A Few Remarks on Differentiation

30 October 2023

A Few Remarks on Differentiation

The metaphysical cosmology of Platonism consists of a series of three hypostases.  This map of the metaphysical cosmos is meant to be inclusive of all things; the sensory and the non-sensory, the mundane and the transcendental.  In other words it is meant to be complete; that’s what makes it metaphysical in a systematic sense. 

The first hypostasis is primarily referred to as The One as well as The Good.  It is complete oneness without division or parts; for this reason, it is beyond affirmation and negation, beyond predication.  As the Buddhists like to say, it is ‘beyond beyond.’  Understood in this sense of ‘beyond’ means that The One is not The One; ‘The One’ is only the name of this fully transcendental reality.  But we use the name The One as a way of speaking about this reality.  There are other names that we use such as The Good, The Beautiful, and God. 

The One is the source of all existing things which emanate from The One.  Emanation is an unfolding of differentiation.  Since The One is oneness as such, there is no differentiation associated with The One.  But the regions of emanation appear due, first of all, from being differentiated from The One, and secondarily from the arising of differentiation within their emanated region.

The second hypostasis is the first region of emanation and it is in this region where predication can be used effectively.  This hypostasis is referred to as Nous, or the Noetic.  The realm of Nous has three primary differentiations within it: Being, Life, and Mind.  Sometimes Life is referred to as Vitality.  Often Mind is referred to as Intellect and the realm of Nous itself is often referred to as the realm of the Intelligible.  I prefer not using the term ‘Intellect’ because of the tendency to think of ‘Intellect’ as the analytical function of the brain.  I think the word ‘Mind’ is closer to what the Platonists had in mind; other possibilities might be Consciousness or Awareness.

Beauty is a permeating presence of Nous; that is to say Being, Life, and Mind are instantiations of the Beautiful.  This is what makes the Noetic so attractive and it is what makes the experience of the Noetic something that aware, or conscious, beings are naturally drawn to.  The beauty found in the material realm is entirely due to Beauty found in Nous.

Number is part of the realm of Nous and is an emanation of Being; Number differentiates Being into things. 

The Forms are also found in Nous; they are emanated by the triad of Being, Life, and Mind.

The key to understanding the nature of noetic realities is that they have no material content.  The being of Being is not the being of particular things, it is Being as such.  Noetic Beauty is not the beauty of a sunset or a rose, it is beauty as such.  Noetic numbers are not instantiations of their reality, rather they are numbers as such (three as such, five as such, ten as such, and so forth). 

It is in the third hypostasis, emanated from the second hypostasis, where material differentiation takes place as well as material instantiation of the forms.  The third hypostasis is where we live and dwell.  The first (metaphysically first) appearance in this realm is the World Soul which governs our realm through everlasting cyclic processes determined by number.  Individual souls also appear here as well as the endless differentiation that material existence brings.

The third hypostasis is also the realm of the Gods.  The Gods are highly differentiated; they have biographies, they are born and die, they have desires and tendencies, duties and hopes and fears.  They are creatures of the third hypostasis in the way that oak trees, rivers, clouds, snakes, dogs, roses, moss, mountains, and we are.  We share the same realm with the Gods.  And like us, the Gods are very far from The One.

The third hypostasis of materiality ends in matter; but since matter lacks the energy (the Vitality or Life Force) necessary for further emanation, the third hypostasis is the conclusion of the emanated metaphysical cosmos. 

The third hypostasis is the realm of impermanence, suffering, limitation, and despair; inherently so.  It is the realm of endless birth and death, of samsara, of becoming and begoning, of genesis.  It is the task of creatures residing in the third hypostasis to Return to the One by ascending the ladder of differentiation; first out of the third hypostasis into the Noetic, and then from the Noetic to The One.  This is accomplished by separating ourselves from materiality, what Socrates taught as ‘separating the soul from the body.’  Separating ourselves from materiality is accomplished by ascetic practices as described in the Platonic Dialogues.  The process is one of overcoming differentiation, step by step ascending to less and less differentiated realities.  This is accomplished through contemplation.  Ascesis and contemplation are the two wings that lift us out of materiality into the transcendental and ultimately to The One.

