Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 70

27 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 70

1.  The Wonder of Philosophy

“Socrates: . . . I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but you have grown.  For I am it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller.  And there are countless myriads of such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned.  You follow me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

“Theaetetus: By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

“Socrates: Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature.  For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy . . . “

(Plato, Theaetetus, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge University Press, 1928, pages 53-55, 155b-155d, ISBN: 0674991370)

1.1  This is a famous passage from Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus.  It has been quoted often.  I can understand why.  Philosophy begins in wonder (awe, amazement, and so forth).  And we have all had that experience of wonder and awe when we face the cosmos or when we wonder why we are here and what we should be doing.

1.2  I also like this passage because it contrasts with how contemporary views of philosophy function.  Contemporary philosophy begins in doubt; this can be seen very clearly in Descartes.  We doubt everything and this has led our society to a kind of militant skepticism.  Doubting has become a compulsive habit rather than a tool to be used when needed.

This compulsive doubting has manifested in the view that the philosopher’s task is to write devastating critiques, particularly of traditional views.  Kant played an enormous part in this way of looking at philosophy because of the huge impact of works like The Critique of Pure Reason.  I don’t think Kant intended to transform philosophy into love of critiques (as opposed to love of wisdom).  I suspect that Kant wanted to provide some philosophical justification for some eternal truths, not the least of which was God.  But what subsequent philosophers learned from Kant’s critiques was not the conclusions that Kant himself reached, but, rather, that critique itself was what was significant.

Plato criticizes movements like the Sophists but his purpose in doing so is to clarify what the meaning of philosophy is; that is to say that in these critiques the ultimate task of Plato is a positive one which is to reveal what Philosophy is and how the path of Philosophy is undertaken.  The Sophists mimicked Philosophy in significant ways and because of this it was easy for young people to be led astray by Sophists.  Plato’s criticisms counter this possibility. 

1.3  I think that the word ‘wonder’ has an aura of the mysterious around it.  Ultimately the cosmos is a mysterious place.  And as we ascend higher on the path of Philosophy it becomes more mysterious, until we merge with that which is the great mystery of life and death.

 2.  Haiku

An old Autumn house –

Dust settles on the table

Of eternity.

3.  Misology

I have some old friends who dislike philosophical discussion, argument, and dialectic.  It might surprise readers that I have such friends.  But friendship has many facets and functions.

In fact, engaging in philosophical discussion is rare; if by ‘philosophical discussion’ one means things like dialectic and related procedures.  Philosophical discussion often irritates people; it makes people feel frustrated and, sometimes, embarrassed.  This goes all the way back to Socrates; it is a frequent observation.  It is discussed in Phaedo where Socrates says that he considers this dislike of philosophical discussion, or misology, to be a major flaw that will prevent people from becoming Philosophers.

Instead, Philosophers tend to be lovers of discussion.  Is this something people are born with?  I’m not sure, but in my own case I was raised by parents who enjoyed having discussions about many issues (primarily politics, but other things as well) at the dinner table.  My parents really liked engaging in this way and I, and my siblings, never got the impression that discussions like this would strain their relationship.  I think having this model while growing up made it much easier for me to engage in philosophical discussion, to be a lover of philosophical discussion rather than someone who dislikes philosophical discussion.

4.  The Joy of Diminishing Sexual Desire

I have posted often about Platonist ethics as the practice of turning away from sensory stimulation and turning away from using pleasure as a measure of the worthiness of various activities.  I have most frequently posted about vegetarianism as a kind of ethical restraint.  I have also posted about refraining from alcohol.  And I have posted about the Platonist perspective on non-harming and non-retaliation.  I have mentioned sexual restraint in passing, but I have not posted about the restraint of sexual activity, meaning the diminishing of sexual activity, as a Platonist practice.  It is time to explore this aspect of Platonist asceticism.  Here is a quote regarding this topic from The Republic:

“Yes indeed, Cephalus,” I [Socrates] said, “and what’s more I do enjoy talking to very old men.  As they have already traveled along a road, as it were, which we too perhaps will have to travel, I think we should find out from them what kind of a road it is: is it rough and difficult, or easy and passable.  I should very much like to ask you in particular what you make of it, since you are now at that point in your life which the poets say is ‘on the threshold of old age’: is it a difficult time of life?  What report can you give of it?

