Thursday, March 9, 2023

A Good Man's Pleasures

9 March 2023

A Good Man’s Pleasures

“There would not be any possibility of the existence of well-being if one said that outward things were to be desired and that the good man desired them.  He would like all men to prosper and no one to be subject to any sort of evil; but if this does not happen, he is all the same well off.  But if anyone maintains that it will make the good man absurd to suppose him wanting anything like this – for it is impossible that evils should not exist – then the person who maintains this will obviously agree with us in directing the good man’s desire inwards.

“When they demand to be shown what is pleasant in a life of this kind, they will not be requiring the presence of the pleasures of debauchees, or of bodily pleasures at all – these could not be there and would abolish well-being – or of violent emotions of pleasure – why should the good man have any? – but only those pleasures which accompany the presence of goods, pleasures not consisting in movements, which are not the results of any process: for the goods are there already, and the good man is present to himself; his pleasure and happiness are at rest.  The good man is always happy; his state is tranquil, his disposition contented and undisturbed by any so-called evils – if he is really good.  If anyone looks for another kind of pleasure in life it is not the life of virtue he is looking for.”

(Plotinus, Ennead 1.4.11 & 12, Plotinus: Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead I, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pages 201-203, ISBN: 9780674994843)

 

“To consider the outer world to be a field to his desire, to fancy the Sage desiring any good external, would be to deny Substantial-Existence to happiness; for the Sage would like to see all men prosperous and no evil befalling anyone; but though it prove otherwise, he is still content.

“If it be admitted that such a desire would be against reason, since evil cannot cease to be, there is no escape from agreeing with us that the Sage’s will is set always and only inward.

“The pleasure demanded for life cannot be in the enjoyments of the licentious or in any gratifications of the body – there is no place for these, and they stifle happiness – nor in any violent emotions – what could so move the Sage? – it can only be such pleasure as there must be where Good is, pleasure that does not rise from movement and is not a thing of process, for all that is good is immediately present to the Sage and the Sage is present to himself: his pleasure, his contentment, stands, immovable.

“Thus he is ever cheerful, the order of his life ever untroubled: his state is fixedly happy and nothing whatever of all that is known as evil can set it awry – given only that he is and remains a Sage.

“If anyone seeks for some other kind of pleasure in the life of the Sage, it is not the life of the Sage he is looking for.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Paige, various editions between 1917 and 1930, quote is from the online edition found at sacredtexts.com)

 

1.  This is one of those passages where the ascetic ideal is highlighted.  Such passages are scattered throughout the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus.  Interestingly, this passage connects asceticism with pleasure, but a particular kind of pleasure and happiness that arise from contemplation, from turning inward.  This means that there is an attractive aspect that encourages the Sage, the philosophical practitioner. 

2.  I like the use of the word ‘Sage’ in the McKenna translation.  I think it brings forth that the way of philosophy is a spiritual path. 

3.  The Sage wishes well for all people, but at the same time knows that evil is pervasive in this realm of differentiation and strife.  When evil arises, the Sage is not thrown from the path of Philosophy, already having established himself in the transcendental.  I sense an overlap with Stoicism in this teaching, though it is possible that Stoicism originally borrowed this teaching from Platonism.

4.  In my own life, as I have previously mentioned, I have had a five-steps-forward, two-, or three-steps-back motion in my journey.  I attribute this to being exceptionally prone to distraction.  Yet, overall, I can clearly see progress on the path; I mean that if I look back to ten years ago, or twenty years ago, I can observe that my stability is much greater, that some things that used to distract me no longer do so, and that my periods of dwelling in the presence of eternity are longer, much longer, and more stable.  I bring this up because the passage is, I think, a portrait of an exceptionally advanced practitioner; probably Plotinus himself.  I’m not such an exalted practitioner or Sage, but it is good to have such a portrait as an ideal to strive for and as a way of observing, and measuring, one’s own progress.