The above is not a complete description; whole books have been written regarding the details of the emanated metaphysical cosmos.  One of the reasons it is not complete is that our understanding of the hypostases and their relationships is necessarily incomplete as long as we have a body.  It has been my experience that as practice continues, the understanding of the structure of the emanated cosmos becomes clearer, more transparent.  This leads to refinements and revisions in our thoughts about this topic as our practice deepens over time and over our many lives.  I suggest that dwelling on the metaphysical structure of the emanated cosmos is itself a contemplation that assists us in our long journey of Returning to the One.  This structure itself, when contemplated, is radiant with meaning, like the radiance of The Good, The One, and The Beautiful.

On the Possibility of Platonist Quietism

28 October 2023

On the Possibility of Platonist Quietism

In the late 17^th century there arose in Catholic Europe, particularly France, Italy, and Spain, an approach to their tradition that came to be known as Quietism.  Its main proponents were Miguel Molinos, Madame Guyon, Francois Malaval, and Bishop Fenelon, though there were other, less famous, teachers of the Quietist approach.

What these teachers had in common was a type of practice known as the ‘prayer of interior silence.’  This was a type of imageless and wordless prayer that brought its practitioners closer to God as they understood God.  This practice was very simple and its simplicity was one of its most attractive features.  For example, Madame Guyon wrote a manual for this approach to interior silence, or contemplation, called A Short and Easy Method of Prayer. 

At first this spiritual movement was very successful.  Molinos, for example, had numerous devoted students and Madame Guyon’s books were widely read.  Eventually, though, there was an attack on Quietism as it was thought that Quietism undermined the centrality of a sacramental life.  Molinos was arrested and charged with heresy.  He was found guilty and died in prison.  Madame Guyon was arrested four times and imprisoned in the Bastille for a period of time, though eventually released.  Bishop Fenelon was exiled from Paris and lived out his life in Cambray.  The final downfall of Quietism within the Catholic Church came when the Pope declared Quietism a heresy in a Papal edict (Bull) known as ‘Coelestis Pastor’ in 1687.  Quietism remains an official heresy in the Catholic Church to this day.

Nevertheless, Quietism was influential in the following centuries on such groups as Quakers and Pietists.  A manual of Quaker contemplation known as A Guide to True Peace, was based on the teachings of the Quietists.  Later, the Methodists would be consciously influenced by Madame Guyon.

The central teaching, and method, of Quietism is to withdraw into the soul, a turning to a silence and stillness found within and a turning away from entanglements with the world.  It is my suggestion that Platonism has striking similarities with Quietism and contemporary Contemplative Platonism could be nourished by building a bridge to the Quietist tradition as it manifested in various contexts.  I’m not saying Quietism and Platonism are ‘the same’; for one thing Quietism was a Christian movement.  Rather I am suggesting that there is enough in common, enough overlap in understanding and practice, that contemporary Contemplative Platonism could benefit by an extended encounter with the tradition of Quietism.  Here are a few observations:

1.  Platonism is filled with teachings and stories about philosophers separating themselves from the world.  This is often spoken of as ‘separating the body from the soul.’  This is congruent with how Quietists presented the prayer of interior silence. 

2.  I suspect that an obstacle to the idea of Platonist Quietism will be the so-called political dialogues such as The Republic, The Statesman, and The Laws.  This barrier is the result of a modern inability to read the Platonic dialogues allegorically, even when Plato explicitly tells the reader that the dialogue is an allegory, as in The Republic.  If, however, we start with the centrality of contemplation, then it becomes clear that these dialogues are allegories and not political treatises.  We can see the centrality of contemplation in the Dialogues by highlighting episodes of divine union that are presented therein.  For example, when Socrates enters into deep contemplation in dialogues such as The Symposium and Phaedrus, we can see this as not just an interesting episode in the life of Socrates, but instead as an example of how the practice of contemplation should be our highest priority. 

