Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 17

15 July 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 17

Continuing with my notes and comments on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’And besides,’ Cebes rejoined, ‘if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember.  But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal.’

“’But, Cebes,’ said Simmias, ‘what were the proofs of this?  Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.’

“’Briefly, said Cebes, ‘a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this.  And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort.’

“’And if you are not convinced in that way, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘see if you don’t agree when you look at in this way.  You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?’

“’I am not incredulous,’ said Simmias, ‘but I want just what we are talking about, recollection.  And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say.’

“’It was this,’ said he.  ‘We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he  must know it at some previous time?’

“’Certainly,’ said he.

“’Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection?  What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?’

“’What do you mean?’

“’Let me give an example.  Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.’

“’Of course.’

“’Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not?  But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could site countless such examples.’

“’To be sure you could,’ said Simmias.

“’Now,’ said he, ‘is that sort of thing a kind of recollection?  Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?’

“’Certainly,’ he replied.

“’Well, then,’ said Socrates, ‘can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?’

“’Surely.’

“’And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?’

“’Yes.’

“’And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?’

“’Inevitably.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 253 - 257)

 

1.  There is now a shift to the theory of recollection, which is an important teaching in the dialogues of Plato.  This is explored in detail in the dialogue Meno.  The basic idea is that much of what we call knowledge is actually recalling what we have known from previous lives and learned in the realm between lives; perhaps because of interaction with, and access to, noetic realities, though that is not explicitly stated either in Phaedo or Meno.  (Addendum: Thinking about this some more, and after having some conversation with others about it, I think that the experience of noetic realities between lives is emphasized in other places in Phaedo.  I think this is also presented when the mythic journey of the soul after death happens at the end of the dialogue.  I'll return to this as the theme appears in the dialogue.)

2.  Here in Phaedo the understanding of learning as recollection is offered as evidence for the immortality of the soul.  This implies, I think, that the soul learns and retains what it has learned over many lifetimes.  In a larger context, this also implies that the spiritual journey that culminates in a return to the One, is a long journey, over many lives, many reincarnations, and that the learning required to enter into transcendence is built up life after life. 

3.  Cebes and Simmias have a brief exchange about how recollection works.  Cebes uses the specific example of awakening to mathematical truths, which Cebes offers are drawn out of people rather than implanted by the teacher.  They can be drawn out because they are already part of the soul’s knowledge from previous lives.  This is the same argument that is presented in Meno where a mathematical truth is drawn out of an uneducated boy in a step-by-step manner, by asking the right questions.  This is a good example of the importance of mathematical truths for the Platonic tradition.

4.  This view of recollection means that the mind, as impacted by the soul, is not a blank slate.  It implies that human beings are born with understandings that they acquired prior to birth. 

5.  After Cebes and Simmias conclude their brief discussion, Socrates steps in again and shifts the focus to how recollection works, even within the current lifetime.  Socrates does this by showing how an object, such as a cloak, can be the occasion for us recalling someone by association; meaning that the someone may also wear a cloak, or own a very similar cloak. 

This kind of association is very common.  A certain song will remind us of someone, or a certain kind of tea might be an occasion for recalling a great deal (there is a superb presentation of this in Remembrance of Things Past by Proust; the famous cup of herbal tea which, when combined with its particular scent, and a kind of sweet cake, gives rise in the character’s mind to a vast display of events from his past.  It is a very famous passage in literature and speaks directly to what Plato is writing about here.)

But Socrates is not speaking from the point of view of modern psychology; I mean that he is not commenting on this process in order to gain information on people’s autobiographies and how that has affected their personality development.  Rather, he is using the process of recollection to gain insight into the nature of the soul and how recollection functions through many lifetimes.

6.  Socrates concludes this section by shifting to a higher level of recollection.  So far he has talked about the recollection of sensory things, of cloaks and lyres, etc.  In closing this section he brings up an example of the recollection of a non-sensory reality by referring to likeness, perfect likeness, which will lead, in the next section, to a discussion of equality.

7.  This deft move from recollection of sensory items to abstract, non-sensory understandings such as likeness mimics the journey of the soul as it shifts its attention from sensory realities to noetic realities (such as mathematical realities), and beyond the noetic to the One itself.  This is done through ascetic practices which have already been covered previously in Phaedo.