5.  This passage has a very conversational feeling to me.  I say this because of all the asides and sub-clauses; these are typical of conversation but tend to disappear in more refined literary texts.  (As an aside, it might be interesting to compare Plotinus and Plato on a literary level and on the usage of particular kinds of structures.)  Visually, the sentences look complex with the dashes, semi-colons, colons, etc.  But if you read it out loud the passage flows easily and if you imagine Plotinus speaking to a student, perhaps answering a student’s question, the flow seems natural and unforced.

6.  Once the practitioner of the Way of Philosophy has some experiences of higher hypostases, the transcendental pleasure that ascetic practice grants becomes clear.  It is true that the practitioner may still fall back, or become distracted by material sensory experiences, but at this stage that will only be temporary.  The practitioner will feel the call of the transcendent, and sense the presence of eternity, and this will lead to the practitioner becoming a Sage in whom the ascetic ideal has taken root in the glowing field of the Good and the One.

 

  

Monday, March 6, 2023

The Food of the Gods

6 March 2023

The Food of the Gods

“For asserting the first principles to be gods and born of gods, they say that the beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal, and clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said, even about the very application of these causes is above our comprehension.  For if the gods taste nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the causes of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their existence, how can gods who need food be eternal?”

(Aristotle, Metaphysics, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book III, the Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton, 1984, pages 1579-1580)

 

In Late Classical Platonism there is an ongoing discussion about what I refer to as the ontological status of deities.  This discussion is complex because it is embedded in discussions about many different types of deities, their specific traits and functions, and their hierarchical status.  Here are a few remarks on this topic:

1.         My view of deities overall is shaped by decades of study in the Buddhist tradition.  Although in many respects I have left behind many basic Buddhist understandings (e.g. I reject the Buddhist view of no-soul), I find the Buddhist view of the place that deities have in a metaphysical cosmology still makes sense to me.  As I understand it, the Buddhist view is that deities, of all kinds, are embedded in samsara, or genesis, or what I like to call ‘becoming and begoning’.  Although deities live very long lives, they are not eternal/immortal.  At some point, they will die, just like every living being in becoming and begoning. 

2.         Applying that understanding to a Platonic context, I see deities, of all types, as residing in the realm of soul, rather than residing in the realm of nous, or even higher.  Because of this, I remain unsympathetic to the idea that there are deities that are, in some sense, residing between the One and Nous/Mind/Intellect.  I have this view because deities are differentiated from each other and from other beings in the realm of soul.  The degree of differentiation, indicating a lack of unity, and metaphysical distance from the One, is a distinguishing feature for those residing in the realm of soul, and for those who have fallen into the material dimension.

3.         Partly how a Platonist understands this depends on how the dialogues are read.  Eric Fallick, in his book, Platonist Contemplative Asceticism: Practice and Principle, speaks to this point as follows, “. . . in the Phaedo when Socrates, who symbolizes the higher divine soul and individual nous, not any actual individual named Socrates, says that he is consecrated like the swans to Apollo, that ‘Apollo’ in Greek is a pun on ‘a-polla’ meaning ‘not-many’, i.e., that Socrates as nous is consecrated to the One as non-multiplicity (nisprapanca in Sanskrit).  Similarly, when he says that the accomplished philosophos when the soul is released from the body goes to be among the gods or his soul will go to the good and wise god (note . . . the indiscriminate use of singular and plural) he means that the individual nous and higher soul released from the lower soul and the experience of the body re-merges with Nous and the One.” (page 161)

This is a skillful symbolic and allegorical reading of Plato.  It is an approach rarely used these days, but I have found that it uncovers meanings and insights that were previously inaccessible to me.