3.  It might seem that The Laws would be difficult to interpret allegorically.  I suggest, though, that the discussion regarding the nature of laws found in various societies, and the specific laws laid out in some sections of the dialogue, are an allegory for living a disciplined life as a contemplative.  It is well known that contemplatives and mystics often lead disciplined lives such as entering into contemplation at regular times, engaging in spiritual reading at specific times; things like that.  In addition, contemplatives often take on restrictive precepts, ‘restrictive’ from the perspective of ‘the world.’  The early Quaker Quietists had an extensive set of regulations governing many aspects of their lives.  The disciplines of Platonic spirituality are offered early in the Phaedo, and in scattered places in other dialogues.  Making a connection between a disciplined life of contemplation and the ‘laws’ of The Laws can unlock its allegorical basis.

4.  One aspect of Quietism that maps well onto Platonism is passivity as a spiritual ideal.  Passivity is acceptance cultivated as a spiritual practice.  Socrates embodied this teaching by accepting the verdict of his jury.  Even when Socrates had an opportunity to escape his sentence, passive acceptance overruled that opportunity and he went to his execution with equanimity.  This is similar to the reports of Madame Guyon’s behavior when she was imprisoned in the Bastille.  In both instances they used their situation to teach others regarding spiritual matters.

5.  Another aspect of Quietism that maps well onto Platonism is patience.  Plotinus uses the metaphor of waiting for the sun to rise for contemplation.  And in Quaker Quietism they used the phrase ‘waiting worship’ to describe their approach to contemplation.  This approach to contemplation cultivates patience which in turn, generates inner strength and courage.

6.  As an aside, I think there is a deep, though somewhat hidden, historical connection between Quietism and Platonism.  The connection I am seeing is that it is through Platonism, as presented by Dionysius the Areopagite in his Mystical Theology, that mysticism as we understand it in the Christian tradition, found a home.  I believe that the Quietists picked up the current of mystical contemplation after all those centuries.  In addition, the Quaker Quietists were influenced by the Cambridge Platonists; Ann Conway, for example, joined the new Quaker movement.  And Robert Barclay who wrote the chief theological work of the Quaker tradition, An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, was studying in Paris when the trials of Madame Guyon were taking place.  I believe the influence of Quietism can be found in his work.

7.  The crushing of Quietism in the late 17^th century has had a lasting impact on Western spirituality and mysticism.  In the Catholic Church, ever since this episode, Catholic mystics have had to be very careful that they distinguish themselves from Quietism; this is done by becoming very strong advocates of a sacramental life to prove that they are not undermining their centrality or their efficacy.  Protestant groups that were initially attracted to Quietism, such as Quakers and Methodists, have not been able to sustain that interest into the modern period, succumbing to a focus on ‘engagement with the world’ rather than a ‘turning inward.’ 

I believe that the often profound insights of the Quietists can find a nourishing ground within the Platonic tradition.  But it would have to be a Platonism that regarded contemplation, and a disciplined, ascetic, life as the ground from which these insights grow. 

Damian Caluori on "The Embodied Soul" in Plotinus

23 October 2023

Damian Caluori on "The Embodied Soul" in Plotinus

When I was posting my series “Notes and Comments on Phaedo” I noted that there were several places in Phaedo that seem to support the view that part of the soul always resides in the noetic.  This perspective on the soul contrasts with later Platonists, such as Proclus and Iamblichus, that have the view that the soul is fully descended, meaning that there is no part of the soul that remains in Nous, or in the One.  This discussion, when first encountered, may seem abstract and it is hard, at first, to see the significance of these two contrasting views.  Briefly, the idea that the soul is ‘fully descended’ is foundational for those who consider Theurgy to be necessary because we need the assistance of the gods to ascend to Nous because soul has no connection to the noetic, whereas the gods do.  In contrast, the Contemplative approach to Platonic spirituality relies on the view that, in some sense, we are already in touch with the noetic because soul is never fully absent from Nous (or the One).

