Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 20

24 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 20

Continuing with my series on Phaedo, I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’Now then,’ said he, ‘do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way:  Do they seem to use to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?’

“’They fall very far short of it,’ said he.

“’Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, “This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,” he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?’

“’We must.’

“’Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?’

“’It certainly is.’

“’Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, “All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.’

“’That is true.’

“’And we agree, also that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses?  I consider that all the senses are alike.’

“’Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.’

“’Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it.  Is that our view?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.’

“’That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates.’”

“’And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?’

“’Certainly.’

“’But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.’

“’It does.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 259-263)

1.  This part of the dialogue starts out with Socrates suggesting that things ‘fall short’ of the ideal.  Furthermore things ‘strive’ for this ideal that we have in our understanding.  This, I think, is the source for a lot of conversation about ‘Platonic Ideals’ being perfect examples of experienced things.  I have heard pianists refer to a perfect performance of a concerto as a ‘Platonic Ideal’ of the concerto.  What I think they are saying is that pianists strive for a perfect performance, but always fall short of that perfection.  This kind of observation is made in many contexts. 

It is helpful to contemplate the terms ‘strive’ and ‘fall short’.  ‘Strive’ appears to imply that things, even ‘inanimate’ things like sticks, have a sense of their own perfection and in some way are working to instantiate that perfection; however such perfection is not possible in the world of becoming and begoning.  Because such perfection is not possible in becoming and begoning things ‘fall short’ of what they strive to be.  It is only by returning to their noetic source that things can reach perfection.

2.  In the next step, Socrates suggests that if we are comparing the sensory stick to an ideal stick, then the ideal must have preceded the experience of the sensory stick.  Socrates is leading us, step by step, to the understanding that our soul has had experience of ideal noetic realities before we take on a body in this life.

3.  Socrates next moves on from the perfect stick and the idea of equality which has no referent in the material world.  Socrates is pointing out that equality and its meaning must exist in our soul prior to seeing two ‘equal sticks.’  Because the understanding of equality exists prior to our use of the idea in material experience, and because there are no material examples of two equal things in an ideal sense, the idea of equality does not derive from material observation; instead the idea of equality is something the soul experiences in the noetic realm prior to rebirth in a material body.  This is emphasized by returning to the term ‘fall short’ and applying it to two equal things, such as two sticks.  We may say that two sticks are equal, but the two sticks fall short of the actual idea we have of equality, though they participate in that idea/form so that we can observe their ‘striving’ for equality.

4.  “Then it appears we must have acquired it before we were born.”  The task Socrates has set himself is to carefully lead his students to an understanding of noetic experience and the reality of the noetic realm as the foundation for reincarnation.  Socrates does through various lines of thought, comparisons, arguments, criticisms, and, at the end of the dialogue, mythic expressions.  Socrates is offering his students on his final day the means for understanding the meaning of noetic experience and that noetic experience is the foundation for sensory experience. 

5.  As an aside, I want to conclude with a brief comment about how to relate to these various strategies that Socrates uses to present his case for reincarnation and the immortality of the soul.  In modernity, particularly among philosophers influenced by, or adhering to, the analytic tradition in Anglo-American philosophy, there are particular demands made for an argument to be considered presentable in a philosophical context.  For example, the analytic tradition does not find comparisons such as metaphors and allegories philosophically useful.  And in the 20^th century various criteria were offered for a philosophical, or scientific, argument to be considered ‘meaningful’ such as the verifiability and falsifiability criteria of meaning.  Although there has been a lot of criticism of these criteria of meaning even within the analytic tradition, they still have a lot of influence on the philosophical community today.

I think that adhering to these apparatuses of analysis when reading a dialogue like Phaedo interferes with accessing what Socrates is trying to say.  Though some of the arguments presented by Socrates in Phaedo could be, and have been, formalized, I don’t think unpacking them in that way is helpful.

