Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 36

27 January 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 36

1.  In the field of classical music there is an ongoing discussion about whether older classical music should be played on the ‘original instruments’ that were used at the time the composer wrote, or, in contrast, contemporary instruments should be used for a contemporary audience.  There are pluses and minuses for each view.  It is true that contemporary pianos, for example, sound different in significant ways from pianos in the 1800’s or other keyboard instruments that were earlier.  This also applies to wind instruments such as the flute and trumpet.  On the other hand, some of those differences seem to favor the usage of contemporary instruments; personally I find Bach very well suited to the contemporary piano; that’s just one example.  Yet I also understand, and to an extent sympathize, with the arguments for using original instruments.

I bring this up because I think that translations are similarly situated in their relationship to the original; I mean that you can think of the original as an ‘original instrument’ and the translation as a ‘contemporary instrument.’  And I similarly think that using translations has its virtues; in other words, I don’t automatically think of a translation as a lesser presentation; translations are causally derivative from the original, but that does not necessarily infer inferiority to the original in terms of the presentation of meaning and significance.

2.  I suspect my mind is on translations because a new translation of Plato’s Dialogues into English is being published this year, as well as being placed online at the Foundation for Platonic Studies.  The translator is David Horan who began this project in 2008.  At the online Platonic Studies site Horan explains a bit about his philosophy of translation which he says is to bring people closer to Plato.  Accordingly, Horan says he has used some new translations for key terms because Horan thinks they align more closely with Plato’s purposes.    

In a way, I think this suggests that translations are a type of commentary.  When the translator makes decisions, particularly about key terms, they are creating a larger context for understanding what they have translated; such as Plato’s Dialogues.  This is because words are not isolated from each other; words exist in what I refer to as webroads of meaning.  One way to understand what I mean by ‘webroads of meaning’ is to take a word and then list a few synonyms for that word that come to mind.  This list is what I call a ‘webroad’ of meaning, or associated meanings.  Then take one of those synonyms and list synonyms for that second word.  This will be a new webroad which exhibits both subtle and significant shifts in meaning.  

I look forward to reading these new translations, both online and in book form.  It is always a pleasure for me to find new resources for understanding the wisdom of Plato.

3.  What does it mean to be a Platonist Monk?  Traditionally, a monastic is someone who lives under the guidance of an ascetic discipline; usually this discipline is in written form.  Examples include the Buddhist Vinaya, the Rule of Saint Benedict, the Rule of Saint Francis, and there are many other examples found in different religious contexts such as Daoism, Jainism, Hinduism, Orthodox Christianity, and so forth.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no such written rule in Platonism.  Even so, I think the idea of a Platonist Monk makes sense.  I think it makes sense because the Platonist Monk embodies the ascetic teachings found in Platonic writings such as Phaedo but also in many other sources.  A Platonist Monk is the embodiment of Platonism as a way of life.

I know of one person who refers to himself as a Monk in the Platonist tradition.  I suspect that there are others.  I think of such people as taking Platonism in a new direction, a direction that is true to the ascetic teachings found in the Platonic corpus.

4.  It is very easy to get distracted by what the modern world has to offer; I’m speaking for myself, but I suspect this is true for a lot (maybe most) people.  By ‘distracted’ I mean distractions that pull one away from the spiritual path that leads to transcendence.  Although it can be argued that this has always been true, I think the easy availability of so many entertainments and types of learning through technological means does, I think, make a difference.  The antidote I use is to schedule certain times for spiritual practice.  For example, on a daily basis in the morning I spend time reading either the Dialogues of Plato or the Enneads of Plotinus.  This is followed by some silent contemplation.  This sets the tone for the day and reminds me of the direction I want to pursue in life.  It’s not complicated; in addition it is flexible in the sense that if I have an early morning appointment I can adjust my reading to only a few pages, or even less.  This also applies to silent contemplation; although I prefer an hour of contemplation, the duration can be adjusted in accordance with what is happening in my life.  Perhaps this approach might be helpful to others.

5.  The One is everywhere in particular.  Theurgy doesn’t understand this.

6.  I find contemporary academic philosophy cacophonous.  The situation seems to me to resemble that of Athens during the time of Plato; the Athens that Plato presents in his dialogues.  For example, in Euthydemus, the sophists that this dialogue focuses on use argument to diminish other people and are indifferent to whether or not what they are arguing for is true or false.  I think this resonates with the idea of a post-truth culture that only believes in power and manipulation and reinterprets any presentations that are based on seeking truth as ideological agendas.  From this derives my feeling that contemporary philosophy is cacophonous.

Plato wrote a lot about this; it is a major theme of his dialogues such as Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Gorgias.  But it also is a topic that is raised in dialogues that are not specifically focused on Sophists and their distortions of reason and truth.  Plato was concerned that his students have the ability to see through the kind of tricks used by Sophists because these techniques are kind of seductive.  These analyses are equally applicable today.

7.  I sometimes think about what intelligence means.  This goes back many years for me when I was in High School and was involved in anti-war activism.  The question arose for me because I observed that many scientists have been, and are, deeply involved in creating and designing highly destructive weapons.  These scientists were obviously smart; I mean they had a highly developed intellect in the sense of feeling at home in the worlds of technology, physics, chemistry, mathematics, and other sciences.  Many of them were philosophically literate and could justify their activity in philosophical terms.

When I became interested in Platonism my interest in what intelligence means re-emerged because the second level of reality, or hypostasis, is often translated as ‘intellect.’  I found that troubling because in modernity intellect is strongly associated with the kind of intelligence that leads to destructive activity and amoral views.  I was pleased to find I was not the only one dissatisfied with the use of the word ‘intellect’ in this context; some chose to use the word ‘mind’ instead of intellect which, I think, has its virtues.  