4.         In Laws Plato argues that the gods must be ‘honored,’ and enacts laws to that effect.  That makes sense to me.  I’m not arguing that deities do not exist; I’m not an atheist.  And I have no problem with honoring the gods through ceremony.  Just as I honor my human teachers and my human ancestors, honoring the gods is a kind of spiritual duty.  But I don’t see aligning myself with the gods as a procedure that will guide me to the Good and the One.  I say that because I see the gods, deities, as a part of becoming and begoning, whereas the Good and the One transcend becoming and begoning.

5.         This is one of those issues that is difficult to resolve.  Partly I rely on what I think of as the ‘ordinary’ or ‘folk’ understanding of how deities behave; meaning that deities are involved with deceits and deceptions, are often seen by Greeks as heartless who treat humans as ‘playthings’.  I tend to see this as an accurate presentation of the gods and their behavior.  Plato, and Platonists, were, understandably, appalled by such behavior and argued for deities who are free from these character flaws; even arguing that stories about the misbehavior of gods should not be read to children.  In the end, though, I think this creates confusion.  No doubt the gods, like humans, have within them, hidden away in their soul, the light of the One.  And if a god turns to that light the god can ascend to the One.  But as they are, they are like human beings, a mixture of tendencies some of which lead them to the darkness of the cave, and some of which lead them out of the cave to the light of the One.

The confusion is to think of a trait of a god as essential; for example, that the beauty of Aphrodite means that Aphrodite is essential beauty.  A god may participate in beauty in a manner that is purer than that of a human being, because human beings are more mired in materiality.  But that does not mean that the deity is essentially that quality.

6.         In the opening quote by Aristotle, he highlights the contingent nature of the gods.  Aristotle argues that if the gods are dependent upon causes, such as ambrosia, for their existence, they cannot be immortal.  This is a causal analysis remarkably close to a Buddhist analysis of gods of all types.  Though some argue that Aristotle and Plato parted ways on significant issues, I tend to have a higher opinion of Aristotle.  Yes, there are differences between Plato and Aristotle, but in many significant areas there is agreement.  I think this quote is an indication of one of those areas.

7.         I take a contemplative view of the Platonist path; that it is through the practice of contemplation, and the cultivation of other virtues, that the practitioner approaches the One.  I realize that others have a different understanding of the path, and I wish them well on their journey.  As for me, I am content with my slow walk on the path of purification and other virtues that leads to the One, the Good, and the Beautiful.

 

 

Saturday, March 4, 2023

Writing About Platonism

4 March 2023

Writing About Platonism

There is a vast body of secondary literature associated with the Platonic tradition.  These include commentaries on the dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, introductory work such as guidebooks or overviews, histories of Platonism or histories of philosophy in which Platonism is featured, appreciations, etc.  I enjoy reading this literature.  Most of the contemporary secondary literature comes from academia; but a surprising amount comes from outside that context.

Recently I have been reading a contemporary commentary on a dialogue of Plato by a philosopher who writes from the perspective of twentieth century analytic philosophy, as well as the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy whose exact date is not clear, but it is likely in the early part of the common era.  This has given me a chance to see how the background of authors of secondary literature shapes the literature, how this background effects, and in some cases, determines how they interpret the author’s understanding of primary sources such as the Dialogues and the Enneads.  Here are a few observations:

1.  I decided to read a commentary on a dialogue of Plato by an analytic philosopher because I wanted to see how the intersection of the Platonic tradition and the modern analytic tradition worked.  Reading this analytic commentary is a strange experience.  The analogy I have come to is that reading this commentary is like listening to someone trying to play a melody who has no sense of rhythm.  The notes are all there, but there is an absence of coherence and it is difficult to actually hear the melody and what feeling or understanding the composer of the melody wanted to communicate.  When I say ‘all the notes are there’ I mean that the dialogue is quoted correctly, just as the arhythmic musician plays all the notes; but everything feels ‘off’, something is missing and what is missing is crucial.

2.  It is my view that the Platonic tradition communicates primarily through the use of allegory and other methods of ‘comparison’ (a word Plotinus used).  Although there are deductive arguments in Platonism, I see logic as a tool for unpacking the meaning of the comparisons, such as the allegory of the cave. 

