Image, Simile, Allegory, Parable

10 March 2025

Image, Simile, Allegory, Parable

1.  There is an interesting section of The Republic, Book VI where Socrates answers a question by using a simile.  Socrates prefaces the response by explicitly stating that he is going to use simile to respond to the question:

“Adeimantus:  . . . someone might well say now that he’s unable to oppose you [Socrates] as you ask each of your questions, yet he sees that of all those who take up philosophy – not those who merely dabble in it while still young in order to complete their upbringing and then drop it, but those who continue in its for a longer time – the greatest number become cranks, not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend.

“Socrates:  When I heard him out, I said: Do you think that what these people say is false?

“Adeimantus:  I don’t know, but I’d be glad to hear what you think.

“Socrates: You’d hear that they seem to me to speak the truth.

“Adeimantus:  How, then, can it be true to say that there will be no end to evils in our cities until philosophers – people we agree to be useless – rule them?

“Socrates:  The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image or simile.”

(Plato, The Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeven, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, pages 1110-1111, 487c-487e, ISBN:9780872203495)

Socrates then goes on to use a ship, the ship’s captain, and the ship's crew, as a simile for the city of The Republic, which is itself a simile, or more accurately an allegory, for the human soul and the soul’s relationship to justice.  In other words, the simile of the ship is embedded in the allegory of the city, giving The Republic a very complex pattern of relationships between several levels of discussion.

2.  This is a good example of how devices like simile, image, and allegory are part of what the Platonic tradition means by reason.  In other words, the ancient view of reason is more expansive, and more varied, than what the word reason tends to indicate at this time.

3.  We have lost the idea that comparisons such as simile are tools for philosophical discussion and dialectic.  When modern philosophy students study reason and inference, they study logic, and by logic this usually means symbolic logic.  Studying the structure and the nature of implication in something like a simile isn’t often a part of the curriculum of logic and reason at this time.  But for Socrates, simile was a tool in his toolbox of dialectic and Socrates clearly regards simile as a valid way of investigating a question in a dialectical discussion.

3.1  I think part of the reason for the shrinking of what constitutes reason in modern philosophy is that the modern understanding of how words work and function is, in my opinion, misguided.  In modern philosophy there was the idea that the logic of words could be improved by incorporating mathematical procedures when analyzing words and word-dependent structures.  But words are not numbers.  Words are much more fluid and subject to shifts in emphasis and meaning.  If that is understood, then using an approach like simile, and related approaches, makes sense.

4.  It is helpful to compare different translations regarding a passage like this.  Here is the Loeb translation:

“In the present situation someone might say to you [Socrates] that he can’t argue against each individual question theoretically, but that when it comes to facts he can see that whoever eagerly seizes upon philosophy – not those who do it when they are young as a set part of their education and then drop it, but those who spend longer on it – the majority become really strange, not to say utterly depraved, while those who seem the most estimable nevertheless turn out to be useless to their states, because they have been involved in the practice you approve of.

“When I heard this, I said: Do you think then that people who say this are speaking falsely?

“I don’t know,” he [Adeimantus] said, "but I'd love to hear what you think."

"You'd hear that they seem to me to be telling the truth."

“How is it right then," he said, "to say that states will not be rid of evil until philosophers, whom we agree are of no use to them, rule in them?

“The question you’re asking,” I said, “needs an answer in the form of an allegory.”

[Footnote: eikon = “image,” “likeness,” “simile”; “allegory” and “parable” are also translations which have been used, the translation here justified to some extant by the length and exact correspondence of the “image.”]

(Plato, The Republic, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, page 17, 487c-487e, ISBN:9780674996519)

And here is the Jowett translation:

“For any of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

“Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

“I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

“Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

“Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

“You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.”

(The Jowett translation is widely available both online and is offered by various reprint houses.  Some editions use the Stephanus numbers and some do not.  In addition, some of the dialogues were revised by Jowett, so there may be discrepancies between editions.  The translation was originally published in 1871, but the third revised edition of 1888 is also used by reprint houses.)

And finally, here is the newest translation by a single translator, David Horan, which was published this year:

“. . . someone may now say that they cannot oppose you in argument based on each individual question, but that you should look at the facts.  Those who venture into philosophy, not taking it up in their youth for educational purposes and then being free from it, but engaging in it for a long period of time, become for the most part very odd or, we could even say, utterly debased.  There are others who seem completely reasonable, except that they are rendered useless to their cities through their encounters with the very subject that you commend.

Having listened to all this, I replied, “Do you think the people who make these statements are lying?”

“I do not know,” he said, “but I would be glad to hear your opinion.”

“Then I will tell you.  In my opinion, they appear to me anyway to be speaking the truth.”

“In that case,” he said, “how is it appropriate to say that the cities will have no relief from evils until the philosophers rule in them, when we agree that such people are useless to these cities?”

“The question you have asked,” I replied, “needs an answer expressed by means of an image.”

(Found online at platonicfoundation (dot) org.  The online edition does not use pagination, but you can follow the Stephanus numbers to locate the passage.)

5.  Notice the variety of words used to express the use of a literary device in this context: image, simile, allegory, parable.  In the footnote found in the Loeb translation, and quoted above, the word ‘likeness’ is listed as a possible translation.  This variation indicates that we are looking at a term that resembles ‘figurative language’ when used in a literary context.  In one of the Enneads, Plotinus uses the term ‘comparisons’ as a collective noun for these kinds of usages.

6.  The discussion raises a question regarding the view that philosophers should be rulers and that rulers should be philosophers, and that until that comes about justice will not find a place in The Republic.  This is stated in Book V, at 473c-d, “Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize . . . cities will not rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race.” (Hackett Publishing edition, page 1100)  

But Adeimantus states that in his observation those who study philosophy are not exactly stellar examples of humanity, or at least not many of them are.  Surprisingly, Socrates agrees with Adeimantus.  Yet Socrates retains his commitment to the idea of the philosopher king, or philosopher ruler.  It is here that Socrates says that in order to explain to Adeimantus why he still favors this arrangement, Socrates will resort to a “comparison”, meaning an analogy, simile, image, and so forth.

7.  Why does Socrates state his argument in the form of a comparison?  My suggestion is that what makes the philosopher, the true philosopher, unique is that the philosopher is focused on, and immersed in, eternal things, in eternity as such.  And eternity is beyond description; eternity is ineffable.  In this kind of situation, then, we can only offer what the philosopher resembles, or is like, or provide a mythos/allegory, to point to this truth.  I think that is why allegory has such a prominent place in The Republic. 

8.  There is so much to learn in a passage like this.  And this is why reading and rereading The Republic, and other dialogues of Plato, is worthwhile.  You could spend a lifetime studying the words, and contemplating the thoughts of, The Republic, and that would be a very good use of the time given to a life.