The intellectual activity of the Platonist tradition, such as developments in mathematics, was initiated and cultivated for the purpose of gaining insight into the nature of the cosmos and using that insight to ascend to the transcendental.  Under the influence of modernity, developments in mathematics, and other sciences, are quickly taken over by military industrial enterprises and used to achieve destructive ends.  

The intellect is usually involved in the development of destructive technologies, but it is questionable that intelligence is involved.  

8.  I think it was last year that I reread Plato’s Laws.  Book X is a scintillating inquiry into atheism, naturalism, and other materialist views.  I had a great time reading it.  It made me realize that some issues are never really settled.  Atheism is one of those issues.  And I think the reason it never gets settled is because it is a reflection of a certain psychology, or a personality dominated by certain traits.  I don’t think it is really a philosophy, or a well thought out view.  Contemporary atheists often think of themselves as offering people something new and they think of themselves as taking a courageous stand against religion (usually Christianity).  But Book X demonstrates that atheism has been around a long time and that the disputes between those who reject the transcendental and those who celebrate the existence of the transcendental does not seem to be one that is resolvable through a reasoned analysis; and I think that is because of the irrationality of atheism.

9.  I wonder what the effect of online activity is on the Platonic tradition?  It is amazing how quickly the online presence of Platonism has displaced academic Platonism in some ways.  For example, it is my observation that Platonist groups outside of academia are able to have an online community that shares their views and concerns vis a vis Platonism.  In my own life significant associations have happened through connecting with someone, who are invariably not academics, online; for example through youtube or because they have set up their own online site.  This results, I think, in a greater diffusion of Platonism among people; or at least it offers the possibility for many people to become acquainted with Platonism who might never have had such an opportunity before online communication became so important.  It seems to me that this will result in Platonism being influenced by other traditions that it was previously separated from for geographical reasons.  At the same time, Platonism might have an impact on cultures that were not previously aware of it.

In my own case, for example, my characterization of Platonism as a Dharmic Tradition, as more closely related to Indian spirituality than it is to contemporary philosophy, has been considerably aided through online interaction.  I’m sure there are other examples.

10.  It has rained here in the desert where I live for the past few days; a very light desert rain.  Because rain is a rare event in desert regions, when it does rain it feels like a blessing.  

The rain of wisdom is also a rare event.  When the rain of wisdom does fall, it nourishes us.  When I say that the rain of wisdom nourishes us, I mean it nourishes that which is essentially us, that the rain of wisdom nourishes the soul.  For some, the rain of wisdom allows for the discovery that there is a soul.

The Platonic tradition is the rain of wisdom for thirsty souls.

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 35

20 January 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 35

1.  Recently I read Alcibiades I and Theages, one after the other.  Both of them are concerned with questioning the main character in the dialogue (Alcibiades and Theages respectively) with their desire to pursue political power and influence.  For some reason I hadn’t noticed that common theme that both of them share before.  Together these dialogues are cautionary instruction on the dangers of entering the realm of politics.

1.1  This reminded me of a tale from the Daoist classic, Chuang Tzu.  I don’t have a copy of this work any more, so I’m relying on my memory.  As I recall, there is a section where Confucius announces to Chaung Tzu that he is going to travel to various Chinese states in order to help them reform their regimes.  Chuang Tzu responds by saying that Confucius will necessarily be co-opted by the power structure and that in the end Confucius will become just another courtly functionary aligning with various factions.

Plato doesn’t talk about this aspect of politics specifically, but I think it hovers in the background of discussions about the dangers of politics.

1.2  I have a theory (well, it’s more a speculation than a theory) about Plato’s letters.  I’ve started thinking of them as creations of Plato meant to be read by his students in the same way as the dialogues were written to be read by his students.  I have begun to view the letters as an alternative literary structure to the dialogue structure that Plato used when he felt his purposes were better served by the letter form.  Just as in the dialogues Plato used historical figures and incidents as the basis of his dialogues, so also the letters use historical figures and actual situations as the basis for his letters.  By using the letter form Plato is able to speak in the first person rather than through a character in the dialogue.  Some of the letters are giving his students a warning about the dangers of becoming involved in politics; Plato does this by depicting what would likely happen to him in such a case.  And some parts of the letters are about how spiritual practice manifests in the teacher/student relationship.  And there are other subjects that Plato used the letter form for.

I realize this is speculation, as I mentioned above.  Even so, I thought I would share this perspective.

2.  I have the view that the sonic realm more clearly displays aspects of the noetic than any other sensory realm.  For example, sonic objects can be, and often are, transparent to each other.  I mean that sonic objects can occupy the same space at the same time.  This is often heard in music where there are multiple lines pursuing their various courses at the same time.  In popular songs there will usually be a bass line, a chord progression, and a melody; all presented simultaneously without any sense of discomfort.  I think this mimics how noetic objects are mutually present to each other.

2.1  Sonic objects also display central features of the material realm in a way that is easily accessible to human consciousness.  A good example is impermanence; sonic objects are impermanent, but the impermanence of sonic objects does not give rise to any anxiety; it just seems a natural feature of sonic objects.  I mean that when a bell is struck we expect the sound of the bell to cease and that cessation does not give rise to any anxiety or resistance.  Contemplating the way sonic objects arise and fall away is a good way to access how impermanence works in the material domain because there is very little resistance to understanding the impermanence of sonic objects.  One can then make an inference (this is where wisdom comes in) that the impermanence of sonic objects does not differ from the impermanence of visual objects, or of thoughts, feelings, emotions, and mental fabrications.  And so forth for the other domains of sensory experience in the material realm.