For those who are interested in this topic, I found an essay by Damian Caluori, ”The Embodied Soul” which I think helps people to understand Plotinus’s view that there exists an ‘undescended’ aspect of the soul that always resides in nous; and that therefore the practices of asceticism and contemplation are the way to ascend to higher realities (as opposed to Theurgy.)  The essay is in The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, edited by Lloyd P. Gerson and James Wilberding, published in 2022.  (This is not to be confused with The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, also edited by Gerson, but published in 1996.)  I especially appreciated that Caluori connects the view of Plotinus with that of the Phaedo; the implication is that the understanding of the soul as intimately connected with higher realities, and not separate from them, was the consistently held view from Plato through Plotinus.  The idea of a ‘fully descended’ soul only appears much later, beginning with Proclus.  Caluori writes:

“Following such dialogues as the Phaedo, Plotinus believes that we are rational souls and that the rational soul essentially belongs to the intelligible world [Nous – my addition].  While other Platonists hold that the human soul as a whole descends from the intelligible world to the sensible world and ascends back to the intelligible world, Plotinus disagrees; ‘And if, against the belief of others, one is to venture to express more clearly one’s own view, the fact is that even our own soul does not descend in its entirety, but there is something of it always in the intelligible world (4.8.8.1-3).”  [Gerson et al translation]

(Caluori, Damian, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus edited by Lloyd P. Gerson and James Wilberding, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2022, pages 220-221, ISBN: 9781108726238)

“In the same chapter, Plotinus illustrates the soul’s being in the sensible world by comparing it to a resident alien in a city (6.4.2.36-38).  The resident alien is active in the city without being a part of the city, that is, without being a citizen.”

(Ibid, page 221)

“The powers of the soul are not in the body – they are everywhere.”

(Ibid, page 232)

The whole essay is worth reading if you are interested in this ancient disagreement.  Here are a few comments:

1.  Another thing that Phaedo demonstrates is that when we talk about the ‘rational’ soul in Platonism, the ancient Platonists had a much richer understanding of what it means to be ‘rational’ than we do today.  I think it is helpful to grapple with this because otherwise we might project onto Plotinus, and Phaedo, a modern understanding of what ‘rational’ means.  Briefly, we have the tendency, in modernity, to think of rational as pertaining to the analytic capacity of the mind, particularly formal structures of inference.  In classical Platonism, though, rational also includes structures of comparison like allegory and metaphor.  This is a consequential difference.

2.  For comparison, here is Armstrong’s translation of the passage Caluori quotes from the Gerson et al translation:

“And, if one ought to dare to express one’s own view more clearly, contradicting the opinion of others, even our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in the intelligible; . . .”

(Plotinus, Ennead IV, The Descent of the Soul into Bodies, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, page 421, ISBN: 9780674994881)

And here is the translation by Stephen MacKenna:

“And – if it is desirable to venture the more definite statement of a personal conviction clashing with the general view – even our human Soul has not sunk entire; something of it is continuously in the Intellectual [Noetic – my addition] Realm, . . . “

(Plotinus, The Enneads, IV.8 The Soul’s Descent into Body, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, pages 416-417, ISBN: 9780943914558)

3.  I don’t know specifically who Plotinus has in mind regarding his view of the soul ‘contradicting’ or ‘clashing’ with the view of ‘others.’  Perhaps this remark is directed against the Stoics or some other tradition of philosophy or theology (I suppose, given the time Plotinus was living in, it might even be directed towards a group of Christians).  It is rare for Plotinus to name the philosopher with whom he is disagreeing.  But to my mind, this indicates that the view Plotinus is presenting is a specifically Platonist view, as found in Phaedo.

4.  The resident alien analogy is a good one, one that I have found helpful. 

5.  My last quote from the essay by Caluori, about the powers of the soul being ‘everywhere’ is, I think, a key observation.  That which is eternal permeates time and space and is not confined to a specific corner of the cosmos.  I like to say that that which is eternal is everywhere, everywhen, and everything or in everything or encompasses everything.  To say that the soul is fully descended is to say that even though the soul is eternal it is, at the same time, confined, fenced off, from the Noetic, that is to say separated from eternity itself.

