Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 7

17 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 7

Continuing with my observations on Phaedo, a reminder that I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’That,’ said Cebes, ‘seems sensible.  But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions.  For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world, are watching over them.  A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do.  A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible; and so he might thoughtlessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself.  And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice.’

“When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes’ earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, ‘Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says.’

“And Simmias said, ‘Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebs is right.  For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them?  And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers.’

“’You have a right to say that,’ he replied; ‘for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court.’

“’Precisely,’ said Simmias.

“’Well, then,’ said he, ‘I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges.  For if I did not believe,’ said, he, ‘that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death.  But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively; but I would assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters.  And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.’”

“’Well,’ said Simmias, ‘do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to ourself, or would you let us share it?  It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence.’

“’I will try’ he replied.”

(Ibid pages 219-221)

1.  I get the impression that in this part of the dialogue Cebes and Simmias are arguing just for the sake of arguing.  I think that is why Socrates says, “You have a right to say that,” which is a way people, even today, mildly dismiss someone’s comment.  It means that someone has a ‘right’ to speak as they wish, even if it doesn’t make much sense or even if the comment is beside the point.

2.  I think that Cebes and Simmias, at times, play a kind of semi-sophistical role.  This gives Plato the chance to unpack the views of Socrates further and helps to propel the discussion forward.

3.  In discussions about life after death and the nature of the soul, skeptics tend to demand very high standards of proof.  Socrates will present a number of arguments for the immortality of the soul, for rebirth, and for what we would call karma shaping one’s destiny in the realms one enters after dying.  Some of Socrates’s arguments are analogical, some are more technical; personally I find all of them well thought out.  But I am aware that many do not feel that way and don’t find them convincing.

This raises the question as to what kind of argument would be convincing for a skeptic?  My feeling is that no amount of evidence, no kind of argument, would be convincing for a skeptic. 

4.  Socrates believes that he is going to meet wise gods and people because he has practiced philosophy during his lifetime.  This belief of Socrates counters Cebes’s assertions, but will Cebes and Simmias be receptive to what Socrates has to say.  I think it is unlikely.

To be fair to Cebes and Simmias, I think their emotional turmoil in this setting may also be coloring their tendency to question Socrates on these matters.  Perhaps Cebes and Simmias still hold on to a hope that, at the last moment, Socrates will agree to escape his situation and that if they can undermine Socrates’s beliefs, the basis of his actions at this time and place, they might be able to convince him to bribe the guards and escape from Athens.

5.  It is noteworthy that Socrates responds to the demands of Cebes and Simmias that he offer a clearer defense of his position with “I will try.”  Socrates doesn’t say “I will do so.”  This may go back to the esoteric nature of the teachings Socrates is basing his view on, which were previously mentioned; I mean that he may be reluctant to offer oath-bound teachings.  Or it may be that Socrates recognizes the emotional complexity of the situation and that Cebes and Simmias are emotionally disinclined to accept what Socrates has to say.  Or it may be that the limited time left for Socrates makes it difficult for Socrates to unpack what is inherently a complex argument(s). 

But it is a good fortune for us that Socrates is going to ‘try’ to present a clearer defense, one that we can read these many centuries later, one that we can learn from and apply to our own lives.

 

 

Porphyry in the Renaissance

14 June 2023

Porphyry in the Renaissance

I recently finished reding Renaissance Vegetarianism: The Philosophical Afterlives of Porphyry’s ‘On Abstinence.’  The author is Cecilia Muratori.  The book was published in 2020 under the auspices of the Modern Humanities Research Association, which, for the purposes of this project, was associated with an organization called ‘Legenda’ which specializes in publishing scholarly research on various topics.  All of this makes this book highly academic with large numbers of footnotes after each chapter.  In addition, quotations and titles of works are given in the original Italian and then translated into English; this is true for both long and short passages.

