-harming, ahimsa, is foundational for a number of Dharmic traditions.  Is it possible that these teachings arrived in the West from India centuries before Socrates and Plato?  I think it is possible, but in order to think of this as more than just a possibility it would be necessary to compare the teachings of ahimsa in Dharmic traditions to the teachings on non-harming in Platonism.  Are they structured in the same way?  Do both of them use similar examples to illustrate what they mean by non-harming?  And so forth.

3.  It is also possible that the teachings on non-harming in India and in the West come from a shared common source that is very ancient.  Looked at in this way the teachings on non-harming in Dharmic and Platonic contexts would be branches of these teachings.  It would be difficult to make a case for this, but perhaps it might not be impossible.

4.  In the context of Platonism, I wonder how Platonists placed non-harming in their overall teachings.  I mean is non-harming a virtue and therefore a part of its ethical teaching?  I have not run into non-harming in my reading on the virtues, but my reading on this is not very wide.

Or is non-harming a purification practice like vegetarianism, to which non-harming is strongly tied?  

Or perhaps non-harming is more metaphysical in the sense of non-harming being an expression of the One and the Good?

Or perhaps non-harming is an alignment with the transcendental in the way that contemplation is that kind of alignment?

5.  How does non-harming fit in with ethical teachings found in Platonism?  Particularly, how does non-harming impact what most people consider to be the political teachings of Platonism?  

I am thinking in particular of how Platonism understands war which is the greatest of human harms.  In The Laws it states that all adults of the city should train for war at least once a month.  Is this consistent with the understanding of non-harming?  Or is there a friction between these two perspectives?

6.  In Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals, Porphyry writes that refraining from killing, eating, sacrificing, or harming animals is specifically a practice for philosophers rather than a practice Porphyry recommends for society as a whole.  I wonder if that is true also for non-harming?

7.  Is non-harming a Form; that is to say is the source of non-harming found in the noetic?  If non-harming is a Form then non-harming emanates the presence of non-harming into the material realm.

It is my understanding of the noetic realm that it is a realm in which differentiation does not lead to strife.  That is to say that noetic realities, such as being, numbers, life, and so forth, are transparent to each other and mutually co-existent.  If that is true, then non-harming is the manner in which noetic realities relate to each other rather than a distinct form itself.

8.  In a number of dialogues Plato depicts the philosopher as someone who is a bit clumsy in their interactions with normal society.  For this reason the philosopher is sometimes the butt of jokes and can be, at times, pitied by ordinary people.  I think that non-harming is one of the aspects of the life of a philosopher that can bring ordinary people to this negative conclusion about philosophers.  The norm in society is to harm those who have harmed us; in fact someone who does not return harm for harm is often viewed as weak or even cowardly.  

But it is more than that.  Initiating harm is a very common feature of human society.  War is the starkest example as wars are initiated most often for phony reasons.  The truth is most people do not think there is anything wrong with war and that war is, in some way, profound.  From this perspective war is not something to overcome or do away with.  But non-harming and non-retaliation would, if widely practiced, lead to the cessation of war and other forms of organized violence.  I think it would transform human beings both at the individual level and at the sociological level as well into something that is almost unrecognizable.

9.  In Phaedo Socrates, when talking about separating the soul from the body, will sometimes suggest that we need to do this to the degree it is possible for a human being with a body to do.  Similarly, I think it is impossible to practice non-harming completely as long as we are living in the material world.  But that doesn’t mean that non-harming should not be practiced and cultivated as part of our Platonic practice.  

10.  Thinking about non-harming has shifted my understanding of Platonism.  This shift has been subtle but significant; more like a spring breeze than a hurricane.  It has reinforced my view that Platonism is a spiritual tradition that is meant to guide people to the transcendent, to that which is beyond the material and sensory world.  And I suspect that these teachings on non-harming make the path to the transcendent clearer and more accessible.