 

 

Whitehead on Plato

19 October 2023

Whitehead on Plato

“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”

(Whitehead, Alfred North, Process and Reality, The Free Press, New York, 1978, page 39, ISBN: 978029345702)

1.  If I were forced to pick a single book of philosophy from the twentieth century to preserve for the future it would be Whitehead’s Process and Reality.  It was originally published in 1929 just as the analytic tradition was gaining a firm hold on the anglosphere.  Anti-metaphysical views, going back to David Hume, were prominent at the time.  In England the British Idealists were being overthrown by materialists and positivists of various types.  One of the leaders in this new movement was Bertrand Russell, a close friend of Whitehead.

These swirling critiques of the very idea of metaphysics seem to have had no impact on Whitehead and he simply went ahead and wrote his essay on classical metaphysics without any apology.  I find that refreshing and inspiring.

2.  The above quote has been cited countless times.  I think that is because it rings true and makes sense.  Even very modern philosophers like Lloyd Gerson and Richard Rorty  accept the truth of this statement.

3.  I remember reading a story about a young Tibetan Lama who wanted to understand the West.  Tutors were hired.  One of the tutors told the young Lama that in order to understand the West he would have to read Plato.  I can just see the young Lama turning the pages of the Dialogues; it’s an intriguing picture.

4.  It’s interesting that Whitehead refers to the ‘European philosophical tradition’ in the above quote.  That is certainly true, but I think it is too limited.  Plato’s influence extends beyond Europe.  For example, the impact of Plato on Eastern Orthodoxy is of great significance for that tradition.  And Plato’s impact on Islamic philosophy and theology is also extensive.

5.  As readers of this blog know, I tend to look at Platonism as a Dharmic tradition; by that I mean that the main features of Platonism are more aligned with the Dharmic traditions of India, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, than they are with philosophy as it is presented today.  From this perspective, Platonism is more intimately related to Indian traditions than it is to what Western philosophy has become.  From this perspective, one could say that Platonism is no longer a European artefact. Instead, I would say Platonism is a representative of, or an instantiation of, philosophy as a salvific path that leads to spiritual realization.

6.  Whitehead also wrote that Plato’s writings are an ‘inexhaustible mine of suggestion.’ (Ibid, page 39.) I tend to use the metaphor of a well where clear water can always be drawn; Plato’s writings are a well of understanding and insight that is inexhaustible and nourishes our spirit in its long journey to wisdom and understanding.

7.  Whitehead identified with the Platonic tradition.  Many of his ideas are controversial, but that can also be said of Platonic sages down through the ages.  I see Process and Reality as a contribution to the great inquiry known as the Platonic tradition.

8.  “The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal.”  (Ibid, page 40)

Saying Goodbye to the Gods

16 October 2023

Saying Goodbye to the Gods

I recently had an intuition (more like a possible intuition) into the last words of Socrates, the words about owing a cock to Asclepius.  What I want to suggest is that Socrates at that moment was saying goodbye to the Gods in the same way that he had just said goodbye to his family, his friends, his jailer, to Athens, to Crito specifically, to this realm of becoming and begoning.  I base this on the idea that the Gods dwell in the realm of becoming and begoning, just as we do.  That is to say that Gods are born and they pass away; they are a lifeform found in the third hypostasis.  Socrates was on his way to the Noetic realm, the second hypostasis, or possibly the source of all, the Good and the One.  That means that Socrates was leaving behind all that was embedded in genesis, in samsara.  Here are a few comments:

1.  Why was Socrates charged with impiety?  It doesn’t look like Socrates was impious; he sacrificed regularly, he didn’t reject the existence of Gods and Goddesses of various types, and he had a personal daemon who was his trusted guide.  I have read that Socrates may have introduced Gods that were not part of the civic pantheon of Athens to his young students and that is the connection between impiety and corrupting the youth.  That may be; it wouldn’t surprise me.

