2 November 2026

2 November 2026

Brief Notes on Various Topics: 112

1.  Love and Grace in Plotinus: 1

For a long time, I have thought of grace as having a significant place in the Platonic tradition.  Grace is not often mentioned in discussions of Platonism and I think one of the reasons is that it is not overtly mentioned in important Platonic works very often.  A second reason is that I think the strong association of grace with Christianity means that secular scholars tend to interpret Platonic grace in Christian terms and while this makes historical sense, it is, I think, a barrier to accessing how grace functions in the Platonic tradition.

There are, however, a few places where Plotinus writes about grace, and there are a few scholars who have examined what Plotinus has to say.  Pierre Hadot wrote a short book about Plotinus called Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision and in that book Hadot briefly talks about Plotinus’s understanding of grace and love.  Here is a quote from Hadot’s book:

“For Plotinus, if things were nothing other than what they are, in their nature, essence and structure, they would not be lovable.  In other words, love is always superior to its object, however lofty the latter may be.  Its object can never explain or justify it.  There is in love a ‘something more,’ something unjustified; and that which, in objects, corresponds to this ‘something more’ is grace, or Life in its deepest mystery.  Forms and structures can be justified, but life and grace cannot.  They are ‘something more,’ and this gratuitous surplus is everything.  In it, Plotinus recognizes ‘the trace of the Good’: ‘Each form, taken by itself, is [only] what it is; but it becomes desirable once the Good diffuses the color of its light over it . . . awakening love in those who desire it’ (VI 7, 22, 5-7).

“What Plotinus calls the Good is thus, at the same time, that which, by bestowing grace, gives rise to love, and that which, by awakening love, causes grace to appear.  The Good is what all things desire; it is what is desirable in an absolute sense.  We asserted that love and grace are unjustified; likewise, the Good itself is absolutely unjustified.  It is not random or accidental, but by willing itself and being what it wants to be, it freely creates the love that beings feel for it, as well as the grace they receive from it.  All these formulations are, in any case, unable to translate what the soul knows of the Good when it goes through the experience of love.”

(Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, translated by Michael Chase, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pages 50 and 51, ISBN: 9780226311944)

1.1  Hadot refers to ‘something more’ in the things of this world.  I think that is an excellent way of looking at how Platonism, and Platonist practitioners, stand in the world.  Platonism is focused on this ‘something more.’  This is one of the primary differences between naturalism and Platonism; in naturalism, or materialism, things are thought of as being sufficiently, and completely, depicted by their natural, material features.  In Platonism the natural features of any given thing are the result of the something more of existence, of the Platonic Forms, of the Good and the One. 

I think Plotinus is connecting with the dialogue Phaedo and that wonderful section where Socrates gives a brief intellectual, or philosophical, biography.  I have mentioned this section on several posts before, it is where Socrates explains that he was, at first, attracted to the philosophy of Anaxagoras, but then later saw through its limitations which are that Anaxagoras explains things through reducing them to natural and material causes alone (and it seems that Socrates is suggesting that even mind in Anaxagoras was explained in this way).  Anaxagoras is the naturalist, the reductionist, in this telling, while Socrates is the one who is rooted in the transcendental.

1.2  Hadot links love and grace in what I have quoted.  I read this as grace being the overflowing of the Good and the One, which in turn generates in material beings love for the Good and the One and the desires to return to the One.  The way Hadot puts it is that grace bestows love.

This love is, at times, given an erotic description, particularly in the Symposium where the Diotima’s ladder of beauty begins with the contemplation of attractive bodies.  At first this may appear to conflict with the ascetic teachings of Plato found in Phaedo and other dialogues.  But what Diotima teaches is to ascend to the transcendental by turning away from material beauty to that which is beautiful as such; that is to say to the beauty of the noetic.  In addition, Socrates is praised in the Symposium for not succumbing to the attempted seduction of Alcibiades, an example of someone who has transcended the seduction of material beauty.

1.3  Hadot uses the word ‘unjustified’ to describe love and grace.  I think this is an aspect of grace that disturbs many people.  That someone will receive the grace of the One even if they have not lived an exemplary life runs counter to our sense of fairness; it can even feel arbitrary.

The metaphor I use for Platonic grace has helped me to understand how this works.  I use the metaphor of moonlight shining on a mountain path that branches of the main path.  A hiker notices this path and turns to hike that path to its conclusion.

The moonlight is the symbol of grace.  The moonlight was shining on the path but wasn’t shining specifically for that individual hiker; moonlight simply shines because that is its nature.  I think that in this sense grace is ‘unjustified’ because the path that is being shown in the moonlight is simply being shown; the presence of the path is not noticed due to some kind of transaction.  The presence of the path is a gift in the sense that it comes to the hiker freely, without calculation.