The way Socrates presents his views has more to do with coherence, both internal and external, than it does with formal logic.  Coherence is a sign of authenticity and that the speaker is speaking from experience.  And a second concern for Socrates is accessibility; that is to say that in Phaedo Socrates is concerned that his students understand what he is saying even if they remain somewhat skeptical of what he has to say.  This is different from analytic philosophy, particular in the more extreme adoptions of notations that only a very few specialists understand. 

So how do we approach all these strategies that Socrates offers us in Phaedo?  First, there is a basic sense that Socrates is a trustworthy man; this is shone by the life he has lived.  Second, it is not necessary to completely comprehend all the ins and outs of each argument in order to appreciate it.  Reincarnation is a subtle subject; it is reasonable to expect that some information about reincarnation will reach us while other information, or explanation, eludes us.  That is why it is a very good idea to read Phaedo many, many times.  I’m suggesting that if a train of thought offered by Socrates does not seem to land or quite make sense, that’s OK; over time, and as one’s contemplative experience deepens, it will make more sense.  The journey to wisdom is a long and twisting road.

 

Resident Aliens

22 July 2023

Resident Aliens

“But since here below (in the third hypostasis – my addition) also in the mixture and composition one element is body and the other soul -- for the All is a living thing – and the nature of soul is in that intelligible All and will not fit into the classification of what is called substance here below (in the material realm – my addition), we must, even if it is difficult to do so, all the same leave soul out of the investigation in which we are at present occupied; just as if someone wishing to classify the citizens of a city, by their property assessments or skills for instance, left the resident foreigners out of account.”

(Plotinus, Plotinus Ennead VI: 1-5, Ennead VI.3, “On the Kinds of Being III,”, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 181, ISBN: 9780674994904)

“. . . it involves in its composite nature the parallel existence of Body and Soul, for the Universe is a living being: essentially, however, Soul is of the Intellectual (Noetic – my addition) and does not enter into the structure of what is called Sensible Being (the things of material existence – my addition).

“Remembering this fact, we must – however great the difficulty – exclude Soul from the present investigation, just as in a census of citizens, taken in the interests of commerce and taxation, we should ignore the alien population.”

(Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, page 560, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  Plotinus uses the metaphor of a ‘resident foreigner’, or resident alien, to describe the soul’s presence in the third hypostasis, the world of becoming and begoning.  Plotinus has the view that the soul is more at home in the second hypostasis, ‘nous,’ usually known as Intellect, but also known as Mind.  Nous is the realm of Being, Life, and Intellect which are unchanging and eternal.  This is the realm that is the soul’s real home.  But because of the soul’s involvement with the body, it is focused on the material realm and fails to recollect noetic existence.

2.  At the same time, if the soul turns to Nous, it becomes aware that Nous is where it naturally resides and the soul feels at home there.

3.  Plotinus does not unpack the metaphor of a resident foreigner, or alien, because Ennead VI.3 is focused on a different topic.  The paragraph, along with the metaphor, is explaining why he won’t be discussing soul in this Ennead as some might expect Plotinus to do.  But I think it is an insightful metaphor and it makes a lot of sense; for this reason I think it is worth contemplating it.

4.  If someone moves to another country and takes up residence there, a period of adjustment ensues.  Learning the languages, becoming familiar with customs both overt and subtle, understanding social expectations, learning how the history of this new country shapes its views of the world, etc.  Over time some of these can be overcome, but for almost all resident aliens there is always an at least residual sense of not quite fitting in.  This is because the socialization process impacts people at a very early age and is never left completely behind, even if we want to do so.

5.  If the resident alien is a diplomat, the diplomat’s orders and tasks will always be arriving from the diplomat’s native land.  In this way the diplomat is persistently reminded of his origin and his connections to his native land.  In a sense you could say that the soul is a diplomatic representative of the noetic realm to those of us dwelling in becoming and begoning.

6.  The soul learns the habits and customs of the realm of materiality; these include that things happen in sequence, one at a time, that things are perishable and very fragile, that things are embedded in complex cyclic processes, as well as a host of minor things that need to be understood to negotiate this realm of becoming and begoning.  The soul learns about emotions, desires, and hopes and fears.  All of this is learned; it is not part of the soul’s nature which actually resides in the Noetic.