3.  I sometimes wonder if copying one of Plato’s dialogues by hand might be a good spiritual practice for a Platonist practitioner.  There are traditions that still admire this kind of practice.  I have read stories of Japanese followers of the Lotus Sutra who copied by hand the Lotus Sutra even though the Lotus Sutra is easily available in printed copies and online as well.  Those who have done this report a deepening of their understanding of the Lotus Sutra and a growing sense of intimacy with its traditions..  

In the Jewish tradition there are a small number of people who produce copies of the Torah which they have done by hand.  This practice is often combined with prayer.  These copies are considered to be of great value.

And at various times I have run into others, such as Daoists and a few Theravada monastics who have undertaken this kind of practice.

The works that are copied may be short or long; that doesn’t seem to matter.  I suspect that the act of copying by hand brings the body into the practice, as well as understanding, wisdom, and faith in the tradition.  Such a practice is also a concentration practice which is of no small value. 

4.  I am more and more convinced that the practice of theurgy in some contemporary Platonic traditions, limits the grandeur of the One, of the ultimately transcendent. 

5.  It is often observed that spiritual practitioners frequently fall away from their practice, even after years dedicated to such practice.  We have an example of this in the Platonic tradition.  The individual Firmus Castricius is presented in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus as a significant follower of Plotinus; Firmus even had a role in the final days of Plotinus.

But in Porphyry’s On Abstinence, Porphyry addresses Firmus because of his falling away from vegetarianism.  This evidently pushed Porphyry to write a book on the virtues of vegetarianism for philosophers; it is the longest work on this subject that survives from the Classical period.  Porphyry hopes to convince Firmus to return to a vegetarian way of life.  (As an aside, all of this implies that vegetarianism was an important practice for the community that gathered around Plotinus.)

This kind of falling away is common; I have observed this often during my spiritual wanderings.  And sometimes it is I myself who has abandoned a particular spiritual practice in my life, feeling that its efficacy has been exhausted.  

Sometimes there are good reasons for the falling away of a spiritual practice; it depends on the situation.  What I have observed is that if such a falling away is done due to a growing cynicism, or a nascent nihilism, then it strikes me as a sad occurrence.  In such a situation it would make sense to try and bring someone back onto the spiritual path.  On the other hand, for some it is necessary to leave a certain teaching and practice behind in order to continue the journey.  From the outside these might look the same, but from the interior perspective of the practitioner they are very different.  It is like a musician who moves on to a different teacher to learn a more advanced technique, or a swimmer taking on a new coach to learn a different way of racing through the water, and so forth.

6.  I think it was Randolph Bourne who wrote, “War is the health of the state.”  I was thinking about this in the context of Book I of the Laws.  In Book I there is a discussion as to what is the purpose of legislation, of creating laws.  One of them states that every law is for the purpose of preparing for war and that war is really the purpose of all legislation, it is what is always the underlying purpose of law.  The Athenian Stranger counters in a fascinating exchange, coming to the conclusion that the purpose of laws is to bring peace to people living under those laws.

In a Platonic context, I don’t think peace is possible in the material world.  I say this because strife is a basic feature of material existence.  In Presocratic Philosophy strife is considered to be an elemental reality by Heraclitus and Empedocles and thus unavoidable.  War is the purest expression of strife.

If the above is accurate, I think that implies that Plato’s depictions of communal societies in The Republic and Laws is actually a glimpse of the noetic realm, or they are allegories of the noetic realm.  I say this because strife is not a feature of the noetic realm.  Noetic realities are in concert with each other because they are one-many.  Peace is only found there, in the noetic, not here in the material realm.

Some Comments on Phaedrus

13 January 2025

Some Comments on Phaedrus

Socrates:  So what distinguishes good from bad writing?  Do we need to ask this question of Lysias or anyone else who ever did or will write anything – whether a public or a private document, poetic verse or plain prose?

Phaedrus:  You ask  if we need to?  Why else should one live, I say, if not for pleasures of this sort?  Certainly not for those you cannot feel unless you are first in pain, like most of the pleasures of the body, and which for this reason we call the pleasures of slaves.

Socrates:  It seems we clearly have the time.  Besides, I think that the cicadas, who are singing and carrying on conversations with one another in the heat of the day above our heads, are also watching us.  And if they see the two of us avoiding conversation at midday like most people, diverted by their song and, sluggish of mind, nodding off, they would have every right to laugh at us, convinced that a pair of slaves had come to their resting place to sleep like sheep gathering around the spring in the afternoon.  But if they see us in conversation, steadfastly navigating around them as if they were the Sirens, they will be very pleased and immediately give us the gift from the gods they are able to give to mortals.

Phaedrus:  What is this gift?  I don’t think I have heard of it.

Socrates:  Everyone who loves the Muses should have heard of this.  The story goes that the cicadas used to be human beings who lived before the birth of the Muses.  When the Muses were born and song was created for the first time, some of the people of that time were so overwhelmed with the pleasure of singing that they forgot to eat or drink; so they died without even realizing it.  It is from them that the race of the cicadas came into being; and, as a gift from the Muses, they have no need of nourishment once they are born.  Instead, they immediately burst into song, without food or drink, until it is time for them to die.  After they die, they go to the Muses and tell each one of them which mortals have honored her.  To Terpsichore they report those who have honored her by their devotion to the dance and thus make them dearer to her.  To Erato, they report those who honored her by dedicating themselves to the affairs of love, and so too with the other Muses, according to the activity that honors each.  And to Calliope, the oldest among them, and Urania, the next after her, who preside over the heavens and all discourse, human and divine, and sing with the sweetest voice, they report those who honor their special kind of music by leading a philosophical life.

There are many reasons, then, why we should talk and not waste our afternoon in sleep.