“By Zeus,” he [Cephalus] said, “I’ll tell you how I feel about it, Socrates.  For a number of us of about the same age often meet together, just as the old proverb says.  Now at these meetings most of us lament, long for the pleasures of youth, and recall the sex, the drinking, the good food and other things of that sort.  And we feel irritated, as if we have been deprived of something important.  We imagine we had a good life then, but now no life at all.  Some also moan on about the abuse shown to their advanced years by their families, and it’s especially for this reason that they harp on about the great miseries old age causes them.  But in my opinion, Socrates, these people are not putting the blame where it belongs.  For if old age were the cause, I too would have had just the same experience, at least as far as old age is concerned, and so would all the others who have reached this time of life.  As it is, I have long encountered others who don’t feel like this, and again I was once present when someone asked the poet Sophocles: ‘How do you get on with sex, Sophocles?  Can you still make love to a woman?’  And he replies, ‘Mind what you say.  Let me tell you I am so glad to have escaped from it; it was like getting away from a raging, savage master.’  I thought his answer was good then, and I still do now no less.  For undoubtedly there is considerable peace and freedom in old age from such things as these.  Whenever our passions stop torturing us, Sophocles’ remark is entirely relevant: it’s an escape from a great many raging masters.  But for all this, and our relationship with our families, there is just one thing to blame: not old age, Socrates, but human character.  For if individuals are orderly and contented, even old age is only a moderate burden.  But if not, this makes both old age and youth hard to bear, Socrates.”

(Plato, The Republic, Book I, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013, pages 9-11, 328e-329d, ISBN: 9780674996502)

And here is a quote from Phaedo regarding ethical restraint, including the restraint of sexual desire:

“Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject.  Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?”

“By no means, Socrates,” said Simmias.

“How about the pleasures of love?”

“Certainly not.”

(Plato, Phaedo, translated by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, page 225, 64d, ISBN: 0674990404)

4.1  In the first quote from The Republic Plato writes about the natural decline in sexual desire and performance in old age.  In Phaedo Plato writes about the conscious rejection of sexual activity in order to become a Philosopher.

4.1.1  In Plato’s time, and for almost all of human history, the natural decline in sexual desire and activity was the norm for both men and women.  In contemporary culture, which has a deep contempt for nature, this natural decline in interest and activity is regarded as unfortunate and mitigated through technological means.  The push is to be as sexually interested and active as we were in our early teenage years.  I find this to be depressing and unfortunate.  But here we are.  I can’t help but think that such technological intervention will, in the long term, have unfortunate results.

4.2  It is difficult to talk about the renunciation of sexual activity, either naturally or for Philosophical reasons, in our culture at this time.  The giving up of sexual activity for Philosophical or spiritual reasons is often reinterpreted in modernity as a sign of psychological problems and labelled a neurosis or due to trauma.  The positive benefits of voluntarily giving up, or restraining to a degree, sexual activity are rarely acknowledged.  There are some exceptions to this; for example I have run across men reporting that they withdrew from sexual activity in order to overcome being constantly derailed in their lives by various levels of lust.  This is what I call strategic asceticism, but I think it is worth noting.

4.2.1  The giving up of sexual activity in order to become a Philosopher would seem to most people, and especially to most academic philosophers, weird.  Most would not be able to draw a causal connection between becoming a Philosopher and refraining from sexual activity.  This only makes sense if you regard Platonism as a spiritual path whose primary practices are various asceses.  This is one of the reasons why I like to say that Platonism more closely resembles Dharma traditions than it does contemporary philosophy.

4.3  It is worth pondering that sexual activity is very often an occasion for negative results.  If we think about it, this is obvious.  For example, sexual activity is very often the occasion for the spreading of serious, even fatal, diseases.  It is surprising to me how seldom this aspect of sexual activity is brought up.  From the perspective of Philosophy as a spiritual path, even if sexual activity had no negative consequences, those on the spiritual path would still want to abandon, or at least restrain, sexual activity.  I mention the frequent consequence of the transmission of diseases because it shows how strongly people are drawn to sexual activity even when the risk of physical harm is great.

4.4  The restraints that Plato refers to in multiple dialogues, but most explicitly in Phaedo, are standard asceses (ascetic practices) found in multiple spiritual traditions.  Such restraints are usually confined to those who become monastics or otherwise follow some set of vows.  In Platonism I don’t detect a monastic grouping that is distinct from non-monastic Platonist practitioners.  It seems to be the case that these ascetic practices, these ethical restraints, are, in the mind of Plato, defining practices for being a Philosopher at all.  This will sound strange today because our conception of Philosophy has drifted very far from Plato’s conception; modern philosophy is a completely secular enterprise that does not require any kind of ethical restraint, or ascetic practices, in order to claim the mantel of Philosophy.

4.4.1  One way of looking at this is to think of something like the Buddhist monastic Sangha as defining what it means to be a Buddhist.  I know that isn’t the case; but follow along as a thought experiment.  If, historically, being a Buddhist was defined by the practices of a Buddhist monk this would be an example of having the same relationship that I detect in Platonism as found in Plato. 

Or you could look at the Benedictines who follow the Rule of Saint Benedict.  A person becomes a Benedictine by following the ascetic rule that Saint Benedict wrote.  In a similar way, a person becomes a Platonist by following the ascetic practices found in Plato.

4.5  An objection to this approach is based on the view that ethical practices should be universal; that is to say, that ethical practices should be for everyone.  Kant’s influential Categorical Imperative also takes this approach.  If everyone became chaste, that is to say renounced sexual activity, that would mean the end of humanity. 

