The Meaning of the One in Different Levels, or Realms, or Hypostases According to Plotinus

6 May 2024

The Meaning of the One in Different Levels, or Realms, or Hypostases According to Plotinus

“But we must investigate how the one is in being, and how what we speak of as division [works], and in general the division of the genera, and if it is the same [as the division of being] or different in each of the two cases.  First, then, how in general each and every thing is called one, and then if we mean the same [by ‘one’ when we speak of it] in the one being and as transcendent.  Now the one over all things is not the same; for [we do not mean] the same [by ‘one’] in the case of perceptible and of intelligible things – and certainly being is not [one in the same sense as the others] – [and it does not mean] the same in the case of perceptible things in comparison with each other; for it is not the same in a chorus and an army and a ship and a house, and not the same in these last and in what is continuous.  But nevertheless all try to represent the same [One], but some attain only a remote resemblance, some come nearer, and attain it already more truly in Intellect: for soul is one and Intellect and being are still more one.  So we then in each thing when we say its being also say its ‘one’, and is it with its ‘one’ as it is with its being?  This happens incidentally, but a thing is not therefore one in proportion to its being, but it is possible to have no less real an existence but to be less one.  For an army or a chorus has no less being than a house, but all the same it is less one.  It seems then that the one in each thing looks more to good, and in so far as it attains to good it is also one, and being more or less one lies in this; for each thing, wishes not just for being, but for being together with the good.  For this reason things which are not one strive as far as they can to become one, natural things by their very nature coming together, wishing to be united in identity with themselves; for all individual things do not strive to get away from each other, but towards each other and towards themselves; and all souls would like to come to unity, following their own nature.  And the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which they go; for all things originate from the One and strive towards the One.”

Note: The words in square brackets are additions by the translator.

(Plotinus, Ennead VI.2.11, On the Kinds of Being II, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, pages 147-149, ISBN: 9780674994904)

“We are bound, however, to inquire under what mode unity is contained in Being.  How is what is termed the ‘dividing’ effected?  What is generic division, and does it apply to this unity?  Or is its division different from the division of genera?

“First then: In what sense, precisely, is any given particular called and known to be a unity?  Secondly: Does ‘unity’ as used of the One-Being carry the same connotation as in reference to the Absolute?

“Unity is not identical in all things; it has a different significance according as it is applied to the Sensible and the Intellectual realms – Being too, of course, comports such a difference – and there is a difference in the unity affirmed among sensible things as compared with each other; the unity is not the same in the cases of chorus, camp, ship, house; there is a difference again as between such discrete things and the continuous.  Nevertheless, all are representations of the one exemplar, some quite remote, others more effective: the truer likeness is in the Intellectual; Soul is a unity, and still more is Intellect a unity and Being a unity.

“When we predicate Being of a particular, do we thereby predicate unity, and does the degree of its unity tally with that of its being?  Such correspondence is accidental: unity is not proportionate to Being; less unity need not mean less Being.  An army or a choir has no less being than a house, though less unity.

“It would appear, then, that the unity of a particular is related not so much to Being as to the Good: in so far as the particular attains goodness, so far is it a unity; and the degree of unity depends on this attainment.  The particular aspires not simply to Being, but to a Being combined with Goodness: it is in this strain towards their good that such beings as do not possess unity strive their utmost to achieve it.

“Things of nature tend by their very nature to coalesce with each other and also to unify each within itself; their movement is not away from but towards each other and inwards upon themselves.  Souls, moreover, seem to desire always to pass into a unity appropriate to their substance (or reality).  Unity in fact confronts them on two sides: their origin and their goal alike are unity; from unity they have arisen, and towards unity they strive.  Unity is thus identical with Goodness; for no being ever came into existence without possessing, from that very moment, an irresistible tendency towards unity.”

Note: The words in curved brackets are additions by the translator.

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead VI.2.11, On the Kinds of Being: 2, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 549, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  A major concern of the writing of Plotinus is to present, as clearly as possible, how certain realities differ depending on the level of reality that we are referring to.  Plotinus has done this with Beauty previously in The Enneads, as well as with the idea of contemplation.  Here Plotinus is, I think, unpacking a confusion that clouds understanding how the One, or the Good, manifests in different realms.  Plotinus does this by distinguishing the functioning of the One and the functioning of Being in those different realms.  This is a complex project, but a project that I find helpful in better understanding the Good and the One.

2.  This passage is embedded in a long discussion regarding the categories of Aristotle.  What I think Plotinus is doing is to place such categories in their correct realm, or hypostasis by relating the categories to being and then clarifying that being is not ultimate reality; the Good and the One is.  I suspect Plotinus does this because Aristotle, in his Metaphysics is concerned primarily with Being and does not move beyond Being to that which transcends Being.