Phaedrus:  By all means, let’s talk.

Socrates:  Well, then, we ought to examine the topic we proposed just now: When is a speech well written and delivered, and when is it not?

Phaedrus:  Plainly.

Socrates:  Won’t someone who is to speak well and nobly have to have in mind the truth about the subject he is going to discuss?

Phaedrus:  What I have actually heard about this, Socrates, my friend, is that it is not necessary for the intending orator to learn what is really just, but only what will seem just to the crowd who will act as judges.  Nor again, what is really good or noble, but only what will seem so.  For that is what persuasion proceeds from, not truth.

Socrates:  Anything that wise men say, Phaedrus, “is not lightly to be cast aside" (Iliad ii.361); we must consider whether it might be right.  And what you just said, in particular, must not be dismissed.

Phaedrus:  You’re right.

Socrates:  Let’s look at it this way, then.

Phaedrus:  How?

Socrates:  Suppose I were trying to convince you that you should fight your enemies on horseback, and neither one of us knew what a horse is, but I happened to know this much about you, that Phaedrus believes a horse is the tame animal with the longest ears 

Phaedrus:  But that would be ridiculous, Socrates.

Socrates:  Not quite yet, actually.  But if I were seriously trying to convince you, having composed a speech in praise of the donkey in which I called it a horse and claimed that having such an animal is of immense value both at home and in military service, that it is good for fighting and for carrying your baggage and that it is useful for much else besides –

Phaedrus:  Well, that would be totally ridiculous.

Socrates:  Well, which is better?  To be ridiculous and a friend?  Or clever and an enemy?

Phaedrus:  The former.

Socrates:  And so, when a rhetorician who does not know good from bad addresses a city which knows no better and attempts to sway it, not praising a miserable donkey as if it were a horse, but bad as if it were good, and, having studied what the people believe, persuades them to do something bad instead of good – with that as its seed, what sort of crop do you think rhetoric can harvest?

Phaedrus:  A crop of really poor quality.

Socrates:  But could it be, my friend, that we have mocked the art of speaking more rudely than it deserves?  For it might perhaps reply, “What bizarre nonsense!  Look, I am not forcing anyone to learn how to make speeches without knowing the truth; on the contrary, my advice, for what it is worth, is to take me up only after mastering the truth.  But I do make this boast: even someone who knows the truth couldn’t produce conviction on the basis of a systematic art without me?”

Phaedrus:  Well, is that a fair reply?

Socrates:  Yes, it is – if, that is, the arguments now advancing upon rhetoric testify that it is an art.  For it seems to me as if I hear certain arguments approaching and protesting that that is a lie and that rhetoric is not an art but an artless practice (see also Gorgias 462b-c).  As the Spartan said, there is no genuine art of speaking without a grasp of truth, and there never will be.

Phaedrus:  We need to hear these arguments, Socrates.  Come, produce them, and examine them: What is their point?  How do they make it?

Socrates:  Come to us, then, noble creatures; convince Phaedrus, him of the beautiful offspring (see Symposium 209b-e), that unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to make a proper speech on any subject either. . .

(Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Dorothea Frede, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997, pages 535-537, 258d-261a, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.  Plato’s dialogue, Phaedrus, has a kind of otherworldly feeling to it; it’s a little bit like fantasy literature.  I am referring to the frequent presence of, or references to, various types of deities.  Early in the dialogue Socrates and Phaedrus talk about the presence of nymphs in the rural setting where the dialogue takes place.  In addition, there is a reference to a mythic incident where the God Boreas took a maid from a nearby stream.  And in the dialogue the cicadas are depicted as semi-divine beings who ‘sing’ and upon their deaths report back to the Muses on the behavior of human beings.  Towards the end of the dialogue there is a reference to the legend of Thoth and a commentary on that legend.

This gives the dialogue a deep sense of connection to this level of reality where deities of various types dwell, and how that level of reality intersects with the material world of human beings.  This is referenced in a relaxed and natural way by Socrates, and Phaedrus; and this gives the impression that both of them are used to these kinds of legends, realities, and presences.

Throughout human history these kinds of realities were taken for granted.  The only culture that does not accept these kinds of realities is our present materialist and reductionist culture.  What I am noting is that the depiction of these kinds of presences is the norm for human cultures; it is only because we grow up in an anomalous cultural situation that when we read these passages about these presences we have to struggle to integrate them into our world view.

One way I have looked at this is that I can either accept that all those other cultures were right and that there are such realities and appearances; but the implication of this is that my own culture, which denies these realities in the name of materialism, is wrong.  Or I can assert that my own culture is right and that every other culture in human history is wrong; but aligning with this type of analysis strikes me as a case of cultural hubris.

2.  Above I said that Phaedrus, at times, reads like a modern fantasy.  But perhaps a better way of putting it is that Phaedrus depicts an enchanted world and landscape with a world permeated by meaning and symbolic significance.  It is the absence of this sense of enchantment that is a significant, and depressing, feature of modernity; a feature that both leads to nihilism and at the same time is a cause of nihilism.

2.1  Thinking about what all these presences mean and how to approach them, it occurs to me that the feeling I get is that Phaedrus depicts an animistic world, a world where everything is alive and ensouled.  For example, late in the dialogue it says:

“Socrates: But, my friend, the priests of the temple of Zeus at Dodona say that the first prophecies were the words of an oak.  Everyone who lived at that time, not being as wise as you young ones are today, found it rewarding enough in their simplicity to listen to an oak or even a stone, so long as it was telling the truth, while it seems to make a difference to you, Phaedrus, who is speaking and where he comes from.  Why, though, don’t you just consider whether what he says is right or wrong?