But Platonism does not think of itself as a universal path, or a path for everyone.  In fact, it has the view that the ascent to the transcendent is something that only a few people will ever undertake.  

4.5.1  Plato often compares learning the way of Philosophy to learning a craft (techne); Plato’s understanding of ‘craft’ is broad and includes such things as learning the specifics of body training for sports like wrestling, learning how to be a Doctor, learning how to be an artist, learning how to be a musician.  None of these crafts are something that people think everyone should study and perfect.  All of them are only for the few who are called to practice that particular craft.  In a similar way, the student of Philosophy learns the skills and practices that constitute the way of Philosophy and perfects these skills over time.  A musician learns the ins and outs of rhythm and pitch, the Philosopher learns the ins and outs of a vegetarian diet and other ethical restraints.  And so forth.

4.5.2  A Doctor takes care of illnesses that strike the body.  A physical trainer takes care of the cultivation of bodily strength.  The musician is focused on the care of the sonic domain.  The carpenter takes care of the craft of creating tables, chairs, and so forth.  The Philosopher is focused on taking care of the soul.

4.6  Returning to the specific practice of avoiding, limiting, or abandoning sexual activity, the reason this is recommended by Plato is that such activity makes it difficult to cultivate an awareness of the soul.  Sexual activity easily becomes obsessive and very time consuming, leaving little, or no, time left for the cultivation of asceses or virtues.  I don’t think it is difficult to understand this.  For example, if someone has a difficult exam coming up they will often step away from the pursuit of sexual pleasure in the lead up to that exam.  This kind of thing is common and it applies to the care of the soul, though the care of the soul is a much more difficult and subtle task than taking an exam.

4.7  In our contemporary society turning away from sexual activity is difficult for the standard reason that its pleasure is very enticing, but also for the reason that at this time there has arisen the idea that our sexual nature is, in some sense, our actual identity.  We no longer think of our soul as our identity, or true self, because we reject the idea of non-material realities.  In the absence of an understanding of the soul, there has been a turning to things like sexual orientations of various kinds as the defining, even the inner reality, of people’s lives.  This creates a barrier to the practice of sexual restraint because it feels to people like you are attacking their inner core by suggesting sexual restraint of any kind.

The antidote to this is to step back and really look at sexual activity and its results, especially, as I mentioned above, the very frequent negative consequences that follow sexual activity.  Thinking about this is helpful to overcoming the compulsion of sexual desire and helps to build a foundation for living a life that is free of sexual activity, a chaste life.

 

 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 69

20 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 69

1.  Plato and Newton

Chapter III of Whitehead’s Process and Reality is titled ‘The Order of Nature.’  This Chapter is Whitehead’s analysis of cosmology and in this presentation Whitehead contrasts Newton’s views, as presented in Newton’s Scholium, with Plato’s views as presented in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus.  I suspect that there are very few people who would be able to offer this kind of analysis because to do so requires a working knowledge of both Plato and Newton.

Whitehead views both cosmologies as having virtues, both as having strengths and weaknesses, though it seems to me that Whitehead slightly tilts towards the Timaeus in spite of what Whitehead sees as that dialogue’s shortcomings.  Certainly a lot has changed in cosmology since Plato, and a lot has changed since Newton.  But I find the presentation of these two, the way Whitehead contrasts both of them, to be insightful.

At the bottom of page 93 Whitehead brings the cosmological discussion to ultimate matters.  Whitehead quotes Newton, “When I wrote my treatise about our system [his cosmology] I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity, . . . “ (ellipsis by Whitehead).  Whitehead points out that “The concept in Newton’s mind is that of a fully articulated system requiring a definite supernatural origin . . . “  This is how Whitehead connects the Timaeus, with its Demiurge, with Newton and Newton’s drive to use his cosmology as a kind of elaborate argument for a supreme Deity. 

Whitehead sums up his own view, “The notion of God, . . . , is that of an actual entity immanent in the actual world, but transcending any future cosmic epoch – a being at once actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent.”  There is a lot in this brief statement, a lot to ponder.  But I think it points to the ultimate, the Good and the One, as occupying a both/and cosmological position; the both/and is that the ultimate in Platonism is both immanent and transcendent.  The ultimate is transcendent because it is beyond being.  The ultimate is immanent because the process of emanation means that the ultimate is present everywhere and everywhen. 

A question that remains for me is what Whitehead means by an ‘actual entity’ as it is not clear to me how the term actual entity would apply to that which is transcendent.  In addition, it’s not clear to me how the term ‘actual entity’ would apply to that which is ineffable, which is the view that Platonism has about the ultimate.  The ineffability of the Good and the One is foundational for Plato, Plotinus, for Dionysius the Areopagite, and so forth. 

Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Whitehead means by ‘actual entity.’  On the other hand, perhaps Whitehead is more of a rationalist than I had previously considered.  By ‘rationalist’ I mean that Whitehead seems to be indicating that the ultimate, God, is accessible through mental and conceptual analysis.  This is the position that both Descartes and Spinoza take and Whitehead was very familiar with these two thinkers.  Again, I may be misunderstanding Whitehead on this point.  Either way, I found the discussion about these contrasting cosmologies of Newton and Plato to be fruitful.

2.  Martyrs of Philosophy

I think it would be useful to bring the idea of martyrdom into a philosophical context.  I think this particularly applies to those of us who view Philosophy as a Dharma, a spiritual system and path, whose ultimate purpose is salvation.

I think taking such a view also places philosophers who have died for philosophy in a context that is more meaningful than the context(s) we use today to understand such a sacrifice.  The two greatest examples of martyrdom for philosophy are Socrates and Boethius.  Their deaths have many similarities that I find meaningful and both of them died for the sake of philosophy.

Here is a brief list of Martyrs of Philosophy:

 Socrates: 399 BCE

Rubellius Plautus: 62 CE

Seneca: 65 CE

Barea Soranus: 65 or 66 CE

Thrasea Paetus: 66 CE

Hypatia of Alexandria: 415 CE

Boethius: 524 CE

Thomas More: 1535 CE

Giordano Bruno: 1600 CE

Jan Patocka: 1977 CE

Philosophers such as Spinoza, Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and Karl Jaspers are examples of ‘near misses’, meaning that they were threatened by the State but narrowly missed being actually martyred.  Some modern philosophers such as Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have written about the inherent suffering that comes with a philosophical commitment to truth.  I think that is likely, but I would want to explore the specific nature of philosophical suffering, how it is similar and how it differs from suffering in general.

The cluster of Martyrs in the mid 60’s CE reflects Emperor Nero’s growing paranoia and hostility to Philosophy as such and Stoicism in particular.  Stoics of that time faced a great deal of hostility due to their commitments to ethical principles and their willingness to criticize Roman Emperors for failing to live ethical lives.  Following Nero there were several episodes where Philosophers as a class were exiled from Rome.  Stoics often took Socrates as a model for their own tradition and this allowed a philosopher like Seneca to accept Nero’s order for Seneca to kill himself.

Thomas More is on the list because many people understand his death as being a martyr for freedom of conscience and, in addition, More was also a philosopher along with his religious commitments.

I think it is likely that there are others; there are big gaps in time between the ones who are listed.  If any readers have suggestions please let me know in the comments below.

I think the positive effect of honoring Martyrs for Philosophy is that it focuses our attention on the inherently spiritual and salvific nature of philosophy which is an understanding that is missing from contemporary presentations.  I don’t think that Pierre Hadot talked about this kind of martyrdom, but Hadot does talk about Philosophy as a way of life grounded in ethical commitments and demands that ancient philosophers took seriously.  In some cases this was taken seriously enough so that it led to martyrdom.

3.  Plato and Technology

It’s interesting to recognize that Plato does not talk much about technology.  I think this is a result of his viewing existence from the perspective of eternity rather than from the perspective of progress.

4.  The Second Edition of the Gerson Translation of the Enneads

I recently purchased the new edition of the Enneads of Plotinus; the second edition of the Gerson led translation; Gerson was the head of the group that translated the Enneads.  I’m looking forward to reading it, but I don’t think I’ll get to it until 2026.  2026 isn’t very far away.

5.  Three Views of Platonism

I think that these days there are three primary views about Platonism.  I’m using the word ‘views’ to designate a broad understanding upon which other understandings are built.  The first view is what I call ‘academic’; you could call it analytical or intellectual (here ‘intellectual’ does not refer to the intellect of nous).  I use the term academic because it is the dominant view in academic culture.  The academic view is that Platonism is a philosophy in the way that contemporary philosophies are philosophies and should be treated with the same methods and approaches.  Aspects of Platonism, such as rebirth, noetic eternal objects, and the transcendent, that clash with the dominant philosophical view and academic culture in general are often simply not mentioned, or if they are it is only briefly and they tend to be treated as archaic superstitions that modern philosophy has left behind.

The second view is what I call ‘ritual efficacy.’  This view, known in Platonism as theurgy, argues that rituals done in a meticulous way are the means whereby the goals of Platonism can be attained.  This is a late classical deviation from Platonism, but it still has its adherents.

The third view is what I call ‘contemplative.’  The contemplative view of Platonism is that it is through contemplation that the student of Platonism arrives at the noetic, and following that, the transcendent.  It is the practice of contemplation which is at the center of the contemplative view.  The contemplative view has many secondary practices, such as purifications, including vegetarianism, sexual restraint, and other asceses.  The practice of wisdom is also a supporting practice for the contemplative in the sense that making clear distinctions supports the practice of contemplation (such as making the distinction between that which is ephemeral and that which is eternal).

The first two, the academic and the ritual views, are widespread, with the academic view dominant.  The contemplative view is, in contrast, a bit sidelined.  I wouldn’t say it is completely ignored, but I think it is, for the most part, not given the attention that the other two views receive.