Overall, I found the book well-organized and well written.  Complex arguments, and disagreements involving multiple participants, are presented in such a way that I was able to follow the various lines of analysis and the divergent interpretations intellectuals had of Porphyry.  I have a great fondness for Porphyry and because of this I decided to read this book.  If you lack this affection for Porphyry (for example, if you are indifferent) the book might be more of a challenge.  Here are a few comments:

1.  Marsilio Ficino (1433 – 1499) translated Porphyry’s work On Abstinence, a treatise on refraining from harming animals by either eating them or sacrificing them in religious ceremonies.  Ficino’s translation was widely read, commented on, and translated.  In this way the treatise by Porphyry had a kind of ‘second life’, having a big impact on the discussions about diet and our ethical relationship to animals.  I was unaware of how Porphyry’s On Abstinence had been, and continues to be, so influential.  I was surprised by how often the discussion that emerged in response to the publication of Porphyry’s book is still the discussion we are having today when people talk about vegetarianism, veganism, and what is the optimal diet for human health, and what is the optimal diet for human ethics.

2.  Porphyry’s view is that a vegetarian diet is necessary for a philosopher.  In other words, Porphyry has the view that Platonism requires that its practitioners be vegetarians as part of the Platonic way of life.  There are several reasons: First, it is part of the process of purification which is the basis of Platonist spiritual practice; Second, vegetarianism assists with the practice of contemplation, an essential Platonist practice; Third, from the perspective of rebirth, killing animals and causing animals harm propels one into difficult rebirths because of what today we would call karmic consequences, thereby creating an obstacle for the contemplative ascent to the One.

It is the claim of Porphyry that vegetarianism is a necessary practice for a genuinely philosophical life that is the focus of attention for much of Renaissance Vegetarianism.

3.  The book is organized by topics rather than by individuals.  It works well.  The topics are Sacrifice, Health, Otherness, and Rationality.

In ‘Sacrifice’ the issue centers on sacrificing animals for religious reasons, which was a main focus of Porphyry’s On Abstinence.  The cultural situation of the Renaissance was very different than that for Porphyry and animal sacrifice is not practiced in a Christian context.  For this reason, the discussion in this section is, for the most part, theoretical, but still very interesting.  Several authors seek to link Porphyry’s opposition to animal sacrifice to Christianity, seeing in this argument a nascent Christian understanding.

In ‘Health’ the discussion becomes more lively as different authors stake out different positions on whether or not the vegetarian diet is healthy for human beings.  It was intriguing for me to find the full range of positions that one finds today; going from vegetarianism is unhealthy, to an omnivorous middle position, to a pescatarian perspective, to a more carnist view.  This section helped me to understand the origins of many of today’s debates on diet.

In ‘Otherness’ the focus is on whether or not the eating of other human beings is acceptable.  This surprised me.  But during the Renaissance it seems that there was a lot of discussion about cannibalism (also known as ‘anthropophagy’) and groups that were known to be cannibalistic.  The ‘Otherness’ has to do with the feeling that if someone indulged in cannibalism then they became, in some sense, non-human; they became more like animals, those animals that are also cannibalistic.

The idea, for some authors, is that cannibalism cripples the soul, making the soul coarse and that in a similar way, eating meat coarsens the soul making it more difficult for a philosopher to enter into subtle practices such as contemplation.  Other authors disagreed with this logic.  In these discussions cannibals were often contrasted with vegetarian Brahmins, a group the Renaissance had learned about through travel literature. 

The concluding section is ‘Rationality’ which centers on whether or not animals can reason, have sensation, and suffer.  There are a wide variety of views ranging from animals lacking all of these capacities to animals having all of these capacities.  The connection to vegetarianism is that if animals have reason, for example, then they are, in a sense, human (though not as sophisticated, or fully developed, as humans.)  The inference, then, is that we should not eat them.

4.  For those who are interested in the place that vegetarianism holds in Platonist views and practice, I think this is an excellent book; though it may cover a greater range of opinions than you would have suspected.  For me it helped to give some historical depth to contemporary disputes about vegetarianism and veganism as opposed to omnivores and carnists.  Often today you pick up the impression that vegetarianism, particularly in its vegan phase, is a new fad; both advocates and critics often act like that is the case.  A great virtue of this book is that it demonstrates how long all of these discussions have been going on and that many of the points raised today have precedents that go back hundreds of years.