7.  Now and then, not very often, the soul has a glimpse of noetic realities; of being as being, of life as such, of mind as such.  Invariably these glimpses are soothing, peaceful, and uplifting; in a word, attractive.  They can happen spontaneously while watching the sun set, they can sometimes happen in a dream, through contemplative practices, or on other occasions.  The significance of these experiences is rarely understood and the soul soon turns its attention back to becoming and begoning.  But if, due to good karma, amd/or the grace of the One, the significance of the experience is understood, even to a small degree, that is the turning that will allow the soul to eventually return to its natural residence in the noetic realm.

8.  The recognition of the significance of such experiences is the recollection of our previous experience of residing in the noetic.  We find it restful just as we find it restful to speak our native tongue after a time away from our own language.  This understanding also provides the impetus for separating the soul from the body, the philosophical task, so that the soul can return to its natural home.  And the separation of the soul from the body is accomplished through the practice, over many lifetimes, of ascetic cultivation.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 19

20 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 19

“’Now see,’ said he (Socrates), ‘if this is true.  We say there is such a thing as equality.  I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that – equality in the abstract.  Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?’

“’We shall say that there is,’ said Simmias, ‘most decidedly.’

“’And do we know what it is?’

“’Certainly,’ said he.

“’Whence did we derive the knowledge of it?  Is it not from the things we were just speaking of?  Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing?  Or do you think it is another thing?  Look at the matter in this way.  Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?’

“’Certainly.’

“’Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?’

“’No, Socrates, never.’

“’Then,’ said he, ‘those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.’

“’Not at all, I should say, Socrates.’

“’But from these equals,’ said he, ‘which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?’

“’Very true,’ he replied.

“’And it is either like them or unlike them?’

“’Certainly.’

“’It makes no difference,’ said he.  ‘Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.’

“’Surely.’

 

1.  In this passage Socrates turns the discussion to purely abstract realities; in this case ‘equality’.  The inquiry is where does our understanding of equality come from?  Socrates points out that when we say two sticks are equal, we mean that they are equal in some respect, such as their length, or that they are both made of oak.  But we have the idea of equality in our minds, and we have the idea of equality as such.  Two equal sticks are instantiations of equality, imperfect instantiations, but they are not equality itself.

2.  When we see a cloak that is like a cloak worn by someone we know, we think of that person.  When we see two equal sticks, we think of equality as such.  Both are examples of recollection.  But the recollection of the person is a recollection of a material presence, while the recollection of equality is the recollection of a noetic, immaterial, reality.

3.  Under materialism abstractions are thought of as arising from material encounters and the mind abstracts concepts out of these encounters.  From this perspective there is no need to assert the prior existence of abstract entities, prior to material reality (metaphysically prior). 

The Platonist position differs.  Platonism understands abstract realities as residing in the second hypostasis, or nous.  And from these noetic realities, or abstractions, are emanated understanding like equality into the third hypostasis, the world of soul and material existence.  Material things participate in these noetic realities and by that participation we perceive there, for example, equality.

4.  One of the supports for the Platonic understanding is the power that abstract realities have in the material world.  This is a topic of discussion in the philosophy of mathematics: where does the power of numbers come from?  By ‘power’ is meant range of relevance, influence, explanatory extent, and causal effectiveness.  Looked at in this way numbers are enormously powerful.

But if numbers are simply distilled material observations it is difficult to understand why numbers have so much power; shouldn’t their power be no greater than the rocks, apples, and chairs that we count if they are ultimately material realities?  The discussion is more complex than this, for sure, but framing the question in this way is, I think, helpful.

5.  The noetic reality ‘equality’ is, like numbers, a powerful presence in material reality and in human consciousness.  The power of noetic realities like ‘equality’ comes from their greater unity; greater than the unity found in the material realm.  This unity is from equality’s participation in the One.  And those of us who reside in the third hypostasis participate both in the unity of the One, and the equality of the Noetic.  Socrates has skillfully moved from referring to material realities in the context of recollection to noetic realities in the context of recollection, showing how recollection is a pervasive means whereby human beings arrive at knowledge.