But the analytic tradition argues that things like allegory, metaphor, and other methods of comparison, are not scientific, are not testable, and are, therefore, ‘meaningless’.  This was explicitly stated and was foundational for the analytic tradition’s rejection of metaphysics as an illegitimate discipline and approach.  What I see happening in the analytic commentary on a Platonic dialogue is that the allegorical dimension of the dialogue is not understood.  The consequence of this is an overemphasis on the ‘meanings’ of specific terms and discussions about whether Plato meant this meaning or that meaning or possibly some third meaning, etc.  This kind of critique doesn’t really get us anywhere.

I’m not saying there is nothing of value in the analytic commentary; the author has a firm grasp of logic and implication and does suggest some intriguing possibilities.  But the central point, the transcendental, the One, is not there and whatever insights are presented tend to be side issues that are not critical to what Plato is saying.

3.  In contrast, the Anonymous Prolegomena is clear about the use of techniques of comparison.  In a previous post I quoted the author of the Prolegomena as saying that Plato’s dialogues are like a cosmos, or a ‘kind of cosmos’.  This is metaphorical reasoning, a type of Plotinian ‘comparison.’  In another passage about why Plato uses the dialogue form, the anonymous author writes as follows:

“Another reason, given by Plato himself, is that a literary work is comparable with a living being, and therefore the most perfect literary work will resemble the most beautiful of living beings; the most beautiful living being is the world, and the dialogue can be compared with the world, as we have already said; consequently the dialogue is the most perfect of literary forms.”

(Anonymous, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, translated by L. WG. Westerink, Prometheus Trust, Wiltshire, UK, page 28, ISBN: 9781898910510)

Here we see that the use of comparisons is freely entered into, without hesitation.  Furthermore, these comparisons are considered meaningful.  In this specific quote the comparison is a complex unfolding.  First a literary work is compared to a living being, then the most perfect literary work is compared to the most beautiful of living beings, then the dialogue is compared to the world as the most beautiful of living beings.  This sequence contains the logic of comparisons, a sequence of metaphorical, as opposed to syllogistic, inferences.  These metaphorical inferences (technically similes) conclude with the word ‘consequently’, a substitute for ‘therefore’ in syllogistic.  But the sequence of inferences is a sequence of comparisons; I refer to this as ‘metaphorical inference’, an art that is well developed in Platonic Philosophy, but that has been lost to modernity.

4.  It has been observed by commentators on modernity that a feature of modernity is that modernity has lost the ability to think allegorically.  Allegory used to be a widespread literary form.  A good example of this is Pilgrim’s Progress, a 17th century Christian allegory, written by John Bunyan, that was hugely popular in England. Today such allegorical presentations of religious and metaphysical matters are largely unread and for the most part misunderstood.  It is my view that the way Plato, and the Platonic tradition, presented their understanding of the cosmos was closer to John Bunyan rather than contemporary analytic philosophy.

5.  I don’t know if there can be a coherent interpretation of Platonism that eschews the central role of ‘comparisons.’  I am aware of attempts to present a ‘secular’ Platonism that still contains the teaching of the transcendental.  In my own mind, this strikes me as similar to attempts in the West to generate a ‘Secular Buddhism.’  I doubt either will work.  On the other hand, Platonism has proven remarkably adaptable to changing external circumstances.  I mean that Platonism has worn Pagan robes, Christian robes, the robes of mathematicians, and the external clothing of other traditions as well.  Not all of these have ‘worked’ equally well.  But I suspect that part of the unfolding process of the encounter between Platonism and Modernity, and specifically between Platonism and Analytic Philosophy, will be ongoing attempts to tailor Platonism to analytic philosophy’s purposes.  Again, I doubt this will work; but such attempts might serve to introduce Platonism to an audience that otherwise might have completely ignored the Way of Philosophy that leads to the ultimate, the transcendental source of all that exists.