3.  The One emanates Being, but being is dependent upon the One.

4.  The unity of “each and every thing” is derived from the One as such, but differs from that which has unity as such.  Here Plotinus is showing how the unfolding of the cosmos means that some things are metaphysically closer to the One, and other things are metaphysically distant.  The closer they are to the One the more unified they are.

Being is very close to the One which may be why there can be confusion as to the nature of Being; I mean confusing Being with the One.

5.  Towards the end of this passage Plotinus introduces the level of Soul into the discussion; this completes the depiction of the three levels, or realms: the One, Intellect, or Nous, (where Being resides), and Soul.  Plotinus states that souls strive for unity, meaning souls strive to return to the One.  This is another example of how Plotinus understands that there is a deep and abiding connection between the Soul and the One.

6.  Plotinus argues that the being that a thing possesses and the unity that a thing possesses differ from each other; that a thing can have more or less of being, as well as more or less of unity.  Plotinus illustrates this point with examples such as a chorus and a house. 

This makes sense if we understand Being as derivative of, and dependent upon, the One.  A difference between the two is that Being is not beyond mind and predication; that is to say we can coherently talk about Being.  In contrast, the One is beyond affirmation and negation, beyond conceptualization.  From this perspective Being derives from non-being.

7.  In a sense Plotinus is saying that things in nature find it insufficient to strive toward Being; they want to go beyond Being to that which is Good, that which is the source of all that is Good. 

8.  Personally, I have found that clarifying the nature of the three metaphysical levels of existence, and their interactions and relationships, clarifies the spiritual journey as a whole.  I can go quite far on the spiritual journey without this kind of clarification; but at some point the specifics of these levels, their nature, and their relationships, is needed in order to go further.

Think of it this way: I may know that the mountain I want to climb is in a mountain range in the West.  Knowing where the mountain range is, I can begin my journey even if I am a continent away.  But as I approach the mountain range, at some point I’m going to need more specific directions; is it that mountain to the north, or should I turn south?  If the mountain itself is very large, and if the mountain has many paths on it, I will need some way of turning to the specific path of my journey. 

Passages like this one by Plotinus offer these kinds of insights and clarifications.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 22

1 May 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 22

1.  In my last Brief Notes post, Number 21, I suggested that translators might want to place the antecedent noun where a pronoun is used.  I suggested that it might make at least some passages clearer.  Right after posting this I came across an example of what I am suggesting in Ennead VI.1, translated by A. H. Armstrong:

“But we [Platonists] must investigate how the numbers in and by themselves are substances . . . “ (page 25 of the translation)

The placement of the word ‘Platonists’ in square brackets was done by Armstrong to clarify the sentence by instantiating the noun to which the pronoun, ‘we,’ refers.  I take it that Armstrong felt a need to do this because the preceding argument and discussion has Plotinus referring to Stoics and Peripatetics immediately prior to this statement.  The pronoun ‘we’ is ambiguous because ‘we’ could mean everyone involved in the discussion, philosophers in general, or it could mean a particular group, like Platonists, as it does in this case.

Armstrong uses the procedure of leaving the pronoun but then adding in brackets the implied referent, Platonists.  Armstrong could have written, “But Platonists must investigate how the numbers in and by themselves are substances . . . “  But this would be taking it one step further and translating the pronoun in an indirect way.

It was nice to stumble upon this example of what I was suggesting; it makes me feel that I’m not so far out on a limb regarding this issue.

2.  Platonism begins in dialogue.  It has been an ongoing observation of mine that, in general, people do not know how to have a dialogue or discussion.  I think this is more of an obstacle to accessing Platonism than people seem to consider.  I have noticed a number of common difficulties that keep people from having actual conversations.  First is frequent interruption.  This is very common.  You might be talking to someone about an idea or view, and right in the middle of your sentence the person you are talking with counters with an objection, even before you have finished your thought.  It feels like being tripped.  You can observe this with some interviewers on social media who do not hesitate to interrupt even when there is no point in doing so.

Second is what I have come to refer to as the ‘document dump.’  This happens when someone responds to a question or a view contrary to their own by going on at great length, listing point after point, using up an inordinate amount of time.  This undermines the possibility of dialogue or conversation.  It also makes it almost impossible to respond because if you respond to one point, and then the conversation continues from there, the overall impression is that you have not answered most of the points being raised; that is a primary reason for the use of this strategy.

I don’t think it is necessary to list all of the methods of subverting dialogue; most of them are well-known.  But in conclusion, I have grown to appreciate how rare it is to have a genuine dialogue over philosophical issues and how nourishing it is when such a discussion happens.

3.  I’m agnostic about the idea of the ‘unwritten teachings’ of Plato.  I’m agnostic about it in terms of if they existed at all and if they did exist, how important they were.  I’m not against the idea of orally transmitted teachings because that seems to have been common in Greek spirituality at that time; I’m thinking in particular of the mystery traditions with which Platonism had some affinity.  On the other hand, I think the references that are cited for this idea are not completely convincing.  I think the idea of unwritten teachings, and the status of those teachings, remains an open question.