5.  In the ‘Epilogue’ Muratori writes, “What is at stake in the Renaissance afterlives of On Abstinence that this book has explored is the meaning of vegetarianism, specifically as a philosophical diet.  The role of the philosopher, too, changed, between Porphyry’s time and the Renaissance: for Porphyry, the ascetic aspect of abstinence, and its practical realization, played a more central role than for his Renaissance sympathizers . . . As Pierre Hadot has remarked, for a Platonist like Porphyry, ‘abstract theory is not considered to be true knowledge.’  With reference to On Abstinence Hadot shows that for Porphyry contemplation needs to be fulfilled in life:

‘We must, [Porphyry] tell us, undertake two exercises: in the first place, we must turn our thought away from all that is mortal and material.  Secondly, we must return toward the activity of the Intellect.  The first stage of these Neoplatonic exercises includes aspects which are highly ascetic, in the modern sense of the word: a vegetarian diet, among other things.’

“Practical changes to one’s own life, such as adherence to vegetarianism, support the philosopher’s turn towards contemplation by providing philosophical discipline for contact with the other world.”  (Muratori, page 227)

 

 

Feral

Feral

In the stream a moss-covered log

Can be seen through the morning fog

Deepening pervasive silence

I briefly see a feral dog

Through the field trots a feral dog

Past the shadow of a huge log,

A door shuts, otherwise silence --

In the distance the coastal fog.

Sometimes my mind is thick with fog

Or distracted, a feral dog,

That's when I return to silence,

Silence like a moss-covered log

A tree has now become a log

Wrapped in the gentle, swirling fog

Surrounded by fields of silence

Where soundly sleeps a feral dog

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 6

11 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 6

This post continues with my notes and comments on the dialogue Phaedo.  I am using the Harold North Fowler translation, published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’So tell Evenus that Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can.  I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians.’

“And Simmias said, ‘What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus!  I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it.’

“’Why so?’ said he, ‘Is not Evenus a philosopher?

“’I think so,’ said Simmias.’

“’Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy.  Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted.’  And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

“’Then Cebes asked him: ‘What do you mean by this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one’s life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?’

“’How is this, Cebes?  Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?’

“’Nothing definite, Socrates.’

“’I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard.  And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?’

“’Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates?  I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it.’

“’You must have courage,’ said he, ‘and perhaps you might hear something.  But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human being for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor.’

“And Cebes, smiling gently, said, ‘Gawd knows it doos’ speaking in his own dialect.

“’It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,’ said Socrates, ‘but perhaps there is some reason in it.  Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand.  But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods.  Do you now believe this?’

“’Yes,’ said Cebes, ‘I do.’

“’Well then,’ said he, ‘if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?’

“’Certainly,’ he replied.’

“’Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me.’”

(Ibid pages 213-217)

1.  The discussion is about the ethics of suicide and whether or not suicide is ever permitted.  This comes up, I think, because Socrates had an opportunity to escape his death sentence.  A group of friends, likely headed by Crito, gathered money for the purposes of bribing guards and other officials (likely members of the Eleven) so that Socrates could escape.  Socrates refuses this offer; this is the focus of the dialogue Crito.

For some it looks like Socrates is, therefore, committing suicide.  But Socrates does not see it that way.  Socrates sees it as obeying the decision of his community and, in addition, following the guidance of the gods from whom he first learned of his calling in life.

In some ways I see the attitude of Socrates as similar to someone who decides to ‘let nature take its course.’  This phrase is used by some people who are diagnosed with a terminal illness and are offered surgery as a way of overcoming the diagnosis.  However, some people respond in this situation by saying that they are ready to move on, and that they are ready ‘to let nature take its course.’  In a similar way, Socrates is ready to let the will of the Athenians have its day.  Looked at in this way Socrates is not taking his own life.

2.  The paragraph beginning “You must have courage,” is a difficult one to unravel.  But I think it makes sense as a lead in to the next point, about our lives belonging to the gods.  In this paragraph, Socrates is emphasizing that the prohibition on suicide is so strong that even those who would be better off dying (say because they are in extreme pain) must not take matters into their own hands; rather they need to wait for some benefactor – I see this as close to what people mean when they say that they will let nature take its course. 

