26 November 2022
“Already
in the second century we find the typical pattern for the interaction between
Platonic philosophy and Christianity in Justin [Martyr’s] autobiographical
account of his philosophical and religious journey. Philosophy in the ancient world was not just
an academic or scholarly exercise but also a very personal and life-changing
thing. In fact it was more like an
alternative religion, a total way of life.
After all, the word ‘philosophy’ means ‘the love of wisdom,’ not ‘the
game of cleverness.’ Justin says the aim
of the philosophers had always been ‘to see God.’”
Peter Kreeft, The Platonic Tradition, Saint Augustine’s Press, South Bend, Indiana, 2018, ISBN: 9781587316500, page 55.
1. Justin
Martyr was an early Christian philosopher and theologian who lived from about
100 to 165. He had studied Platonism and
considered both Socrates and Plato to be precursors of Christianity. This is what Kreeft means by saying that
Justin Martyr used what would become a ‘typical pattern’ of early Christian
thinkers with regard to Platonism. They
saw Platonism as leading to Christianity and as, in some sense, preparing the
Roman culture for the appearance of Christianity. This is not a view that non-Christians find
compelling or attractive, naturally, but it does explain why early Christianity
was so strongly Platonic in its emerging theology.
2. Kreeft states that Philosophy in the ancient, I would say ‘classical’, world was a “life-changing thing.” This is seen in the stories about people who became Platonists and their life was completely altered by taking this step; for example they changed their diet, gave up luxuries and opulence, gave up political power, etc. Contemporary philosophy is not like that because what contemporary philosophy offers is not compelling enough to want a student of, for example, analytic philosophy, to sacrifice and renounce worldly attachments and ambitious for the very meager rewards of contemporary philosophy.
3. Kreeft quotes Justin Martyr as saying that the purpose of classical philosophy was to ‘see God’. In other words, classical philosophy was salvific; I would argue that Platonism still is when it is taken seriously.
4. Kreeft states that classical philosophy, and Platonism in particular, was like an ‘alternative religion’. My own view is that Platonism in the classical period was understood by the classical world to be primarily religious in nature; by ‘primarily religious in nature’ I mean that the purpose of Platonism was (and remains) union with the transcendental, the eternal. When Kreeft says that Platonism is like an ‘alternative religion’ I think this remark is spoken not about Platonism’s status in the classical world, but, rather, Platonism’s status in modernity. Platonism is an ‘alternative religion’ in the same way that Dharmic religions are ‘alternatives’ for westerners. By ‘in the same way’ I mean that dwellers in Western modernity are just as distant from Platonism as they are from Dharmic traditions. This means that the religious nature of Platonism comes as a surprise to many; this was true of myself as my studies in philosophy at University did not prepare me for comprehending Platonism as one of the great spiritual traditions of all time, a tradition that is still compelling in its beauty, scope, and transcendental understanding.
5. Today many people think of themselves as ‘spiritual but not religious’. Though the phrase is vague, my intuition is that a tradition like Platonism fits well into this kind of thinking because Platonism is not an institutionalized form of spirituality. Yet at the same time, it has an attractive tradition of practice and study; a spiritual practice that people can access to the degree that they are able, and practice to the degree that their situation allows.
While it seems true that for contemporary philosophy in it’s analytic form, it’s hard to find examples for which it’s a “life changing thing” (though maybe John Rawls or Peter Singer ?), it seems there are some pretty clear examples of that in continental philosophy, e.g. Simone Weil. And it also seems there are inclinations to try to return to something like that for some modern philosophers, e.g. the value ethicists (strongly influenced by Plato as they are). But admittedly none of them seem to have developed anything as specific as contemplative practices at this point.
ReplyDeleteHi Karl -- The Simone Weil example is a good exception to my observation. Pierre Hadot is another example, but he originally wanted to be a Catholic Priest before turning to Philosophy and it doesn't seem that he ever abandoned his basic transcendental views that he had as a Priest. He recognized the basically religious nature of Classical Philosophy, both in terms of content and practice, because he already had that point of view. I have, at times, observed that people like Hadot, Kreeft, and Gerson often have a source of spiritual nourishment from outside of academia that allows them to enter into classical philosophy with a secure spiritual footing. It seems that they were never really tempted by analytic philosophy or materialism because of that background. // Hadot in particular links contemplative practices, what he calls 'Spiritual Exercises', to Classical Philosophy. Hadot considers this the overlooked dimension of Classical Philosophy and that without understanding this dimension our understanding of that period of philosophy will remain incomplete. // Thanks for your comments.
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