“Phaedrus:  I deserved that, Socrates. . . “

(As above, page 552, 275b)

Discussions about the theology of Platonism seem to center on arguing that Plato was a Pagan Polytheist, or that Plato was in some sense a Monist.  I have tended to view Plato as a Monist, but I think a case can be made for other interpretations of Plato’s theology.  My suggestion here is that Platonism can be understood to have deep roots connecting it with an ancient animistic substrata, inherited from primal traditions such as Orphism and Pythagoreanism.  Notice how Socrates contrasts the youth of his time with those of the past whom he ironically refers to as simple-minded.  This quote is connected with the rest of the dialogue because other sections of the dialogue are focused on, for example, the techniques of rhetoric which can be used to advocate for the truth or for falsehoods.  And there are sections that are similarly focused but in relationship to the Sophists.  The thread that links all of these together is that Socrates is consistently advocating for speaking the truth, for following the path that leads to truth, for listening to the truth, and that this is the Way of Philosophy.  If an oak tree speaks words of truth, or if a stone speaks words of truth, or if the cicadas are speaking truth, then they should be accepted as sources of wisdom.  They should be listened to and learned from.  But this implies that in some sense oak trees, stones, and cicadas are conscious, or have a mind, and that they possess a soul.  I think this reshapes, or can reshape, how we view the religiosity of Platonic thought.  

3.  The dialogue begins with Phaedrus leading Socrates out of the city of Athens into a rural setting.  I believe that the Athens of that day was a walled city so that the transition from urban Athens to the rural setting beyond Athens would be abrupt.  It reminds me of Alice stepping into the looking glass and encountering another world where things are very different.  

4.  As Phaedrus and Socrates are walking to a shade tree near a stream, the question of how to treat these appearances, legends, and enchanted realities is raised.  I posted about this in another context already.  But to briefly repeat, Phaedrus asks Socrates if Socrates really believes that these stories and realities are true?  Socrates responds that he has no time for such questions and that he does not concern himself with them.  He accepts them but focuses on looking into his own self.

I don’t think of the response of Socrates here as agnostic.  Rather I think of it as the response of someone who is comfortable with these realities without being personally invested in them.  My own understanding of this is that Socrates views these fantastic realities as part of the third level, or hypostasis, of reality; that is to say they are part of the material world.  I think the attitude of Socrates resembles someone telling Socrates about the people of China, or the people of India, whom he has never met or interacted with.  If a traveller tells Socrates about these people and places Socrates would be inclined to accept what he was told; but if Socrates met someone who wanted to argue about these reports I suspect Socrates would respond that he doesn’t get into arguments about topics like this because his focus is on knowing his self or his soul.

5.  The image that Plato gives to us of the cicadas singing transforms an experience many of us have had on a hot summer day into a divine communication.  The cicadas become messengers of the presence of the divine.  And they are messengers to the divine regarding our own behavior.  Plato transforms the sound of the cicadas to the singing of the cicadas and by doing so Plato is able to link the cicadas to the Muses.  The Muses have a long history in the ancient world, both in Greece and in other regions.  The number of Muses changed over time and from region to region, but in the classical period there were nine.  According to Wikipedia they are:

Calliope – the muse of epic poetry

Clio – the muse of history

Polyhymnia – the muse of hymns

Euterpe – the muse associated with the flute

Terpsichore – the muse of dance

Erato – the muse of lyric choral poetry

Melpomene – the muse of tragedy

Thalia – the muse of comedy

Urania – the muse of astronomy, astrology, and space

Plato mentions four muses:

Terpsichore – the muse of dance

Erato – the muse of erotic affairs

     Calliope (the oldest of the muses) and Urania (the next oldest) – the muses of discourse both heavenly and human, the muses for those leading a philosophical life.

I’m not sure what role the Muses played in the life of philosophy, but I suspect it was a significant one.  I say this because in 2024 a history of Plato’s Academy was deciphered from a scroll found in Pompeii.  The scroll mentions that Plato was buried in the Academy near a statue, or shrine, of the Muses (reported in The Smithsonian of May 1, 2024.)  This may indicate a relationship between Plato, or Platonism and the Muses, though exactly what this relationship consisted in, is not clear to me.  But tentatively, I think it indicates a divine origin to philosophy and that there was a kind of communication between the Muses of Philosophy, Calliope and Urania, and philosophers like Plato.  

The whole mythic episode is thick with suggestive meaning in the way that a song can have multiple layers of meaning.

6.  The dialogue moves from the singing of the cicadas to the speechifying of humans and asks the question of when a speech is well done.  This is a theme that is woven into the dialogue from beginning to end.  Issues such as whether or not a well constructed speech that attempts to convince people of a lie is still a good speech; or, in contrast, whether a good speech must also be dedicated to the truth.

Plato’s discussion on this topic is found in a number of dialogues, such as those that directly involve Sophists.  It is a topic that is relevant to us today when we are inundated by manipulative discourse such as propaganda and advertising.  Plato’s observations speak directly to the condition of our society at this time.

7.  We live in a society where a significant portion of people, especially intellectuals, do not believe in the existence of truth; instead they believe in something called ‘narrative’ or ‘story.’  This leads to conflicts because there is no way to settle differences of opinion, or view, when there are conflicting narratives if there is no truth.  

For this reason the Platonist is put in the position of defending the idea of truth; not an easy task.

8.  “. . . unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to make a proper speech on any subject . . . “  (as above, page 537)

Philosophy is the love of wisdom.  Wisdom is the pursuit of transcendental truth by making careful distinctions through careful divisions, through dialectic, through carefully crafted questions, through considering implications, and so forth.  Wisdom is also the art of making careful comparisons through devices such as allegory, metaphor, and myth.  All of this is done for the purpose of ascending to the realm of truth that lies beyond the material realm, which is the realm of opinion.  A proper speech is in the service of these goals, in the service of truth and transcendence.