 

 

What Do You Need to Know?

19 July 2023

What Do You Need to Know?

1.  Now and then I think about what I would tell someone if they asked me how to become a Platonist.  The question doesn’t come up very often because most people who have had some encounter with Western philosophy have been at least introduced to Plato in an academic setting and this is taken as a kind of first step on the path of Platonism.

But I think it is an interesting question because a great deal of writing on Platonism is about difficult distinctions between various Platonists, or analyses that are rooted in techniques that an ordinary person is likely to not understand.  This leaves an impression that fairly complex and refined disputation is central to Platonism, and being able to participate in these disputes is what qualifies someone as a Platonist.

But I think it is simpler.

2.  I think there are two things someone needs to know in order to walk the way of Platonism.  The first is understanding that the core writings of Platonism, such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, are spiritual resources.  That is to say that in a sense they are ‘scripture’ and not just ancient curiosities. 

The second is understanding the ascetic ideal as the basis for living a philosophical life as that is understood in the tradition of Platonism.  The ascetic ideal in Platonism is the method whereby one applies the understandings of the core texts of Platonism.  This is clearly stated in Phaedo, but it appears frequently in other places as well.  Vegetarianism and Veganism, refraining from alcohol and other drugs that dull the mind and lead to heedlessness, and sexual restraint are the big three; but there are others such as living simply, not charging for teachings, etc. 

Reading the Dialogues and the Enneads is the cultivation of wisdom.  The Ascetic Ideal is the application of that wisdom to everyday life.

3.  One of the obstacles to accessing the core texts of Platonism as spiritual resources is that these works are presented in today’s universities as if they are precursors to contemporary analytic philosophy.  Seen in this way, the spiritual dimension of the dialogues is sidelined, and the heart of the teachings is either not presented at all, or dismissed as something that modernity has surpassed.

That is one reason why I say that it is easier to access Platonism if you consider Platonism to be a Dharmic tradition.  Looked at as a kind of Dharma, then the Dialogues and Enneads resemble the Vedas and Upanishads, or the Suttas and the Vinaya, etc., instead of trying to make them fit into the mode of contemporary analytic philosophy.

4.  There are always issues being discussed in any spiritual tradition, and Platonism is no different.  But what I am suggesting is that for the beginner these issues are usually remote and unhelpful; they are usually abstractions and mental constructions and because of this they do not help someone find the path that leads to noetic realities and to the One.  But having a deferential relationship to the core texts of Platonism will assist a practitioner in walking the way of Platonism.  And the application of the Ascetic Ideal will teach a new practitioner what is involved in Platonism as a way of life. 

These two mutually nourish each other.  The Ascetic Ideal is presented in the core texts, and the application of that ideal, and the experience that engenders, leads to renewed admiration and fondness for those core texts.

5.  It is not necessary to know in detail all the arguments and disputes that have emerged in the history of the Platonic tradition.  For some knowing about these will be helpful; it depends on their karma and their type of mind.  But it is necessary to know the core practices of the Ascetic Ideal and to begin living in accordance with them.  These practices are spiritual exercises that strengthen our spiritual muscles, allowing us to keep walking up the mountain into the noetic realm, and beyond that, to the One.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 18

 

17 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 18

Plotinus on Recollection

This continues with my posts on Phaedo.  We have reached the section where there is a discussion of ‘recollection.’  I thought it would be helpful to refer to a passage from one of the Enneads where Plotinus places recollection in the context of various functions of the soul.  It is Ennead V.3.2, On the Knowing Hypostases.

