11 November 2024
Bits and Pieces
I like to write about Platonism. That’s why I started this blog. Since this blog was re-energized, I have followed a once a week schedule for posting; specifically every Monday. That contrasts with the more spontaneous posting I did for the first year or so with the blog, posting whenever I felt inspired to do so. Both approaches have their virtues.
The once a week schedule works well for me; it gives me time to rewrite and reconsider and to sometimes reject what I have written. But now and then I find myself unable to focus on anything specific. This is what has happened this week. Partly I think this is due to external circumstances such as a friend who is in a serious health crisis; and partly I think this is simply the cyclical nature of mental functioning. I like to say that the mind (small ‘m’ mind) has its seasons and its periods of storm and repose.
This week I have tried three times to produce something I thought worthy of posting, but upon rereading I found they lacked focus and ran off in confusing directions. But I really do want to keep with my once a week schedule. The solution is to post what I refer to as ‘bits and pieces’ of thought; these are incomplete thoughts, more like suggestions. Here they are:
1. I have been reading The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, edited by Thomas L. Pangle. Pangle published a translation of Plato’s Laws. Pangle studied under Allan Bloom who published a translation of The Republic. Allan Bloom studied under Leo Strauss who seems to think of Plato as primarily (solely?) a political philosopher. Both Allan Bloom and Leo Strauss contribute essays and translations to the collection.
The volume is dedicated to reexamining some of Plato’s Dialogues, all of them short, that have been considered to be spurious since, approximately, the 19th century. The Introduction by Pangle offers a vigorous defense of these works as genuine works written by Plato. That’s why I got the volume; because I wanted to read a contemporary defense of these often neglected dialogues, and because I am skeptical of some of the academic disciplines as being capable of determining the question of authenticity.
At the same time I am uncomfortable with the strong influence of Strauss on the volume; the title, The Roots of Political Philosophy, reflect what my discomfort is about. The discomfort flows from my view that Plato is a mystic and primarily concerned with transcendence and the methodology of achieving that transcendence; that methodology being asceticism. I am not well read in Strauss’s output, so my discomfort may be misguided. And I think I understand that Strauss seems to be using ‘political philosophy’ in a way that might be unique and that does not necessarily map onto what is typically called ‘political philosophy.’ On the other hand, I often run into people who only see Plato as having a political focus, whereas I see Plato as only marginally interested in politics. I’m bolstered in my view by the fact that philosophers and commentators on Plato and Platonism in the Classical Period did not think of Plato as concerned with politics (I’m thinking of Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and people like that.) Politics impinges on Plato’s thought now and then in the way that bad weather can impinge on our lives; but neither are a central focus of Plato’s thought.
2. When I have a spare moment I like to pick up Plutarch’s Moralia and read a section or two. Plutarch’s writing is often nicely divided into small, digestible, sections so that I can read a bit of Plutarch when I have a half-hour of uncommitted time. In Plutarch’s section “Sayings of the Spartans: Agesilaus the Great,” there are several sayings that I marked in the margin for consideration:
“. . . when someone inquired what advantage the laws of Lycurgus had brought to Sparta, he [Agesilaus] said, ‘Contempt for pleasures.’
“In answer to the man who expressed surprise at the plainness of the clothes and the fare of both himself and of the other Spartans, he said, ‘From this mode of life, my friend, we reap a harvest of liberty.’
“The Thasians, as he [Agesilaus] was marching through their country with his army, sent to him flour, geese, sweetmeats, honey-cakes, and other costly foods and drinks of all kinds. The flour alone he accepted, but the rest of the things he bade those who had brought them to carry back because these were of no use to the Spartans. But when the Thasians importuned him and begged him by all means to take all, he gave orders to distribute them among the Helots. And when the Thasians inquired the reason, he said, ‘It is not in keeping that those who practise manly virtues should indulge in such gormandizing, for things that allure the servile crowd are alien to free men.’”
(Plutarch, Moralia, Volume III, translated by Frank Cole Babbitt, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931, pages 253-255, ISBN: 9780674992702)
2.1 In the last quote, the one about the Thasians, the ‘Helots’ were a subjugated class; sometimes referred to as slaves and sometimes referred to as having a status between slaves and freemen. The point of the story is that Agesilaus thought such extravagant food was not good for a Spartan, but it was OK to give it to the Helots.
