Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 36

19 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 36

Continuing with my series on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’The fact is,’ said he (Socrates), ‘in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea.  But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples.  In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?’

“’Certainly.’

“’But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd?  I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many examples.  Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three?  Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd.  And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness.  Do you agree, or not?’

“’Of course,’ he replied.

“’Now see what I want to make plain.  This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites; these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw.  We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?’

“’Certainly,’ said Cebes.

“’But the number two is not the opposite of the number three.’

“’No.’

“’Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites.’

“’Very true,’ he said.

“’Shall we then,’ said Socrates, ‘determine if we can, what these are?’

“’Certainly.’

“’Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?’

“’What do you mean?’

“’Such things as we were speaking of just now.  You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd.’

“’Certainly.’

“’Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result.’

“’No, it cannot.’

“’But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?’

“’Yes.’

“’And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three.’

“’No.’

“’Then three has no part in the even.’

“’No, it has none.’

“’Then the number three is uneven.’

“’Yes.’

“’Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and for that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples.  Now see if you accept this statement: not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought.  Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition.  The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd.  Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple fractions reject the idea of the whole.  Do you go with me and agree to this?’

“’Yes, I agree entirely,’ he said, ‘and am with you.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 357-363, 103E-105C)

1.  I am going to contrast Fowler’s translation of the first part of this section with the translation by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, published by the Focus Philosophical Library:

“’So it’s the case,’ said he (Socrates), ‘about some things of this sort, that the Form Itself isn’t the only thing worthy of the form’s name for all time; there’s also something else, something that is not that form but, whenever it is, always has the shape of that form.  But perhaps what I mean will be still plainer in this example: I suppose the Odd must always happen on this very name which we are not uttering – or not?’

(Plato’s Phaedo, translated by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, Focus, an imprint of Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1998, page 85, 103E, ISBN: 9780941051699)

I want to highlight the difference between Fowler’s ‘the abstract idea itself’ with ‘the Form Itself.’  Fowler has used ‘abstract’ or ‘abstract idea’ a number of times.  The difficulty I have with this kind of usage is that abstract is often used to mean an intellectual distillation.  In scientific contexts, such as to ‘abstract data’ it means to deduce something from material observation; in other words the abstraction is built on the foundation of the observation of material instances.

This is particularly true for British Empiricism as John Locke describes the process.  The view is that the mind/brain cannot retain all the sensory impressions it receives and the mind therefore abstracts from the cacophony of sense impressions pertinent ideas, or rather ideas emerge from that process of abstraction from sense impressions.  This depiction of the relationship between ideas and materiality infers that ideas are built from the ground up, as it were; I mean that ideas are dependent upon sense impressions which are, in turn, dependent upon material things impressing themselves upon the human organism.

But this is the opposite of how Platonism views this, and it is far from what Socrates it attempting to illuminate in Phaedo.  Of course the word isn’t always, or even primarily, used in this context of British Empiricism.  In ordinary discourse the word ‘abstract’ means something like ‘not concrete’, or not taking concrete things into consideration.  But in a philosophical context, such as Phaedo, I think there may be a tendency to understand ‘the abstract idea itself’ in an Empiricist way, or to inadvertently lean in that direction. 

Perhaps I am overstating this; on the other hand, The Focus translation of ‘the Form Itself’, along with the use of capitals, avoids this kind of philosophical confusion.  This phrase is also used by some other translators, such as R. Hackforth in his commentary on Phaedo. A phrase like ‘the Form Itself’ I read as referring to the Form as a reality residing in the noetic as opposed to Form that is present in the material dimension through participation. 

2.  Notice how the analysis by Socrates is becoming more complex, more refined, as he sharpens his analysis.  I think that is why there appear confusions among those listening; such confusion can also appear for the reader.  An argument like this needs to be read and absorbed over a period of time, with a number of readings, as well as some contemplation.  It is OK to be unsure about the parameters and inferences of the discussion, especially on the first encounter.  With the first reading you might pick up a few points that are being made, while some other points remain obscure.  Again, that is OK.  Through rereading and contemplation the meaning will gradually emerge.  It’s a bit like learning a new language.

3.  Socrates is shifting his focus primarily, though not exclusively, to types of numbers; in this case even and odd numbers.  Socrates is laying out a kind of mental geography as to how ideas relate to each other.  He is arguing that there is a kind of relationship between ideas such that ideas have a kind of range of application and outside of that range they either wither or withdraw into their own ecology where they can thrive.  He is suggesting that this is true for all ideas just as it has been demonstrated to be true for opposites such as hot and cold. 

4.  I think that Socrates is laying out a kind of taxonomy of ideas that Aristotle would later write about in detail in works like Categories.  When Socrates notes that the number three is always, eternally, odd, but that the number three is not oddness itself, he is illuminating the manner in which ideas are related to each other, nested within each other, nourished and the manner in which they participate with each other.  Oddness is a higher, meaning more remote from materiality, idea than that of threeness.  Threeness is dependent on oddness, but the range of oddness is much greater than that of threeness.  Threeness participates in oddness and oddness is the form that, when differentiated, generates threeness.  There is a hierarchical relationship between them with oddness being the source of threeness along with an infinite number of other numbers.

5.  What is the point of all this discussion about opposites and their nature.  First, Socrates will soon bring this back to the nature of soul and link it with his view of the immortality of the soul.  In the first round of discussions about opposites he does the same thing, linking the discussion back to the nature of soul.

The second is clarity as to the way the human mind works.  When we become familiar with how the mind works, and its relationship to higher hypostases such as the noetic realm, this means becoming more familiar with these higher realities, more relaxed with experiences of them, and better able to negotiate the divine ascent which is the central purpose of the Platonic tradition.  It’s like a cook becoming familiar with all the ingredients used in cooking, how they react at certain temperatures, how they combine with other ingredients, and how they generate the end product of bread or some other nourishing food.  Here becoming familiar with noetic realities and their relationship to the material world allows us to follow the web-roads of meaning back to their source in the noetic, and beyond the noetic to the source of all, the Good and the One.