The Place of Contemplation in the Symposium

6 January 2025

The Place of Contemplation in the Symposium

Plato’s dialogue, Symposium, is framed by two episodes that depict Socrates in contemplation.  The first episode is early in the dialogue, in the opening section prior to the actual symposium.  The second episode is presented in the closing speech by Alcibiades where Alcibiades talks about his personal interactions with Socrates.  (The first episode is at 174d-175d.  The second episode is at 220c-d.)  

The first episode takes place shortly after Aristodemus joins Socrates as Socrates is walking to the symposium hosted by Agathon.  Aristodemus has not been invited but Socrates encourages Aristodemus to join him and after some slight resistance, Aristodemus agrees.

“Let’s go,” he (Socrates) said.  “We’ll think about what to say as we proceed the two of us along the way.

“With these words, they set out.  [Apollodorus is narrating these events.]  But as they were walking, Socrates began to think about something, lost himself in thought, and kept lagging behind.  Whenever Aristodemus stopped to wait for him, Socrates would urge him to go on ahead.  When he (Aristodemus) arrived at Agathon’s he found the gate wide open, and that, Aristodemus said, caused him to find himself in a very embarrassing situation: a household slave saw him the moment he arrived and took him immediately to the dining room, where the guests already lying down on their couches, and dinner was about to be served.

“As soon as Agathon saw him, he called:

“Welcome, Aristodemus!  What perfect timing!  You’re just in time for dinner!  I hope you’re not here for any other reason – if you are, forget it.  I looked all over for you yesterday, so I could invite you, but I couldn’t find you anywhere.  But where is Socrates?  How come you didn’t bring him along?

“So I turned around (Aristodemus said), and Socrates was nowhere to be seen.  And I said that it was actually Socrates who had brought me along as his guest.

“I’m delighted he did,” Agathon replied.  “But where is he?”

“He was directly behind me, but I have no idea where he is now.”

“Go look for Socrates,” Agathon ordered a slave, “and bring him in, Aristodemus,” he added, “you can share Eryximachus’s couch.”

A slave brought water, and Aristodemus washed himself before he lay down.  Then another slave entered and said: “Socrates is here, but he’s gone off to the neighbor’s porch.  He’s standing there and won’t come in even though I called him several times.”

“How strange,” Agathon replied.  “Go back and bring him in.  Don’t leave him there.”

But Aristodemus stopped him.  “No, no.” he said,  “Leave him alone.  It’s one of his habits: every now and then he just goes off like that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be.  I’m sure he’ll come in very soon, so don’t disturb him: let him be.”

(Plato, Symposium, translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1977, pages 460-461, ISBN: 9780872203495)

***

The second episode, at the end of Symposium, is told to us by Alcibiades as part of a presentation on Socrates’s military courage during a battle.  Alcibiades and Socrates served in the same unit.

“One day, at dawn, he (Socrates) started thinking about some problem or other; he just stood outside, trying to figure it out.  He couldn’t resolve it, but he wouldn’t give up.  He simply stood there, glued to the same spot.  By midday, many soldiers had seen him, and, quite mystified, they told everyone that Socrates had been standing there all day, thinking about something.  He was still there when evening came, and after dinner some Ionians moved their bedding outside, where it was cooler and more comfortable (all this took place in summer), but mainly in order to watch if Socrates was going to stay out there all night.  And so he did; he stood on the very same spot until dawn!  He only left next morning, when the sun came out, and he made his prayers to the new day.”

(As above, page 502)

1.  The Symposium is framed by these two episodes that show Socrates in contemplation.  The first episode, the one that opens the dialogue, is in the present of the dialogue.  The second episode, the one that closes the dialogue, is in the past of the dialogue; that is to say it is relating an incident that happened prior to the gathering of the symposium. 

Aristodemus relates to Agathon that Socrates does this ‘every now and then’ and that such behavior is nothing to worry about.  This indicates that it is likely that Socrates will exhibit such behavior in the future.

I think this indicates the central significance of contemplation for Platonism and that contemplation was of importance all the way back to the time of Plato and Socrates.  (As an aside, I think it likely that the practice of contemplation precedes Platonism and that such a practice is part of what is meant when, now and then, a dialogue refers to ‘ancient teachings’ as the basis for Platonism.  Perhaps such practices were part of the Pythagorean and/or the Orphic traditions.)

2.  Having said this, I think the translation hides the contemplative nature of what Socrates is doing; not completely, but I think the translation casts the contemplative practice that is exhibited in such behavior into a fog.

For example, in the first quote it says that “Socrates began to think about something . . .”  In the second quote it says that “One day, at dawn, he (Socrates) started thinking about some problem or other . . . “

This makes it seem that Socrates is engaged in discursive problem solving or reasoning.  But what is taking place bears none of the signs that Socrates exhibits when he is problem solving; such problem-solving behavior is often shown in the dialogues and it differs from the kind of behavior we read about in the above quotes.  When faced with a question Socrates wants to solve he discusses it with others in an exchange of dialectic.  Almost every dialogue (with the exception of those dialogues where Socrates is not present) shows Socrates engaged in these kinds of discussions; searching for a definition, practicing the art of division, uncovering a defining essence, and so forth.  This is the method that Socrates has when faced with a problem that can be formulated in discursive terms.  The behavior exhibited in the two quotes differs from this; Socrates disengages, rather than engaging, with others.  Socrates becomes silent rather than using words.  Socrates stands still rather than shifting back and forth, or walking here and there, as he does in many dialogues.  