4.  In my last post of Brief Notes, Number 21, I said that I am not convinced that Plato was a Pagan.  I want to clarify that I don’t think Plato was an atheist with regard to the gods; I think Plato accepted their reality.  The question is whether or not the gods are in some sense ultimate reality and I see Platonism as arguing for an ultimate reality that transcends the gods just as it transcends all material manifestations.  Here I am talking about the gods as popularly conceived in poems, plays, and songs, and in the writings of theologians like Hesiod.  Ultimate reality, the One, is far beyond the gods in that sense.

5.  I have begun reading Plotinus’s Ennead VI.  Ennead VI begins with three long essays (VI.1, VI.2, and VI.3) focused on the basic categories of existence.  In the background of the discussion is Aristotle’s Categories.  The Categories had a big influence on Classical philosophy and continues to have a significant influence on how Western culture views existence.  But there were alternative categorical systems, such as those of the Stoics; and Plotinus himself offers his own, different, categorical structure.  (Ultimately, it was Aristotle’s categories which would win out.  This was partly due to Porphyry’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories which was translated by Boethius into Latin and was one of the few works of Aristotle available to Europe prior to the reintroduction of Aristotle’s corpus centuries later.)

It is intriguing to me how much attention this very short work of Aristotle received.  There were lots of commentaries written on the Categories in the Classical period.  My feeling is that there is a felt need to come to terms with the almost overwhelming sensory impressions that the world offers us, moment by moment.  Categorical analyses are ways of dealing with this flood of sensory stimulation by simplifying the structure of these impressions.  I also think that in at least some cases, philosophical issues can be resolved, or at least better understood, by understanding a dispute as a categorical confusion rather than a metaphysical confusion.

I have previously said that one of the functions of wisdom is to make clear distinctions.  On a metaphysical level wisdom distinguishes between that which is eternal and that which is ephemeral.  But on a material level, distinctions focus on categorical differences among sensory experiences.  This is an important task for the philosopher and for that reason it makes sense to me that Plotinus would spend considerable energy on this topic.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 21

28 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 21

1.  The importance of friendship is emphasized by Aristotle in books VIII and IX of Nicomachean Ethics.  And the Buddha was once asked by his disciple, Ananda, about the Buddhist Monastic Sangha and what importance should be placed on it.  The Buddha responded that the Sangha was the whole of the Dharma (the Buddhist teachings.)  These observations emphasize how significant friendship is for a well lived life.

There appears to be about 30 people who followed Socrates around.  From the Dialogues I get the impression that most of them knew each other and the parameters of each other’s lives.  They could joke with each other, dispute with each other, walk here and there with each other while listening to Socrates.  In many ways it looks like an ideal philosophical community.

It is not easy for a Platonist today to find a spiritual friend.  Perhaps it has never been easy, but I’m inclined to think that it is more difficult today than it was in the past, though I can’t prove it.  A spiritual friend is someone who encourages us in our spiritual quest.  A spiritual friend is someone who refrains from distracting us with worldly activities and concerns.  A spiritual friend is someone who understands the direction of asceticism and the path entailed by an ascetic commitment.  A spiritual friend is a reciprocal relationship; I mean that a spiritual friendship mutually encourages both parties to retain a spiritual focus in life.

It is possible to make progress without a spiritual friend, but I think it is much more difficult to do it that way. 

2.  For some reason I’ve become more aware of the problem, often mentioned by translators, of how it is often difficult to know which noun a pronoun refers to in the writings of Plotinus.  In Ennead V there seem to be a number of essays where the pronoun ‘it’ is used very frequently; I find I need to slow down at times to check that I still have the thread of the sentence in mind, meaning that I’m getting the antecedent reference of ‘it’ correct.  It’s not a huge problem, but at times it’s a bit awkward.  I wonder if a translator might substitute the referent for the pronoun in cases where the abundant usage of pronouns might make it difficult to get clarity?  Just to test the idea I rewrote some of the sentences I was wrestling with, replacing the antecedent noun for the pronoun (usually this was either The Good or Intellect/Nous).  Then I reread the sentence and I found it more agreeable from a reader’s perspective. 

I am told that it is not always clear what the antecedent noun is and, in those cases, it is better to simply leave the pronoun as is.  That makes sense.  But in at least some cases it might make the writing more accessible to supply the antecedent noun.  A translator could compromise by using a device like ‘it/intellect’ or ‘it/the Good.’  There are various ways of going about it. 

Keep in mind that I don’t know Greek and I’m not a translator, so these remarks are made from a reader who likely is missing important aspects of this situation.

3.  I’m not convinced that Plato was a Pagan.  I don’t think Plato was a monotheist either.  There are more alternatives than Pagan or Monotheist. 