But I have one other suggestion; what if Socrates taught that the Gods were mortal, that they were a part of becoming and begoning, that they were born and that they would die.  This is a radical teaching and one that would have offended those who thought of the Gods as immortal.  From that perspective such a teaching would be ‘impious.’

2.  In the last part of Phaedo (115B) Socrates says to Crito that Crito and the followers of Socrates should follow the teachings Socrates had presented over his life ‘step by step’ and that if they do their lives will be worthwhile.  Crito then asks about how Socrates should be buried.  Socrates responds that Crito should do what he thinks best because Socrates will no longer be there, having separated from the body.  Socrates briefly mentions his trial and indicates that he is fine with what has happened.

Then Socrates bathes, a standard ritual that is symbolic of purification, an act of separating himself from this world.  This is followed by his interaction with his children and the women of his family to whom he gives his final instructions.

Then the jailer appears and he and Socrates express admiration for each other.  There is a notable absence of rancor or ill will.

The poison is brought to Socrates and Socrates asks if it is OK for him to offer a libation to ‘some god’ but this is not possible because they have made only enough for the execution.  Socrates complies.  I see Socrates wanting to offer a libation as similar to Socrates giving instructions to his children and family, and before that, giving instruction to his students and followers about sticking to the path ‘step by step.’  A libation is usually combined with a prayer of some kind; it might be a formula or it might be particular to the occasion.  I see Socrates as wanting to let the Gods know that they need not be concerned about him, just as he indicated to his students, followers, and family to not be concerned.

When Socrates drinks the poison and everyone bursts into tears, he tells them to ‘keep quiet and be brave.’  I take this as a general instruction for their lives, not just an instruction for the moment.

Then Socrates speaks his last words to Crito about owing a cock to Asclepius.  Notice that it was only in the instance of the Gods that Socrates was thwarted in his efforts to speak to them.  In the case of his followers and students, in the case of his friend Crito, in the case of his family and children, not only was he able to connect with them and speak to them, but this contact was actively facilitated by jailers and other personnel.  Again, it was only in the case of the Gods that this was thwarted.  My intuition is that in order to overcome that, he turned once again to his good friend Crito and asked him to complete the closing of his life by communicating with the Gods on his behalf.  Look at it this way: if meeting with his family had been thwarted, I could see Socrates asking Crito to say some final words to them. 

3.  It might seem odd to think of Socrates as looking for an opportunity to speak to the Gods so that he could explain to the Gods that they should not worry about him.  This means that Socrates was in the position of teaching the Gods about higher realities. 

There is precedence for this.  In the Theravada Suttas there is a collection of short Suttas where the Buddha teaches the Devas, explaining higher realities to them.  The implication is that the Devas need to be freed from their attachments to the world of becoming and begoning, to samsara.  I believe that this applies equally to the Gods of the culture in which Socrates lived.

4.  I see Socrates telling Crito about the cock being owed to Asclepius as an allegory for the gods in general.  This is supported by Socrates first saying that he wanted to offer a libation to ‘some god’, a general statement.  Socrates is saying that he owed the Gods a teaching, just as he felt an obligation to give a final teaching to all those others who were present.  My feeling is that Crito, and the others who were present, would understand that he was speaking analogically and also understand what it was that he was requesting.  That’s why no one is puzzled and bewildered by these last words at the time they were spoken.

5.  I cannot prove that this is ‘in fact’ what was going on.  But I think it is consistent with what precedes.  And it makes sense if one understands the Gods as also in need of teaching and instruction so that they also can find the road, which they can travel ‘step by step’, that leads to the Good and the One. 

Reason's Range

Reason’s Range

The process of reading through Phaedo in small sections, thinking about those sections, and then posting my own observations about them, has brought to mind a number of observations about Platonism as a spiritual system, and about how different the philosophical world of Platonism is from that of modern philosophy.  One of the topics that I noticed in this reading of Phaedo is the topic of ‘reason,’ and what reason means in Platonism in contrast to what reason means today, particularly in a philosophical context.  Here are a few remarks:

1.  What I noticed in particular was that Socrates uses numerous types of inference structures to make his points in Phaedo.  On at least one occasion Socrates uses a well known rule of inference, modus ponens, which every first year logic student learns.  But much more often Socrates uses structures of argument and persuasion (logoi) that some today would consider deficient (particularly analytic philosophers.)  For example, Socrates will argue that A and B are like each other because they share characteristic X, and then infer from that they are also alike in characteristic Y.  And on other occasions Socrates uses devices such as metaphor and simile to link two appearances together, as opposed to syllogistic. 