I did not start studying Greek until I was into my seventies, and my facility with languages has always been slight.  For this reason I contacted a friend about the use of the word ‘thinking’ in the translation.  My friend said that ‘thinking’ is a legitimate translation, but it can also mean things like to ponder, investigate, and so forth.  The problem with using the word ‘thinking’ is that it tends to place what is happening as in the same conceptual frame as what Socrates does when he is questioning people, or responding to someone’s views or conclusions.  But that seems implausible to me for the reasons I just mentioned.

My guess is that the translators of the translations I looked at have not practiced either meditation or contemplation.  For this reason they do not recognize what is being presented by Plato in these two episodes.  Because of this they subsume what I think is a rather clear presentation of Socrates in contemplation, as an example of ‘thinking’ about something.  In fairness, I could be wrong about this; I don’t know any of the translators and I’m not familiar with their other work.  If I am wrong, then I would conclude that what is happening here is that the nature of what it means to be a philosopher in contemporary culture makes it difficult for the translators to include contemplation in a philosophical context.  This is especially true due to the influence of analytic philosophy on contemporary philosophical discourse.  Analytic philosophy rejects the idea of a transcendental reality and is inclined to see the history of Western Philosophy as one of a progression to its materialist and reductionist  procedures.  Because of this they tend to look at Socrates and Plato as proto-rationalists and want to see Socrates as engaged as much as possible in behavior that can be easily understood in the context of the analytic tradition.  There is no reason to think that Socrates is engaged in any kind of analysis in these episodes; and in fact there are good reasons to question that idea (see, for example, that Socrates offers prayers at the end of the second quote.)  

From my perspective, in these two episodes Socrates wasn’t ‘thinking about something.’  He had abandoned thinking, which is a manifestation of the third level, or hypostasis, and ascended into nous or the One as such.  Socrates had gone beyond affirmation and negation into the silence and stillness of the transcendental.

3.  I have often observed that people will confuse the practices of meditation and contemplation with ‘thinking about’ something.  For example, I attended a Quaker Meeting for some years.  In the Quaker Meeting we sat for an hour in silence and, as is the Quaker practice, people would at times rise to speak if the spirit moved them.  What interested me is that when people would rise (or sometimes this would happen when the Meeting had concluded and conversation was informal) they would begin speaking by saying “I was thinking about . . . “  It became clear to me that members were using the hour of silence to think about various topics.  I’m sympathetic to this.  Most peoples’ lives are so busy that it is difficult to find time to simply pause to think about what is going on in their lives.  The Quaker Meeting offered people an opportunity to do just that.  That’s not a small thing and I suspect it is helpful to many people.

On the other hand, “thinking about” is not meditation or contemplation.  In the Quaker tradition there are manuals for the practice of contemplation in a Quaker context that explicitly teach how to go beyond discursive mind.  A prominent one in the early 19th century was A Guide to True Peace which was widely read and admired.  But these kinds of teachings have been lost; I mean by ‘lost’ that these kinds of teachings are no longer presented or advocated in a contemporary Quaker context so that the teaching of mystical contemplation is no longer a living reality.  

I have observed a similar kind of drift in some contemporary Western Zen communities.  My observation has been that there is a tendency to reframe Zen meditation into a therapeutic modality.  This erases the transcendental nature of traditional Zen meditation.  In some cases I have observed Western Zen teachers criticizing Zen students for wanting to go on an intensive retreat structured in such a way as to allow for something like four hours of meditation distributed throughout the day.  A period of intense meditation practice is traditional for the Zen tradition and historically was offered on a yearly basis, often lasting three or four months.  But I think that kind of focus is being pushed aside in Western Zen in favor of therapeutic thinking.  I could be wrong about this; my observations are anecdotal so it’s possible I don’t have the pulse of the Western Zen community.  But this is what I have observed.

I have come to the conclusion that if a person doesn’t have a strong experience of ‘before thinking mind’ or non-discursive mind, it is very difficult for that person to understand what is being asked when instruction is given for meditation or contemplation.  It is natural for a new person to subsume the instructions into what that person already knows and in this way there is a shift from non-conceptual mind cultivation to “thinking about something.”

4.  “. . . lost himself in thought . . . “  This is the remark that follows the quote in item 2.  I suggest that Socrates was not lost in thought.  Instead, I think what is happening is that he has gone beyond, or transcended, thought.  Thought is based on differentiation which is the manner in which the third level, or hypostasis, the material realm, works.  In the practice of contemplation the practitioner can ascend to the one-many of the noetic realm, and from there to the undifferentiated unity of the One.  In other words, I think what is depicted is the subsiding of thought into the timeless field of the transcendental.

5.  Another example is the closing of the second quote which says, “He only left next morning, when the sun came out, and he made his prayers to the new day.”

The Loeb translation, by W. R. M. Lamb, says, “He stood till dawn came and the sun rose; then walked away, after offering a prayer to the sun.” (Page 235 of the Loeb translation.).

In a previous post I discussed four approaches, or ways of reading, a Platonic dialogue: historical, allegorical, symbolic, and transcendental.  This quote is an example of why the symbolic level is needed.  The sun is a symbol of the One in Platonism.  Whenever the sun is mentioned the undermeaning of the passage is that it is about, or refers, to the One, the fully transcendental.  What I think Plato is telling the reader is that Socrates, at the conclusion of his 24 hours of contemplation, is offering a prayer to the One because Socrates was experiencing the One, or united with the One, for that time.  