I’m not saying that Plato was anti-Pagan, and I am aware of the strident conflict that late Classical Platonists had with triumphalist Christianity.  But I think one of the sad things about that Late Classical period is that the non-Pagan and non-Monotheist perspectives were banished from the discussion as the conflict between the Monotheists and Pagans intensified. 

My own feeling at this time is that Plato was what I would call a monist of an idealist leaning.  The use of the term ‘idealist’ is a bit anachronistic, but I think it fits.  I say Plato was an idealist because of the centrality of contemplation in Platonic practice; as Plotinus will say, all things are engaged in contemplation, at least to some degree. 

4.  As I become more familiar with the history of Platonism I observe that there seem to be certain perspectives that are used to interpret Platonism; they rise like a wave and then recede back into the sea.  The earliest one I observe is the adoption of a militant skepticism at the Academy after the first four or five heads of the Academy had passed.  A contemporary example of one that I see emerging is a kind of secular, self-consciously atheist, interpretation (I don’t think this will last very long.) 

I see this as the dominant culture impressing itself on Platonism.  But Platonism is about that which is eternal.  These cultural impressions come and go, but the Platonist tradition, which sees things from the perspective of eternity, outlasts these cultural intrusions.

5.  It is quiet in the desert this afternoon.  Some sparrows are chirping in the bougainvillea.  The sky is cloudless; clear like space. 

Plotinus on The Good

26 April 2024

Plotinus on The Good

“But do not, I beg you, look at it (the Good) through other things: otherwise you might see a trace of it, not itself (the Good itself); but consider what this might be which it is possible to grasp as existing by itself, pure, mixed with nothing, in which all things have a share, though nothing has it (the Good): for there is nothing else like this (the Good), but there must be something like this.  Who, then, could capture its power all together as a whole?  For if one did capture it all together as a whole, why would one be different from it (the Good)?  Does one then grasp it (the Good) partially?  But when you concentrate on it (the Good), you will do so totally, but you will not declare the whole: otherwise, you will be [only – translator’s addition] Intellect thinking, and, even if you attain, he (the Good) will escape you, or rather you will escape him (the Good).  But when you see him, look at him as a whole; but when you think him, think whatever you remember about him, that he is the Good – for he is the productive power of thoughtful, intelligent life, from whom come life and intelligence and whatever there is of substance and being – that he (the Good) is One – for he is simple and first – that he is the Principle – for all things come from him (the Good) . . . “

(Plotinus, Ennead V.5.10, That the Inetelligibles not Outside the Intellect, and on the Good, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, pages 185-187, ISBN: 9780674994898)

“Still, do not, I urge you, look for The Good through any of these other things; if you do, you will see not itself but its trace: you must form the idea of that which is to be grasped, cleanly standing to itself, not in any combination, the unheld in which all have hold: for no other is such, yet one such there must be.

“Now it is clear that we cannot possess ourselves of the power of this principle in its concentrated fullness: so to do one must be identical with it: but some partial attainment is within our reach. 

“You who make the venture will throw forward all your being but you will never tell it entire – for that, you must yourself be the divine Intellect in Act – and at your utmost success it will still pass from you or, rather, you from it.  When you see The Good, see it entire: later you may think of it and identify with The Good whatever you can remember.

“It is The Good since, being a power (being effective outwardly), it is the cause of the intelligent and intellective life as of life and intellect: for these grow from it as from the source of essence and of existence, the Source as being One (where all else has duality), simplex and first because before it was nothing.  All derives from this . . . “

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead V.5.10, That the Intellectual Beings are not outside the Intellectual-Principle: and on The Nature of the Good, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, 1992, pages 472-473, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  Plotinus opens this part of the Ennead with the request that we refrain from looking for the Good “through other things.”  I see this as connected with the ending of Ennead V.3 where Plotinus writes “Take away everything!”  The point I think Plotinus is emphasizing is that the Good, or the One, is found through this process of removing all sensory objects, including Noetic objects.  Noetic objects are non-sensory objects, but they are, nevertheless, differentiated objects in the realm of Mind.  If they were not differentiated objects they would either be nonexistent, or they would be the One, and undifferentiated. 

Looking at something ‘through other things’ means to relate to that something in a manner that subsumes that something to a previously experienced thing.  It is natural to do this; it is how our understanding works.  But in the case of the Good, it does not work because the Good is not a thing, the Good is not differentiated (it is pure Unity), and it is beyond both sensory and mental, or mind-based, experience.

2.  The Good is ‘mixed with nothing [else]’ yet ‘all things have a share’ in it.  How is that possible?  Analogies assist: all living things on earth have a share of the sun though things on earth are not the sun and are unable to grasp the sun.  The moon is reflected in countless bodies of water and in this sense all these bodies of water have a share in the moon; but the moon remains undiminished by that sharing and ungrasped by those bodies of water. 