I say this because in discussing Plotinus I often run into the framing of Plotinus as a ‘rationalist’ (I’ve mentioned this before).  It seems that the choices that people think about when considering Plotinus are that either Plotinus would be a ritualist or a rationalist.  But Plotinus is neither of these two; Plotinus was a contemplative as is, in my opinion, the Platonic tradition as a whole.

My feeling is that the contemplative view is difficult for people to access unless they practice contemplation and have some familiarity with the experiences that emerge from such practice.  In addition it is difficult to communicate to people what contemplation is.  The instructions for contemplation are not difficult, but it takes time for those practicing contemplation to get a feeling for what contemplation is.  For example, I have observed many beginners who think that contemplation means ‘thinking about’ as opposed to transcending the conceptual mind altogether. 

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 68

13 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 68

1.  Moving Beyond a Defensive Posture

If you hold a view that is a minority view in your culture this often puts you on a defensive footing.  I mean that the dominant culture will see criticizing a minority view as natural and unproblematic and often as not something that needs justification or even much thought.  In such a situation those holding a minority view need to spend a lot of time deflecting the criticisms that most people will bring up.  A negative consequence of this is that the minority view can become stuck and unable to find the time and resources to unfold and grow their own understanding.

The steady critique of metaphysics in modernity puts those who view classical metaphysics not only as legitimate, but as the finest philosophical study possible, in such a position.  One way or another, most contemporary philosophers, particularly academic philosophers, reject metaphysics as such and have what they consider to be an articulate critique of the entire enterprise.

There is only so much one can do in response to those who hold such a critical stance.  I see the position of those who view classical metaphysics as valuable as in a position similar to someone today who writes music who faces constant criticisms for using procedures the critics regard as outdated.  Imagine if, for some strange reason, academics had decided that the minor scale was outdated and passe.  Furthermore, their view was that anyone who wrote music using the minor scale was a throwback to an earlier time that did not understand that the minor scale was unacceptable in our enlightened times.  It would be difficult for a composer who was using the minor scale to defend himself; at some point the composer would simply have to let the music speak for itself, and for himself. 

2.  War and the Causes of War

There have been several books published recently that investigate if war happens because of human nature.  Those who think of war as the result of human nature view war as inevitable.  In contrast, those who regard war as conditional, as the result of specific circumstances, don’t regard war as inevitable.

This discussion has been going on for a long time.  Plato touches on this topic in Phaedo, but most extensively in Book I of Laws.  Plato doesn’t explicitly land on one side or the other of the debate as it is currently framed, but Plato does argue that war is not the purpose of the State and this interpretation runs against those who think of war as an inevitable consequence of human nature.

My own thinking about this is that war is a manifestation of differentiation and differentiation is pervasive in the material realm.  War is the most explicit mode of differentiation.

3.  Me and Christianity

I thought I would take a moment and share my own views regarding Christianity.  I think this is a good time because I have noted in several posts the translation of Pagan anti-Christian works translated by David Litwa and this might be interpreted as reflecting my own view.  Here are a few observations:

3.1  I don’t consider myself to be anti-Christian.  I was raised in a secular household where religion in general, and Christianity specifically, were not a topic of conversation or interest.  Of course I picked up some of the basics of Christianity from the culture at large, but there was no encouragement towards Christianity, or any other religion, in the home. 

3.2  When I first became interested in religion I turned to Buddhism.  This was in the 70’s and there were a lot of Buddhist teachers coming to the U.S. at that time.  But my interest in Buddhism was not motivated by a hostility to Christianity.  While studying and practicing Buddhism I noticed that many young people of my own age were strongly motivated to study Buddhism by a more or less strong hostility to either Christianity or Judaism.  At the same time I didn’t really understand where that came from, but I simply noted that this was the case.  I can remember early in my period of study of Buddhism telling others involved in the same studies that I didn’t have negative feelings about Christianity; and this set me a bit apart though I wouldn’t say it became a significant issue.

3.3  It was only after studying Buddhism for decades that I became interested in Christianity which I approached in the same spirit that I had approached Buddhism when I began studying it.  For the most part, Christianity was new to me.

3.4  I found Christianity to be a mixed bag; there were some things that I found uplifting, and, at the same time, other things that I found problematic.  I didn’t mind this; I had come to the same conclusion about Buddhism and over time I found this mix to be true of every religion. 

3.5  One of the movements in Christianity that I studied a lot, because I found it nourishing, was the 17^th century teachings known as Quietism.  I eagerly read Madame Guyon, Miguel Molinos, Bishop Fenelon, Francois Malaval, and other, less well known, advocates of this teaching.  Quietism as a movement was eventually crushed and officially labelled a heresy, which is still true today.  Yet I found myself nourished by its teachings; even today I am still very impressed by Quietism which has influenced how I view and understand mysticism and spirituality in general.