 

  

Monday, February 27, 2023

The Meaning of the Dialogue Form in Plato's Philosophy

27 February 2023

The Meaning of the Dialogue Form in Plato’s Philosophy

“We must now mention the reason why Plato used this literary form [the dialogue].  He chose it, we say, because the dialogue is a kind of cosmos.  For in the same way as a dialogue has different personages each speaking in character, so does the universe comprise existences of various nature expressing themselves in various ways; for the utterance of each is according to its nature.  It was in imitation, then, of God’s creation, the cosmos, that he did this.”

(Anonymous, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, translated by L. G. Westerink, Prometheus Trust, Wiltshire, UK, 2011, page 28, ISBN: 9781898910510)

 

1.  The anonymous author gives seven reasons, some of them overlapping, for why Plato chose the dialogue form.  This is the first reason.  The full list of reasons is too long to post here; perhaps I will post some of the others in the future.

2.  The author offers the idea that the dialogues of Plato are a ‘kind of cosmos’; meaning that the dialogues imitate, or reflect, or instantiate features of the cosmos.  This means that Plato’s dialogues are teaching the reader at the symbolic level; that beneath the specific topic of a dialogue, and the discussion in that dialogue, the dialogue itself is demonstrating the truth of the Platonic view. 

I find this idea appealing.  As I have mentioned in a previous post (perhaps more than one) I think the dialogues of Plato transmit to the reader a subtle energy of understanding.  I can’t prove this; on the other hand, others have experienced a similar feeling of a transmission of wisdom from reading the dialogues. 

3.  The author offers that the multitude of characters in the dialogues is an imitation of the multitude of entities in the cosmos.  I think that this means that just as the dialogue as a whole is a symbol of the cosmos, the characters as individuals are symbols of aspects of the cosmos.  Each character has archetypal significance.

In addition, most dialogues make specific reference to a deity and/or a ceremony in honor of a deity.  The deity referred to acts as a symbol of the meaning of the dialogue as a whole.

4.  In this way, the dialogues allow for the attentive reader access to higher hypostases by comprehending the dialogue as an emanation of those realms.  In this way, reading the dialogues of Plato becomes an occasion for contemplation.

Saturday, February 25, 2023

The Way of Virtue

25 February 2023

The Way of Virtue

“You will best honour God by making your mind like unto Him, and this you can do by virtue alone.”

(Porphyry, Porphyry’s Letter to His Wife Marcella, translated by Alice Zimmern, Phanes Press, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1986, page 49, ISBN: 0933999275)

 

“The virtues of the man who tries to rise to contemplation consist in detaching oneself from things here below; this is why they are called ‘purifications.’  They command us to abstain from activities which innervate the organs and which excite the affections that relate to the body.”

(Porphyry, Launching-Points to the Realm of Mind, translated by Kenneth Guthrie, Phanes Press, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988, pages 27 & 28, ISBN: 0933999585)

 

1.  The word “God” is loaded with associations that are embedded in monotheistic traditions.  In Platonism, the word God is used, now and then, in a way that is equivalent to the use of terms like ‘the One’, and ‘the Good’.  It is an appropriate word for designating that which is ultimate and fully transcendental.  But it does have some differences in meaning when used in a Platonic context as opposed to a monotheistic context.  For example, Platonists have the view that the cosmos is eternal in the sense of everlasting.  Proclus wrote a treatise on this called “On the Eternity of the World.”  And some early Christian clerics, such as Synesius, accepted this view, arguing that creation was a metaphorical teaching rather than an actuality.  It is good to keep this difference, and others, in mind so that when reading Platonic works that use the word “God” we refrain projecting onto that usage meanings from a monotheistic context that might not apply.