I think that the opening remark about needing ‘courage’ to understand this teaching is made because it is natural for people to think otherwise, to try to avoid terminal discomfort, and to take matters into one’s own hands.  Socrates is suggesting that such an attitude is ‘impious’, meaning an afront to the gods and to that part of the soul that is connected to the gods. 

Socrates realizes that this will seem ‘strange’ to Cebes and Cebes says that, indeed, it does seem strange.  (I’m not sure why Plato writes here in Cebes’s local dialect.  It may be a sign of affection.  It may be an indicator that this part of the conversation should be understood as verbatim.  It may be a way of reminding the reader that Cebes is not an Athenian.  But, again, I’m not sure why this device is used at this time.);

3.  It is intriguing to me that Socrates mentions that the doctrine they are discussing is given in ‘secret’; that is to say it is an esoteric teaching.  It would be helpful to know under what circumstances Socrates received this teaching.  Was it from Diotima?, or perhaps from one of the mystery traditions such as the Orphics or the Mysteries of Eleusis?  It may be that his audience knows what mystery tradition Socrates is referring to and does not need a specific reference.

4.  The teaching that Socrates offers is that we are chattel of the gods; that is to say, we are owned by the gods.  This is a difficult teaching for us moderns.  We tend to think of ourselves as individuals who stand on our own; at least we think adults are this way. 

It is possible to think of this from the perspective of what, in some East Asian traditions, is referred to as Great Nature.  Great Nature means the energy that pours forth from the source and from which everything emerges.  It is way beyond our control.  We are completely dependent upon it.

5.  There is also a kind of fatalism in the teaching of Socrates at this point.  Modernity tends to see each individual as the ‘master of their fate.’  But Classical culture didn’t see things that way.  Instead Classical culture tended to see people as pushed and pulled by forces far beyond their ability to understand, driven this way and that by the whims of fortune and misfortune.

Classical Astrology was very much a tool to determine the fate of individuals and of larger groupings such as nations.  Classical Astrology was predictive, meaning that if negative configurations appeared in your chart, then negative things would happen to you and you should be prepared.  Classical Astrology wasn’t psychologically oriented; as I said, it was fate-based, and astrology itself was a kind of elaborate explanation of how fate works.

The Stoic philosophy partially grew because of this focus on fate.  The Stoic philosophy emphasized that almost everything is beyond our control.  But, Stoics argued, there is an ‘inner citadel’ where we are free to accept these circumstances, no matter how difficult, or free to succumb.  Much of Stoic practice was teaching how to overcome fate.

In The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, it opens with Boethius lamenting his misfortune and how the Goddess Fortuna rules our lives.  One moment we are riding high, and the next moment laid low.  The Goddess Philosophy leads Boethius to the transcendental that lies beyond the cycles of fateful material existence through carefully reasoned insights and inferences, thereby freeing Boethius from his fate; not in the sense that Boethius is released from prison, but in the sense that Boethius’s soul is beyond whatever circumstances manifests in the material domain.

And finally, there is the medieval poem ‘Carmina Burana’, which opens with a bitter lamentation, ‘O Fortuna’, listing the fickle nature of material existence that is under the control of the Goddess Fortuna.  This has been turned into a full chorus with symphony orchestra, written by Carl Orff in the 1930’s.  It is very popular with some versions receiving millions of ‘hits’ on youtube.  I think this indicates that the teaching of the fickleness of fate is still a truth that rings true for people even in the midst of modernity where we tend to think of ourselves as demi-deities and in some way masters of the universe.

To return to Phaedo, Socrates seems to be saying that we owe our lives to the gods.  Yes, we are owned by the gods, the forces of fate, but from another perspective our life is a gift of the gods.  And we should not simply throw this gift away as it would be an afront to the gods.  No matter what our circumstances, we should wait patiently until god sends a necessity to our lives, as in the case of Socrates or Boethius.