3.6  When I eventually found a home in Platonism I picked up that some significant Platonists were strongly anti-Christian and/or anti-Monotheist.  The influence of some of these Platonists, like Thomas Taylor, is considerable.

I see the anti-Christian Platonists of today as of basically two types; first are those that think of themselves as Pagans or Neo-Pagans.  They tend to think of themselves as in some sense returning to a kind of original Platonism, a Platonism before it was appropriated by Christianity.  They tend to align themselves with such Platonists as Iamblichus and Julian.

The second group of anti-Christian Platonists tend to be secular and they want to present a secular version of Platonism to the world.  This involves removing Christian influences on Platonism.  But this project also involves editing out aspects of Platonism found in the Dialogues.

3.7  I’m not a Pagan (I’m not anti-Pagan either).  Because of this the presentation of Platonism by contemporary Pagans doesn’t have a strong pull on me.  As I have mentioned before, I tend to see Platonism as monist and idealist.

3.7.1  When I say I’m not a Pagan I mean that I’m not a Pagan in the way that contemporary Pagan Platonists depict Paganism.  I believe in the existence of living beings like nature spirits and forces that seem abstract but I think have consciousness and life.  Where I diverge is that I think of these kinds of living beings as sharing the same world, or realm, or hypostasis, as human beings, animals, and plants.  I don’t think of them as part of, for example, nous.  And I am very much ill at ease with the idea of henads because I think that even the gods of the Greek pantheon are creatures of this realm.  From a certain point of view believing in things like nature spirits would cause some people to think of me as a Pagan.  But from another point of view, my conception of nature spirits, and so forth, differs from how most Pagans seem to think of them.  The closest any spiritual tradition has come to the way I think of these matters is the Shinto tradition with its understanding of ‘Kami’.  Perhaps I will expand on this in a future post.

3.8  What I find attractive in Christianity are certain Christian mystics.  I have a strong liking for Dionysius the Areopagite and it was reading his Mystical Theology which lead me to Platonism; because of the strongly Platonic nature of that work, as well as the other works of Dionysius such as The Divine Names.  And, as I said above, the mysticism of the Quietists has had an enduring influence on me.

3.8.1  The fact that Quietism is an official heresy in the Catholic tradition, and that Quietism is explicitly rejected by most Protestant traditions, has made me cautious about Christianity as a whole. 

3.9  I think that the intense anti-Christian views held by some modern Platonists has, at times, cramped modern Platonism.  An important example for me is the rejection of grace as a significant factor in Platonism by some (most?) modern Platonists outside of Catholic Platonists.  I think this is unfortunate and is due, I think, to the role that grace plays in Christianity.  My own understanding of grace was formed during my period of Buddhist studies; in particular the way that Pure Land Buddhism thinks about grace, which I see as compatible with the way grace works in Platonism.  But it has been my observation that this Buddhist resource for understanding grace is not known or appreciated among modern Platonists who are strongly anti-Christian.

3.9.1  Another example along the lines of grace is asceticism.  Again, it has been my observation that strongly anti-Christian modern Platonists tend to ignore Platonist asceticism because they associate asceticism with Christianity.  I don’t see it that way.  Instead, I see Christian asceticism as rooted in Platonic teachings on asceticism and as an essential part of the Platonic tradition.

3.10  Christianity is a huge, complex, tradition.  Because of this it is difficult to make generalizations that cover the whole range of Christian traditions.  In my own case, I value Christian mysticism, particularly that of Dionysius and the Quietists, and the teachings on grace which I think is only fully understandable in the context of mysticism. 

But most Christians are not mystics.  So in the end, my appreciation of Christianity is rather limited or selective.  This is similar to my relationship to Buddhism; there are aspects of Buddhism that remain from my period of Buddhist studies.  But there are also aspects, such as Buddhist teachings on emptiness, that I no longer align with. 

 

Brief Notes- on Various Topics - 67

6 October 2025

Brief Notes on Various Topics - 67

1.  Julian the Apostate

I read that David Litwa is translating Julian the Apostate’s Against the Galileans.  Julian (331 – 363 CE) was the last Pagan Emperor of the Roman world.  He became Emperor following a number of Christian Emperors.  Julian attempted to reestablish Pagan institutions, temples, and rituals including animal sacrifice, that is to say blood sacrifice, which Julian practiced with great enthusiasm.  Julian’s plan to reestablish Paganism failed for a variety of reasons; personally I think it was simply too late to turn back the Christian tide.  I suspect that even if Julian had lived longer he would not have been successful.

1.1  Litwa’s translation of Against the Galileans is the latest in a series of translations of Pagan critiques of Christianity translated by Litwa.  Litwa previously has translated the fragmentary remains of Celsus and Porphyry who wrote works that were highly critical of Christianity.  The translation of Julian is the third in the series.  I’ve read Litwa’s translations of Celsus and Porphyry and look forward to reading the translation of Julian.