3.  It’s interesting that Plotinus talks about the difficulty of grasping the Good in its entirety or as a whole, and seems to suggest that ‘partial’ experience of the Good is possible; as MacKenna writes, ‘partial attainment is within our reach.’  I think this is a recognition of how the experience of the One comes and goes; there is a description of this process in another Ennead where Plotinus talks about how he returns to the body and sensory experience after entering into the domain of the One. 

This way of viewing the experience of the One, or what we might call ultimate enlightenment, differs from what many spiritual teachers describe today.  The tendency today is to think of the enlightenment experience as all or nothing and that such experience completely transforms an individual who then never falls back into more ordinary modes of experience.  I think the Platonic presentation, both in Plato and Plotinus, is both more accurate and more realistic.  As I understand it, and as it is talked about in, for example, Phaedo, as long as we have a body our experience of the ultimate will be ‘partial’ or limited.  This isn’t surprising because actually all of our experiences are partial, including ordinary sensory experiences.  For example, the range of light we can experience is limited, and the range of sounds we can experience is limited, and so forth.  In addition, the range of our intellectual insights is limited by our own inherited capacities and by our cultural inclinations.  That doesn’t mean that the spiritual ascent is unavailable, but it does mean that the spiritual ascent is, in part, shaped by our bodily lives. 

The One is beyond bodily and mental formations, but it is approached through the means of our bodily existence.  The One is attained by putting aside bodily and mental capacities aside (take away everything) and when we do so, the Good and the One appear like a sunrise.  This putting aside bodily and mental capacities and realms, or transcending bodily and mental capacities and realms, is accomplished through renunciation and the practice of asceticism as presented in Platonic literature.

But our ability to experience the One is like looking at a vast landscape through a window (our body and mind being the window.)  The view is stunning.  And the view is partial.  But the partial view of the One is enough to set our soul on the path that will lead to full and complete realization of the One when body and mind finally fall away.

4.  The Good and the One is the First Principle and the source for existence and such and for all existing things.  Knowing this, it is possible to trace back the light that is present in things by their participation in the One, to its source which is the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, that which is eternal. 

5.  Partial or not, there is nothing more wonderful than the experience of the One.  Even a very brief and puzzling experience of the One is transformative.  

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 20

23 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 20

1.  I wonder what it was like to study with Plato.  There are all sorts of theories ranging from basically an ancient classroom setting to a structured set of initiations that mimicked some mystery traditions.  These are not necessarily exclusive.

From what I have read it seems that the Academy was keen on mathematics.  That makes sense to me because numbers are, I think, the most accessible example of a non-sensory reality; by ‘most accessible’ I mean that people use them everyday and are familiar with them.  For this reason numbers are a good place to start out exploring Forms and other non-sensory realities. 

I tend to think that contemplation was practiced but perhaps only by ‘advanced’ students.  I base this on fragmentary evidence such as remarks attributed to Xenocrates that he practiced silence for one hour every day. (As an aside, I suspect that this ‘one hour’ was two of our hours.) This is found in Diogenes Laertius; perhaps it is in other sources as well.  But the practice of contemplation is well attested in Plato’s Dialogues with episodes depicting Socrates falling into trance states of some kind (for example in Phaedrus and The Symposium.)  It’s hard for me to discern if contemplation was done as a group practice; that is to say I don’t recall that being specifically mentioned. 

All of this is very vague.  But Aristotle reports that Plato gave lectures and it is likely that Plato’s latest Dialogue would be something the Academy during Plato’s lifetime would have eagerly looked forward to and discussed.

I wonder what the criteria were for attendance?  Plato came from a wealthy background and did not need to charge for his instruction and Plato’s teacher, Socrates, opposed charging for philosophical instruction.  This implies that there were no financial barriers.  Perhaps people became ‘members’ simply by hanging out over an extended period of time and offering their own services when such were needed. 

It's unlikely that we will ever know for sure; but if my idea that Plato was a spiritual teacher in the manner of teachers in Dharmic traditions has merit, then perhaps we can use that as a model for what went on at the Academy.  In such a setting the primary activity would be the teachings, in both written and oral forms such as lectures and discussions, as well as including everyday interactions, with their teacher Plato.  Plato was both the holder, or recipient, of an ancient tradition(s) and the communicator of that tradition to the Athenian community and context.  Plato understood what wisdom, transcendent wisdom, is.  And Plato understood how to teach others the path to the attainment of that wisdom.  That would be reason enough for many to attend the Academy for many years.  And it is reason enough for us to read, study, and contemplate the Dialogues today.

2.  The other day I heard, on a recorded lecture, a complaint about analytic philosophy and how analytic philosophers often distort philosophers’ views by reshaping those views in accordance with their own criteria of how a philosophical argument should be presented.  The lecturer was referring to a philosopher who has a significant literary output and how an analytic commenter reconfigured the view from a literary work by turning the view into a syllogism. 