I think it is possible, and helpful, to look at this from the perspective of rebirth and karma.  By taking our own life we are seeking to alter our karma by our own actions, and by our own standards.  But the karmic consequences that would have manifested had we not taken our own life, are simply transferred to another life; they are inescapable.  And because of this we are tied to the wheel of birth and death by this action we have taken instead of freeing ourselves from our karmic heritage.  This sounds Dharmic, but I believe it also applies in a Platonic context.

6.  The conversation on this topic will continue in the next post.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 5

8 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 5

Continuing with my series of posts on Phaedo; I am using the translation by Harold North Fowler from the Loeb Classical Library:

“Here Cebes interrupted and said, ‘By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me.  Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop’s fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison.  Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again – and I know he will ask me – tell me what to say.’

“’Then tell him, Cebes,’ said he, ‘the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way.  They were something like this.  The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: “Socrates,” it said, “make music and work at it.”  And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so that dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the greatest kind of music and I was working at that.  But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey.  For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses.  So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon.  So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can.  I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians.’”

(Ibid, pages 211 – 213)

1.  One of the intriguing things about Socrates, as depicted in the Dialogues, is how Socrates seems to reside in many dimensions of experience.  In addition to waking reality, Socrates is shown as someone who interacts with the dream realm.  Socrates is also shown falling into contemplative trances.  Socrates is also at ease with the realm of myth and allegory.  This has the impact of relativizing waking realm experience, depicting the waking realm as only one realm in which human beings act and live their lives. 

2.  Evenus appears in two other dialogues: Phaedrus and Apology.  In the Apology Evenus is praised by Socrates for charging very little for his philosophical teachings, “five minae”, in contrast to the Sophists who charge a high price.  (Ibid, page 79)  Evenus is quoted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics.  Evidently Evenus was well known both as a philosopher and a poet.

‘Evenus’ is also the name of a river god.  That Evenus was a Prince who failed in recovering his abducted daughter.  Having failed he threw himself into a river in Aetolia.  Since then the river was named for him as he was transformed into the god of the river.  I’m not familiar enough with this myth to connect it with the Phaedo.  There is the obvious similarity between the death of King Aegeus and the Prince in this story; since both of them died by throwing themselves into bodies of water.  The connection might be that Evenus is brought into the discussion that immediately follows about the philosopher’s attitude towards death with a specific focus on the ethics of suicide.  I will discuss this more in my next post which will contain that discussion.

3.  It is worth contemplating that Socrates refers to philosophy as “the greatest kind of music.”  I think this fits in well with Socrates’ ease with allegory, myth, and altered states of consciousness such as the dream state and contemplative trances.  In a way, we can think of music as an altered state of mind.  The key here, I think, is that music is meaningful, but it is neither true nor false in the way that declarative discursive statements are.  Musical statements transcend true and false; they are other than true or false.  This is also true of dreams and their interpretation.  That is why Socrates is unpacking this repeated dream he has had, even during the last days of his life.  And that is why is writing a hymn to Apollo and poetic renditions of Aesop’s fables (fables are a kind of waking dream.) 

I think this helps us understand why allegories play such a prominent part in the Dialogues; because allegories are, in some ways, reminiscent of dreams and music.  As I have in other posts, my view is that reason in Plato’s dialogues has the function of unpacking the meaning of the allegories that appear in the dialogues.  In other words, reason is there as a servant to the allegorical and symbolic, rather than allegories illustrating the process of reasoning.

4.  This quote ends with Socrates humorously suggesting the Evenus ‘quickly’ follow him, meaning follow Socrates into the afterlife.  This is a good example of the equanimity that Socrates has in his situation.  Those around Socrates are distraught and pulled by strong emotions.  But Socrates himself is not perturbed, secure in his understanding of the afterlife and his own destiny.