2.  It was Porphyry’s view that the Platonic ascent to the One, or God, was accomplished through the practice of “virtue”, and further, that it is only through the practice of virtue that the ultimate union with God can be accomplished.  Porphyry wrote extensively about the meaning of virtue, dividing virtue into a number of types and categories such as civic virtue, contemplative virtue, etc.  The different types of virtue were united in their purpose of functioning as purifications.  And purifications were united in their purpose of turning the practitioner of Platonism away from attachments that ‘innervate’ the body (such as alcohol) and ‘excite the affections’; I would interpret ‘excite the affections’ as meaning ‘stimulate the senses’.

3.  Porphyry’s understanding of the Platonic Path was fundamentally grounded in what I call the Ascetic Ideal.  I’m not sure, but I don’t recall Porphyry using the word ‘ascetic’ specifically.  Nevertheless, his vision is that of an ascetic, meaning someone who turns away from a life based on sensory stimulation for the purpose of union with the Divine, the One, with God.

4.  Porphyry’s books on vegetarianism, such as “On Abstention from Killing Animals”, and his “Letter to Anebo”, are specific applications of this general understanding of virtue as purification.  Looking at Porphyry’s writings broadly, vegetarianism/veganism is foundational for his understanding of how Platonism works because it both detaches the practitioner from things here below (I take ‘here below’ to mean ‘the material realm’) and establishes a right relationship, or alignment, to the transcendental, to God.

5.  In one sense, the path of asceticism that Porphyry advocates for is not an easy one.  It is not easy in the sense that becoming a talented musician is not easy; one has to put time and effort into becoming a talented musician, and one has to put time and effort into becoming an ascetic.  On the other hand, the ascetic way offers numerous opportunities for embodiment in practice.  I mean that there are numerous opportunities to refrain from stimulating the senses such as refraining from popular entertainment, refraining from luxurious carnist meals, refraining from ostentatious clothing, etc.  Even small ascetic gestures begin to set up a habit of mind that eventually internalizes the Ascetic Ideal.  And once the Ascetic Ideal has been internalized the path to the One, to God, becomes clear.

 

 

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

Distinguishing Eternity

22 February 2023

Distinguishing Eternity

“He [Plato] was also the first to develop the notion of eternity, for whereas his predecessors understood by eternity endless time, Plato showed that endless time is different from eternity.”

(Anonymous, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, translated by L.G. Westerink, The Prometheus Trust, Wiltshire, UK, 2011, page 12)

1.  The ultimate source of all in Platonism is usually referred to as the One, or the Good, sometimes as the Beautiful.  In reality this ultimacy is beyond name and form, beyond predication, beyond affirmation or negation.  I think of names like the Good and the One and the Beautiful as a kind of first manifestation from this ultimacy.  Strictly speaking you cannot say anything positive or negative about the ultimate; on the other hand, speaking about the ultimate has its virtues and purposes and is not inherently misleading.

2.  In my own journey I have tended to configure the Platonic ultimate as the Eternal (hence the name of this blog).  As the quote above suggests, it seems to me that Platonism has a subtle and deep understanding of eternity; it is one of the things that drew me to Platonism.  The ultimate is eternal as such, just as for the ultimate oneness is unity as such.  Things are things because they are descended from this Oneness, and things endure through time because of their participation in the Eternal.  And because they are metaphysically distant from the ultimate, their unity is deficient and unsustainable, and their capacity to endure is limited by time.

3.  From the perspective of eternity the ultimate is eternity as such.  In the first emanation (nous) things are eternal by participation; this is why, for example, numbers are eternal.  In the second emanation, the realm of soul, the metaphysical distance from the Eternal introduces time, through the presence of number.  It is here that we observe everlasting things, what the quote refers to as ‘endless time’.  The world soul and the cosmos as a whole are examples of this enduring through time.  And it is here that Plato speaks of ‘time as the moving image of eternity’ in the Timaeus.  The appearance of ephemerality emerges as the world soul differentiates into a individual consciousnesses that endure only for a measurable amount of time; they lack the nature of everlastingness.  This is the realm of deities, humans, and other living beings.  This is the realm of materiality, the lowest realm which is the farthest from the ultimate.