There are a significant number of philosophers who also wrote literary works; Jean Paul Sartre and Iris Murdoch are recent examples.  The insistence that a philosophical argument must take a specific form, such as that of a syllogism, means that arguments that use allegory, metaphor, and other devices that Plotinus refers to as ‘comparisons’ are in some sense inherently deficient.  Turning these views into a syllogism would, from the analytic point of view, only improve them.

Platonism is very far from that way of looking at philosophy because the founding documents of the tradition, the Dialogues of Plato, are packed with allegory and other types of comparisons.  And these allegories are very powerful and fertile in their meanings.  The Allegory of the Cave is powerful because it is an allegory, not in spite of it being an allegory. 

3.  You can look at the divine ascent in Platonism as the gradual shedding of individuation, or differentiation.  I mean that as the practitioner ascends to Nous, and then past Nous, to the One, less and less remains of that which differentiates the self from the Universal until the differentiations are completely shed in the act of absorption into the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, absorbed into the Eternal.

4.  I was deeply involved, as a young man, in antiwar activities.  I no longer think it is possible to bring about an end to war, or to even reduce the extent of war.  I came to this conclusion with great reluctance.  Platonism helped me make the transition.  It’s not that Platonism is pro-war; rather it is that Platonism understands that the cause of war is embedded in the material conditions of being a human being.  In Phaedo Socrates says that war comes from greed; but the tendency is to write history as if particular individuals through their actions bring about war.  But the passage in Phaedo suggests that as long as there is greed, there will be war. 

And there is another reason; we live in the realm of differentiation and strife.  That is the nature of this realm.  Therefore, war is inevitable.

But there is a way out; follow the path to transcendence and at the end of the journey, there is the grotto of true peace.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 19

20 April 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 19

1.  I finished reading Plato of Athens by Robin Waterfield.  It is well written; by that I mean that Waterfield is a good stylist, the sentences are well shaped and are not obscure.  The sentences are well formed; these days that should not be taken for granted.  Like any good biography, this book tells a good story.

Waterfield has an amazing grasp of the relevant literature and is capable of making his own decisions regarding reliability and inclusion.  It was nice to see that kind of independence.

The one drawback for me is that Waterfield seems to think of Plato as primarily a political philosopher; to be fair that is a view shared by a lot of scholars.  But it differs from how I understand and approach Plato and I don’t think that Classical Philosophers viewed Plato that way either.  It’s intriguing that three or four times Waterfield mentions Plato’s ‘religious’ inclinations, meaning that there are religious elements in his philosophy.  But this is mentioned only in passing; it almost sounds like an afterthought.  My perspective is that Plato was a spiritual teacher and that Platonism is a spiritual tradition in the manner of Dharmic traditions from India.  Waterfield skirts this, I think, by leaving out antecedent spiritual influences on Plato such as Orphism; with Pythagoreanism he mentions them, but mostly in a political context rather than in the context of numbers as forms and primary realities.

I enjoyed reading the book and the range of reading and study Waterfield has done is impressive.  But from my perspective Waterfield sees Platonism through a modernist lens and because of this misses what are for me the heart of Plato’s teachings.

2.  When Porphyry edited Plotinus’s writings he would sometimes take a longer work and divide it up into the different Enneads that Porphyry was using to arrange the writings topically.  Some of Plotinus’s essays covered more than one topic and this allowed the kind of division that Porphyry used.  Fortunately Porphyry carefully tells us all about this in his Life of Plotinus.

This came back to me because I am reading Ennead V.5, That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect, and on the Good.  Ennead V.5 is part of a long essay that was divided into four different essays among three Enneads: III.8, V.8, V.5, and II.9; I believe German scholars refer to this as the Great Treatise.  I wonder if it might be helpful to read these four as a single work and that this might be facilitated by including the four of them as a single work in an appendix?  The translator, A. H. Armstrong, in his ‘Introductory Note’ to Ennead V.5, suggests that “It is best read after V.8 which is completely continuous: the last sentence of V.8 directly introduces the argument which occupies the first three chapters of V.5.”  I’ll give it a try and see how it feels.

3.  Recently I have read several works by contemporary philosophers in the anglo-sphere that retain a strong influence from the analytic tradition.  I don’t know whether these philosophers identify with the analytic tradition, but they show that the influence is still quite strong.  What I am referring to is the tendency to put forth their insights in abstract presentations, in this case through the use of graphs and other types of scientific looking symbolic means, even though the graphs are not data based or data driven.  I have thought for a long time that this way of presenting philosophy obscures what the author is saying rather than clarifying.  I keep thinking of how Whitehead wrote Process and Reality without using any of those kinds of tools, though he was very well versed in them.  In almost all cases when I have rethought the abstract, graphic, presentation into discursive statements, the ordinary discursive statements have been clearer.