1.2  Platonism at the time of Julian was in a difficult situation.  On the one hand, Pagan Platonism, represented by the Academy in Athens and other teaching centers such as Alexandria, was highly critical of Christianity.  On the other hand, Christian Platonism had taken root and was finding a place in the emerging Christian tradition; it is true that Christian Platonism modified the tradition, producing what I refer to as a kind of hyphenated Platonism.  But even so, Platonism was finding a home among Christian theologians, a place in the emerging new cultural context.

1.2.1  What I think is often overlooked is that the form of Pagan Platonism that was competing with Christianity at the time of Julian was Theurgic Platonism and it is my contention that Theurgic Platonism is just as hyphenated as Christian Platonism and in some ways I would argue that Theurgic Platonism was more altered than Christian Platonism.  I say this because Platonism at that time was governed by the writings of Iamblichus and in particular the critique that Iamblichus wrote of Porphyry’s commitments to refraining from killing animals either for food or for religious ritual sacrifice which Iamblichus presented in what is now called On the Mysteries. 

It is difficult to overemphasize how Iamblichus altered Platonism as a whole in order to advocate for the necessity of blood sacrifice in some theurgic contexts.  For example, it completely changed Platonist ethics and undermined the possibility of the mystical ascent.  It was this kind of hyphenated Platonism that Julian was steeped in and was an advocate for.  It seems that Julian thought of Iamblichus as on an at least equal status as Plato and for that reason I think you could say that Julian was an Iamblichean rather than a Platonist.

1.3  The overall point I want to make is that Christian Platonism, and Christianity in general at that time, did not advocate for the ritual sacrifice of animals; in fact Christian Emperors either restricted such sacrifice or outlawed it altogether.  As I understand it, the reasons for outlawing animal sacrifice in Christianity were theological rather than ethical; I mean that Christianity outlawed animal sacrifice because Jesus was understood to be the final sacrifice and therefore other sacrifices, such as animal sacrifice, were unnecessary, and in a sense blasphemous.

But regardless of the reasons, Christianity brought an end to animal sacrifice.  From an Orthodox Platonist perspective, that is a very good thing.  From the perspective of Orthodox Platonist ethics, that was good for Platonism.

1.4  The way I see it is that Christianity at that time rescued Platonism from Theurgy by putting a stop to a system whose main goal and purpose was the justification of ritual animal slaughter.  I don’t mean to say that Christianity had that purpose in mind; I suspect that Christians outlawed ritual animal slaughter in order to further solidify their power.  But I am saying that rescuing Platonism from a descent into Theurgically sponsored mayhem was an unintended consequence of their program.  I’m looking at this in terms of cause and effect rather than psychological intention.

2.  The God of the Philosophers

Sometimes theologians (I find that this happens mostly among theologians, not so much amongst philosophers) in the West contrast what they call ‘The God of the Philosophers’ as opposed to ‘The God of Scripture’ or ‘The God of Revelation.’  I don’t think it is a major topic in Western Theology, but I find it reappearing now and then.

The contrast arose because the characteristics of God, such as immutability, eternity, and so forth, that are found in treatises by philosophers are difficult to reconcile with the God of Scripture.  For example, if God is immutable (changeless), then how would it be possible for God to respond to prayers or to enter into history in the way described in the revealed texts of the monotheistic tradition?  There are other conundrums that arise in this context. 

I think the most pressing contrast between the Theology of the Philosophers and the Theology of the Monotheists is that the God of the Philosophers tends to be impersonal.  In contrast, the God of Monotheism is a personal God with whom individuals have a personal relationship that very much resembles the relationships a human being has with other human beings.  Two examples of the impersonal nature of the God of the Philosophers are Plotinus and Spinoza.  For Plotinus, God is encountered by transcending all differentiation which implies leaving personhood behind.  For Spinoza God is encountered as the underlying nature, that is constantly modified into specific appearances, that eternally abides as the source of appearances, including the appearance of human beings. 

For neither Spinoza nor Plotinus does God have any features or characteristics upon which a relationship that resembles a human relationship may be established.  When it comes to the God of the Philosophers, the goal is not to have a relationship with God, but to be absorbed in his presence which transcends all material appearances.  In a sense you could say that being absorbed in the presence of God is a kind of relationship; but even if that is granted the nature of the relationship differs from the personal relationship found in Monotheistic traditions.  The relationship to the God of the Philosophers is more like our relationship to the sun; we have such a relationship, and it is an important one, but it doesn’t feel like a personal relationship.

One of the things I have noticed about the literature of this issue is that non-Western understandings of God are not brought into the discussion.  I mean that the Hindu understanding of Brahman and Brahman’s relationship to Atman is not part of the discussion.  Neither is the relationship of the Tao to material appearances part of the discussion.  I find this frustrating because I suspect that bringing in non-Western analyses of an issue like this could be quite fruitful.