4.  By following the traces of eternity we can ascend, step by step, to that which is eternal by nature.  The first step is to contemplate impermanence; that all sensory things, and all mental constructions, are impermanent.  In some cases this is not difficult; for example, we have no problem accepting the impermanence of the sound of a bell.  In other cases there can be deep resistance to impermanence; for example, many people think that a nation or religion are permanent, and some think that their ephemeral opinions are permanent.  This is why serious study of impermanence is so helpful, because it leads us away from relying on the ephemeral domain of sensation; it is a process of distinguishing eternity from that which is ephemeral.  This is just the first step in the long journey to the eternal.  Plotinus is the great guide for this journey which takes us beyond the realms of sensation, beyond the realms of the everlasting, to a return to the truly Eternal.

5.  The presence of eternity is found within; it lies at the center of the soul.  It is like a ray of sunlight that can, if we pay attention, lead us back to the sun, the spiritual sun.  Though that which is eternal as such is metaphysically distant, it is spiritually close.  When we turn within, entering silence and stillness, we find this inner light and, with patience, the source of that inner light, which is the Good, the One, and the Eternal.

 

 

Saturday, February 18, 2023

More on the Word 'Neoplatonism'

18 February 2023

More on the Word ‘Neoplatonism’

In mid-January of this year I posted “Why I Don’t Use the Word ‘Neoplatonism.”  It was my quick take on why I think the word ‘Neoplatonism’ inherently distorts the history of the Platonic tradition as well as the teachings of Plotinus and other late classical Platonists.  Recently, I was rereading Pure by Mark Anderson and came across a passage where Anderson makes the same point, but with different emphases.  Anderson is much more adamant than I was in my post and more strongly emphasizes the history behind the introduction of the word ‘Neoplatonism’ into the discourse of modernity.  Here it is:

“Of Longinus Plotinus said, ‘He is a scholar, but he is not at all a philosopher.’ [I believe this is from Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus.]  We might say the same of those intellectual historians who insist upon distinguishing Platonism from Neoplatonism.  Plotinus, the supposed founder of ‘Neoplatonism,’ knew nothing of this distinction; he considered himself a loyal Platonist.  He may have elaborated Plato’s central themes; no doubt he illuminated what was only dimly implicit in the master’s written works; but he consistently maintained that he derived his ideas from the tradition that descended from Plato.  He was taken at his word for nearly two thousand years.

“Then came historicism.

“In the nineteenth century, certain German scholars claiming to have detected previously unperceived fissures separating Plotinus’ ideas from pure Platonism, declared Plotinus the unwitting founder of a new school of thought, inspired by but diverging from Platonism sufficiently to merit the prefix ‘Neo.’  Thus died a tradition that had sustained the greatest of Western minds, from Plotinus himself to Michelangelo.  It was not a natural death.  Platonism as a unified, living, inspirational tradition was assassinated by pedantry, drowned in an inkwell. . .

“The inferences one draws from this event depend upon whether one aspires to be a scholar or a philosopher.  From the perspective of the intellectual historian, the segregating of Plato from Plotinus is fecund, endlessly productive of the most minute research projects.  The philosopher seeks a different sort of fecundity.

“The labor of identifying and categorizing the varieties of Platonism and Neoplatonism – in a word, taxonomy – satisfied the instincts of the scholar.  The unity of Platonism nourishes the spirits of those who love wisdom.  If you long for what counts today as historical accuracy, accept the scholar’s distinction between Platonism and Neoplatonism.  If you long for wisdom, live the unity of Platonism.”

(Mark Anderson, Pure: Modernity, Philosophy, and the One, Sophia Perennis, San Rafael, CA, 2009, pages 30 & 31.)