“First we must enquire about the soul, whether we should grant it knowledge of itself, and what is that which knows in it, and how.  We could say at once that its perceptive part is perceptive only of what is external; for even if there is a concomitant awareness of what goes on inside the body, yet even here the apprehension is of something outside the perceptive part; for it perceives the experiences in its body by its own agency, but the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining and dividing them; and, as for the things which come to it from Intellect (Nous – my addition), it observes what one might call their imprints, and has the same power also in dealing with these; and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have long been within it: this process is what we should call the ‘recollections’ of the soul.”

(Plotinus, Ennead V, Ennead V.3, On the Knowing Hypostases, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, pages 75-77, ISBN: 9780674994898)

And here is another translation of part of what was quoted above:

“As for the part of the soul that engages in calculative reasoning; it makes discriminatory judgements about the semblances presented to it by sense-perception, organizing and distinguishing them.  In fact, in regard to what comes from Intellect, it even considers something like impressions of these, and has the identical power of discrimination in relation to them.  And it acquires further comprehension as if by recognizing and matching up those impressions that have been in it from before with new ones recently arrived.  And we would certainly call these acts the soul’s ‘recollections.’

(Plotinus, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus edited by Lloyd P. Gerson and James Wilberding; Christian Tornau, Plotinus on Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2022, page 200, ISBN: 9781108726238)

1.  This is not from a commentary on Phaedo, but I thought I would post it because it places recognition within the overall context of perception and other functions of the soul.

2.  Today we think of perception as a mental function, combined with physiological dimensions.  It is rare that someone will connect perception with the soul, and not only because it is becoming increasingly rare that people think about the soul at all. 

3.  In this short quote Plotinus places a significant number of activities within the soul’s domain; perception, reason, and judgment (I think this is ‘judgment’ in the sense of ‘evaluation’.)  I think that Socrates also had this expansive, and complex understanding, of the soul’s domain and the soul’s functions in human experience.  It is helpful, I think, to keep this in mind when reading Phaedo.

4.  Plotinus is putting forth the idea that the soul engages with perception by making judgments about the perceptions through combining and dividing them in accordance with previously experienced perceptions.  In this way, I think this implies, our conceptual apparatus is built up and refined from perception.  This already refers to a kind of ‘recollection’, the kind where Socrates talks about how encountering a cloak may cause the observer to ‘recollect’ a person who has a similar cloak. 

Then Plotinus offers that the same kind of process happens when the soul is considering noetic realities, what is here called the realm of ‘Intellect.’  Our experience, or perception, of noetic realities is ‘fitted’ into our previous experiences of these realities through the two modes of combining and dividing, or through similarity and differentiation.  Differentiation is the way hypostases are generated from the One.  Similarities is the way the return to the One is undertaken in the sense of perceiving wider and more general realities such as Being.  From the experience of noetic realities it is possible to ascend to the One itself because the degree of differentiation between the One and a Noetic reality like Being, is very slight. 

5.  The context of rebirth is, I believe, implicit in this passage.  Armstrong writes, “. . . it (the soul – my addition) continues to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have long been within it . . .”  I think this refers to the soul’s experience with these impressions over many lifetimes as well as between lifetimes.

Tornau writes, “And it acquires further comprehension as if by recognizing and matching up those impressions that have been in it from before with new ones recently arrived.”  The ‘before’, I think, refers to not only before during this life, but over many lifetimes, as well as between lives.

6.  This process of combining and dividing, or discriminations and semblances, happens when the philosopher has become disengaged, at least to some extent, with sensory experience.  Being disengaged allows space in the soul where these processes can operate without completely succumbing to sensory stimulation.

This, in turn, is based on the foundational practices of Platonic purification and a life lived in accordance with the ascetic ideal. 

 

 

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 17

15 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 17

Continuing with my notes and comments on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’And besides,’ Cebes rejoined, ‘if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember.  But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal.’

“’But, Cebes,’ said Simmias, ‘what were the proofs of this?  Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.’

“’Briefly, said Cebes, ‘a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this.  And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort.’

“’And if you are not convinced in that way, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘see if you don’t agree when you look at in this way.  You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?’

“’I am not incredulous,’ said Simmias, ‘but I want just what we are talking about, recollection.  And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say.’