The word ‘prayer’ can mean many things; there are many types of prayer.  I don’t think that the prayer to the sun was petitionary (but it might have been, or partially been.)  The context strikes me as more an expression of reverence and/or gratitude.  But we don’t really know what the prayer specifically consisted of.  There are a lot of surviving prayers to the sun in Greek texts and magical papyri.  I have not studied these so I am not able to suggest if they may be relevant here.  In the case of magical texts, I don’t get the impression that Socrates was interested in magic; on the other hand he did have contact with deities such as his personal daemon, and in Phaedrus Socrates is depicted as contacting the Goddess of the grove where the dialogue takes place.  So it’s not out of the question.

My feeling is that a ‘prayer to the new day’ sounds pro forma whereas a ‘prayer to the sun’ sounds more heartfelt, the kind of thing that would normally conclude a session of contemplation.  For Platonism, the sun is a powerful symbol, overflowing with meaning and significance.  And I suspect that for Socrates the sun was also a deity, that is to say that the sun was a person to whom prayers could be directed.  This doesn’t conflict with the idea that the sun is a symbol of higher realities; it is a both/and situation.

6.  It is interesting that in both quotes Socrates is standing in contemplation rather than sitting.  I think we tend to assume that contemplation requires a sitting posture and there are some traditions that emphasize the sitting posture.  But in this case Socrates is standing.  And in the second quote Socrates is standing in contemplation for 24 hours.  

But there are traditions where standing postures are of significance and are taught to practitioners from the beginning.  One of the best known in the West is Chi Gong which contains a number of standing postures.  In my own experience I was taught in the Zen tradition I studied, that if sleepiness became a problem to quietly get off the cushion and assume a standing posture behind the cushion.  This was taught both as an antidote to sleepiness, or sluggishness, and as a valid posture for meditation in itself.  I still use this approach (though I have never stood still in meditation for 24 hours!)

It would be helpful to know the specifics of Socrates’s standing posture; where his hands at his side, clasped in front, palms together in prayer, or some other configuration?  Were his knees straight or slightly bent?  And so forth.  I wonder if there are any statues or art that illustrate such a posture that have survived?  

The story of Socrates standing still for 24 hours tests our credulity.  Did Socrates take a bathroom break, or a meal break?  Did he have periods where he stretched?  Inquiring minds want to know.

What we are given here is Socrates as a shaman, someone who is himself a bridge between heaven and earth, between the transcendental and the material.  

7.  These two episodes from Symposium suggest that the central meaning of this dialogue is the One and how to ascend to that transcendental reality.  It is understandable that we see the theme of Symposium as that of beauty; given all the talks about beauty, their insights and their flaws, it seems on the surface that beauty and the nature of beauty is the purpose of the dialogue.  But given the emphasis on contemplation and the placement of the episodes of contemplation, I’m thinking that beauty is to be understood as a provisional teaching of the dialogue rather than the dialogue’s primary purpose.  Beauty is understood to be a gate to the transcendental which is the source of beauty but is beyond Beauty itself.

8.  I also see in Symposium an emphasis on asceticism.  This isn’t obvious because most of the action takes place at a drinking party and towards the end Alcibiades enters in a drunken state.  This gives the reader the overall impression of an indulgent occasion.

But if I look at the behavior of Socrates, both his behavior at the symposium as well as the reported behavior of Socrates, I tend to see an emphasis on asceticism.  For example, there is the idea that though Socrates may participate in drinking he does not get drunk.  He seems to be immune from its influence.

This is further emphasized when Alcibiades tells us about his efforts to seduce Socrates and how these efforts failed; they failed because Socrates was indifferent to the advances of Alcibiades, just as Socrates is indifferent to the effects of alcohol, just as Socrates is indifferent to the cold weather in one of the stories Alcibiades tells us about Socrates’s participation in a military campaign.  Just as Socrates becomes indifferent to the world when he enters into a trance contemplation that lasts for twenty-four hours, an extraordinary accomplishment.

And there is Diotima’s speech on how to follow beauty to higher spheres of reality.  For example, Diotima is reported to have said, “A lover who goes about this matter correctly must begin in his youth to devote himself to beautiful bodies.  First, if the leader [that is to say, love] leads aright, he should love one body and beget beautiful ideas there; then he should realize that the beauty of any one body is brother to the beauty of any other and that if he is to pursue beauty of form he’d be very foolish not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same.  When he grasps this, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and he must think that this wild gaping after just one body is a small thing and despise it.”  (As above, page 492)

To despise something is to turn away from it.  What Diotima offers is the transformation of desire through a growing realization of its limitations which leads to a rejection of the desire as a guide, or standard, for living one’s life.  This is the essence of the ascetic idea, to not live one’s life based on sensory pleasures.

Then Diotima says, “After this he must think that the beauty of people’s souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies.” (Ibid) Again, this is an ascetic gesture; the student is moving away from the physical and from sensory stimulation.

Then Diotima moves to a depiction of transcendent beauty which always is and neither comes to be nor passes away.  This is a beauty that, according to Diotima does not belong to the body or anything material.  “This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to learning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful.” (Ibid, page 493)

This process of ascent by turning away from sensory experience leads to Beauty as such.  It seems to me that this step by step process is what Socrates is doing when he withdraws from the material world in the two episodes that frame the dialogue.  This is the ascetic ideal that unfolds with each step on the way to Beauty, the Good, and the One.  In a way you could say that asceticism is the presence of Beauty in the practitioner.

9.  Symposium is a lush, complex, presentation of the Platonic Path.  I, and many others, have found it very inspiring.  I also think that Symposium offers us a depiction of Socrates that reveals dimensions of his life that are, for the most part, absent from other dialogues.  Socrates is depicted as primarily a contemplative; and when he does speak he offers a passionate presentation of the step by step ascent to the transcendental.  This portrait broadens our understanding of what it means to be a philosopher; I think this offers us a portrait of the philosopher as a contemplative ascetic.  And that is a great healing in itself.