2.2 These quotes have an ascetic slant to them, but this appears in a martial context. In a lot of ascetic literature, ascetic training is compared to the physical training of a warrior.
3. In Classical and Medieval teachings four ways of interpretation are offered. This way of reading, particularly scripture, goes back to Augustine. The four ways of reading are historical or literal, typological or symbolic, tropological or ethical, and anagogical that deal with future events; I’ve also read that the fourth way of reading is allegorical. I’ve also read that in Kabbalah there are four approaches to reading as follows; literal, allusive, allegorical, and mystical.
Thinking about this I see the following ways of reading a Platonic Dialogue: historical, symbolic, allegorical, and mystical.
3.1 Historical means to read the dialogue as an actual record of an interaction that took place in a particular time and place.
3.2 Symbolic means to look for particular symbols as carriers of meaning for a dialogue. Examples would be the sun as a symbol of the One, and swan(s) as a symbol of Apollo and also as a symbol of Plato himself.
3.3 I used ‘allegorical’ but I mean all the kinds of comparisons used by Plato including metaphor, simile, allegory, and so forth.
3.4 Mystical means to place the dialogue in the overall context of the ascent to the Good and the One; that is to say to comprehend the dialogue as contributing to that ascent in some manner. ‘Some manner’ means, for example, wisdom, asceses, metaphors and other comparisons, purifications, and so forth.
4. I have noticed that different contemporary Platonist groups (or individuals) interpret the history of Platonism differently and that these differences impact their practice of Platonism. Those who focus on theurgy tend to view Classical Platonism as a single stream of thought, or one might say a single structure that has been added to over the centuries. They tend to view this history as a series of insightful Sages who, in spite of their differences, stand in a single line of succession. For example in Late Classical Platonism you have Plotinus followed by Porphyry, then Iamblichus, then Proclus, then Damascius. Various intermediary Platonists are sometimes included but each Sage receives the previous insights and then adds their own, passing along the full corpus to some kind of successor.
In contrast, contemplative Platonists tend to see this same period as one of essential division, meaning that Platonism separated into two distinct ways of interpreting and practicing Platonism. The division referred to takes place after Plotinus who is seen from this perspective as a contemplative. The separation takes place due to disputes between Porphyry (234 - 305) and Iamblichus (245 - 325). The disputes centered around the efficacy of theurgy and the place that asceticism, and ascetic practices such as vegetarianism, holds in Platonic practice. From this perspective a separation occurred which is documented in The Mysteries which is Iamblichus’s critique of a letter that Porphyry wrote to Anebo on the necessity of a vegetarian diet for philosophers. From this point on there are at least two branches of Platonism with striking differences and this is true down to the present day.
4.1 Rethinking what I wrote, it’s actually more complicated than just two branches. For example, the emergence of Christian Platonism is a branch of its own. And the branches keep multiplying in the modern era. This isn’t a bad thing, this multiplication of interpretations. But the purpose of noting this is that the idea of a single line of succession seems to lack explanatory power when I look at the manner in which Platonism has grown and developed. Platonism is more like a tree with many branches.
5. I often have an experience of spaciousness while reading Plato. I think this is partly due to the dialogue format. There is no sense of threat coming from Socrates. There are sometimes threatening contexts surrounding the dialogue (Crito, Phaedo) but there is none of this from Socrates himself.
This contrasts with the sense of threat that is just below the surface in many conversations that we have. Some psychologists have suggested that beneath every human verbal interaction is the possibility of physical confrontation. I don’t think I would say this is universal, but it is very common. And in ordinary life conversations often degenerate into verbal insults and attacks followed by physical fights.
But in the dialogues this is absent. I think this arises from Socrates’s commitment to non-harming which leads to a feeling of security in the midst of philosophical debate and dialectic. And there is also the Platonist commitment to reason which implies putting aside threat so that the truth can be pursued and hopefully uncovered. In addition, the dialogues are rooted in the experience of the transcendental which is the abode of true peace.
All of this makes the experience of reading the dialogues a kind of meditative practice. The dialogues of Plato are an emanation of the Good and the One and very close to those transcendent realities.