3.  Are the Laws in Laws Harsh?

In reading Plato’s Dialogue Laws I sometimes run into sections where the punishment for breaking a law was, it seemed to me, harsh; at least that was my initial response.  I am thinking of, for example, the use of the death penalty for theft when the theft is of items from a temple; there are other examples, but that is the one I tend to recall most often.  I come from a society where the death penalty is rarely used and when it is used it is because of some extraordinary aspect of the crime.  My society tends to congratulate itself on this; I mean that it tends to think of itself as better than other societies that used the death penalty much more frequently and for a variety of crimes in a routine way.  Many people in my society would like to see the death penalty eliminated altogether.

If Laws is read as a treatise for how to organize a community at the political level, these kinds of questions will naturally arise.  I mean that a reader will naturally compare the laws of his own community, along with their punishments for a guilty verdict, to those found in the Laws.  This kind of engagement can become complicated as there are a lot of laws and punishments to compare.  A plus with this kind of engagement with Laws is that it provides an opportunity for questioning one’s own uncritical views because of the contrast of those views with that offered in the Laws. 

A careful reading of a dialogue like Laws, with its wealth of detail and with the meticulous way it investigates certain matters of public life (for example, the long discussion about consuming alcohol), is that it provides an opportunity for understanding how various aspects of Platonism fit together.  For example, how would the use of the death penalty in Laws fit with Plato’s teachings on non-harming found in Crito? 

Finally, I think these kinds of teachings found in Laws can be unpacked as allegorical teachings for the dedicated practitioner on the spiritual path.  When Plato writes that a certain activity requires the application of the death penalty when the perpetrator of that activity is found guilty, it is an indication of how seriously Plato takes this situation and I think what Plato is communicating to those on the spiritual path is that the tendency to indulge in that activity must be slain, avoided at all costs, if they want to complete the spiritual journey.  For example, the theft of items from a temple is allegorically the ‘theft’ of the spiritual impulse for the purposes of material goals and indulgences.  If this continues, it will severely damage the spiritual prospects of the student.  Therefore, the impulse must be slain.

Using such strong allegorical language is not unusual in spiritual literature.  In Chapter 5 of the Tao Te Ching it says that the Sage treats human beings like straw dogs; straw dogs where ritually sacrificed by throwing them into a sacrificial fire.  In verses 294 and 295 of the Dhammapada the Buddha talks about slaying your mother and father.  This is traditionally understood as slaying one’s attachments; in addition, monastics in Buddhism are commonly referred to as ‘home-leavers’.  And the Bhagavad Gita is one long allegorical battle between desire and liberation (at least some interpret it that way).  There are many examples of this kind of usage in spiritual literature.  The Laws can be read this way as well.

One way of examining whether or not it makes sense to read Laws allegorically is to see if an allegorical reading makes Laws more consistent with the rest of the Dialogues of Plato.  For example, when Plato asks for capital punishment for breaking a law in Laws that would seem to clash, or be inconsistent with, Plato’s teachings on non-harming and non-retaliation in a dialogue like Crito.  But if we read Laws allegorically and read the dialogue as a guide to spiritual practice, then the clash in this particular case, and other cases, is resolved, or at least lessened. 

Is it justifiable to read Laws allegorically?  I think so; but to be open to this possibility it is necessary to see how allegorical readings operate in other dialogues where an allegorical interpretation is more commonly accepted.  I think the best comparison to the Laws would be the Republic.  Personally, I think the deep meaning of the Republic is only accessible through an allegorical reading.  And I suspect the same is true for Laws as well.

If the reader approaches Laws allegorically that will shift the meaning of what is being read; I don’t think it necessarily eliminates a literal reading, but it adds another dimension of meaning.  For example, Laws is a conversation between three old men on the island of Crete.  One is Athenian, the Athenian Stranger, one is Spartan, and one is from Crete.  I think together they symbolize the three principal aspects of a human being.  The Athenian represents the soul.  The Spartan represents the body.  The Cretan represents the mind as the function of differentiation.  That is why, in Book 1, when they discuss what the purpose of laws is, the Spartan and the Cretan put forth the view that the purpose of laws is to be effective in war and that war is the overriding purpose of government and laws.  This is consistent with them being symbols of the mind of differentiation (without the presence of wisdom) and the body as the engine of desire.  It is the Athenian Stranger who counters with the view that the purpose of laws is peace and that peace supersedes, or is prior to, the demands of war; because the Athenian Stranger symbolizes the presence of soul which is the presence of eternity which is the realm of true peace.

I think it is also worthy of noting that the first word in Laws is ‘Theos’ or God.  I think this is a significant clue that Laws is primarily about our relationship with the divine and all the discussions about communal relationships and laws governing those relationships are aimed at indicating the rules, or laws, for cultivating a relationship with the divine, with God, with the One.  I think that Plato is telling us this because the three old men in Laws are taking a long walk on a hot day to a cave dedicated to Zeus.  Zeus is an important symbol in Plato’s Dialogues as the source of all life and other key Platonic concepts.  In other words, Zeus is to be understood allegorically in Laws as well as the long walk of the three old men is allegorically a walk to the divine as the ultimate source of all things.