 

 

Gods, Goddesses, Deities, and the One

7 June 2023

Gods, Goddesses, Deities, and the One

I find a lot of ambiguity in the Platonist tradition regarding the usage of the terms used to discuss trans-sensory realities such as deities, gods, and goddesses.  The ambiguity is partly due to the cultural context of the Classical world.  In the tales and myths told about deities their behavior frequently involves promiscuity, plotting revenge, cannibalism, plotting wars, backstabbing, etc.  Because of this ethically questionable behavior, in popular culture, such as plays and poems, deities were often thought of as heartless manipulators of human beings.  In the Platonic tradition these same deities become symbols of transcendental realities and are thought of as highly elevated unities who would never engage in such behavior.  The difference in the way the same deities are depicted in popular culture and Platonic writing is so great that it makes me wonder if, in fact, they are even talking about the same realities.  Here are a few tentative thoughts about this:

1.  My general feeling is that the two depictions of gods and goddesses (the one found in popular Classical culture and the one found in Platonist writing, particularly the post-Proclean writings) are irreconcilable.  My intuition is that the reason they diverge so dramatically is that they are, in fact, talking about two different realities.

2.  I see the popular conception of gods and goddesses as essentially accurate.  I see the Platonic reconfiguration of the gods and goddesses as an attempt to generate a cataphatic Platonism; that is to say something similar to the ‘Divine Names’ literature, such as The Divine Names of Dionysius the Areopagite, and other similar works. 

3.  I’m not rejecting the existence of deities as depicted in popular culture, nor am I rejecting deities as depicted in Platonic writings such as those of Proclus.  I think both are actual existing realities, but they are different realities and the use of the same names to designate these realities has, I think, caused confusion.  It’s as if candles and stars had the same name; if that were the case, we would all have to make an effort to distinguish between the two. 

4.  Part of the confusion is that Proclus, and later Platonists who follow his lead on this topic, place deities between the One and Nous, between the One and Being, Life, and Intellect.  This means that deities, with their individual names, appearances, functions, etc., are closer to the One than, for example, Being found in Nous.  But deities are more differentiated than Nous is and, as I understand it, the more differentiated something is, the farther that something is from the One.  For this reason, and others, placing deities above Being, Life, and Intellect, does not make sense to me.

5.  However, it does make sense to talk about the One using the analogy of transcendental personalities, that is to say, deities.  This is what I mean by ‘cataphatic.’ 

6.  The One has no name and no form; but because we are human beings trapped in materiality, it is necessary to find a way to talk about the One using words that are efficacious and attractive.  Platonism developed terms like the One (the most widely used term), and the Good.  At times Platonists will also use the Beautiful (the Beautiful which is above the Beautiful found in nous), now and then the term the ‘Eternal’ will be offered, and at other times Platonists will use the term God in the singular. 

This in itself is cataphatic; meaning these names, or terms, are positive statements rather than negations.  The use of idealized deities is another means of talking about that which ultimately has no name or form.  These personifications, which are more concrete than terms like the One, or the Good, or the Eternal, or even the Beautiful, offer a fuller vocabulary with which Platonic practitioners can talk among themselves about their experiences and understandings of the goal of the Platonic quest.  These names, drawn from the pantheon of Classical deities, in this context become symbols of the transcendental; they are limited expressions of that which is unlimited.  They are facets of eternity.

7.  I’m suggesting that the deities’ names are tools that limited human beings can use to assist them on their journey to the One.  These Divine Names are like the equipment a hiker takes with him; they are like backpackers' hiking shoes, rope, protein bars, etc. 

At the same time, I refrain from thinking of these deities as somehow placed between the One and Nous.  My feeling is that such a placement turns the One into a specific metaphysical region, which would mean that the One has a form, a kind of separate metaphysical region.  My understanding of the One differs; I understand the One as permeating everywhere, and at the same time an ultimate otherness found in everything, transcending time and for this reason the One is everywhen.  The One is, therefore, accessible to living beings because of its permeating presence.

8.  The apophatic approach is emphasized in Platonism, particularly in the writings of Plotinus who writes at one point ‘take away everything.’  That is because the One is fully transcendental and, as said above, an ultimate otherness.  Even the name ‘the One’ is provisional; such a name is useful in helping us on our journey, but the One is not the One. 

In a similar way, the gods and goddesses, as depicted in their purity in Platonic sources, can inspire practitioners to higher realities by personifying higher realities found on the journey to that which is ultimate.  These personifications act as signposts and, at the same time, reminders of what the journey is about.