 

1.  I think the difference between the scholar and the philosopher that Anderson refers to is that the philosopher is, from the Platonist perspective, a mystic whereas the scholar is not.  (It’s possible to be a scholar and a mystic, just like it’s possible for someone to be a cook and a mystic; but being a mystic is not part of the essence of scholarship whereas, from the Platonist perspective, it is the essence of being a philosopher.) 

2.  I would like to know when ‘German scholars’ introduced the word ‘Neoplatonism’ and the specific paper where the introduction occurred and who the author was.  I’m like that; I’m the kind of reader who will track down footnotes.  So far, I haven’t come across the specifics of this shift in terminology.  I suspect the specifics would be illuminating.

3.  Anderson refers to the truth that Platonism was considered a single tradition for a very long time.  I made the same point in my mid-January post.  There is a disturbing hubris inherent in the term ‘Neoplatonism’; it implies that many centuries of scholars got it wrong, but that we moderns all of a sudden got it right.  I refer to this way of thinking as ‘chronocentrism’, a word I made up to name the view that modernity has of itself, namely that modernity is more wise, more insightful, and better informed, as well as ethically superior, to those ancients.

I first experienced the hubris of modernist chronocentrism when I was deeply involved in Western Buddhism.  For example, modernist Western Buddhists do not hesitate to refer to the idea of rebirth as a ‘superstition’ that the progressive, materialist, and scientific West does not need and has every right to eject from the Buddhadharma.  Every single tradition of Buddhism, from Abhidhamma to Zen, has accepted the truth of rebirth, but that means nothing to ‘Secular Buddhism’ (trademarked).  Chronocentrism is the way modernity disposes of sources of possible alternatives to its basic world view; and it has done so successfully.

What I find helpful is that Anderson points out that long before there was Western Buddhism, the Chronocentrism of modernity was used to reconfigure Platonism in a manner that divested Platonism of its mystical foundation, so that it would become acceptable to materialist  modernity.  So when Buddhism arrived in the West, the West was already experienced at how to handle ideas alien to its current modernist beliefs.

4.  Anderson mentions that the ‘scholar’ and the ‘philosopher’ are searching for different kinds of fecundity.  For the scholar the analysis of things into different types, what Anderson calls ‘taxonomy’, produces many essays, conferences, and understandings compatible with their materialist assumptions.  The fecundity of the philosopher is the fecundity of The One, the primal source that gives rise to all things.  By nourishing our experience of The One we align ourselves with creation as such, as well as the unity which allows things to be things as opposed to jumbled heaps of random assemblages.  But this kind of unity is only accessible through the contemplation of the mystic.

5.  Anderson makes the point that if you are attracted to Platonism out of a love of wisdom, because you are seeking wisdom, meaning transcendental wisdom, then you will perceive the Platonist tradition as a unity.  One way of looking at this is that a lover of wisdom will tend to see all the dialogues of Plato and all the Enneads of Plotinus, as a single book, focused on a single project; that project being mystical union with The Good and The One.  In contrast, the ‘scholar’ will find multiplicity in the form of divergences, contrasts, and incompatibilities.  How does that happen?

Think of a musical form like the classical symphony.  One way of listening to symphonies from that period is to hear the common formal foundations that each composer uses.  Another way of listening to these symphonies is to hear the divergences of one composer from another.  But in the context of the classical symphony, these divergences are not considered to be separate schools; that is to say Mozart is not a ‘Neo-symphonist’ to Haydn the symphonist.

In a similar way, the Platonic Sages are presenting the symphony of the eternal using their own orchestration to do so.  But the later Platonists, such as Plotinus, Maximus, Porphyry, et al, are presenting the same truth, and pointing to the same mystical ascent to the transcendental source of all things.  And that is why the Platonic tradition is a singular tradition with a single teaching, the teaching of the eternal in the midst of this ephemeral and gossamer world.


Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 113

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