4.  Ennead V.3, On the Knowing Hypostases is one of the great works of spiritual literature; it is difficult for me to think of anything that surpasses it; though some of Plato’s Dialogues are at the same level.  The work steadily builds, point by point, step by step, to the last paragraph, and to the last sentence, “Take away everything” (ephele panta).  It is like listening to a steady rhythm that carries you along as it grows steadily stronger, until it reaches its final cadence and closing.

5.  Sometimes there is remarkable wisdom to be found in popular culture.  There is a song by the rock group Kansas called ‘Dust in the Wind.’  It is well-written with a minor melody and well-crafted supporting harmonies.  The refrain changes through the song beginning with “All they are is dust in the wind,” referring to the singer’s dreams and plans.  In the second verse the refrain says “All we are is dust in the wind.”  And the third verse says “Everything is dust in the wind.”

What is surprising is how popular this song is; it has been covered by other groups and solo singers countless times; it is performed very frequently.  I see this as a contemplation on impermanence, obviously.  I think appearances like this song show that certain core spiritual truths are just below the surface of our busy ordinary lives and every now and then they manage to emerge and have their say or, as in this case, sing their song.

 

Plotinus on the Ineffable and the Transcendent

17 April 2024

Plotinus on the Ineffable and the Transcendent

I’m posting three quotes from Ennead V.3, “On the Knowing Hypostases” that are found in different parts of this Ennead.  After each quote I will give the page number and the translator; at the conclusion of these quotes I will give the full bibliographic reference.

First Quote

“It (the One) must not be one of the things before which it is, and you are not to call it Intellect (Nous, Mind): not even the Good, then: no, not even this if ‘the Good’ means one of all things; but if it means that which is before all things, let the name stand.  If, then, Intellect (Nous) is Intellect because it is multiple, and thinking itself, even if it derives from Intellect, is a kind of internal occurrence which makes it many, that which is absolutely simple and first of all things must be beyond Intellect.  And certainly if it is going to think, it will not be beyond Intellect, but will be Intellect; but if it is Intellect, it (the One) itself will be multiplicity.” (Armstrong, page 111)

“Thus we come, once more, to a Being above the Intellectual-Principle and, since the sequent amounts to no less than the All, we recognize, again, a Being above the All.  This assuredly cannot be one of the things to which it is prior.  We may not call it Intellect; therefore, too, we may not call it the Good, if the Good is to be taken in the sense of some one member of the universe; if we mean that which precedes the universe of things, the name may be allowed.

“The Intellectual-Principle is established in multiplicity; its intellection, self-sprung thought it be, is in the nature of something added to it (some accidental dualism) and makes it multiple: the utterly simplex, and therefore first of all beings, must, then transcend the Intellectual-Principle; and, obviously, if this had intellection it would no longer transcend the Intellectual-Principle but be it, and at once be a multiple.” (McKenna, page 451)

Second Quote

“It is, therefore, truly ineffable; for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a ‘something’.  But ‘beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect’ is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and ‘has no name’, because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it.”  (Armstrong, page 117)

“Thus The One is in truth beyond all statement: any affirmation is of a thing; but ‘all-transcending, resting above even the most august divine Mind’ – this is the only true description, since it does not make it a thing among things, nor name it where no name could identify it: we can but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something concerning it.”  (MacKenna, page 452)

Third Quote

“How then do we ourselves speak about it (the One)?  We do indeed say something about it, but we certainly do not speak it, and we have neither knowledge or thought of it.  But if we do not have it in knowledge, do we not have it at all?  But we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it.  For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it.  But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it.”  (Armstrong, page 121)

“How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking of it?

“No doubt we deal with it, but we do not state it; we have neither knowledge nor intellection of it.

“But in what sense do we even deal with it when we have no hold upon it?

“We do not, it is true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as to be able to speak about it.  And we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, speaking of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we may still possess it.”  (MacKenna, pages 453 and 454)

(Plotinus, Ennead V.3, On the Knowing Hypostases, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1984, page numbers follow the quotations above, ISBN: 9780674994898)

(Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead V.3, The Knowing Hypostases, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page numbers follow the quotations above, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  In footnotes, Armstrong refers readers to the first hypothesis of Plato’s Dialogue, Parmenides as a source for Plotinus’s thoughts about the transcendence of the One beyond Intellect, or Nous.  Armstrong also writes in a footnote on page 110, “Intellect only constitutes itself as Intellect because it eternally falls short in its endeavour to reach the one and there is perpetually in need of and perpetually desires the One.”

I understand this footnote, and the quotes, to mean that the One is a complete, or full, unity, whereas Intellect, or Nous, is not.  This is because Nous is differentiated into aspects; the three primal aspects are Being, Life, and Mind (also Nous, or Intellect).  From these three primal differentiations all further Noetic differentiations flow.