1.4  A few paragraphs later, Hadot writes, “The grace he (Plotinus) speaks of reveals to use the gratuitousness of divine initiative.  Let the reader be reassured: this is not an attempt to Christianize Plotinus.  It is too obvious that he is unaware of or opposed to the idea of a new creation in Christ, which constitutes the content of the specifically Christian concept of grace.  The gratuitousness of divine initiative is only ne element of this concept, and not the most characteristic one at that.  If philosophical reflection goes to its own extreme, and still more if it attempts to express the content of the mystical experience, it, too, will be led to this notion of gratuitousness.  It will, moreover, become clear upon reflection that all necessity and all duty presuppose the absolute initiative of an original love and freedom.”  (Ibid, page 51)  And I would add an original grace.

The use of the word ‘gratuitous’ I read as emphasizing that the grace of the Good and the One is beyond affirmation and negation; as I mentioned above, it is not calculated.  I also think the usage of ‘gratuitous’ emphasizes that the Good and the One are beyond being, mind, and life.  I think it is a way of talking about the ineffable that is particularly effective.

1.5  The moonlight on the mountain path is a metaphor I like because it doesn’t negate the need for purification.  The hiker does need to notice the path, does need to turn to the path, and needs to consider the path valuable enough to turn away from, to renounce, other possible paths.  In this way purification and grace can be understood to work together.

1.6  Again, I have not observed much writing on the topics of grace and love in University Platonism.  And I suspect that one of the reasons is that to think of grace and love as significant, even foundational, is to move the Platonic tradition to another dimension of reality that modern philosophy has for the most part rejected. 

1.7  Hadot’s description of love and grace also connects love and grace with beauty.  Beauty is ‘something more’ just as love and grace are something more.  I think this explains why Plotinus, following Plato, spends so much energy referring to beauty and the illuminating presence of Beauty.  Beauty is the presence of grace perceived.

2.  Plotinian

I have started thinking of myself as a ‘Plotinian.’  I think of this as similar to a Christian who refers to himself as an ‘Augustinian.’  In other words, Plotinian refers to a stream of, or tradition of, Platonism.  I feel attracted to this way of speaking because of the vastness of the Platonic tradition and how this vastness facilitates misunderstandings; ‘Plotinian’ narrows the focus.

My only hesitancy about the term ‘Plotinian’ is that it is still common, unfortunately, for people to refer to Plotinus as the ‘father of Neoplatonism.’  I’ve posted before about why I think this is misguided; it’s kind of like referring to Augustine as ‘the father of Neochristianity.’  No one does that because it would be laughable to do so.  In a similar way, I think associating Plotinus with ‘Neoplatonism’ misunderstands what Plotinus was doing and who he was.

But there’s nothing I can do about that, other than to offer my own understanding, along with others who agree and let people decide for themselves as to this usage.  In the meantime, I will try on the Plotinian hat and see if it fits.

3.  The Demise of Postmodernism?

I recently saw a few videos on YouTube that share the theme of the approaching end of postmodernism.  That’s interesting; I think this is the first time I’ve seen young people talk in this way.  I don’t know what the future will bring, but I can kind of see that postmodernism has a faddish quality to it.  And its opaque use of language guaranteed that it would exclude most people from understanding what it was about and that it would remain primarily of interest to academics.

For Platonists, modernism and postmodernism created an intellectual environment that was casually hostile to its primary concerns such as the nature of the transcendental, the manner in which Platonic forms work, asceticism and the cultivation of virtue, and a strong interest in the nature of beauty.  If it is true that postmodernism is reaching a conclusion that doesn’t guarantee that what follows it will be more congenial to Platonism.  On the other hand, its demise might create more space for Platonism to present itself as a way of life that is just as valid today as it was thousands of years ago.

4.  Aphorisms

I consider the Letters of Plato as a warning Plato left for his students so they would not pursue political careers or engagement.

Sometimes I feel profoundly tired of this world.

Reading different translations of Plotinus resembles listening to different conductors conduct the same symphony.

The instantiation of beauty fades but beauty as such does not fade.

Contemplation is the conversion of attention from the dispersions of the material world to the unity of the One which is found within.

A strange thing I have noticed about nihilists is that they seem to find meaning in the meaninglessness of nihilist teachings.

I found a fossil in the desert.

The material world is dominated by the cacophony of differentiation but there are hidden appearances of eternity here and there, now and then.