2.  It would be interesting, and perhaps revealing, to classify the arguments presented in Phaedo in accordance with their underlying structure.  I have read some modern commentaries on Phaedo that sort of do that, but because they see the arguments presented by Socrates through the lens of analytic philosophy, their approach falls short.  I mean by that they simply reject arguments that analytic philosophy would be unhappy about, thus losing an opportunity to challenge the basic assumptions of analytic philosophy.

3.  What I began to gradually see while reading Phaedo this time around is that reason has a greater range of application in Platonism than it does today.  For example, it would seem from Phaedo that metaphor and simile are a type of structured reasoning in Platonism; and, of course, allegory is also a means whereby one presents one’s arguments in a reasonable way. 

In contrast, the range of reason in modern philosophy has contracted to structures of formal inference that, because of the influence of early analytic philosophy, hover around the border of mathematics.  Other aspects of reason, found in the Dialogues are not considered to be logical, and because they are not logical they are not really reason by today’s standards.

4.  There is a type of person today who think of themselves as rational because they claim that their views are logical in the formal way of contemporary philosophy.  Contemporary atheists often present themselves that way, which I find humorous.  You can find many examples on youtube. But this is not confined to youtubers; widely admired authors like Steven Pinker and Richard Dawkins are examples, and there are many others.  This claim has historical precedents; one of the more significant ones is the French Revolution.  The leaders of the French Revolution thought of themselves as completely rational and reasonable.  And step by logical step the logic of the revolution led to a very active guillotine. 

I refer to this view of reason as ‘the nightmare of reason.’  You could say that modernity is the nightmare of reason.

5.  You can spot people who have this modernist view of reason, that reason is self-sufficient and confined to formal inferential structures, by asking whether or not they think that two completely rational people will necessarily reach the same conclusion in every given situation, dispute, or argument.  If someone says ‘yes’, I would say they live in the nightmare of reason.  If they say no, then I suggest that they are probably free from that nightmare.

6.  Platonism is the way those who dwell in modernity can wake up from the nightmare of reason; not because Platonism rejects reason, but because Platonism expands the range of reason, and this expanded range is like the sun at dawn that clarifies an unknown landscape.

7.  It has been pointed out by many that reason does not give us our starting points.  That is why Euclid starts with Axioms.  Axioms are intuitions, that are not accessed through inference.  Structures like metaphor, simile, allegory, and other types of ‘comparisons’ (as Plotinus says) are ways of cultivating that intuition.  They can be unpacked in multiple ways which keeps them alive and interesting (as an aside, this is why two equally reasonable people might not reach the same conclusion in an argument, because these intuitive approaches are an inherent part of human consciousness and intellect and will always affect the process of reasoning no matter how ‘formal’ someone thinks they are being.) 

8.  Phaedo is a kind of guide to the full range of reason, to the vastness of mind, to the many facets of mind found in human consciousness.  In nous all of these facets are a unity, they are not in opposition.  In the realm of differentiation in which we live, these facets are comprehended as distinct from each other and this can give rise to disputes about their relative efficacy.  In Phaedo Socrates shows how all of these can be used to serve the purpose of spiritual awakening.  This can be done because they are all emanations of Mind as such, which is a facet of nous.  And when we understand Mind as such, from there we can ascend to the Good and the One.

