Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 98

15 June 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 98 

1.  Creeping Secularism

I was listening to some Orthodox Christian Apologetics the other day on Youtube.  At one point in my life, I was interested in Christian Apologetics, both Orthodox and Non-Orthodox, but that interest has faded since my involvement with Platonism.  But I thought I would listen to this presentation and see if something was offered that I had not known about before.

What interested me as a Platonist was that this presentation listed secular views that Christian Apologetics needs to deal with and on the list was Platonism.  I don’t think of Platonism as a secular philosophy; in fact, I think of Platonism as the antidote to secular modernity.  I didn’t come up with that on my own; I learned about this from a number of contemporary Platonists who put forth the view that in fundamental ways Platonism and Secularism are opposed to each other.

In listening to the presentation, I came away with an understanding of why they think Platonism is a secular view.  Surprisingly it has to do with the way mathematicians who openly align with Platonism when it comes to the existence of abstract objects (Platonic Forms), but are not inclined to adopt any other Platonic views such as the transcendental and ineffable One. 

In addition, there is no discussion in the context of modern math about the ethical commitments that are foundational for Platonism; I am referring to the Virtues and the Restraints.  I think this is because it is rare for people to think of math as involving ethical commitments and it would be regarded as very eccentric if some math professor made that connection by the professor’s colleagues.

What I am beginning to see is that the contemporary University defines Platonism as a belief in the independent existence of abstract objects and leaves it at that.  And that is why the Orthodox presentation on Apologetics placed Platonism in the secular category of views.

I have only become aware of this recently, but my suspicion is that this likely goes back to two sources; first is the early history of analytic philosophy which dismisses anything in Plato that is mythic or allegorical as not really philosophy, and second I think this goes back to German Historiography of the 1700’s, in particular Brucker’s Historia Critica Philosophiae which had a big influence in both German philosophy and also in English philosophy through a condensed translation by William Enfield.  A good example of this influence is Jowett’s translation of the Dialogues of Plato.  In the copious introductory material, Jowett expresses this kind of secular view of Plato as a proto-rationalist; for example, Jowett frequently refers to Platonism as ‘scientific’ and to Plato as having a scientific sense. 

This view of Plato and Platonism is not universal in the University; there exists significant opposition to such views by scholars such as John Dillon, Lloyd Gerson, Mark Anderson, and others.  The view of Plato as a proto-rationalist does seem to have weakened since its high point in the early 20^th century.  But it is still there and as a Platonist who views Platonism as a spiritual tradition that has the purpose of guiding people to the immaterial and ineffable transcendent, it is helpful to understand this kind of ‘secular Platonism’ and learn how to steer around it.

2.  The Layers of Plato’s Discourse

Early in The Laws there is a discussion about how conflict appears in various human situations:

“Athenian Stranger:  You appear to me, stranger [KLeinias], to have had a fine gymnastic training in understanding the legal customs of the Cretans.  But explain this to me more clearly: the definition you seem to me to have given for a well-governed city is that it must be ordered in such a way as to defeat the other cities in war.  Isn’t that so?

“Kleinias:  By all means.  And I think that’s how it seems to this man here.

“Megillus: How else would any Lacedaimonian [Spartan} answer, you divine man?

“Athenian Stranger: Well, is it the case that this definition is correct for cities, in relation to cities, but that another would be correct for a neighborhood, in relation to another neighborhood?

“Kleinias: In no way.

“Athenian Stranger:  The same applies?

“Kleinias: Yes.

“Athenian Stranger: What then?  For a household in relation to another household in the neighborhood, and for one man in relation to another man, the same still?

“Kleinias:  The same.

“Athenian Stranger:  For a person in relation to himself, should the relationship be understood to be one of enemy to enemy?  Or how then should we speak of this?

“Kleinias:  O Athenian stranger – I would rather not address you as merely ‘Attic,’ for you seem to me worthy of being called rather by the name of the goddess – you have correctly followed the argument up to its source and have thus made it clearer, so that you will the more easily discover that we were correct just now in saying that all are enemies of all in public and in private each is an enemy of himself.

“Athenian Stranger:  What are you saying, you amazing man?

“Kleinias:  Why, right here, stranger, is the first and best of all victories, the victory of oneself over oneself; and being defeated by oneself is the most shameful and the same time the worst of all defeats.  These things indicate that there is a war going on in us, ourselves against ourselves.”

(Plato, The Laws of Plato, translated by Thomas L. Pangle, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960, pages 4 and 5, 626b-626e, ISBN: 0226671100)

2.1  I think this is an example of Plato telling the reader that The Laws is written at multiple levels.  The movement of the passage is from the level of a city-state and then a gradual narrowing of focus until we reach the level of the individual.  What is being communicated is that the reader should view the Dialogue as written in such a way that it is applicable to all the levels indicated in this passage.

2.1.1  What this means is that the teachings found in The Laws are broadly applicable to many situations that we face in our lives from social and familial circumstances to internal conflicts we find within ourselves.

2.1.2  What this means for us as individuals is that the teachings found in The Laws are instructions to us for how to live a less divided life which is a life that moves towards peace and reconciliation of conflicting aspects within us.

This is not immediately apparent because we tend to read a dialogue like The Laws as consistent with the way political philosophy has been written in the modern period; I’m thinking of political philosophers like Rousseau and Hobbes and Locke.  In modern political philosophy we don’t find the idea that their teachings are applicable at multiple levels of social interaction and also at the level of interiority.  Interior conflicts are the domain of psychology, not political science.  Family conflicts are the domain of a branch of psychology, not political science or political philosophy.  This kind of separation of domains, a kind of fragmentation or differentiation, reduces our ability to comprehend the incredible range of a dialogue like The Laws.  But it is possible to overcome this habit of separating these functions of human life into separate categories and see how all of them are related by common tendencies that are metaphysical in nature.  Being able to see how that works is one of the great gifts that Plato brings to us.