Brief Notes on Various Topics - 93

20 April 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 93

1.  Cicero, Alcinous, and Plato on Wisdom

“For Cicero, philosophy is the love of ‘wisdom’ (sapientia), and is ancient in fact if not in name.  Wisdom on the other hand is ancient in fact and in name, and can be defined as ‘the knowledge of divine and human things and of the beginnings and causes of each thing.’”

(Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1986, page 74, ISBN: 9780268014384)

Plato doesn’t talk about wisdom in this specific way as ‘knowledge of divine and human things.’  According to what I have found in some sources, this definition was widely used in Stoicism.  The merging of Stoicism and Platonism was not unusual.

We can see how widespread this way of understanding wisdom was by referencing the first section of The Handbook of Platonism by Alcinous:

“Philosophy is a striving for wisdom, or the freeing and turning around of the soul from the body, when we turn towards the intelligible and what truly is, and wisdom is the science of things divine and human.”

(Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, translated by John Dillon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, page 3, ISBN: 0198236077)

Dillon connects the definition above by Cicero and Alcinous to Stoicism in Dillon’s endnote on this section of the Handbook, “The definition of wisdom given here is Stoic in its inspiration, cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2.  35: ‘Wisdom is the science of the divine and the human . . . “ (as above, page 52)

Earlier in Dillon’s endnote he connects the definition of Alcinous to the work Definitions which is found in the Platonic corpus; however Definitions is not a dialogue.  It is simply a list of definitions of key terms in Platonic philosophy.  Most scholars doubt that it was written by Plato, but it seems to have circulated fairly early.  Dillon writes, “The initial definition of philosophy [by Alcinous], as orexis Sophias, ‘striving’ or ‘desire for wisdom’, seems to be just a watered-down version of that in the Platonic Definitions, where philosophy is defined as ‘the striving for knowledge of the eternally existent’ (tes ton onton aei epistemes orexis), but ultimately derives from Republic 5. 475B . . . “ (as above, page 51.)

The reference to Book V of The Republic is as follows:

“Then do you agree to this or not?  When we say that someone desires something, do we mean that he desires everything of that kind or that he desires one part of it but not another?

“We mean he desires everything.

“Then won’t we also say that the philosopher doesn’t desire one part of wisdom rather than another, but desires the whole thing?

“Yes, that’s true.”

(Plato, The Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, Plato, Complete Worbks, edited by John M. Cooper, Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis1997, Indiana, 1997, pages 1101 and 1102, 475b, ISBN: 9780872203495)

1.1  I enjoy seeing how these Platonic and Stoic views of wisdom merged and spread.  It’s an interesting episode in spiritual, and intellectual, history.  And it also demonstrates how porous the various Philosophies were to each other in the Classical period.

1.2  The strictly Platonic definition is highlighted in Alcinous when Alcinous highlights the ‘turning around the soul from the body’ and is, I think, based on Phaedo.  This separation of body and soul does not seem to be a focus in Stoic definitions of wisdom. 

1.3  The definitions above speak of knowledge of the human and the divine.  But the definition found in Definitions specifies what the divine is when it says that it is striving for the knowledge of ‘the eternally existent.’ 

What I see here is that wisdom is the use of the capacity for differentiation found in the human mind to distinguish, have knowledge of, that which is ephemeral from that which is eternal.  Human things, and their causes that are found in the material realm, are ephemeral.  Eternal things are noetic, or by analogy, that which is eternal is found in the Good and the One.

1.4  The separation of the soul from the body is the separation of that which is eternal (the soul) from that which is ephemeral (the body).  This will happen naturally when we pass away, but the philosopher enters into a discipline to enact that separation prior to nature’s processes because that separation is necessary in order to enter into the noetic and the realm of the One. 

1.4.1  The primary means for such separation are the ascetic practices as found in Phaedo and other Dialogues.

1.5  The mind differentiates things, places them into categories; that is what the mind does.  The human mind is the presence of the Noetic in the individual.  It is in Nous where differentiation first manifests and this capacity for differentiation is passed down by emanation to the human mind.  In a sense you could say that the mind is a fragment of the Noetic or a pale representation of the Noetic.

1.6  Normally when the mind differentiates the mind does so in service to the body.  The body is the presence of time and of cyclic existence in the individual.  But if the mind starts to have a dim awareness of that which is eternal, the mind can then use the capacity for differentiation in service to that which is eternal.  This happens, if it does happen, gradually, step by step; like a flower blossoming in a glen.

1.7  The mind can sense the presence of eternity because of the silence and stillness of the soul.  The soul is the presence of the Good and the One in the individual.  Because of that presence there is a unity in the individual; it is the unity of the One, and its presence as soul, that makes an individual an individual rather than just a random collection of parts. 

Because the soul is silent, still, and partless, it is difficult for the mind to notice it.  When the mind serves the body the needs of the body are noticeable sensory things.  But the Good and the One are ineffable, and the soul shares in that ineffability.  Nevertheless, its presence, the presence of eternity, is detected by its stillness and silence which contrast with the noise and agitation of the body. 

1.8  The turning to eternity is something the mind can do, but it is not easy.  It requires studying the works of Plato and Plotinus, meditation and contemplation, and a love of the wisdom that leads to that which is eternal.

1.9  Alcinous talks about ‘striving’ and the word ‘philosophy’ refers to love.  I think this is why we find erotic imagery in the Dialogues; these images are symbols of the love for wisdom that blossoms in the heart of the philosopher.

2.  Immanence and Transcendence

I have given some thought recently to the question of whether or not the Good and the One are transcendent or immanent.  In many ways the Platonic tradition offers us a transcendental view of the ultimate.  The allegory of the cave supports a transcendent view.  And Plotinus will use words like ‘here’ for the sensory/material world and there, or There, for the noetic or ineffable ultimate.  These ways of talking about the Good and the One, as well as the Noetic, support a transcendental view of the spiritual journey where you abandon the material domain and ‘move’ to the transcendental domain.

The one exception to this way of speaking that I can think of is when writers in the Platonist tradition refer to higher realities, such as the Noetic and the Ineffable, as ‘everywhere’ and ‘everywhen’ (eternal).  I think this suggests (‘implies’ might be too strong a word) an interpretation of ultimate nature that is immanent; that is to say that the ultimate is, in some way, not separate from that which is not ultimate.

One solution to these different modes of speaking is to think of them as tools for talking about spiritual practice.  The transcendental way of speaking is very helpful in creating a sense of dedication to practice that resembles the way a musician will dedicate his time to mastering an instrument, or a carpenter dedicating his life to his craft, and so forth.  I have personally found this manner of speaking very helpful for my own spiritual journey.

The immanent way of speaking is a kind of antidote to thinking that the Good and the One are so far away, that it is impossible for an ordinary person like myself to rise to the level of experiencing the Good and the One.  It’s like a person with a badly broken leg trying to become a ballet dancer. 

I think that when Platonic literature talks about the importance and significance of beauty it feels like leaning towards a more immanent approach to the divine.  I know that structurally the origin of Beauty is in the Noetic (and at times the ineffable), and that the beauty here is a poor reflection of the Beauty There.  Nevertheless, the way Platonists talk about beauty shields Platonism from becoming filled with Gnostic repulsion for material existence as well as shielding Platonists from the widespread nihilism of our own culture.

A second solution to these different modes of speaking is to remind ourselves that the Good and the One are only names for the ultimacy that Platonism points to.  In this way transcendence and immanence are seen as provisional ways of speaking about the Good and the One; they are tools for shifting our attention from the material world to a way of seeing and comprehending a world, that is both here and There, and that is the end of sorrow.