2.  The ascent to Nous is done through purification and the practices of asceticism; that is to say the turning away from sensory experience, including mental experience.  Noetic realities lack specific, that is to say differentiated, content; Noetic realities are the empty vessel in which material content can arise.

The ascent to the One is done through turning away from Noetic differentiation to the unified source from which Noetic differentiations arise.  The turning away is the same in both instances: turning away from sensory experience and turning away from Noetic realities.  But the results differ.  The result of ascending to the Noetic is clarity regarding realities of the cosmos, such as Being and so forth.  The result of ascending to the One is beyond clarity; it is beyond light and darkness, it is both light and dark.

We can speak about Noetic realities, but we can only analogize that which is fully unified and fully transcendent.

3.  “. . . but if it means that which is before all things, let the name stand.”  Here Plotinus is referring to the name ‘The Good.’  But this principle would apply to any of the terms we commonly use when talking about the ultimate, such as: the Good, the One, the Beautiful, the Eternal, and so forth. 

This is not easy to do.  Our mind (small ‘m’) has the habit, a very strong habit, of taking a name in a non-transcendental way.  If I say ‘the store’ I am communicating a material reality.  If I say ‘I feel happy’ I am communicating a psychological reality.  But if I say ‘The One’ I am talking about a reality that has no sensory or mental mark.  I think that without having some experience in contemplation this is hard to understand.

4.  A couple of decades ago I became aware of just how difficult it is for people to understand what is being asked for in contemplation.  I have attended various meditation groups for many years.  I was involved with a group that practiced ‘interior silence.’  After an hour of silence people would share insights.  Often I would hear someone say, “Today I was thinking about . . . “ as a description of their contemplation.  Even though the literature of the tradition explicitly says that contemplation is not time for thinking, the kind of response I quoted was the most frequent report of what was happening.

It took some time, but I began to realize that people are so busy with activities, commitments, and obligations that many do not have even ten minutes in their lives to just think about their lives, their situation.  For such people, and I think they are the vast majority, the opportunity to sit in silence and discursively think about their lives and their situation was highly unusual, so unusual that it felt like a kind of divine blessing, or even a divine intervention.

I sympathize.  On the other hand, Plotinus and the mystical tradition that flows from the Platonic tradition, are suggesting something else.

5.  It is a rare gift to have the path to ultimacy, the Good, the One, and the Beautiful, laid out so clearly, to encounter writing that is rooted in that experience.  I think of that gift as a grace, though I know some people don’t like the use of the term ‘grace.’  But I am comfortable with it.  Understanding The Enneads as a gift and a grace helps me to rededicate myself to the ascetic practices that allow for reaching the source of that gift and that grace.  

6.  Addendum: After reading these passages as translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie I have decided to include them, for the purpose of comparison.  I am aware of the criticisms of Guthrie's translation which was the first complete translation of Plotinus into English; I understand it was published about 1917.  To be fair to Guthrie, most criticisms of his translation point out that there did not exist at that time the kind of critical text that later translators, such as MacKenna, Armstrong, and Gerson et al, had available.  Other criticisms suggest that Guthrie relied on Latin, or French, translations of some of Plotinus's terms so that, in effect, at times the Latin, or French, overpowers the Greek (that's my interpretation of the criticism; not being a scholar myself I may have misunderstood).  

On the other hand, Guthrie was a mystic who practiced contemplation.  (I used to own a manual of contemplation that he wrote but gave it away when I moved and I can't remember the title at this time.)  Guthrie had a wide ranging interest in other mystical writings of that time including Apollonius of Tyana and Porphyry, among others.  I think this, and his practice of contemplation, may give his translation a perspective, or an emphasis, on this experiential dimension that may be absent from other translations.  And over time I have found myself more at ease with his approach to Plotinus.  So here are the three passages as translated by Guthrie for your consideration:

6.1.  ". . . as Unity thus is anterior to universal things, it cannot be any one of them.  Therefore, it should not be called either intelligence or good, if by 'good' you mean any object comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if it indicate that it is anterior to everything.  If Intelligence be intelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found within Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the Principle that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if He think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would be manifold." (page 575)

6.2.  "This Principle, therefore, is really indescribable.  We are individualizing it in any statement about it.  That which is above everything, even above the venerable Intelligence, really has no name, and all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything.  Nor can He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him.  We refer to Him only as best we can." (page 576)

6.3.  "How then do we speak of Him?  Because we can assert something about Him, though we cannot express Him by speech.  We could not know Him, nor grasp Him by thought.  How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp Him?  Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us completely.  We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without expressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He is; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to designate only lower things." (page 577)

(Plotinus, Complete Works in Chronological Order, Ennead V.3, The Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, 1918, reprinted by Kshetra Books, 2017, ISBN: 9781974518968)