“’It was this,’ said he.  ‘We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he  must know it at some previous time?’

“’Certainly,’ said he.

“’Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection?  What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?’

“’What do you mean?’

“’Let me give an example.  Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.’

“’Of course.’

“’Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not?  But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could site countless such examples.’

“’To be sure you could,’ said Simmias.

“’Now,’ said he, ‘is that sort of thing a kind of recollection?  Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?’

“’Certainly,’ he replied.

“’Well, then,’ said Socrates, ‘can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?’

“’Surely.’

“’And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?’

“’Yes.’

“’And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?’

“’Inevitably.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 253 - 257)

 

1.  There is now a shift to the theory of recollection, which is an important teaching in the dialogues of Plato.  This is explored in detail in the dialogue Meno.  The basic idea is that much of what we call knowledge is actually recalling what we have known from previous lives and learned in the realm between lives; perhaps because of interaction with, and access to, noetic realities, though that is not explicitly stated either in Phaedo or Meno.  (Addendum: Thinking about this some more, and after having some conversation with others about it, I think that the experience of noetic realities between lives is emphasized in other places in Phaedo.  I think this is also presented when the mythic journey of the soul after death happens at the end of the dialogue.  I'll return to this as the theme appears in the dialogue.)

2.  Here in Phaedo the understanding of learning as recollection is offered as evidence for the immortality of the soul.  This implies, I think, that the soul learns and retains what it has learned over many lifetimes.  In a larger context, this also implies that the spiritual journey that culminates in a return to the One, is a long journey, over many lives, many reincarnations, and that the learning required to enter into transcendence is built up life after life. 

3.  Cebes and Simmias have a brief exchange about how recollection works.  Cebes uses the specific example of awakening to mathematical truths, which Cebes offers are drawn out of people rather than implanted by the teacher.  They can be drawn out because they are already part of the soul’s knowledge from previous lives.  This is the same argument that is presented in Meno where a mathematical truth is drawn out of an uneducated boy in a step-by-step manner, by asking the right questions.  This is a good example of the importance of mathematical truths for the Platonic tradition.

4.  This view of recollection means that the mind, as impacted by the soul, is not a blank slate.  It implies that human beings are born with understandings that they acquired prior to birth. 

5.  After Cebes and Simmias conclude their brief discussion, Socrates steps in again and shifts the focus to how recollection works, even within the current lifetime.  Socrates does this by showing how an object, such as a cloak, can be the occasion for us recalling someone by association; meaning that the someone may also wear a cloak, or own a very similar cloak. 

This kind of association is very common.  A certain song will remind us of someone, or a certain kind of tea might be an occasion for recalling a great deal (there is a superb presentation of this in Remembrance of Things Past by Proust; the famous cup of herbal tea which, when combined with its particular scent, and a kind of sweet cake, gives rise in the character’s mind to a vast display of events from his past.  It is a very famous passage in literature and speaks directly to what Plato is writing about here.)

But Socrates is not speaking from the point of view of modern psychology; I mean that he is not commenting on this process in order to gain information on people’s autobiographies and how that has affected their personality development.  Rather, he is using the process of recollection to gain insight into the nature of the soul and how recollection functions through many lifetimes.

6.  Socrates concludes this section by shifting to a higher level of recollection.  So far he has talked about the recollection of sensory things, of cloaks and lyres, etc.  In closing this section he brings up an example of the recollection of a non-sensory reality by referring to likeness, perfect likeness, which will lead, in the next section, to a discussion of equality.

7.  This deft move from recollection of sensory items to abstract, non-sensory understandings such as likeness mimics the journey of the soul as it shifts its attention from sensory realities to noetic realities (such as mathematical realities), and beyond the noetic to the One itself.  This is done through ascetic practices which have already been covered previously in Phaedo. 

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 16

12 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 16

Continuing with my notes and comments on Phaedo, I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions.  For if generatiaon did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all.’

“’What do you mean?’ said he.