Plato, Plotinus, and the Platonic Tradition: A Review of 'Plotinus the Platonist' by David J. Yount

Plato, Plotinus, and the Platonic Tradition

A Review and Appreciation of Plotinus the Platonist by David J. Yount

For over a thousand years Plotinus was thought of as a Platonist.  Plotinus himself, as well as all of the contemporaries of Plotinus, and the philosophers who came after in the Late Classical Period, thought of Plotinus as a Platonist; nothing more and nothing less.  The emerging Christian Platonism also thought of Plotinus as a Platonist; this was true both in Latin Christianity (for example, St. Augustine) as well as the Greek tradition of orthodoxy.  And this continued right through to the early modern period; for example, Ficino viewed Plotinus as a Platonist.

Then some academic scholars in the 1600’s decided that Plotinus was not actually a Platonist; instead Plotinus was a ‘Neoplatonist.’  This created a separation in the history of Platonism that did not exist before it was conjured in an academic setting.  And ever since the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’ was conjured it has negatively affected the West’s understanding of Plotinus by creating a separation where none actually exists.

I have posted about this before, usually out of a sense of frustration.  When I hear a youtuber say that ‘Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism,’ a statement heard often, I realize that a deep misunderstanding is at the root of what they are about to present.  It’s not that someone who makes a statement like that has nothing to offer; but this opening thought about Plotinus will feed distortions and misunderstandings.  It’s like trying to write a song in major, but only using a minor key; some aspects of the song, like rhythm, will come through, but the overall presentation will not be accurate.

I recently came upon an antidote to this distortion.  David J. Yount, a philosophy Professor at Mesa College, has been equally frustrated by how the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’, and in particular the idea that Plotinus has something to do with it, as I have been (as well as many others).  But Yount has the scholarly ability to counter the idea of ‘Neoplatonism’, and how that idea has been used.  Yount’s findings are presented in two books; the first is Plotinus the Platonist and the second is Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics.

Yount’s method is to focus on particular features of Platonic philosophy, or particular topics in philosophy in general, and then meticulously compare how Plato and Plotinus treat these topics.  In doing so Yount demonstrates the unity of the two.

For example, in Plotinus the Platonist Yount has chapters dedicated to The One, Beauty, Intellect, World-Soul, The Three Hypostases and Emanation, and Matter and Evil.  In the second volume Yount takes the same approach with Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics (because the topics in the second volume are broader, the chapters are longer.)  In each chapter Yount takes quotes from Plato and Plotinus on the selected topic, compares them, showing how the two agree. 

In addition, Yount references modern scholars who disagree with the idea that Plato and Plotinus are in agreement on the specific topic being considered.  Because most academics have signed on to the idea that there is a meaningful difference between the two, Yount only takes a representative sample of those who argue against Yount’s view of a basic unity.  Yount then explains why he does not think that those holding to the idea that, for example, the understanding of the One is the same in Plato and Plotinus, are not reading the two philosophers accurately. 

This approach means the books are a rich treasury of material on various aspects of the Platonic tradition.  If you are interested in a specific topic, such as Beauty, you can go to that chapter and find relevant references in Plato and Plotinus, as well as what others have to say about Beauty in Platonism, along with a defense for the basic unity of the tradition.  This makes the two volumes an invaluable resource for those who regularly read and study the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, a resource that will prove helpful for their studies for many years.

The books are not easy reads and the prose at times is a bit plodding.  But I think that is a necessary consequence of Yount’s thoroughness and the inherent complexity of some of the issues; Yount needed to be thorough and meticulous because many, but not all, academics have accepted the idea of a division between the two, rather than comprehending their basic unity.  I am impressed, to the point of being in awe, of Yount’s command of the material and the ease with which he cross-references material from Plato with relevant material from Plotinus.  It must have taken Yount a long time to work on a project like this; it takes a lot of dedication to organize material in this way.  In addition, Yount is able to communicate to the reader how these passages are related with a sure voice which, at the same time, does not talk down to the reader. 

Yount says in the ‘Introduction’ that the reason for this foundational agreement is that Plato and Plotinus had the same experience of the Good and the One.  And it is from this experience that their philosophy flows.  In other words, Plato and Plotinus are talking about the same thing, guiding others to the same realization, showing readers the path to the transcendental source of all things that is beyond all affirmation and negation.