9.  But what about the deities of popular culture?  My view here is that they are all part of the third hypostasis, part of genesis.  These deities, from angels and archangels to heroes and daemons and nature spirits and even higher deities, are impermanent.  They will pass away just like human beings do, and they will be reborn in accordance with their deeds, just like we will be.  If they enter into purification and contemplation, if they practice philosophy, they will be reborn in auspicious conditions such that in that future rebirth they may have the opportunity to return to the One.

10.  I see the apophatic and the cataphatic as like the steps we take with our two feet; first the left foot, then the right foot, as we move forward on the path that leads to the one.

11.  This has been a contentious issue within Platonism for a long time.  Yet I think it is possible to come to a kind of ‘middle’ position wherein value is found in both perspectives as well as limitations.

12.  As I mentioned at the start, these are tentative thoughts; as the reader can see, they are not very systematic or polished.  But perhaps they will be received as a modest contribution and of some value.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 4

6 June 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 4

Echecrates:  “Well, then, what was the conversation?”

Phaedo:  “I will try to tell you everything from the beginning.  On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates.  We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him.  On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos.  So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible.  And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us.  ‘For,’ he said, ‘the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die today.’  So after a little delay he came and told us to go in.  We went in then and Xanthippe – you know her – with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him.  Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: ‘Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them.’  And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, ‘Crito, let somebody take her home.’  And some of Crito’s people took her away wailing and beating her breast.  But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, ‘What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure!   How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head.  And I think,’ he said, ‘if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a tale telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after.  Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after.’”

(Plato, Phaedo, translated by Harold North Fowler, Plato I, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, pages 207-211, ISBN: 0674990404)

1.  “… the ship had arrived from Delos.”  The word ‘Delos’ means, according to scholars I  looked up, something like ‘apparent’, ‘unconcealed’, ‘clear’, ‘brought to light’.  The ship returning from Delos, (the ship is discussed above in Notes 3), is a symbol that something is going to be brought to light, that something will become clear, something will be unconcealed.  It is also a symbol for Socrates transitioning to a brighter realm of existence where the true nature of existence is no longer concealed.  This symbol is strengthened by noting that the students of Socrates used to gather at ‘daybreak’ and wait patiently to talk with Socrates.  Daybreak is when things are ‘brought to light’, daybreak is the transition from darkness to light; in this way the pattern of their meeting is replicated at a symbolic level, by the return of the ship from Delos.

2.  The prison itself is a symbol of life in the material realm.  This kind of symbol is used by Plato in a number of contexts; most famously in the allegory of the cave.  The cave symbolizes mundane existence and those who dwell in the cave are shackled, just as Socrates is shackled in prison.  The prisoners in the cave have to turn to the light and climb out of the cave to understand the real world that transcends the world of the cave.  Similarly, Socrates will be transcending the physical prison, and the prison of materiality, the prison of the body, when he is executed.

3.  ‘The Eleven’ were officials, elected for yearly terms, in charge of executions and all matters that related to executions.  (I don’t know why eleven were selected.)  For example, The Eleven were in charge of appropriating the property of someone who was executed and either selling it or redistributing it, as the case may be. 

In Phaedo The Eleven are ‘releasing Socrates from his fetters.’  The role of The Eleven is thus given a positive turn, that of releasing Socrates from the chains that had bound him for so many days.  It is interesting how in this dialogue The Eleven play a dual role; on the one hand they are carrying out the orders of the State, on the other hand they are symbolically agents of release from earthly bonds and the limitations of having a material body. 

4.  The brief scene with Xanthippe, holding their youngest child, and Socrates is touching.  It means that Xanthippe was able to speak to Socrates one to one, while the students of Socrates were waiting outside the jail.  Naturally Xanthippe is distressed and expresses her distress by noting that this will be the last time that Socrates will be able to speak with his students. 

The parting of Socrates and Xanthippe, along with their youngest child, is a prelude to Socrates parting from the earthly, and material, realm altogether. 

5.  When Socrates first speaks to his gathered students he observes how the opposites of pleasure and pain seem to be intimately connected.  This is the first comment on the nature of opposites, and the way opposites are connected, in the dialogue.  Opposites and their relationship is a major theme in Phaedo and will be discussed later.