“’It is not at all hard,’ said Socrates, to understand what I mean.  For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would e nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep.  Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, “all things are chaos,” would soon come true.  And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive?  For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?’

“’I see none, Socrates,’ said Cebes.  ‘What you say seems to be perfectly true.’

“’I think, Cebes,’ said he, ‘it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist.’”

 

1.  “Now here is another method . . .”  It is interesting that Socrates seems to be self-conscious of using various ‘methods’ when engaging in philosophical conversation.  I think this implies a sense of detachment or equanimity regarding the arguments put forth.  In addition, I think it points to the experiential basis of Socrates’s belief in the cyclic nature of life and death; I mean the abundance of ‘methods’ is a result of experience and for that reason Socrates does not have to rely on one single argument to put forth his view.  I think this helps us to understand why Socrates offers multiple arguments in Phaedo, because it’s not so much about any specific argument, it’s about relaying to his students Socrates’s own experience-based insights.

2.  “. . . as it were in a circle . . . “  In Classical understanding the planets, and other celestial bodies, were understood to be moving in circles and this was considered to be a sign of their perfection.  I suspect that Socrates is casually referring to this understanding and implying, in a loose way, that the soul is perfect, like celestial bodies, because of this metaphorically circular motion.  In modern cosmology planets don’t move in circles, they move in ellipses and all their motions exhibit complex irregularities.  The solution to this kind of discrepancy is to see that Socrates is using metaphorical inference rather than a materialist, scientific inference.  The soul isn’t a planet, but its cyclic motion is like the motion of the planets.  The world of the planets and the world of the soul is, in a way, the same world.  And that world is the third hypostasis of cyclic becoming and begoning.

3.  Socrates puts forth the idea that if soul’s only proceeded to their death, and never returned, then there would be no ensouled beings, and no people, as they would eventually disappear from the manifest material world.  The view is that number and time generate the cosmos, and all its inhabitants, through cyclic processes. 

The idea that ensouled being never return after dying is like viewing the cosmos as a great room from which people leave, never to return.  At some point the room would become empty.  The room of the cosmos is not empty and for that reason we can understand that souls return from death into life in the cycle known as reincarnation or rebirth.

4.  I think the comments of Socrates here are relevant to the pervasive nihilism of modernity.  Nihilism is the view that nothing matter, in the sense that there are no actual consequences for one’s actions, good or bad, after someone dies.  There is no transition between lives that allows for those karmic consequences to be transmitted to a future life.  Nihilism is the logical result of materialism and is a widely held position, even if many who hold it do not explicitly think of themselves as nihilists.

Socrates is pointing out some of the nihilistic consequences of a cosmos where the dead remain dead forever.  While the consequences of nihilism do not prove that nihilism is wrong, it is useful to be clear about what nihilism actually implies.  The main counter to nihilism at this point in the dialogue is that cyclic existence is observed everywhere and there is no reason to exempt life and death from this pervasive cyclic nature.

5.  “ . . . the return to life is an actual fact . . .”  Here Socrates is expressing himself with confidence.  I mentioned in previous comments that Socrates seems, at times, to be kind of hesitant.  Why the shift in tone?

If I were to use an analogy, I would use something like musical style.  If someone were to ask me about a kind of music that is obscure for Western culture, say Japanese classical music, I might hesitate to respond.  I’m not hesitating because of unfamiliarity, but because of the questioner’s unfamiliarity.  I might be wondering what is my best approach, thinking about what would work: should I use a structured musical analysis, should I compare the instruments used to instruments more familiar to the questioner, should I start out with a philosophy of music, etc.  As the conversation proceeds and I learn more about the questioner’s views, I become more confident about what the questioner is seeking, what they want to know.  And for this reason my tone changes.

I think something like that is going on with Socrates in this dialogue.  Socrates is becoming clearer about Cebes and Simmias, what challenges them, what views they hold.  At this point in the dialogue, after some back and forth, Socrates feels he is in the position to state his belief in reincarnation more directly and without hesitation.