That was impressive for being written with a “lack of focus” ! I only wanted to make a brief comment, highly influenced by something I’m currently reading , “Reading Neoplatonism” by Sara Rappe, who makes a strong case for reading Plato as well as the Neoplatonists as primarily mystical (how I interpret her use of the term ineffable) with a healthy does of allegory and symbolism (and BTW she seems to be an advocate of a fairly mixed view of “strong trunk” Platonism and a variety of diverging and re-converging branches, e.g. she thinks Proclus went a long way towards reconciling the Iamblichus/Porphyry divide).
ReplyDeleteBut, sorry for the digression, my comment is that reading Rappe’s book brought about a bit of an epiphany for me that relates to the issue of Plato’s interest in politics. My engagement with Zen over the years led to some amount of confusion as to the relationship between the relative and absolute and how to negotiate that divide. Rappe’s book leads me to believe that the Neoplatonists, and in particular their interpretation of Plato, provide. a model of this relationship as a virtual continuum (seven steps to heaven, as above so below,…) that is worth considering. This in turn leads me to believe that perhaps everyday activities, including political activities, could be understood as “symbols of the Good”, tied all the way up the ladder to the penultimate good of the henads and to the One. On the face of it this seems to me to be a somewhat efficacious model for thinking about how to bridge the gap between asceticism and social engagement.
Well someone had to write something unfocused !
Good Morning Karl, thanks for your thoughtful comment. Sara Rappe is an impressive scholar; I believe she translated a big treatise by Damascius which has been greatly admired. I only read a small part of it, but even with this taste I found it well done. I'll take a look at her 'Reading Platonism.'
ReplyDeleteI'm more skeptical of the possibility of integrating politics with spirituality. This is partly based on historical examples; I mean that when philosophers or spiritual teachers have become involved in politics it usually turns out very badly. When Plato tried to reform the tyrant of Syracuse in Sicily, the tyrant finally got tired of Plato and sold him off as a slave (a friend purchased Plato.) When Confucius tried to reform various leaders during the Waring States Period he had no success and was, at times, threatened. Boethius rose to significant political power and ended up tortured in prison. And, of course, there is Heidegger's seduction into a totalitarian system. And, since you brought up Zen, there is the difficult history of Zen during WW II. There are other examples. For some reason, philosophy and politics do not mix well in actual history. I'm not sure why this is the case (I have some speculations) but it seems to be the case.
Part of the problem, I think, has to do with ends and means. Political means used to achieve an end teach that it is legitimate to use political means; it doesn't teach people that the end is a good idea. For example, if I believe that X should be the case in our society and I launch a political program to make X happen, it might seem that I am successful. But opponents to X learn that politics can be used to achieve their ends which are contrary to X. And thus it goes, without any final resolution. Perhaps I am too cynical. Perhaps this is old age talking. But it is how I see it at this time. Thanks again for your comments. Xenocrates
Hi Jim. I certainly agree that specific examples of trying to apply a set of spiritual ideas to a political situation is not a good idea and in fact generally turns into a case of misapplied idealism (I can think of a number of additional examples, e.g. Buddhists on My. Hiei and in Myanmar). And I agree with your argument distinguishing ends and means.
DeleteI didn’t really mean creating actual political situations and didn’t express myself well. What I meant was that in our standard discursive world (the relative world) we often have feelings about a political situation and may even write about those (e.g. The Republic, The Phaedo, or The Laws). A Zen take might be, fine have those views but they’re just ultimately irrelevant bits of the relative world so any view is as good as another (i.e. ultimately not worth much). And that was my concern, i.e. is there any productive way to even think about political systems i.e. systems of sentient agents. I guess I was driving at the fact that I thought that the Neoplatonists with the ideas of graded emenation and ascension from and to the One provided a possible way to reflect the ideas of the One at the physical manifestation level so that contemplation of things like political issues could be informed by that. But to actively engage politically seems like it would require something else, i.e. understanding what “the other” might mean in relation to one’s constructed self. And that would seem fraught and counter to what one might contemplatively believe about the behavior of political systems. Any “ideal” political system, should it actually exist, would seem to require considering and integrating the contemplative understanding of all participants in that system (The Republic notwithstanding); given that most participants would probably not be inclined to worry about contemplative understanding of the political situation this would seem like a non-starter.